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Author(s): Stanford J. Shaw

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THE ORIGINS OF OTTOMAN MILITARY REFORM:
THE NIZAM-I CEDID ARMY OF SULTAN SELIM III

STANFORD J. SHAW

SELIM III came to the Ottoman throne on April 6, 1789, at a time of considerable peril for his empire. The lands north of the Danube with the exception of the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia had been lost to Austria in the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699) almost a century before. The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774) had brought the Russians to the Black Sea and put them into a position where they could take the Crimea and intervene in the Principalities. Empress Catherine II's subsequent efforts to break up the Ottoman Empire and establish a new Greek state on its ruins had led to a new war between it and Russia and Austria (1787-92). By the time of Selim's accession, the Russians had captured the great Dniester forts of Akkerman, Bender, and Khotzim, overrun Bessarabia, and invaded Moldavia. Within a few months the allies routed his army at Fokshani and again on the Rimmik and took Belgrade, and Serbia and Bosnia were in danger of occupation by the Austrians. It seemed that nothing remained to save the rest of the empire in Europe, including Istanbul itself.

Selim was able to avert this threat, however, by taking advantage of European problems and internal Austrian

difficulties to make the separate peace of Sistova (1791) with her, and then by concentrating his efforts against the Russians and compelling them to give up their conquests by the Treaty of Jassy (1792). So, for the moment, the Danube and Save again marked the Ottoman boundary in the west, and the Dnieper in the east. While the lands between the Dniester and Bug had been lost, the Principalities, Serbia, and Bosnia remained under the sultan's rule. But Selim was not deluded by his diplomatic triumph.

The Ottoman army had once again shown that long periods of neglect and decay had left it far inferior to its European rivals. During the war, Selim had made efforts to get the Janissaries to accept new weapons and tactics from western Europe. But they had staunchly resisted, since their very positions in Ottoman society, as well as that of their supporters among the ruling classes in Istanbul, depended on a monopoly of the old ways which the reforms were designed to replace. While these troops were no longer able to defeat foreign enemies, they still had enough power at home to protect their interests. So, although Selim was able to introduce new organizations, tactics, and weapons on

a limited scale in the artillery corps, he had to abandon his efforts with the Janissaries, who still formed the bulk of the standing army.¹ As a result of this experience, in the years following the war Selim entirely abandoned his efforts to reform the old corps and, instead, concentrated on establishing an entirely new army which was intended to supplant the Janissaries eventually.

The term "Nizam-i Cedid" (new order) is generally applied to the entire spectrum of reforms introduced during Selim III's reign (1789–1807). The term is sometimes used synonymously with the reign itself. Yet, in fact, it was applied by the sultan and his contemporaries only to one specific part of his reforms, the new army itself, and only because of its spectacular nature was the name later applied to Selim's other reforms as well. The term is used here in the limited, contemporary sense.

The Nizam-i Cedid army was largely a failure in its own time. Yet it represented an important step forward in the evolution of Ottoman reform. Until it was created, even the most modern and liberal Ottomans conceived of reform as no more than an effort to restore the purity of old institutions and practices and to make them operate in the manner which had brought greatness to the empire in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Even the most perceptive of eighteenth-century Ottoman "reformers" did not understand how much Europe

had changed since the time of Suleiman the Magnificent, so that no matter how great the Ottoman ways had been two centuries before, even at their best they could be no match for the modern institutions of state and war which had been evolved in the West. But with the Nizam-i Cedid came the first real Ottoman awakening to the realities of the modern world and a new concept of reform—the creation of new institutions and practices directly modeled on those developed in the West, and their substitution for those inherited from the past. This idea of reform was left as a legacy to the later *Tanzimat* movement (1839–76) which was to bring the Ottoman Empire fully into the modern world for the first time.

The nucleus of the new army actually came into being on a small scale some time before the sultan knew about it or made a definite decision to organize such a force independent of the older corps. In late 1791 the Grand Vezir Koca Yusuf Paşa, still in the field against the Russians, assembled in his camp a small number of renegades captured in the course of the campaign, including at least one Turk who had been captured by the Russians years before and had served for some time in the Russian army. These renegades, in co-operation with a few members of the grand vezir's personal guard, began to train with captured Russian weapons, using European-style exercises and maneuvers, and they performed periodically in front of their master's tent as a kind of entertainment in order to divert the army's leaders from their increasingly difficult military problems. At this stage, this new group was no more than a toy, a personal caprice of the grand vezir. No effort was made to force the other corps to accept or even observe the infidel practices of

¹ On these reforms see S. J. Shaw, "The established Ottoman army corps under Selim III," *Der Islam*, XL (1965), 142–84; Enver Ziya Karal, *Selim III' ün Hat-ti Hümayunları—Nizam-i Cedid, 1789–1807* (Ankara, 1946); J. W. Zinkeisen, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa* (7 vols.; Gotha, 1840–63, 1962), VII, 458–71; N. Iorga, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches* (5 vols.; Gotha, 1908–1913, 1962), V, 177–81; J. H. Kramers, "Selim III," *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (1st ed., 1934), IV, 219–22.

war, since such a revolutionary step had not yet been authorized by the sultan, and the older corps in the past had demonstrated violent reactions to any attempts to introduce new ways which might undermine the position they had secured in Ottoman society by virtue of their monopoly of the military techniques and weapons of the past. Such a reaction could not be risked so long as the enemy was ready to take advantage of any internal disorder in the Ottoman army.²

When the Treaty of Jassy finally brought peace in 1792, the imperial army returned to Istanbul, and with it came Yusuf Paşa and his new corps. But he left it outside the city so he could discover the sultan's views on the subject before exposing himself to the wrath of the supporters of the old corps. By this time, the weakness shown by the latter had convinced the sultan that they could not be reformed and that only an entirely new army, created especially to use the new weapons and tactics unhindered by the ways of the past, could successfully defend the empire against its enemies. So, when he learned of the presence of the new corps, he went to see it perform and was favorably impressed. In fact, he was so struck with the superiority of the massed firepower which it was able to assemble that he decided to create a new army and to use this group as its nucleus.³

Selim's decision was promptly fol-

lowed by acts to develop this nucleus. In late March 1792, the British ambassador to Istanbul provided a few new muskets and bayonets on an informal basis, while inquiring of his government as to the reply he should give to the sultan's requests for large-scale assistance of that kind.⁴ In the meantime, the grand vezir enrolled approximately one hundred Turks from the streets of Istanbul to man the new corps, and the German and Russian renegades brought back from the war became its officers and drill masters.⁵ In April the district of Levend Çiftlik (an isolated spot ten miles north of the capital on the plateau overlooking Beşiktaş on the Bosphorus, used by the rapid-fire artillery force trained on a small scale by Baron de Tott two decades before) was chosen as the drill grounds of the new corps. The new unit thus was placed far enough away from the people of Istanbul and from the older corps so that it would excite neither their disapproval nor their anxiety until it was ready to meet any opposition with force.⁶ In addition, much to the chagrin of the British ambassador, four French infantry officers, Lieutenant General Menant, and Lieu-

⁴ F.O., 78/20 (Mar. 1, 1792); F.O., 78/13, No. 8 (Apr. 10, 1792); A.E., 183, fol. 284 (Mar. 26, 1793); Ahmed Vâsîf, "Mahâsin al-Âsâr ve Haqâyiğ al-Ahbâr," IV (MS, TY 5979, Istanbul University Library, Istanbul), fols. 129a-30a.

⁵ Eton, p. 99; F.O., 78/14, No. 14 (May 25, 1793); Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Archives of the ministry of foreign affairs, Turkei II correspondence (hereafter cited as "St.A."), C, No. 33 (Oct. 10, 1792).

⁶ Levend Çiftlik originally was given by Sultan 'Abd ul-Ĥamid I to Gâzi Ĥasan Paşa as an estate in reward for his long and meritorious service. Gâzi Ĥasan, since he was grand admiral of the Ottoman fleet, used sailors (*levends*) from the fleet to farm and maintain this estate, and so it came to be called "Levend Çiftlik." Construction of the Nizam-i Cedid barracks began there in August 1792 (St.A., C, No. 33 [Oct. 10, 1792]; F.O., 78/14, No. 14 [May 25, 1793]).

² Top Kapı Saray archives (hereafter cited as "T.K.S."), Yeni Gelenler 1376, fols. 40a-50a; W. Eton, *A survey of the Turkish empire* (2d ed.; London, 1799), pp. 98-99; Public Record Office, London, Foreign Office (hereafter cited as "F.O."), 78/20, No. 7 (Mar. 1, 1792).

³ F.O., 78/13, No. 8 (Apr. 10, 1792); F.O., 78/15, No. 31 (Dec. 25, 1794); Archives du Ministère des affaires étrangères, Paris, Correspondance politique: Turquie (hereafter cited as "A.E."), 184, fol. 284 (Mar. 26, 1793).

tenants Luzin, Ranchoup, and Pierce Laroque-Monteil, were appointed to advise on the unit's operations and assist in the drills.⁷

This activity had been undertaken secretly by the sultan and the grand vezir, without publicizing it in any way or obtaining formal approval from the imperial council. Only in late April and early May was this undertaken, in a series of meetings held on the subject in the rooms of the imperial council.⁸ Since the sultan's views were made clear from the start, there was little open opposition to the new army. The proponents of the new force were led by the *Şeyh ul-Islām*, Mehmed 'Arif Efendī, the influential Molla Tatarcik 'Abdullāh Efendī, and the sultan's former personal slave and close friend and adviser, Muşafa Reşid Efendī, who later became the director of the new corps and its chief proponent in the councils of state. Differences between these men and the other members of the council arose mainly on the question of how the new army would be organized and financed. Would it be part of the old corps or would it be independent? Would the old imperial treasury (*Hazīne-i 'Āmire*) have to pay for it, or could new sources of revenue be found?

Debate on these matters lasted for some days. Yusuf Paşa argued that an entirely new corps completely outside the established military hierarchy would

needlessly excite the Janissaries and the vested interests associated with them and incite them to revolt before the new army was strong enough to defend itself. He felt that, if the new corps were in some way made part of the old system, at least in form, the opposition would be deluded or appeased until it was too late. Tatarcik 'Abdullāh Efendī replied by pointing out the burden that such an army would place on the imperial treasury and the older corps if it were attached to them. New barracks, weapons, uniforms, and schools would be expensive. New men and officers would have to be paid. The necessary employment of foreign technicians and advisers would be costly. The treasury and its established revenues were already being tapped to the limit. Each item of revenue was already assigned to a specific purpose. The older corps would vigorously protest if any of their revenues were diverted for the benefit of the new corps. The only solution was to create new taxes, to find new sources of revenue previously untapped, or to turn over neglected older sources to an energetic new treasury organization much better able to administer them than was the established treasury. Yusuf Paşa wanted the new army corps and its financial organization entirely separated from the old in the fear that the latter would hinder the new efforts at every turn. These were the two principal arguments. Muşafa Reşid led those who supported 'Abdullāh Efendī's position and wanted an entirely independent new corps, while Treasurer Şerif Paşa led those who supported the grand vezir, stating that the old treasury should expand its revenues to meet the new expenses, and that the creation of another treasury and military corps would cause even further inefficiency and duplication of effort, an argu-

⁷ Baş Vekâlet Arşivi (Archives of the Prime Minister's Office, Istanbul) (hereafter cited as "B.V.A."), Hatt-ı Humayun (hereafter cited as "H.H."), 12193; A.E., 184, fols. 285-88 (Mar. 26, 1793).

⁸ Karal, p. 49. The debates at these meetings are summarized in Vâsif, IV, fols. 140a-50a; Halil Nürî, "Nürî Tâ'rihi" (Aşir Efendi collection, Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul, MS 239), fols. 151b-54b. See also St.A., CII, No. 6 (Mar. 11, 1793).

ment not entirely without merit.⁹ Finally, on May 14, 1792, a compromise was reached. A new army was to be created under the name "Nizam-i Cedid." To provide for its expenses a new treasury would be organized to administer whatever revenues were assigned to it. But to appease the vested interests, both the new army and its treasury were clothed in the garb of established institutions in the Ottoman system.

Because the creation of an entirely new force required prior provision of funds for its operation, legislation for the funds came first. On March 1, 1793, an independent treasury was established for it with the name "İrad-i Cedid" (new revenue).¹⁰ Direction of the entire Nizam-i Cedid organization was given to Mustafa Reşid Paşa as supervisor, with the formal titles "İrad-i Cedid Defterdārī" (treasurer of the new revenue) for his financial duties as head of the new treasury and "Ta'limlī 'Askerī Nāzirī" (supervisor of the trained soldiers) for his military duties, with an annual salary of 50,000 piasters plus rations. To provide him with rank and prestige in the regular Ottoman hierarchy, the now honorific post of *Şiqq-i Sānī Defterdārī* (second treasurer of the imperial treas-

ury)¹¹ was set aside for him and his successors as director of the Nizam-i Cedid, thus making him an equal with the other officers of state in the imperial council.

During the next few months, Mustafa Reşid and other high officials of the imperial treasury examined all of its revenues to see which could best be given up to the new treasury. Specifically, they were looking for potentially profitable sources of taxation which had not been fully exploited in the past, so that their loss would not harm the old treasury too much, while they would at the same time provide the new treasury with a good tax base. Finally they decided to give the new revenue as its main source of income all the tax farms¹² of the treasury, together with those belonging to the holy cities foundations, which produced annual profits of more than ten purses each to the tax farmers to whom they were assigned. To lighten

¹¹ The *Şiqq-i Sānī Defterdārlik* was created after the conquest of the Arab provinces in the early sixteenth century to deal with their financial affairs and those of Anatolia. In the middle of the same century, these two areas were divided, with the second *Defterdar* thereafter dealing primarily with the financial problems of Anatolia. By the time of Selim III, however, this post no longer entailed any formal duties and was no more than an honorific position given to provide its holders with rank and revenues. See B. Lewis, "Daftardār," *Encyclopaedia of Islam: new edition*, II, 83; Mehmed Zekî, "Teşkilât-i 'Atıqada Defterdār," *Türk Tarih Encumeni Mecmu'ası*, VIII (1926), No. 14/91, pp. 96-102, No. 16/93, pp. 234-44; Mehmed Zekî Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü* (3 vols.; Istanbul, 1946-55), I, 411-18.

¹² Imperial possessions were alienated from the possession of the imperial treasury as *Muqâta'as*, and these *Muqâta'as* were assigned to agents as tax farms (*İltizâms*) or to salaried employees (*Emîns*) as agencies (*Emânetis*) for collection. See Uzunçarşılı, pp. 383-84; Pakalın, II, 578-79; Süleymân Şüdi, *Defter-i Muqtesid* (3 vols.; Istanbul, 1890), II, 47; H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic society and the West* (1 vol., 2 parts; London, 1950-57), Part II, p. 21 n.

⁹ Nürî, fols. 154b-55a.

¹⁰ The regulations establishing and organizing the İrad-i Cedid are given in full in "Qavānīn-i Sultān Selim," MS Y-534, in the library of the Turkish Historical Society (*Türk Tarih Kurumu*) in Ankara, fols. 42a-45b; Vāsif, IV, 72b-80b; Ahmed Cevād, "Tārīh-i 'Asker-i 'Osmanī" (MS, TY 3208, in Istanbul University Library, Istanbul), II, 14-19. They are summarized and discussed in İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilâtı* (Ankara, 1948), pp. 368-69; Mahmud Rayf, *Tableau des nouveaux réglemens de l'empire Ottoman* (Istanbul, 1213/1798), pp. 9-14; Nürî, fols. 155a-64a; Karal, pp. 49-59, 81-93; Ahmed Cevdet, *Tārīh-i Cevdet* (12 vols.; Istanbul, 1885-1894), VI, 47-52; F.O., 78/14, No. 6 (Mar. 11, 1793); St.A., CII, No. 6 (Mar. 11, 1793).

the effect of the loss of these revenues on the imperial treasury and its tax farmers, the sultan also decreed that this transfer should take place only when the holdings in question were vacated by their current farmers, that after the treasury of the new revenue took them over it should pay the imperial treasury the regular purchase prices previously paid it for these farms by the private tax farmers, equal to five years' profits of the tax farmers, and that in addition it should pay the regular annual taxes which the tax farmers previously had delivered to the imperial treasury for these farms. In essence, thus, the treasury of the new revenue itself became the tax farmer of these holdings for the imperial treasury, administering them and collecting their taxes by subfarming them to its own tax farmers.

In addition, all fiefs previously set aside for members of the mortar corps and the navy and all military fiefs worth more than 15,000 piasters per year whose holders were found to be absent from their lands or failing in their duties in any way were to be seized for the new treasury and administered by it. Finally, various old and newly created taxes were assigned to it for direct collection by its agents in order to provide the new treasury with a steady annual revenue of about one million piasters.

To compensate further the imperial treasury for the loss of these revenues, a number of its obligations for expenditure associated with the established military corps were also transferred to the treasury of the new revenue. From the start of the financial year 1793 it was required to pay not only the salaries and expenses of the Nizam-i Cedid army, its basic *raison d'être*, but also the cost of the new equipment, barracks, and salaries of the mortar, mining, and artillery

corps, the salaries and expenses of the men and officers of the fleet and dockyard, and all expenses above those normally provided by the imperial treasury for the established infantry corps in the course of expeditions against the enemy. Thus, the imperial treasury was required to pay only those expenditures incumbent on it in peace time before the Nizam-i Cedid and other new reforms were inaugurated. All surpluses left in the new treasury at the end of each year had to be sent to a separate place in the mint and there saved for special wartime expenditures, something like a "war chest" to be used only in emergencies, thus to spare the new and old treasuries alike from the heavy burden of war.

The treasury of the new revenue was given a separate building for its operations in the Orta Kapısı quarter of the Top Kapı Saray Palace. To register its daily revenues and expenditures, a special scribe was assigned to it by the *Rûznâme* department of the imperial treasury, along with a weigher to measure payments made to it in cash and kind. While the treasurer of the new revenue was made the director of the new treasury, the treasurer of the imperial treasury was required to supervise his activities and examine all his accounts at least once a month. Thus, the financial foundations of the "new order" were laid.

Mustafa Reşid Efendi immediately set about to organize his treasury and to arrange the collection of its revenues. By the end of August 1793 he had seized fifty-one fiefs in Karaman province alone.¹³ By the end of the same year he

¹³ B.V.A., Cevdet Maliye 3106, and Cevdet Dahiliye 8750; T.K.S., E 2053, Complete lists of fiefs seized for the İrād-i Cedid treasury between 1793 and 1800 are found in the following B.V.A. registers: Tapu 941; Kepeci 615; Cevdet Maliye

had over 400 fiefs bringing in revenues of 7,000 piasters per month, and he was collecting about 435,000 piasters monthly from all the revenues assigned to his treasury, out of which only 124,000 piasters were paid to the imperial treasury and to the collecting agents.¹⁴

Steps were taken also to expand the military corps. Three additional officers came from France along with six sergeants sent by the French ministry of war to train the new corps, and new-style rifles were imported in increasing quantities from France, Britain, and Sweden.¹⁵ At first the size of the corps was deliberately kept small, with no more than two hundred men and officers enrolled and training at the end of May 1793. In 1793 and 1794 most of the new revenues were used to provide barracks and drill grounds at Levend Çiftlik, to bring officers and equipment from western Europe, to make new uniforms for the men, and to provide bonuses and salaries for those who were enrolled. Between April 1793 and March 1795, Mustafa Reşid managed to collect a total of 1,356,541 piasters for the corps, of which three-quarters was spent at the time, with the balance put aside for the war chest.¹⁶

While the nucleus of the corps trained at Levend Çiftlik and preparations were made for subsequent expansion, efforts were also made to popularize the new ways among the people and the men of the older corps, or at least to break the news gradually, so that when the establishment of the new corps was publicly proclaimed they would not be taken by

surprise and goaded into sudden, violent action. The sultan and his ministers went regularly to Levend Çiftlik to inspect the drills and, by their presence, to publicize the existence of the corps and lend official sanction to its activities.¹⁷

Not until the late summer of 1794 was the sultan satisfied that public opinion was prepared and that the corps itself was sufficiently developed for it to resist any opposition which its open proclamation might create. So the official regulations establishing its military organization were finally proclaimed on September 18, almost two years after it had actually begun its work.¹⁸

The proclamation described the organization of a regiment of the new corps. In order to fit the Nizam-i Cedid army into the established Ottoman military hierarchy and attract as little attention as possible, it was officially attached to the old, established *Bostāniyān-i Hāşşa* corps¹⁹ as its infantry-rifle

¹⁷ A.E., 184, fol. 284 (Mar. 26, 1793); A.E., 189, fol. 159 (5 Frimaire an III), fols. 71-73 (19 Vendémiaire an III); St.A., CIII, No. 18 (June 28, 1793); T.K.S., E 7016, E 3786, E 8421.

¹⁸ The full text of the regulations establishing and organizing the Nizam-i Cedid corps, dated 21 Şafar 1208/September 17, 1794, are found in "Qavānīn-i Sultān Selim," fols. 52b-56b; Anon. and untitled MS in Istanbul University Library, TY3208, fols. 33b-37a; Cevdā, II, 23-31. It is summarized in Cevdet, VI, 58-61, 304-5; Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi* (Ankara, 1947), V, 67-68.

¹⁹ The *Bostāniyān* (gardeners), also called *Bostāncī*, corps, led by the *Bostāncī Bāşī* (chief gardener) were watchmen and guards for the pavilions in the Top Kapı Saray Palace grounds and at many gates and walls of the palace. They also provided personal guardians for the sultan (Gibb and Bowen, Part II, p. 84; Pakalın, I, 239-40; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, "Bostāndjī," *Encyclopaedia of Islam: new edition*, I, 1277-78, and "Bostāndjī-Başı," 1278-79). The *Bostāni Tüfenkçisi* corps, which was the name given to the Nizam-i Cedid by Selim, did not exist before and was created especially for this purpose.

4567; Cevdet Maliye 3106; Cevdet Maliye 7082; Muhasebe 6094.

¹⁴ B.V.A., Ali Emiri—III Selim 17665.

¹⁵ H.H., 12193.

¹⁶ B.V.A., Ali Emiri—III Selim 16264 and 16551; T.K.S., E343; Chénié, "Apperçu de la situation militaire des Turcs," A.E., 191, p. 355.

branch, the *Bostānī Tüfenkcīsī* (*Bostānī* riflemen) corps. To assist Mustafa Reşid in its military operations, Veli Āġā²⁰ was appointed as its first colonel. While the regulations declared the hope and intention that the full corps would eventually have 12,000 men and officers, for the moment a single regiment of 1,602 officers and men was organized at Levend Çiftlik as a model for later groups to be established as money and men became available. Actual military direction of the regiment was given to a *Bīnbāşī* (head of one thousand) and two majors, the *Āġā-yı Yemīn* (major of the right) and *Āġā-yı Yesār* (major of the left). Each of the majors was put in charge of a division of 800 men and officers. The two divisions were further divided into twelve companies, each composed of 90 men and 10 officers and led by a company commander later called "Yüzbāşī" (chief of one hundred). Each company was given 5 cannon, 8 cannon men, 1 cannon master, 5 cannon-wagon men, 6 orderlies, and various other minor officers.²¹ These companies were divided into platoons of 9 men each, commanded by an *Önbāşī* (chief of ten).

The regulations also treated of the affairs of officers and men. Common soldiers in the corps were provided with uniforms when they enlisted and once every year thereafter, with the full cost paid by the treasury of the new revenue. Officers were expected to meet the cost of their uniforms and other personal expenses from their salaries. A regular hierarchy was established within the corps, with vacancies filled by everyone moving up one notch. But provision was made for the advancement of un-

usually qualified men out of order in special cases, especially if they showed ability in battle. Among persons of equal ability, however, preference had to be given to age and seniority. The men were required to remain in their barracks night and day, to forego all outside employment and residence, and to drill constantly, except that arrangements were made for one out of every five men to return to his family for periods up to six months during the winter. Heavy punishments were established for those who returned late from such leave and for all members of such groups of five of whom more than one man was absent at a given time. In the summer months all the men had to be at their posts except those excused because of illness. Men had to remain in the corps at least three years so that the state would benefit from the training given them. After that time they could leave and return to their former occupations if they wished, but only if they agreed to pay back all the salaries they had received since entering the corps. Those who retired because of illness or old age were given pensions equal to one-half their active salaries at the time of retirement. If they retired as the result of battle wounds incurred in the course of active duty, they were given pensions equal to their full salaries, and even more in certain cases.

At the time the regulation was issued, only 468 men and 20 officers were in training at Levend Çiftlik, and they were living in flimsy wooden shacks and tents because the regular barracks had not yet been completed.²² But during the next year recruits came rapidly, mainly from among unemployed youths found roaming the streets of Istanbul

²⁰ See Ismail Hami Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi* (4 vols.; Istanbul, 1947-55), IV, 72.

²¹ See Appendix Table, p. 306.

²² H.H., 9759.

and from the private armies of the leading notables of Anatolia,²³ and the regiment soon reached its full strength. In some cases, the notables contributed men to the new army for specific periods of two or three years, so they would get training and weapons from the central government and could then return home to bolster the provincial forces.²⁴ Most of the permanent buildings were completed by the end of 1796, including three barracks, a rifle factory, two mosques, and a school.²⁵ Members of the corps wore blue berets, red breeches, and red jackets. The officers wore swords and had buttons sewn above the pockets of their jackets.²⁶ Training went ahead rapidly under the direction of Ranchoup, Luzin, and Menant, and the drills were frequently inspected by the sultan and his chief officials.

The revenues of the treasury of the new revenue expanded rapidly as more and more vacated tax farms and fiefs were turned over to it, reaching 3,033,894 piasters in the financial year 1795²⁷ and 6,500,000 piasters in 1798.²⁸ Of this sum, about 1,000,000 piasters were paid annually to the imperial treasury as compensation for its lost revenues and a similar sum went to pay the salaries and expenses of the men and officers training at Levend Çiftlik, while the balance went to the war chest to pay for the expenses of the campaigns currently in progress against "mountain rebels" in both Europe and Anatolia.²⁹

With this very favorable financial situation and under the stimulus of the

French invasion of Egypt, the sultan finally felt that the new corps could be safely expanded, and so a new regiment was created on the model of that at Levend Çiftlik on November 23, 1799. There were differences between the regiments, however. The older Levend Çiftlik force was composed entirely of infantry, whereas the new regiment had cavalry as well. Men for the new regiment were provided by the provincial governors, who were ordered to recruit men locally and train them in the Nizam-i Cedid way under the direction of officers sent from Levend Çiftlik. The salaries of trainees and officers alike were provided by the treasury of the new revenue. While these men were to continue to serve with the governors, almost as provincial militias, in order to maintain local order, a central barracks was established for them at Üsküdar (Scutari), across the Bosphorus from Istanbul, to control their training and direct their operations. Barracks and training grounds for the new regiment were also set aside at Kadiköy, including the famous Selimiye barracks, which survived into recent times.³⁰ The internal organization of the new regiment was exactly the same as that of Levend Çiftlik, with the exception that its total number was without limit. To co-ordinate the activities of the two Nizam-i Cedid regiments, a new post, *Öcâq Kethodâsî* (lieutenant of the corps), was created, and it was usually given to the ablest of the majors of the two regiments. Over-all direction of both remained in the hands of the holder of the combined posts of the treasurer of the new revenue and the supervisor of the trained soldiers. Finally, the new regiment was

²³ St.A., CIII, No. 14 (May 10, 1793), No. 20 (July 25, 1793).

²⁴ H.H., 12087.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 7137.

²⁶ Cevâd, II, 31.

²⁷ B.V.A., Cevdet Maliye 19808.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Kepeci 2381.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Mehmed Râif, *Mir'at-i İstânbûl* (Istanbul, 1898), I, 80-84; T.K.S., E 113, E 3752; H.H., 3732.

given the color light blue for its jackets and breeches to distinguish its men and officers from those of Levend Çiftlik.³¹

In May 1797 the Nizam-i Cedid army, with a single regiment, had 2,536 men and 27 officers officially enrolled and paid,³² but with the addition of the new regiment and increasing revenues this number rose rapidly. In September 1799 there were 4,317 men and 30 officers in the two regiments; in April 1800, 6,029 men and 27 officers; and in July 1801, 9,263 men and 27 officers.³³ In the summer of 1800 the wealthy feudal districts (*sancāq*) of Bölü, Hudāvendigār (Bursa), and Karamān were seized for the treasury of the new revenue, and those of the remainder of Anatolia underwent a similar transformation one year later. In the end, not all the provincial governors recruited and trained Nizam-i Cedid men, but nine of them did, including 'Abdurrahmān Paşa, governor of Karamān, who, in reward for his services, was appointed colonel of the Üsküdar regiment in 1801.³⁴

Starting in 1802 the colonel developed a system of military conscription throughout Anatolia to provide regular contingents of men for the Nizam-i Cedid. Each provincial and district official and notable was required to send a certain number of men to Üsküdar for training in the new army for periods of from six months to a year. About half of these contingents were trained as infantry for service in the regular Levend Çiftlik and Üsküdar regiments. The other half were trained as cavalry so they could return to form the local militias of the provincial governors and district notables.

³¹ B.V.A., Cevdet Maliye 4327 and Cevdet Askeri 34197; "Qavānin-i Sultān Selim," fol. 57b.

³² H.H. 7137 and 9559.

³³ *Ibid.*, 6768.

³⁴ T.K.S., E 1113.

In return for this service the recruits and their families were exempted from all local taxes and were paid the regular Nizam-i Cedid salaries even while they were still in training.

In addition to this, after 1804 an effort was made to transform gradually the old *Tīmār* feudal system into a new financial base for the Nizam-i Cedid militia. Fiefs were seized on the flimsiest of pretexts and administered by the treasury of the new revenue as tax farms to provide revenue to support the recruitment and training of the same number of men for the Nizam-i Cedid militia as were formerly supported on a feudal basis. The fiction of feudal organization was preserved only in name, while in fact the fiefs were administered by salaried officers sent to the provinces by the Levend Çiftlik and Üsküdar corps. The treasury of the new revenue built regular barracks in Anatolia for the new provincial militia at Ankara, Bölü, Kastamonu, Kutahya, Kaysari, Niğde, Kirşehir, Çorum, Menteşe, and Izmir, while elsewhere the soldiers were housed in buildings previously used by the local security forces. Between 1802 and 1806 about 5,000 of these provincial Nizam-i Cedid men came to Üsküdar for six-month training periods each year. As the result of these efforts a total of 22,685 men and 1,590 officers were enrolled in the Nizam-i Cedid army by the end of 1806. Approximately one-half of these men were stationed in Anatolia and the balance in Istanbul and the Balkans.³⁵ The relative success of the Anatolian venture caused the sultan to create a similar corps in Europe in 1805. Its central base was at Edirne (Adrianople), but the European portions of the empire by this

³⁵ B.V.A., Cevdet Maliye 28741; T.K.S., E 3404; H.H., 10731, 9125; St.A., CIV, No. 24 (Aug. 24, 1793), CVI, No. 16 (May 16, 1794).

time were entirely too far removed from the effective control of the central government for this sort of levy to be effective, and, as before, the Ottoman army in Europe under Selim continued to depend for men primarily on the contributions of the independent local notables.

The rapid increase in the number of men enrolled in the Nizam-i Cedid created new problems, in particular the same sort of disorderly, undisciplined behavior that had brought the older corps into disrepute. In the early days of the Nizam-i Cedid, the nucleus of its force consisted of renegades who had fallen into Ottoman hands during the Austrian and Russian campaigns. The bulk of the enlisted men enrolled in the first few years were Turks, coming mainly from the unemployed in Istanbul, who had joined as the only alternative to starvation. Both of these groups consisted of persons who were accustomed to the discipline, restraint, and sanitary methods required by the residence in close proximity of large numbers of persons in cities and camps. But most of the new men enrolled after 1796 came from the villages and tribal areas of Anatolia. By 1800, 90 per cent of the enlisted men in the army were Turkish peasants and tribesmen from Anatolia.³⁶ Many of these joined more for the weapons and plunder they could gain than for anything else. Resistant to discipline and unaccustomed to the kind of life required by the corps, they became increasingly turbulent and disorderly, often coming down from Levend Çiftlik to ravage the villages along the Bosphorus, with Tarabya, Yeni Köy, and Beşkitaş suffering most.³⁷ The officers of the corps found it increasingly difficult

to train such men in European tactics and organization. Many of the men fled from the camps shortly after they received their uniforms and weapons, complaining that the work was too hard, the discipline too severe, and the pay too low.³⁸ Forming themselves into powerful new robber bands, they began to plague notables and governors alike in western Anatolia and the Balkans, with the superior weapons and training provided by the sultan giving them a great advantage over their opponents.³⁹

To combat these difficulties, various changes were made in the corps. Additional officers were appointed. Punishments for infractions of the rules were made more severe. Efforts were made to supervise the men when they were not actually in the field or training at the practice grounds. The rapid increase in the number of men in the corps had far outstripped the drill facilities at Levend Çiftlik and Üsküdar, so that it was impossible for all the men to practice and drill daily, as was originally envisaged in their regulations. Those unable to practice were left with nothing to do for much of the time, since such a contingency had not been provided for in the regulations. The resulting idleness and lack of supervision was a major cause of the difficulties. So, as part of the solution, new revised training regulations were decreed on April 6, 1801.⁴⁰ A regular system of training rotation was set up for the use of the drill fields. Six companies were ordered to train each day, with each company of the two regiments at Levend Çiftlik thus being able to train every fourth day, while Fridays

³⁸ *Ibid.*, E 3404.

³⁹ B.V.A., Cevdet Askeri 3876.

⁴⁰ The supplementary regulations of the Nizam-i Cedid corps, dated 21 Qada 1215 (April 6, 1801), are given in "Qavānīn-i Sultān Selīm," fol. 71b.

³⁶ H.H., 9125.

³⁷ T.K.S., E 3752.

and Tuesdays were kept aside as vacation days as before. When the men were not scheduled to report to the drill fields they were required to practice without powder near or in their barracks and to clean and repair their weapons. As an additional measure to relieve the pressure caused by idleness, those members of the corps wishing to engage in outside trades when they were not required at the practice field were allowed to do so if they had performed their other duties satisfactorily and in full, if their work was considered to be a trade in keeping with the honor of the corps, and if they worked near enough to their barracks so they could return at night and could be called for instant duty when they were needed. Officers were now allowed for the first time to marry, although the men were supposed to remain single so they could be subjected to the severe discipline of the corps. But those men already in the corps who had married were not required to divorce their wives. On the contrary, as before, those whose families needed them were allowed to form themselves into groups of five men of whom one could return home during the winter.

In addition, to secure more efficient command of the corps, the financial and military duties originally united in the person of the supervisor were separated in late 1801, with the post of *Ta'limli 'Askeri Nāzirī* (supervisor of training) transferred to the man who was the supervisor of the cannon and cannon-wagon corps, while the Nizam-i Cedid supervisor was left with only his financial and administrative duties as treasurer of the new revenue with the rank of second treasurer of the imperial treasury.⁴¹ These reforms had some effect

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, fol. 46a; Cevād, II, 18–20.

during 1801 and 1802, but periodic cases of indiscipline on the part of members of the Üsküdar corps in particular continued to be reported, manifesting an increasing decline in the discipline and efficiency of the corps and also inflicting a final, crushing blow against the government's effort to popularize the Nizam-i Cedid among the people.⁴²

This, then, was the new army. By the end of Selim's reign it numbered almost 25,000 men, who were armed with modern weapons, trained by western European officers, and praised for their efficiency and good bearing by almost all the Europeans who observed them.⁴³ Together with the reformed artillery corps, it should have provided the sultan with an effective military force capable, not only of meeting the enemy on equal terms, but also of protecting the sultan and itself against the attacks of domestic enemies. On the occasions in which it was employed, the Nizam-i Cedid army effectively demonstrated its superiority over the Janissaries and the other elements of the old army. In 1799 approximately 700 of its men were sent by sea to Gaza, where they performed important services in assisting its governor, Aḥmed Cezzār Paşa, in his stalwart defense of that fort against the advancing French army led by Napoleon Bonaparte.⁴⁴ In 1800, when the British fleet blockaded the French in Alexandria, 2,000 Nizam-i Cedid soldiers were landed, along with a British contingent, and they managed to maintain a successful blockade against the French at Rosetta, eventually forcing them to surrender early in the following

⁴² H.H., 10731.

⁴³ Chénié, pp. 362–63; St.A., CVII, No. 29 (Sept. 10, 1794), CVIII, No. 32 (Oct. 25, 1794).

⁴⁴ Cevdet, VII, 58; Cevād, II, 43; T.K.S., E 3404, E 7014; H.H., 13828; St.A., CXX, No. 13 (Feb. 25, 1799), No. 14 (Mar. 2, 1799), No. 33 (May 18, 1799), No. 37 (June 3, 1799).

year.⁴⁵ During the next six years, soldiers of the new army performed important, although somewhat limited, service against rebel bands in Thrace and Macedonia.⁴⁶ But for the most part, bitter Janissary objections to service with the new troops caused the sultan to retain the latter in Istanbul, and the main Ottoman army continued to be composed primarily of the unruly and ineffective Janissaries, with disastrous results.⁴⁷

Much of the reason for Selim's failure to force the Janissaries to accept the new army, let alone accept reforms themselves, lay in his preoccupation with numerous foreign and internal difficulties. Between 1798 and 1802 he was involved anew in the wars of Europe, this time fighting as an ally of Russia and Britain against France as the result of Bonaparte's ill-fated expedition to Egypt. Late in 1806 he had to face a new Russian invasion of the Principalities, inaugurating a war that lasted well beyond his reign to the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812. Even in the times of apparent peace, from 1792 to 1798, and 1802 to 1806, there was no rest. Large parts of the empire were taken over by local "notables"—Ali Pasha of Janina in southern Albania and Epirus; Pasvanoglu of Vidin in western Bulgaria and parts of Little Wallachia and Serbia; Ismail Aga and his successor Alemdar Mustafa Paşa of Ruşuk, who controlled central and eastern Bulgaria and parts of eastern Thrace; the Karaosmanoglu family in southwest Anatolia; the Chapmanoglu in the central plateau; the Janikli rebels Tayyar Paşa and Battal

Paşa in the northeast; Cezzar Ahmed Paşa in Syria, Palestine, and the Lebanon; Suleyman Paşa "The Great" in Irak; the Wahhabi-Saudi movement which gained control of most of Arabia, including the holy cities; and Murad Bey and Ibrahim Bey in Egypt. Beginning in 1802, Serbia revolted against the sultan's authority under the leadership of Kara George. All these insurrections usurped most of the treasury's provincial revenues, while forcing the sultan to send out expensive military expeditions, making it virtually impossible for him to spare the resources and energies needed if the military reforms were to be really successful.⁴⁸

Nor were conditions in Istanbul propitious. Selim's efforts to popularize the reforms were largely unsuccessful. While a few ruling-class Ottomans became

⁴⁵ The brigands and notables active in the Ottoman Empire under Selim III are described in Ismail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, "Ayan," *Islam Ansiklopedisi*, II, 41-42; Harold Bowen, "Ayan," *Encyclopaedia of Islam: new edition*, I, 778; A. F. Miller, *Mustafa Pasha Bayrakdar* (Moscow, 1952); and Ismail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Alemdar Mustafa Paşa* (Istanbul, 1942), pp. 2-7. See also Çagatay Uluçay, "Karaosmanoğullarına ait bazı vesikalar," *Tarih Vesikalar*, II (1942-43), 193-207, 300-308, 434-40; B. Lewis, "Djāniklı Hadjdji 'Ali Pasha," *Encyclopaedia of Islam: new edition*, II, 446-47; M. C. Şehabeddin Tekindağ, "Cezzar Ahmed Paşa," *Islam Ansiklopedisi*, III, 156-58; W. R. Polk, *The opening of South Lebanon* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), pp. 13-18; S. Longrigg, *Four centuries of modern Iraq* (Oxford, 1925), pp. 75-186; H. St. John Philby, *Saudi Arabia* (London, 1955); G. Rémérand, *Ali de Tébélen* (Paris, 1928); S. Gopčević, *Geschichte von Montenegro und Albanien* (Gotha, 1914); A. Boppe, *La mission de l'adjudant-commandant Mériage à Vidin* (Paris, 1886); F. Bajraktarović, "Paswan-Oghlu," *Encyclopaedia of Islam: new edition*, III, 1034-35; C. Jireček, *Geschichte der Bulgaren* (Prague, 1876), pp. 486-503; A. Hajek, *Bulgarien unter der Türkenherrschaft* (Berlin, 1925); and G. Yakschitch, *L'Europe et la résurrection de la Serbie* (Paris, 1907). On Selim's efforts against them, see Ismail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, "Vezir Hakkı Mehmed Paşa, 1747-1811," *Türkiyat Mecmuası*, VII (Istanbul, 1942), 177-285.

⁴⁵ T.K.S., E 2320, E 4241; B.V.A., Kepeci 3247; St.A., CXXII, No. 11 (Mar. 26, 1800).

⁴⁶ T.K.S., E 3752; St.A., CXIII, No. 31 (Oct. 31, 1796), CXXII, No. 11 (Mar. 29, 1800).

⁴⁷ F.O., 78/25 (May 25, 1799); F.O., 78/28 (Jan. 29, 1800).

aware of Europe for the first time, mainly through contact with the increasing number of Europeans who flocked to the capital, most of their fellows were as isolated from the outside world as they ever had been and, together with the mass of the subjects, remained convinced that the only way to save the empire was to resume the ways of the past and that "infidel innovations" such as the Nizam-i Cedid only disrupted and demoralized the traditional Ottoman institutions and military corps, leaving them easy prey to the attacks of their enemies. Moreover, the long series of wars and revolts which engulfed the empire at this time left its great cities subject to regular periods of scarcity and even famine, which the opponents of reform could all too easily attribute to the efforts of the sultan and his supporters. The consequent sullen opposition was easily fanned into disorder by each new report of military disasters and economic calamities.

Moreover, the sultan himself proved to be without the kind of character and ability needed to face and overcome these problems. Instead of trying to encourage and lead his supporters through an example of energy and determination, he increasingly retired to the pleasures of his harem while resuming his predecessors' policy of controlling his officials by encouraging them to compete with one another for his favor. As a result, the reformers divided into political parties and factions and dissipated most of their strength and energy in intrigues and disputes. In the face of critical military, economic, and social problems and the united opposition of the Janissaries and their supporters, this division was fatal.

In addition to this, Selim lacked the courage of his convictions. Whenever

conservative opposition led to a crisis, he invariably sacrificed his own men, the reformers, to save himself. In 1805, Kadi Abdurrahmân Paşa's effort to conscript men in the Balkans for the new Edirne regiment led to the "Edirne Event," in which Ismail Ağa of Rusçuk led a coalition of Balkan notables who captured Edirne, attacked the new army, and threatened to march on Istanbul if the regiment was not dissolved. Instead of allowing Abdurrahmân and his well-trained and well-armed men to attack and disperse their opponents, as they could easily have done, Selim dismissed him, sent the Nizam-i Cedid men to Anatolia, and appointed as grand vezir the leader of the Janissaries, Ibrahim Hilmi Paşa.⁴⁹ In the spring of 1807 when an effort to reform the Janissary auxiliaries stationed at the Bosphorus forts led to a new conservative rising in Istanbul, Selim responded, not by using the new army to suppress it, but by dissolving the Nizam-i Cedid, dispersing its men, and dismissing the reformers from his government. In the end, even this did not satisfy the rebels, who went on to replace him with his cousin Mustafa IV and to kill all the Nizam-i Cedid men they could find.⁵⁰

Finally, in the last analysis, the entire Nizam-i Cedid was too limited in scope and concept for it to achieve real success. The new army was no more than an enlarged and modernized model of the rifle and cannon corps created in Istanbul.

⁴⁹ Cevdet (2d ed., 1871), VIII, 50-54, 93-94; Ahmed Asım, *Asım Tarihi* (2 vols.; Istanbul, n.d.), I, 102-7; F.O., 78/50 (June 20, 1806); Uzunçarşılı, *Alemdar*, pp. 26-28.

⁵⁰ Cevdet (2d ed.), VIII, 128-45; A. de Juchereau de Saint-Denys, *Révolutions de Constantinople en 1807 et 1808* (2 vols.; Paris, 1818); C. Schlechta Wssehrd, *Die Revolutionen in Constantinopel* (Vienna, 1882); Ismail Hakki Uzunçarşılı, "Kabakçı Mustafa İsyanına dair yazılmış tarihçe," *Bellekten* (Ankara), VI (1942), 253-61.

bul during the eighteenth century by the Count de Bonneval, Baron de Tott, and others. It was created outside the established army and had almost no effect on it. So long as it was not accompanied by significant military, political, social, and economic reforms on a large scale, it was left without the context which had made possible the development and success of its military counterparts in Europe. Left to stand alone against the entrenched ruling class and Janissary corps, its demise was inevitable so long as it lacked the support of an active, intelligent, and energetic sultan.

Despite this, the Nizam-i Cedid army did have an important influence on Ottoman reform later in the nineteenth

century. Its fate showed those reformers who survived the importance of destroying the military arm of reaction and of expanding the scope and depth of reform if success was to be achieved. Moreover, its officers and men provided the nucleus for the new *Asâkir-i Mansûre* army created by Mahmud II after he destroyed the Janissaries in 1826, while its basic organization and regulations were followed almost without change by this and succeeding military forces created prior to the Crimean war. Selim's new army thus provided the example, the lesson, the model, and the nucleus for the military reforms which were to follow.

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APPENDIX TABLE

ORGANIZATION OF THE NIZAM-I CEDID REGIMENT AT LEVEND ÇİFTLİK

	No. Men	Annual Salary Each (Piasters)	Daily Bread Each (Okkes)	Annual Total Salary (Piasters)	Daily Total Bread (Okkes)
Chief Officers					
<i>Āğā</i>	1	12,000	10	12,000	10
<i>Kātib</i> (scribe)	1	4,000	3½	4,000	3½
<i>Muderris</i> (chief instructor)	1	...	25	...	25
<i>Kātib Yamāğī</i> (assistant scribe)	2	1,000	1	2,000	2
<i>Nefer Kātibī</i> (salary scribe)	2	500	1	1,000	2
<i>Binbāšī</i> (colonel)	1	4,000	5	4,000	5
<i>Kethodā</i> (lieutenant)	1	1,250	2½	1,250	2½
<i>Toğçı Bāšī</i> (chief cannoneer)	1	1,000	2	1,000	2
<i>Arabacībāšī</i> (cannon-wagon chief)	1	800	2	800	2
<i>Cebecībāšī</i> (chief of ammunition stores)	1	500	1½	500	1½
<i>Cebecī Çāvūšū</i> (ammunition stores assistant)	1	300	1	300	1
<i>Mehterbāšī</i> (band chief)	1	600	1½	600	1½
<i>Āğā-yı Yemūn</i> (major of the right division)	1	1,000	2	1,000	2
<i>Āğā-yı Yesār</i> (major of the left division)	1	1,000	2	1,000	2
<i>Mulāzım Āğā</i> (major of apprentices)	2	750	1½	1,500	3

Officers and Men of Each Company (*Bölük*)

<i>Bölük Bāšī</i>	12	500	1½	6,000	18
<i>Mulāzım</i>	24	400	1	9,600	24
<i>Alemdār</i> (standard-bearer)	12	350	1	4,200	12
<i>Çāvūş</i> (sergeant)	12	300	1	3,600	12

OFFICERS AND MEN IN THE REGIMENT

	Men per Company	Total in Regiment	Daily Salary plus Money for Food (Ağçes)	Total Daily Salary plus Money for Food (Ağçes)
<i>Önbāšī</i> (corporal)	10	120	70 (40+30)	8,400
<i>Neferāt</i> (riflemen)	90	1,080	50 (20+30)	5,400
<i>Tōp Ustāsī</i> (cannon master)	1	12	78 (48+30)	926
<i>Tōp Halīfesī</i> (cannon assistant)	1	12	66 (36+30)	792
<i>Tōpçī</i> (cannoneers)	8	96	58 (28+30)	5,568
<i>Arabacī Halīfesī</i> (cannon-wagon assistant)	1	12	66 (36+30)	792
<i>Arabacī Neferātī</i> (cannon-wagon men)	5	60	50 (20+30)	3,000
<i>Sornazen</i> (trumpeters)	1	12	66 (36+30)	792
<i>Tablzen</i> (drummers)	1	12	66 (36+30)	792
<i>Saqqā</i> (water-bearers)	2	24	50 (20+30)	1,200
<i>Qara qöllüççü</i> (apprentices)	6	72	50 (20+30)	3,600