ARIEL SALZMANN

TOCQUEVILLE IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Rival Paths to the Modern State

TOCQUEVILLE IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

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TOCQUEVILLE IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Rival Paths to the Modern State

BY

ARIEL SALZMANN

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To my mother and father

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PREFACE

Exotic painters, hack journalists, and impoverished academics have picked over the relics of the Ottoman old regime. Yet for some the empire has not died. Whether it is the Islamist's dream of a compassionate theocracy, a Balkan nationalist's vow to avenge a medieval defeat, or an American president's blueprint for the "new" Iraq, there is reason to question those who seek to remake its past.

Rather than braving this unsettled history alone, I have invited a more seasoned traveler to join me. Alexis de Tocqueville's specter lends this project a comparative slant while furnishing a conceptual anchor to an inherently unmanageable topic. Those familiar with my dissertation, "Measures of State: Tax Farmers and the Ottoman Ancien Régime, (1695–1807) (Columbia University, 1995) will recognize themes and sources. However, the aims of the present work are quite different. From a study on the political economy of tax farming, it has become an inquiry into the origins of government under the old regime.

This essay trespasses across many disciplinary boundaries. Courses in sociology, language and history at Binghamton and Columbia universities with Cağlar Keyder, Rhoads Murphey, and Kathleen Burrill introduced me to the Ottoman Empire. Richard Bulliet, Donald Quataert, John Mundy, and Charles Tilly shaped my historical method and tolerated my eclecticism. In proseminars, conferences, workshops, and over coffee in New York City and Cincinnati, many colleagues have patiently considered my ideas; my students have inspired me.

Countless hours in the archives and many gifted scholars have transformed me into an Ottomanist. I remain deeply indebted to my *hocalarım* Mehmet Genç and Suraiya Faroqhi. Murat Çizakça, Mübahat Kütükoğlu, Engin Akarlı, Cornell Fleischer, Halil Sahillioğlu, Nejat Göyünç, İdris Bostan, Thomas Goodrich, and Rifa'at Abou-El-Haj never failed to answer my questions; *rahmetli* Jean-Pierre Thieck, Gülden Sarıyıldız, Caroline Finkle, Tony Greenwood, Neşe Erim, Caroline and Andy Finkle shared tea and wisdom. Özer Ergenç, Rifat Özdemir and Mustafa Öztürk tutored me in urban studies. Halil İnalcık kindly read this manuscript before publication and

pointed out my errors. Despite their best efforts, more remain. Naturally, these defects are mine alone.

Special thanks are reserved for those who contributed very directly to the preparation of the manuscript: my editor at Brill, Trudy Kamperveen, Betty Seaver who groomed the text; Paula Hible whose artistry polished the maps. Jane Kepp, Geoff Porter, Yüksel Duman, Sabri Ateş, and Markus Dressler took on editorial tasks. Materially, the author benefited from the support of the Pratt Institute and New York University. Two National Endowment for the Humanities-American Research Institute in Turkey grants (in 1994 and 1999) allowed me to continue archival research and a writing fellowship from American Council of Learned Societies 1999–2000 gave me a respite from nearly a decade of teaching.

Gratitude goes to an extended family of friends—Noosha Baqi, Carolle Charles, Jenny White, Selcuk Esenbel, Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Faruk Tabak, Paula Hible, Serpil Bağcı, Selim Deringil, Elizabeth Thompson, Gaynor Ellis, Dan Goffman, Shala Baqi and Randy Martin who have always been there. The Abbasis of Kabul and Vancouver, the Ziyabaksh-Tabari of Teheran, the Salzmanns of London, the Marchettis of Perugia, and the Hanioğlus of Istanbul fed and sheltered me during my travels. I remember with admiration and love those who have not lived to see this work's completion: my art teachers, Kalman and Doris Kubinyi, my second mom and Harlem activist, Ruth Johnson, my buddy and prisoner-rights advocate, Felix Reyes, and my ever-defiant aunt Marsha Weiland.

In the end, as in the beginning, my parents have given boundlessly to this project. I dedicate this work to my mother, Audrey Pastor Salzmann and my father, Harold I. Salzmann, my first teachers.

ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Aleppo Ahkâm Defterleri, Başbakanlık Arşivi.
Belgeler	*Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi.*
Belleten	*Türk Tarih Kurumu Belleten.*
BSOAS	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.*
CA	Cevdet Askeriye, Başbakanlık Arşivi.
CB	Cevdet Belediye, Başbakanlık Arşivi.
CD	Cevdet Dahiliye, Başbakanlık Arşivi.
CDp	Cevdet Darphane, Başbakanlık Arşivi.
C?	Cevdet İktisat, Başbakanlık Arşivi.
CM	Cevdet Maliye, Başbakanlık Arşivi.
CMRS	*Cahiers de Monde Russe et Sovietique.*
CT	Cevdet Timar, Başbakanlık Arşivi.
CZ	Cevdet Zaptiye, Başbakanlık Arşivi.
CSSH	Comparative Studies in Society and History.
DA	Diyarbekir Ahkâm Defterleri, Başbakanlık Arşivi.
EA	Erzurum Ahkâm Defterleri Başbakanlık Arşivi.
EI^2	*Encyclopaedia of Islam. New Edition.*
D.BŞM	Başmuhâsebe Kalemi, Başbakanlık Arşivi.
D.MKF	Bâb-ı Defteri Mevkûfât Kalemi, Başbakanlık Arşivi.
DŞS	Diyarbekir Şeriye Sicilleri Milli Kütüphane.
İA	*İslâm Ansiklopedisi.*
İFM	*İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası.*
IJMES	*International Journal of Middle East Studies.*
IJTS	*International Journal of Turkish Studies.*
IŞMS	Istanbul Şeriye Mahkeme Sicilleri (microfilm).
JTS	*Journal of Turkish Studies.*
JESHO	*Journal of the Economic and History of the Orient.*
JOAS	*Journal of the American Oriental Society.*
KK	Kâmil Kepeci, Başbakanlık Arşivi.
MMD	Maliye'den Müdevver Defterleri, Başbakanlık Arşivi.
MŞS	Mardin Şer'iye Sicilleri Milli Kütüphane.
POF	*Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiyu i Istorija Jugoslavenskih Naroda pod Turskom Valdavinom.*
RMMM	*Revue du Monde Musulmane et de la Mediterranée.*
SA	Sivas Ahkâm Defterleri, Başbakanlık Arşivi.

TKSA	Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi.
TKSK	Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi.
TTK	Türk Tarih Kurumu.
ZDMG	*Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlädischen Geselleschaft.*

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

English spellings have been used for commonly used Middle Eastern terms (e.g. ulema, vizier, pasha) and place names. Terms with reference to the broader Islamic world (e.g. Naqshbandiyya, shah, waqf, shaykh, etc.) have been transcribed from Arabic or Persian without diacritics or italics.

I adhere to the New *Redhouse Turkish-English Dictionary* (Istanbul: Redhouse Press, 8th Ed., 1986) for the transcription of Ottoman terminology with certain modifications: to account for the Arabic sound- and Persian plural, I use "ât" and "ân" respectively; and I have also chosen to preserve the original Arabic articles (ul- al-) and Persian ezafe (-i) instead of a compound: e.g. *Şeyh'ül-İslam* vs. *Şeyhülislam*. Throughout, I have attempted to reduce the number of diacritical marks.

English readers unfamiliar with Turkish characters should note the following: the "ç" is pronounced like the "ch" in church; the "c" like "j" in jam; the "ş" like "sh" in shoe. The "ğ", though silent, lengthens the preceding vowel. As for vowels: the "ı" is like the "i" in slip; the "ö" as "u" in burr; and the "ü" is pronounced as the "u" in French.

INTRODUCTION

TOCQUEVILLE'S GHOST

Distracted by the call to prayer that echoed across Divan Yolu from the mosque at Sultan Ahmad, the guard did not notice as Alexis de Tocqueville, the historian of the old regime and the scholar of modern government, slipped quietly past and entered the Prime Minister's Archive.[1]

He strode briskly along the corridor and up a short flight of stairs, then he turned left toward the reading hall. Heading toward the last row of desks at the back of the room, he seated himself. The previous researcher had left at the desk a pile of red-bound registers. Curious, Tocqueville opened the uppermost document (Fig. 1). He bent over to get a better look at the unfamiliar handwriting before realizing that what lay before him was a ledger of contracts issued on village revenues in a remote province. Scrawled over its pages were notations that spanned nearly a century, between 1697 and 1793.

As he peeled back the pages, tattered by time and use, Tocqueville contemplated the profound changes in the style of the chancellery: unlike the clear and comprehensive registers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the ancien régime's records seemed a patois of script, cipher, and haphazard numbers.[2] He sighed, thinking of the "clarity and intelligence of the men" who compiled the first cadastral records of the early sixteenth century. These "obscure, ill ordered, incomplete, and slovenly" pages did not bode well for the eighteenth-

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[1] Quotations are from *The Old Régime and the French Revolution*, trans. Stuart Gilbert (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1955). When meaning is unclear, I have also checked *L'ancien régime et la Révolution*, ed. J.-P. Mayer (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1967), and François Furet and Françoise Mélonio's new edition of the complete text and Tocqueville's notes, translated by Alan S. Kahan, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). Also see J.-P. Mayer, ed. *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris: Gallimard, 1951–) 12 vols.

[2] For samples, see Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlı Belgelerinin Dili (Diplomatik)* (Istanbul: Kubbealtı Akademisi Kütür ve San'at Vakfı, 1998).



Fig. 1. A double page (reduced) from a *malikâne mukataa* "master" register for the province (*eyalet*) of Diyarbekir (MMD 9518:17–18). On the right hand side there are six entries; on the left, five. The transactions between contractors, connected by flourishes of the pen, span nearly a century. By permission of the Başbakanlık Arşivi.

century empire. They conjured up an image of a great power teetering on the edge of an abyss.[3]

The Ottomans, he mused, once dominated the Mediterranean and West Asia. Their neighbors regarded their political institutions as a marvel of statecraft. The sultan's civil servants formed tight administrative cadres, hierarchically organized, hardworking and honest. His soldiers possessed an incomparable ésprit de corps. What had happened to this great state? The fierce janissaries laid down their muskets for pushcarts. Administrators, shunning their duties, distributed liberties and immunities far and wide. The sale of agricultural tithes, internal tariffs, and offices impoverished the peasantry and handicapped the merchant. Even the most powerful viziers and generals owed their political fortunes to Istanbul's Christian and Jewish bankers.

Tocqueville felt as if he had entered a hall of mirrors: the semblances between prerevolutionary France and the Ottoman old regime were uncanny. There was the strange synchrony of rise and fall, reform and centralization that punctuated the eighteenth Christian and the corresponding twelfth Islamic centuries. Administrative consolidation had begun under the absolutism of the Sun King, Louis XIV, as well as under the reign of his contemporary, the "Hunter-Sultan," Mehmet IV. Similar to the fiscal reforms carried out by the Bourbon minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert (d. 1683), the imperial program was pushed forward by a succession of Körpülü viziers (1656–1683) as well as by Sultan Ahmed III's Grand Vizier İbrahim Pasha (r. 1718–1730). As in France, years of dramatic innovation were followed by decades of prevaricating, borrowing, special favors, and venality. Stunned by the outcome of military engagements and the financial crises they wrought, the administrators of both regimes threw themselves into a program of fiscal reform in the last quarter century which culminated in the founding of a central treasury in

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[3] "The progressive decay of the institutions stemming from the Middle Ages can be followed in records of the period . . . In the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century registers I examined, I was much impressed by the skill with which they were drafted, their clarity, and the intelligence of the men compiling them, In later periods, however, there is a very definite falling off; the terriers become more and more obscure, ill ordered, incomplete, and slovenly" *The Old Régime*, 16. Echoes of Tocqueville ring through Bernard Lewis' account of Ottoman decline (*The Emergence of Modern Turkey* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961, 3d ed., 2002]), 23.

France (1788) and the "New Order" fisc (*İrade-i Cedid Hazinesi*) in Istanbul (1793). Yet this defensive centralization only hastened the downfall of the ancien régime and sealed the fate of both sovereigns, Louis XVI in 1790 and Selim III in 1807.

Tocqueville suddenly grew disconcerted by his discovery: if the policies and institutional patterns of the old regime were so similar in character and so close in timing why did their paths suddenly divide? Why did France cohere and the Ottoman Empire fall apart?

Tocqueville straightened his waistcoat and closed the ledger. Rising from his seat, he turned his back on the reading room and walked deliberately down the stairs, past the guard's station and into the street. A thin figure in quaint attire disappeared among the throngs of tourists milling in the gardens and the teahouses of the Hippodrome.

Alexis de Tocqueville did not, of course, visit Istanbul or its archives. Yet despite such imperious intellectual indifference to France's former ally, Tocqueville's ghost haunts the social scientific imagination of the Ottoman past.[4] It is found in the model of the modern state, whose genesis is encapsulated in his classic *L'ancien régime et la Revolution*.[5] As the popularizer of one of the most influential accounts of state centralization his thoughts about power and society

[4] For a selection of his writings on Ottoman Algeria, see Alexis de Tocqueville, *De la colonie en Algérie*, ed. Tzvetan Todorovo (Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, 1988); and Tocqueville, *Writings on Empire and Slavery*, ed. Jennifer Pitts (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001). For one of the most sustained reflections, Tocqueville, Oeuvres compléte, 3 pt. 1:129–253.

[5] On his life and works, see André Jardin, *Tocqueville: A Biography*, (New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux, 1988); Cheryl B. Welch, *De Tocqueville* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). As Edward Shills notes ("Tradition, Ecology and Institution in the History of Sociology," in *The Constitution of Society* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982], 359), the revival of Tocqueville in sociological theory owes to Raymond Aron. See Raymond Aron, *Les Étapes de la pensée sociologique. Montesquieu. Comte. Marx. Tocqueville. Durkheim. Pareto. Weber.* (Paris: Gallimard, 1967), and "Tocqueville retrouvé," *Tocqueville Review* (1979): 8–23. I was grateful for the opportunity to hear Cheryl Welch, "Tocqueville between Two Worlds: France and Algeria," and Joyce Appleby, "Does It Matter That Tocqueville Got Some Things Wrong?" at the special colloquium on Sheldon S. Wolin's *Tocqueville Between Two Worlds: The Making of a Political and Theoretical Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), held at the Institute of French Studies of New York University on April 19, 2002.

in eighteenth-century Europe are still refracted across the canon of political science and sociology.[6] As an explanation for the rise of liberal government, his analysis rests on a "uniquely" European template of social and cultural institutions from which the prophets of modernization have derived many of their most cherished theories and policies.[7] Extracting Europe from the interactive meridian of territorial states and oceanic empires and establishing the exceptionalism of the French political culture, the Tocquevillean model has also misrepresented the nature of historical change—the modern state could be implanted in foreign soils only through acculturation, capitalism, or colonialism.

There is, however, a paradox here. As our imaginary Tocqueville discovers, France had no monopoly over the institutional features of the ancien régime. In rereading Tocqueville's classic through the filter of a growing body of early modern European, Middle Eastern and South Asian historiography, we find abundant contradictions, equivocations, and, at times, what seem to be willful misreading of the past. As our understanding of the historical record broadens and gains greater geographic equilibrium, so too the Islamic A.H. twelfth or, alternately, the Christian A.D. eighteenth centuries come into new focus, highlighting trends, processes, and phenomena that previous scholars once relegated to the margins. Comparison is not only possible,[8] it is also absolutely necessary to make sense of political change in the past as well as to appreciate the peculiar stresses and strains of regimes in transition.

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[6] The assumption that the state under the ancien régime achieved a high degree of institutional centralization appears to filter from Tocqueville through Marx to modern social science, as David Waldner notes in *State Building and Late Development* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 31. See also Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolution: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 178–179. For Durkheim and the concept of centralization, Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, *The Sociology of the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 12; and Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," 64, in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. Idem (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

[7] The list is long. For some well known representatives in historical and political sociology, see S. N. Eisenstadt, *Modernization: Protest and Change* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966); and Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds. *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965). See also Seymour Drescher, *Dilemmas of Democracy: Tocqueville and Modernization* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1968).

[8] Michael Mann (*The Sources of Social Power* [Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University

Far from rendering his study of the old regime obsolete, Tocqueville's encounter with the Ottoman Empire might further our inquiry into the inner workings of the early modern state while helping us to exorcize a nineteenth ghost that still stalks the social scientific imagination.

In Search of an Archive

Like the *terriers* that provoked the real Tocqueville's exasperated assessment, the registers and loose documents of the Ottoman ancien-régime archive have disappointed and baffled many researchers. Yet this seeming unintelligibility or purported opacity is also a modern affect, a result of the physical and ideological clean sweep of the historical record during the early nineteenth century. The selective purge of history began well before the French Revolution and would become part of the colonial project as well. During the Enlightenment, advocates of statistical knowledge tied numerical precision to the very image of state power.[9] Napoleon's conquests in the Mediterranean put these radical alterations to collective memory into effect. Revolutionary engineers transformed the urban plan, beginning with the razing of ghetto walls; and bureaucrats reshuffled the contents of archives, from Papal Rome to Mamluk Cairo.[10] By the early nineteenth century, historians too entered the fray, claiming the archives

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Press, 1986] 1:502–503) insists: "Comparison fails . . . Consider for a moment one obvious additional case, Islamic civilization. Why did the Miracle not occur there? . . . One distinctive feature of Islam has been tribalism; another, that religious fundamentalism recurs powerfully, usually from desert tribal bases . . . The comparative method has no solution to these problems, not because of any general logical or epistemological defects it might have but because, in dealing with the problems we simply do not have enough autonomous, analogical cases." For one response, see Rifa'at 'Ali Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991). For some important qualifications of the comparative method, see R. Bin Wong, *China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of the European Experience* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

[9] On the "statistical" school of Göttingen University, see Theodore M. Porter, *The Rise of Statistical Thinking, 1820–1900* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 23. Ausgust Ludwig von Schlözer was an early student of the Ottoman Empire and an exponent of the new "scientific" method.

[10] On the impact on Italy, see Silvana Patriarca, *Numbers and Nationhood: Writing Statistics in Nineteenth-Century Italy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 8.

as their own. Some, most notably Leopold von Ranke, who directed the Prussian state archives, even busied themselves with reworking the very raw materials of their craft.[11] Already a symbol of the sovereignty of the modern nation state, industrial might and colonial domination allowed the European archive to subsume the world's past.[12]

If revolutionary fervor remade the past, as Tocqueville's own disclaimer acknowledges (". . . [W]hen great revolutions are successful their causes cease to exist and the very fact of their success has made them incomprehensible"), modern historians have had an even freer hand in rewriting the history of states that failed to make the late eighteenth-century transition.[13] This is not simply because the historicist rewriting of the Ottoman past came from implacably hostile and religiously-biased corners of the globe.[14] Rather, the distortions of the Ottoman past, owe first and foremost to the empire's loss of sovereignty over the raw materials of memory. Unlike the defeated colonizing nation-state—such as France, which covered its retreat from North American in 1763 and two century later from Algeria,[15] clutching the fig leaf of its "archives de souverainté"—Ottoman archival materials were spoils that fell to the great powers or the new states of the Balkans.[16] After World War I, the Ottoman past

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[11] George G. Iggers, *New Directions in European Historiography* (Hanover, N.H.: University of New England, 1984), 19.

[12] E.g. Leopold von Ranke, *The Ottoman and the Spanish Empires, in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard, 1845). This is not simply a question of ignoring the world's history, but effectively of putting "history" itself on separate and unequal empirical and methodological tracks. Ranke justified very different methods for classical, biblical, and non-Western history. Iggers, *New Directions in European Historiography*, 15–17.

[13] Tocqueville, *The Old Régime*, 5.

[14] On the impact of orientalism on Ottoman history, see Suraiya Faroqhi, *Approaching Ottoman history: An Introduction to the Sources* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and for a critique of historicism on Indian historiography, see Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

[15] While robbing other peoples of their past, European states seem to have considered the return of archives to be part of the gentleman's rules of war. Article 22 of the treaty concluding the Seven Years War specified the return of French administrative documentation. Zenab Esmat Rashed, The Peace of Paris, 1763 (Liverpool: University Press, 1951), 212–229.

[16] İsmet Binark, ed., *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Rehberi* (Ankara: Turkish Republic Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivileri Genel Müdürlüğü Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başbakanlığı, 1992), 14–34.

was unceremoniously stripped away in colonial mandates. Just as in the nineteenth-century Balkans, these materials would become the contested inheritance of nation-states and the nations without states. As many, often competing, national narratives superseded it, archival dismemberment reinforced a partial and self-serving vision of the features of a multicontinental and multiethnic state.[17]

Given the dispersal of the remains, the prospect of writing a comprehensive study of this Ottoman century, one that unifies the disparate threads of provinces and center seems daunting indeed. Although there is rapid growth in this field, the historiography devoted to the eighteenth century still falls far short of research carried out on the empire's earlier centuries.[18] Together, the monographic research devoted to the Ottoman past constitutes but a fraction of the accumulated studies on early modern Europe.[19] Mindful of the long road ahead and fully appreciating whence we have come, the task I propose is a very different one.

This study does not pretend to reconstruct the Ottoman Empire's political history as such. Rather, it seeks to construct a series of interpretive frames derived from the current state of Ottoman historiography that might scrutinize Tocqueville's legacy while reexamining the paradoxes of power that obscure the past and remain an imped-

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[17] The literature continues to reinforce this divide by focusing on either provincial social and political history or on central-state institutional studies. For a sampling of studies that try to surmount this frontier, see Abdul-Karim Refeq, *The Province of Damascus, 1723–1783* (Beirut: Khayats, 1966); Stanford Shaw, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789–1807* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); Madeline Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age (1600–1800)* (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1988); T. Naff and R. Owen, eds., *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History* (Carbondale: University of Southern Illinois Press, 1977); Robert W. Olson, *The Siege of Mosul and Ottoman-Persian Relations, 1718–43* (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1975). One of the most comprehensive studies to date on Ottoman fiscality is Yavuz Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi XVIII Yüzyıldan Tanzimat'a Mali Tarih* (Istanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1986).

[18] Leaving to one side Hamilton A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen's outdated overview of the "Arab provinces," (*Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East*, 2 vols. [London: Oxford University Press, 1950 and 1957]) an introduction to the last generation of eighteenth-century studies may to be found in Bruce McGowan, "The Age of the Ayan," in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Halil İnalcık with Donald Quataert (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 637–743; and Robert Mantran et al., *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris: Fayard, 1989).

[19] A point well taken by Abou-El-Haj, Formation of the Modern State, 6.

iment to understanding modern political paths. By filtering one of the classic narratives of socio-political change and revolution through an unfamiliar lens, the Ottoman ancien régime prods historians to turn questions of socio-organizational change both inward and outward: inward, toward the complex social and economic relationships between a center and its many peripheries; and outward, toward ever greater integration of historical polities within and among adjoining, converging or colliding, cultural and political systems.

Even by reducing the scope of this inquiry and taking advantage of a wide range of sources, both archival and published, this study has required more than a decade of empirical and conceptual spadework. It began in 1986 with a study on the economic history of the province of Diyarbekir, located in the Kurdish southeast of today's Republic of Turkey. Only a year into that project, my focus began to change. As I peered deeper into the Ottoman past and questioned the received wisdom of European political theory, I was drawn into the larger puzzle of the eighteenth-century state. Realizing that it was impossible to understand a part without a better grasp of the mechanisms of the whole, I persevered in the archive. Repeatedly, I have returned to Istanbul and Ankara to conduct research, to consult with colleagues, and to explore newly catalogued sources.[20]

The dissertation, "Measures of Empire: Tax Farmers and the Ottoman Ancien Régime,"[21] reassessed the role of fiscal and administrative decentralization in early modern state formation. Conceptually and methodologically, it was built on the foundation laid for eighteenth-century political economy by Mehmet Genç. Addressing the large question of economic development from an Ottoman vantage point, Genç devised a method for using Ottoman archival documentation for quantifying change in the empire's domestic market.[22]

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[20] Despite casting my net wide, I have scraped only the surface of many of the new collections in the Başbakanlık Arşivi in Istanbul. In 1994, I was able to consult the Ottoman judicial court records (*şer'iye sicilleri*) for eighteenth-century Mardin and Diyarbekir that had been transferred to Milli Kütüphane in Ankara. For more on the local court records found in the Republic of Turkey, see Ahmet Akgündüz et al., eds., *Şer'iye Sicilleri*, 2 vols. (Istanbul: Türk Dünyaşi Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1988).

[21] Ph.D. diss. Columbia University, 1995.

[22] Mehmet Genç, "A Study on the Feasibility of Using Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Financial Records as an Indicator of Economic Activity," in *The Ottoman Empire in the World Economy*, ed. Huri Islamoğlu-Inan (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 345–373.

By adapting what had long been regarded as the quintessentially old-regime type of revenue contracting, the quasi-proprietary, lease-for-life *malikâne* contract to this end, he also furnished students of the old regime with an acutely sensitive tool for retracing social relationships and political organization. Recognizing its promise for social history, Jean-Pierre Thieck, who was working on a monograph on Aleppo before his untimely death in 1990, cracked another key part of the old regime puzzle.[23] He employed tax-farming documentation to reconstruct the economy and polity of northern Syria. By tracing connections between town and country through rural tax farms and by identifying gentry-contractors, he illuminated a government of the urban gentry forming in the shadow of the state's policies of extraction and redistribution.

Applying these conceptual and methodological insights to new data and bringing an outline of the central-state's redistributive structure together with the evolving administrative system in the provinces, my research pointed to concomitant processes.[24] First, as the web of contractual relationships emanating from contracting identified the actors and interests that cemented the old-regime elite, I observed that sectoral investments distinguished the state elite from non-investors such as the religious establishment, as well as from more ordinary contractors, members of what we might call the third estate, whose portfolios were restricted to small scale agricultural holdings. Even as this system of contracting networks grew more distended in space, I speculated, the state's monetary policy and regulation of credit markets assured Istanbul's continued dominance over many of the key imperial actors.[25]

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[23] Jean-Pierre Thieck, "Décentralisation ottomane et affirmation urbaine à Alep à la fin du XVIII[ème] siècle," in *Mouvements communautaires et espaces urbains au Machreq*, ed. Mona Zakaria et al. (Beirut: Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Moyen-Orient Contemporain, 1985), 118–168. For an expanded version of this seminal article as well as the journalistic writings of "Michel Farrère") see Gilles Kepel, ed., *Passion d'Orient* (Paris: Éditions Karthala, 1992).

[24] See Ariel Salzmann, "An Ancien Régime Revisited: Privatization and Political Economy in the 18th Century Ottoman Empire," *Politics & Society* 21 (1993): 393–423.

[25] For more on Istanbul's arbitrage policies, see Halil Sahillioğlu, "The Role of International Monetary and Metal Movements in Ottoman Monetary History, 1300–1700," in *Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds*, ed. J. F. Richards (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1983), 269–304; and Şevket Pamuk, "The Recovery of the Ottoman Monetary System in the Eighteenth Century," in Kemal Karpat, *The Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000), 188–211.

Second, by studying the devolution, transfer, and partnerships of shareholders of tax farms, I noted that premodern "privatization" did not necessarily contribute to economic and political disaffection with the state. Instead, it fostered a distinct form of sociopolitical integration: vertically, as the *rical-ı devlet*, the Ottoman aristocracy of service and courtiers cultivated extensive networks across the empire in order to manage their assets; and horizontally, as gentry (*eşrâf ve ayân*) invested in smaller-scale tax farming as a means for creating spheres of influence within cities and the countryside. Not "indirect rule" or the solvent of an imperial structure, tax farming should be considered state formation by other means.

The dissertation, which offered an alternative model for eighteenth-century Ottoman sociopolitical history, lent itself toward further quantitative and qualitative research. Rather than continue to quantify these aspects of the imperial structure, the present work explores several of the more misunderstood facets of old-regime rule and governance. Thankfully, I did not have to start from scratch. Although much of the material in chapter 1 is substantially new, the core of my dissertation research, including a quasi-monographic account of the political economy of an Ottoman province, provided raw materials for the present essay as well.

Despite its distance (approximately 1400 kilometers from Istanbul), Diyarbekir was tethered to the imperial system in a peculiar logistical, social, and economic fashion. Like northern and central Syria, northeastern Anatolia, and many of the Balkan provinces,[26] political relationships in Diyarbekir exemplify the old regime compromise. By contrast, as recent monographs on eighteenth-century Cairo, Mosul, Baghdad, Basra, and southern Syria/Palestine have shown, outerring Asian and African provinces were simply too far removed to exhibit the more characteristic aspects of vernacular government under the old regime. As Tocqueville himself found for France's southernmost provinces, the so-called *pays d'états*, these outlying zones testify to the territorial limits of the early modern state: during much of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, their actors responded to the strategic concerns of the frontier or the opportunities afforded by a competitive interstate system.[27]

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[26] For another example, see Michael Robert Hickok, *Ottoman Military Administration in Eighteenth-Century Bosnia* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997).

[27] See, in particular, Richard van Leeuwen, *Notables and Clergy in Mount Lebanon:*

If benefiting from earlier choices, the present study has presented new documentary challenges. Ideally, I would have hoped to have stumbled upon a rich cache of documents, such as the *cahiers de doléance* or the diaries of provincial elites, that might help better explain the political ideas of the gentry or the quotidian cultural and social relations within and between a provincial city and the Sublime Porte. Although I did not, there is every reason to believe that the patient and creative researcher will yet find them.[28] But the records I have used, although all too often drafted in Istanbul itself, do help me reconstruct no less compelling features of the polity of the old regime. In addressing issues of space, hierarchy, and government, I have tried to diversify the witnesses and media of documentation, teasing information from documents left by palace scientists, artists, court historians, judges and bureaucrats. Despite efforts to broaden my witnesses, readers will note many absences and silences. Few subalterns and no women, with the exception of a rare cameo appearance, are to be found within these pages.

While preoccupied with managing the scale of this endeavor, it is no less true that even the most determined attempts to provide a synthetic overview of an as yet unintegrated historical landscape will fail without attention to more specific regional realities. To the extent possible, I have tried to accomplish this by maintaining a critical distance from the unparalleled but inherently biased vantage point offered by the registers, edits, orders, and reports of the Sublime Porte. In addition to another round of research in the eighteenth-century court records for Diyarbekir and Mardin, I have gleaned information from monographs on the provincial history of neighboring regions to build a composite picture. İbrahim Yılmazçelik's fine study on Diyarbekir's late-eighteenth/early-nineteenth-century capital district and city of Amid, a monograph that relies almost

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The Khazin Sheikhs and the Maronite Church (1736–1840) (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995); Jane Hathaway, *The Politics of Household in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of the Qazadağlı* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Thabit A. J. Abdullah, *Merchants, Mamluks, and Murder: The Political Economy of Trade in Eighteenth-Century Basra* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001); Dina Rizk Khoury, *State and provincial society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540–1834* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Beshara Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus*, 1700–1900 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

[28] For Arabic sources, see Reinhard Schulze, "Was Ist Die Islamische Augklärung?" *Die Welt Des Islams* 36 (1996): 277–325.

exclusively on provincial documentation and narrative sources otherwise unavailable to me, keeps the provincial story from faltering.[29]

If the Ottoman Empire challenges students of the old regime in an acute fashion, it is not simply a consequence of documentation. The difficulties of reading and interpretation are part and parcel of modern notions of sovereignty.[30] For modern sovereignty entails not only a notion of a monopoly of powers and the mutual recognition of its members within a "club" of nation-states, but also predisposes the investigator to adopting a particular perspective within the polity itself. As such, an interpretation of the Ottoman past has invariably demanded that researchers choose a central point of perspective and, by it, to predetermine the gravitational center of power between a state elite and the populations of its many peripheries. By beginning this study with a map in which the empire itself is embedded in larger geopolitical landscape of Eurasia, I hope to remind myself as much as my readers, that the picture I paint would be very different had I limited my perspective to Belgrade, Cairo, Istanbul or Baghdad. As historians and social scientists recover diverse facets of a common past, it is will not be enough to revise narratives or simply scrap the dominant paradigm; we must also re-site historiography itself.

The Old Régime through an Ottoman Lens

The Ottoman Empire, the sociological axiom goes, is not a state; it is an empire, to be exact, as Talcott Parsons would have it, an "intermediate empire."[31] This classification conveys a preordained course: a "youth" of precocious, albeit despotic centralization,

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[29] Dr. Yılmazçelik kindly provided me with a copy of his dissertation, "XIX. Yüzyılın ilk Yarısında Diyarbakır, 1790–1840," (Fırat University, 1991) 2 vols., during my visit to Elazığ/Harput in 1992; given discrepancies in documentation, I cite from both the dissertation as well as the resulting monograph, XIX. *Yüzyılın ilk Yarısında Diyarbakır, 1790–1840* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1995).

[30] On revisions to the classic notions of sovereignty, see John Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," *International Organisation*, 47 (1993): 139–74; and Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds., *State Sovereignty as a Social Construct* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[31] S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political System of Empires* (New York: Free Press, 1969), 17–23. For an early critique, see Norman Izkowitz, "Eighteenth Century Ottoman Realities," *Studia Islamica* 16 (1962): 73–94.

middle years of social stasis, followed inevitably by institutional decay and violent collapse. As new studies disabuse such generalizations, Ottoman scholars are increasingly reluctant to accept the received wisdom of nineteenth-century historiography and social science or to reflexively segregate a Eurasia and African state from the course of modern political history.[32] In fact, a healthy degree of skepticism with regard to the authority of the Western canon has become an indispensable tool of our trade.

Ironically, a student of Ottoman history who might peruse *The Old Régime and the French Revolution* today no longer sees in the budding "state" of Western Europe an alien, impossibly distant entity. Quite the contrary, she finds herself at home in Tocqueville's description of the twists and turns in the old-regime plot and smiles with familiarity at the recurrence of the comparable tropes. Tocqueville's celebration of Louis XIV's role as the grand architect of French absolutism (borrowed from Voltaire) begs for comparison with the glorification of Süleyman the Magnificent (d. 1566) in the historiography of Ottoman statecraft or the line of continuity traced between the programs of "Westernization" of Ahmet III and those of his grandson Selim III (r. 1789–1807).[33]

Although the Ottoman historian might sympathize with an author who tries sustain his central thesis despite the contradictory evidence he examines, we can no longer ignore the ideological blinders that fundamentally obstructed his field of vision. Addressing the French Revolution's sharpest critic in his introduction and proposing to trace its roots to the genetic structure Western institutions and the specific socioeconomic conditions of old-regime France, book 1 steers readers away from the territorial state system and the world economy.[34] Outside of space, European institutional structures appear primordial.[35] Teleology replaces contingency. Whether we call them paths

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[32] See Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State*.

[33] Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *The Ancien Régime: A History of France, 1610–1774* (Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1996), 72, 266–267, 273, 630–635; Halil İnalcık and Cemal Kafadar eds., *Suleyman The First and His Time* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1993) and Cornell H. Fleischer, "The Lawgiver as Messiah: The Making of the Imperial Image in the Reign of Süleymân," *In Soliman le Manifique et son temps: actes du colloque de Paris Galeries Nationales du Grand Palais 7–10 Mars 1990*, ed. Gilles Veinstein (Paris: École des Hautes Études en Science Sociales, 1992), 159–77.

[34] *The Old Régime*, bk. 1, ch. 4.

[35] Ibid., 10–11. François Furet (*The Old Regime*, vol. 1, 99) voices frustration over Tocqueville's lack of concern for the wars of religion.

or modes of production, only the nations "des confins de la Polande à la mer d'Irlande" that arise from post-Roman, Christian "Europe" plot a common course that leads through "feudalism," parish communities, and aristocracy toward private property, capitalism and modern government, irrespective of the interactive, interdependent Eurasian and African state systems. In subsequent chapters we realize the significance of these abstract claims: as the rudiments of the modern state emerge from absolutist monarchy in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it is Christian civilization, the bonds of the rural parish, and the residue of an autonomous aristocratic hierarchy which guard European absolutism from lapsing into pure despotism (one assumes of an "oriental" variety).[36]

Even if we accept a grain-of-truth argument about the political constitution of medieval Europe, the peculiarities of the French clergy, and the specificities of culture and cultivation, the fact remains that Tocqueville's strongest interpretative arguments about the institutional and social structure of prerevolutionary France are at odds with the findings of most social historians.[37] Despite Tocqueville's insistence, claims that old regime laid the basic foundation for further centralization in areas of taxation, military recruitment, and justice, that Paris became "maitre" of the nation, or that the cultural identity of its populations grew increasingly homogeneous ring hollow. France of the seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries more closely resembled the classic definition of an early modern "empire" than a nation-state.[38] It was a composite of regional governments and near city-states, which zealously defended local languages, legal codes and customs.[39] Half of its revenues derived from indirect methods of finance and revenue collection, including tax farming and the sale of thousands of venal offices.[40]

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[36] The Old Régime, 27; bk. 2, ch. 11.

[37] Charles Tilly, "State and Counterrevolution in France," *Social Research*, 56 (1989): 72–73. For references in *The Old Régime*: on the influence of Paris over the provinces, 35, 65–72; on the destruction of the nobility, 27, 72–79; on the centralization process, 34–38, 65 131, 204; on conscription, 104–105; on the rule of the intendants, 36–38, 134–135, 180.

[38] George Rudé, *Europe in the 18th Century: Aristocracy and the Buorgeois Challenge* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 85, 117–119.

[39] For the provincial dimension, see Charles Tilly, The *Contentious French: Four Centuries of Popular Struggle* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986); and more recently, Pierre Deyon, *L'état face au pouvoir local: un autre regard sur l'histoire de France* (Paris: Editions Locales de France, 1996).

[40] George T. Matthews, *The Royal General Farms in Eighteenth Century France* (New

Despite his renewed popularity among certain schools of French historiography,[41] Tocqueville's archival database for the *The Old Régime and the French Revolution* was exceedingly shallow. While appreciating Tocquevillean sensitivity toward the interplay of state and society, we must recognize that his method of analysis is frequently contradictory and his conclusions are often inconsistent with his own evidence.[42] Causality is elusive: in one section Tocqueville might attribute the catalyst of change to the pressures of increasing state centralization; pages later, he will point to the role of forms of decentralization in mounting social tensions. In fact, struggles for what we might define as social and political rights do not necessarily owe to confrontations with central authority. Rather, following the texts of the Enlightenment, Tocqueville cites the arbitrary exercise of power, the failure to pay creditors, the promiscuous sale of offices, and the granting of immunities as the kindling that ignited intellectual dissent and inter-estate conflict.

The Old Régime, despite its author's insistence, does not sustain his argument for a linear social and organizational progression from absolutism to revolution and the modern nation-state. Moreover, the institutional features of the old regime that he identified are not unique to France, but are found in other settings, including the Ottoman Empire. Yet, these contradictions should not detract from what this essay did accomplish, if largely impressionistically. For even as Tocqueville reinstated the old regime as an important stage in modern political development, he was forced to grapple with the paradoxical nature of the processes that characterized eighteenth-century political transformation overall. Thus, unlike many of his later interpreters, he remained keenly aware of the very tentative nature of the "infrastructural power" of early modern polities and relevance of the concessions made en route to consolidation:

York: Columbia University Press, 1958), 3–16; Isser Woloch, *The New Regime: Transformations of the French Civic Order, 1789–1820* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1994), 114–118; and Eugen Joseph Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).

[41] François Furet (*Penser la Révolution française* [Paris: Gallimard, 1978]) was one of the main proponents of the Tocquevillean turn; see also Roger Chartier, *The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution*, trans. Lydia G. Cohrane (Durhan: Duke University Press, 1991); compare, George C. Comninel, *Rethinking the French Revolution: Marxism and the Revisionists* (London: Verso, 1987).

[42] Compare, Theda Skocpol, "Introduction: Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research" in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. T. Skocpol, Peter Evans, and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 21.

> While the central government was gradually taking over all the powers of local authorities and coming more and more to monopolize the whole administration of the country, some institutions which it had allowed to survive and even some new ones created by itself tended to check this centripetal movement . . . it had no very clear idea of the extent of its power. None of its rights was firmly established or unequivocally defined, and though its sphere of action was already vast, it had to grope, so to speak in the dark and exercise much prudence.[43]

Of the features Tocqueville describes, fiscal and administrative decentralization remains one of the more intransigent components of the old-regime paradox.[44] It is ironic that precisely because of an error-ridden social scientific paradigms on "empires," decentralization, along with its attendant state involution, have long taken center stage in eighteenth-century Ottoman studies. Over the past quarter century, new political and socioeconomic investigations have shed the anachronism and reductionism of functionalist sociology, furnishing early modern historiography with a far more complex analysis of an evolving institutional structure.[45] Approaching the problem of decentralization from different points on the Ottoman map, Albert Hourani and Halil İnalcık have been at the forefront of this reassessment of the old regime.[46] Although neither scholar addresses Tocqueville directly, their creative interpretation of Ottoman realities actually helps us reconsider his classic account of state formation in the eighteenth century. For example, Hourani's characterization of Istanbul's

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[43] *The Old Régime*, 108–109.

[44] See Ian Copland and Michael R. Godley,"Revenue Farming in Comparative Perspective: Reflections on Taxation, Social Structure and Development in the Early-Modern Period," in *The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming: Business Elites and the Emergence of the Modern State in Southeast Asia*, ed. John Butcher and Howard Dick (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 45–68. Helen Nader, *Liberty in Absolutist Spain: The Habsburg Sale of Towns, 1516–1700* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990); Muzaffar Alam, *The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India: Awadh and the Punjab, 1707–1748* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986); Gabriel Ardant, "Financial Policy and Economic Infrastructure of Modern States and Nations," in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 164–242; Susan Mann, *Local Merchants and the Chinese Breaucracy, 1750–1950* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987); and Murat Çizakça, *A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships: The Islamic World and Europe with Specific Reference to the Ottoman Archives* (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1996).

[45] Note Virginia H. Aksan, Locating the Ottomans among Early Modern Empires," *Journal of Early Modern History* 3 (1999): 1–32.

[46] Albert Hourani, "The Changing Face of the Fertile Crescent in the XVIIIth Century," *Studia Islamica* 8 (1957): 89–122, reprinted in Hourani, *A Vision of History* (London: Constable & Co. Ltd., 1961), 35–70; and Halil İnalcık, "Centralization and Decentralization Ottoman Administration," in *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, 27–52.

authority over old-regime Arab cities demonstrates that what Tocqueville calls Versailles' "tutelle administrative," did not subvert the power of urban elites so much as complement it.[47] The uneasy domination of the court over the provincial bourgeoisie, feudal lords, and priests would be better considered within Halil İnalcık's dialectical framework, which posits an ongoing tug-of-war between the Sublime Porte (*Bab-ı Âli*), commanders in the field, and particularly the provincial gentry.[48]

Conscious of the larger historical context, studies on Ottoman history have also refined our understanding of the questions that Tocqueville summarily discarded, such as the impact of the world market on state formation.[49] Rescuing Ottoman economic history from the anecdotal or unidimensional accounts that had filled in a vast, undetermined space in world history, Mehmet Genç reconstructs a trajectory of economic growth during the first three-quarters of the century.[50] His research demonstrates the intimate relationship between global financial trends and state development, as well as between Istanbul's policies of military command and the relative resiliency of Ottoman industry. Genç's studies also reveal the fact that the state's ability to grant immunities and privileges expanded and contracted with wars and fiscal exigencies.

By reimagining the space of the early modern state, recent studies shed light on the complexities of socio-organizational change in the provinces and in the imperial capital. Research on Syria by Jean-Pierre Thieck and Karl Barbir points to the fact that Istanbul might decentralize, even devolve military authority unto provincial agents, while simultaneously building new nodes of state power throughout the empire. Policies of decentralization were no less important for the cohesion of the ruling elite. Rifa'at Abou-El-Haj documents how

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[47] Hourani, "The Changing Face of the Fertile Crescent," 100.

[48] See İnalcık, "Centralization and Decentralization."

[49] For representatives of this school, see Huri İslamoğlu-Inan, ed. *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). For a superb new monograph, see Edhem Eldem, *French Trade in Istanbul in the Eighteenth Century* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1999).

[50] Mehmet Genç, "Osmanlı Ekonomisi ve Şavaş," *Yapıt* 49 (1984): 52–61, Tables 49: (1984): 86–93; Genç "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikâne Sistemi," in *İktisat Tarihi Semineri*, ed. Osman Okyar and Ünal Nalbantoğlu (Ankara: Hacetepe Üniversitesi Yay., 1975), 231–96; and Genç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda: Devlet ve Ekonomi* (Istanbul: Ötüken, 2000).

a bureaucratic and military "aristocracy", lacking hereditary title or property, reproduced itself as an estate by extensive political households or patronage networks.[51] As we will see in chapter 2, prime access to information and resources, particularly fiscal favors, was essential to sustaining these networks. The Istanbul "aristocracy of service," took advantage of a distinctly old-regime type of insider trading or what the economist Joseph Stiglitz calls in a modern context "asymmetric information."[52]

Ottoman historians have another advantage in a critical rereading of the Tocquevillean account of institutional change in the eighteenth century. As an ancien régime writ large, Ottoman history has demanded a complex and often fragmented approach to its parts; indeed, it has never really been possible to investigate a polity, which at one time encompassed lands from Yemen to Hungary, using a single unit of analysis. Although modern notions of sovereignty (just as the ideology of absolutism and "reason of state" in the past) might require that political scientists maintain this fiction,[53] there is no reason for the historian to accept the category of the unitary state at face value.

As an anthropologist of law, Sally Falk Moore reminds fellow social scientists that even the contemporary state is an "organization of organizations" whose integration (and disintegration) over time occurs through competition and negotiation.[54] To put this in an early modern context, we might say that despite the growing concentration of coercive powers, autonomous behavior, and increased agility in coordinating its parts, the pre-modern state, as Tocqueville conceded

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[51] "The Ottoman Vezir and Pasha Households, 1683–1703: A Preliminary Report," *JAOS* 94 (1972): 438–47.

[52] Compare, Philip T. Hoffman, Gille Postel-Vinay, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, "Information and Economic History: How the Credit Market in Old Regime Paris Forces us to Rethink the Transition to Capitalism," *The American Historical Review* 101 (1999): 69–94.

[53] Nicholas Henshall, *The Myth of Absolutism: Change and Continuity in Early Modern European Monarchy* (London: Longman, 1992), esp. Introduction. See also J. P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," *World Politics* 20 (1968): 559–592. On the morrow of WWI, Harold J. Laski (*Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1917], 1) rendered it thusly: "Hegelianwise, we cannot avoid the temptation that bids us make our State a unity. It is to be all-absorptive. All groups within itself are to be but the ministrants to its life; their relativity is the outcome of its sovereignty since without it they could have no existence."

[54] Sally Falk Moore, *Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach* (London: Routledge, 1978), 1–31.

above, operated within a limited range and with varying degrees of efficiency. Rather than a monopoly of powers in the Weberian sense, the absolutist sovereign relied on a plurality of force: the early modern state ruled, but it did not govern.

In disaggregating the early modern state, the experience of Ottoman historiography also warns us about repeating the error of merely splitting a large territorial polity along what appears to be its most obvious sociological and spatial seams. Instead, it is the very irregularities of rule that give us some idea of the complex division of organizational and administrative labor, or of the "split capacities" between center and periphery, as well as between cities and the countryside. As Tocqueville himself conceded, this was not a zero-sum game in which the center perpetually gained the upper hand as peripheries surrendered powers. The governmental capacity of the province might grow alongside the expanding powers of the central state. These powers might be adjunctive or complementary; on other occasions local powers came into direct competition with the central state.

Taxation remains one of the more sensitive economic and socio-organizational indicators of the gradual process of state consolidation which also helps to map this division of labor in space. There is a fair degree of congruence among the old regimes of Europe and Asia in the timing of the first direct taxes. Although both the French and Ottoman centers introduced a variety of taxes from the sixteenth century onward, fiscal obligations and rents (whether deemed state or private) were still, in large part, diverted into local coffers. Officially or unofficially, this seepage was part of the equation of rule. Even as statesmen attempted to impose more "direct" methods of taxation, they were forced to devolve other facets of government to local actors in order to forge alliances. Ironically, rather than closing the power gap, increasing obligations also made for new opportunities for exemptions. In both France and the Ottoman Empire tax farming increased apace with direct taxation. The paradox remains: although tax farming dispersed state capacity, it also established uniform terms of contract between sovereign and a certain stratum of the subject population; it standardized an important political relationship.

New research on questions of privilege and property within Europe suggests that we should look to forms of decentralization and devolution of power to help us better appreciate the rise of modern gov-

ernment and changing political claims of subjects.[55] Such agreements were not merely economic transactions. Although privileges and immunities were not rights in the classical sense, they were far from ephemeral. In the Ottoman case, tax farming implicitly or explicitly entailed a redefinition of obligations and privilege, hence of political status. On a more abstract plane, long-standing privileges, like property, established new boundaries between state and society. Cumulatively, revenue contracting and venal offices often constituted veritable forms of governance. Moreover, these privileges or contractual relations established a baseline from which subjects might make new demands of central authority or, alternately, erect barriers against the further state encroachment on local authority.

By better appreciating variation within a single polity, disaggregating the premodern state also allows us to gauge the synchronicity and the contingency of state formation across the European and Asian meridian of territorial states as well as appreciating multilateral relationships with respect to other territorial states.[56] This reorientation is particularly critical for states like the Ottoman Empire, not only because of scale but also because of its geopolitical coordinates at the intersection of different regional systems.[57] As the "hinge" of Eurasia,[58] the Ottoman state responded to diverse forms of warfare, the pulse of discrete trade networks, and a multiplicity of administrative forms. In the West, the Ottoman state remained a critical guarantor, with France, of the balance of power within the

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[55] See Philip T. Hoffman and Kathryn Norberg, eds. *Fiscal Crises, Liberty, and Representative Government, 1450–1789* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).

[56] See Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990–1990* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990); and Otto Hintze, "The Formation of States and Constitutional Development: A Study in History and Politics," in *The Historical Essays*, ed. Felix Gilbert (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 157–178. Edward W. Soja ("Re-Presenting the Spatial Critique of Historicism," in Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Read-and-Imagined Places [Malden, MA and Oxford: M.I.T. Press, 1996], 164–185) takes discursive analysis to task and Hayden White's approach in particular, for de-territorialing the same contexts they pretend to historicize.

[57] The conflation of so-called empires with the colonizing nation-states of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries only further obscures the contrasts and similarities between historic polities. See Ariel Salzmann, "Toward a Comparative History of the Ottoman State, 1450–1850" *Archív orientální* (Oriental Archive) 66 (1998), special issue, Supplementa VIII, 351–66.

[58] Compare, William Hardy McNeill, *Venice: The Hinge of Europe, 1081–1797* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974) and McNeill, *Europe's Steppe Frontier, 1500–1800* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).

European state system until the end of the Seven Years War.[59] It was also an active participant in a very unstable West Asian system of states.

If the empire was the hinge, then Iran might well be considered the geopolitical epicenter of early modern European and Asian history. The protracted post-Safavid civil wars raged intermittently between 1720 and the final assumption of power by the Qajars after 1790. Spilling over into the Caucasus, Iraq, Central Asia, and India, the wars of the Iranian succession facilitated Russian and British expansion in Asia. The Ottoman Empire's own increasing territorial vulnerability during the last quarter of the eighteenth century was an indirect product of Nadir Shah's invasion of the Gulf and Mughal India and a direct consequence of the new global parameters of power after the Seven Years War. By the late eighteenth century the Ottoman Empire had lost a French counterweight to Britain in the Indian Ocean and to Russia in eastern Europe. Lacking a viable framework for a West Asian order, it also remained isolated from the emerging central European coalitions.[60]

Taking as a given the compound makeup of most premodern polities and the multiplicity of geopolitical contexts in which such entities operated, territorial scale becomes a historical, rather than an institutional, ethnic, or demographic question. Whether we consider the multiple divisions of Poland, the relatively lax colonial regime in North America or the administrative decentralization in pre-revolutionary France, new lessons were learned on the relationship of state building and the degree of administrative consolidation in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. To put the modern state in historical perspective demands that we recognize that in both

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[59] See Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); and Thomas Naff, "The Ottoman Empire and the European State System," in *The Expansion of International Society*, ed. H. Bull and A. Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 143–170.

[60] There have been several attempts to come to come to terms with the early modern "Euro-Asian" (Frank Perlin's term) and African state system. See, for example, Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization*. Vol. 3, *The Gunpowder Empires and Modern Times* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974); C. A. Bayly, *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780–1830* (London: Longman, 1989; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Connected Histories: Notes towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia," *Modern Asian Studies*, 31 (1997): 735–762; and Victor Lieberman, "Transcending East-West Dichotomies: State and Culture Formation in Six Ostensibly Disparate Areas," *Modern Asian Studies* 31 (1997): 463–546, among others.

France and the Ottoman Empire the first blow to the old regime was not ideological agitation or mass mobilization but fiscal crises, induced by prior military commitments.[61] Yet both reached an impasse. Ottoman vulnerability to fluctuations in financial markets was exacerbated by a political apparatus soldered by credit. As it began to retract privileges and reached more deeply into provincial pockets, Istanbul confronted resistance at many levels.

Summoning the will, neither the Ottoman Empire in 1793 nor France in 1788, could call upon the political, coercive, administrative or legislative means to enforce it. Even a relatively compact state, such as France (with a land mass that comprised a territory smaller than even the Ottoman "core" in Asia Minor) came up short at the end of the century. Although revolutionary mobilization in the context of a European-wide war overwhelmed the opposition and counter-revolution, the gap between the state apparatus and local government in the Ottoman Empire could not be filled by the emerging unitary state.

A rereading of the Tocquevillean investigation of the emergence of modern government and correction for its myopia in matters of geopolitics and world economy, suggests that the reasons for the parting of political paths between Europe and Asia can be explained only by considering the common conundrums of power left by the nearly simultaneous dissolution of the old regime political order. In all cases, the transition was rocky and protracted. Some states, Venice and Poland, to name only two, fell by the wayside. The old regime sputtered to a close over the course of four decades in the Ottoman Empire. Interruptions and detours in state programs of fiscal centralization after 1793 allowed provincial elites and local governments ample time to regroup and dig in their heels. With its many exposed territorial edges and the fluid geopolitical situation of the Napoleonic Wars, provincial powers were able to renegotiate their relationship with the central state with outside support. In sharp contrast to the care with which statesmen crafted and restored "Europe," including

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[61] Among many studies on this subject, see Larry Neal, *The Rise of Financial Capitalism: International Capital Markets in the Age of Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 180–214; and Frank Perlin, "Financial Institutions and Business Practices across the Euro-Asian Interface: Comparative and Structural Considerations, 1500–1900," in *The European Discovery of the World and Its Economic Effects on Pre-Industrial Society, 1500–1900: Papers of the Tenth International Economic History Congress*, ed. Hans Pohl (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1990), 257–303.

the offending French state after 1815, was the refusal of the Great Powers to extend equivalent recognition to Ottoman sovereignty or to guarantee its territorial integrity. This summary dissolution of the old-regime order and the expulsion of the Ottomans from the modern state system were rendered in a convenient euphemism: "The Eastern Question."[62] In the decades that followed every successful "exit" from the Ottoman Empire, including that of Greece in 1830 and Egypt after 1840, was mediated by foreign powers who not only conferred the laurels of sovereignty on local leadership but also militarily imposed new territorial divisions.[63]

Vocabularies of Early Modernity

Tocqueville might have learned much from the Ottoman old regime had he removed his geographical and cultural blinders. Yet he still would have been stymied for lack of a suitable lexicon. Indeed, one of the greatest handicaps for those who attempt comparative investigations of the early modern world, a world before the crude stamp of colonialism and the nation-state took its toll on the diversity of cultures and reduced the variations of political organization, has been the absence of a common historical vocabulary.

For a handle on the premodern polity, we might borrow Tocqueville's own all-embracing notion of the "ancien régime" (or old regime)[64] as a short hand for an amalgamated or, what Michael Hanagan would call, an "unconsolidated" state found in both Europe and Asia. If this term allows us to gather disparate facets of politics, society and economy under one historical umbrella, it also blurs the distinction between capacities that were dispersed in space. Rather than coining new terms, it might be best to modify existing terminology to acknowledge the inherent disjuncture of powers within the

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[62] Compare, Biancamaria Fontana, "The Napoleonic Empire and the Europe of Nations," in *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union*, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge, U.K. and Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002), 116–138.

[63] Consider, Albert O. Hirschman's *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).

[64] For the history of the term, see D. Venturino, "La Naissance de l'Ancien Régime," in *The Political Culture of the French Revolution*, ed. Colin Lucas (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988), 11–40.

premodern "state" and to emphasize the protracted and uneven historical process involved in their realignment in space and sociologically into what we now know as the modern state.

For the purpose of this inquiry, I use the term state in a relatively narrow sense: it corresponds to a limited set of institutions and individuals within a territorial policy; it refers to actors who ruled primarily from or through the capital city and via politywide institutions (e.g., the dynasty/palace/court, the judiciary and formulation of imperial law, administrative and military hierarchies, the regulation of internal and external trade). During the early modern period, even though domestic challengers remained, the autonomy of state centers grew as a result of competition in an interstate arena. States were armed with unprecedented stockpiles of weapons and standing armies; they dressed each other in identifiable cultural uniforms on the battlefields and established patterns of alliances through an expanding web of diplomatic exchanges. Advancing at times and retreating at others, socio-organizational elements of the state during the early modern period permeated the periphery and were reproduced in cognate forms, among and between them.

Having narrowed the sense and reference of the premodern "state," it is no less important to rename those dimensions of rule that escaped its direct cultural, coercive, and socio-organizational reach. Rather than conflating the notion of those who rule with those who govern, we might reserve the terms governance or government specifically for the complex of distinct provincial capacities: the quotidian acts of administration, adjudication, and enforcement. Not only was old-regime governance institutionally separate from many of the official organs of the state, it was also highly localized.[65] At the same time, it assured a peculiar form of standardization owing to the fact that government retained (in the case of the Ottomans) or gained (in many European contexts) elements of an overarching state "syntax." This partial capacity, constituted of fragments of standard idiom amid diverse languages of power, made each government a hybrid, a "vernacular."[66] Less inhibited by the officially constituted and chartered

[65] My sense of the "local" differs importantly from Clifford Geertz's (*Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology* [New York: Basic Books, 1983], 167–234) concept of "local knowledge."

[66] By vernacular I appeal to the relationship between the Latinate languages and

hierarchies of the center, vernacular governments could act through a variety of agents, including formally constituted bodies such as urban parliaments and advisory councils. In other cases, governmental agency was vested in individuals drawn from the "third estate" under special patents; or, in the absence of stronger claimants legitimized by the state, governmental powers were seized by rural lords, religious leaders, or revenue collectors.

In addition to the reminting of two concepts, readers will find an eclectic mix of historical idioms. For instance: in place of the traditional, often reified, dyad, *askeri/reaya* (military order/subject), I invoke the notion of the second and third estates. My intent is to highlight the central importance of privilege and fiscal immunity in the definition of status under the old regime, qualities that distinguished the Ottoman religious establishment, or *ulema/ilmiye* and its "aristocracy of service," the *rical-ı devlet*, no less than their French counterparts.[67] So too the non-class-based social umbrella conveyed by the notion of the "third estate" is eminently serviceable in the Ottoman context for the tax-paying *reaya*, a category that in theory designated gentry, bourgeoisie, and peasantry alike. By drawing out similarities, I can also better clarify what I regard to be the key differences between the European nobility and the Ottoman "aristocracy of service." It is precisely the inability to guarantee their patrimony from one generation to the next that gave rise to an extensive intra-generational form of accumulation ("corporate patrimonialism") through networks and fungible assets, like tax-farms.[68]

Latin during the Medieval period. Contrast, Jenny White, *Islamicist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), esp. Introduction.

[67] Gail Bossenga ("Society," in *Old Regime France*, ed. William Doyle [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001], 76) comments that "The legal system of the old regime had its roots in a far more personal and paternalistic society that failed to distinguish explicitly between personal status, political rule, and rights of property."

[68] Carter V. Findley (*Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789–1922* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980) stresses the singular importance of the political household in the formation of the Ottoman state. Although I would not dispute the importance of networks in this or any political organization, the specific strategies that I describe in chapter 2 are not uniquely Ottoman. In fact, I believe that they are constitutive of the institutional changes that are associated with political modernization. See Gernot Grabher and David Stark, eds. *Restructuring Networks in Post-Socialism: Legacies, Linkages, and Localities* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

Even in cases where the fit may appear more difficult, French or English equivalents have been used interchangeably with Ottoman terms for the purposes of fostering comparative reflection. (Indeed, the Armenian dragoman, Mouragea D'Ohsson [1740–1807] readily found French equivalents for Ottoman old-regime personnel and fiscal institutions throughout his multivolume opus.)[69] For example, the duties and origins of the chief, fiscal officer of a province, often called *voyvoda* in Ottoman parlance might have differed throughout the Ottoman Empire and was clearly not a replica of his next-of-kin in old-regime France, the *intendant*.[70] However, there is broad enough congruence on the social origins of these actors (members of the third estate), the nature of these offices within the respective old regimes and, no less importantly, the increasingly strategic position they occupied in the historical evolution of government-state relations, to warrant this risky translation.[71] In other cases, it seems only appropriate to swap Ottoman "buzz words" for terms with no less controversial baggage in their respective fields, such as the term "gentry" for the collective noun, *ayân-ı vilayet* and "judge" for *kadı*.[72]

The occasional importation of terminology (mainly of European extraction) in this study does in no way minimize the specificity of the old regime in North Africa and West Asia. Yet some exchange of historiographical argot is necessary in order to furnish a medium for comparison. Even as I attempt to translate parallel social and political arrangements, I have also preserved terms that are of special import to the history of the Ottoman and the larger Islamicate

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[69] *Tableau général de l'Empire othoman, divisé en deux parties, dont l'une comprend la législation mahométane; l'autre, l'histoire de l'Empire othoman* (Paris, Imp. de monsieur [Firmin Didot] 1787–1820), vol. 3, 370–371. He translated *eyalet* as "government"; and the life-lease (*malikâne*) becomes "ferme fiscale".

[70] Tocqueville (*The Old Régime*, 36) recounts a quip, made by John Law to the Marquis d'Argenson, to the effect that the administration of France rested in hands of two dozen intendants. For France, see J. F. Bosher, *French Finances 1770–1795: From Business to Bureaucracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

[71] In many instances, the reluctance to translate reveals an ideological unease with the consequences of equivalence rather than a penchant for historical specificity. See Frank Perlin, "Concepts of Order and Comparison, with a Diversion on Counter Ideologies and Corporate Institutions in Late Pre-Colonial India," in *Feudalism and non-European Societies*, ed. T. J. Byres and Harbans Mukhia (London: Frank Cass 1985), 87–165.

[72] See P. R. Coss, "The Formation of the English Gentry," *Past and Present* 147 (1995): 38–64. On attempts to redefine the social sense and reference of these groups, see Deena Sadat, "Notables in the Ottoman Empire: The Ayan," (Ph.D.

world (e.g., ulema, waqf, *timar, sipahi, malikâne*, etc.). These terms should form part of the growing lexicon of world and comparative early modern history. For general readers, in addition to the requisite glossary, I have tried cushioning the use of Ottoman terms with explanatory context to make them comprehensible or have provided a rough translation in parentheses. Finally, although I do from time to time make use of the Islamic calendar for the dating of documents or manuscripts, for simplicity's sake as much as to engage the standard, that is, Western, chronology of political change, I have employed a single, common-era dating system.

Vocabularies and calendars are some of the more obvious impediments to reconceptualizing the modern political time line. In the case of Islamic history, there has been a particularly insidious imbalance in the visual representation of the past, a veil over history created by the prolific output of nineteenth-century Orientalist painters.[73] In searching for a new way to narrate socio-organizational change in a distant time and place, over the past years I have made a concerted effort to locate new visual signposts. The result are the images that I have inserted within these pages. They should not be regarded as supplements to my text. Rather, these graphic references are an integral part of the narrative.

Sandwiched between two attempts to reappraise the historiographical legacy of Tocqueville, are three sketches of the Ottoman old regime. In chapter 1, questions of territoriality involve a dialogue with the cartographer and artist who produced one of perhaps three large polychromic maps on silk completed in the palace in Istanbul between 1727 and 1728.[74] Laden with both graphic and textual infor-

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diss. Rutgers University, 1969); and Engin D. Akarlı, "Provincial Power Magnates in Ottoman Bilad al-Sham and Egypt, 1740–1840," in *La vie sociale dans les provinces arabes a l'époque ottomane*, ed. Abdeljelil Temimi, vol. 3, 41–56 (Tunis: Publications du Centre d'Études et de Recherches Ottomanes, Morisques, de Documentation et d'Informations, 1988).

[73] There is a wealth of new studies on this subject following Edward Said's seminal *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1979) and Alain Grosrichard, *The Sultan's Court: European Fantasies of the East* (New York: Verso, 1998). See for example, Aslı Çirakman, *From the "Terror of the World" to the 'Sick Man of Europe': Images of Ottoman Empire and Society from the Sixteenth Century to the Nineteenth* (New York: Peter Lang, 2002).

[74] Topkapı Sarayı Museum Library (TKSK) H. 447. The map reproduced here is a retouched photograph (by Paula Hible) of the outline published as an large folded insert by Faik Reşid Unat without commentary in *Tarih Vesikaları* 1 (1941)

mation, this unusual map helps modern visitors explore the dimensions of premodern territoriality and the historical and logistical meanings of state domination. By setting the West Asian portions of the empire amidst the space of Eurasia, it also helps to alternate an understanding of the geography of sovereignty that has largely been apprized from its Mediterranean shores.

Chapter 2's discussion revolves around the portraits of the revelers and participants in the pageant that preceded the circumcisions of the sons of Ahmet III in 1720. As an introduction to the masks of Ottoman absolutism, these portraits of courtly life contain oblique references to the actual workings of the state. Evaluating position and repetition of imagery we might discern the increasing concentration of powers, under the omnipresent figures of the grand vizier and the bureaucracy, the Sublime Porte. We might also consider the social characteristics of the first and second estates, such as the members of the religious establishment, or ulema, the military and the bureaucracy seated at the table of the sultan. Hidden from view, however, are the imperial circuits of distribution cemented by the burgeoning market in life-leases (*malikâne mukataât*) and the Islamicate nexus of finance capitalism that tied the ulema, courtiers, and gentry-officers to the Christian and Jewish bankers of Istanbul and the merchants of Marseilles.

In chapter 3, we reexamine one of those infamous tax-farming registers produced by the clerks of the ancien régime.[75] Adjusted for the parallax of modern expectations,[76] this document becomes an eloquent witness of the fluidity of state-government relationships and administrative changes within the province of Diyarbekir. Tracing the transfer of title from central-state to provincial actors reveals the shift in the balance of powers. Meandering notations

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between pages 160–161. Thomas D. Goodrich provided much important bibliographic information and brought to my attention other copies of the map in Turkey and Austria. Permission for reproduction of the outline was provided by the Türk Tarih Kurumu.

[75] Photocopy (and permission) from Başbakanlık Arşivi for the reproduction of a page from register MMD 9518, "*Defter-i Mukataât-ı Malikânehâ-i Mezkûre der Eyâlet-i Diyarbekir*," registering transactions on tax farms from 1697 to 1791. MMD 9519 spans the years 1792 to 1845 in the same province. Among the other examples, are Tokat, MMD 9543; Athens, MMD 9512; Mosul, MMD 9611; Damascus, MMD 9530, 9538; and Erzurum, MMD 9517.

[76] See James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

across the page serve as an apt metaphor for the "creative destruction" of revenue contracting that dissolved the administrative boundaries between town and country laid down in the early centuries of the empire. Venal offices bring into relief the vernacular government of provincial cities and the role of the urban gentry, what Tocqueville might have called a "petty oligarchy," in perpetuating rule.

After exploring these facets of the old regime in West Asia, this study returns to the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville and his Ottoman contemporary, the religious scholar and pro-reform statesmen, Ahmed Cevdet Pasha. In our conclusion, we consider one among the many possible sequels to the old regime in the Ottoman Empire while raising new questions about the nineteenth-century imperatives and prejudices which continue to haunt contemporary social scientific thought.

CHAPTER ONE

ON A MAP OF EURASIA

There was no need to inscribe the words "the realms of the exalted Ottoman state" (*memâlik-i Devlet-i Âliye-i Osmaniye*) over the broad areas of early modern maps of Europe and Asia.[1] Literate audiences of the period would have instantly recognized the outline of Ottoman Empire. Over the span of four centuries the sultans had reassembled virtually all the territories that had once made up the Roman Empire in Europe, Africa, and Asia, striking terror and awe in the hearts of the sovereigns of Christendom. Of its continental territories, Ottoman Asia remained the empire's largest—nearly twice the area of its European lands and roughly half of its entirety.[2] Despite letters, treatises, and reports by travelers, merchants, and an occasional natural scientist, Western scholars remained largely ignorant of Ottoman economic, political, and social geography. Beyond the sliver of terra firma bordering the Mediterranean and its major trading towns and highways, Dutch and Italian maps of the day filled in these lacunae with classical and biblical references.[3] Even an

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[1] In addition to well-known maps by Gerard Mercato (1512–94) and Jodocus Hondius, Sr. (1563–1612), see Willem Blaeu's 1617 maps of the "Turcicum Imperium," in Joan Blaeu's widely circulating *Atlas Major* (1662); reprint, introduced and edited by Johan Gross (London: Random House, 1997). In 1668, a copy of the *Atlas* was presented to the Ottoman court by Justin Collier, the Dutch ambassador, and translated by Ebu Bekir b. Bahram al-Dimişki in 1685 (Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, Ramazan Şeşen, M. Serdar Bekar, Gülcan Gündüz, and A Hamdi Furat, eds., *Osmanlı Coğrafya Literatürü* [Istanbul: IRCICA, 2000], vol. 1, 111).

[2] Donald Edgar Pitcher (*An Historical Geography of the Ottoman Empire from the Earliest Times to the End of the Sixteenth Century with Detailed Maps to Illustrate the Expansion of the Empire* [Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972], 134) estimates the empire's land surface in 1606 to have been 1,071,000 square miles, including vassals. See also Andreas Birken, *Die Provinzen des Osmanischen Reiches* (Wiesbaden: Beihefte zum Tübinger Atlas des Vorderen Orients, 1976) and logistical maps in Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare, 1500–1700* (London: University of London Press, 1999). For comparison with the Roman Empire's frontiers along the Danube, Euphrates, and Rhine, C. R. Whittaker, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire: A Social and Economic Study* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

[3] Ir. C. Koeman, *Joan Blaeu and His Grand Atlas: Introduction to the Facsimile Edition of "Le Grand Atlas," 1663* (Amsterdam: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1970), 84.

Enlightenment polymath who prided himself on an encyclopedic knowledge of surveying techniques and the ability to classify flora and fauna with Linnæan precision, such as Count Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli, in his 1732 encyclopedia of Ottoman military structure deferred to the authority of the Muslim scientist Ebu Bekir Efendi al-Dimişki, whose map provided Ottoman administrative divisions ("Beylerbati, Passalati, e Beylati" [sic]).[4] So, too, at the eve of the Seven Years War, the French cartographer Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon D'Anville (1697–1782), famed for his geographies of Africa, Asia, and the Americas, confessed his reliance on Katıp Çelebi's world geography, *Cihânumâ*, in describing the lands between Afghanistan and the Indus in his own *Éclaircissements Géographiques sur la Carte de l'Inde* (1753).[5]

We do not know the name or qualifications of the Ottoman cartographer who at some point between 1727 and 1728 completed the large map of Eurasia reproduced in black and white outline in figure 2.[6]

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[4] *Stato Militare dell'Impero Ottomanno* (Amsterdam and Hague: Herm. Uytawerf & Franc. Changuion, 1732; reprint, Graz-Austria: Akademische Druck Verlagsanstalt, 1972), vol. 1, 9–10, insert. On Ebübekir b. Behrâm'ın Nusretü'l İslâm's (ad-Dimaski) maps, see G. J. Halasi-Kun, "The Map of 'Şeki-i Yeni Felemenk Maa İngiliz' in Ebubekir Dimişki's *Terciime-i Atlas Mayor*," *Archivium Ottomanicum* 11 (1988): 51–70. On Marsigli, see John Stoye, *Marsigli's Europe, 1680–1730: The Life and Times of Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli, Soldier and Virtuoso* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

[5] "La pluspart des lieux marqués sur ma carte entre Kandahar & l'Indus, je les dois a la geographie Turque, conpilée par Kiatib-shelebi, sous le titre de Gehan-Numa (le miroir du Monde)," confesses Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon D'Anville in his *Eclaircissements Geographiques su La Carte de l'Inde* (Paris: De l'Imprimerie royale, 1753), 20. For D'Anville's place in the early cartography, Leo Bagrow, *History of Cartography*, 2d ed., revised and enlarged by R. A. Skelton (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1985), 185–86.

[6] TKSK H. 447. The map measures 210 cm. × 150 cm. Faik Reşid Unat (*Tarih Vesikaları* 1 [Istanbul, 1941], 160 insert) published an outline of it without commentary, which I have reproduced in Fig. 2; passing mention is made by Ahmet Karamustafa in J. B. Harley and David Woodward, eds., Joseph E. Schwartzberg, Gerald R. Tibbetts, and Ahmet T. Karamustafa, assoc. eds., *The History of Cartography* vol. 2 pt. 1, *Cartography in the Traditional Islamic and South Asian Societies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 225; Thomas D. Goodrich, "Old Maps in the Library of the Topkapı Palace in Istanbul," *Imago Mundi* 45 (1993): 120–33. Professor Goodrich calls TKSK H. 447 "the first modern political and economic Ottoman map." He attributes the Iranian geography to a map of Iran found in J. B. Homan's *Neuor Atlas*, a copy of which is also in the Topkapı Sarayı Library (H. 2740). According to Goodrich, another copy of the same map, albeit lacking coloring, is found in the Istanbul Archeological Museum. I am extremely grateful to him for his attention to this chapter and for sharing photographs of a third copy, found in the Kriegsarchiv in Vienna.



Fig. 2 An outline drawing of a map produced in the palace of Ahmed III. One of several colored copies, the original is found in the Topkapı Sarayı Museum Library (H. 447). After Faik Reşid Unat, ed. *Tarih Vesikaları* 1 (1941): 160–161. By permission of the Türk Tarih Kurumu and Topkapı Sarayı Museum.

Clearly, however, he is a beneficiary of an ongoing exchange of scientific information between East and West. The science of cartography in the Ottoman Empire advanced with the arrival of European manuals on geography and mapmaking.[7] Translations of new surveying methods and descriptions of unseen lands enriched an already well developed Islamic scientific foundation. By the early eighteenth century, in addition to manuscripts describing the New World and portolan charts of the oceans, maps of Europe, the Black Sea, and the Caspian rolled off the presses of the court engineer İbrahim Müteferrika (1674–1744). An officer of Hungarian origin, İbrahim's efforts were supported by sultans and viziers.[8]

Even by the rigorous scientific and artistic standards of the day, the anonymous cartographer's effort is prodigious, unique for its subject matter, scale, and artistry. On the original, an enormous canvas tableau (measuring three meters in length and a meter and half in height), we would see an empire drawn across the "Asia" of Ptolemy in the measure of Alexander the Great. In this rendering, Eurasia stretches from the borders of Rumeli (Thrace) at the far left to the Pamirs and the foothills of the Himalayas near its right border.[9]

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[7] Generally, Abdulhak Adnan Adivar, *Osmanlı Türklerinde Ilım* (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 1943). Katib Çelebı or Haci Halifa Mustafa ibn Abullah was familiar with Mercator's *Atlas Major* (Bagrow, *History of Cartography*, 210–211). On the impact of European science on the Ottomans during the first half of the eighteenth century, see Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu et al., eds., *Osmanlı Coğrafya Literatürü*, vol. 1, 111–43. In 1732, İbrahim Müteferrika published Katib Çelebı's (Haci Halifa Mustafa b. Abdullah) *Kitab-ı* Cihânnüma (Constantinople). On the state of Islamic cartography, see also David A. King, *World Maps for Finding the Direction and Distance of Mecca: Examples of Innovation and Tradition in Islamic Science* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1999); and Thomas D. Goodrich, *The Ottoman Turks and the New World: A Study of Tarih-i Hind-i Garbi and Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Americana* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1990). For sixteenth-century European maps of the Ottoman Empire, see Jerry Brotton, *Trading Territories: Mapping the Early Modern World* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).

[8] See Turgut Kut and Fatma Türe, eds., *Yazmadan Basmaya: Müteferrika, Mühendishane, Uskudar* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi, 1996); William J. Watson, "İbrahim Müteferrika and Turkish Incunabul," *JAOS* 88 (1968): 435–41; Halasi Kun, "İbrahım Müteferrika" İA 5, pt. 2: 896–900; Ibrahim Müteferrika published Katib Çelebı's *Kitab-ı Cihannuma* in 1732. On the exchange of information between Europe and the empire, Virginia H. Aksan, *An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700–1783* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), 34–42.

[9] There is a Ptolemaic conception of Asia at work; note book 7 of *Ptolemy's Geography* (Lennart Berggren and Alexander Jones, *Ptolemy's Geography: An Annotated Translation of the Theoretical Chapters* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000]). See also Karl J. Schmidt, *An Atlas and Survey of South Asian History* (Armonk, N. Y. and London: Missouri Southern State College, Sharpe: 1995), 19; and Serpil Bağcı,

Without betraying the secrets behind its commission, much less the patron's political aims, the map still resonates with imagined deliberations in vizierial chambers concerning history, technology, and territorial ambitions. The mottled colorings of provinces and territories contrast with one another in soft blue, red and yellow while the pale green seas appeal to the aesthetic inclination of the viewer, as well as enhancing the map's topographical and regional character.[10]

It is not improbable that map celebrated the empire's newest military conquests. The armies of Sultan Ahmed III (r. 1703–1730) and his son-in-law, Grand Vizier Nevşehirli İbrahim Pasha (r. 1718–1730), were victorious in the lands of what had been their chief Muslim rival, the Shi'i Safavid shah of Iran. Occupying the cities of Tabriz and Hamedan, the sultan had annexed the provinces of Azarbayjan, Kermanshah, and Luristan. The members of imperial council, the *divan*, undoubtedly debated the czar's strategy in the Volga region. Looking east beyond "Turan"—the great middle ground between the empires—they might have contemplated the status of the country of Tibet (already under Manchu rule), which is profiled in upper-right corner.

In two large cartouches that obscure part of Arabia and Upper Egypt, the cartographer puts his purposes in more modest terms:

> The principal aim and object of this map is to render a pictorial and written account in accordance with the principles of the science of geography, the clime, or rather the continent of, Asia; its countries, towns, territories, seas, mountains and rivers, from the felicitous seat of the abode of the kingdom, the most excellent Istanbul, eastward to the lands of India. And within this expanse [its objective] is [also] to capture to the best of our ability, the breadth and length of the settlements, seas, countries, and lands over which the exalted Ottoman state rules . . . to record in picture and text those of the land of Iran otherwise known as "Acem" and those of [the lands of] Turan, in the vicinity of the Oxus river, as well as [the region of] Transoxiana . . .

"Osmanlı Dünyasında Efsanevı Yönetıcı Imgesı Olarak Büyük Iskender ve Osmanlı Iskendernamesi," in *Humana Boskurt Güvenç e Armağan* (Istanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1994), 111–31, for the geographical conquests and the later iconography of Alexander the Great within Ottoman art.

[10] Karen Pinto (American University in Beirut) gave me a brief introduction to the importance of color in medieval Islamic world maps. Compare, François de Dainville, *Le langage des géographes: termes, signes, couleurs des cartes anciennes, 1500–1800* (Paris: A. et J. Picard, 1964).

> where today reside the Uzbek, Çağatay, Turks, Turkmen and Tatar and other tribes and clans . . .[11]

The scale of this enterprise appears to intimidate the cartographer. He seems unsure of his ability to do justice to the many kingdoms and lands that he has been commissioned to depict. The legends, commentary, and captions written over the map are more than ornament. They enhance his images with historical explication, orientation, and institutional relief, compensating in words for the limits of his visual knowledge. In deference to his sovereign, Istanbul figures prominently in the upper right of his canvas, but the cartographer cannot but pay greater homage to Mecca and Medina. He embellishes the symbols for the Holy Cities of Islam and places them at the nexus of many lines of trade and pilgrimage. Giving short shrift to the birthplace of the Prophet Muhammad, he apologizes for his omission of much of the Arabian peninsula by reminding his viewers that the areas inhabited by the beduins are so large that "it takes six and half months to travel the length and breadth."[12]

Words allow him to provide potentially useful logistical information beyond the empire. He offers the approximate distances between Georgia and the Black Sea, the length, in *farsakhs* (farshakh/parasang, a league or 3 miles) of the province of Azarbayjan. He inscribes over the Persian Gulf the number of days, thirty-two, it takes monsoon winds to speed a dhow from the Makran coast to Oman.

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[11] The author is presently preparing a translation of the entire text with a detailed analysis of the map for publication. "Hakki buyurulmaya ki, asitane-i saadet aşiyane-i belde tayibbe-i Konstantiniye'den ibtidaen olup, şarkta memâlik-i Hindustan'a varinca mesafe-i mübeyinde vaki memâlik ve bilad, yerar, bihar, cibel, ve enhar kaide-i fenn-i coğrafya üzre resm ve tahrir olunmak iş bu haritada umde ve maksud ul-asl olduğuna binaen, iklim-i Asya tabir olunur kitaya dahil ve mesafe-i merkumede vaki olup, tulen ve arzen daire-i Devlet-i Âliye-i Osmaniye'nin hakim olduğu yer ve bihar ve memâlik ve bilad al'el-kader ül'[ittikan ?] tersim ve teşkil olunup, Iran-Zemin tabir olunur Acem dahi bitamam ma'dud resm ve tahrir ve Nehr-i Ceyhun'un mavaresinde Turan Zeminde . . . hala mesken-i tava'if-i Özbek ve Çağatay ve Türk ve Türkmen ve Tatar ve sair kaba'il ve aşa'ir meskunları olan memâlik-i Maaveraünnehir . . ."

[12] "İklim-i Ceziret'ül-Arap, bu iklim on iki kisma taksim olunup . . . bu iklimin mesafesi ve devri altı buçuk ay mesafe olup, iş bu haritada tamamen resmine mesaha olma(ma)ğla, Mekke-i Mükereme ve Medine-i Münvvera vaki olduğu memleket-i Hicaz'dan ve bâdiyeden bir miktar resm iktifa olunmuştur . . ." For more on the Hijaz during this period, see Abdulrahman S. M. Alorabi, "The Ottoman Policy in the Hejaz in the Eighteenth Century: A Study of Political and Administrative Developments, 1143–1202." (Ph.D. diss., University of Utah, 1988).

Indeed, his lines are meant to convey movement as well as static information. They represent the pilgrims, soldiers, and merchants traveling in convoys along highways and linkages between cities. The oceans surge: a galley sets sail on the Mediterranean. Yet as he proceeds eastward, the reliability of his comments falters and his information about the current state of affairs in the eastern regions of Iran wears thin. And he seems unaware of the political disposition of either Afghanistan or India.[13]

Although these inaccuracies may have troubled and certainly misled his contemporaries, they in no way detract from the map's cultural and historical value. As a densely coded document of a past conception of space as much as a graphic description of the larger Eurasian context of the empire, it is the combination of the textual (*tahrir*) and the graphic (*resm*) that leads modern viewers closer toward the "multitude of intersections" that qualify an Ottoman appreciation of territoriality in the early eighteenth century.[14] Often these mediums of conveying information take us in opposite directions. As an image of mountains, deserts, and rivers, the map draws our gaze toward the two great inland "seas," the Black and the Caspian, and to the foci of Russo-Ottoman conflict during the eighteenth century. The narrative, by contrast, describes the political and institutional space of states. The legend leads our eye not from the center or from the edges but from west to east, beginning with Anatolia, or as the cartographer prefers, "Asia Minor" ("Küçük Asya," his translation from the Latin). In a landscape without graphic boundaries or borders, the description of provinces and principalities in words, not lines, slices through painstakingly rendered topographic details depicting the high plateaus of Anatolia and Iran, the mountain ranges

[13] See W. Bartold, *An Historical Geography of Iran*, trans., Svat Soucek (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Khorasan is rendered as the "clime" (*iklim*) of "Hirandan," though correctly identified by its cities of Herat, Nishapur, and the site of the tomb of Imam Rıza (i.e., Mashhad). These and other mistakes lead me to suspect that a painter, rather than a geographer, supervised and executed the final versions.

[14] Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 33. For different views on the historical meaning of space, see Edward Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (London: Verso, 1989); Robert D. Sack, *Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); and David Harvey, "On the History and Present Conditions of Geography: An Historical Materialist Manifesto," *Professional Geographer* 3 (1984): 1–11.

and deserts of the Hindu Kush, and along the riverine systems from the Nile to the Amu Darya.

This is a landscape of classical proportions, drawn in accordance with modern, that is, mimetic, cartographic standards. As such, it is not simply another, less familiar way of framing the Ottoman Empire on a world map. Rather, by inserting this European and Asian state in a contiguous meridian of state from the Mediterranean eastward, it emphatically conveys to modern viewers the cultural artifice of "Europe" and of a "natural" division between Orient and Occident. Ottoman Asia is not external to but hinges on an intersecting political geography. It serves as a check on European expansion in the Balkans and continues to shape and constrain the ever-changing balance of power among the great powers of continental Christendom that emerged in the aftermath of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1714. Sitting out the exhausting series of dynastic squabbles of the first half of the eighteenth century, not only that of Spain but of Poland (1731–35) and Austria (1740–48), the Ottoman military, though weakened, held its forward line in "Europe," to the consternation of both the Habsburgs and Russians.

Territorially, however, the gravitational center of this map is not the Ottoman Empire per se. Rather, by dint of its rendering of Ptolemaic Asia, it emphasizes Iran, the center of an unfolding drama whose impact would reverberate globally. The collapse of the Safavid state in 1722 with an invasion of its former Afghan vassals was not simply another example of the fragility of dynastic regimes and the tentative nature of the territorial state. As the opening salvo in a series of devastating civil wars (resumed in 1747 and again in 1779), or what should properly be called the Iranian Wars of Succession, it also proved the tenacity of the Safavid political system, for the ensuing seven decades of conflict invariably brought forward a claimant from among the dynasty's former tribal confederates. Although the initial phases of the war drew in Iran's more powerful neighbors, the Ottomans and Russians, the partition of Iran would not hold. Moreover, between 1739 and 1741, the Iranian wars fatefully spilled across the Indian Ocean.[15]

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[15] Virginia Aksan's comments ("Ottoman War and Warfare, 1453–1812," in *War in the Early Modern World*, ed. Jeremy Black [London: University College London Press, 1999], 147–76) on the military constraints of the empire serve as a much needed antidote to a rather sweeping and overly simplistic assessment of West Asian

Edges of Empires

The cartographer is rather tight-lipped about the extent of the Ottoman incursion into its neighbor, Safavid Iran. Perhaps that is because the sultan had only recently signed a new trade agreement with Shah Sultan Huseyin II (r. 1694–1722).[16] By setting aside the rhetoric of Shi'i-Sunni sectarianism, nearly a century of peace prevailed between the two countries, lasting from the Treaty of Zuhab (1639) until the Ottoman invasion of Luristan and Azarbayjan in 1724. Quiet on the eastern frontier had freed the Ottomans to continue their expansion into the Aegean and to launch a final, ill-considered bid to pluck the "red apple" of Vienna from the center of Catholic Europe in 1683. In the humiliating aftermath of the Peace of Karlowitz (1699), which ceded Hungary to the Holy Roman Emperor, this pattern of mutual recognition and peaceful negotiation with the shah of disputes over trade routes and tariffs allowed the Ottomans to counter Peter the Great at Pruth in 1711 and to salvage the Morea from Venice four years later.

Yet the death of Huseyin II with the Ghalzai invasion overturned the West Asian order suddenly and radically. Profiting from the Afghan siege and occupation of Isfahan, Russian troops occupied the silk-producing Caspian provinces of Dagestan and Shirvan. As the surviving Safavid heir, Shah Tahmasb II (r. 1722–1732?), fled northward toward his Qizilbash confederates, the Afshars and Qajars, members of the Ottoman imperial council (*divan*) weighed their response.[17] In an unusual meeting of minds, mediated by the French

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geopolitics in the eighteenth century, including that of C. A. Bayly in *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780–1830* (London: Longman, 1989). For an inclusive and interactive approach to Europe-Eurasia, see Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990–1990* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990) and Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). For chronology, see Ismail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *XVIII Yüzyıl*, vol. 4, pts. 1 and 2, *Osmanlı Tarihi* (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1983); and Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhardt, eds., *The Timurid and Safavid Periods*, vol. 6 of *The Cambridge History of Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

[16] Münir Aktepe, ed., *1720–1724 Osmanlı-Iran Münasebetleri ve Silahşör Kemani Mustafa Ağa'nın Revan Fetih-Namesi* (Istanbul: Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1970), 6–8.

[17] Ibid. For a pioneering study on the Ottoman policy during its occupation of Iran, see Fariba Zarinebaf-Shahr, "Tabriz under Ottoman Rule, 1725–1730" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1991). See also B. H. Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1949); and Raoul Motika and Michael Ursinus,

ambassador, Ahmed III agreed to recognize Peter the Great's gains in the Caspian. The czar, in exchange, acquiesced to the sultan's territorial ambitions in Azarbayjan and Georgia.[18]

The opportunity to push the Ottoman frontier forward into the Caucasus and western Iran was not missed, although this military gamble and potential overreach of manpower and supply lines was still carried out within an overall geopolitical calculus of East-West commitments. Yet, as the Russo-Ottoman agreement to partition Iran demonstrates, force of arms was increasingly tempered with diplomacy. From the outset of the century, West Asia was abuzz with envoys and new diplomatic initiatives.[19] The Ottoman court received an embassy from the Kalmyk tribes of the eastern Volga in search of an alliance that would protect them from the Russians in Astrakhan.[20] Viziers entertained ambassadors from the Uzbek ruler of Transoxiana, the empire's habitual Sunni partner and beneficiary of its military technology in containing the "heretical" Safavids.[21] After years of silence, the new Mughal sultan, Farrukhsiya, dispatched a plenipotentiary to Istanbul in 1712–13, in the first of what appears to have been several missions.[22]

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eds., *Caucasia between the Ottoman Empire and Iran, 1555–1914* (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2000).

[18] Aktepe, *1720–1724 Osmanlı-Iran Münasebetleri*, 19–32; J. C. Hurewitz, *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics*, 2 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 1:65–74; and Ernest Tucker's excellent analysis, "The Peace Negotiation of 1736: A Conceptual Turning Point in Ottoman-Iranian Relations," *TSA Bulletin* 20 (1996): 16–37.

[19] P. Kahle, "China as Described by Turkish Geographers from Iranian Sources," *Proceedings of the Iran Society*, vol. 11 (London, 1940), 48–59.

[20] On the ill-fated negotiations initiated by Kalmyks with the Russians, the Manchu, and the Ottomans between 1704 and 1714, Michael Khodarkovsky, *Where Two Worlds Met: The Russian State and the Kalmyk Nomads, 1600–1771* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 139, 153–55.

[21] Sultan Ahmad II (r. 1691–1695) toyed with the idea of joint action against the Safavids in 1691. However, the Uzbek dynasty itself was fractured. Undoubtedly this is why the cartographer describes Balkh as a "part of Khorasan [which] has many rulers and towns. Currently, it is under the rule of Uzbeks." See also J. Audrey Burton, "Relations between Bukhara and Turkey," *IJTS* 5 (1990–91): 83–103; and on the arrival of the Uzbek ambassador, *Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi (1099–1116/1688–1704)*, ed. Abdülkadir Özcan (Ankara: Türk Tarihi Kurumu Basımevi, 2000), 222.

[22] On Ottoman claims to the caliphate and relations with the Mughals, see Naimur Rahman Farooqi, *Mughal-Ottoman Relations: A Study of Political and Diplomatic Relations between Mughal India and the Ottoman Empire, 1556–1748* (New Delhi: Idarah-i Adabiyat-i Delhi, 1989), 6–71.

If contacts among West Asian states remained episodic, the first decades of the century witnessed a phase of sustained, multilateral diplomatic relations with the empire's Western neighbors, the "Christian nations" (*milel-i nasrani*). Throughout the century, France, which under Louis XIV began casting its diplomatic net ever wider in eastern Europe, the Black Sea, and the Indian Ocean, retained its place as most favored ally. Yet Istanbul also recognized the need to diversify its alliances in the Mediterranean and signed new treaties and commercial agreements with the British and Dutch.[23] At war again between 1737 and 1739 with Austria and Russia, to which he lost the key Crimean fortress of Azov in 1736, the sultan tried to hem in the czar diplomatically in the Baltic by concluding agreements with both Sweden and Denmark.[24]

Certainly, "friends" like the king of France were able to wrest unprecedented liberties in the Red Sea, with respect to Christian holy sites in Palestine, in addition to expanding their commercial privileges in Istanbul itself.[25] However, the Sun King and his successors repaid the sultan in kind. French diplomatic finesse proved invaluable in the complicated negotiations with Habsburg Austria that resulted in the restoration of Ottoman control over the city of Belgrade in 1739. After the heyday of Franco-Ottoman relations under the embassy of the Marquis Louis Sauveur de Villeneuve

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[23] Halil İnalcık, "Imtiyâzât," *EI*[2] 3: 1178–1189. Ottoman missions to Europe included Russia (1722–23, 1740–42), Austria (1719, 1730, 1748, 1757–58), France (1721), and Poland (1730, 1757–58) (Faik Reşit Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri* [Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1987]). See also İbrahim Müteferika's description of the different forms of government in Europe, *Usûl'ûl-Hikem fî Nizâmü'l-Umem*, ed. Adel Şen (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1995); and the extremely interesting, though anonymous, "dialogue" between a Christian and Muslim officer from this period, published by Faik Reşid Unat, "Ahmed III devrine ait bir Islahat Takiri," *Tarih Vesikaları* 1 (1941): 107–21. For examples of reports and analysis of individual missions during the first half of the eighteenth century, see Beynun Akyavaş, ed., *Yirmisekiz Çelebi Mehmed Efendi'nin Fransa Sefâretnâmesi* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1993), and *Mubadele—An Ottoman Russian Exchange of Ambassadors*, annotated and translated by Norman Itzkowitz and Max Mote (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). For an overview of Ottoman-European diplomatic practice, see Maria Pia Pedani's meticulous study, *In Nome del Gran Signore: Inviati Ottomani a Venezia della Caduta di Costantinopoli alla Guerra di Candia* (Venezia: Deputazione Editrice, 1994) and Aksan's *An Ottoman Statesman*.

[24] Charles of Sweden sought Ottoman help as early as 1709. Karl A. Roider, Jr., *Austria's Eastern Question, 1700–1790* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 18.

[25] France, too, dreamed of dividing the empire according to L. Darperon, "Le Grand Dessein sécret de Louis XIV," *Revue de Géographie* 1 (1877): 435–61.

between 1728 and 1741, Versailles' regard for its ally, the Sublime Porte, may have waxed and waned over the second half of the century. Nonetheless, the Porte's military presence in the heart of Europe as much as the prospect of furthering Russian territorial gains at Ottoman expense in the East, remained a sobering thought for Vienna. Peace held with Istanbul from 1740 to 1769.[26]

The increasing frequency of diplomatic exchange was bound to have an impact on the way Ottoman statesmen saw other powers, as well as on the way both sides came to view the still illusive concept of territorial sovereignty during this period.[27] Certainly the battle cry in Europe to "throw the Turk completely out of Europe," remained as loud as ever and, invoking the spirit of the Crusades, still enlisted the support of Pope Clement XII, who levied a special tithe on Church properties within Austria itself in 1737. Yet depending on the context, one might discern that the Realpolitik between states and the succession crises contributed to an overall muting of traditional religious and sectarian overtones in favor of respect for dynastic claims.[28] Continued Ottoman negotiations with the last Safavids (Tahmasp II [r. 1722–29] and 'Abbas III [r. 1729–36]), although without issue, did have their political motivation. By begrudging recognition to both the Sunni Afghan and Tahmasp Kuli Khan, the Afshar regent who would declare himself sovereign under the name of Nadir Shah in 1736, indeed, condemning both as rebels, Ottoman statesmen clung to the fiction of the Safavid dynastic legitimacy.[29]

Rather than trying to reconcile the semantic drift among historical accounts, diplomatic formulae, religious treatises, and internal

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[26] For more on Habsburg-Ottoman relations, see Roider, *Austria's Eastern Question*. And for an introduction to Russia's "Iran question," see Muriel Atkin, *Russia and Iran, 1780–1828* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980).

[27] Note the utterly contradictory reports of the extravagant Ottoman embassy to Vienna in 1718. Roider, *Austria's Eastern Question*, 59.

[28] Much to the unhappiness of Austria, the Ottomans took their inclusion in intra-European diplomacy quite seriously: they tried to mediate the Austrian war of succession and sent a protest to Maria Theresa's after her decision to expel the Jews of Prague whom she charged with collusion with Prussia. Roider, *Austria's Eastern Question*, 77, 95.

[29] Tucker, "The Peace Negotiation of 1736," 22. Decades of war would eventually prod Istanbul into formal recognition of Nadir Shah. But the Safavids continued in effigy: the last puppet shah, Ismail III, would die in 1773. See J. R. Perry, "The Last Safavids, 1722–73," *Iran* 9 (1971): 59–70.

memos, we may defer to our cautious cartographer, whose words and images match terminology with coordinates in space.[30] However, to reconsider sovereignty from this perspective does require modern viewers to suspend their operating understanding of the unitary state as it emerged in the nineteenth century and with Ratzelian notions of political geography.[31] Indeed, early modern rule was far from even: from the center to its frontier, state control was a question of degrees and forms. Above all, it was a matter of the mapmaker's perspective.

Describing the permutations of power from Istanbul, the cartographer naturally accords his own patrons the highest expressions of "stateness": it is the Ottomans who rule (*hakim*), "enjoy the fruits of" (*tassaruf*) or vanquish (*zapt*) territory. Defining the gradations between direct institutional control— conveyed by the Ottoman division into provinces (*eyalet*) and military districts (*sancak*) or, for the Safavids, into command units (*tumen*)—and the myriad forms of suzerainty remains an exercise in frustration: often on the map's face or in the legend one reads the term *tâbi* [dependent] in conjunction with a dynastic title over lands, peoples, and cities. He thus recognizes lands attributed to the Uzbeks, the Safavids, the czars (Moscow), and the Mughals ("Monarch of India").

Apparently, other considerations enter into our mapmaker's evaluation of suzerainty, vassalage, and tributary polities. Before doubling back in his legend to acknowledge the Ottoman occupation of Tiflis and Kaht,[32] the cartographer relates that Georgia, a non-trib-

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[30] Navigation and shipping terminology had long been received multiple influences. For an example of the hybridity of geographic idiom, see the treatise of Bartınlı İbrahim Hamdi (Cengiz Orhonlu, "XVIII Yüzyılda Osmanlılarda Coğrafya ve Bartınlı İbrahim Hamdi'nin Atlası," *Tarih Dergisi* 10 (1959): 115–40). İbrahim uses such locutions as the "European frontier," ("hudud-i Avrupa") and translates the papal state in Rome with the term "hükümet" (reserved in Ottoman parlance for the enclaves ruled by Kurdish dynasties). This comparison, beyond the bounds of the present work, must take as its point of departure Katib Çelebi's *Kitab-ı* Cihânnüma: see Gottfried Hagen, *Ein osmanischer Geograph bei der Arbeit. Entstehung and Gedankenwelt von Kâtib Çelebis Cihânnümâ.* Ph.D. diss., Freie Universität Berlin, 1996).

[31] For a critique of the work of Friedrich Ratzel, the political geographer of Bismarck's Germany, see Lucien Febvre's *La terre et l'évolution humaine. introduction géographique à l'histoire* (Paris: Renaissance du Livre, 1922). The literature on sovereignty is also relevant. For an introduction to European thought on the subject of sovereignty, see Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

[32] The legend makes no mention of the Russian occupation or the the Afghan

ute-paying but politically subordinate principality, is itself "subdivided into different countries (*ülke*)."[33] Large expanses of steppe and desert, such as Transoxiana and Arabia, where fluid relationships among nomadic pastoralists may or may not obey a proximate agrarian hegemon, are left to the imagination.[34] Above all, what seems to matter, in every quarter of the map and every verbal qualifier, is history. Time pervades space. It justifies the recognition of neighbors, whether or not their claims are granted equality with those of the sultan. Time also accounts for the layering of jurisdictions, exemplified by the recurrence of the word "realm" (or "country") (*memlikat*, pl. *memâlik*), which does not so much beg the question of independence as of prior or concurrent political identities.[35]

For those habituated to reading sovereignty from the political and ethnoreligiously coded maps drafted in western Europe ateliers during this period or from the pen of a pope who with one stroke divided the Americas between the Spanish and Portuguese crowns under the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), the Ottoman cartographer's reluctance to encapsulate dynastic claims and nations with graphic lines seems strange. Indeed, given the sultan's undiminished assertion of universal sovereignty, the lack of an apparent *fines ottomanorum* in

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siege of Isfahan. The cartographer does volunteer logistical information and in the case of Shirvan, described by its sixteenth-century Ottoman name, Demürkapı, admits that it has been redivided into seven military districts. (". . . nevah-i Demürkapı Devlet-i Âliye canibinden zabt olundukta yedi sancağa taksim olunmuş, sancakları bunlardır, Şabur, Dağistan, Dahti, Beşker, Dur, Berrak, Destab)." As for Georgia, we are finally told that it is "half under the rule of the Ottomans." ("Memâlik-i Gürcüstan bilada tahrir olduğu üzre bu memleketlerin nisf miktarı öteden berü Devlet-i Âliye'e tâbi ve nisf-i ahri Acem'e tâbi olup, Acem'e tâbi olan yerleri Tiflis ve Kaht eyaletleri bir kaç tümen 'ad olunur . . .") For military appointments to Tabriz, Erdilan, Genc (Ganja), Rumiye, and Marağa, see Fahameddin Başar, *Osmanlı Eyâlet Tevcihâtı (1717–1730)* (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1997).

[33] Pitcher, *An Historical Geography*, 140.

[34] Over the face of the map, in the vast, uncharted regions of the Kara and Kızıl Kum, he simply writes, "The tribes of the Tatar, Turk, Turkmen, Kalmyk and Kalamak, Mongol, Kazak, and other nomadic peoples."

[35] Bartınlı İbrahim Hamdi (Orhonlu, "XVIII Yüzyılda Osmanlılarda Coğrafya," 139) attempts to use terminology with a certain consistency: e.g., "empire" applies to Spain while Austria and Venice are distinguished with the term clime (*iklim*). As on our map of Eurasia, the parts that make up such "compound" polities are often recognized as having a separate historical identity, such as the "country (*memliket*) of al-Andalus" or bundles of semi-sovereign countries, such as the Germanys, "*memliket-i Cermanya*." See also Henry Kahane, Reneé Kahane, Andreas Tietze, *The Lingua Franca in the Levant: Turkish Nautical Terms of Italian and Greek Origin* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958), 594–97.

Asia might strike the viewer as overtly menacing.[36] Yet in this simple and telling act, the Ottoman cartographer betrays one of the great secrets of absolutism. True borders—fully surveyed, mapped, and continuously demarcated with ditches, fences, and walls, and monitored by a network of stations and fortresses—were still a rarity and would remain so even in western Europe until the nineteenth century. Part of the bluff and bluster of colonizers, they were hardly relevant to imperial claims or the actual disposition of colonies, including those in the Americas.[37] Thus, despite the obsessive reflection on the territorial state after the Peace of Westphalia (1648), on many fronts, including that between Russia and the Ottomans, the cessation of conflict often meant retaining whatever territories and fortresses were in hand, in accordance with the venerable Roman principle of *uti possidetis*.[38]

Recently, some exceptions had appeared.[39] An unusual clause in the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699) which dictated the formation of a commission to survey and physically define a border stretching the entire length of the Croatian-Ottoman frontier to an exactitude of two hours from either side, did constitute, as Rifa'at Abou-El-Haj notes, an "unambiguous declaration of territorial integrity."[40] But even the foremost scientists of the day, Count Marsigli being one of

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[36] For reflections on the ideology of expansion, see Pal Fodor, *In Quest of the Golden Apple: Imperial Ideology, Politics, and Military Administration in the Ottoman Empire* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2000).

[37] Compare the gradual formation of frontiers between New World empires in Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and their claims to sovereignty, in Anthony Pagden, *Lords of the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France, c. 1500–1800* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 78.

[38] The territoriality of the state remained of utmost concern for political thinkers in Europe of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. For more on Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, and von Pufendorf, among others, see Quentin Skinner, *The Foundation of Modern Political Thought*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Stoye, *Marsigli's Europe*, 101; and Roider, *Austria's Eastern Question*, 44–59.

[39] Compare Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrennees* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 274–75; Stoye, *Marsigli's Europe*, 181–83.

[40] Rifa'at 'Ali Abou-El-Haj," The Formal Closure of the Ottoman Frontier in Europe," *JOAS* 89 (1969): 467; see also Stefanos Yerasimos, *Questions d'Orient: Frontiers et Minorités des Balkans au Caucase* (Paris: Editions de Decouverte, 1993), and Gunter E. Rothenberg, *The Austrian Military Border in Croatia, 1522–1737* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960). For important new studies on Ottoman borders, see Dariusz

them, found their astrolabes and surveying instruments inadequate to the task. Ottoman and Hapsburg representatives alike returned to time-honored methods of judging the edge between empires: they neglected mountainous regions entirely and readily deferred to natural markers, such as rivers. Indeed, the frontiers remained as they had been since antiquity: zones of continuous passage and exchange as much as of regulation and military control.[41]

There were nonetheless other man-made solutions to the problem of frontiers between political units.[42] Recasting the modern image of the state, it is helpful to think of early modern polities not only as bundles of "realms" but as packages containing multiple cores and variegated edges. The wide margins or edges that separated larger, dominant powers were themselves composed of more loosely controlled zones and subordinate polities, qualified in Ottoman Turkish with *salyane* or *haracguzar*, and often rendered, unhappily, with modern terms such as vassal-state, client, tributary, or protectorate. Looking at the map's rendering of the Black Sea, we must envision the cluster of such semiautonomous polities that formed an active, at times mobile, frontier between the Ottoman heartland, Russia, and Poland. It was composed of peoples, including the Nogay Tatars and Zaporozhye Cossacks, as well as the principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia, Transylvania, and briefly, Podolia-Ukraine.

Although all parties established pragmatic policies with regard to their more dominant neighbors, specific constitutional terms defined

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Kolodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations (15th–18th century): An Annotated Edition of Ahdnames and Other Documents. Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe: The Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000); and Daniel Power and Naomi Standen, *Frontiers in Question: Eurasian Borderlands, 700–1700* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999). In "The Ottoman-Venetian Frontier (15th–18th Centuries)," in *The Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilization*, ed. Kemal Çiçek, Ercümen Kuran, Nejat Göyünç, İber Ortaylı, et al. (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2000), 1: 171–77, Maria Pia Pedani Fabris makes a case for an earlier prototype in the Adriatic.

[41] Stoye, *Marsigli's Europe*, 175–76. On the subject of frontiers, see also Whittaker's comments (in *Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, 66–72), which are based on the conceptual framework of Lucien Febvre (*La Terre et l'Evolution Humaine*).

[42] Owen Lattimore's discussion (*Inner Asian Frontiers of China* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1940], 244) suggests a dual frontier, a concept that recognizes both the ecological limits of territorialization and need for political demarcation. By contrast, David Moon ("Peasant Migration and the Settlement of Russia's Frontiers, 1509–1897," *The Historical Journal* 40 (1997): 859–893) speaks of three frontiers beyond the "political": between forest and steppe, between peasant and tribesman, as well as between peasant village and Russian administration.

relationships and the extent of reciprocity within the Ottoman political umbrella. The Orthodox principalities submitted to Muslim suzerainty, rather than that of Christian Russia or Catholic Poland, in order to safeguard their own religious autonomy. In exchange for logistical services, notably provision of grain for the Hungarian campaigns and tributary payments to Istanbul in war and peacetime, they retained the right to select their prince from among the landholding elite and to refuse the indignities of having Muslim soldiers or merchants quartered in their cities.[43] In the Crimea, the Giray Khans played a parallel territorial role. However, by virtue of their status as Muslim military allies, their receipt of sizable subventions from Istanbul, as well as protection money from their Christian neighbors, they retained a far greater degree of independence in the conduct of internal and external affairs. The Crimean Khan proclaimed his hegemony over weaker Tatar groups such as the Nogay.[44] Notable for the Black Sea region as a whole during the first decades of the eighteenth century was the increasing rigidity of the relationship between frontier-state and suzerain power. In a period of rising Russian influence, Tatar defiance of Istanbul resulted in blunt intervention in the Crimean *khanate* in 1703.[45] As for the principalities, Istanbul bypassed the local elite altogether after 1716, selecting new *hospodars* and *voyvoda* from the prominent Greeks of the Fener quarter of Istanbul, the so-called Phanariote.[46]

Religious animosity electrified other perimeters of the empire. Beyond the bounds of our map, in the Magrib, the largely inde-

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[43] Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. 4, pt. 2, 41–77. Şerban Constantin, "La suzerainetée Ottomane a l'égard des pays roumains dans le contexte des relations internationales Européenes (Sec. XVI–XVII)," *Tarih Dergisi* 32 (1979): 211–18; M. M. Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, "L'approvisionnement d'Istanbul par les Principautés Roumaines au XVIII[e] siecle: Commerce ou Requisition?" *RMMM* 66 (1992): 73–78; compare Bistra Cvetkova, "Les *celep* et leur rôle dans la vie économique des Balkans à l'époque ottomane (XV[e]–XVIII[e] s.)," in *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East*, ed. M. A. Cook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 172–93.

[44] A. W. Fisher, "Les rapports entre l'Empire ottoman et la Crimée: L'aspect financier," *CMRS* 13 (1967): 368–81, notes the increased dependency of the khanate because of the curtailment of the Crimean slave trade in the first decades of the century; see also Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. 4, pt. 2, 1–37.

[45] Abou-El-Haj, "The Formal Closure," 472–74. For French mediation between Poland and the khans, see Gilles Veinstein, "Les Tatar de Crimée et la seconde élection de Stanislas Leszczynski," *CMRS* 11 (1965): 24–92.

[46] For an Ottoman perspective, Münir Aktepe, ed., *Mehmed Emni Beyefendi Paşa'nın Rusya Sefareti ve Sefaret Namesi* (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1989), 52.

pendent and hereditary Deys of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli faced off against their perennial foes, Spain, the Knights of Malta, and Catholic buccaneers.[47] In eastern Europe, the Catholic borderlands of the Balkans, Croatia, Hungary, and Slovakia, and after 1721, Venetian Dalmatia, parried the Muslim-ruled Balkans. The Wars of the Iranian Succession also rekindled sectarian hatreds between Sunni and Shi'i Qizilbash although the newly crowned Nadir Shah (r. 1736–47) tried to distinguish his own reign by declaring his veneration of Ja'far, the sixth, rather than of Reza, the eighth, Imam.

Yet it would be a mistake to see religious antagonism as an indelible mark on the geopolitical map. As the common-cause alliances between Cossack and Tatar in previous centuries and the Tunisian-European treaties struck in the first decades of the eighteenth century demonstrated, political empathy and commercial concerns still transcended confessional lines.[48] In fact, it was Catholicism's resurgent anti-Protestantism, in Hungary and in France, the revocation of the Treaty of Nantes in 1691, that more accurately characterized the changing nature of religious frontiers. As western European attitudes toward the "other" at home hardened, the multiconfessional enclaves of Albania, Bosnia, and Mount Lebanon made the Ottoman Empire appear as more incidious threat: a permeable frontier of shaded contrasts rather than stark contraries.[49] Indeed, extraterritorial rights clouded borders; between Karlowitz (1699) and the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, dynastic sovereignty was enhanced by

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[47] Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. 4, pt. 2, 253–58; Abdallah Laroui, *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 262–70.

[48] See Charles Frazee, *Catholics and Sultans: The Church and the Ottoman Empire, 1453–1917* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Gregory L. Bruess (*Religion, Identity, and Empire: A Greek Archbishop in the Russia of Catherine the Great* [Boulder: East European Monographs, 1997], 61) notes that Russia insisted on the dissolution of the Zaporozhian Cossak Host in 1774, precisely to subsume this "nation" under the larger banner of religion. On the religious frontier in another setting, see Richard M. Eaton, *The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204–1760* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 228–67.

[49] Conversion to Islam in Albania was a continous process, according to Ferit Duka, "XV–XVIII. Yüzyıllarda Arnavut Nüfusunun Islamlaşması Süreci üzerine Gözlemler," *Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi* 2 (1991): 63–72. On Bosnia, see Michael Robert Hickok, *Ottoman Military Administration in Eighteenth-Century Bosnia* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997); and on Lebanon, Richard van Leeuwen, *Notables and Clergy in Mount Lebanon: The Khazin Sheikhs and the Maronite Church (1736–1840)* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995).

extraterritorial claims, not only for the Habsburg emperor over Catholics and for the czar over Orthodox populations with the Ottoman lands but also with respect to the sultan's caliphal authority over Muslims living in Christendom.[50]

Precisely because nationalism has tended to color the boundaries between states in ethnic as well as confessional hues, it has become difficult to appreciate the fact that the internal edges of empire, as well as the edges abutting constitutionally tributary powers, also molded themselves to new geopolitical and institutional conditions. Just as the Ottomans reached forms of accommodation with both Christian and Muslim subordinates along the frontier with Christendom, they also accommodated Muslim elites within. In fact, accommodation was built into the administrative architecture of Asia. Logistics alone demanded an administrative system with ample institutional seams and wide political perimeters. The road from Istanbul to Baghdad is more than twice the length of that to Belgrade.[51] As the premier Muslim power in the West, the sultan had earned the designation and responsibilities of the "servitor of the Holy Cities," guardian of Mecca and Medina. However, with normal communications requiring three to four weeks to relay information between Egypt and Damascus alone,[52] the supervision of the yearly pilgrimage, which in the measure of the day entailed 316.5 hours' journey from Istanbul to Damascus and nearly equal time, 379 hours, to Mecca (150 days of normal travel), was increasingly delegated to the pashas of Damascus and the janissary *serdar* in Cairo.[53]

In the Red Sea region, the age of gunpowder weaponry had only accentuated the inherent obstacles to direct rule. After local powers

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[50] D. Sourdel, "Khal fa," *EI*[2] 4: 946.

[51] Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare*, 22; Halil Sahillioğlu, "Dördüncü Murad'in Bağdad Seferinin Menzilnamesi," *Belgeler* 2 (1965): 1–36.

[52] Antoine Abdel Nour, "Le Réseau Routier de la Syrie Ottomane (XVI[e]–XVIII[e] siècle)," *Arabica* 30 (1983): 174.

[53] TKSK MS. H. 446 (1762–1763) is a record of the post-stations (*menzilhane*) and the distances between them in "hours" from Uskudar to Mecca. According to Marsigili (*Stato Militare*, vol. 1, 9) "The Turks measure distances between places by the hours that a horse can traverse at a good pace which corresponds to three Italian miles." Murphey (*Ottoman Warfare*, 65) estimates a typical 4–5 "hour" day of riding to average 22 kilometers. For general orientation, see Suraiya Faroqhi, *Pilgrims and Sultans: The Hajj under the Ottomans* (London: I. B. Taurus, 1994), 156–62. On the Egyptian caravan, Jane Hathaway, *The Politics of Household in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of the Qazadağli* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 134.

gained access to artillery, muskets, and other ordinance, the Ottoman armada, once the lords of the Horn of Africa and southern Arabia, relinquished Yemen definitively in 1636, and by the end of the century, its presence had receded to the coastline.[54]

The Egypt profiled in our map also required a new type of ruling formula. Until the rise of Ali Bey al-Kabir after 1757, the large garrisons of Cairo, regular circuits of intra-imperial commerce, high-level appointments (to the governorship and the elite müterrika corps), as well as the large yearly payment (*salyâne*), secured strong ties to the Istanbul court. At the same time, Cairo witnessed the rising influence of local military households aspiring for the de facto power of the beylicate, particularly under the Qazdağlı party and competition for leadership of the seven regiments. As in the Balkans these developments, it may be argued, owed less to a slackening of Ottoman rule than to a local economy swollen with commerce. In Cairo, wealth revolved around the coffee trade and state contracts issued for the endowed grain lands benefitting the Holy Cities.[55]

Similarly, the West Asian reaches of the empire, with their low population density, relative to that of western Anatolia and the Balkans, and with their widespread nomadic or seminomadic populations, continually confounded attempts to impose an overarching imperial apparatus and, for the purposes of security and war, to allocate resources effectively.[56] Although the road network of western and northern Anatolia permitted wheeled traffic, from the Euphrates

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[54] Halil İnalcık, "The Socio-Political Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-Arms in the Middle East," in *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, ed. V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 203–6.

[55] See Hathaway, *The Politics of Households*; and Kenneth M. Cuno, *The Pasha's Peasants: Land, Society, and Economy in Lower Egypt, 1740–1858* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

[56] For a useful model, see G. William Skinner, "Cities and the Hierarchy of Local Systems," in *The City in Late Imperial China*, ed. Skinner (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977), 275–351. For an attempt to estimate the empire's eighteenth-century population, see Bruce McGowan, "The Age of the Ayan," in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Halil İnalcık with Donald Quataert, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 666; Following Daniel Panzac, ("La population de l'Empire ottoman et de ses marges du XV^{e} au XIX^{e} siècle: bibliographie (1941–80) et bilan provisoire," *Revue de l'Occident Musulmane et e la Méditerranée*. 31 [1981]: 119–37) and others, McGowan estimates the population of the empire as a whole, circa 1800, to have been between 25 and 32 millions, with all parts of the empire, but particularly the Asian provinces, lagging behind growth in western Europe.

southward convoys of donkeys, horses, and camels would remain the chief mode of transport for cargo and people toward destinations in Syria and Iraq.[57] Neither the Euphrates nor the Tigris was fully navigable until the advent of the steamship. Only in spring and summer when the water was at its highest, could barges, laden with timber, grain, and copper, depart Diyarbekir on the upper Tigris for Basra, arriving two months later.[58] Thus despite the presence of the janissary corps, the award of fiscal contracts, and ongoing cooperation in maintaining the security of the imperial highway, powerful local regimes were needed to contain the festering frontier with Iran, one of the causes of rural unrest, as tribes, mercenaries, bandits, and lawless provincial officers competed for resources. An Istanbul appointee to the governorship of Baghdad, Hasan Pasha (r. 1702–24) founded a new dynasty that, perpetuated by his son, Ahmad (r. 1724–47), and subsequently by their administrative corps, slaves of Georgian origin, guarded Ottoman interests while holding on to regional power until the early nineteenth century.[59]

As the cartographer put the final touches on the geography of Asia, Istanbul's direct control over provincial administration in West Asia was probably at its highest point in decades. Even so, as he arrives at the easternmost edge of the empire, the border with the Iranian shah, a distance of more than four hundred "hours" from the army encampment in Uskudar, he indulges in an uncharacteristically long digression on the "region of Kurdistan" that helps us to put the nature of territorial sovereignty under this old regime in its proper perspective.[60]

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[57] Suraiya Faroqhi, "Camels, Wagons, and the Ottoman State in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," *IJMES* 14 (1982): 523–39, 553–54; and F. Taescher, *Das Anatolische Wegenetz nach Osmanischen Quellen*, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Mayer & Müller, 1924–26).

[58] Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı Imparatorluğundaunda Derbend Teşkilâtı* (Istanbul: Eren, 1984), 128–33. Additionally, many of the Euphrates ports were fortified with heavy artillery according to İnalcık, "The Social-Political Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-Arms," 214.

[59] For an appreciation of local dynamics, see Tom Nieuwenhuis, *Politics and Society in Early Modern Iraq* (The Hague-Amsterdam: Studies in Social History of the International Institute of Social History, 1982); Percy Kemp, *Territoire de l'Islam: le monde vu de Moussoul au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris: Sindbad, 1982); Hala Fattah, *The Politics of Regional Trade in Iraq, Arabia and the Gulf, 1745–1900* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997); and Dina Rizk Khoury, *State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire Mosul, 1540–1834* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[60] To be exact, it took 408.5 hours for the route between Uskudar and Tabriz.

The "region (*vilayet*) of Kurdistan," he relates, "begins in area of Hormuz [in the Persian Gulf] and comprises Malatya and Maraş; its northernmost region is Yerevan (Armenia) and its southernmost, Mosul and Iraq."[61] Without mentioning its population or ethnicity, the cartographer continues his description of this vaguely cultural geography by noting the centrality of a "magnificent mountain range," which begins "at the frontier of the [Safavid] provinces of Fars and Kerman and stretches as far as Van and the mountain of Erzurum [Ararat?]."[62] Although an ambiguous rendering of space, it is such ecological details that evoke both peculiar sociological adaptations to this region as well as a physical and economic remoteness that permitted its myriad populations alternately to evade and comply with the proximate agrarian-based state.[63]

Yet there remain other details that capture the difference between the Ottoman frontier and the lands properly belonging to its neighbor, the Safavids. "Kurdistan" is not simply an ecological zone between states. Rather, it is a vast region whose constituent societies are given peculiar coordinates in space by dominant powers. Here, the cartographer does not attempt to reduce these internal sociological divisions to sectarianism, although this was indeed a factor historically in fostering allegiances between Kurdish tribes, sultans, and shahs. Instead, he distinguishes political allegiance in the very forms of autonomous and semiautonomous organization. Thus, those loyal to the house of Osman reside in "places [that] go by the name of *sancak* [fully surveyed, command districts], *hükümet* [hereditary counties granted to a tribal leadership] and *ocaklık* [semiautonomous but non-

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Suleymaniye Library, Esad Efendi MS. 2362 pt. 8 (n.d.) Anonymous, *Menzilname*, folios 157–59. Special envoys and couriers traveled at a much faster pace. For example, the Ottoman ambassador who left the capital on 29 May 1724 arrived in Yerevan on 17 June (Aktepe, *1720–1724 Osmanlı-Iran Münasebetleri*, 31–32).

[61] In contrast to the *eyalet*, Marsigli (*Stato Militare dell'Impero Ottomanno*, 9) translates "*vilayet*," credibly, as "all large countries" ("tutti i paesi vasti").

[62] "Vilayet-i Kürdistan: vilayet-i Hürmüz'den ibtida Malatya ve Maraş hududunda müntehi olur; şimalisi Revan, cenubisi Musul ve Irak-ı Arab'dır. Ve asl-ı Cebel-i Kürdistan Acem diyar[ın?]da Fars ve Kirman hududundan [ahiz ?] edüp, Van'a ve Erzurum cebeline ulaşır. Cebel-i azime silsile ve muttasıldır. Bazi yerleri sancak hükümet ve ocaklık ünvanlarıyla Âli Osman'a tâbi, bazi yerleri serhad-ı Şah-ı Acemde vaki olmuştur. On sekiz miktar vilayet 'ad olunur."

[63] From the perspective of the state, this was a zone of economic marginality, as Lattimore in *Inner Asian Frontiers* notes, but it also featured a symbiosis between pastoralism and agriculture. On this point, see A. M. Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

hereditary enclaves]." An organized and bounded autonomy, as much as formal administrative division, closes the Ottoman edge, separating it from Kurdish tribes, which, as he says elsewhere, "are found within the borders [*serhad*] of the shah."[64]

From the Inside Out

Without drawing a line on the map, the cartographer uses text to establish the mettle of a state, its organizational logic, and the sociopolitical relationship between subject and sovereign.[65] This preference for depicting space in numbers and words is not a surprising response from a servant of an early modern state famous for leaving an astounding paper trail. In the sixteenth century, the Ottomans established sovereignty by quill as well as by sword: assembling a region's inhabitants and notables, a bureaucrat worked with the local *kadı*

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[64] Martin van Bruinessen, "The Ottoman Conquest of Diyarbekir and the Administrative Organization of the Province in the 16th and 17th Centuries," in *Evliya Çelebi in Diyarbekir*, ed. Van Bruinessen and Hendrik Boeschoten (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), 13–28. The 1555 treaty between the Ottoman sultan and the Kurdish Şerif Han of Bitlis (Nazmi Sevgen, "Kürtler V," *Belgeler* 3 [1968]: 70) defined a *hükümet* as a hereditary fief that included fortresses, cities, villages, and fields; Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi (Sevim Ilgürel, ed., *Hezarfen Hüseyın Efendi Telhisü'l Beyan fi Kavanin-i Al-i Osman* [Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 2000], 132) qualifies *hükümet* with such expressions as "free from accounts" and "possessor of all its fruits" ("mefruzü'l-kalem ve maktü'ül-kadem olup evbab-ı mahsulatı her ne ise hakimleri mutasarrıfdır"). The legend gives the same breakdown for Diyarbekir that we find in the mid-seventeenth century: five *hükümet* (Cezire, Eğil, Genç, Palu, and Hazzo)and eight *ocaklıks* (Sağman, Kulp, Mihrani, Tercil, Atak, Pertek, Çapakçur, and Çermik) that carried no hereditary rights. See also, Chèref-ou'ddîne. *Chèref-Nâmeh ou Fastes de la Nation Kourde*, trans. François Bernard Charmoy (St. Pétersbourg: l'Académie Impériale des Sciences, 1873). Naturally, this did not guarantee autonomy in later centuries, as *Kanûn-nâme-i Sultânî li' Azîz Efendi: 'Aziz Efendi's Book of Sultanic Laws and Regulation: An Agenda for Reform by a Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Statesman* (ed. and trans. Rhoads Murphey [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985] makes clear; for the eighteenth century, see Mouradgea D'Ohsson *Tableau général de l'Empire othoman, divisé en deux parties, dont l'une comprend la législation mahométane; l'autre, l'histoire de l'Empire othoman* (Paris, Imp. de monsieur [Firmin Didot] 1787–1820), vol. 7, 299; and DA IV:45.

[65] Jean Bodin (*On Sovereignty: Four Chapters from the Six Books of the Commonwealth*, ed. and trans. Julian H. Franklin [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992], 56) defines sovereignty juridically and institutionally, not territorially, asserting that "the first prerogative of sovereignty is to give law to all in general and to each in particular, the latter part refers to privileges, which are in the jurisdiction of sovereign princes to the exclusion of all others."

and cavalry officer to carry out the cadastration of each *eyalet* and component *sancak* of the empire. These tomes were prefaced by a *kanunnâme*, a codification or compendium of customary law and imperial statute as well as relevant Islamic codes, describing the obligations and rights of subjects.[66] Although the types of taxation changed over the centuries, they overlay a fundamental relationship between sovereign and subject established with the first local administrative codes.[67] Preparation for war in the eighteenth century still entailed mustering a wagon load of registers, from texts of treaties, tax receipts, the numbers of taxable households, provincial complaints and remedies, to the timetable of installments from tax contractors and the tribute from Egypt. With such guides, paymasters and commanders could find the names of officials in exile, determine sources of cash and raw material, and reference important security matters.[68]

Like a register, the cartographer's legend guides us on another tour of West Asia. Keenly aware of logistics, to the extent knowledge and page permit, his commentary is driven by the administrative space of the Caucasus, Iran, and Central Asia. Like an architect, he rebuilds the empire itself, beginning with the "inner" (Kütahya, Karaman, and Sivas) and then the "outer" (the Mediterranean coast and Cyprus) provinces of Anatolia. His geographical narrative scans the limits of Anatolia on the Euphrates (the province of Ayintab); then, after a detour through Syria, it returns to the

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[66] For the classical cadastral system, see Ömer Lûtfi Barkan, "Research on the Ottoman Fiscal Surveys," in *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East*," ed. M. A. Cook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 163–71; D. A. Howard, "The Historical Development of the Ottoman Imperial Registry (Defter-i Hakanî): Mid-Fifteenth to Mid-Seventeenth Centuries," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 11 (1988): 213–30; and H. İnalcık, "Suleiman the Lawgiver and Ottoman Law," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 1 (1969): 117–24. Most *tahrir* were carried out in the sixteenth century and are now housed in the Ankara's Tapu Kadastro Kuyûd-ı Kadime Arşivi and the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi in Istanbul. For a late European example, Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, "The Defter-i Mufassal of Kaminiçe from ca. 1681: An example of Late Ottoman Tahrir, Reliability, Function, Principles of Publication, *JOS* 13 (1993): 91–98; and for early-eighteenth-century Tabriz, Zarinebaf-Shahr, "Tabriz under Ottoman Rule," 115–20.

[67] See H. İnalcık, "Osmanlılarda Raiyyet Rüsûmu," *Belleten* 23 (1959): 575–600.

[68] Feridun M. Emecen, "Sefere Götürülen Defterlerin Defteri," in *Prof. Dr. Bekir Kütükoğlu'na Armağan*, ed. Mübahat Kütükoğlu (Istanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1991), 241–68. For a register that fell into enemy hands before Vienna in 1783, see H. G. Majer, *Das osmanische "Registerbuch der Beschwerden" (Şikayet Defteri) wom Jahre 1675: Österreichische Nationalbibliothek Cod. Mixt. 683* (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1984).

Northeast and the province of Erzurum, which he reminds us, was "formerly part of Ermeniye [Armenia]." From the Caucasus and the eastern shores of the Black Sea, he completes the tour with a secondary tier of provinces in the region of the Tigris (Diyarbekir, Mosul, Şehrizor), Iraq, and Arabia. Given the constraints of space, the cartographer hardly pauses between his list of twenty-one provinces and their constituent command units.[69]

There are times, however, when the need to add critical information overcomes economy. Without mentioning the Ottoman state's point of origin around the Byzantine cities of Bursa/Brusa and Iznik/Nicea, the cartographer proceeds directly to the province of Kütahya, where he provides a fleeting glimpse into the politics of the state's early centuries. Reminding his readers that Kütahya enjoys a "special position because its annexation to the Ottoman state took place through divine assistance," he refers to the prestige of the Germiyan dynasty from which the city was wrested and the dream that foretold the ascent of the Ottomans to world power.[70] On a more mundane note, Kütahya's importance lay in its early incorporation as a province in the last decade of the fourteenth century, the second formal unit after Rumeli, the eastern Balkans. An institutional milestone, the introduction of this distinctively Ottoman administrative structure saw the transformation of a loosely knit alliance between a frontier lord and tribal armies, bound by oral agreements, honor, and the spoils of raiding into a hierarchy headed by the provincial commander, or *beglerbeği*, and the subcommander, or *sancakbeği*.[71] Armed with estimates of agricultural production and the disposition

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[69] Compare the cartographer's list of twenty-one provinces with figures and dates found in Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300–1600* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), 104–18 and Ayn-i Ali Efendi (Tayyib Gökbilgin, ed., *Kavânin-i Âl-i Osman der Hülâsa-i Mezâmin-i Defter-i Divân* [Istanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1979].) D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, vol. 7, 278–79, speaks of twenty-six "government generaux" (*malikâne-i miri*) and eighteen hundred "ressorts de justices (*nahiye*)" in the Middle East.

[70] "Eyalet-i Kütahya ibtidaen talu gökse Devlet-i Âliye ebed-i kıyyamdan buna gelince merâ'at olunan kaide-i mustahsına üzre avn ve inayet-i hak ile feth ve teshiri müyesser olan memâlik taksim olundukta beğlerbeğliğe . . . bir memleket eyalet itibar olunup, ol eyalet dahi nice elviye itibar olunageldiğine binaen, eyalet-i Kütahya on yedi sancak itibar olunmuştur."

[71] Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 8–9, 76–77; compare, Isenbike Togan, *Flexibility and Limitation in Steppe Formations: The Kerait Khanate and Chinggis Khan* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988).

of fields and villages, viziers, commanders, and bureaucrats assigned taxable units of land (*timar*) in lieu of salary to the cavalry while offering a deed of hereditary usufruct to the peasant.

Although the temptation is great for historians to measure the efficiency and order of Ottoman statecraft by the yardstick of the classical *sancak* military hierarchy, changing tactics and technologies of warfare, especially in the European theater, would soon reduce the emphasis on cavalry in favor of musket-bearing infantry. An enduring aspect of rural administration, the *timar* would change in function and number while the janissaries, once a special guard, levied from the Balkans and assigned to the palace, became a standing army of tens of thousands, domiciled in the capital, in large cities, and frontier garrisons.[72] Beginning in the early seventeenth century, the full-time infantry was seconded by battalions of mercenaries (*sekban, levend*) and, eventually, large militias (*mükemmel kapı*) maintained by provincial governors and viziers.[73]

With an appreciation of such enormous changes in the structure of the empire, the cartographer pauses again at Syria. Perhaps, this is a sign of respect to the former seat of the Umayyad caliphs. It also provides him the pretext to emphasize the continuities, and not only the differences, between Sunni dynasties. His contemporaries would have been well aware of the significance of the conquest of Damascus, particularly when, within the space of a year, the conquest of Mamluk Egypt made the sultan the preeminent Muslim power of the Mediterranean. The addition of these large, rich provinces tilted the demography of European and Asian empire toward its Muslim subjects. It is no coincidence that the flourishing of Hanefite legal thought and especially the outpouring of *fatwa* from the pen of Suleyman the Magnificent's chief jurist, Ebu Su'ud Efendi, occurred as the state integrated this Muslim intelligentsia. Syrian and Egyptian lawyers questioned the status of land designated as eminent domain

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[72] Hüseyın Efendi Hazarfen (*Hezarfen Hüseyın Efendi Telhısü'l Beyan fi Kavanin-i Al-i Osman*, ed. Sevim Ilgürel [Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 2000], 143) distinguishes between salaried and nonsalaried forces. On the janissaries generally, see İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatından Kapıkulu Ocakları. Acemi Ocağı ve Yeniçeri Ocağı* (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1943); for Cairo, André Raymond, *Le Caire des Janissaires: L'apogée de la ville ottomane sous Abd al-Rahman Katkhuda* (Paris: CNRS Editions, 1995).

[73] Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare*, 16–42; and H. İnalcık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600–1700," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6 (1980): 283–337.

(*miri*) and disputed the onus of taxation.[74] With or without the hair-splitting treatises of the *ulema*, Ottoman administrators took care to ease the incorporation of Muslim elites with special inducements, ranging from high position, the total exemption from bureaucratic accounts and fiscal surveys (such as the tribal *hukumet*), and split-rent agreements (*malikane-divani*) to large military estates (*zeamet*) and long-term tax-farming leases.[75]

The cartographer credits Ottoman administration with remaining faithful to the original territorial divisions of the Syrian lands, transforming such units as the province of Palestine (*cund-i Filistin*) and other realms into full-fledged Ottoman *eyalet*.[76] He is not entirely accurate. Once the dust had settled after early sixteenth-century conquests, the addition of an outer tier of provinces (*vilâyat-ı saire*), stretching from the eastern Black Sea southward through the Fertile Crescent, prompted Istanbul to reconsider its overall organization of procurement and recruitment. Provincial boundaries were drawn and redrawn. The initial land surveys in the provinces of Syria, Kurdistan, eastern Anatolia, and Iraq dedicated a greater share of land to crown lands and viziers' estates (*hass-ı hümayun*) than in western Anatolia.[77]

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[74] Colin Imber, *Ebu's-su'ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 135–37. For the debates, see Baber Johansen, *The Islamic Law on Land Tax and Rent* (London: Croom Helm, 1988).

[75] Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "Fiscalité et formes de possession de la terre arable dans l'Anatolie Preottomane," *JESHO* 19 (1976): 234–322; I. Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "Malikâne," *EI*[2] 4: 227–28; Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, "The *Iltizam* of Mansur Faraykh: A Case Study of *Iltizam* in Sixteenth Century Syria," in *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East*, ed. Tarif Khalidi (Beirut: American University in Beirut Press, 1984), 249–256. For an exhaustive study of one of the provinces where the Muslim elite went over to the Ottoman side, see M. Mehdi Ilhan, *Amid (Diyarbakır) 1518 Tarihli Defter-I Mufassal* (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 2000).

[76] The legend explains that each "*cund*" (*jund* [in Arabic, a military division or army]) should be "regarded as a separate realm (*memliket*)": "Beyan iklim-i Şam. Bundan akdem Şam iklimine mutasarrıf olanlar Şam ikliminin muhit olduğu memâliki beş kısma taksim edüp, her kısmına cund tesmiye her cundi bir memlekete izafe etmişlerdir. Mesala cund-i Filistin, cund-i Ardan, cund-i Dimaşk, cund-i Hums, cund-i Kanasrin gibi. Ve cund dedikleri kurradır. Yani bir kita memâliktir ki medden kasabat ve kariye müştemil ola. Devlet-i Âliye ebed-i kiyyam Osmaniye iklim-i Şam'a mutasarrif oldukta resm-i sabik üzre bir kaç eyalet itibar eylemişlerdir.) For the original divisions, see Ruth Kark, "Mamluk and Ottoman Cadastral Surveys and Early Mapping of Landed Properties in Palestine," *Agricultural History* 71 (1997): 46–70.

[77] Ömer Lutfi Barkan, "Timar," İA 12, pt. 1: 288. In comparison to Western Anatolia, where 26 percent of cultivated lands was set aside for imperial domains and more than half (56 percent) was held by individual cavalry officers, in Diyarbekir,

Such estates functioned as a pool of discretionary fiscal units (*mukataât*) for local treasuries.[78] In this outer tier, the *timar-cavalry* coexisted with functionaries assigned to imperial estates. In addition to the janissaries and urban officials, Istanbul sent special fiscal agents (*emin*), awarded contracts to tax farmers (*mültezim*), and allowed individuals and entire companies to designate their own stewards and intendants to collect the revenues assigned for their upkeep and salary.[79]

Yet there were myriad drawbacks to liquidity. At the turn of the seventeenth century Istanbul bureaucrats introduced the first universal, direct taxes, the *avârız-ı divaniye* and the *bedel-i nüzül*, which were levied on both rural and urban households. As a regular cash flow that bypassed the cavalry, these funds could be utilized within the region or forwarded, as need arose, to another province or the imperial treasury.[80] However, social upheaval also followed in the wake of sharp increases in direct taxation. Swollen provincial treasuries provided the means for local pretenders to gain power. As populations fled before demobilized mercenaries, and rebellions, such as those launched by Fakhr al-Din Ma'n II, amir of Mount Lebanon (1590–1635), and the Celalis (1595–1609) in Anatolia, the loss of agricultural labor effectively dissolved many individual *timar* and severely eroded the basis of the older system in which protection services were bartered for peasant rents.

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31 percent and in Syria (Aleppo and Damascus combined), 48 percent of lands of the landed resources were designated as imperial domains and thus were often administered with some form of revenue contract

[78] Douglas Howard's fine study of the changing *timar* system, "The Ottoman Timar System and Its Transformation, 1563–1656," (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1987), establishes the causes for the dissatisfaction of the full-time cavalry. He also notes the desire of Sultan Murad IV (1623–39) to balance payments in kind with cash taxation or cash-units, which could be redistributed as "stipends" (*ulufe, ocaklık*) and retirement income (*arpalık* or "fodder money"). Alternately, they could be eventually earmarked for expenses or for the salaries of individual officers and battalions.

[79] In 1596–97 (MMD 7637:2–4), the largest single component of cash taxes in the provincial treasury was found under the heading of the "*muktaât-ı vilâyet-i Diyarbekir*," that is, 180,000 *kuruş* of a total of 539,000 *kuruş*. Most of these tax farms were collected by janissaries. See also Rhoads Murphey, *Regional Structure in the Ottoman Empire: A Sultanic Memorandum of 1636 A.D. Concerning the Sources and Uses of the Tax-Farm Revenues of Anatolia and the Coastal and Northern Portions of Syria* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1987), Introduction.

[80] Linda Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560–1650* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 81–119. See also Halil İnalcık, "Centralization and Decentralization Ottoman Administration," in *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, T. Naff and R. Owen (Carbondale: University of Southern Illinois Press, 1977), 27–52.

As we will see in chapter 3, although the province of Diyarbekir was particularly hard hit by these rebellions and continuing tribal depredations along the lower Tigris broader, we must also attribute changing patterns of administration to secular change in grain cultivation and urbanization. Former tribal areas, benefitted from an influx of cultivators, as did the districts closest to cities.[81] Therefore, even as the Ottoman state restored order in Syria and eastern Anatolia, the new tax system allowed for seemingly contradictory trends. Bureaucratic sleight of hand and changes in appointment procedures gave the central state the upper hand over the provincial military hierarchy, all the while the central state devolved more of the quotidian duties of administration and policing to regional authorities.[82]

Although these details may not have concerned the mapmaker, what he does draw attention to is how the Ottoman state resolved these logistical problems and integrated the myriad changes into its military and administrative structure. Cash could not resolve all of the organizational problems caused by such difficult communications and the resulting costs of forwarding basic supplies, from fodder to foodstuffs, to the front.[83] As Rhoads Murphey's studies make

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[81] On peasant flight during and after the Celalis, see Wolf-Dieter Hutteroth and Kamal Abdulfattah, *Historical Geography of Palestine, Transjordan and Southern Syria in Late 16th Century* (Erlangen: Frankische Geographische Ges., 1977); Mustafa Akdağ, "Celali Isyanlarından Büyük Kaçgunluk, 1603–1606," *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 2 (1964): 10ff.; and MMD 7637:2 (1596); and William Griswold, *Political Unrest and Rebellion in Anatolia 1000–1020/1591–1611* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983). The proportion of ruined (*harabe*) *timar* in the *tahvil* register KK 493, dating from 1694 is particularly high in the urban districts of Amid (22 percent) and Ergani (33 percent).

[82] Both İbrahim Metin Kunt (*The Sultan's Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550–1650* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1983], 68–69) and Rifa'at ʿAli Abou-El-Haj (*The 1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics* [Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul, 1984], 43) note a shift in control over appointments over full-time salaried positions toward central state elites. Karl Barbir (*Ottoman Rule in Damascus, 1708–1758* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980]) observes a parallel process in the province within the capital city during the late seventeenth century and early eighteenth century to centralize apparatus in the provincial cities under civil and military authority. At the same time, a great many other duties devolved upon personnel. For an extreme example of privatization, note the case of poststations and couriers: Colin J. Heywood, "The Ottoman *Menzilhane* and *Ulak* System in Rumeli in the 18th Century," in *Türkiye'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi (1071–1920)*, ed. Osman Okyar and Halil Inalcık (Ankara: Hacetepe Üniversitesi, 1980), 182–84.

[83] Lütfi Güçer, *XVI–XVII Asırlardan Osmanlı Imparatorluğunda Hububat Meselesi ve*

clear,[84] the state relied on a regional division of labor with West Asia, and in particular a triangular inner bulwark formed by the agriculturally and industrially rich provinces of Sivas-Tokat, Diyarbekir, and Aleppo. The pivot of past Iranian campaigns,[85] the province of Diyarbekir remained a major source of grains and a center of textile manufacturing. It also possessed an important smelting plant for copper in its capital, Amid, as well as iron and silver mines (in Kigi, Ergani, and Keban).[86]

During the Wars of the Iranian Succession, these overlapping forms of administrative organization moved into high gear. Areas far from the front sent monies rather than manpower or, as we read in an order sent to the northern frontier city of Erzurum, which redirected income earned from commercial taxes for the purchase of beasts of burden to supply the army.[87] The organization of barley, wheat, and hardtack, to be purchased at nominal rate from peasants or collected in lieu of taxes, was often directed by Diyarbekir's *voyvoda*, an intendant, and in this case, the civil official in charge of revenues from crown and vizier estates.[88]

Hububattan Alınan Vergiler (Istanbul: Istanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1964), 29; L. Güçer, "XVI–XVIII Asırlarda Osmanlı Imparatorluğu'nun Ticaret Politikası," 31. See also Bruce Masters, *The Origins of Western Dominance in the Middle East: Mercantalism and the Islamic Economy in Aleppo, 1600–1750* (New York: New York University Press, 1988), 113.

[84] For a logistical analysis of the Asian defense system, see Rhoads Murphey, "Functioning of the Ottoman Army under Murad IV (1623–1639/1032–1049): Key to the Understanding of the Relationship between Center and Periphery in the Seventeenth Century Turkey" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1979). Compare with the Europe theater of war: Caroline B. Finkel, "The Provisioning of the Ottoman Army during the Campaigns of 1593–1606," in *Habsburgisch-osmanische Beziehungen/Relations Habsbourg-Ottomanes*, ed. Andreas Tietze (Vienna: Verlag des Verband der wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaften Österreichs), 107–24.

[85] Diyarbekir lay at mid-point between Basra and Istanbul; it was separated from the other two important logistiscal cities by approximately ten days' travel. Vital Cuinet, (*La Turquie d'Asie: Géographie Administrative Statistique Déscriptive et Raisonnée de Chaque Province de l'Asie-Mineure* [Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1890–1894], vol. 1, 451), estimates the distance between Diyarbekir and Tokat at 377 kilometers (or Sivas, 302) and between Diyarbekir and Aleppo at 312 kilometers.

[86] Fahrettin Tizlak, "Osmanli Devleti'nde Ham Bakır İsleme Merkezleri Olarak Tokat ve Diyarbakir," *Belleten* 59 (1995): 643–59. Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare*, 98–101.

[87] In 1736, the state ordered (D.MKF 1771) that 2,900 *kuruş* from customs income be used to purchase pack animals for the front. For the impact on the city of Ayıntab, see Cemil Cahit Güzelbey and Hulusî Yetkin, eds., *Gaziantep şeri'i Mahkeme Sicillerinden Örnekler* (*Cilt 81–141, Miladi 1729–1820*) (Gaziantep: Yeni Matbaa, 1970), 34–35; on Damascus, Barbir, *Ottoman Rule in Damascus*, 36.

[88] In 1701, Diyarbekir's voyvoda provided 15,000 Istanbul *kile* of wheat for

So too, the accordionlike layers of the Ottoman military expanded as early offensive campaigns of the 1720s turned to defensive strategies in the 1730s and 1740s. The third arm of the Yerevan campaign of 1724–25, for example, assembled some 60,000 troops in Georgia under the command of vizier Hasan Pasha. They included regular cavalry from the provinces of Diyarbekir, Kars, Sivas, Maraş, Hüdevendigar, and Karahisar-i Şarki, as well as from the districts of Aksaray and Bayezid. They were followed by 27,000 janissaries, 1,000 specially-trained infantry, 2,500 technical personnel trained in cannon and other ordinance, and militias commanded by the governors of Anatolia and Kars.[89] When Nadir Shah's armies turned the tables on the sultan (between 1730 and 1734, and again between 1741 and 1745), threatening Ottoman Iraq and Kurdistan, the Ottoman military activated its reserves: mercenary battalions and local condottieri.[90] The defense of the city of Mosul was undertaken by its governor, Abdülcelil-zâde Hüseyin Pasha, a prominent member of the local gentry, who summoned Kurdish tribal armies from the *hükümet* (which, according to the mapmaker, may have been those in Eğil, Palu, Cizre, Hazzo, and Genc) in addition to regular cavalry from Diyarbekir, Mosul, and Şehrizor.[91]

Movements of People, Commodities, and Capital

These territorial conflicts with Iran cannot be separated from an ongoing struggle to control and tax the movement of people and

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Daltaban Mustafa Pasha to put down a revolt in Baghdad. (I thank Dina Khoury for bringing MMD 3134:126 to my attention). For one of many examples during the era of Nadir Shah, see MMD 10,168:252 (grain at the rate of, 30 *sağ* akçe per *kile* or 22,112.5 *kuruş* in 1725–26); and Çengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda unda şehirçilik ve Ulaşım Üzerine Araştırmalar* (İzmir: Ege Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1984), 130; and according to Stephen H. Longrigg (*Four Centuries of Modern Iraq* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925], 144), in July 1741, a single order to restock the Baghdad fortress stipulated 36,150 Istanbul *kile* of wheat and 150,000 Istanbul *kile* of barley. See also Robert W. Olson, *The Siege of Mosul and Ottoman-Persian Relations, 1718–43* (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1975).

[89] Aktepe, *1720–1724 Osmanlı-Iran Münasebetleri*, 18–20, 33–34.

[90] For the life and times of Nadir Shah, see Ernest S. Tucker, "Religion and Politics in the Era of Nâdir Shâh: The View of Six Contemporary Sources," (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1992).

[91] Münir Aktepe, ed., *Şem'dâni-zâde Fındıklı Süleyman Efendi Tarihi Mur'i't-Tevarih* (Istanbul: Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1978) vol. 1A, 113–14.

goods across West Asia. Of the highways for commerce and pilgrimage etched on the map, in 1722 the Ghalzai horsemen took the one traversing the belly of southwest Asia. From their native Kandahar they headed toward Khorasan, where they encountered another Safavid vassal, the Abdali; from there they rode through Kirman toward Isfahan, the Safavid capital and chief trading entrepot.[92]

The Ottomans, too, in response to the Russian occupation of the silk-producing regions of the Caspian, launched their first and second offensives through the heart of the East-West trading network. The second front targeted the northern part of the silk route, which ran from Tabriz, Iran's second-most-important trading center, toward Anatolia and Syria. Nadir Shah was more audacious still. After testing Ottoman defenses in Iraq, he launched a full-scale assault on the West Asian trading system. In 1738–39 he marched on Delhi; the new Iranian monarch and his Afghan ally and looted the imperial treasury of the Mughals. Upon his return in 1741, he targeted the coffee-rich state of Oman.

Unabashedly material motives did not, however, necessarily obtain the desired results. The war derailed older trading linkages rather than securing new ones, often driving away merchants and sending shock waves through commodity markets as far west as Aleppo.[93] Chaos within Iran forced merchants to change their routing while ships avoided the Safavid ports in the Gulf. Conflict choked the lucrative Iranian silk trade through the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, Neşe Erim's study of the customs post at Erzurum demonstrates how quickly this conflict extinguished the trans-Anatolian silk trade, which once accounted for approximately 2 percent of imperial revenues and furnished an estimated two thousand bales of Caspian silk yearly for domestic and international markets.[94] Mediterranean consumers soon found alternatives to Iranian goods in Bursa, Syria, Bengal, and

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[92] The route, including the number of hours between Baghdad and North India, may be found in an undated but, plausibly eighteenth-century manuscript, Suleymaniye Library, *Esad Efendi* MS. 2362 pt. 8, folios 157r–159v.

[93] Katsumi Fukasawa, *Toilerie et commerce du Levant au XVIII^e siècle d'Alep à Marseille* (Marseille: Groupe de Recherche et d'Ètudes sur le Proche Orient Centre Regional de Publication de Marseille, 1985), 22–24.

[94] Neşe Erim, "Onsekizinci Yüzyılda Erzurum Gümrüğü." (Ph.D. diss., Istanbul University, 1984), 13–14. Generally on this trade, see Rudolph P. Matthee, *The Politics of Trade in Safavid Iran: Silk for Silver, 1600–1730* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

China.[95] Only the czar translated annexation into commercial advantage. As the cartographer's rendering of ships on the Caspian suggest, Russian merchants diverted Iranian silk production northward through their entrepôts at Astrakhan.[96]

If the merchants of the middle routes, particularly those intersecting with Safavid cities and their chief port of Bandar 'Abbas, felt the negative impact of war for many decades, commerce in other Ottoman cities and ports soon revived and even prospered from their neighbors' misfortunes. Pilgrims continued to bring a steady stream of merchandise both small and large through Damascus. Although the sub-Saharan gold trade between Takfur to Egypt was already in decline, ships on the Red Sea and caravans along the Nile carried coffee and Indian goods as well as Chinese export porcelain.[97] Commerce on the Black Sea, which remained an Ottoman lake until 1774, expanded rapidly after the Treaty of Belgrade (1739). Ottoman captains transported Russian traders who were bringing furs and iron and exchanged these goods in Syria and Istanbul for Indian cloth and Arabian coffee.[98] Izmir's entrepreneurs shipped Ankara mohair, Anatolia cotton twist, and a range of raw agricultural products.[99] Throughout the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Mediterranean ports of Salonika, Izmir, and Alexandria maintained a favorable balance of trade with their European partners.[100]

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[95] E. Hertzig, "The Iranian Raw Silk Trade and European Manufacture in the XVIIth and XVIIIth Century," *Journal of European Economic History* 12 (1990): 73–91; Masters, *The Origins of Western Dominance in the Middle East*, 196.

[96] See Stephen Dale, *Indian Merchants and Eurasian Trade, 1600–1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

[97] There is an enormous literature on the subject, beginning with André Raymond, *Les commerçants au Caire au XVIII*e *siècle*, 2 vols. (Damas: Institut Français de Damas, 1973–74). For some interesting, recent additions, see Cheryl Ward, "The Sadana Island Shipwreck," in *An Historical Archaeology of the Ottoman Empire: Breaking New Ground*, ed. Uzi Baram and Lynda Carroll (New York, Boston, Dordrecht, London, Moscow: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2000), 185–202; and Colette Establet and Jean-Paul Pascual, *Ultime voyage pour la Mecque: Les inventaires apres dèces de pélerins morts a Damas vers 1700* (Damas: Institut français d'études arabes de Damas, 1998).

[98] İdris Bostan, "Rusya'nin Karadeniz'de Ticaret Başlaması ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu (1700–1787)," *Belleten* 59 (1995): 362.

[99] Daniel Goffman, *Izmir and the Levantine World, 1550–1650* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1990), 10–11, 36–38, 69–70. For later developments, see Necmi Ülker, "The Rise of Izmir, 1688–1740" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1974); Daniel Panzac, "International and Domestic Maritime Trade in the Ottoman Empire during the 18th Century," *IJMES* 24 (1992): 189–206.

[100] On Bursa, see Halil İnalcık, "Bursa and the Commerce of the Levant," *JESHO*

In addition to the pilgrims' destination in the Hijaz, the cartographer defers to the commanding presence of Istanbul, one of the Mediterranean's largest cities over the long-distance commercial system. Its population, rich and poor, consumed imported manufactures, raw materials, and foods in enormous quantities. In fact, the city imported four times more than it exported.[101] Istanbul's unbridled consumption spurred the growth of the local industries, including the textile manufacturing of Bursa, as well as spurring the development of the Aegean port of Izmir. Although Istanbul's growth after the sixteenth century dwarfed that of towns in western Anatolia, long-distance trade percolated through the region on its way to the Bosphorus.[102] Cities and towns exchanged ready-made cloaks, belts, embroidered pillow cases, and shawls. They depended on a steady supply of local raw and semifinished materials, such as dye stuffs, henna, and soap, as well as locally prized items, such as the squirrel pelts that a merchant from Erzurum transported in addition to his fine cotton and raw wool.[103] In the eighteenth century, a booming trade in cotton twist and textile manufactures from Aleppo to Mosul found foreign markets.[104] To keep roadways open and safe throughout Anatolia, unemployed mercenaries on contract functioned as guardians (*derbentçi*) while peasants were obligated to repair bridges and caravansaries.[105]

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3 (1960): 131–47. Haim Gerber, *Economy and Society in an Ottoman City: Bursa, 1600–1700* (Jerusalem: Hebrew University Press, 1988). On Syria and Iraq, see Amnon Cohen, *Economic Life in Ottoman Jerusalem* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); André Raymond, "The Ottoman Conquest and the Development of the Great Arab Towns," *IJTS* 1 (1979–1980): 84–101; and Antoine Abdel Nour, *Introduction à l'Historie Urbaine de la Syrie Ottomane*, (Beirut: Publications de l'Université Libanaise, 1982), 174.

[101] Panzac, "International and Domestic Maritime Trade," 193.

[102] Leila T. Erder and Suraiya Faroqhi ("The Development of the Anatolian Urban Network During the Sixteenth Century," *JESHO* 23 [1980]: 284) speak of great development. For a detailed study, see Usha M. Luther, *Historical Route Network of Anatolia (Istanbul-Izmir-Konya) 1550's to 1850's: A Methodological Study* (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1989); see also Suraiya Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia: Trade, Crafts, and Food Production in an Urban Setting, 1520–1650* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

[103] EA II:201.

[104] Fukasawa, *Toilerie et commerce du Levant*, 21–27. During the period of recovery, cotton cloth represented 9.4 percent of cargo shipped from the Levant to France.

[105] Orhonlu, *Osmanlı Imparatorluğu'nda Derbend Teşkilâtı*, 60–63; and Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda şehirçilik*, 13–16, 48, 71–73, 78–79.

The efflorescence of urban consumerism and manufacture within the eighteenth-century empire has long been the focus of Mehmet Genç's research. Without his empirical studies and pathbreaking interpretation of Ottoman economic policy, it would be impossible to appreciate the dynamism of, or the peculiar constraints on, the Ottoman market during this period.[106] Both external and internal commerce were regulated by the Ottoman tariff system (*gümrük*). More than a means to skim off revenues from transit trade, the tariff system was designed to channel goods and merchants in directions dictated by state priorities. In theory, commercial taxation favored the subjects of the empire, with Muslims paying lower rates than either Ottoman Christians and Jews or foreign merchants. Far from discouraging trade or sealing the empire off from foreign capital, the terms of treaty (*ahîdname*) afforded many European merchants and tax-immune Ottoman traders (officers, officials, and patent holders [*beratlı*]) special privileges and opportunities.[107] Indeed, state income from commercial taxation and industrial production grew apace between 1730 and 1768.[108] The growing demand from internal cities, despite the devastating epidemics of 1729, 1756–58, and 1772–74,

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[106] For the complete works in Turkish, see Mehmet Genç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda: Devlet ve Ekonomi* (Istanbul: Ötüken, 2000).

[107] İnalcık, "Imtiyâzât," 1180–85; Masters, *The Origins of Western Dominance*, 194–95; Genç, "Osmanlı Imparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi," in *V. Milletlerarası Türkiye Sosyal ve İktisat Tarihi Kongresi*, ed. Hakkı Dursun Yıldız, İnci Enginün, and Emine Gürsoy Naskalı (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1990), 13–25; Zeki Arıkan, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda İhracı Yasak Mallar," in *Prof. Dr. Bekir Kütükoğlu Armağan*, ed. Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu (Istanbul: Istanbul Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1991), 279–306; Rhoads Murphey, "Conditions of Trade in the Eastern Mediterranean: An Appraisal of Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Documents from Aleppo," *JESHO* 33 (1990): 35–50.

[108] Mehmet Genç,"Osmanlı İktisadî Dünya Görüşünün İlkeleri," *Sosyoloji Dergisi Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi*, 3rd ser. 1 (1989): 176–85; *idem*, "Osmanlı Devleti'nde İç Gümrük Rejimi," in *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985) 3:786–89; *idem*, "Osmanlı Ekonomisi ve Şavaş," *Yapıt* 49 (1984): 52–61, 86–93; see also Lütfi Güçer, "XVI–XVIII Asırlarda Osmanlı Imparatorluğu'nun Ticaret Politikası," *Türk Iktisat Tarihi Yıllığı*, no. 1 (Istanbul: Istanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Türk İktisat ve İctimaiyat Tarihi Araştırmaları Merkezi, 1987), 1–55; and Roger Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800–1914* (London: Methuen, 1981), 1–23. On "private control" of the Istanbul customs, see Sarı Mehmed Pasha, *Ottoman Statecraft: The Book of Counsel for Vezirs and Governors of Sarı Mehmed Paša (Nasa'ih ul-vuzera ve'l-umera)*, ed. and trans. W. L. Wright (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1935), 107. For the income in the first half of the eighteenth century from the Istanbul *gümrük*, see Ahmet Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Osmanlı Maliyesi* (Istanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 1986), 95, 232, 237, 269, 274.

also contributed to the rise of imported consumer goods, like coffee and tobacco.[109] Appreciating these multilateral linkages, in the early eighteenth century, the state placed new customs posts in secondary cities like Urfa, in addition to long-standing tariff stations at ports and transit cities like Tokat, Erzurum, Trabzon, Aleppo, Damascus, Baghdad, and Diyarbekir.[110]

Although Western European woolens and watches made inroads into middle-class homes in the empire, the Indian subcontinent would remain the empire's single largest source of imported manufactures and raw materials.[111] Even Istanbul, the empire's most avid consumer of things European, imported twice as many goods from the Indian Ocean as it did from France, its leading Western trade partner. Taking into account the domestic market overall and re-exports to Central and Eastern Europe, statistical data for Istanbul's commodity consumption must be considered as only the tip of an enormous iceberg of the Indian Ocean traffic in textiles, coffee, dyes, and spices in the empire.[112]

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[109] On the trail of epidemics that accompanied expanded trade linkages, see Daniel Panzac, *La peste dans l'empire ottoman: 1700–1850* (Leuven: Peeters, 1985), 105–33. Between 1717 and 1788, the tax-farm on the transit *gümrük* station in Tokat (*mukataa-yı amediye*) rose tenfold in nominal terms from 6.6 million *akçe* to 60 million *akçe*, according to Mehmet Genç, "A Study on the Feasibility of Using Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Financial Records as an Indicator of Economic Activity," in *The Ottoman Empire in the World Economy*, ed. Huri İslamoğlu-İnan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 363.

[110] Mehmet Genç, "Osmanlı Devleti'nde İç Gümrük Rejimi," in *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 3, 786–89; Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken*, 84–85.

[111] On the American coffee trade, see Edhem Eldem, *French Trade in Istanbul in the Eighteenth Century* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1999), 75–76. For one perspective on elite consumption, see Fatma Müge Göcek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie; Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

[112] Panzac, "International and Domestic Maritime Trade," 191; Halil İnalcık, "Osmanlı Pamuklu Pazarı, Hindistan ve Ingiltere, Pazar Rekabetinde Emek Maliyetinin Rolü," *Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Gelişme Dergisi Özel Sayısı* (1979–80): 1–66. Some sense of the scale of the interstate transit trade may be gauged from the dispute between the Austrian Paolo and the merchant Abdul Rahman over 13,500 *kuruş* in cash and coffee in 1763–64 (DA III:44); as for the scale of domestic commerce, see the complaint brought by an Ottoman Jewish merchant to the Diyarbekir judge, Seyyid Halil, in 1748–49 concerning a robbery in Cizre, involving coffee, nutmeg, cloves, as well as Baghdadi and Indian cloth (DA I:150). For estimates of the early nineteenth century, see E. Wirth, "Aleppo im 19. Jahrhundert—ein Beispiel für Stabilität und Dynamik spätosmanischer Wirtschaft," *Osmanistische Studien zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte. Im memoriam Van o Boškov*, ed. Hans Georg Majer (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1986), 187–206.

Much of this trade was funneled through the Ottoman port of Basra, the greatest beneficiary of the decline of Bandar ʻAbbas after 1722.[113] Monsoon winds carried ships bearing textiles, dyes, sugars, cotton twist, spices, musk, and lac from Bengal, the Coromandel coast, and Gujarat in addition to the commerce in slaves, ivory, and, above all, coffee, from Musqat, Oman, and Mukha.[114] Smaller caravans picking up their goods after the "long monsoon" took merchants and their wares in spring via Baghdad and Diyarbekir to the Ottoman capital.[115] Others took the the meandering Euphrates highway toward Aleppo. But the shortest route to the Mediterranean from the Indian Ocean cut directly across the Syrian desert. Departures along the desert route were the least frequent because security demanded larger convoys—comprising between 1,500 and 4,000 camels (each bearing more than 200 kilograms of goods). Caravans traveled through Syria at the pace of 25–30 kilometers a day.[116]

Ottoman administrators had spared no expense in realizing their aim of reintegrating Basra into the empire at the turn of the century.[117] They took into consideration the perspective of merchants, who carefully calculated their options and profits on the basis of the fluctuating price of pack animals, tolls, and the seasonal risks to person and property in overland transport.[118] To lure the merchants toward the more highly taxed but better patrolled highways linking Basra to Istanbul and Aleppo, they improved facilities and security.

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[113] Zarinebaf-Shahr, "Tabriz under Ottoman Rule," 165. Thabit A. J. Abdullah, *Merchants, Mamluks, and Murder: The Political Economy of Trade in Eighteenth-Century Basra* (Albany, State University of New York Press, 2001), 49.

[114] D.BŞM 694. The textiles entering Baghdad in 1692, included both Iraqi and Indian goods. Abdullah, *Merchants, Mamluks*, 58.

[115] On the Diyarbekir route, the peak season for traffic to and from the Gulf was autumn (August, September, and October) in the early nineteenth century. KK 5594 (1823–24).

[116] Masters, *Origins of Western Dominance*, 113. Abdullah, *Merchants, Mamluks*, 78. On the routes through Syria, Abdel Nour, "Le Réseau Routier de la Syrie Ottomane (XVI^{e}–XVIII^{e} siècle)," *Arabica* 30 (1983): 174.

[117] For highlights of the reintegration of Basra into the empire between 1695 and 1701, see Özcan, *Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi*, 106, 141–59.

[118] From Baghdad, the route proceeded toward Kerkuk (8 days), Mosul (4 days), Mardin (8 days), Urfa (7 days), and Aleppo (5 days), totaling 33 days in the 1750s. Bartholomew Plaisted, *The Desert Route to India Being the Journals of Four Travellers by the Great Desert Caravan Route between Aleppo and Basra, 1745–51. Narrative of a Journey from Basra to Aleppo in 1750* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1929), 102–3. See also Neşe Erim, "Trade, Traders, and the State in Eighteenth-Century Erzurum," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 5 (1991): 123–50.

To oversee operations at the lower confluence of the two rivers, the Şat'ül-Arab, the state created a new office, the "confluence captain" (*şat kaptanı*). Istanbul transferred experienced personnel from the Danube to supervise dredging and other engineering operations in the lower end of the Euphrates River near Dir, Ana, and Hit. State largesse flowed toward the construction of harbors and ports and paid for skilled craftsmen to construct new dual-purpose trade and military ships on the upper branch of the Eurphrates.[119] Had such efforts continued, they might have improved intra-imperial transport within Asia.

As for protection, the regional and central-state administrations responded to merchant complaints and pledged to pacify the main axes linking Istanbul and Aleppo and the Persian Gulf. In addition to tracking down notorious bandits, between 1690 and 1740, provincial commanders launched repeated campaigns to remove the Turkish, Kurdish, and Arab tribes who raided transport in Kurdistan, Syria, and Iraq and to forcibly resettle them in the western provinces of Rakka and Adana, far from the trade routes. Yet the burgeoning wealth in transit invited new interlopers. During the middle years of the eighteenth century, only strong local regimes could effectively contain the Kurdish lords of Cizre or the Milan tribe of the upper Tigris, the Arab Shammar, and ʿAnaza of the Middle Euphrates, and the Kaʿb and Khazaʿil at the southern end of the trade routes, much less counter the large and powerful confederate of the Muntafiq of Khuzistan.[120]

The ebb and flow of the central-state's territorial control along these commercial corridors prevented Istanbul from restraining the political latitude of action of the provincial regimes of Baghdad and Mosul. However, even without force of arms, Istanbul exerted a new

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[119] New ships and barges capable of carrying seventy persons and their cargo were built at the dockyards of Payas near Ayıntab and at Birecik. Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Şehircilik ve Ulasım*, 128–33. Güzelbey and Yetkin, *Gaziantep şeri'i Mahkeme Sicilleri*, 5, 12–13, 94. In 1733, officials at Payas (Ayıntab's port) were ordered to build 123 new boats, each at a cost of 297 *kuruş* 33 *para*. The rowers and *dümenci* were to be paid 98 *kuruş* per year.

[120] Abdullah, *Merchants, Mamluks*, 50–60. Masters, *The Origins of Western Dominance*, 118; Longrigg, *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq*, 79. Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun İskan Siyaseti ve Aşiretlerin Yerleştirilmesi* (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1991), 46–62, 78–80, 113. Cevdet Türkay, *Başbakanlık Arşivi Belgeleri'ne göre Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Oymak, Aşiret ve Cemaâtlar* (Istanbul: Tercüman, 1979), 809.

form of hegemony over much of its Asian and at least part of its North African empire for most of the eighteenth century. The Ottomans, in contrast to the Safavid shahs, possessed both an organizational structure tempered by time and the indigenous sources of silver needed to retrofit this structure.[121] These relatively favorable circumstances cushioned the state against the Mediterranean-wide financial crises after 1695 and the sea change in the global monetary system at the end of the New World silver boom.[122] The contraction of precious metal stocks resulting from the technological impasse in South and Central American mining overcame the Old World's reluctance to mine domestically.[123] The Ottomans, as did their neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe, began to rework older mines in the Balkans and staked new claims in Anatolia, at Gümüşhane, Keban, Ergani, and Espiye.[124]

Ottoman reserves never approached those of Russian Siberia, but they did provide self-sufficiency.[125] After a century of currency manipulation, chipped and debased coinage, domestic supply finally sufficed for the imperial mints: of some twenty-five to forty metric tons of metal mined between the 1730s and 1760s, 80 percent was turned into coins. Even as the grand vizier rallied the troops for war in western Iran, he was completing the final phases of an overhaul of coinage. The new standards for Ottoman specie emulated the most stable currencies of oceanic commerce. Thus the new silver *kuruş*

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[121] See Willem Floor and Patrick Clawson, "Safavid Iran's Search for Silver and Gold," *IJMES* 32 (2000): 345–68. Consider too, the global impact of the changes in funding state debt: Larry Neal, *The Rise of Financial Capitalism: International Capital Markets in the Age of Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 46. Jack Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); for the critique, Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Precious Metal Flows and Prices in Western and Southern Asia, 1500–1750: Some Comparative and Conjunctural Aspects," *Studies in History* 7 (1991): 79–105.

[122] Halil Sahillioğlu ("The Role of International Monetary and Metal Movements in Ottoman Monetary History, 1300–1700," in *Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds*, ed. J. F. Richards [Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1983], 269–304, 288–89) notes that Ottoman mines between 1640 and 1687 were inactive because of the abundance of silver arriving from the Americas. On early modern monetary history, see also Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and generally, Pierre Vilar, *A History of Gold and Money, 1450–1920* (London: Verso, 1984).

[123] Ian Blanchard, *Russia's 'Age of Silver': Precious-Metal Production and Economic Growth in the Eighteenth Century* (London: Routlege, 1989), 169–70.

[124] Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire*, 161–63.

[125] Sahillioğlu, "International Monetary and Metal Movements," 286–90.

(from the German word *groschen*, also known as piaster) was modeled on the Dutch thaler and fixed at the rate of 120 *akçe*. The Venetian ducat served as the measure for a new series of gold coins.[126] Despite opportunistic intervention in monetary markets, particularly to boost receipts into the treasury, Ottoman administrators generally let the value of gold fluctuate in the market.[127] The result of this monetary policy was positive: a long period of stability for the Ottoman monetary system and the *kuruş*, the principal unit of government accounting and market transactions.

Although one might interpret these reforms as evidence of an increased conformity or even incorporation into the European market, Ottoman policy continued to defy the conventional wisdom of mercantilism.[128] There were advocates of controlling imports, and voices among the Ottoman elite who saw danger in the imbalance in trade relationships with India, to be sure.[129] However, the idea of restricting imports or dissolving the institutions for procurement of basic urban and military supplies remained anathema to the empire's administrative ideology: "provisionism," as Mehmet Genç defines it, prioritized urban consumption in the empire's major administrative cities. To assure levels of comfort for the elite as well as to promote social peace among Istanbul's working classes and the poor, it was necessary to maintain a steady supply of goods and raw materials from luxuries to food staples, regardless of cost or source.[130]

Although provisionism may well have affected the ability of domestic manufacturers to compete with certain types of goods, particularly

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[126] Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire*, 161–66. Sahilloğlu, "The Role of International Monetary and Metal Movements," 289.

[127] Eldem, *French Trade in Istanbul*, 113–19, 199.

[128] For the debate, see Halil İnalcık, "The Ottoman Economic Mind and Aspects of the Ottoman Economy," in *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East*, ed. M. A. Cook (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 207–18, and Fernand Braudel, "L'Empire Turc est-il une économie-monde?" in *Mémorial Ömer Lûtfi Barkan* (Istanbul: Bibliothèque de l'Institut Français d'Études Anatoliennes d'Istanbul, 1980); compare Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Of Imârat and Tijârat: Asian Merchants and State in the Western Indian Ocean, 1400 to 1750," 37 (1995): 776. M. N. Pearson, *Before Colonialism: Theories on Asian-European Relations, 1500–1750* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988); K. N. Chaudhuri, *Asia before Europe: Economy and Civilization of the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990).

[129] Naima was particularly concerned about trade imbalance with India. Lewis V. Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, ed. Norman Izkowitz (New York: New York University Press, 1972), 144–45.

[130] Genç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda: Devlet ve Ekonomi*, 68–86.

the flood of cotton stuffs from India, as a theory of commerce, even mercantilism bore increasingly little relevance to real trade practices, interstate flows of bullion, and credit systems. Despite the growing clout of London, Amsterdam, and Marseilles in the Mediterranean and beyond, credit systems remained highly decentralized.[131] Few states could claim true monetary sovereignty; even Britain resigned itself to the use of Spanish coin within its North American colonies.[132] The Ottoman state, at the juncture of different market and monetary systems, faced even greater difficulties. With or without Istanbul's massive trade deficit, as long as silver had a greater purchasing power in India and China (and even in eastern Europe) than it did within the Mediterranean—the ratio between gold and silver in Istanbul was roughly equivalent to that in western European states[133]—it would be impossible to prevent the escape of specie through its eastern land frontiers, the Black Sea, or the Persian Gulf.[134]

In constructing a financial sphere of influence, Ottoman solutions were ingenious and enduring. Currency reform entailed not only minting coins with a high degree of metallic purity but also sharply reducing the number of mints operating in the empire. Although provincial cities continued to produce small coppers, the large silver and gold coins that serviced major transactions were minted only in Istanbul, Cairo, and for a time, it seems, Tabriz.[135] Using the principle of arbitrage to ensure the capital city's preeminence in specie, orders to Cairo set a standard for the silver content of coin that was slightly inferior to that employed in Istanbul.[136] Gradually, the Istanbul

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[131] On the bullionist tendencies, see Om Prakash, "Bullion for Goods: International Trade and the Economy of Early 18th Century Bengal," *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 13 (1976): 159–87. On the copper coinage used in Europe and Eurasia during the 1680s, Vilar, *History of Gold and Money*, 219–21; Neal, *The Rise of Financial Capitalism*, 11–17; Sahilloğlu, "The Role of International Monetary and Metal Movements," 288; and Frank Perlin, *Unbroken Landscape: Commodity, Category, Sign and Identity: Their Production as Knowledge from 1500* (Aldershot: Variorum and Brookfield, V.T.: Ashgate Publishing, 1994), 129.

[132] Edwin J. Perkins, *American Public Finance and Financial Services, 1700–1785* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press), 13–28.

[133] Eldem, *French Trade in Istanbul*, 117–18. The ratio in the Istanbul market averaged 14:1, fluctuating between a high of 15:1 and a low of 12.5:1.

[134] Ahmet Refik, *Hicri On İkinci Asırda Istanbul Hayatı (1100–1200)* (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaasi, 1930), 39, 62–63.

[135] Zarinebaf-Shahr, "Tabriz under Ottoman Rule," 203.

[136] Sahillioğlu, "The Role of International Monetary and Metal Movements," 279. Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire*, 180–89.

kuruş edged out rival currencies, both foreign and domestic, in the cities of Syria, as well as in the Balkans, Anatolia, and parts of Kurdistan and Iraq, though the Gulf managed to elude its financial hegemony (as it did Britain's).[137]

Yet it should be remembered too that a successful monetary hegemony complemented the fiscal system of empire, which was increasingly dependent on private contracts for tax collection and cash advances on high office, as we will read in the next chapter. Thus the flow of silver linking Istanbul to an export entrepôt like Izmir, constituted only part of a circuit of payments, in both bullion and paper, that united the imperial center with its peripheries and, over the course of the century, the empire as a whole to the global financial hubs of Marseilles, Amsterdam, and London.[138]

Eurasia in Transition

The Ottoman courtiers who studied this map might have regarded West Asia as slate upon which they could still redraw the lines of empire. Three centuries later this map—witness to a past political economy of space and the practices of sovereignty—invites us to consider not only actual outcomes but also a counterfactual one: What if the partition of Iran between the Ottoman Empire and Czarist Russia had become permanent? Although the sultan and his advisors might not have dreamt of reconstituting Alexander's empire, Azarbayjan was well on its way to becoming an Ottoman province. Bureaucrats had carried out exhaustive cadastral surveys. *Timars* and later, tax farms were distributed to Ottomans and local residents. The third mint of the new monetary system was established in Tabriz in 1725.[139] If Iran's division might have brought the czar one step

[137] Basra was clearly a credit and monetary frontier, well integrated into the Indian Ocean system (Abdullah, *Merchants, Mamluks*, 90). Şevket Pamuk ("The Recovery of the Ottoman Monetary System in the Eighteenth Century," in Kemal Karpat, *The Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey* [Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000], 188–211) confirms the strong linkages forged by this currency policy, especially within the Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, and Balkans. However, as we shall see in the following chapter, this is only part of a complex financial system, circulating paper (titles and letters of exchange), tax, tribute, and remittances (endowments) in addition to coinage.

[138] Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire*, 188–90.

[139] Zarinebaf-Shahr, "Tabriz under Ottoman Rule," 115–20.

closer to realizing a coveted southern port on the Indian Ocean, it would have also allowed the Ottomans to achieve more immediate goals. Istanbul could have shored up its position in the Black Sea from the Caucasus, by relying on the Georgian principalities, rather than on the erratic aid of the khans of the Crimea. Indeed, in 1774 at Küçük Kaynarca, while the Russians retreated from Moldavia, Wallachia, Bucak, and Georgia, the Ghiray khan finally secured the desired degree of autonomy. Or so he thought, because the treaty was but a preliminary to the total annexation of the Crimea by the czarina in 1783.

Yet Iran's repeated resurrection precluded a Russo-Ottoman territorial pact. Against all predictions, the old Safavid confederates—the Afshars (1736–47), then the Zands (1750–79), and finally, the Qajars (1779–1924)—rallied and restored much of the Iranian empire.[140] Nadir Shah's military adventures were felt across the larger Indian Ocean system. The attack on Delhi in 1741 netted him and his ally, the future Ahmad Shah Durrani of Afghanistan, tremendous wealth but evisserated the financial center of the distended Mughal state. This blow crippled Delhi's ability to defend its frontiers or aid its commanders in the eastern province of Bengal. After the East India Company's victory at Plassey in 1757[141] and with the rival Dutch colony at Kharq Island and French establishments along the Indian coastline disbanded, the British fleet dominated the sea. Carrying on where Nadir Shah's "hit-and-run" imperialism left off, British shippers took over not only long distance transport but also the carriage or "country trade" in the western Indian Ocean and Gulf. From bases in Bengal and Surat, its merchant capitalism reached deeply into the internal market, infiltrating distribution and manufacturing networks.[142]

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[140] Jos J. L. Gommans, *The Rise of the Indo-Afghan Empire, c. 1710–1780* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), 99–101. For later developments, see John Perry, *Karim Khan Zand: A History of Iran, 1747–1779* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); Longrigg, *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq*; and A. S. K. Lambton, "Persian Trade Under the Early Qajars," in *Islam and Trade in Asia*, ed. D. S. Richards (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 215–44.

[141] Gommans, *Rise of the Indo-Afghan Empire*, 29.

[142] See Ashin Das Gupta, *Indian Merchants and the Decline of Surat, c. 1700–1750* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1979). Sudipta Sen (*Empire of Free Trade: The East India Company and the Making of the Colonial Marketplace* [Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998]) follows the impact of changing long-distance trade relationships on local distribution and production.

Beyond reasserting suzerainty over Afghanistan and replenishing his own treasury, Nadir Shah's longer-term goals in South Asia remain a mystery. One of them was certainly to gain formal recognition as the head of a dynastic state in the eyes of their western neighbor, the Ottoman Empire. The Afshar leader, recognizing Ottoman weakness in the North and West, pressed negotiations with the sultan. After a decade of wrangling over the terms of sovereignty and the rights of adherents to the Afshar-championed Jafari sect in Mecca and Medina, in 1746 the Ottoman *divan* ratified the Treaty of Kurdan. A landmark piece of diplomacy, this agreement offered the framework for the territorial state system within Muslim Asia: a multilateral order that respected Ottoman religious paramountcy, its caliphal leadership, while recognizing the autonomy and legitimacy of other, Muslim dynastic polities. As a harbinger of modern relations between the two states, one increasingly shorn of sectarian overtones, Ernie Tucker's argument that "the dynamic of conceptual change [which] transcended the rise and fall of dynasties in Iran," may be correct. Nevertheless, Nadir Shah's assassination the following year had disastrous consequences for the region during the second half of the eighteenth century. It rendered the treaty a dead letter and threw Iran, once again, into turmoil.[143]

During the decades between the Treaty of Kurdan and the death of Nadir Shah's successor, Karim Khan Zand, in 1779, a palpable asymmetry within Eurasia would emerge.[144] The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and the Treaty Utrecht (1714) had been way stations on the road to new terms of sovereign rule. However, it was the Treaty of Paris (1763) that finally ended a half century of dynastic crises. It sealed the edges of the early modern political map, including Prussia's critical annexation of Silesia in 1740.

Standing outside the general conflagration of the Seven Years War brought mixed blessings to the Ottomans. Although spared the expense

[143] Tucker, "The Peace Negotiation of 1736," 35.

[144] Neither reducing difference to matter of cultural perception and projection, as Larry Wolf (*Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization of the Mind of the Enlightenment* [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994]) nor essentializing cultural and social forms, such as pastoral nomadism, as C. A. Bayly contends (*Imperial Meridian*, 17–18) brings us closer to appreciating the growing imbalance between European and Asian states during the second half of eighteenth century.

and buffered by their enemies' distraction between 1757 and 1768, Istanbul also missed decades of rapid advances in martial organization and technique. Nor did the final outcome favor the empire within the new global balance, given France's resounding defeat in both the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. Despite the promise of an alliance with Prussia, the opening of a new Habsburg and Russian front in 1768 presented the Ottomans with an even more dangerous territorial accord in central Europe.[145] At the height of the conflict, after the loss of its navy at Çeşme in 1770 and in the face of coordinated actions between the rebel Egyptian bey "Cloud-catcher" Ali and Moscow in Syria, Prussia joined the czar and emperor in the Poland partition of 1772–75.[146]

Preoccupation with the ever-sharper edges of the European state system and the entry of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea may have dampened the enthusiasm of Ottoman mapmakers for depictions of Alexander's Asia during the last quarter of the century. As British and French adventurers and cartographers traced real and imaginary lines in the legendary footsteps of Tamerlane and Nadir Shah across Anatolia and Egypt to India, the Ottomans tried to secure their western frontier. In addition to enlisting the support of the lords of its agrarian heartlands, the *derebey*, Istanbul would muster new resources and sponsor European advisors. To the east, goals of reconsolidating its provincial structure along the long and fragmented frontier of Kurdistan, seemed illusory. With Karim Khan Zand's siege of Baghdad and occupation of Basra in 1775, the Iranian war again erupted into Ottoman lands and choked the vital commercial channel that linked the capital with the Indian Ocean.

Although the Zand threat receded, it did not resolve the empire's fundamental dilemma: wedged between two increasingly incommensurate geopolitical systems, Istanbul sought other solutions. Ensnaring provincial actors in a web of high finance and courtly networks, it maintained the support of the urban gentry and rural lords while anchoring its eastern perimeters by giving its tacit assent to the semi-autonomous regimes that governed Egypt and Iraq.[147]

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[145] See Kemal Beydilli, *1780 Osmanlı-Prusya Ittifâkı (Meydana Gelişi-Tahlili Tatbiki)* (Istanbul: Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1984).

[146] Schroeder, *European Politics, 1763–1848*, 3–11.

[147] Aksan, "Ottoman War and Warfare, 1453–1812," 167.

CHAPTER TWO

THE SUBLIME PORTE AND THE CREDIT NEXUS

As the Ottoman armies crossed into Azarbayjan, the court turned its attentions to the pleasures of the capital seated on the shores of the Bosphorus, the strait connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.[1] Istanbul had been all but abandoned by Ahmed III's brother and father for bucolic Thrace. Now the sultan, his viziers, and his princesses embellished the city with new palaces, fountains, fields of tulips, and mosques. They transformed the waterways of the Golden Horn and the crowded thoroughfares of the inner city into a open air court. Festivals celebrated the rites of passage of the dynasty—marriages of princesses, births of princes, and circumcisions. Public ceremonies greeted the entry of foreign ambassadors and hailed the birth of an heir to a Bourbon ally.[2]

Perhaps the most fabled of these public events was the fortnight of feasting, parades, and entertainments that preceded the circumcision of the sultan's sons in the fall of 1720. In his "Ceremony Treatise" (*Surnâme-i Vehbi*), the poet Seyyid Hüseyin Vehbi (d. 1736) transcribed these festivities in verse.[3] Court painters immortalized

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[1] On this period, see Ahmet Refik, Lâle Devri (Ankara: Pınar Yayınları, 1912); Mary Lucille Shaw, *The Ottoman Empire from 1720 to 1734: As Revealed in the Despatches of the Venetian Baili* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1944). For other European paintings of courtly life in Istanbul, see Jean-Baptiste Van Mour (1671–1737) (Remmet van Luttervelt, *De "Turkse" Schilderijen van J. B. Vanmour en Zijn School* [Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut in het Nabije Oosten, 1958]), a protégé of the French Embassy.

[2] Consider Voltaire, *Candide or the Optimism* (London: Penguin, 1947), 125. On the concept of "civilization" under the old-regime and its discontents, see Norbert Elias, *The History of Manners* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 39–40.

[3] TKSK MS A. 3593. See Esin Atıl and Omer Koc, eds., *Levni and the Surname: The Story of an Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Festival* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000); Esin Atıl, "The Story of an Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Festival," *Muqarnas* 10 (1993): 181–211; E. Atil, "Surnâme-i Vehbi: An Eighteenth Century Book of Festivals," 2 vols. (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1969); in addition to the many manuscript copies found in Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Library, see Seyyit Vehbi, *Sûrnâme: Üçüncü Ahmed'in Oğullarının Sünnet Düğünü*, ed. Reşad Ekrem Koçu (Istanbul: Çigir Kitabevi, 1939).

them as well. Before 1732, Levni, the sobriquet of the celebrated court artist Abdülcelil Çelebi, and the members of his atelier recorded this event in two lavishly illustrated albums (Plates 1–6). The circumcision of the young princes provided the pretext to freeze the activities of the bustling city and turn the eyes of its thousands of shopkeepers, artisans, merchants, scholars, housewives, and grandees on the dynasty.

Parades, reviews of troops, and receptions regimented the actors of the régime into clearly defined institutions. The *solak*, the *bostancı* who patrolled the waterways and royal gardens, the armed *silahdar* and *peyk*, and the mounted *sipahi* patrolled the line separating the sovereign and his subjects. Surrounded by the eunuch-administrators of the harem, pages, and chamberlains, the sultan, seated in his palace, in a luxurious tent on the parade ground, or on a balcony overlooking the Golden Horn, is the center of a swirling panorama of activities. The populace, which peers from the sidelines at these marvelous entertainments—fireworks, dancers, acrobats, jugglers, and mock battles at sea—shares in the palace's merriment as well as its acts of piety.

In contrast to the tiered, rigorously hierarchical portrait of the high-ranking statesmen, the *rical-ı devlet*, or to the depiction of the carefully choreographed procession that led the princes to Topkapı Palace, dispersed elements in Levni's pictorial narrative also preform what is known as the "circle of justice." Ibn Khaldun had traced this theorem of redistributive government to Aristole's *Politics*.[4] It is

[4] Ibn Khaldûn, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, ed. and trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 41, attributes the "circle of justice" to the Sassanian king Khosraw I and Aristotle. Ibn Khaldun claims that Aristotle in his Book on Politics "arranged his statement in a remarkable circle that he discussed at length. It runs as follows: 'The world is a garden the fence of which is the dynasty. The dynasty is an authority through which life is given to proper behavior. Proper behavior is a policy directed by the ruler. The ruler is an institution supported by the soldiers. The soldiers are helpers who are maintained by money. Money is sustenance brought together by the subjects. The subjects are servants who are protected by justice. Justice is something familiar (harmonious) and through it, the world persists. The world is a garden . . . and then it begins again . . . They are held together in a circle with no definite beginning or end." An Ottoman translation of Ibn Khaldun's *Prolegomena* was completed by the head of the religious establishment, Şeyh'ül-İslam Mehmed Sa'ib Pirizâde (d. 1749). On Ibn Khaldun's influence, see Cornell Fleischer, "Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism and 'Ibn Khaldunism' in Sixteenth Century Ottoman Letters," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 18 (1984): 218–37. Notable Ottoman versions of the "circle of justice" include

"a circle with no definite beginning or end," a circulation of obligations linking the longevity and prosperity of an agrarian state to the quality of justice and protection that the sovereign offers those whose toil creates the empire's wealth.

The Ok Meydanı, the archery range by the Golden Horn served as the stage for the dramatization of the ideal earthy order. Fittingly, the farmer (Plate 1), who guides a pair of oxen and a plow—the symbol of the *çiftlik*, the unit of land needed for a household's subsistence—leads the way. He is followed by master craftsmen, journeymen, and apprentices of the trades that prepare food (butchers and cooks) and those that process tallow and hide (candle makers and tanners). Present too are barbers, grocers, quilt makers, and finally, the dealers in luxuries—jewelers, makers of fine brocade, and spice traders, all of whom bear samples of their wares, clever and costly gifts for the sultan.

As the earthly magistrate, the sultan stands at the apex of social hierarchies and at the nexus of the redistributive circuits of the realm. He reciprocates his subjects' gifts after his own manner. Ceremonial banquets channel the empire's bounty to those who render just decisions on disputes and to the officials and officers charged with safeguarding order. The first round of feasts honors the ulema and the jurists, the *ilmiye*, at whose head are the *Şeyh'ül-İslam* and two jurisconsults of Anatolia and Rumelia. Another banquet is hosted for the imams of important mosques and those who call the people to prayer, the *hatip*s. In subsequent paintings, we see the palace pages waiting upon the *seyfiye*, the men of the sword, among whom sit viziers, provincial governors, and the commanders of the imperial regiment. Although the sultan does not dine with his servants, leading members of the bureaucracy, the *kalemiye*, such as the *defterdar efendi*, the imperial treasurer and the sultan's deputy, the grand vizier, stand in his stead.

Amid the political upheaval of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries that roiled the city and overturned the regimes of his father and brother, these masques of absolutism were not worn

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the sixteenth-century Kınalızade Ali Efendi, *Ahlâk-ı Alâi* (Cairo: Bulak, 1248), vol. 3, 49 as well as that by the early-eighteenth-century imperial treasurer, Sarı Mehmed Efendi, *Ottoman Statecraft: The Book of Counsel for Vezirs and Governors of Sarı Mehmed Pasha (Nasa'ih ul-vuzera ve'l-umera)*, ed. W. L. Wright (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1935), 118.

lightly. Nonetheless, although the fall of Tabriz in 1730 would put an end to Ahmed III's reign as well as to the "Age of Tulips," the Ottoman dynasty rested on firm foundations. The dangerous centuries of fratricidal struggles among princes had passed and dynastic succession passed predictably to the eldest male heir.[5] Ahmed III's reign of nearly three decades defined the basic institutional modalities of the ancien régime. Under the watchful eye of the vizier, the Sublime Porte emerged as the regulatory force that oversaw the "circle of justice." Yet rather than a single circulatory system subject to rise and fall, it was composed of numerous circuits that assured the redistribution of privilege and power among an aristocracy of service and the empire's religious establishment. While allowing points of entry for new elements drawn from the wider society, the old-regime operated through an Istanbul nexus and the radiating spokes of an empire-wide financial system.[6]

Palace, "Porte," and Fiscal Patronage

The art historian Esin Atıl points to a shadow protagonist in Levni's storybook of the 1720 ceremonies. It is the Nevşehirli İbrahim Pasha (1662?–1730), the probable patron of the manuscript, who often shares the painter's frame with the sultan.[7] In these double portraits, sultan and deputy are almost interchangeable, distinguishable less by their features or dress than by the inferior position that the vizier occupies on the page. (Plate 2)

The grand vizier's notoriety owed to such presumptuosness: the servant who dared to display his own image more frequently than that of his sovereign, a deputy whose character and abilities are extolled in the panegyric of Vehbi that adorns the large fountain

[5] Mehmet IV was succeeded by his brothers, Süleyman II (r. 1687–1691)and Ahmed II (r. 1691–1695) before his sons, Mustafa II (r. 1695–1703) and Ahmed III (r. 1703–1730). Both of their reigns were cut short by janissary revolts. A. D. Alderson, *The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), 76; Leslie P. Peirce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), especially 191–218.

[6] Norbert Elias, *The Court Society* (New York: Pantheon, 1983), 91.

[7] Atıl, "The Story of an Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Festival," 200. The grand vizier appears in forty-four scenes; the sultan in only forty-one.

standing before the Topkapı Palace.[8] In reality, vizier and sultan were only two faces of the state: they might be considered figureheads of merging institutional and political currents, between the palace, the "Gate of Felicity" (*Dar üs-Saâde*) with its complex of private populations, pages, and patrimonial wealth, and the expanding resources and personnel of the "Sublime Porte," the *Bâb-ı Âli* (an abbreviation of the *Saraya-ı Sadr-ı Âli Divanhane-i Bâb-ı Âli*).[9]

İbrahim Pasha of Nevşehir, the sultan's son-in-law presided over a decisive phase in the restructuring of state institutions.[10] Like France's Jean-Baptiste Colbert, his tenure witnessed the consolidation of power and especially the means of raising state revenues under the vizierate.[11] The imperial council (*Divan-ı Hümayun*), once the locus of policy-making lost its monopoly; its chief tasks were surrendered to the executive officers who would take charge of both domestic and foreign affairs.[12] The grand vizier, his chief of staff (*kethüda*) and the director of the imperial treasury (*baş defterdar* or *defterdar efendi*) were empowered to draft edicts, decrees, and certificates and to render judgment in the sultan's name.[13] Deliberations concerning war and peace took place in the vizier's chambers.

Under İbrahim Pasha, the Sublime Porte realized even greater oversight over the empire's certificates, legal records, cadastral surveys,

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[8] E. J. W. Gibb, *A History of Ottoman Poetry* (London: Luzac & Company, 1967) vol. 4, 111.

[9] Tayyip Gökbilgin, "*Bâbıâli*," *İA* 2:174–77. Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 47. For the composition of the Porte's staff in the late seventeenth century, see the Anonymous author of *Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi* (1099–1116/1688–1704) (ed. Abdülkadir Özcan [Ankara: Türk Tarihi Kurumu Basımevi, 2000], 184–85), who follows Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi (*Hezarfen Hüseyın Efendi Telhısü'l Beyan fi Kavanin-i Âl-ı Osman*, ed. Sevim Ilgürel [Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1998], 132).

[10] For an overview of the history of the bureaucracy, see Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*; idem., *Ottoman Civil Officialdom* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); and Virginia Aksan, *An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace, Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700–1783* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), 1–14.

[11] Colbert's 1681 consolidation of the largest French tax farms into a single institution was dissolved one hundred ten years later by the revolutionary government. See Vida Azimi, *Un modèle administratif de l'ancien régime: les commis de la ferme générale et de la régie générale des aides* (Paris: Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1987).

[12] Ahmet Mumcu, *Hukuksal ve Siyasal Karar Organı Olarak Divan-ı Hümayun* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayınları, 1976), 69.

[13] İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilâatı* (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1984), 338–61; Halil İnalcık, "Re'is-ül-küttâb," *İA* 9:672–83.

records of complaints, foreign correspondence, and ledgers. The palace had already begun to shed the archive. Süleyman I (r. 1520–1566) ordered the physical removal of the registers of state lands from the precincts of the imperial council to the imperial registry (*defter-i hakani*).[14] Leaving the ceremonial head of the chancellery (*nişancı*) behind in the palace, the official who had been the vizier's chief clerk (*re'is ül-küttâb*) emerged as a new secretary of state, charged with maintaining the records of laws, treaties, and awards of certificates to office. Rather than entrusting these records to the care of the chief minister and thus, allowing them to pass from one administration to the next, two years before his death, İbrahim Pasha gathered imperial records together in a permanent, central depository located within the grand vizier's chambers.[15]

As the vizierate grew, with its chancellery, the fisc, and the state archive, so did the ranks of its minions: ushers, messengers, special assistants, accountants, clerks, special guards and officers. Yet, Levni's paintings remind us that there was at least one formidable redoubt of power beyond the Porte. Hac Beşir Ağa (1717–46), the senior black eunuch (*dar üs-saâde ağası*), who rarely leaves the sultan's side throughout the festivities, remained firmly in control of the palace's assets. He, as many of his predecessors in office, routinely intervened in domestic and foreign affairs. Since the late sixteenth century, when Habeşî Mehmed Ağa succeeded in wresting control of both the position of *kahya* of the sultan's treasury and chief administrator of the endowments from the other corps of eunuchs, those of Eurasian extraction, the senior black eunuch controlled vast resources throughout the empire.[16] As protectors and heads of the harem staff and the apartments of the sultan's family and slaves, the eunuchs exercised undiminished influence over members of the dynasty.

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[14] See D. A. Howard, "The Historical Development of the Ottoman Imperial Registry (Defter-i Hakanî): Mid-Fifteenth to Mid-Seventeenth Centuries," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 11 (1988): 213–30; and Klaus Röhrborn, "Die Emanzipation der Finanzbürokratie im Osmanischen Reich (Ende 16. Jahrhundert)," *ZDMG* 122 (1972): 118–39. In the 1750s, these documents were transfered to the palace of princess Esma Sultan (R. Ekrem Koçu, "Bâbıâli," *IA* 4:1446).

[15] İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Saray Teşkilâtı* (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1945), 173–77. On the lives and accomplishments of the senior black eunuchs living between 1574 and 1752, see Ahmed Resmi Efendi, *Hamiletü'l-Küberâ*, ed. Ahmet Nezihi Turan (Istanbul: Istanbul Kitabevi, 2000).

[16] Ahmed Resmi Efendi, *Hamiletü'l-Küberâ*, 45; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleteinin Saray Teşkilâtı*, 173.

Lest we reduce the dynamic of Ottoman polity to a perennial contest between factions, or in this case, a tug-of-war between Porte and palace, we must recall the similarities between the Ottoman Empire and its counterparts in Europe and Asia. Notwithstanding accounts of a relatively smooth and uncontested transition to absolutism and a seamless relationship between religion and state, consolidation of the key state institutions was fraught and indirect.[17] Early sultans, no less than their "feudal" European neighbors, struggled mightily to subdue their allies as well as their enemies. The religious aura surrounding the dynasty became an important component in the transition between a frontier principality and an early modern "tax state."[18] Like European monarchs who preferred the lawyers trained in Roman statutes to dependence on churchmen, the sultans Murad I (1362–89) and Beyazid I (1389–1402) drew new personnel from a pool of Byzantine and Ilkhanid administrators who began the process of bureaucratizing the military order.[19] Specialized in scribal cipher, *siyakat*, Persian "schoolmen" reduced the empire's wealth to cadastral records and converted the sovereign's fifth of the spoils of war into the salaries for an infantry of palace-trained slaves, the janissaries.

Vehbi's festival book was also an instrument of state making. Just as the exploits of the religious knight, the *ghazi*, once inspired the empire builders of yore, the "mirror of princes," manuals drafted by courtly advisers and bureaucrats, laden with well-honed adages, moralizing verse, and allegories such as the "circle of justice," were integral to the ideology of a palace-centered state.[20] The palace-state in its most predatory form, during a period often associated with the reign of Sultan Mehmet II (r. 1453–1481), enlisted such ideals

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[17] For two examples, see Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); and Linda Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560–1650* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996).

[18] Compare Peter-Christian Witt, "The History and Sociology of Public Finance: Problems and Topics," in *Wealth and Taxation in Central Europe: The History and Sociology of Public Finance*, ed. Witt (Leamington Spa, UK: Berg Publishing, 1987), 1–18.

[19] Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds*, 111–13.

[20] See Cornell H. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa 'Ali (1541–1600)* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 100–102; Abou El-Haj, *Modern State*; and Pal Fodor, "State and Society, Crisis and Reform in 15th–17th Century Ottoman Mirror for Princes," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 40 (1986): 217–40.

to consolidate absolutism, to detach his commanders from conflicting regional loyalties, and to radically curtail the accumulation of property by statesmen.[21]

In centralizing state institutions, Mehmet II also brought into existence a new division of labor, first between the old and new palaces and, later, among the orders composing the central state.[22] Unlike the oral compacts binding amirs and princes, the charters of incorporation and codes of administrative law, the *Teşrifat-i Kanunnâme-i Âl-i Osman* were copied and revised. They did not simply detail protocol—duties, dress, ranks, and privileges—or reaffirm the division between statesmen and subject. They also gave permanency to the ruling estates and established a system of checks and balances between them. It was the grand vizier, the bearer of the sultan's seal and deputy, who shared custody over state resources and tended its finances alongside the chief treasurer, the *defterdar efendi*. Thus, despite the seemingly impregnable fortress and, to outside observers, the hermetically sealed orders residing in the Topkapı Sarayı, replete with schools, atelier, financial apparatus, kitchens, supreme court, and *divan*, these organizational charters planted the seeds of other sophisticated hierarchies and established the basic parameters of privilege and obligation for the ruling elite, as well as for other aspirants, individuals or groups, to state office.[23]

The Istanbul bureaucracy grew alongside the geographical expanse of the empire. However, by the early seventeenth century their numbers stabilized. For every clerk, accountant, and scribe in the central-state bureaucracy, there were approximately one thousand salaried soldiers and ten harem staff members.[24] Linda Darling attributes this compactness to the changing nature of its duties.[25] The labor-intensive tasks of codification and cadastration had been accomplished.

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[21] Colin Imber, *Ebu's-su'ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 67.

[22] Halil İnalcık, "Kânûnnâme," *EI*², 4:562–66.

[23] For the origins of the provincial treasuries, Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual*, 312–13. On the financial foundations of the rebel Canbuladoğlu's mini-state in Syria, see William Griswold, *Political Unrest and Rebellion in Anatolia, 1000–1020/1591–1611* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Griswold, 1983), 122.

[24] Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare, 1500–1700* (London: University of London Press, 1999), 53; Peirce, The Imperial Harem, 122. Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy*, 70.

[25] Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy*, 62–65. In 1613, the high point in her study, there were 188 clerks and accountants.

A purely geographical division of bureaus and tasks gave way, to greater standardization of process in terms of formulae, precedent, universal forms of taxation, and contract. At its greatest extent, the eighteenth-century the Istanbul civil service never seems to have exceeded fifteen hundred individuals, only a fraction of comparable administrations in France and Russia.[26]

To a large degree the size of the Ottoman administration was illusory. Certainly, Cornell Fleischer is correct in emphasizing the role that bureaucrats themselves played in inhibiting the expansion of the Istanbul orders and restricting entry to clients and kin, particularly, as we shall see, when state service constituted the sine qua non for its quasi-aristocratic claims, what Rifa'at Abou-el-Haj calls the "sense of entitlement."[27] However, we must look beyond the official cadres in Istanbul to the thousands of contractors, subcontractors, and multi-tasking officials in the provinces who put these orders into effect. Without conceding the honor of official title or the security of inclusion in their charters, imperial bureaucrats, increasingly specialized in communications and coordination of operations, devolved many of the most labor-intensive duties, say, tax assessment and collection, on the provincial gentry and resident janissaries. By the end of the eighteenth century, the inordinately large number of viziers may also have been product of this shunting of responsibilities outside the official hierarchy.[28]

Comparing the number of "internal" to "external" state agents is also a misleading gauge of institutional centralization. A more apt measure might be found in the incremental merging of palace resources and with it, the powers of patronage under the Porte.[29] Rhetorically the vast resources of the empire all belonged to the sultan, whether from his personal wealth, from properties of the state and the commonweal (*beyt'ül-mal*), or from taxation; But in practice Ottoman finances had long been divided into two separate entities. On one

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[26] Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, 22–23.

[27] Cornell Fleischer, "Preliminaries to the Study of the Ottoman Bureaucracy," in *Raiyyet Rüsumu, Essays Presented to Halil İnalcık* (Special Edition of Journal of Turkish Studies), ed. Bernard Lewis et al. 10 (1986): 140–41.

[28] Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom*, 22–23.

[29] See Halil Sahillioğlu, "Şıvış Year Crises in the Ottoman Empire," in *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to the Present Day*, ed. M. A. Cook (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 230–33; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilâtı*; Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy*, 81–119.

hand, there was the purely patrimonial treasury of the sultan (*hazine-i enderun*), who served as trustee of the commonweal and religious endowments. On the other hand, there was the true forerunner of the fisc, the operational treasury, called alternately, the *hazine-i birûn* or, more commonly, the *hazine-i amire*, devoted to the running of the state, war and the management of the empire's vast latifundia.[30]

As controller of the harem, the senior black eunuchs oversaw palace finances. In effect, the palace treasury received the sultan's share of imperial wealth. This included war booty and slaves, the routine confiscation (*müsadere*) of the goods of former officials and officers, gifts, profits from the mint, earnings from mines, the yearly payment from Egypt, and the tribute paid by conquered or vassal countries, in addition to a steady stream of gifts (*pişkeş*) that were mandatory for those ascending the highest rungs of the state hierarchy. The head of the harem possessed the ability to appoint and dismiss scholars and preachers to posts in the pious endowments (*waqf/awqâf*) founded by members of the dynasty as well as those established for the benefit of pilgrims to Mecca and Medina.

The vizier who retained the keys to both vaults, oversaw the operational treasury. Originally, it received the taxation created by statute and much of the poll tax levied, usually in aggregate sums, from Christian and Jewish communities. The vizier could draw upon revenues that were received from *miri* (state) lands, whether assigned as *timar*s or collected by nonresident officials and tax farmers.[31] In the sixteenth century, the annualization of the first direct levies, under the heading of the *avârız* and the *nüzül bedeliyesi*, brought in another large stream of income into this treasury.[32] Although established to run the state and specifically to pay for the upkeep and outfitting

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[30] Ömer Lûtfi Barkan,"(1669–70) Mali Yılına ait bir Osmanlı Bütçesi ve Ekleri," *İFM* 17 (1955–56): 193–347.

[31] Sahillioğlu, "Şıvış Year Crises," 330–33; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilâatı*, 328–31.

[32] For the history of the first direct tax, known generically as *avârız*, see Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy*, 81–118. On the application of the taille in France, see James B. Collins, *Fiscal Limits of Absolutism: Direct Taxation in Early Seventeenth-Century France* (Berkeley: University of California, 1988); and for the "Turk tax" in Austria, Kersten Krüger, "Public Finance and Modernisation: The Change from the Domain State to Tax State in Hesse in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. A Case Study," *Wealth and Taxation in Central Europe: The History and Sociology of Public Finance*, ed. Peter-Christian Witt (Lexington Spa, UK: Berg, 1987), 49–62.

of its military forces, the operational treasury continued to contribute to palace expenses as well. Funds were set aside for the upkeep of the royal household and for the "pocket money" of the sultan.

A summary of income and expenditures of the outer treasury dating from 1669–70 helps us better appreciate the actual allocation of imperial income. It reveals that the palace still commanded nearly 30 percent of the state's total revenues, a little less than half of the monies used to pay the salaries of infantry (both full-time salaried corps and mercenaries), cavalry, sailors, and frontier guards, which constituted 62.5 percent of total expenditures. Outright payment for salaries due the civil bureaucracy amounted to less than 1 percent of the imperial budget.[33]

Over the course of the seventeenth century, the operational treasury far outstripped the sultan's coffers in complexity of tasks and sheer volume of transactions. The relentless demands of warfare forced a steady expansion of the state's economic claims on society overall as well as on the sultanate. In addition to the new universal, direct taxes by the end of the seventeenth century, the Sublime Porte imposed excise duties on formerly banned substances, such as tobacco and coffee.[34] Minorities, who also bore the brunt of new legislation in Europe and Mughal India, were subjected to the reformulated poll tax (*cizye*) of 1691, which would become one of the single most important sources of Ottoman state revenues by the early eighteenth century.[35]

Bitter experience taught Istanbul officials to choose their targets with care. They staggered new taxation geographically, particularly for peasants living close to the battle front or for residents of major administrative cities.[36] Yet many other types of taxation never reached Istanbul. The central government turned a blind eye to the raising

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[33] Barkan, "Mali Yılına ait bir Osmanlı Bütçesi," 224.

[34] Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy, 67, 78–79. Ahmet Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi* (Istanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 1985), 272–73.

[35] Halil İnalcık, "Djizya," *EI*², 2:563–566; Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken*, 104–5, 136–43, 157–61, 180. The poll tax became the largest single component of direct taxation during the eighteenth century; it yielded between 22 percent and 40 percent of the total. By contrast, *avârız* income sharply declined.

[36] On the deteriorating conditions in the countryside, Bruce McGowan, *Economic Life in the Ottoman Europe: Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 54–55; Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken, 140–42, 274, 289; and M. Münir Aktepe, *Patrona Isyanı* (1730) (Istanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1958), 9–10.

of extraordinary levies in the provinces, such as *the sürsat bedeliyesi* and *iştira bedeliyesi*, needed for military provisions or for salaries, as well as to the arbitrary dues that commanders, sipahi, jannisaries, and other officers demanded from rural populations.[37]

Perhaps the most powerful catalyst of growth in the state's capacity was debt. When tax receipts did not suffice, bureaucrats reversed the predatory relationship that had prevailed between the two treasuries.[38] The grand vizier, when need arose, could withdraw funds to pay for state expenses.[39] A time honored practice, reliance on the palace treasury in early centuries was timed with the financial shortfalls occasioned by the leap months of the Islamic calendar.[40] Although the adoption of a solar calendar after 1710 for accounting purposes remedied this particular problem, from the last decade of the seventeenth century onward supplements drawn from the palace treasury became a common occurrence in wartime. During the protracted war with the Holy League (1683–1699), loans from the sultan's treasury to the fisc met about one-tenth of its annual expenses; during the military campaign against Peter the Great (1710–1711), the palace contributed nearly one-third of state expenses.[41]

Because little of these monies was ever repaid, the chief treasurer devised subtler means of poaching upon palace wealth. A common practice was for accountants to divide the revenues of receipts earmarked for the palace, such as the imperial mint, between the fisc and palace treasury.[42] The confiscated goods of former soldiers and civil servants as well as intestate goods that were traditionally channeled toward the *beyt'ül-mal* or commonweal (and thus entrusted to the sultan's keeping), also increasingly found their way into general spending.[43]

Amid the worldwide financial crises of the turn of the century, sovereigns scoured their realms and populations for the means to

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[37] Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken*, 153–61.

[38] See Ariel Salzmann, "An Ancien Régime Revisited: Privatization and Political Economy in the 18th century Ottoman Empire," *Politics & Society* 21 (1993): 393–423.

[39] Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken*, 36–39.

[40] Sahillioğlu, "Şıvış Year Crises," 330–33.

[41] Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken*, 16, 243.

[42] MMD 9524:16.

[43] Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy*, 65. For a detailed study of the process of expropriation, see Yavuz Cezar, "Bir Âyanın Muhallefatı: Havza ve Köprü Âyanı Kör Ismail-oğlu Hüseyin (Müsadere Olayı ve Terekenin İncelenmesi)," *Belleten* 151 (1977): 41–78.

meet fiscal exigencies.[44] In the Ottoman Empire, the treasury deferred cash outlays by bureaucratic sleight of hand: tagging the revenues from agrarian sources to individuals in the form of retirement assignments, pin ("shoe") money for princesses, or *ocaklık* (the taxes of villages or rural communities), which were devoted to the upkeep of infantry units or frontier troops. The dynasty's crown lands or *hass* revenues, which included the large fiscal estates reserved for governors and commanders in such regions as West Asia (particularly, Syria, Eastern Anatolia, Kurdistan, and Iraq, where the *timar* system had never been applied in a comprehensive fashion) were increasingly reduced to fiscal units. These *mukataât* served as a quasi-modular form of accounting; they afforded the bureaucracy a new flexibility in the assignment of distant resources, as well as the means to anticipate revenues through revenue contracting.[45] At times a central-state agent would be appointed to carry out the collection of taxes; in many other instances, the fiscal bureaucracy would leave beneficiaries to their own devices.[46]

Borrowing took many forms. Revenue contracting, as Yavuz Cezar reminds us, was probably one of the most common means of managing state debt. However, precisely because revenue farming entailed a contractual relationship as well as a recycling of state resources through multiple hands, the specific modalities merit closer examination.[47] The edict of 1695, which authorized the use of leases for life (*malikâne mukataât*) on such fiscal units brought into being distinctive sociopolitical arrangements while fulfilling multiple financial and bureaucratic purposes.[48] For the potential contractor, the treasury offered

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[44] Larry Neal, *The Rise of Financial Capitalism: International Capital Markets in the Age of Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 11–17.

[45] Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy*, 123.

[46] *Mukataât* were either assigned as salary to be managed by tax farmers (*mültezim*), stewards (*voyvoda*), or revenue agents (*emin*) or directly to janissaries in lieu of salary. Some were even awarded on a lifetime basis. Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken*, 126–28.

[47] Yavuz Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi (XVIII. Yüzyıldan Tanzimat'a Mali Tarih)* (Istanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1986), 51.

[48] The standard work on the subject remains Mehmet Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikâne Sistemi," *in Türkiye İktisat Tarihi Semineri*, ed., Osman Okyar and Ünal Nalbantoğlu (Ankara: Hacetepe Üniversitesi 1975), 231–296. One does not have to search far to find reports of deteriorating conditions: KK 3105:11 (1721), for example, concerns the plight of villages whose taxation, held in an *ocaklık*, had been farmed out under short-term contracts. Given terms of contract, however, tax-farmers seemed reluctant to assume all but the most lucrative contracts, such as Istanbul's snuff tax

revenues with quasi-proprietary rights, including administrative autonomy and the possibility of passing shares to sons and male relatives. For the treasury, the edit assured an immense infusion of capital. Each successful bid brought in a large advance on future income in the form of a surety (*muaccele*). Thereafter, the bureaucrats were assured of regular installments of income (*mal*) over decades.[49] For a strapped bureaucratic corps, it helped standardize procedure, lifted the burden of repeated reassessment, and furnished longer-term agents to collect revenues, particularly the many sources that formed the oldest revenue bureaus, such as the *baş muhasebe*. Moreover, without formal expansion of the Istanbul bureaucracy itself, the new contract harnessed a labor force for the state as it extended its powers of fiscal patronage.[50]

By providing very competitive terms of contract and, even, dignifying the practice of tax farming, the *malikâne* system facilitated the merging of the two treasuries. Within two years of its promulgation, provisions were made for the application of the life-lease to resources that formed part of the palace income.[51] They included the enormous crown estates set aside for the upkeep of the queen mother, royal consorts, princesses, the admiral of the Mediterranean fleet, the grand viziers, the senior black eunuch, the steward of the imperial stirrup (*rikab-ı hümayun kaymakamı*), and the khans of the

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(*mukataa-ı resm-i duhan*), which sold quickly (Özcan, *Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi*, 20). By contrast, another document (D.BŞM 624) reveals that many other contracts, including villages in Kars, the customs stations of Erzurum and Baghdad, crown estates in Mar'aş, *zamet*s in Urfa, and a soap factory in Bosnia, found no bidders at a 1694–95 auction.

[49] MMD 3423 (1695–98) contains copies of the certificates awarded to life-lease contractors during the first years of auctions.

[50] In addition the document reported by Raşid Efendi, (Mehmed Raşid, *Tarih-i Raşid* [Istanbul: Matbaa-i Miri, 1282/1865–66] 2:288–89), Genç ("Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikâne Sistemi," 284–88) has located two important decrees in the archive (KK 5040:1–2). Although Avdo Sučeska ("Malikane," *POF* 36 [1986]: 197–229) may be correct in attributing the edit itself to the reign of Ahmed II; however, as a policy, the life-lease system is testimony to a growing consensus among the elite of this period concerning fiscal and administrative matters.

[51] Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken*, 194–96. *Hass* accounts are included in the budget in 1690–91 and provides payments for the palace. On the *malikâne-hass*, that is, *havass-ı hümayun*, awarded under *malikâne* contracts, see Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım*, 39–44, 48–49, 66. Such estates constitute an important component of the subventions given the Crimean khans. Among the many documents pertaining to the estates of eighteenth-century princesses, see those for Safiye Sultan (CS 868); Alemşah Sultan (CS 4207); Ayşe Sultan (CS 5433); and Hadime Sultan (CS 2902).

Crimea, to name only the some of the noble individuals involved.[52] Once converted, the bureaucrats assumed the ultimate oversight of these resources which allowed them to divert least part of the income, from either the surety or annual remittance, toward general operating expenses.[53]

Ibrahim Pasha's tenure, in particular, witnessed a marked expansion of the life-leases.[54] State auctions designated taxes and duties throughout the empire, such as the Balkans and the Aegean, regions that technically fell well outside the scope of the original edict. A wide variety of agents—from personal stewards (*kethüda*), intendants (*voyvoda*), revenue agents (*emin*), and financial agents (*sarraf*), to provincial soldiers and members of the gentry—acted as on-site administrators.[55] Contractors paid the executive officers of the Porte and the highest-ranking members of the judiciary special fees for awards and transfers of shares in their contracts.[56]

Thus, the new contract added another weapon to the Porte's institutional arsenal against the financial independence of the palace. There were other attempts to pry away its powers of patronage. Shortly before Beşir Ağa's promotion to head of the harem staff, Grand Vizier Şehid Ali Pasha succeeded in establishing two new accounting bureaus to oversee part of the imperial household's vast endowments, particularly those involving agricultural and tribal taxes in northern Syria and Anatolia.[57] But many areas of palace finance withstood this assault. The valuable grain lands in Egypt, which

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[52] Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım*, 37, 48–49.

[53] Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken*, 104, 289. Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım*, 328. Many if not most contracts were awarded from the large financial bureau of the *muhasebe-i evvel*, which yielded between 18.8 percent and 38.7 percent of the general income over the century.

[54] Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken*, 134.

[55] Hüseyin Özdeğer, "III. Ahmed'in Varidât ve Defteri," *Türk İktisat Tarihi Yıllığı* (Istanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Türk İktisat ve İçtimâiyât Tarihi Araştırmaları Merkezi, 1987), 1:305–52. Whether these are the sultan's own estates or those of his sons, such revenues as *hass-ı Beğpazarı, hass-ı Haymana-ı Büzürk ve Küçük, hass-ı Menemen, hass-ı Boynu İncelü (taifesi), hass-ı Mukataa-i Malatya, hass-ı Esb-Keşân ve Boz-Ulus*) do form part of the inner treasury. For another example of shares in *hass* of princes "*veledân-ı sultan*," see CS 5287.

[56] Mouradgea I. D'Ohsson, *Tableau général de l'Empire Othoman* (Paris: M. Firmin Didot Imp., 1820–24) vol. 3, 175–76; 368–70. For registration the treasury charged a 10 percent fee, two thirds of which was paid to the grand vizier and one-third to the director of the fisc.

[57] Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken*, 90, 104; Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım*, 100–101.

supported pilgrims and the population of Mecca and Medina, would resist reorganization until the 1740s.[58] In other areas, the palace gained ground. In 1716, the senior black eunuch assumed the oversight of nearly all of the endowments founded by members of the palace, in addition to those of the eunuchs themselves. At his Wednesday *divan*, Beşir Ağa discussed salaries, awards of revenue contracts on the Egyptian villages, and appointments of professors and imams at hundreds of mosques and religious institutions throughout the empire, including the prestigious mosques of Istanbul, Edirne, and Bursa.[59]

In countering this influence generally, and in an attempt to win the hearts generally, of the empire's ulema in particular, the Porte summoned income from the largest revenue contracts, many of which became life-leases, or later, state-managed bonds or *esham*.[60] Stipends (*yevmiye*) were allotted to three categories of recipients: pensioners (*mütekâ'idin*), servants (*hüddâm*) and the ulema, or "those who say prayers" (*du'â-güyân*). These allotments constituted either pensions or rewards for unspecified "duties" (*vazife*). Over the century, although the pool of pensioners and servants remained fairly stable, the population of *du'â-güyân*—scholars, imams, sayyids (descendents of the Prophet), and leaders of Sufi orders, as well as members of their families—living in Istanbul, Edirne, Izmir, Salonika, Mecca, Medina, and Damascus multiplied.[61] In 1738, for example, the tax farm on the commercial tariffs of "greater" Istanbul, which included its suburbs, such as Galata and the ports of Gelibolu and Mudanya, supported only 550 *mütekâ'idin* and *hüddâm* but disbursed stipends to approximately 6,000 *du'â-güyân*.[62] The yearly income from large provin-

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[58] Jane Hathaway, *The Politics of Household in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of the Qazadağlı* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 139–64.

[59] Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Saray Teşkilâtı*. See also Jane Hathaway, "The Role of the Kızlar Ağası in Seventeenth-Eighteenth Century Ottoman Egypt," *Studia Islamica* 75 (1992): 141–58.

[60] See H. Veli Aydin, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Esham Uygulaması (1775–1840)" (Ph.D. diss., Ankara University, 1998).

[61] The seventeenth-century Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi (*Telhîsü'l-Beyân*, 98) states that 136 *yük* 22,400 *akçe* from the *mukataa* revenues in the *hazine-i amire* were set aside for this purpose. But the historian Naima (d. 1716) (Lewis V. Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, ed. Norman Itzkowitz [New York: New York University Press, 1972], 104–5) insists that most ulema received stipends from endowments connected to mosques and other religious institutions and that the customs revenues were used for the salaries of other officials.

[62] KK 4264; KK 4308.

cial revenue contracts, such as Bursa's silk tax, paid the salaries of the ulema of the Holy Cities.[63] Provincial tax farms, such as the *voyvodalık* of Diyarbekir or the *deftardarlık* of Damascus, contributed subventions in cash and grain to local professors and the members of Sufi orders.[64]

One of the most important sources of ulema stipends were the remittances from the excise tax on coffee and tobacco, the so-called sin taxes (*resm-i bid'at*). In 1722–23, the coffee tax for Istanbul (including income from other major ports such as Salonika) paid out stipends to 728 pensioners of the palace and 1,160 members of the ulema (*du'â-güyân*). Thirty years later the same tax farm made payments to 2,450 members of the ulema (of whom 665 were female relatives).[65] As for the tobacco tax, awarded as a tax farm in 1691 and as a life-lease in 1744–45, its revenues supported 1,586 individuals, of whom 51 were women.[66] In 1772–73, the 623 women who derived stipends from this tax farm constituted more than one-third of the total (1,761) number of those listed as members of the "ulema."[67] Naturally, the chief mufti of the empire also received his share: of the tobacco regie's annual income of 159,028.5 *kuruş*, 25,000 *kuruş* was paid to him directly, in lieu of salary (*bedel*).[68]

If the operational treasury under the supervision of the Porte was—as it could be argued—the forerunner of the modern fisc, then it was the rhizome of financial relations engendered by debt that expanded and structured the social capacity of the emerging state.

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[63] A 1780 Summary (KK 4547) assigned 1.23 million *akçe* to stipend holders and 7.09 million *akçe* went for *du'â-güyân* stipends. In 1802, the tax on silk sales in Bursa (KK 4198) supported ulema resident in Mecca and Medina.

[64] D.BŞM 2071:2–9 1150–1154 (1737–1741). Provincial tax farm budgets were much the same; of the three-year income (mal) from the *voyvodalık* of Diyarbekir, totaling 31,391,793 *akçe*, 1,396,461 *akçe* were devoted to pensioners and *du'â-güyân*.

[65] In 1691, the coffee tax yielded 204 *kese*, or 10.2 million *akçe* according to Tabakoğlu (*Gerileme Dönemine Girerken*, 274); see KK 4520 (1722–23) and KK 4530 (1752–53) later income. In 1780 (KK 4557), 1.23 million *akçe* were subtracted from it to support pensioners and 7.09 million *akçe* went to the ulema as "stipends." They included their wives and daughters such as Rakiya hanım (at 130 *akçe* per day) and Ayşe hatun (80 *akçe* per day).

[66] Özcan, *Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi*, 20–21; KK 4471.

[67] KK 4484. The tobacco taxes involved in this farm were collected at many ports, including Salonika, Drac (Durazzo), Boğaz, Tekfur Dağı, İnegöl, Edirne, Tripoli, Istanbul, Aleppo, Damascus, and Jaffa. In 1761–62, its gross income for the fisc was 2900 *kese rumi akçe* or 145 million *akçe*/1.21 million *kuruş* (CM 26,858).

[68] CM 21,369.

In many ways, the *malikâne* contract epitomized the indirect strategy of centralization under the old regime. It was a particularly effective tactic in wresting away palace funds and placing all or part of those assets under the aegis of the Sublime Porte. Although it applied to only a fraction of central-state revenues as a whole, the leasing system generated a secondary apparatus consisting of thousands of contractors across the empire who seconded a small bureaucratic corps based in the capital. From its introduction in 1695 to its gradual phasing out after 1789, it fostered a complex circuitry of redistribution and fiscal patronage that bound members of court, the ulema and the ruling estate to one another.

Hierarchies of Service

In a snapshot of the imperial hierarchy, Levni records the dignitaries and statesmen as they stand at attention in anticipation of the sultan (Plate 3). Throughout the album, bureau chiefs, professors, members of the divan, captains, ushers, the commander of the palace doormen—are all distinguished by dress, textiles, furs, and the number of ceremonial horsetails and plumes. In such small details as headgear, the painter conjures up the myriad gradations of political status. The head eunuchs of the palace's inner sanctum, the *dar ül-saâde ağası* and the *bab ül-saâde ağası* (chief white eunuch), sport wide conical hats (*mücevveze*). The tall, triangular-shaped hat bearing a gold band distinguishes the vizier from the descendent of the Prophet, who wears a large, round, green turban. The sultan himself bears no crown. But, a confection made up of precious gems, the *sorguc*, is clipped to the front of his *kavuk*, a cap encircled with precious cloth.

It fell to the court to enforce these sumptuary distinctions.[69] Displays of status delimited the social borders between the "men of the state" and the third estate, as well as between the Muslims, Jews, and Christians of the city.[70] Yet the display of rank took many forms. The four governors, representing the provinces of Mosul, Aleppo, Aydin, and Bursa, who will join the festivities later and who have

[69] On this topic, see Donald Quataert, "Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720–1829," *IJMES* 29 (1997): 403–25.

[70] Bekir Sitki Baykal, "Mustafa III," *AI* 8:702.

been diverted from their provincial posts for the occasion, demonstrate another form of sociopolitical obligation. Their appearance at the ritual is marked by the presentation of a lavish gift to the sultan.[71] Far more intricate than mastering the details of status associated with dress were the nuances of etiquette (*teşrifat*) that determined the value and type of gifts exchanged between superior and subordinate.

Behind the curtain of ceremonial preformances, therefore, rank and status are also revealed in the expense ledgers of pashas and in entries under the terms "blandishments" (*avaidat*), "honoraria" (*caize*), and "presents" (*hediye*).[72] A governorship in eighteenth-century Aleppo, for example, demanded many such gratuities: to the secretary of state, his purse-bearer, the chief usher of the Porte, and the director of the chancellery, among many other officials and members of court whose pockets were filled by his largesse. These payments were over and above the enormous gifts to the grand vizier and his chief of staff, personal accountant, and clerk.[73] Not only did an incoming governor pass out gifts up and down the Istanbul chain of command, he was also obliged to confer gratuities in cloth and cash on the local commander of the fort (*dizdar*) and the sergeant of the guard (*karakullakina baş*), who in turn paid him homage in money when seeking transfers or new appointments.[74]

In a hierarchy defined by service to the state and the presumption of merit and ability, the introduction of such vast sums into the process of promotion and political mobility produced a tension to be sure. These exorbitant expenditures for etiquette's sake, had become the modus vivendi of the old regime, prompted contemporary observers to voice their objections to practices that they felt transgressed the boundaries between a "gift" and outright bribery or extortion.[75] Yet

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[71] See Metin Kunt, "Derviş Mehmet Paşa: Vezir and Entrepreneur: A Study in Ottoman Political-Economic Theory and Practice," *Turcica* 9 (1977): 197–214.

[72] D.BŞM 3546 (1759); M. Zeki Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü* (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1983), 2:58. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez*, 199–202.

[73] D.BŞM 5019 (1780–1781).

[74] D.BŞM 3546 (1759–1760). Registration fees included 8,467.5 *kuruş* for the grand vizier and 4,233.5 *kuruş* for the imperial treasurer. Abdul-Karim Rafeq, *The Province of Damascus* (Beirut: Khayats, 1966), 234–39.

[75] See Ahmet Mumcu, *Tarih İçindeki Genel Gelişimiyle Birlikte Osmanlı Devletinde Rüşvet Özellikle Adli Rüşvet* (Istanbul: Inkilâp Kitabevi, 1985); compare Natalie Zemon Davis, *The Gift in Sixteenth-Century France* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 2000), 85–99.

inflation of the concept of the "gift" was inevitable. But this, too, was relative to status: what might be considered a criminal offense for an individual of a lower station would be perfectly respectable, even obligatory for his social superior. Facing the greatly increasing costs of office and diminished incomes, most appointees to higher office necessarily fell back on entrepreneurial skills.[76]

The eighteenth century was a point of transition in imperial hierarchies. Nonetheless, it seemed for a time that despite the pressure for material resources for entrance and promotion, good introductions and proper training could still propel a talented young man into the orbit of the court and or the bureaucracy. Nevşehirli İbrahim Pasha is a case in point. He found his way to the top through the ceremonial *helvacılar* corps, a position that his father, an Anatolian intendant for the palace, had secured for him.[77] A good education and eloquence must have brought the poet Hâmi of Amid (b. 1679) to the attention of Muhsinzâde Abdullah Pasha, the grand vizier's chief of staff, in 1709.[78] Selected to accompany Vizier Köprülüzâde Abdullah Pasha on his tour of the poet's native town in 1717, the pasha entrusted him with the management of his *mukataât*.

Ultimately, it was business acumene that paid off. Hâmi invested his own money in *malikâne* contracts. This income and experience, must have eventually helped him, at the rather mature age of fifty-two, to attain a tenured position in the financial department dealing with such contracts, the *malikâne halifesi*. In reconstructing the life of another talented man of provincial origin, Ahmed Resmi of Crete, whose career began in 1730s, Virginia Aksan remarks on "the apparent serendipity of many of the career paths, an elasticity at the upper administrative levels in a system otherwise restrictive."[79]

Fluidity and serendipity were an even greater factor in appointments to provincial office in the eighteenth century. In time of war, the normal channels of promotion could be bypassed completely. The distinguished field commander Çeteci Abdullah Pasha, whom we encountered during the first decades of the Wars of the Iranian

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[76] Kunt, *Bir Osmanlı Valisinin Yıllık Gelir Gideri*, 48–49; for the income and expenses of a pasha serving in the Balkans in 1714, see Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım*, 50.

[77] M. Münir Aktepe, "Nevşehirli İbrahim Paşa," *İA* 9:234–39.

[78] Ali Amiri, *Tezkere-i Şu'ara-yı Amid* (Istanbul: Matbu'a-i Amidi, 1328/1910) vol. 1, 187–93, 260; Gibb, *A History of Ottoman Poetry*, vol. 4, 111.

[79] Aksan, *An Ottoman Statesman*, 14–15.

Succession and who served valiantly in the Caucasus campaigns of the 1720s as the captain of a mercenary battalion (*levend başağası*), rose quickly to the rank of *beylerbeyi* of Sivas in 1739 and shortly thereafter to vizier-governorships in Diyarbekir, Damascus, and Erzurum.[80]

More extraordinary still was the fortune of Osman Pasha, a Georgian slave in the household of the gentry-governor of Damascus who succeeded his master, one of the members of the powerful ʿAzm clan, to this office between 1760 and 1771.[81] This improbable situation came about after the disastrous pillage of the pilgrim caravan in 1757, for which Grand Vizier Ragıb Pasha ordered the execution of As'ad Pasha al-ʿAzm and the exile of his palace benefactor, Ebukuf Ahmed Ağa (r. 1755–58), the senior black eunuch. By leading officials to the whereabouts of his master's treasures, the slave, Osman was rewarded with the governorship of Damascus, the rank of *beylerbeyi* of Tripoli, and 150,000 *kuruş* in *malikâne* contracts in Hama and Hums. With his son's elevation to the governorship of Tripoli shortly thereafter, Istanbul's intervention effectively turned a gentry dynasty upside down.

Certainly this confusion of wealth and power, of rising provincial stars and what appeared to be an unscrupulous central-state elite, must have rankled the hardworking denizens of the central bureaucracy to whom we owe many court histories.[82] After the overthrow of Mehmet IV in 1687, internecine rivalries often took the form of fiscal assaults by one chartered order on the privileges of another.[83] In the decades of political upheaval and fluctuating coalitions between palace, Porte, soldiers, and populace that followed, all parties were suspicious of innovation and any tampering with the perquisites of rank.[84] In this setting the new contract appeared to undercut the

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[80] Şevket Beysanoğlu, *Diyarbakır Tarihi: Anıtları ve Kitabeleri ile* (Ankara: Neyir Matbaası, 1993), 679–81. With the exception of a posting in Syria and in Erzurum, his assignments were close to home: initially Rakka at the rank of *beylerbeyi*, then as pasha (*vali*) of Diyarbekir in 1744, 1750, 1752, and 1759.

[81] Rafeq, The Province of Damascus, 234–39. D.BŞM 3546 (1759–65) records payments for office, tax farms, and gifts on the occasion of the appointment of Osman Pasha "currently the Vizier of Damascus" (pp. 1–18); and expenses for his son Mehmet to assume office in Tripoli (pp. 20–21).

[82] Bekir Kütükoğlu, "Vekâyınüvis," *AI* 13:271–87.

[83] For more on the *bedel-i timar*, the special levy (*cihet*) on endowment income, and other new impositions on wealth and privilege, Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken*, 207–12; 270–73.

[84] On the nature of politics, see Halil İnalcık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation," and Rifaʿat ʿAli Abou-El-Haj (*The 1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics*

exclusivity of the statesmen's privilege and immunity. By establishing public auctions throughout the empire, a Muslim man, whether statesman or commoner, could tender bids on state resources. The *malikâne* (from a Persian-Arabic compound meaning "as if to the owner")[85] seemed to promise proprietary rights: it offered a long-term investment, freedom from administrative interference, and the opportunity for reputable male heirs to lay claim to the shares after the previous contractor's death.

Commenting on the grand vizier's decision to retract most contracts at the eve of the war with Venice in 1715 (an order that was rescinded shortly before İbrahim Pasha's assumption of office),[86] the court historian Raşid Efendi vented his frustration. He denounced "those not deign of state resources and lacking even a trace of 'nobility' [literally, absolutely not belonging to the state 'kati'an miri olmiyan']—[such as] a common porter or boatswain, [who] could upon reaching the rank of shaykh of any guild whatsoever, obtain a *malikâne* contract." The historian lamented that while the new contract was "spreading throughout the empire" it did not promote the requisite sense of civic responsibility for the welfare of the empire's subjects. Rich men simply treated the *malikâne* as another business venture, using state assets "as if they were their private property."[87]

Although it strikes many familiar, anti-corruption chords, Raşid Efendi's diatribe does contains some distinctly eighteenth-century elements. In his eyes, the problem with the life-lease was not simply that it allowed commoners to trespass beyond estate lines or that it relegated landed resources to armchair administrators instead of to soldiers. Rather, by his unusual use of the term "miri" (imperial) as

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[Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul, 1984], 31); compare Philip T. Hoffman ("Early Modern France, 1450–1700," in *Fiscal Crises, Liberty and Representative Government, 1450–1789*, ed. Philip T. Hoffman and Kathryn Norberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 250–51.

[85] F. Steinglass, *Persian-English Dictionary* 6th ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), 1143. The term also referred to the early "split-rent" agreements between landlords and the Ottoman state. See Irene Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "Malikâne," *EI²* 4:227–28; and Ömer Lutfi Barkan, "Malikâne-Divânî Sistemi," *Türk Hukuk ve İktisat Tarihi Mecmuası* 2 (1939): 119–84.

[86] Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikâne Sistemi," 235 n. 34. For an example, note the reinstatement of the farm held by a religious scholar in Mosul, Haydar Efendi (MMD 6549:32–33).

[87] "Rich individuals [*kuvvet-i maliyesi olanlar*] began taking *malikâne* contracts on everything they saw, using these resources as if they were their own personal property [*kendü mülkü gibi mutassarif*]." Raşid, *Tarih-i Raşid*, 4:176–77.

a qualifier of persons as well as things, he seems to express the fear that this particular contract threatened the very principle of agency upon which the bureaucratic orders were founded.[88] The life-lease represented a bought privilege that diluted the differences that distinguished the *rical-i devlet* from the third estate. While a commoner gained quasi-official perquisites,[89] officials and officers, the true servants of state, actually compromised their immunities when they took up such contracts. Whether it was by paying the special enthronement tax (*rüsum-u cülus*) of 1703 or by contributing a percentage of the surety as compensation for not taking up arms (*cebelü bedeliyesi*) in years of war, officers and officials had became tax payers as well as contractors.[90]

Perhaps most grating for the civil servant who had patiently climbed the rungs of the state hierarchy, was the potential for commoners to amass state resources in an unregulated manner. This was, after all, a ruling class that was defined not only by its privileges and tax immunities but by its liabilities, chief among which were the forfeiture of all personal wealth upon death or dismissal from office.[91]

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[88] Defterdar Sarı Mehmet Pasha (Wright, *Ottoman Statecraft*, 23) chastises contemporaries about the misuse of state resources. For other abuses, see Abou-El-Haj, *The 1703 Rebellion*, 116; Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim*, 42, 51. The perception of abuse is not unconnected to the rank and status of the actor. In the sixteenth century, Mustafa Ali complained about the impudence of low ranking persons (Andreas Tietze, *Mustafa Ali's Counsel for Sultans of 1581* [Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1979] vol. 1, 58). In the late eighteenth century, similar sentiments are expressed by Selim III's advisor, Abdullah Efendi Tatarcık (see "Selim-i Sâni devrinde Nizâm-ı Devlet hakkında mutâl'aât," *Türk Tarihi Encümeni Mecmuası* 8 [1333/1914–1915]: 17).

[89] The usual formula to confer such immunity is "mefrüzü'l-kalem ve maktü'ülkadem"; Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikâne," 239; for examples in diplomas, MMD 9486:6 and DA III:153.

[90] Michael Kwass ("A Kingdom of Taxpayers: State Formation, Privilege, and Political Culture in Eighteenth-Century France," *Journal of Modern History* 70 [1998]: 300) suggests that privilege should have been incompatible with tax paying. The Ottoman nobility of service had similar tax immunities but were forced to contribute in periods of crisis. The new lease brought new obligations. Lease holders contributed to the *cülus bahşişi*, the ascension donation to the janissaries (Defterdar Sarı Mehmet Pasha, Ottoman Statecraft, 104–5; Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikâne Sistemi," 247). In the years of war, they paid the *cebelü bedeliyesi*, a levy assessed on contracts at the rate of 10 percent or 15 percent of the bid price.

[91] J. R. Jones ("Fiscal Policies, Liberties, and Representative Government during the Reigns of the Last Stuarts," in Hoffman and Norberg, *Fiscal Crises*, 67–95) provides a useful discussion on the difference between liberties, such as property, and privileges, such as tax farming.

Although some courtiers and high officials may have welcomed the loophole furnished by the *malikâne* edit which provided for some form of intergenerational devolution,[92] there was no reason to allow the gentry and ulema to take advantage of this provision because they had no legal barriers to inheritance. Every aspect of the new contract seemed to assure that the third estate would benefit from such special provisions or from any ambiguities arising from an overly generous interpretation of Islamic laws on private property.[93]

The bureaucrat's fears proved largely unfounded. Despite attempts to conflate contract and property, ordinary contractors rarely succeeded in gaining state recognition of their claims.[94] Whether as beneficiaries of the income of high yielding revenue sources in their lifetime or as a member of an elite network of shareholders, it was the courtier and the high ranking officer who benefited disproportionately from this fiscal dispensation. They, too, had the best chance of converting, often in stages, a public resource into private property.[95]

Rather than the cause, the new contract may have been another symptom of the pronounced closing of state ranks to outsiders that occurred in the eighteenth century. A clique of households and

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[92] D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, vol. 3, 368–69. Although the principle of devolving shares to a surviving male relative, the "evlâdiyet şurûtu," was a well-established practice, disputes (note MMD 9494:23 [1702–03]) did arise.

[93] The Hanefite legal school recognizes overlapping but analytically distinct proprietary claims on the usufruct and ownership of assets, according to Chafik Chehata, *Essai d'une theorie générale de l'obligation en droit Musulman* (Cairo: Nury Publishers, 1936) 1:173.

[94] For example, in 1696 (MMD 3426:56) the sons of a certain Yahya Beg (perhaps a janissary or a *timar* holder) petitioned the Porte for the life-lease on the dye house in Aleppo, arguing that they were entitled to the lease because their father, the previous tax farmer, had made substantial capital investments in the building. Indeed, the brothers seemed to have proprietary claims. Jean-Pierre, "Décentralisation Ottomane et affirmation urbaine à Alep à la fin du XVIII^{ème} siècle," in *Mouvements communautaires et éspaces urbains au Machreq*, ed. Mona Zakaria, et al. [Beirut: Centre d'études et de recherches sur le Moyen-Orient Contemporain, 1985], 129) came across a complaint that had been brought against them in the court of Aleppo. Craftsmen accused the sons of insisting that the new contract made them owners outright of the dye house.

[95] For the gradual privatization of the dye house of Çünküş, originally a tax farm, MMD 9519:81 and D.BŞM 1069 (n.d.) For other instances of converting contract into property, Abou-El-Haj, *The 1703 Rebellion*, 9, 51, 116. Of these attempts, the conversion of contracts into endowments seems to have been the most secure route: In 1710 Grand Vizier Ali Pasha converted a *malikâne* holding into a pious endowment (waqf) that supported the building of a mosque-*imaret-dershane* complex in Istanbul.

influential bureaucratic families would dominate the major branches of government service.[96] The lower rungs of state service may have traded size for security and exclusivity.[97] In addition to securing life tenure in office, *gedik* (an analogue of the "slots" held by infantry), which was conceded in 1732, bureaucrats were able to amend their charter to assure that family members and protégés were given preference over apprentices in assignments for vacant posts.[98]

Although these developments did not preclude the possibility that a Hâmi or an Ahmed Resmi might still enter the official hierarchies of service, in the later decades of the eighteenth century most positions did fall to the descendants of *rical* families or, in the case of the judiciary, the children of former muftis, the so-called *mollahzâde*.[99] Wealth alone could not provide the insider's edge; a general literacy in the branches of state service and residence in the Istanbul was also essential.[100] Proximity to palace and Porte gave them access to the most important tax-farm auctions, credit, and the officers who could make or break a candidate's career. Over the century, the administration would grow top heavy with vizierial-level appointees. Rather than a pyramid, the state hierarchy, with its narrow middle of intermediate-rank positions, such as the coveted cadre of the bureau chiefs, the *hâcegân*, grew hourglass shaped.[101]

Such assets also separated the Istanbul bureaucratic elites, who assumed executive, military, and administrative provincial positions with greater frequency, from the gentry-governors of the eighteenth-century. One need only compare career paths to see the glaring differences in opportunities. In comparison to the wide range of

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[96] See Abou-El-Haj, "The Ottoman Vezir and Pasha Households:" Tülay Artan, "From Charismatic Leadership to Collective Rule," *Toplum ve Ekonomi* 4 (1993): 53–94; Madeline Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age (1600–1800)* (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1988); Suraiya Faroqhi, "Civilian Society and Political Power in the Ottoman Empire: A Report on Research in Collective Bibliography, 1480–1830," *IJMES* 17 (1985): 109–17.

[97] See Joel Shinder, "Career Line Formation in the Ottoman Bureaucracy, 1648–1750: A New Perspective," *JESHO* 16 (1973): 216–37.

[98] Shinder, "Career Line Formation," 228–29, 233–35.

[99] See Madeline Zilfi, "Elite Circulation in the Ottoman Empire: Great Mollas of the Eighteenth Century," *JESHO* 26 (1983): 318–20.

[100] According to Aksan (*An Ottoman Statesman*, 14–15, n. 47) there was little or no tracking within the civil bureaucracy allowing clerks to acquire expertise in a variety of fields.

[101] In 1793, the Porte issued a new *kanunname* aimed at reducing the number of the top tier of *rical*, the pasha elite. Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım*, 344–45.

appointments afforded the Istanbul-based aristocracy of service, the Porte rotated a gentry-governor's assignments within a restricted geographical radius, typically to regions adjoining to the appointee's place of origin. With the exception of tours of duty in Syria and Erzurum, Çeteci Abdullah Pasha, an heroic defender of the empire, spent most of his career close to his native town of Çermik, in governorships in Rakka and in Diyarbekir (1744, 1750, 1752, and 1759).[102] The practice of awarding the entire revenues of a province as a "block" contract could only have reinforced this pattern, as well as the tendency for gentry-governors such as the ʿAzms of Syria, the Jalilis of Mosul, and the Karaosmanoğlu in the greater Izmir-Bergama region, to pass these offices from one generation to another.[103] To the extent that the gentry's own economic and political ambitions were circumscribed regionally, they may not have even considered these differences as inherent limitations. Gentry-governors reinvested state-gained income in urban real estate, tax farms, plantations, loans, and trade, a diversified portfolio of assets that remained well within their political sphere of influence.[104]

The Istanbul insider remained closely tethered to the capital. Short tours of duty throughout the empire discouraged concentrated investments in a single province, unless they offered, as did many Balkan and Aegean commercial revenues, particularly high rates of return. Maintaining a full-time household in the capital was essential. Sırrı Selim Pasha paid 925 *kuruş* a month to support his skeletal administrative household in the capital while on duty in Baghdad between 1777 and 1780.[105] This staff managed his portfolio in his absence.

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[102] Beysanoğlu, *Diyarbakır Tarihi*, 679–81.

[103] The sons of Vizier Süleyman Pasha ʿAzmzâde (d. 1743), pasha of Damascus, shared title to tax farms valued at 52,330 *kuruş*.

[104] On gentry accumulation during this period, see Margaret Meriwether, "Urban Notables and Rural Resources in Aleppo, 1770–1830," *IJTS* 4 (1987): 55–73; Yuzo Nagata, Some Documents on the Big Farms (Çiftliks) of the Notables in Western Anatolia (Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1976); and Suraiya Faroqhi, "Wealth and Power in the Land of Olives: Economic and Political Activities of Müridzâde Hacı Mehmed Agha, Notable of Edremit," in *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East*, ed. Çağlar Keyder and Faruk Tabak (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 77–96. For an approach to accumulation in early modern South Asia, see Sanjay Subrahmanyam and C. A. Bayly, "Portfolio Capitalists and the Political Economy of Early Modern India," in *Merchants, Markets and the State in Early Modern India*, ed. Sanjay Subrahmanyam (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990), 242–54.

[105] KK 786. I am grateful to Mehmet Genç for sharing this record with me.

They recorded payments from the four corners of the empire: 42,060 *kuruş* from Belgrade, sent by an agent, Osman Efendi; a down payment of 10,000 *kuruş* on a tax farm from Kara Halil in Kütahya; revenues from a plantation in Siroz, administered by Muhurdarzâde Hasan Pasha; and income on the shares in the recently reorganized, state-run tobacco regie in Istanbul, among many other holdings and ventures.

By reinforcing a divided hierarchy, the market in *malikâne* leases perpetuated the dominance of the Istanbul elite while, as we shall see in the next chapter, extending a certain range of the benefits of state office to the gentry. Such disparities were, however, build in to the system. The initial commands establishing provincial auctions explicitly restricted the type of tax contracts that could be sold outside the capital and discouraged provincials from obtaining shares in another region. The most valuable commercial and aggregate tax-grants remained in the hands of the state elite.[106] Istanbul's insatiable demand for highly liquid revenues, such as customs and excise taxes, undoubtedly dictated the extension of this form of contracting into specific regions and economic sectors.[107] By 1741, cumulative *malikâne* investments in the empire (as measured in surety payments) reached 4.3 million *kuruş*, of which fully one-quarter were located in the Morea and the Aegean islands. Another third of the investments were located in the Balkans.[108] As the number of Istanbul investors

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D.BŞM 4666 records deposits from Aleppo made by *poliçe* to Istanbul between 1776 and 1781.

[106] MMD 10,143:164 (pertaining to Diyarbekir); in Damascus (MMD 3423:570) the auctioneer was restricted from offering *ocaklık mukataa* as proprietary contracts.

[107] MMD 1637; MMD 730 (copy). Of 1,442 new contracts in 1703, more than half (871 contracts) were awarded on Balkan resources. There were 571 contracts in Damascus, Malatya, Diyarbekir, Mosul, Adana, and Şehrizor; the remaining contracts were held in the regions of Western Anatolia, Aleppo, and Tokat-Sivas. In effect, of the 897,705 *kuruş* taken in by the treasury in the form of cash advance (*muaccele*) payments, less than half (361,835 *kuruş*) fell within the geographical zone originally designated by the edit; one-third pertained to the Balkans (322,278 *kuruş*). A little less than a quarter were on contracts in Anatolia (213,592 *kuruş*).

[108] Forty-three percent were located in Anatolia, Syria, Kurdistan, and Iraq. Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken*, 134, and CM 5001 (1741) provide figures for the Balkans (172,610,160 *akçe*); Anadolu, Damascus, Aleppo, Baghdad, Mosul, and Diyarbekir (268,525,200 *akçe*); Morea, Crete, and other islands (79,732,320 *akçe*). MMD 6981 provides a running tally of new contracts awarded between 1721 and 1723 for Aleppo (which rose by 67,905 *kuruş*); Tokat sales nearly doubled (15,181 *kuruş*, on top of an existing 16,391.5 *kuruş* in contracts). Sales in Adana, Ayıntab, Malatya, Diyarbekir, Erzurum, Mosul, and Baghdad increased at slower rates. For sales within Crete see also MMD 9511.

and partnerships rose from 771 in 1768 to 963 in 1789,[109] their share of the *malikâne* market as a whole rose from approximately two-thirds of the total (65 percent) to nine-tenths (87 percent).[110]

"Corporate Patrimonialism" and the Reproduction of Power

The portrait painters of the imperial elite rarely allowed rumblings of discontent to disturb the varnished surfaces of their compositions.[111] In Levni's paintings, the calvary parade gallantly; decorous officers and well-disciplined foot soldiers march in tight formation. In a rare instance or two, some indication of countercurrents does break through. Violent disorder may be is represented by the janissaries who break formation and race wildly toward their plates of saffron-scented rice (Plate 4).[112] It was the ritual overturning of the kettle at the At Meydanı that sent up the signal for a military insurrection. During the Edirne Incident of 1703 and again in 1730 under the leadership of Patrona Halil, janissaries and guildsmen took to the streets to demand the execution of corrupt officials and an end to oppressive taxation.[113]

Spectators at the circumcision ceremony in 1720 may not yet have forgotten the ignominious fate of Feyzullah Efendi, who, after serving in two administrations, fell victim to the uprising of 1703. Feyzullah Efendi was the tutor of the young Mustafa II (1695–1703) and served as the *nakib'ül-eşrâf* under his father. The janissary coup of 1687 banished him to his hometown, Erzurum. Once his former pupil came

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[109] Murat Çizakça, *A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships: The Islamic World and Europe, with Specific Reference to the Ottoman Archives* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 173.

[110] Ibid., 174. MMD 9524:10. By 1734, central state investors held 633 *kese* and 9 *kuruş* in contracts and the provincials had invested about half as much, or 334 *kese* and 460 *kuruş* (50,000 *akçe* per *kese*). Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikâne Sistemi," 282. Note: the percentage (87) is based on records from 1789, not 1787.

[111] See Serpil Bağcı, Priscilla Mary Işin, and Selmin Kangal, eds. *The Sultan's Portrait: Picturing the House of Osman* (Istanbul: Tükiye İş Bankası, 2000).

[112] TKSA MS 3593: 22b–23a.

[113] On the upheavals of the first half of the century, see Abou-El-Haj, *The 1703 Rebellion*; Lavender Cassels, *The Struggle for the Ottoman Empire* (London: Murray, 1966); Robert Olson, "The Esnaf and the Patrona Halil Rebellion of 1730: A Realignment in Ottoman Politics?" *JESHO* 17 (1974): 329–40; and idem, "Jews, Janissaries, Esnaf and the Revolt of 1740 in Istanbul: Social Upheaval and Political Realignment in the Ottoman Empire," *JESHO* 20 (1978): 185–207; and M. Münir Aktepe, *Patrona Isyanı (1730)* (Istanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1958).

to the throne, however, the former tutor was recalled to Istanbul.[114] Assuming the post of head of the religious establishment, the *Şeyh'ül-İslam*, but a few months after the rescript authorizing the new *malikâne* contract, Feyzullah Efendi lost no opportunity to enhance his personal fortune. He seized gardens, farms, and villas in Edirne and Istanbul for personal use. He laid claim to revenues from tax farms on agricultural resources and villages across the empire, from Thrace to the Caucasus.[115] By the time of his death, his probate revealed a fortune of 50 million akçe in cash alone.[116]

Such rapacity, as well as his bold trespass over clearly marked lines of service, earned Feyzullah Efendi the dubious distinction of being one of only three chief muftis to be executed in office.[117] Though audacious and unbridled, his actions were far from impolitic. Past experience had taught him the fleeting nature of power. Although he exploited the full potential of his office, he also liberally handed out positions and tax fiefs in Edirne, Rumeli, Sivas, and Çorum to his retainers.[118] He placed members of his family, even minors, in important judicial posts; at one point, all of the top positions were filled by relatives.[119] Lacking money in hand, he prevailed upon other members of the administration whenever a choice contract came to auction.[120]

Because he was a member of the ulema, Feyzullah Efendi's execution in 1703 and the subsequent confiscation of his patrimony were extraordinary events. Nonetheless, he exemplifies the dilemma of state elite as well as the breakdown of the boundaries between privilege and property. For members of the military or bureaucracy,

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[114] Abou-El-Haj (*The 1703 Rebellion*) emphasizes this point. For other studies, see Sabra F. Meservey, "Feyzullah Efendi: An Ottoman Seyhülislam" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1966); Suraiya Faroqhi, "An Ulama Grandee and his Household," *JOS* 9 (1989): 199–208; and Ahmet Türek and F. Çetin Derin, "Feyzullah Efendi'nin Kendü Kaleminden Hal Tercümesi," *Tarih Dergisi* 23 (1969): 204–8; *Tarih Dergisi* 24 (1970): 69–92.

[115] Özcan, *Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi*, 221–27.

[116] Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken, 297.

[117] Mumcu, *Osmanlı Devletinde Rüşvet*, 232–33. See also idem, *Osmanlı Devletinde Siyaseten Katl* (Ankara: Birey ve Toplum Yayınları, 1985).

[118] Özcan, *Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi*, 224.

[119] Ibid., 225. The author of this anonymous history attributes the origins of the rebellion against Mustafa II to a squabble over a *malikâne* lease in Adana that involved one of Feyzullah Effendi's followers, Telhisi Mehmet Ağa.

[120] Ibid., 224. "He buys a *malikâne* for 1000 *kuruş* at auction, paying only half the price, explaining that the vizier or *defterdar* would pay the balance."

expropriation was the inescapable conclusion to even the most illustrious career. Once justified because of the servile status of the sixteenth-century elite, the predominance of freeborn Muslims, including many who were married to princesses, in state service may have given pause to the administration in later years. Bureaucrats and historians clearly disapproved of the vindictive and opportunistic uses of forfeiture so common during Feyzullah Efendi's tenure and during the first half of the reign of Ahmet III.[121] Nevertheless, as the reams of records documenting the estates of officers found in the probate section of the military court (*kismet-i askeriye*) of Istanbul and other cities or the inventories of the possessions of officials and, increasingly in the eighteenth century, prominent gentry and townsmen, found in *muhalefat* registers of the central-state archive testify, these rules were vigorously enforced throughout the century. Although judges recognized the right of widows to reclaim their dowry and even allowed children a fixed share of inheritance in accordance with Islamic law, officials went to enormous lengths to ferret out wealth and liquidate an officer's worldly possessions—from home furnishings, clothing, books, weapons, and beasts to gardens, outstanding debts, and urban real estate.

In short, what makes Feyzullah Efendi's example particularly interesting to historians is not that his strategy for accumulating wealth was unusual, but because it was considered unfitting for a member of the ulema, the mufti's practice of what we might call "corporate patrimonialism"[122] caught the attention of his contemporaries. Typically, officials made the utmost of their time in office to insure the reproduction of family wealth and power. Given the restrictions on individual patrimony, it was necessary for the ruling elite to distribute these assets, position as well as property, widely among family and associates in the hope that at least part of these investments would outlive them. And, in this, few had been more successful than the

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[121] Deftardar Sarı Mehmed Efendi, *Ottoman Statescraft*, 70; Raşid Efendi, *Tarih-i Raşid*, vol. 2, 100–1, 122, 301, 424; 4:30, 284. Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken*, 296–98; Abou-El-Haj, *The 1703 Rebellion*, 12–13.

[122] Charles Tilly reminds me that this form of accumulation is in many ways analogous to guild practices in early modern England and Italy. For some thoughts on how to rehabilitate the notion of patrimonialism, see Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and Lloyd I. Rudolph, "Authority and Power in Bureaucratic and Patrimonial Administration: A Revisionist Interpretation of Weber on Bureaucracy," *World Politics* 31 (1979): 195–227.

former chief mufti; although most of Feyzullah Efendi's urban real estate appears to have been seized and resold, at least part of his wide-ranging investments slipped through the probate officer's reach.[123] Personal disgrace notwithstanding, he established his family as one of the great ulema lineages of the eighteenth century.[124] His sons Mustafa and Murtaza served as the empire's chief judicial authority under Mahmud I (r. 1730–54) and Osman III (r. 1754–57), respectively.[125]

Rifa'at Abou-El-Haj's research on political networks has brought to light the fact that the social reproduction of power also depended contacts and connections that reached across orders and the status lines. The creation of lateral lines of accumulation of both capital and connections was raised to a high art in the organization of an official's political household or *kapı*.[126] Composed of family, associates and retainers, the *kapı* offered training to its members while enhancing the political prospects of its head. In time of war, the officer with a well-appointed household might lend a battalion of men to the sultan. In peacetime, his retainers, who numbered from one hundred to one thousand persons, furnished the basis of a provincial administration as well as a permanent staff for his Istanbul base of operations.[127] In the end, the household was itself an insurance policy and investment. Whether it took the form of seeding members of his *kapı* through the bureaucracy and military, by distributing his wealth among them, or by offering a trusted associate his daughter and making his servant a *damad*, the head of a household created a party that extended his influence as well as a medium for perpetuating wealth beyond his own lifetime.

As Feyzullah's case also makes clear, corporate strategies for managing and reproducing wealth and power required assets that were fungible. Not only the narrowly defined *rical-i devlet*, but other groups

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[123] He did retain a cash foundation. İsmail Kurt, *Para Vakfları Nazariyat ve Tatbikat* (Istanbul: Ensar Neşriyat, 1996), 163.

[124] Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken*, 297.

[125] Norman Izkowitz, "Men and Ideas in the Eighteenth Century Ottoman Empire," in *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, ed. T. Naff and R. Owen (Carbondale: University of Southern Illinois Press, 1977), 19.

[126] On the *kapı*, see Abou-El-Haj, "The Ottoman Vezir and Pasha Households, 1683–1703."

[127] Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez, 207. Onik Jamgocyan ("Les finances de l'Empire Ottoman et les financièrs de Constantinople, 1732–1853" [Thèse de doc., Université de Paris I [Sorbonne] 1988], 231–32) concludes that the size of pasha households actually increased over the century.

including the court utilized these resources in building and maintaining their networks. Princesses cultivated their own variation on the political household, consisting of circles of intimates, including nieces, husbands, children, and female slaves. Revenue contracts were ideal forms of capital in that they could easily be subdivided in shares and distributed among members of the household.[128] In the case of Esma Sultan, the Elder (1726–1788), one of Ahmad III's daughters, crown estates turned into *malikâne* contracts were divided among her protégés and managed by agents and subcontractors.[129] The name of one of her male associates appears as contractor in his own right.[130]

Although extant lists of the Istanbul tax farming elite tend to register shareholders or family partnerships separately, it seems likely that many "individuals" were actually members of larger political houses.[131] Indeed, given the pervasiveness of corporate strategies of accumulation, we might ask how many degrees of separation actually distanced the highest and lowest bidders in the Istanbul market? An incomplete register of *malikâne* contractors who paid the special war tax of 1737–38 lists 405 individuals, couples and partnerships, perhaps slightly less than half of the total investors in the city.[132] At first glance, aside from the decided underrepresentation of

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[128] See İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, "Üçüncü Mustafa'nın kızı Şah Sultan'a Borç Senedi," *Belleten* 25 (1961): 97; and idem, "Sultan III. Mustafa'nın Hüzün Verici Bir Borç Senedi," *Belleten* 22 (1968): 595–98.

[129] According to CS 4051, a document that Michael Hickok kindly brought to my attention, princesses also operated their own firms of tax farms, dividing shares among female and male household members. For other examples, see MMD 9565:10–11, which contains the holdings of various royal women (Emine, Fatma, and Zeyneb Hanım); TKSA D 4477 is the *esham* register of Hatice Hanım; TKSA D 6573 is a register of Habibe Hanım, the wife of Moralı Ahmed. In Egypt, Mamluk women played an important role in preserving household wealth (See Susan Staffa, "Dimensions of Women's Power in Historic Cairo," *Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies: A Festschrift in Honor of Professor Wadie Jwaideh*, ed. Robert Olson et al. [Brattleboro, Vt.: Amana, 1987], 62–99). They invested in tax farms. In the rest of the empire, however, local women were poorly represented. Only one woman tax farmer appears in the local accounts for eighteenth-century Diyarbekir (MMD 9518:52) and she resided in Istanbul. The situation changes at the end of the old regime. Between 1848 and 1860, three Diyarbekir women (MMD 9519:122, 130, 137) held shares in village tax farms.

[130] MMD 9565, entry no. 655.

[131] On the practice of assigning revenues to members of a rical's household, see Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, 105 and Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants*, 88.

[132] MMD 367 is undated. Internal evidence (Neşe Erim identified Süleyman Efendi as one of contractors on the customhouse of Erzurum) suggests that it belongs to the 1736–37 war period. Süleyman Pasha, another individual, was governor of

the ulema, the composition of contractors seems to reflect a cross section of officialdom and palace staff.

Although subsumed under individual entries, it is still possible to discern the outline, at times faint, of corporate strategies of accumulation. Partnerships based on blood relationships are frequently clearly spelled out. Such is the case of the household headed by Hacı Mehmet Emin Ağa, captain of the mounted palace guard, *ağa-ı silâhdar*, who together with his sons and brother held 75,340 *kuruş* in *malikâne* contracts.[133] Others sought out investments for the purposes of retirement.[134] Perhaps this may help explain the "reverse migration" in the eighteenth century, as central-state bureaucrats relocated to provincial cities or towns where they had invested in tax farms or real estate.[135] Few members of the gentry find their way onto the central-state rolls. However, the clan holdings of the brother and sons of Vizier Süleyman Pasha ʿAzmzâde (d. 1743), governor of Damascus were substantial enough to merit an entry. Collectively, these shares valued at 52,330 *kuruş* suggest that tax-farming partnerships might have served as a deterrent to probate officers.

The vast majority of entries—involving the nine out of ten individuals who invested at levels of 10,000 *kuruş* (equivalent to approximately 2,500 Venetian ducats) or less[136]—are less forthcoming about

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Damascus between 1734 and 1738 (Rafeq, *The Province of Damascus*, 119). 322 persons held investments (based on their muaccele) of less than 10,000 *kuruş*; 51 persons, between 10–25,000 *kuruş*; 26 persons, between 25–50,000 *kuruş*; three persons, between 50–100,000 *kuruş*; and three persons, above 100,000 *kuruş*.

[133] MMD 367. One son, Mehmed, held a quarter share in Anatolia (in the *Voyvodalık* of Tokat) valued at 10,850 *kuruş*.

[134] MMD 367. For example, the sons of former Vizier Ali Pasha, İsmail Bey, Selim, Ahmed, and Mehmed, held 34,475 *kuruş* in shares on various *malikâne* farms, principally located in the mainland Greece (the Morea). In the case of a civil bureaucrat, Kasariyeli Hacı Ahmed Efendi, once head of a treasury bureau dealing with accounts receivable (*ruznamçe evvel*), held *malikâne* contracts valued at 57,650 *kuruş* together with his son Ebü Bekir Ağa, a nephew (or grandson) Mehmed Ağa; a son-in-law, Mehmed; and an unidentified individual, Ahmed Ağa (perhaps his steward or head of household).

[135] For the social fluidity of the pool of "provincial" elites and return migration, see Karl K. Barbir, "From Pasha to Efendi: The Assimilation of Ottomans into Damascene Society, 1516–1783," *IJTS* 1 (1979–80): 68–83.

[136] Investment distribution continues to be extremely skewed. Only one in ten individuals held shares valued at 25,000 *kuruş* or higher; four out of five invested far below 10,000 *kuruş*. A considerable sum of money, 10,000 *kuruş* was the equivalent of 2,500 Venetian ducats and represented many times the lifetime wealth of an ordinary officer. Consider that the entire worldly goods of a low-ranking officer of the Arsenal in 1766–67 amounted to 3,040 *kuruş* (IŞMS K-A, 293:2–3); Esseyyid

their relationships to other investors. In some cases, however, the clerk has noted the network. Belonging to a *kapı* is explicitly indicated by such expressions as "the dependent of" (*tâbi-i*) or "from among the followers of" (*ân etbâ-ı, ân hulefâ*, or *ân bâb*).[137]

Splitting contracts among a household combined payment and collective management. The size and distribution of shares may also indicate the division of labor within a household. For example, the household of the deceased director of the fisc, Halil Efendi, suggests a close intermingling, even parity, between kin and clients. His son, Hüseyin Ağa (752.5 *kuruş*) and his personal attendant (*mehter*) Hasan Ağa (750 *kuruş*) possessed nearly equal allotments. Halil Efendi left other retainers smaller portions in the same contracts: for his purse bearer (*kisedâr*), there was a share valued at 683 *kuruş*; for his deputy (*kethüda*), a 300 *kuruş* share; for his *ser mehterân*, a 420 *kuruş* share; and his *ser çuhadar* (head chamberlain), a 160 *kuruş* share. His relationship with a scholar, Kadızâde Elhac Süleyman, who possessed the largest share (1070 *kuruş*) in these holdings, however, remains undefined.

Over the century, the disparities among the roughly 1,000 *malikâne* investors seem to mirror the stratification of wealth and power among Istanbul political elite as a whole. A narrow group at the uppermost tier of the shareholder pyramid appears to constitute the truly aristocratic level of the Ottoman bureaucratic and military elite.[138] In 1787–88, this group comprised the fourteen individuals and family partnerships whose assets exceeded 100,000 *kuruş*. Although representing only 2 percent of the total number of individuals registered in Istanbul (833 individual entries, of which 133 were explicitly partnerships), their combined wealth, which totaled 3,264,282 *kuruş*, made up roughly 30 percent of the value of *malikâne* shares held by central-state investors and 24 percent of the total investments in *malikâne* contracts in the empire. The largest *malikâne* firm, that of Admiral Âdet Hüseyin Pasha and his wife Emine, held shares that totaled

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Ebübekir, the *cavuş ağası*, head courier of the grand vizier, left an estate of 26,604 *kuruş* (IŞMS 181:1–3); a deputy judge, a *naib* (Ibid., 11–12) in Rumeli owned goods and a house together estimated at 9,498 *kuruş*.

[137] MMD 367. For some examples: Ahmet Ağa ve Küçük Mehmed Ağa, *ân etbâ-i* Sa'adullah Efendi, 4500 *kuruş*; Mustafa Ağa, *ân müteferrikân-ı gedikluyân ân etbâ-i müteveffa* Karakulak Ali Ağa, 312 *kuruş*.

[138] Çizakca, *Business Partnerships*, 173.

829,201.5 *kuruş* and was roughly equivalent to 8 percent of the total *malikâne* investments in the empire.[139] They held almost exclusively commercial revenues, such as those pertaining to the tariff stations at the ports of Chios, Iskenderiye, and Crete.[140]

Middle-range investors accounted for no more than 10 percent of the total population of Istanbul contractors. It is conceivable that the 26 (3 percent of the total) individuals who held shares valued at between 50,000 and 100,000 *kuruş* and the 62 individuals (7.4 percent of the total) who possessed shares valued at between 25,000 and 50,000 *kuruş* may have had a degree of autonomy with respect to the true aristocracy of service. However, it seems unlikely that the remainder, still nearly nine out of every ten individuals listed (88 percent), whose holdings fell far below a 25,000 *kuruş* threshold, could have functioned without affiliation to a larger corporate structure. Without detailed studies, it is not possible to reconstruct their ties to other shareholders.

As tax farming expanded over the century, so did the responsibilities of the members of the larger households. Transactions between shareholders and transfers of money were best handled through the Istanbul courts, as were procedures of ceding shares from one party to another (*kasr-ı yed* or *ferağ*), demands for repayment, and loans in arrears, as well as the petitions to devolve shares to sons.[141] They processed petitions, made appearances at court, and bid at auction, in addition to protecting their patrons' political interests broadly;[142] they secured credit and subfinanced operations.[143] The legal courts

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[139] MMD 9565:1–5.

[140] Some of their shares might include crown estates. Many investments were concentrated within discrete regions. For example, the shares of Vizier Gül Ahmed Pasha and household members, including his *kethüda-i harç*, Mustafa Ağa; his mehterdar, Süleyman Ağa; and his children, Feyzullah Bey, Ali Bey, and İsmail Bey, were all held in the Aegean—the Morea, Crete, and Izmir.

[141] For examples of ceding (*kasr-ı yed*) shares, see MMD 9896:138; MMD 9494:23. On the legal methods of transferring/relinquishing title (*ferağ*), see the judge's handbook (circa 1784) Süleymâniye Library MS Izmir 782 no. 1, folios 66a–67b.

[142] In 1705–6, a Diyarbekir *seyyid* re-registered his contract through an Istanbul intermediary (MMD 9896:138).

[143] On the difficulties of finance and credit in the provinces, see Araks Şahiner, "The Sarrafs of Istanbul: Financiers of the Empire," (M.A. thesis, Institute of Social Sciences, Master of Arts in History, Boğaziçi University, 1995), 30. Bartholomew Plaisted, *Narrative of a Journey from Basra to Aleppo in 1750 in The Desert Route to India Being the Journals of Four Travelers by the Great Desert Caravan Route between Aleppo and Basra, 1745–51*, ed. Douglas Carruthers (London: Hakluyt Society, 1929), 104. Bruce

furnished notarial documents (*hüccet*) attesting to payment and describing the ultimate recipient or recipients of the funds.[144] As we have seen, members of the Istanbul household coordinated the duties of provincial employees, whether this involved a deputy on site,[145] a member of his household, a steward drafted from a prominent gentry family, or a subfarmer.[146]

Deyn-ü Devlet *(Debt and State): Islamicate High Finance*

For European visitors to the Ottoman Empire, even the seasoned French and Russian diplomats whom Levni depicts enjoying their special perch on the parade grounds, (Plate 5) Islamic society presented many oddities. There was the strange, that is, from the perspective of Western Europeans, relationship between *din-ü devlet* ("religion and state"). On the one hand, there was no mistaking Islam's pride of place in the empire. At the ceremonies, palace munificence allowed thousands of Muslim boys to be circumcised along with the princes. Before greeting all others, the sultan prepared a special reception for the dignitary representing the descendants of the Prophet Muhammed. In architecture, calligraphic arts, and ritual, religion permeated the life of the city. The call to prayer that resonated in every quarter gave the days their rhythms.

On the other, for visitors from Christendom who were accustomed to the sectarian rivalries between Catholic and Protestant that not only segregated cities but had split entire countries, the relatively unhindered interaction between religious majority and minority in

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Masters, *The Origins of Western Dominance in the Middle East: Mercantilism and the Islamic Economy in Aleppo, 1600–1750* (New York: New York University Press, 1988), 151–52.

[144] Halil İnalcık, "Hawala," *EI*[2] 3: 284; D'Ohsson, *Tableau générale*, vol. 1, 248–49; for examples of transfers of funds, see D.BŞM 4666 (1776–80), a register belonging to Lala Mustafa Ağa whose income was sent from Syria. For an example of a payment by local administrators through the judge in Diyarbekir, DŞS 360:35 (1739–1740).

[145] Telhisi Mehmet Ağa, for example, entrusted his malikâne holdings to a subfarmer or his own deputy (subaşı). Özcan, *Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi*, 225. On subcontracting, see Defterdar Sarı Mehmet Efendi, *Zubde-i Vekayiat* (Süleymâniye Library, Ms. Esad Efendi, No. 2387) folios 288b–289a, cited in Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken*, 132 n. 30.

[146] HA IV:1 (1781–82); although a 1715 order attempted to restrict subleasing, absentee contracting was commonplace. In 1767 orders were issued to standardize the practice. Avdo Sučeska, "Malikana." Prilozi za orientalnu filologiju 36 (1986): 209; Genç, "Malikâne Sistemi," 240, n. 17.

Istanbul's streets and marketplace could not have rendered Muslim society more alien and repugnant. The preeminence of the religious majority did not entail the banishment of the minority from much of economic life or their confinement within walled ghettos. The lack of ability in languages and protocol compelled Catholic and Protestant missions to engage Armenian and Sephardic dragomen to conduct their business with the Sublime Porte. The Greek translators of the imperial *divan* were entrusted with the empire's most delicate political negotiations. In affairs of commerce it was the same: French, Dutch, Swedish and English chartered companies in Izmir, Salonica, Aleppo, Baghdad, or Cairo dealt with the Jew or Christian assigned to the tariff station who held the venal of office of moneychanger or broker.[147] Along the Levantine coastline non-Muslim merchants or *bazirgân*, including those special purveyors who worked for the palace, the so-called *beratlı tüccar*, proved formidable rivals.[148]

Most shocking of all for the European was the conspicuous involvement of Jewish and Christian bankers in public finances, the sinews of state power.[149] Every official or officer of any standing counted on the backing of an Armenian, Greek, or Jewish financier, accountant, or banker (*sarraf*).[150] At every step up the ladder of higher office, from the initial down payment on an office to the funds needed buy the gifts befitting a princess, a rising candidate needed to borrow ever greater amounts of money. Without a letter of guarantee from a reputable financier, provided only after a thorough credit check, it was impossible for him even to bid on a tax farm.[151]

Credit was the life blood of officialdom. A governor from Aleppo spent 126,830 *kuruş* for ten months in office over the years 1781 and 1782. Of this 2,102 *kuruş* a month or 20 percent of his income, was paid in interest.[152] His expenses might escalate sharply if, as we

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[147] For their social backgrounds, see Onik Jamgocyan, "Les finances de l'Empire Ottoman," and Şahiner, "The Sarrafs of Istanbul."

[148] See Ali İhsan Bağıs, *Osmanlı Ticaretinde Gayrı Müslimler: Kapitülasyonlar-Beratlı Tüccarlar, Avrupa ve Hayriye Tüccarları (1750–1839)* (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1983), 21–38.

[149] Consider France, Janine Garrison, *L'Edit de Nantes et sa révocation: Histoire d'une intolerance* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1985).

[150] Robert Olson, "Jews, Janissaries, Esnaf and the Revolt of 1740 in Istanbul: Social Upheaval and Political Realignment in the Ottoman Empire," *JESHO* 20 (1978): 199.

[151] Şahiner, "The Sarrafs of Istanbul," 24.

[152] D.BŞM 5019. Mouradgea d'Ohsson, (*Tableau générale*, vol. 3, 175–6) historian

have seen, assuming office also meant taking the responsibility for the large *malikâne* contracts.[153]

While the court was the focal point of status, and the Porte, the source of patronage, the city itself furnished the personnel and services for financial capitalism within the empire. Over the century there developed a degree of regional specialization among the financiers themselves. Greek influence held sway in the Aegean and the Black Sea; Jewish firms rose to prominence in Syria, Iraq, and for at time, Egypt.[154] Armenian companies dominated the financial hub of the empire. Members of the upper strata or *amira* class of their community, the Armenian financiers served as personal agents for the upper echelon of the aristocracy of service.[155] They filled almost every one of the seventy-two fully accredited (*gedik*) posts allowed to deal directly with the fisc.[156]

Yet, this number does not begin to capture the scope of imperial high finance. In addition to the *gedik*-holding financiers, a 1761 document records another 137 individuals who practiced some form of financial services (*sarraflık*) under the title of purchasing agents (*mubayaacı*), silver dealers/silversmiths (*gümüşciyân*), or as their apprentices (*mülâzimler*) in Istanbul alone.[157] These bankers preformed duties that

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of the Ottoman Empire and son-in-law of the financier Abraham Kuleliyan, recorded interest rates ranging between 12 percent and 24 percent. See Şahiner, "The Sarrafs of Istanbul," 33 and Jamgocyan, "Les finances de l'Empire Ottoman," 285–86. Ronald Jennings notes ("Loan and Credit in Early 17th Century Judicial Records, The Shari'a Court of Anatolia and Kayseri," *JESHO* 16 [1973]: 184, 190, 214) that interest rates ran as high as 20–24 percent per year.

[153] Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken*, 134–35. Entire provinces—Adana, Tripoli, Rakka (Urfa), and the entire tax farm apparatus of a region, such as the *muhassılık*, of the Morea, Cyprus, and Aydin, were awarded to local gentry or incoming governors. According to D'Ohsson (*Tableau générale*, vol. 6, 279), twenty-two *sancak*s (out of sixty-three) were held directly as *malikâne-i miri* (imperial *malikâne*). For one example, see D.BŞM 3546 (1759–60).

[154] The Carmona, Aciman, and Gabay family firms were associated with the janissaries. For more on this connection, see Robert W. Olson, "Jews in the Ottoman Empire in Light of New Documents," Jewish Social Studies, 41 (1979): 75–88. Syrian Christians served as bankers of the Egyptian elite, after Ali Bey who had broken his Jewish bankers. See John William Livingston, "Ali Bey al-Kabir and the Jews," *Middle Eastern Studies* 7 (1971): 221–28.

[155] Many *sarraf* families traced their origins to northeastern Anatolia, near the cities of Van, Sivas and Harput, at the crossroads of the long-distance transit trade in silk and proximate to the silver mines of Gümüşhane, Keban, and Ergani. Hagop Levon Barsoumian, "The Armenian Amira Class of Istanbul." (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1980), 90. D'Ohsson, *Tableau générale*, vol. 3, 175–76; Jamgocyan, "Les finances de l'Empire Ottoman," 285–86.

[156] Şahiner, "The Sarrafs of Istanbul," 71. CDp 193.

[157] Ahmet Refik, *Hicrî On İkinci Asırda Istanbul Hayatı (1100–1200)* (Istanbul: Devlet

ranged from money lending to keeping accounts. As bankers or merchants who redeemed the transfer of funds in the form of bills of exchange, or *police*, they were essential links in the chain of credit throughout the empire.[158]

Sealed by shared risks, the relationship between banker and pasha remained close. It is no wonder that officers and officials petitioned for special privileges for their non-Muslim protegees.[159] Yet, as elsewhere, wealth and prominence made minorities the objects of scorn and resentment. Muslim writers accused financiers of enriching themselves by fraudulent means, such as passing adulterated coin, and disguising illegal investments in revenue contracts.[160] There is no reason to minimize their role in this system. With tax farming an integral part of the credit nexus within the empire and interest rates running as high as 24 percent, they could be considered, after a fashion, silent partners in most transactions.[161] Nonetheless, given the constraints under which they operated, non-Muslim financiers in the Ottoman capital cannot be considered truly autonomous entrepreneurs or comprising a fully "private" sector.

Matbaası, 1930), 193–94. Credit for monetary reform in the eighteenth century must also be given to the financiers. The Armenian Duzian family assumed the position of intendant (*emin*) of the imperial mint in 1757.

[158] İnalcık, "Hawala," 283–85; M. Zeki Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü* (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1971) vol. 2, 58. Çizakca, *Business Partnerships*, 141. See also Halil Sahillioğlu, "Bir Mültezimin Zimmet Defterine göre XV. Yüzyıl Sonunda Osmanlı Darphane Mukataaları," *IFM* 23 (1963): 145–218. Jamgocyan, "Les finances de l'Empire Ottoman," 308. After 1788 the state tried to borrow directly from the financiers. Rates of interest varied (Şahiner, "The Sarrafs of Istanbul," 33, 55) according to the relationships between the parties. Financiers also borrowed (or invested) monies from high officers and courtiers. On Selim III's policies concerning credit for contracts, see Yücel Özkaya, "III Selim'in Imparatorluk Hakkındaki Bazi Hatt-ı Humayunları," *Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi* 1 (1990): 341–42."

[159] CS 884 (1743) is a petition from Seyyid İbrahim, *cuhadarbaşı* of the palace requesting special exemptions for Mikail, son of Boğaz, in recognition of twenty years of loyal service.

[160] Özcan, *Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi*, 22. A century later we hear the same complaints and accusations. Abdullah Efendi Tatarcık ("Selim-i sâni devrinde Nizâm-ı Devlet hakkinda mutâl'aât," *Türk Tarihi Encümeni Mecmuası* 8 (1333/1914–1915): 17), an advisor to sultan Selim III (r. 1789–1807), made a blanket accusation: "Every Armenian from Kemah or Eğin who possesses a few thousand *kuruş*," uses a Muslim front for their own operations; for this thousand they are able to milk the peasantry of "300–500 *kese* of *akçe* [125,000 to 208,000 *kuruş*] in an *iltizam*." See also Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım*, 144–48.

[161] D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, vol. 3, 175–77. From 12 to 24 percent interest, "depending on the circumstances."

In fact, Christian and Jewish financiers had lost ground in most areas of domestic finance and tax collection over the course of the previous century. Better armed and connected, the janissaries, who had been redeployed to provincial cities during the seventeenth century, outbid them on agrarian and commercial tax farms.[162] A de facto withdrawal from the tax-farming market was made official in 1714, when imperial decree barred non-Muslims from bidding on *malikâne* contracts.[163] Nonetheless, non-Muslim financiers continued to perform indispensable services for the treasury. Minority financiers helped liquidate probated estates.[164] They furnished stop-gap loans to the state, "interest" that appears in columns under the Persian euphemism "güzeşte" or the Turkish compound "senelik nemâ."[165] In the eighteenth century, they were often assigned to tariff stations as official money changers, or as paymasters and forwarding agents at the site of mining operations. Typically, the wartime *cebelü bedeliyesi*, a heavy cash outlay for the statesmen and an urgently needed infusion of cash for the state, was submitted by "the hand of the *sarraf*."[166]

Şemdanî-zâde Fındıklı Süleyman Efendi, a court historian writing in the latter half of the eighteenth century,[167] betrayed his own ambivalence toward the credit system as a whole, as he weighed the justness of the decision of Şeyh'ül-İslâm Dürrî-zâde Mustafa Efendi to execute four Eğinli (Akn, present-day Kemaliye in Turkey) bankers who had been convicted of bribing an official in 1765. He acknowledged that their infraction would have been considered only a slight breach of etiquette for a member of the Muslim elite and that their "crime did not deserve the death sentence."[168] Because it did con-

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[162] Çizakca, *Business Partnerships*, 155–58.

[163] Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken*, 131, n. 28. A 1714 rescript prohibited the sale of *malikâne mukataa* to non-Muslims.

[164] Ahmet Kal'a, Ahmet Tabakoğlu, Salih Aynural, et al. eds., *İstanbul Ahkâm Defterleri İstanbul Finans Tarihi* (1742–1787) (Istanbul: Istanbul Araştırmaları Merkezi, 1998) vol. 1, 61.

[165] Hamilton A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East* (London: Oxford University Press, 1950 and 1957) vol. 1, pt. 2,24, n. 4; Wright, *Ottoman Statecraft*, 77; Özdeğer, "III. Ahmed'in Varidât ve Defteri," 321, 331, 343.

[166] MMD 9613 (1809–1810), "ân yed-i sarraf."

[167] Süleyman Efendi, *Şem'dâni-zâde Fındıklı Süleyman Efendi Tarihi* Mur'i't-Tevarih, ed. M. Münir Aktepe (Istanbul: Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1978) vol. 2A, 68–69.

[168] Mumcu, *Osmanlı* Devletinde Rüşvet, 226, 237.

stitute a serious breach of the boundaries of status, he agreed that severe punishment was warranted lest other wealthy Christians and Jews take to comporting themselves as if they were Muslims ("Lâkin sarraflar murad ettiği işi fi'ile ve vücûda getürdüğünden çok kimesne kavlen ve kiyâfeten gerçi müsülmandır").

This was not, however, the real ethical dilemma. Finally, the historian's invective finds its true target. He cannot fault the Christians alone. Didn't the upper-ranking officials who encouraged such impropriety by their "delicate and deferential" ("mahrem ve dost ittihaz") treatment of social inferiors share the blame? Even the "greatest of statesmen" ("ricâl-i devletin küberâsı"), brushed aside their indulgence with the excuse "[I do this] because he serves my interests" ("zirâ işime yarar deyü").[169]

Although Fındıklı Süleyman Efendi stopped short of condemning the tax farming system itself, others did question its morality. Ottoman jurist had in past centuries considered tax farming (*iltizam*) a necessary evil. It was tolerated because Christians and Jews were the main practitioners.[170] Writing in the mid-seventeenth century as Muslim involvement in tax farming increased appreciably, the Syrian Hanefite scholar al-Ramli took a firm position again the practice, arguing that because tax farming involved a speculative investment to gain an undetermined amount of profit it was analogous to money lending.[171] But, his objections were not shared by the juridical establishment in Istanbul which was well disposed toward the reconciliation of sharia with *kanun*. Without so much as a comment on the concept of *faiz* (profit) with respect to long-term tax farming, the chief mufti of Istanbul *Şeyh'ül-İslam* Mehmed Sadık in 1694–1695, joined by the jurisconsults of Anatolia and Rumelia, issued an opinion in Arabic alongside the 1695 imperial edict. They placed their seal of approval on the new *malikâne* contract "for the good order of the Islamic state."[172] *Malikâne* contractors, it was said, could appeal their cases

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[169] ". . . Gerçi bu hususda bunlar şer'an katle müstahak değiler-idi," Süleyman Efendi, *Mur'i't*-Tevarih, 2A: 68–69.

[170] See Joseph E. Matuz,"Contributions to the Ottoman Institution of the İltizam," *JOS* 11 (1991): 237–49; Bistra Cvetkova, "Recherches sur le systeme d'affermage (Iltizam) dans L'Empire Ottoman au cours du XVI^{e} XVIII^{e} s. par rapport aux contrées Bulgares," Rocznik orentalistyczny 27 (1964): 111–32 and Bruce McGowan, *Economic Life in the Ottoman Europe*, 61.

[171] Khaled Abou El Fadl, "Tax Farming in Islamic Law (Qibalah and Daman of Kharaj): A Search for a Concept," *Islamic Studies* 31 (1992): 5–32.

[172] KK 5040:2.

to the chief mufti himself, who would represent their interests before the sultan.[173] Given ulema involvement at all levels in the tax farming system, by the time of the Hanefite scholar Ibn Abidin (d. 1836–37) the very question had become moot.[174]

Formative, too, was the role of the religious establishment in creating the legal foundations for private finance in Istanbul and Bursa, as well as other Anatolian and Balkan cities. The debate surrounding the innovation of *vakıf al-nukud*, that is, a foundation or trust (waqf) based on liquid capital remains one of the stranger chapters in Hanefite jurisprudence. The debate raged between jurists and professors during the first half of the seventeenth century. Here, the contravention of Islamic law was scarcely a matter of interpretation. The laws on endowments dedicated to pious or family ends specifically dictate the use of rents from fixed capital, such as urban real estate or agricultural lands.[175] These discrepancies had not troubled Ottoman elites and by the time the practice came to the notice of leading jurists, the practice was widespread, particularly in Istanbul and Edirne. In addition to pleasing their patrons, Istanbul ulema's willingness to bend the rules may also speak of a certain degree of altruism. Coinciding with a period of rising taxation, the cash endowment might have functioned as a type of credit union that offered craftsmen, traders, and town residents needed loans as well as providing support for orphans and widows.

Istanbul Muslims established an average of five new cash endowments a year in the period between 1685 and 1781. Many, perhaps most, of these endowments functioned as investment banks. They realized "rents" by furnishing Jewish and Christian financiers with capital at prime rates of interest, ranging between 6 and 15 percent.[176]

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[173] D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, vol. 3, 175–76. On transfer of title or ceding shares, the fees were set at 2 percent for the chief herald or *çavuşbaşı*, 2.5 percent for the *kadıasker* (chief judge) of the Balkans, and .75 percent for the kadıasker of Anatolia.

[174] See Abou El Fadl, "Tax Farming in Islamic Law." For an example of how *malikâne-iltizam* contracts were used privately, Kal'a et al. eds., *İstanbul Ahkâm Defterleri*, vol. 1, 147.

[175] Jon E. Mandaville, "Usurious Piety: The Cash Waqf Controversy in the Ottoman Empire," *IJMES* 10 (1979): 291–98.

[176] Şahiner, "The Sarrafs of Istanbul," 32–33, 38–39, 45. After 1763, the rate of interest offered by endowments appears to have been fixed at 7 percent. See also Haim Gerber, "The Monetary System of the Ottoman Empire," *JESHO* 25 (1982): 308–324.

Many of the 1,624 cash endowments at the end of the century were located in neighborhoods closest to the Porte and state offices.[177]

State debt involved the religious authorities in other ways. As judges, the ulema were actively involved in many transactions between lender and debtor.[178] They ruled on disputes between financiers.[179] Together with local military authorities, judges helped collect principal and interest on "Islamically sanctioned loans" (*cihet-i karz-i şer'îyle*) owed to non-Muslim bankers.[180] In general, they carried out their duties with fairness and stood by the credit system regardless of the rank of the borrower.[181] Whether it be the governor who owed 16,565 *kuruş*, the business transaction of the wealthy merchant (*bazirgân*) named Sarkis,[182] or far more modest debtors,[183] the entire central-state and provincial apparatus was set into motion to make sure that some payment was made. Months of correspondence and investigation were often needed to disentangle layers of credit and debt complicated by subfarming.[184]

Given state supervision of financial institutions and collection, it should come as no surprise that Ottoman officials initially balked when it came to accepting foreign instruments of credit and payment, despite having signed an article governing letters of exchange

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[177] Kurt, *Para Vakıfları Nazariyatı*, 91, 162. In a half century Istanbul added 886 new cash waqfs.

[178] Jamgocyan, "Les finances de l'Empire Ottoman," 226–33.

[179] DA III:55. In 1763–64, orders were sent from Istanbul to collect funds in the amount of 10,000 *kuruş* from a Mardin resident, Sama'anoğlu Karbas Yorgi.

[180] A *hüküm* (DA III:231) sent on behalf of two Armenian financiers in Istanbul to officers overseeing the city of Mardin ordered the payment of balance 5,750 *kuruş* on a debt that was being repaid in installments between 1757 and 1762. In another case we find a certain Agop in pursuit of a Mardin resident by the name of Şeyhzâde Hacı Ahmed (DA IV:77 [1783–84]); the text speaks of an "Islamically contracted loan" (*cihet-i karz-i şer'iyle*) of which 5,100 *kuruş* remained outstanding. For other examples of collection through the state, see DA III:267, DA II:6, and DA II:282.

[181] A *hüküm* (DA III:267) was issued in 1775 to the governor and the *kadı* of Mosul on behalf of Anton, resident in Istanbul, who was seeking repayment of 1500 *kuruş* from the probate estate of the former governor of Tripoli, Abdülfattah Paşazâde Mir Abdürrahman, who had been the borrower.

[182] DA III:231.

[183] DA II:6; DA II:282.

[184] Ohannes and Mardus (DA II:191) from Istanbul demanded 9,485 *kuruş* from the *voyvoda* of Çarşınacak, Osman Ağa. The *voyvoda* in turn claimed his own remittance was delayed because the subfarmers had failed to pay him; for examples from Sivas and Aleppo, see respectively SA XIII:28 and HA IV:11, 72; for loans between non-Muslims, see Kal'a et al., eds., *İstanbul Ahkâm Defterleri*, vol. 1, 25.

in the Franco-Ottoman Treaty of 1740.[185] Official reluctance notwithstanding, the old-regime elite could not remain indifferent to foreign creditors and instruments of exchange indefinitely. European letters of credit circulated with greater facility and frequency in the empire, particularly along the Levantine coastline, during the second half of the century. Merchants balanced their accounts between the main Ottoman ports of call in the Aegean, Syria, and Istanbul with a combination of bullion and letters of exchange. Commercial capital and state borrowing merged with the Mediterranean markets. Subject to laws of demand, such instruments of credit also drew the Ottoman treasury, minority bankers and pious Muslim investors, into the orbit of global financial capitalism.[186]

Completing the Circle

Winding their way through the crowded streets of Istanbul, architects cleared a path for the procession of janissaries, judges, chamberlains, gatekeepers, surgeons, and the military band that heralded the young princes, including the future Mustafa III (1717–1774) to the Topkapı palace. In his final pair of paintings Levni captures the Ottoman dynasts in the palace after the festivities have ended. The grand vizier's ministrations to the convalescing princes fill one scene. Facing it is a last, lingering image: a full-length portrait of the sultan (Plate 6). Standing before a pool of water, Ahmed III stares out from the page. His left hand rests by his side. His right hand is raised and clutches a fistful of gold. At his feet attendants and pages, *enderun ağaları*, scramble to collect the tossed coins that roll across the floor.[187]

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[185] Edhem Eldem, "The Trade in Precious Metals and Bills," in *V. Milletlerarası Türkiye Sosyal ve İktisat Tarihi Kongresi*, ed. Hakkı Dursun Yıldız, Inci Enginün, and Emine Gürsoy Naskalı (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1990), 579–89 and idem, "Le Commerce Français d'Istanbul au XVIII^{e} Siècle" (Thèse de doc., University of Provence, Aix-Marseille I, 1988), 131–37, 199. On letters of exchange, see also Pierre Vilar, *A History of Gold and Money* (London: Verso, 1984), 216–21, 242–43, 273–76.

[186] See Edhem Eldem, "The Trade in Precious Metals and Bills," 579–89.

[187] Michael Gilsenan noted the parallels with the Roman "sparsio." See Alain Caille and Jean Starobinski, *Critique de la Raison Utilitaire: Manifeste du Mauss* (Paris: La Découverte, 1989). For gold policy under Ahmed III, see Edhem Eldem, *French Trade in Istanbul in the Eighteenth Century* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1999), 113–19; and Ekrem

More than symbolic, Ahmed III's reign did bequeath his nephew, Mahmud I (r. 1730–1754), a state on solid financial foundations, thanks in part to his vizier's staggering fortune that passed into the state's coffers. Yet the solidity of the empire's political economy was not only the product of currency reform and good accounting. It owed to the gradual merging of two treasuries under the aegis of the Porte's administrative apparatus. A complex system of contracts and patronage helped orchestrated this gradual integration while delegating many duties to the upper-ranking members of the ruling estate and, as we shall see in the next chapter, to the provincial gentry.[188]

Fiscal patronage anticipated formal bureaucratization of the state. The contracting system expanded rapidly over the first half of the century, although oversight lagged.[189] Under Ahmed III's son Mustafa III (1757–1774) and his vizier Koca Ragıp Mehmed Pasha (1757–1763), the pace of financial consolidation picked up speed. One of the last redoubts of palace autonomy, the crown endowments for the Holy Cities, finally surrendered to the grand vizier's oversight and the once powerful *kahya* of the palace was banished. Yet the challenge to the consolidation of the "state" remained: on the one hand, to circumscribe the autonomy of those who controlled the privy purse of the sultan and, on the other, to cultivate the financial ties among and beyond the aristocracy of service all the while maintaining the political subordination of the cadres, individuals, and clans who carried out the tasks of provincial administration.[190] With the pretext of pressing military and financial needs, in the wake of the disastrous defeat by the Russians in 1774, the bureaucracy would withdraw some of the most valuable revenues from the *malikâne* market entirely.

Kolerkiliç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Para Tarihi* (Ankara: Doğuş, 1958), 99–100; Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi, 250.

[188] The treasury was swollen with sureties from the *malikâne*. Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken*, 298.

[189] Already in 1698–99 (KK 4050:37–38) there were complaints about subadministrators (*mubaşir*) who were remiss in their payment of the nominal mal, that was due in three installments annually. A "münavebe" or "rotation" system was adopted later in the century, making one of the largest shareholders responsible for collecting the rents and dividing the profits among the partners. Mehmet Genç, "Iltizam," *Islam Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, forthcoming), cited in Çizakca, *Business Partnerships*, 174.

[190] Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım*, 100–101.

In place of a few high bidders, hundreds of small shares were auctioned to women, members of the ulema and ordinary Istanbul residents while remaining under state management. A fiscal measure to be sure, this new *esham* modality of borrowing again enlarged the pool of investors in the state.[191] By 1800, there were more than four thousand investors of all backgrounds in the *esham.*[192]

Behind the luxurious textiles, costly entertainments, and exquisite manners of the courtly life captured in Levni's paintings, lay the less familiar haunts of old regime rule. Only obliquely does the artist betray the tensions between palace and the Porte; no mention is made of the strategic blockage in the channels of promotion or the collective means by which pashas secured their wealth and political futures. Far beyond the Ok Meydanı and the parade grounds, were the shops and offices of the Armenian, Jewish, and Greek agents who tended the accounts of viziers, commanders, captains, and increasingly many of the provincial gentry as well.[193] Completely hidden from view, were the Islamic endowments that undergirded Ottoman public finance and the foreign letters of credit that furnished Ottoman officials with an additional means of remitting funds to Istanbul for the fisc and their *kapı.*

Perhaps it was not the official face of the state but the dizzying intricacies of the circulatory system convergent in the Ottoman capital that explain the continued popularity of the *Surnâme-i Vehbi.* Although only the sultan and vizier possessed souvenirs of those marvelous days of festival in paint, the elaborate prose allegory of state-society relationships continued to be recopied and enjoyed until the twilight of the old order. Its reassuring allusions to redistribution of wealth and social equity harmonized the disparate and often dissonant elements of court and society and cloaked an imperfect reality. This enduring event provided a singular optic through which

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[191] Aydin, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Esham Uygulaması," 154–58. See appendices, table XII.

[192] Süleyman Efendi, *Mur'i't-Tevarih*, vol. 2A, 31. Mehmet Genç, "Esham," *Islam Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfi, 1995), 11:375–80. Norman Itzkowitz, "Mehmed Raghib Pasha: The Making of an Ottoman Grand Vizier" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1959).

[193] Ms. Canay Sahin, a Ph.D. candidate at Bilkent University, is in the process of editing the register of one of Istanbul's financiers whose clients included members of the gentry throughout the empire.

the reader might discern the logic of rule and appreciate the bases of the empire's social cohesion. By bringing the reader into this charmed circle, Vehbi also imparted a certain knowledge of the whole, a view from the summit denied the ordinary subject.

Each reader might find something to suit his own tastes. The visitor who brought a copy back to Cairo might have been captivated by the descriptions of monumental candy gardens, the performances of agile acrobats, or the marvelous products of the capital's gifted craftsmen. The memories of the drumbeat of the military band, the parades of guards in formation, and the lavish banquets awaiting the men of the state, may have inspired a commander (*serasker*) by the name of Ali Pasha, to purchase a copy before leaving on assignment to Diyarbekir. Auctioned along with his personal effects, the manuscript eventually found its way back—hundreds of kilometers from his last posting—to the imperial treasury.[194]

[194] For the location of other copies of this work, see Atıl and Koç, *Levni and the Surname*, 43. In 1744, Ali Pasha's personal copy (TKSK MS. B 223) was confiscated by the state.

CHAPTER THREE

GOVERNMENT IN THE VERNACULAR

While the painters in the palace atelier were re-creating the candy flowers and wreaths of court pageant long past, the clerks of the *Bâb-ı Âli* tended another garden.

The imperial archive represents the "art of governing" writ large. Through its reports, orders, certificates, requisitions, and audits, the state ruled over many peoples and provinces. Yet where chapter 1's map and chapter 2's festival book crack open a window on a readily discernible (if nonetheless misleading) visual order, the ledgers of the empire's eighteenth common era, or twelfth century after the Hijra, seems to slam shut a dialogue with modernity.

Indeed, in the mirror of one of its many registers—say, a page drawn from a master accounting of *malikâne* revenue contracts in the "province of Diyarbekir" (figs. 3 and 4)—the archive seems less a garden than an overgrown thicket: a chaotic jumble of entries inscribed across a now-tattered and worm-eaten Venetian folio. Its caption, the names of a pair of villages, "Kürd Hasan" and "Meslahî," corresponds to no designation on the contemporary map.[1] Nor does it follow firmly in the tradition of cadastration perfected in the empire's earlier centuries; in place of neat rows describing crop types and yields, we see knots of scribal shorthand, or *siyakat*, tangled references, notations, and the minutiae of dates and formulae that overflow the page.[2] Rather than an exhaustive accounting of rural population or current income from crops on a *sancak*-by-*sancak* basis,[3] nearly an

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[1] MMD 9518:17. Only one of the two settlements bears some type of spacial reference (to the district of Çermik, a town some fifty kilometers northwest of present-day Diyarbekir).

[2] MMD 9518. This is but one of many "master" registers for the networks of provincial tax farming: for Tokat, MMD 9543, 9559; for Athens, MMD 9512; for Mosul, MMD 9611; for Damascus, MMD 9530, 9538; for Erzurum, MMD 9517; for Crete, MMD 9503; for Bosnia, MMD 9520; for Aleppo, MMD 9482.

[3] For an exhaustive treatment of Ottoman diplomatics, see Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlı Belgelerinin Dili* (*Diplomatik*) (Istanbul: Kubbealtı Akademisi Kütür ve San'at Vakfi, 1998). For facsimiles of the classic register, see L. Fekete, *Die Siyaqat-Schrift in der Türkischen Finanzverwaltung* (Budapest: Akademiai Kiadó, 1955), esp. vol. 2.

Fig. 3 Detail of the *malikâne mukataa* "master" register. (MMD 9518:17). The four tax-farming partnerships registered concern villages in the Diyarbekir province, including the judicial districts of Amid, Çermik and Savur. For a translation of the entry in the upper right hand corner, see Fig. 4.

Village of Kürd Hasan in the Judicial District of Çermik	1,202 *akçe*
Village of Meslahî el-Ma'ruf bi Suphan [سبحان]	2,285 *akçe*
	3,485 *akçe*
increase in 1708	8,513 *akçe*
Annual Payment	12,000 *akçe*



Fig. 4 The Devolution of Shares in a Diyarbekir Tax Farm (1710–1791)

entire century's worth of tax revenues from two villages (or likewise, tribes and commercial revenues scattered throughout town and countryside) is subsumed in a perfunctory table: the initial amount of 3,485 *akçe* is rounded up to 12,000 *akçe* in 1708–9, after which there is no further reassessment of value.[4]

Like the "obscure, ill ordered, incomplete, and slovenly" pages of the tax registers that greeted Tocqueville in his foray into the ancien-régime archive, these unseemly documents might strike us as evidence of the "progressive decay" that brought low a great empire.[5] Yet such an idealized vision of a classical age past and a naive appreciation of the bright future of transparent government only further confound our passage through the tangled forests of the Ottoman old regime archive.[6] Enlightenment authors did advocate a new science of statecraft, a "governmentality,"[7] they bequeathed to the Physiocrats and Prussian statisticians. Most, like Colbert, who in 1679 dreamt of a comprehensive cadastral map that would document the agrarian state of France in its entirety, found it impossible to realize their projects. Foreign conquest and colonialism did unfetter the bureaucrat's imagination. Without the impediment of a potent aristocracy or deference to local custom, colonial administrators, such as William Petty, deployed "political arithmetic" to reduce the seventeenth-century Irish economy to numbers, just as Lord Cornwallis would annex eighteenth-century Bengal with his surveyors.[8]

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[4] My initial assumption was that these registers were kept in the provinces by provincial treasurers, or even local *voyvodas* and *muhassıls* because their period coincides with the *Nizam-ı Cedid* (1793–1807) and the *Tanzimat* (1839–76). For provincial record keeping, Yavuz Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi (XVIII. Yüzyıldan Tanzimat'a Mali Tarih)* (Istanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1986), 331.

[5] Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Régime and the French Revolution* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1955), 16.

[6] Cf. Brinkley Messick, *The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

[7] See Graham Burchell and Colin Gordon, eds., *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality: With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

[8] Although the short leases on the Great Farm of the English customs were phased out in the early seventeenth century, Britain continued to farm revenues in Canada until the mid-nineteenth century and in India until the "Permanentment Settle" with Bengal in 1793. See Ranajit Guha, *A Rule of Property for Bengal: An Essay on the Idea of Permanent Settlement* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), and Anthony Pagden, "Dispossessing the Barbarian: The Language of Spanish Thomism and the Debate over the Property Rights of the American Indians," in *The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe*, ed. A. Pagden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 79–98.

However, it is possible to forget that in an age that considered adherence to standard orthography optional, statesmen did not mistake the diligence of excise agents or bookkeepers for the mettle of a nation.[9] Quite the contrary; a contemporary observer, such as Sir James Porter, who served as British ambassador to the sultan between 1746 and 1762, might find peculiarities of chancellery style intriguing. Indeed, Sir James marveled at the singular efficiency of the Ottoman clerk's techniques of compiling and retrieving data. No tedious plugging of information into columns and categories here. Sir James remarked upon a collocation of entries that, as in our register, pirouetted instead around date and transaction.[10]

Without such guidance we would surely miss the economy and sophistication of our master register of tax farms.[11] Though scant on coordinates in space, the information condensed in this half page furnishes a schematic: the essential details of the fiscal and political history of two villages at a distance of more than a thousand kilometers from the Ottoman capital. Each flourish refers us to another generation of contractors who pass shares by auction, cession, or default. The page introduces us to partnerships such as those of Seyyid Ahmed and Ali, ulema who share their holding with their sons Salih, Feyzullah, and Ömer; to members of the Diyarbekir gentry; and to soldiers like Mehmet Ağa, who continued to reside in Istanbul. This is no static roster of names or mere register of quantities of goods. The Ottoman old regime recorded power as a process, as a chain of relations tying persons, to places, and resources.

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[9] Article 22 of the Treaty of Paris (1763) specified the fate of French archives, allowing for "Tous les Papiers, Lettres, Documens, et Archives, qui se sont trouvés dans les Pays, Terres, Villes, et Places qui sont restituté et ceux appartenans aux Païs cédés, seront délivrés, ou fournis respsectivement, et de bonne Foy, dans le mêmes Tems, s'il est possible, de la Prise de Possession . . ." See Zenab Esmat Rashed, *The Peace of Paris, 1763* (Liverpool: University Press, 1951). Theodore M. Porter (*The Rise of Statistical Thinking, 1820–1900* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986], 25) attributes the peculiarities of the pre-modern archive to an epistemology fixed on status rather than economics and social stratification.

[10] "Papers of the remotest date, if singly the year of the transaction is known, may be found at the Porte; every command granted at that time, and every regulation then made can be immediately produced." *Observations on the Religion, Law, Government and Manners of the Turks* (Dublin: Printed for P. Wilson, 1768) vol. 2, 131.

[11] See Mehmet Genç, "A Study on the Feasibility of Using Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Financial Records as an Indicator of Economic Activity," in *The Ottoman Empire in the World Economy*, ed. Huri Islamoğlu-Inan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 345–373; and Ariel Salzmann, "Measures of Empire: Tax Farmers and the Ottoman Ancien Régime" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1995), introduction.

No matter how comprehensive the document, even this register of seventy-odd pages, the archive yields no more than jagged slices of the past. Nonetheless, with judicious supplements,[12] this particular ledger may furnish an alternative point of perspective from which to consider a form of governance that has slipped into the recesses of the old and new regimes. It forces us to consider the state as a work in progress and the quotidian facets of rule as an compound that I call vernacular government. Such forms of governance took shape in the shifting jurisdictions within and between provinces and as a by-product of a land or, better, labor regime that was continuously remapping itself against the demands and resistance of tax lords, peasants, peasants and herders. It also opens a window on the city as locus of contractual relationships linking Istanbul with the urban elites. Even as certain figures, such as great gentry, loom larger than others, our register helps us to situate both these families and prominent individuals within a complex system of checks and balances that anticipated the age of reforms.

Questions of Jurisdiction

As one turns the first pages of the register, the eye searches for a signpost, a label. The round, clear script employed for cataloging promises a "Register pertaining to the Life-leases here-indicated [located] in the [jurisdiction] of the province of Diyarbekir" ("Defter-i Mukataât-ı Malikânehâ-i Mezkûre der Eyâlet-i Diyarbekir").

Yet like much else of the old regime, this register is not exactly what it appears to be. The province, or *eyalet*, which we first encountered in chapter 1, was as much an historical as a territorial notion of space. The jurisdictional lines produced in the empire's first decades in this region were buffeted by the political, economic, and social tempests of later centuries. While retrofitting its administrative architecture, Istanbul clung to the formalities of a command structure that bound cavalry to district captains, governor-commanders, and

[12] For more on the city of Amid (today's Diyarbekir/Diyarbakır in Turkey) and the province of Diyarbekir, see Yılmazçelik, "XIX. Yüzyılın ilk Yarısında Diyarbakır 1790–1840," 2 vols. (Ph.D. diss., Fırat University, 1991) (hereafter, "XIX. Yüzyılın ilk Yarısında"), and his monograph *XIX. Yüzyılın ilk Yarısında Diyarbakır, 1790–1840* (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1995) (hereafter, *Diyarbakır*).

viziers. Even as new officials came to fill the gaps between older forms of administration and the new, or simply to carry out mundane functions of governance, the Porte continued the convention of issuing directives (*hüküm*) to the *vali* or *beylerbeyi* on such issues as security at the frontier, policing the province, the collecting of debts and taxes, and the enforcing of land administration.

Older jurisdictional forms would continue to cast long shadows over the archive. However, the bureaucrat who consulted this register must necessarily have been apprized of another reality on the ground. The caption on the first entry brings us to the point: it is not, as one might have expected a summary of the administrative code of a district or the income accruing to the governor's estate. Instead, an expanding column of taxes, dues, and levies is subsumed below the heading "The tax units [that form part of] the voyvodalık of Diyarbakir and dependencies and [values] current from the first of Mart 1149 (1737)."[13] Beneath this is the sum of the annual remittance (10,352,231 *akçe*) and a table listing multiple adjustments and additional revenues. Income from a Sufi lodge, special dues from a battalion of soldiers (*gilman*), unassigned imperial estates in Arabgir and Çemişgezik, an unassigned *timar* in Mardin, and, after 1776, a share in the import tax on tobacco, magnify the jurisdictional space and enlarge the range of contractual relationships represented within this single tax farm.

The term *voyvodalık* does not only signify a large and aggregate *malikâne* contract with an intendant of its own or a valuable resource that attracted some of Istanbul's most prominent rical. As a *kalam* or *eklâm*, it was also a provincial fiscal bureau that had absorbed a considerable portion of the state-designated wealth of this province, but particularly the interstitial dimension of its fiscal and political structure as well as most of the life-leases awarded within this region. Its etymology contains a microhistory of a polyglot, Eurasian regime. Whereas *eyalet* traces its roots to the Arabic lexicon and Islamic precedent, the term *voyvodalık* derives from a Slavic noun. A *voyvoda* refers to a subcommander. In the sixteenth century, it was the title of the civil governor of the Black Sea states under Ottoman suzerainty. Recycled through the machinery of the imperial administration from the Balkans to northern Anatolia and Kurdistan, the title stuck to

[13] MMD 9518:1–2.

those who served as intendants of tax farms or as on-site stewards of an officer's revenues. Its transformation into an fiscal locution or category, the "*voyvodalık*"[14] (an Ottoman hybrid formed by the addition of a Turkish suffix), introduced to its meaning sufficient administrative elasticity to embrace scores of separate revenue contracts.[15] The *voyvodalık* of Diyarbekir, like that in Tokat or its analogues, the *muhassılık* of Aleppo or the *defterdarlık* of Damascus, carved new administrative lines within and through the classical chain of command and between military and civil-juridical authority.

Over the eighteenth century, the jurisdictional range of the Diyarbekir *voyvodalık* waxed and waned (Fig. 5). It could not but respect the operating reality of the province, which lay in the upper Jazira (the Tigris and Euphrates region) at the edge of the high Anatolian plain and in the depression before the Zagros mountains. From the provincial capital of Amid, itself 1,400 kilometers southeast of Istanbul via Sivas and Malatya, the province in its successive incarnations had once subordinated cities such as Harput, 160 kilometers to the north, the mines of Keban and Ergani to the northwest, and smaller fortified cities such as Palu and Hisnkeyf. It included a vast agricultural hinterland that stretched eastward across the fertile region of Miyafarikin as far as the town of Siirt and westward to Siverek on the Tigris. Its southern limits were fixed by the arid land between the provinces of Urfa, Baghdad, and Mosul.[16]

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[14] This is but one of many names for an analogous phenomenon: provincial treasuries largely made up of revenue contracts that are supervised by intendants. These provincial treasuries are called, alternately *defterdarlık* (for Damascus), *muhassıllık* (for Aleppo), and *nezaret* (in Silstre and Rusçuk). For the state of many of these tax farms in Diyarbekir before this reorganization under new provincial bureaus (*eklâm*), see Rhoads Murphey, *Regional Structure in the Ottoman Empire: A Sultanic Memorandum of 1636 A.D. Concerning the Sources and Uses of the Tax farm Revenues of Anatolia and the Coastal and Northern Portions of Syria* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1987), 181.

[15] MMD 10,143:233. Phraseology reproduces this ambiguity, referring to tax farms "within and outside the jurisdiction of the *voyvodalık*, that is in the judiciary districts of Ergani, Siverek, Çüngüş, Hani and Barzani [Birazî] . . ." (*der canib-ı Diyarbekir harec-i voyvodalık ve dahil-i voyvodalık*).

[16] The number of constituent districts (*sancak*) in the *eyalet* grew from 19 in 1733, to 27 in 1747, and finally to 30 in 1797 (Yılmazçelik, *Diyarbakır*, 128–29). DŞS 360:50 (1736) adds the districts of Mihrani and Çeşke. See also Mouragea D'Ohsson, *Tableau général de l'Empire othoman, divisé en deux parties, dont l'une comprend la législation mahométane; l'autre, l'histoire de l'Empire othoman* (Paris, Imp. de monsieur [Firmin Didot] 1787–1820) 6:300; and F. Akbal, "1831 Tarihinde Osmanlı Imparatorluğunda Idari Taksimat ve Nufus," *Belleten* 15 (1951): 621–22 which records the following *sancak*

Fig. 5 Shifting jurisdictions in Ottoman Asia. After İbrahim Yilmazçelik, *XIX Yüyzıllın İlk Yarısında Diyarbekir (1790–1840)* Ankara Türk Tarih Kurumu. 1995 appendix 4. Courtesy of Türk Tarih Kurumu.

Given its proximity to the Kurdish edge, indeed the absorption of most of the Sunni confederates in the initial configuration of the *eyalet*[17] and the strategic goods produced by its inhabitants, Diyarbekir's importance to imperial defense remained undiminished in the second half of the eighteenth century. Although the region did not suffer the threat of invasion, as did Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra, it paid dearly for the Wars of the Iranian Succession. The general insecurity of the countryside caused a hero of the Iranian campaigns such as Çeteci Abdullah Pasha—as well as his successors to the governorship and the office of *voyvoda* in Diyarbekir—to spend months on campaigns suppressing roving bands of "vagrant [*baş-ı boş*] *levend* (mercenaries) and other bandits" who preyed upon traders and peasants.[18] Although spared the direct burden of the Russo-Ottoman wars or the rebellions of Ali Bey in Egypt and the Zadaniyya in Palestine, Diyarbekir still felt the ripple effect of crises brought by Karim Khan Zand's incursions into Iraq (and occupation of Basra in 1776) and the uneasy succession within the pashalik of Baghdad that preceded the restoration under Suleyman "the Great" (1780–1802). Each conflict generated fresh waves of unemployed soldiers armed with pistols made in Erzurum or Russia.[19]

Soldiers were not the only actors who violently reshaped the contours of the *eyalet*, especially at its southern margins.[20] Turn-of-the-century efforts to resettle local tribesmen had not so much cleared

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in 1831: Amid, Hani, Mazgird, Mifarkin, Harput, Sincar, Isiirt, Siverek, Ergani, Anade (?), Hısnkeyf, Çemişgezik, Nisiybin, Çapakçur, Sağman, Çermik, Kulp, Iklis, Penbek, and Pertek, in addition to the *hükümet* of Palu, Genç, Cizre, Eğil, Hazzo, Tercil, and Savur.

[17] On the back and forth of branches of the Milan tribe between 1711 and 1724, see Halaçoğlu, *İskan Siyaseti*, 52, 114. For later efforts, see the "Tribal Settlement Registers" of 1146/1733 published by Cevdet Türkay: *Başbakanlık Arşivi Belgeleri'ne göre Osmanlı mparatorluğu'nda Oymak, Aşiret ve Cemaâtlar* (Istanbul: Tercüman, 1979).

[18] Mustafa Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler* (Istanbul: Güzel Sanatlar Akademisi, 1965), 434–35. For events in neighboring provinces of Mosul, see Kemp, *Territoire de l'Islam*; and Yasin al-ʿUmari, *al-Durr al-Maknûn fî al-Ma'âthir al-Mâdiya min al Qurun*, 3 vols., critical ed. by Sayyar Kawkab ʿAli al-Jamil (Ph.D. diss., University of St. Andrews, 1983); Herbert L. Bodman, *Political Factions in Aleppo, 1760–1826* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963); T. Niewenhuis, *Politics and Society in Early Modern Iraq*, Studies in Social History (The Hague-Amsterdam: International Institute of Social History, 1982).

[19] Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler*, 294, 434–35.

[20] Xavier de Planhol, "L'évolution du nomadisme en Anatolie et en Iran. Étude comparée," in *Viehwirtschaft und Hirtenkultur. Ethnographische Studien*, ed. L. Földes and B. Gunda (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1969), 69–93. These were the quasi-

the region of pastoralists as opened the door to new waves of nomadic herdsmen from eastern Arabia. No longer strong enough to block their path, the remaining Turkmen, Arab, and Kurdish tribes who frequented the southern districts of Diyarbekir and the eastern fringes of Aleppo yielded to the Arab tribes who migrated from Najd toward the middle routes of the Euphrates. In northern Iraq, local tribes found a way to recover an autonomy lost. Intraprovincial competition crystallized into geopolitical realignments between cities and tribes. The Tayy tribe of Nisibin threw in its lot with the hereditary gentry-governors of Mosul, the Jalilis, and the Kurdish Milan (in Turkish, "Millü") allied with Baghdad.

Over the century, as our register's thirty-three tribal entries testify, local administration adapted the contracting system to this restive population. Tax farming, particularly through the life-term contracts, proved an effective instrument of harnessing branches of tribes with mixed economies, such as the Kara Ulus, who were targeted for new agrarian taxation.[21] Alternatively, contracts reconfirmed the title and authority of a tribal shaykh. In the process, the Sublime Porte carved out new claims against tribal income—dividing it, as happened in the case of the nine villages "in Mardin Mountain," in which 388 peasant-tribesmen were registered—unequally between the imperial treasury (24,033 *akçe*) and the head of the tribe (*mir*), whose take (of 11,900 *akçe*) was less than half.[22] The award of contracts to different shaykhs, such as Faruk, head of the Cemaleddin branch (*aşireti*) of the Milan, whittled away at the larger Milan confederation. With it thus fragmented, the clerk needed only to transfer a contract from one heading to another when, in 1733–34, the eight branches of Milan left with Ali Pasha for resettlement in Urfa.[23]

Nonetheless, the large contracts awarded at the margins of the province betray the state's resignation before the fluidity of jurisdiction

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independent governments within the original province of Diyarbekir: Hakkari, Imadiyye, Bitlis, Hisnkeyf, Cizre, Sohran, Çemisgezek, Mazgird, Pertek, Sağman, Palu, Eğil, Çermik, Hazzo, Sasun, Erzen, Zirkan, Gurdukan, Atak, Tercil, Mihrani, Hizan, Hançuk, Genç, Çapakcur, Kulp, and Mifarikin (Van Bruinessen, *Evliya Çelebi in Diyarbekir*, 18–21). In the eighteenth century (according to Yılmazçelik, *Diyarbakır*, 317), there were the "*aşiret*" of the Kikî and the Resî, as well as the "*cemaat*" of Dögülü Alucî, the Karaciya, Izolu, Karabeğan, Kirmanî, (Millan), and Karapınar.

[21] MMD 3677:9–11; MMD 9518:60–75. Different headmen, called *kethuda* or *mir asiret*, figure in this account book.

[22] MMD 9518:65–75.

[23] MMD 9518:71.

over the great arid and mountainous spaces between provinces. Relying on either tribal elites or combined tribal-urban partnerships, the awards of enormous *malikâne* contracts captured valuable but otherwise elusive revenues from herds and the *avâriz* tax in Kurdish Çemişgezek, Sağman, and Mazgerd (yielding in 1717 a yearly payment of 723,996 *akçe*).[24]

If the state was scarcely able to provide security for cultivators in the vicinity of Diyarbekir's capital district, Amid, where tribes were known to raid villages for food, livestock, and even women,[25] the authorities were even less likely to defend cultivators in the lands south of Mardin, a zone of annual tribal migration between winter and summer pastures.[26] Already in 1694 Mardin and Nisibin (128 kilometers from Amid) recorded the highest losses in the number of tax fiefs: only 55 of 311 *timar* and *zeamet* holders paid their *cebelü bedeliyesi* (dues paid in lieu of military service). Of the remainder, 120 did not pay and 141, one-third of all units, were officially declared totally ruined (*harabe*).[27] The lower districts continued to experience

[24] MMD 9518:73.

[25] DA III:50, 164; IV:71–72.

[26] Yılmazçelik, *Diyarbakır*, 170. These "tribes" were officially recognized in the province of Mardin in 1747: the Mihi, Tausi, Piran-o-Zencir, Karadar, Rişail, Kabalı, Maski, Birnek, Cevzat, Hindülü, Telermen, Karacahisar, Ihrahimiye, Bilali, Kalemtra, Şeyhhan-i Zencir, Kültülü, Selah, Tekük, Şiğlevan, Kavus, Telfeyyaz, Makbele, Kiki, Ömeriyan, Milli (Milan) Şarkiyan, Kalenderan, Mir Sinan, Bayraklı, Araban, Büyükhan, and Behdire.

[27] *Timar*s and *Zeamet*s in the province of Diyarbekir

	1609 Total	1694 Total	1694 Paid	1694 Unpaid	1694 Ruined
Amid	176	176	138	38	
Harput	201	n.d.	n.d.		
Ergani	124	128	75	10	43
Siverek	67	60	47	13	
Nisibin	6	21			
Mardin	n.d.	316	55	120	141
Hisnkeyf	28	38	13	25	
Siirt	6	n.d.			
Çemişgezik	9	n.d.			
Kulb	27	78	37	41	
Tercil	28	n.d.			
Çapakcur	35	37	37		
Çermik	0	31	1	30	

Sources: 'Ayn-i 'Ali Efendi, *Kavanin-i Al-i Osman*, ed. M. Tayyib Gökbilgin (Istanbul, 1960); KK 493:1–30.

considerable dislocation of their agrarian populations during the eighteenth century. In 1783–84, Göksu, once a flourishing, largely Armenian agricultural district south of Diyarbekir on the Tigris, had lost nearly three out of every five *timar*s. The district of Savur, also south of the provincial capital, retained only six functioning of the twenty-one *timar*s recorded in the previous census.[28] One contract auctioned in the district of Mardin aptly expresses a pervasive reality. It is captioned: "villages that are 'off the books' and without resident cavalry officers."[29]

Yet Mardin's inhabitants could employ the shifting use of land to their advantage. At 95 kilometers from Amid, the city had long rivaled the provincial capital in textile manufacturing and, in particular, as a transit point on trade routes between Iraq and Syria. Although wartime may have necessitated accepting the embrace of the "province" anew (in 1734–35 and 1747–51, Mardin reverted to the *eyalet* of Diyarbekir),[30] the city remained a dependency of Baghdad.[31] It was governed by a *voyvoda* who paid two hundred purses for his office and commanded both the janissary garrison and a battalion of troops. The city's tax farms, though entered within the *voyvodalık* bureau, also reflected Baghdad's de facto annexation of the district. The large contract over an aggregate block of revenues (possibly former crown estates) within Mardin and Nisibin had been held by the founders of the pashalik, Hasan Pasha (d. 1724) and a son, Ahmad Pasha (d. 1747), and continued to be awarded as contracts to officials based in Baghdad.[32]

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[28] Cti 4668.

[29] MMD 9518:75.

[30] MŞS 195:12. Although in 1764 the governor of Diyarbekir apparently made the rounds of Mardin to collect his "salyane" (see also DA III:276); typically, however, Istanbul deferred to the local administrators. See DA III:221 addressed to the Mardin judge and *voyvoda* concerning the claims of a *sipahi* in a canton still within Amid *sancak* in 1771.

[31] On the extension of the province of Baghdad to the east and north, Niewenhuis, *Politics and Society in Early Modern Iraq*, 240; also Suavi Aydin, Kudret Emiroğlu, Oktay Özel, and Süha Ünsal, *Mardin Aşiret-Cemaat-Devlet* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 2000), 164–65. For a travel account from 1766, Carsten Niebuhr, *Reisebeschreibung durch Syrien und Palästina nach Zypern und durch Kleinasien und die Türkei nach Deutschland und Dannemark* (Hamburg: Friedrich Berthes, 1837) vol. 2, 395–96.

[32] Niewenhuis, *Politics and Society in Early Modern Iraq*, 24. MMD 9518:101. The contracts on these farms were ceded in 1751 to Suleyman Pasha; and in 1769 for 110,000 *kuruş* to Ömür Pasha, also of Baghdad. Other contracts were administered directly by Mardin's *voyvoda* (see MMD 9518:103 [1731]).

Unable to prevent the transfer of power to members of Ahmad Pasha's largely Georgian household after his death, the Porte still relied on Baghdad to protect its interests at the frontier. Nonetheless, in matters concerning domestic commerce, especially the lifeline of coffee, spices, and cotton stuffs destined for Istanbul from the Gulf, the Porte turned to the authorities of the intermediate provinces, such as Urfa and Diyarbekir, for reinforcements.[33] Unrest in the Milan regions brought this intraimperial rivalry to a head in 1791. The governors of Malatya and Aleppo and the *voyvoda* of Diyarbekir hunted down the shaykhly elites and confiscated their wealth. One of the survivors, Timur Bey, found sanctuary in Baghdad. His brush with the gentry-administrator of Diyarbekir in particular would add a level of personal enmity to the geopolitical rivalry between tribal clans and the prominent family of Amid, the Şeyhzâde.[34]

Throughout the century, rural insecurity continued to exact a heavy toll on agricultural settlements.[35] Even in the two judicial districts (*kaza*) immediately surrounding the provincial capital, documents indicate a decrease in the numbers of both tax fiefs and villages during the first half of the century. In 1739, Amid's court clerk recorded the names of 111 villages in Eastern Amid, of which one in ten (eleven), he noted, were "ruined" for the purposes of tax assessment.[36] A series of natural disasters struck the province in mid-century. The troubles began with crop failures in dry-farmed lands of Diyarbekir and Mosul; locusts and an unseasonably cold winter followed. With starvation driving near-naked beggars as far as the city of Aleppo in search of food, the region was ripe for a pandemic.[37]

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[33] DA II:243.

[34] Aydin et al., *Mardin Aşiret-Cemaat-Devlet*, 182–83, 197.

[35] Van Bruinessen, *Evliya Çelebi in Diyarbekir*, 122–23. For eighteenth-century information relative to the reassignment of *timar*, see also DA IV:45; DA III:191. In 1795–96, 624 *timar*s and *zeamet*s paid 177,000 *kuruş* (Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler*, 464).

[36] DŞS 360:35–38. The number of *avârız hanes* (an accounting unit representing a number of fiscal "houses") dropped from 2,022 in 1701 (808,900 *akçe*) to 2015.5 in 1723–24; however, income rose to 999,600 *akçe*. (MMD 1347:2; MMD 5781:8; MMD 10,166:231). As for the *avariz* in Diyarbekir in the sixteenth century, see MMD 7637:2–4 for the year 1003 (1594–95); the rate was 2 *kuruş* per household in the city, and 3 *kuruş* per household in the district (*kaza*); *ciziye* was based on 70,000 persons.

[37] On the famine of August 1758, see MMD 10,200:230; for later occurrences, see Süleyman Efendi, *Mur'i't-Tevarih*, vol. 2A, 25; Charles Issawi, ed., *The Fertile Crescent, 1800–1914: A Documentary Economic History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

The scars of the bubonic plague, known as the "Great Dying" of 1762, were still visible on *timar* holdings in 1783–84, a generation later. In Western Amid, nearly half of the agrarian settlements were no longer capable of supporting cavalry officers (of a total of 98 *timar*s, 35 were considered ruined and 17 no longer existed).[38] Although Istanbul continued to assign *timar*s in deference to the logic of the *eyalet* for another half century,[39] given the *sipahi*'s increasingly marginal role in defense, there was no compelling reason, other than rural administration, to restore the system to its former glory. Indeed, in many respects the original *timar* hierarchy had become all but vestigial. Central-state officers whose names are recorded in our register and whose agents made payments on their behalf through the court of Amid held contracts on the estates belonging to the treasurer and secretariat of local *timar*s, the *hass-ı defterdarlık-ı timar ve kethüdalık-ı defter-i vilâyet-i Diyarbekir*.[40]

Such scant and scattered indices of the health of the agricultural economy must be handled with care. However dire conditions may have been during these decades, population rebounded and perhaps relocated between bouts of war and famine. Cash crops such as cotton were produced in Harput, Çermik, and Çemişgezik.[41] In addition to the staples of life—wheat, millet, barley, lentils, and sesame—there were luxury goods: wine from Siirt and rice and melons from

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1988), 96; and Antoine Abdel Nour, *Introduction à l'historie urbaine de la Syrie Ottomane* (Beirut: Publication de l'Université Libanaise, 1982), 70.

[38] Cti 4668. In Amid's eastern district (şark-ı Amid), the toll was somewhat less: of 75 *timar*, 15 were ruined and another 17 "no longer existed."

[39] On the drastic decline of *timar* holdings in Aleppo, compare Jean-Pierre Thieck, "Décentralisation ottomane et affirmation urbaine à Alep à la fin du XVIII[ème] siècle," in *Mouvements communautaires et espaces urbains au Machreq*, ed. Mona Zakaria et al. (Beirut: Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Moyen-Orient Contemporain, 1985), 129.

[40] MMD 9518:3. In 1719–20, it was assumed by the former inspector of the imperial mint, Suleyman Efendi, together with Seyyid Abu Bakr Efendi, for 1,200 *kuruş*. Typically, there was a "local" partner, such as Mustafa Ağa from Erzurum in 1726–27 and later Huseyn Ağa, who, we are told, was a member of the retinue of İbrahim, the former *voyvoda* of Diyarbekir, 1728–29. Another contract regarding the defunct estate of the provincial treasurer (*mukataât-ı hass-ı defterdarlık-ı hazine-i Diyarbekir nam-ı diğer çeske*). This too was in the hands of central-state officers (see TKSA E 10,129). They also relied on local subcontractors: in 1740–41 (DŞS 360:35), three Diyarbekir residents, Elhac Ali Ağa, Huseyin Ağa, and Halil registered, making their payments to Istanbul partners.

[41] Thus Çermik, which held no *timar* in 1609, recorded thirty-one at the end of the century. See n. 27 above.

Western Amid.[42] Grain cultivation seems to have shifted eastward toward the Silvan Plain, a region that would earn the title "granary of Kurdistan" in the nineteenth century.[43] In fact, whereas military requisitions of grain targeted regions in the immediate vicinity of the capital in the first half of the sixteenth century, a century later, in 1741, the levy was more evenly distributed. Now, much of the grain supply came from Hani, a small town to the northeast (in which many of the city's gentry would purchase tax contracts), from the well-irrigated land surrounding the city of Harput, and from Ergani (including Çunkuş), Palu. and Siirt. More surprising is the fact that tribal regions that had few or no *timar*s in the sixteenth century, such as Çapakcur, Savur, Atak, and Tercil, now provided a quarter of the total wheat requisition.[44]

Paradoxically, the declining number of *timar*s and the retrenchment of the *eyalet* structure are also the symptoms of a new economic vitality. This was certainly true for the mining industry. The copper, silver, and iron mines in the province's northwestern corner were linked by roads to the smelting factory of Amid, thirty hours, or 73 kilometers away. To tighten their grip over production, Istanbul bureaucrats turned over the administration of the northwestern portions of the *eyalet*, including Palu, Çarşanıcak, Harput, Eğin, Arapgir, Siverek, and Çunkuş, to the intendant of mines at Ergani.[45] Carrying

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[42] DA III:14 (1758–59); MMD 3677:11 (for rates of rice in 1697); Van Bruinessen, *Evliya Çelebi in Diyarbekir*, 40, 167–79, 193; D.BŞM 5508; DA III:78 (1764–65); DA II:92.

[43] Charles Issawi, ed. *An Economic History of Turkey* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 218–20. Wheat was sown in the early fall and barley from November to February, both were harvested in June and July; they were milled and stored in August.

[44] Van Bruinessen, *Evliya Çelebi in Diyarbekir*, 23. In the seventeenth century, Amid provided about 50 percent of the levies; Harput, 11 percent; and Ergani, 10 percent. According to MMD 9891:224 in 1741, a century later, the distribution of wheat levies was as follows: of 1 million kilos of flour (39,300 *kile*/25.64 kilos) requested, the capital district provided approximately 10 percent (99,996 kilos or 99.9 metric tons); Hani and Çermik furnished 76,920 kilos; Harput, Ergani, and Eğil, nearly 20 percent (184,608 kilos); Hisnkeyf (205,120 kg); Siird (128,200 kg); Çapakcur, Palu, Savur, Atak, Mihrani, and Tercil provided more than a quarter of the total (284,604 kg). On the basis of the *cizye* of 1797 (D.BŞM 6292, 81,950 *kuruş*), one finds that non-Muslim populations, presumably the largely Armenian villagers and town-dwellers, were particularly concentrated in the central districts of the province (Eastern and Western Amid and in Amid itself) and to the west and north in the districts of Harput, Palu, and Çarşınacak.

[45] MMD 9518:93.

the rank of *kapıcıbaşı*, between 1740 and 1774, the intendant of mines actually superseded the governors of Sivas and Diyarbekir in matters pertaining to production and supply in the mine.[46] Within his districts, he resettled miners and requisitioned carters. He commandeered wood for firing into coal, wax for candles to illuminate the shafts, beasts of burden for hauling, and grain for fodder.[47]

Few examples illustrate more vividly the complex and overlapping lines of jurisdictional control under the old regime, or the total inversion of prior categories of rule, than the role of the Ergani complex with respect to the *eyalet* hierarchy. As a member of the aristocracy of service with access to the Istanbul auction, the intendant of mines might hold a share in Diyarbekir's *voyvodalık*, the large, composite tax farm administered by the province's *voyvoda*. By awarding short-term tax contracts, subfarming his own, confirming guild appointments, recognizing members of the gentry, and encouraging members of his own family and household to acquire tax farms in the districts under the command of the governor of Diyarbekir, the mine administrator built his own sociopolitical infrastructure in the region.[48] In a final episode that turned the military and administrative hierarchy of the sixteenth century on its head, in 1794 Yusuf Ziya Pasha, whose tenure as intendant of mines was one of the longest, absorbed the governorship of Diyarbekir itself.[49] Shunning the provincial capital, he ruled from Ergani, while consolidating his control over the industry by acquiring shares in the valuable life-lease on the smelting factory of Amid.[50]

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[46] DA III:52 (1774–75). Instructions are sent to the Ergani intendant to track down a "bandit" living in Amid itself.

[47] Fahrettin Tızlak, *Osmanlı Döneminde Keban-Ergani Yöresinde Madencilik (1775–1850)* (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1997), 15; see the register of the Intendant of Mines edited by Hasan Yüksel, *1776–1794 Tarihli Maaden Emini Defteri* (Sivas: Dilek Matbaası, 1997), 108–9, 121, 126–28.

[48] Tızlak, *Osmanlı Döneminde Keban-Ergani*, introduction, 76; Yüksel, *1776–1794 Tarihli Maaden Emini*, 109; a former intendant of the Keban Mine, Mehmed Ağa, held a quarter share in 1723.

[49] Mehmed Süreyya Bey, *Sicill-i Osmanî; yahut Tezkere-yi Meşahir-i Osmaniye* (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Âmire, 1308–15/1890–97), vol. 4, 670–71. Ali Emiri, *Tezkere-i Şu'arâ-i Amid* (Istanbul: Matbua-i Amidi, 1328/1910–1911) vol. 1, 141. Yusuf Ziya Pasha began his career as a clerk in 1789. He was promoted to the position of *mir-i miran* in 1793–94 as intendant of mines. In 1798, he was promoted to grand vizier and then returned to Ergani as intendant of mines in 1807. The income of the intendant of mines between 1795 and 1802 was 117,776 *kuruş* (Tızlak, *Osmanlı Döneminde Keban-Ergani*, 58–63). See also n. 206 below.

[50] MMD 9519:9 (1795).

At the Interstices of Rural Administration

The crisscrossing of jurisdictions is evident in the tug-of-war between the intendant of mines and the governors of Diyarbekir. It was also inherent in the very structure of smaller agrarian fiscal units that made up the province. As a bureaucratic convention, an umbrella sheltering most of the life contracts awarded within the boundaries of the historic province, the *voyvodalık* adopted stray fiscal categories, balanced power relationships in the countryside, and bridged town and country. It acknowledged the lapses that had occurred in the administration of space. Yet the contractors who filled the interstices in the fiscal landscape might reside not locally but in Istanbul or Baghdad. The revenues in question might derive from widely disparate sources, such as the eleven aggregate *malikâne mukataa* awarded on villages and fields in both Hani and Savur, districts located at opposite ends of the province.[51]

The overwhelming majority of contracts within our *voyvodalık* register pertain to taxes owed by peasants and herdsmen in villages scattered throughout the older and newer jurisdictions of the *eyalet*. A determined researcher might painstakingly combine this information with data from other extant sources to reconstruct a true agrarian survey of the province during the eighteenth century.[52] Our register does not, however, make this task easy.[53] For scores of *mukataât* and *maktû* (forty-two in the register of 1799), we find no more information than the phrase "within the jurisdiction of the *sancak* of Amid."[54]

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[51] Traian Stoianovich, "The Segmentary State and La Grande Nation," in *Geographic Perspectives in History*, ed. E. Genovese and L. Hochberg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 258–59. D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, vol. 7, 299, translates *nahiye* (judiciary districts) as canton as well.

[52] When I first showed these registers to Nejat Göyünç, one of the foremost authorities on land tenure in this region, he threw up his hands in despair, commenting that the term "*nahiye*" had a very elastic meaning. For lists of villages in the eighteenth-century district of Amid (both Eastern and Western), see Yılmazçelik, *Diyarbakır*, 151–60. Register MMD 9518 includes tax farms in different designations, including villages in the judicial districts (*kaza*) of Garb-ı Amid (2), Şark-ı Amid (6), Amid (16), Şark-i and Garb-i Amid Mixed (6), Savur (16), Hani (30), Hani and Savur (11), Kaza-yı Çermik (17), Barzani (13), Birecik (1), Atak (1), Kulp (7), Ergani (30), and Kuh-i Mardin (2). In addition, there were 45 unidentified "*makataât*" and one "*maktuât*" as well as 33 tribes (*aşiret*).

[53] The large imperial estates created in the original administrative division of Syria and Kurdistan account for many of these tax farms. Barkan, "*Timar*," 288, estimates that 31 percent of the land in Diyarbekir itself was set aside in crown estates.

[54] For the lists of villages in the eighteenth century, see Yılmazçelik, *Diyarbakır*,

Some appear on the earliest surveys of the province. The village of Beyanoğlu, for example, is found on the cadastral record of Diyarbekir carried out in 1518.[55] As tax farms and later as proprietary contracts, such villages might have slipped through the cracks of later surveys. Others live a ghostly existence in extant documentation, like the villages of Ali Daraklu, Hanebazar, and Derviş Hasan, which figure on the judge's list for 1733 but vanish thereafter.[56]

If many of these agricultural settlements remain specters in the successive accounts of provincial revenues for us today, local investors knew where they were located and whether they merited investment.[57] Of course there were preferred regions: Hani and Savur, as well as Çermik to the west and the former tribal area of Barzani/Birazi, were among the most desirable. Yet bidders were also prepared to take a risk. Gentry from Amid, Ergani, and Harput attended the 1721 auction of the villages that made up the "ruined" *ocaklık* (agrarian revenues designated as salaries) in Harput. These villages' taxes had paid the stipends of the defenders of the fortress at Van, but their cultivators had fled because of the oppressive practices of a series of short-term tax farmers.[58]

In a changing countryside, the *malikâne* contract addressed a perennial problem: the gaps in the land regime. Once the state's agent, presumably the *voyvoda* himself, identified a village as being "off the books and without an owner" (*harec ez defter ve bilâ saheb*), the cen-

144–60. The 46 or more villages under proprietary contract represent in the aggregate a considerable percentage of the district composed of 154 villages in 1758.

[55] Both Hanebazar and Derviş Hasan do appear on the nineteenth-century map prepared by Yılmazçelik in his *Diyarbakır*, appendix. A great many may be within two kilometers east of the provincial capital. For lists of villages from 1518, see Ibid, 144, 149; Monla Kuçuk, in Western Amid, figures in the cadastral survey of 1565.

[56] We might attribute this disappearance to the very fact of their being "privatized" (*bilcümle serbest olmağla*) and hence no longer subject to bureaucratic oversight. But this does not explain registration of the village of Şukru'llah (in Western Amid) on the lists for 1733, 1747, and 1797, though not in 1738 or 1755; similarly, Şevketlü in 1797 (also Ali Bardak, due north of Amid; Develü in Western Amid in 1797; Akviran in Eastern Amid, appears on the list for 1747, as two villages, "upper" and "lower"; and Nureddin in Western Amid, which appears only in 1738–39). Yılmazçelik, *Diyarbakır*, 151–62.

[57] At present, our purpose is not to map the province, particularly given the flux in settlement and the inconsistent use of geographical descriptions, but to sketch out the basic political relationships that emerged from these overlapping jurisdictions and the contractualization of property and rent relations.

[58] KK 3105 (1721); MMD 9518:90 (1734–35).

tral administration went into action.[59] Initially "repossessed" (*mirice zapt*),[60] so to speak, some villages, such as Misr Kendü, which had been removed from the responsibility of the *voyvoda* of Çermik, would become the foster child of the *voyvoda* of Diyarbekir, under his own designated aggregate tax farm, the *voyvodalık*.[61] There is little explanation why others might be awarded to a *malikâne* contractor or a *sipahi*. In all cases, it was necessary to act quickly and decisively. In the countryside, the operating principle of "nulle terre sans taxe" meant that every unit of land overlooked by the fiscal system, absent a revenue agent or resident lord, would soon be annexed by another claimant, such as the *zaim* in the district of Eastern Amid who, finding no *sipahi* in sight, merely added the surplus of the nearby village of Timur Han Abbas to his own estate, the village of Timur Han Eyüp.[62]

From the distance of the Bosphorus, "the land" in Diyarbekir's rural districts was an intangible without the peasants and herders whose rents were collected by revenue agents. In an age when many of these relationships had been reduced to short-term and lifelong contracts rather than the older military hierarchy, establishing a chain of fiscal responsibility required the mediation of a resident fiscal administrator, a broker between Porte and province. In Diyarbekir that role fell most often to the *voyvoda* of Amid. He still oversaw the aggregate block of revenues, both urban and rural, for contractors who generally resided in Istanbul.[63] Over time he became responsible for most fiscal affairs of the province beyond the purview of the *timar* system: he collected the universal taxes on households, the *avarız* and *bedel-i nüzül*, as well as the poll tax.[64] Although a special officer

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[59] MMD 9518:75. Regarding *timar*s in the canton of Mardin, which originally turned over to the *voyvoda* of Diyarbekir. In 1777, the *miralay* of Mardin, Seyyid Abdullah, purchased the contract on these villages for 150 *kuruş*.

[60] Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım*, 41–42.

[61] MMD 9815:77 (1781).

[62] DA IV:19; DA II:97; DA I:52, 68.

[63] There was not always a distinction between post and resources. During the years 1689–94 (TT 831:38 (1689–94/1100–1105) the *voyvodalık* was held twice as a two-year tax farm by other tax farmers by the names of Şahban Ağa, Uzun Ali Ağa, and Mehmed Ağa, quite probably local janissaries. Uzun Ali had a guarantor named Ahmed Ağa.

[64] MMD 10,168:252 (1725–26). The number of "*hane*" (a fiscal unit, or household) in the *eyalet* of Diyarbekir was 2015.5 for the *avarız* and 2704 for the *bedel-i nüzül*, which yielded 20,788 *kuruş esedi*. See also MMD 9518:73, a lump sum farm (*maktu*) of the *avarız* and the *bedel-i nüzül* for villages "East and West in Diyarbekir which are off the register."

from Istanbul carried out a roll call of contractors to collect the special wartime levy demanded of all *malikâne* holders, it was the *voyvoda* who handled much of the day-to-day management of the tax farms. He must have supervised auctions, requested adjustments or new certificates.[65] He handled the retration (*refi, zapt, ibka*) of shares or entire contracts that had been improperly awarded or were poorly managed.[66]

As violence escalated in the countryside, the *voyvoda*'s coercive abilities must have grown apace. His personal guard could not have been inferior to that of the *voyvoda* of Siverek (technically subordinate to him), who, we are told in a 1742 judgment against him, routinely sent his deputy (*vekil*) and scribe (*kâtib*) with "thirty or forty horsemen" to villages to demand 5 to 10 *kuruş* in special gifts (*pişkeş*), in addition to legitimate requests for *avârız*, the *imdad-ı hazariyye*, and the *imdad-ı seferiyye*.[67] Indeed, in 1777 the *voyvoda* İsmail, of whom I will speak again, raised two thousand mercenary troops for the defense of Iraq against the Zand armies, a number equal to that raised by the governor of Mosul.[68]

Beyond the chain of payments and certificates that linked them to the *voyvoda* or to high-ranking partners or benefactors in Istanbul, contractors were fairly autonomous. By 1717, 156 individuals were listed as holders of *malikâne mukataât* in Diyarbekir. This was far fewer than in the larger and wealthier district of Aleppo but still greater than the number of contractors in Damascus. In 1717, local contractors held 179 tax farms in Diyarbekir (venal offices, villages, fields, and tribal resources). In 1730, that number reached 205.[69] In 1787, the global value of sureties paid on *malikâne* contracts in the region had risen to 147,863.5 *kuruş* approximately double that of 1717 (78,029.5 *kuruş*).[70] Yet the agriculture sector, especially the small con-

[65] MMD 4748:2; MMD 9518:50, "by request of the *voyvoda*" ("ba arz-ı voyvoda"); MMD 9518:44, 50.

[66] DA I:127 (1747–48). A tax farm on a settlement with seventeen peasants who were growing cotton in the vicinity of Western Amid was retracted by order of the treasurer to the Diyarbekir *voyvoda* Elhac Ahmad. The period of the 1730s and 1740s saw the highest rate of repossession. Of these, the Suvidî *aşiret* ("tevâbi Mehmed ve Hasan kethüda"), valued at 1,150 *kuruş*, was revoked in 1740 and again eight years later. MMD 9518:21, 22, 28, 33, 42, 43, 50, 51, 64, 71, 73.

[67] DA I:17.

[68] Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler*, 454–57. Each soldier was paid 36.8 *kuruş*.

[69] Central-state investors' bids outstripped those of locals four to one (MMD 4748:75, 48, 16, 76).

[70] MMD 3677:2–3, 12–16.

tracts scattered around the *voyvodalık*, remained overwhelmingly dominated by local investors. By the end of the century, 268 individuals had invested in 129 different village contracts in Hani, Amid, Savur, and other villages.[71]

Changing relationships of administration and property were not restricted to Diyarbekir.[72] Here, however, the gentry had long exploited private gardens along the Tigris on the outskirts of the city.[73] Outgoing orders make frequent mention of private landholdings in the form of fields (*mülk çiftlik*) and gardens (*mülk bağçe and bağ*), often in the area of old tribal *hükümet*.[74] Although the new life-contract gave the gentry a means of entering into the agrarian economy of the provincial interior, their proprietary aspirations were contained by a cadastral map crowded with other claimants to rents and taxes. Officials respected the existing map of claims. Using a common locution, the certificate awarded to a central-state officer for a *malikâne mukataa* in the district of Mardin spoke of a plot of land whose "boundaries were well known and were not the benefice (*dirlik*) or concern of anyone else."[75] Yet as a relative newcomer, the tax farmer provided Istanbul with an unwitting surveyor to update its registers. In some cases, that meant discovering that the resource in question was valueless: a marginal note in our register tells us of a contractor who upon arriving at his designated area, found that there were no cultivators remaining to tax.[76]

From this perspective, the state ruled by default. Conflicting claims between tax agents inevitably drew central authority into the

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[71] MMD 9566 (1787) (excluding those in Ergani).

[72] The need for codes and a new cadastral survey was noted in a preface to a register on Sivas and Tokat (MMD 9481:1–2, 34 (1692–1717). Land sales in the "vicinity of the city" were subject to a 10 percent surcharge.

[73] Van Bruinessen, *Evliya Çelebi in Diyarbekir*, 177–79.

[74] A peasant *çiftlik* ranged from 80 to 150 *dönüm* in Diyarbekir depending on land quality. (Halil İnalcık, "Osmanlılarda Raiyyet Rüsûmu," *Belleten* 23 (1959): 582, n. 27). However, the meaning of the *çiftlik* in the following contexts is far from clear: one reads of three "*çiftlik bagçesi*" belonging to a member of the ulema, Seyyid Hacı Osman; DA I:50; in 1744–45 a *çiftlik* in Sağman district; a *mülk çiftlik* ("*ma'alum al-hudud*") in 1767–68 (DA III:173); Mustafa Kasem and Isa petitioned in the same year concerning 5 *mülk çiftlik* (DA III:176); in 1755–56, Fatma Hatun in Çemisgezik claimed a *çiftlik* bequeathed by her father, DA II:52; Yuzo Nagata, too, notes that a *çiftlik* can be any tract of land (*Tarihte Âyânlar: Karaosmanoğlulları üzerinde bir İnceleme* [Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1997], 98).

[75] DA I:206. A 1750 rescript given to a central-state officer (Mehmed Silahsôr) in the district of Mardin; similarly DŞS 360:57, *a plot awarded because it was not the* "*imperial estate, zeamet* or *timar* or *vakıf* of anyone, [but] off the books (*harez az defter*)."

[76] MMD 9518:75.

agricultural landscape. All sorts of agents and property holders turned to the Porte for deliberation of the relative merits of their titles or to reconfirm the terms of tenure.[77] Thus the *sipahi*, Hüseyin, who argued that the taxes of the village of Kakulu and its state/common field or *mezra*, valued at 15,540 *akçe*, had long been part of his fief in Göksu and not, as the *malikâne* contractor Abdulrahman asserted, part of a newly contracted lot, demanded consultation of the cadastral registers and reconfirmation of his claim with an imperial order (*hüküm-ü hümayun*).[78] *Malikâne* contractors frequently appealed to Istanbul, invoking their rights to administrative immunity and freedom from local interference in accordance with the 1695 imperial script.[79] The Istanbul administration and high court remained the ultimate arbiter of property rights, of which tax farming was one point on a continuum of claims: it adjudicated inheritance conflicts (often brought by women, whose rights were usurped by family and stranger alike),[80] determined the status of peasants' deeds of usufruct (*tapu*), and settled questions of irrigation, cultivation rights, and personal property within villages.[81]

We might detect a certain bias in judgments in favor of revenue agents generally and *timar* holders in particular.[82] The *timar* system, indeed, still furnished the prevailing model of relationships between tax lord and peasant. As the "possessor" (*mutassarıf*) of the contracted rights over tax collection in a designated village, the tax farmer was entitled to that which was due the *sipahi*, as described in ancient registers (*tahrir-i âtik defterleri*).[83] These rents included income from fines on criminal offenses, such as the penalty for causing accidental death (*resm-i cürm-i cinâyet*), from the feudal tax on marriage (*resm-i arûsâne*), and from varieties of cash and converted labor dues bundled together under the so-called *bâd-i havâ* (*wind-of-the-air*) taxes.[84]

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[77] Nonetheless, there were many cases of overlapping jurisdictional rights involving *malikâne, timar, vakıf,* and *ocaklık.* DA II:279; DA I:68; DA III:173.

[78] DA I:134, 199, 206, 219; DA II:97.

[79] MMD 9486:6.

[80] See also DA II:94; DA III:141; and DA III:143, which concerns a certain Emine Hatun petitioning Istanbul over a *çiftlik* in a village in Pertek in 1766.

[81] DA III:195; DA II:192; MMD 9486:6.

[82] DA II:315. In 1760–61, this included a *mülk çiftlik* and ninety-one peasants, which the state declared a crown estate, part of the *havass-ı hümayun* and not private property (*mülk*).

[83] Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikâne Sistemi," 284–88.

The peasant paid taxes on the produce of vegetable gardens (*bağât*) and fruit and almond trees.[85] On land producing cotton, the tax lord collected a tithe, or *öşr*, of one-tenth the weight of the raw cotton harvested.[86] Commonly, the tithe on grains was either one-fifth or one-sixth of the harvest.[87] So-called large fields (at times called *çiftlik*) were usually taxed at the higher rate of one-fifth.[88]

If decentralization often left peasants to the mercy of tax farmers and landlords or to fend for themselves against marauding bandits and rapacious revenue agents, it also allowed them to eke out minimal advantages from momentary lapses in the state's attention. Villagers fought hard to retain certain forms of autonomy or rights of common use that landlords attempted to wrest from them. In the Aegean region, the struggle with landlords revolved around the status of common fields (*koru*).[89] In Diyarbekir, peasants defended time-honored methods of paying taxes. In one petition, a *malikâne* contractor, Molla Musa, pleaded for state backing in his dispute with villagers. The peasants had refused his demands for tithes, insisting that they would continue to "pay on the basis of the old lump-sum payment (*maktu*) and not on the basis of the tithe." Undoubtedly, they preferred the lump sum as a means of distributing the burden as they saw fit. Because harvests had not been assessed for some time, the lump sum probably represented a smaller amount than tithe rate. Despite the peasants' resistance, Istanbul issued a decision favoring the tax farmer. The tithe was fixed at the rate of one in five.[90]

Peasants such as the villagers of Ak Viran in the district of Eastern Amid turned to the courts too for remedies against illegal taxation and exorbitant rates demanded by *malikâne* contractors.[91] They complained of arbitrary imposts, redundant demands for *avârız* and other illegal payments (*salyâne*) by subcontractors such as the agent of Shaykh Mahmud, one of three shareholders in a village in the

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[84] DA II:23.
[85] DA III:141.
[86] DA I:127; DA III:4.
[87] Compare Göksu *canton* (DA II:214) in 1760 with Savur (DA I:199) in 1750 and the *çiftlik* in Ergani (DA I:134) in 1748.
[88] DA II:16.
[89] Nagata, *Tarihte Âyânlar*, 100.
[90] DA II:26; also in Tokat (1714) MMD 3139:188.
[91] DA I:244. On the *maktu* see also Halil İnalcık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600–1700," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6 (1980): 334.

district of Çapakçur,[92] by heads of tribal *hükümet*,[93] or by provincial authorities and officers.[94] Yet justice did not come quickly for peasants. In 1754, the state finally responded to complaints made by the villagers of Eğil against two *malikâne* holders, Tosyalioğlu and Mustafa Ağa, who had been taking duplicate taxes since 1729.[95] In another case, orders from Istanbul simply arrived too late to protect the villagers in a district of Paul. Six men met death and nine women were raped at the hands of their aggressors.[96]

Given Istanbul's poor record, what prompted peasants to continue to seek redress through the *kadı*'s court in Amid, Harput, or Mardin? Did the benevolent image of the sultan from afar disassociate him from his immediate representative, the revenue collector, and give villagers the illusion that imperial intercession might protect them? Outgoing judgments suggest that peasants might find a champion in the courts. However, without discounting their impulse to render a just decision, we must also remember that by restricting fiscal interlopers, judges and bureaucrats also safeguarded the rights of contractors and property holders.[97] An injured party in Istanbul might tip the scale of justice in the peasants' direction. A *çavuş* at the Porte for example, obtained a judgment against the Göksu secretary (*kâtib*) Elhac Hüseyin, the on-site subcontractor of his 65,123 *akçe* estate, who had been collecting taxes in "contravention of the imperial register."[98] Hüseyin, another Istanbul officer, brought suit against the *kethüda* of Siirt, Elhac Ahmedoğlu Hüseyin, whom he accused of illegally taking taxes from his aggregate *mukataât*, officially valued at 10,000 *kuruş* a year.[99] In any event, to an Istanbul bureaucrats who believed that every other provincial officer was a bandit, no stretch of the imagination was required to believe the cultivators' complaints.[100]

Competition over peasant surplus was fierce, not only because of a surfeit of armed actors in the countryside but also because of the

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[92] DA II:241.
[93] DA II:250; DA III:141; DA I:16.
[94] DA III:434; DA II:218; DA I:160.
[95] DA II:42.
[96] DA I:160.
[97] DA II:93; DA I:26.
[98] DA II:21; DA I:108.
[99] DA II:216.
[100] DA II:23. Beşir, also of Istanbul, accused the entire provincial administration—from the *mir-i mirân*, the *mir alayı*, the *mütesellim*, and the *voyvoda*, to the *alay beyi*—of routine, illegal intervention in his contracted villages.

narrow margin between legal taxes and subsistence. Even in the best of times legal taxation represented only the tip of the iceberg of quasi-legitimate payments cultivators paid to those holding land as contract or tax fief. The private accounts of an Istanbul courtier from 1728 to 1737 concerning "our share-croppers" (*bizim ekiciler*) for villages, apparently in coastal Anatolia, provide some idea of this burden: farmers paid not only annual revenues from olive oil, barley, and wheat but also special fees such as the *pişin akçesi*, taken in cash or in kind, in addition to payments of interest on previous loans.[101] Peasants were often unable to meet their annual taxes and required loans of seed, animals, or equipment to make the next planting. Money lending by tax farmers trapped the peasant in a cycle of debt. It also anchored the contractor's claims for generations because Ottoman judges recognized villagers' debt and held them liable for repayment of principal and interest even after the contract lapsed or passed to another party.[102]

Such conditions might drive cultivators to take drastic actions. We know the names of the inhabitants of Misr Kale village in the district of Ergani who declared a strike, refusing to pay tithes during the famine years of 1759, 1760, and 1761. Bilaloğlu Ali, İbrahimoğlu Mustafa, Şeyhoğlu Kara Ali, Kurt Hüseyinoğlu Ali, Mecnunoğlu Mecnun, and Osmanoğlu Hasan all suffered the consequences: beatings and even death.[103] Others voted with their feet, fleeing tax-lord oppression and debt.[104] Not a few, like the peasants of the district of Hani who headed toward so-*called askerî çiftlikler* (perhaps some form of *ocaklık*?) may have sought the promise of better soil and lower rents.[105] In response to two military officers who complained that the villagers from their *malikâne* holdings under the jurisdiction

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[101] D.BŞM 1624:65–66. Compare Abdul-Karim Rafeq, "Changes in the Relationship between the Ottoman Central Administration and the Syrian Provinces in the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries," in *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, ed. Thomas Naff and Roger Owen (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), 53–77.

[102] Compare Margaret Meriwether, "Urban Notables and Rural Resources in Aleppo, 1770–1830," *IJTS* 4 (1987): 69–72; Abdel Nour, *Introduction à l'historie urbaine de la Syrie Ottomane*, 394–95.

[103] DA III:9. A peasant who was accused of rebelliousness in Ergani was sentenced to exile. Yüksel, *1776–1794 Tarihli Maaden Emini Defteri*, 113–15.

[104] In the district of Savur in 1746, peasants had already deserted a *maktû* settlement of 2,000 *akçe* awarded as a *malikâne*. DA I:261–62.

[105] DA III:283.

of the Diyarbekir *voyvodalık* had fled to so-called military estates, Istanbul ruled pragmatically. The deputy justices of neighboring towns and the *kadı* of Amid were instructed to inform landlords in the region to return all peasants who had been "resident in their new villages for less than ten years and were still not registered in the *avârız* lists for that region."[106] In one of the more dramatic incidents, a 1765 order alerted authorities at the Mediterranean port of Iskenderun to be on the lookout for peasants who, having fled from Beşir, a janissary who held the *malikâne mukataa* on the village of Kara Ceylan, might attempt to seek passage to Thrace by ship.[107]

Peasant flight, in addition to the terrifying impact of the plagues of 1762 and 1800, put labor at a premium during the second half of the century.[108] The need to exert new forms of social control in order to assure a stable labor force in agriculture also helps explain the high tolerance for local tax farmers, particularly in the West Asian provinces. The holders of life-term contracts in Diyarbekir made up a socially heterogeneous group that included members of the ulema, local officers, and town gentry or *âyan.*[109] If we follow transactions in a sample of contracts found in our register—fourteen tax-farm villages in the districts of Hani, Amid, Çermik, Savur, and Tercil—we see as well a tendency to retain shares within families over several generations.[110] Notable, too, in the last decades of the eighteenth century and first decades of the nineteenth, is the appearance of a new locution, "resident in the village," which follows the name of the last generation of contractors.[111]

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[106] DA II:222. They fled to former tribal lands, in Hani, Tercil; the state contacted the deputy judges of Mehranî and Atak, as well as Eastern and Western Amid, with descriptions of the former inhabitants of the village of Cevre named Musa, Osman, Resul, another Osman, and the "sons of the Circassian" who had left to settle in "some towns and villages and *askerî çiftlikler*," and ordered that "in whatever region they were found they should be removed and sent back and resettled in their own villages." (See DA III:116; DA III:132; DA IV:84.)

[107] DA III:129.

[108] Flight was a problem throughout the Asian provinces. See Yucel Özkaya, "Osmanlı Imparatorluğunda XVIII. Yuzyılda Göç Sorunu," Ankara University DTC Fakultesi, *Tarih Arastırmaları Dergisi* 14 (1983): 171–203.

[109] Salzmann, "Measures of State," 173–75. MMD 1637:730; MMD 3677:4–8. In 1703, 195 individual contracts were awarded in Diyarbekir; 259 in Aleppo; and 210 in Tokat. In contrast, only 222 were awarded in all of the Balkans.

[110] Villages in Diyarbekir over the period 1714–91 (MMD 9518:14, 15, 18, 20, 27, 38, 40, 42, 45, 50; not all of these entries had sufficient data to include in this analysis).

[111] Our register does not tell who these individuals are—were they townsmen

In contrast to the social makeup of contractors in the Balkans, Cyprus, and Anatolia, where janissary officers predominated, Diyarbekir's ulema made a strong showing among the ranks of smaller rural contractors.[112] Religious officials and dignitaries maintained a parallel administrative network far into the countryside, serving as village imams and deputy judges (*naib*s) or participating in lodges of various tarikat in smaller towns.[113] Forty-one of the 268 shareholders in villages located in Hani, Amid, and Savur carried the title of *seyyid* in 1787–88.[114]

Although the ulema might have found it more difficult to summon force to defend their interests, moral authority often weighed on their side.[115] Knowledge of the intricacies of both Ottoman and Islamic law made them better able to take their battle to the courts. Indeed, failing to find justice in the provincial court circuit or even at the Porte, they often appealed their cases to the *Şeyh'ül-İslâm*.[116]

We can appreciate the value of such legal standing in a dispute over the legitimate title to a contract that pitted one of the city's gentry families against the sons of the leading Shafi'i dignitary. A

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who had resettled in the countryside, yeoman farmers, or village heads? However, their presence in the villages themselves during the last decades of life-term contracting coincides with the emergence of the class of village strongmen (the "agha" or "ağa") who figure in subsequent Kurdish agrarian history. Haim Gerber, *The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987), 114.

[112] For the ulema in Aleppo: Mohammad Tahazâde, a former *nakib'ül-eşrâf* (representative of the descendants of the Prophet), alone possessed 18.5 percent of the total state contracts, much in the fertile district of Jabal Sima'an. The recent cataloging of provincial finance records holds must promise. See, for example, *D.BŞM-MLK* 1:13 (*Hazine-i* Musul) *berat* awarded to Dervis Seyyid Mehmet "from among the ulema" for half a share in a field (*mezraa*) (1730–31).

[113] DA IV:168 concerns the appointment of an *imam* in a town outside Diyarbekir in 1786–87.

[114] MMD 9566 (1786–87).

[115] DA II:104. Three Naqshbandi shaykhs named Mustafa, Mehmed, and Sadrullah put a better-armed *sipahi*, Osman, on the defensive, forcing him to turn to the state to ascertain whether their contract on Kırk Paykar, with its twelve registered peasants and two *çiftlik*s (valued at 8,811 *akçe*) in Ergani, overlapped with his own 11,450 *akçe timar* at Tuna Viran.

[116] A certain seyyid, Mühiddin of Palu (DA II:237), insisted on his rights concerning an *iltizam*, bolstered by a *fetvâ* (religious opinion) issued in his favor by the Şeyh'ül-İslâm. Molla Seyyid Hüseyin, who held a *malikâne mukataa* in the eastern district of Amid, was granted permission to pass these rights to his son, along with a fruit tree grove (DA I:17). A woman named Sofiya Hatun appealed to the state for protection against the demands of a certain *malikâne* holder who claimed her private field; she received an opinion that was to be put into effect by the state authorities (DA I:237; DA II:35).

1786 report (*takrir*) sent to the treasurer in Istanbul tells of Ömer Paşazâde Elhac Mehmed Ref'i Bey's contract on the taxes of the village of İdrislü. He had purchased it at auction on behalf of himself and his sons Mustafa, Nurullah, İbrahim, and Salih Bey. His bid of 2,500 *kuruş* also included shares in another *malikâne* contract in Hani, all of which came to auction after the death of its former owner, Seyyid Mehmed Efendi Piranizâde.[117]

Notwithstanding the award of new certificates, Piranizâde's sons successfully reclaimed their patrimony. They contended that the auction had been made improperly. The court should have informed them, as children of the deceased contractor, of the impending resale. Now they requested, according to the terms of the *malikâne*—or in the words of another member of the ulema, "these Islamic *malikâne* contracts" (*mezkûr el-İslâm olan malikâneler*)[118]—first option on the shares and, accordingly, invalidation of the earlier sale.[119] Their request was granted. Of course it was not inconsequential that the petitioners included none other than Seyyid Mahmud, the Shafi'i mufti, perhaps the most influential member of the ulema in Amid.[120] He and other members of his family enjoyed special stipends from the provincial treasury.[121]

Government in the Vernacular

Although our register does little to aid us in our search for coordinates and addresses, auction records and ledgers of new certificates do provide the names and a few other pertinent details about new contractors. Among the first to purchase tax farms in the Diyarbekir region was Shaykh Kasim Efendi, one of the two muftis of Amid, who invested a sizable sum, 310 *kuruş*, for the lease on a village, Monla (molla, in Diyarbekir's dialect). Mustafa and his partner, Ebu Bekir, acquired a village contract, as did Sa'ad Shaykh Ahmed,

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[117] CM 28,020.
[118] CM 14,147.
[119] CM 28,020.
[120] In addition to the quarter share in İdrislü village in Eastern Amid, he also held the contracting rights to another three villages in the district of Hani for a total investment of 753 *kuruş* at the time of death. CM 14,147.
[121] D.BŞM 6772. His share was half an Amidî *mud* (220 cubic decimeters) of wheat flour, as was his sister Rakiye's (Raziye?) and his two brothers Mesud's and

Shaykh of the Gülşeni order, based in Mardin. Members of the gentry, the local bureaucracy, and the janissary corps appear in the register: Mehmet Emin and İbrahim ibn Abdelrahman of Amid; "Black" Ali, a scion of the Milan tribe; Murtaza Ağa, captain of an auxillary infantry unit (*sekban*), and Mehmet, the clerk of the local tariff station. Some, like Ahmed and Mustafa traveled to Amid from the town of Çermik; others, like Abdullah and Suleyman, lived in the quarter near the Ulu Mosque in the provincial capital.[122]

The first auctions in Amid, in 1696 and 1697, took place under the direction of the "sales agent" Abdulkader Ağa, a *kapıcıbaşı* dispatched from Istanbul.[123] Despite rivalries over trade routes and administrative preeminence, the provincial capital—a city of some fifty thousand inhabitants—still overshadowed the other towns of the upper Tigris-Euphrates in size and wealth.[124] Having served as the capital of medieval Islamic dynasties, Amid retained the major cultural institutions of the region, including mosques, academies, churches, charitable foundations, and a new library founded in 1769.[125] It was home to two muftis, a Hanefi, who represented the official Ottoman school, and a Shafi'i scholar who ministered to the large Kurdish population. Christian leadership represented several denominations, including the Armenian Orthodox; the Syrian (Jacobite) rite; the uniate Nestorians, or Chaldean Church; and Catholics. By the early nineteenth century, a dwindling number of Jewish households lived there as well.[126] These workmen, merchants, traders, artisans, spinners, and manufacturers made the city one of Ottoman Asia's major manufacturers of textiles and refined copper.

Mehmed's, among thirty-six other distinguished members of the ulema and brotherhood or *tarikat*. In the same year (1799–1800), total payments in local salaries, stipends, and subsidies from the local budget came to 5255.5 *kuruş* or 630,660 *akçe*.

[122] MMD 3677:1–3, 12–15.

[123] MMD 10,143:233.

[124] Van Bruinessen, *Evliya Çelebi in Diyarbekir*, 33–34.

[125] Yılmazçelik, "XIX. Yüzyılın ilk Yarısında," 208.

[126] The first Carmelite mission in Basra was established by the Portuguese in 1622; a Catholic Presbyter was found in Diyarbekir by 1730. (Herman Gollancz, ed., *Chronicle of Events between the Years 1623 and 1733 Relating to the Settlement of the Order of Carmelites in Mesopotamia [Bassura]* [London: Oxford University Press, 1927], 634.) Walter J. Fischel, ed. and trans., *Unknown Jews in Unknown Lands: The Travels of Rabbi David D'Beth Hillel (1824–1832)* (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1973), 72–74. It is difficult to gauge the size of the Christian population in the eighteenth century. After the 1819 uprising, which devasted the population, the survivors were in roughly equal numbers Muslim and Christian. M. Fahrettin Kırzıoğlu, "Kara-Âmid'te

During the eighteenth century, whenever special envoys from Istanbul entered the city, perhaps as Elhac Süleyman Ağa did in 1787–88, to investigate the status of *malikâne* holdings and to collect the special tax due for the war effort before moving on toward Mosul,[127] they must have repaired to the governor's compound. It sat protected in a citadel nested inside the city's massive basalt ramparts. The envoy might have called the city's notables and officers to the reception hall of the palace, where they also gathered to welcome a new governor on the first Friday after his arrival.[128] Despite its grandeur, with rooms for the hundreds of retainers who awaited the governors appointed from Istanbul, for much of the eighteenth century the palace remained vacant. Turnover in appointed candidates was highest at the turn-of-the eighteenth century. Subsequently, although appointments were made more regularly, governors frequently arrived late. In their place, governors themselves would designate a deputy (*mütesellim*) who frequently served out much of the one-year term of office.[129]

Even without the governor and perhaps much of the complement of hundreds of clerks, servants, and guards who accompanied him to his post, city government continued to function.[130] The residences of the *kadı*, the mufti, the captain of the local gendarmerie (the janissary *serdar*), and the *voyvoda*, along with a jail, were all located inside the citadel.[131] Many of the leading gentry—the Şeyhzâde, Müftizâde,

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1819 da A'yandan Şeyhzâdeler'in Öncülüğünde Milli Deli-Behram Paşa'ya Karşı Ayaklanma Ve Sonucu," *Kara Âmid Dergisi* 2–4 (1956–58): 351. Yılmazçelik, *Diyarbakır*, 105–7.

[127] MMD 9565:1.

[128] See Hrand D. Andreasyan translation of P. G. Iniciyan (1758–1833)'s travelogue, *XVIII. Asır'da İstanbul* (Istanbul: Istanbul Fethi Derneği, 1956). Yılmazçelik (*Diyarbakır*, 353) was able to locate a copy of Abdulgani Buldak's unpublished history of Diyarbekir, "El-Cezire'nin Muhtasar Tarihi," in a private collection.

[129] *Diyarbekir Salnamesi*, 25–29. İbrahim Metin Kunt, *Bir Osmanlı Valisinin Yıllık Gelir Gideri: Diyarbakır, 1670–71*, No. 162 (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1981), 36. Only two (Bigalı Mehmed Pasha, 1699–1701, and Topal Yusuf Pasha, 1702–3) of nineteen candidates appointed actually served out their full tenure. There are some exceptions: Köprülüzâde Abdullah Pasha's wife and daughter, Zübeyde and Leyla, were buried in Diyarbekir in the Nebi mosque in 1718. See Metin Sözen, *Diyarbakır'da Türk Mimarisi* (Istanbul: Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1971), 189–90.

[130] Yılmazçelik, *Diyarbakır*, 20–23. Among the residents were the *divan efendisi, voyvoda, mütesellim, tütüncü ağası, kapıcılar kethudası, şamdan ağası, baş çavuş ağa, iç çukadar ağa, kaftan ağası, silahdar ağa, alemdar ağa, hazinedar ağa, miftah ağa, peşkir ağa, ibrikdar ağa, kahya, imam efendi, delilbaşı, haytabaşı, baş çukadar ağa, ikinci kavvas*, and *mühürbaşı*.

[131] Compare Jean-Pierre Thieck, "Décentralisation ottomane et affirmation urbaine

Kadızâde, Çinarzâde, and Gevranlı-zâde[132]—had two-story mansions in neighboring quarters.[133] The gentry formed a pool of candidates for government offices, including that of deputy governor (*mütesellim*), *voyvoda, nakib'ül-eşrâf*, and *şehir kedhüdası*.[134] Together with the local religious authorities and elders of the guilds, these men and organizations carried out the day-to-day functions of state: the administration of justice, collection of taxes, regulation of the economy, and policing of the city's quarters and surrounding countryside.

Whereas rule was fragmented in the countryside and subject, as the state entered contests over rents and landed resources as a distant party, in the city there developed a more synthetic version of home rule. Like a dialect that consists of an imperial syntax and a local vocabulary, vernacular government entailed a gradual transformation of the character and content of rule that differed depending on which branches of urban administration were affected.[135]

In some instances, vernacular government involved relinquishing key duties and offices to local appointees. Imperial justice serves as a case in point. Officially, the judge (*kadı*), leading professors (*müderris*), and muftis were appointed by the religious authorities of Istanbul. The judgeship in Amid was a prestigious one. It was one of the top forty posts in the empire.[136] Occupying the first rung up in fairly prominent circuit of appointments, Mektûbi-zâde Nûrullâh Efendi, who died in office in Diyarbekir, had also held important positions in Manisa, Baghdad, Kütahya, and Filibe.[137]

Despite the fact that this judgeship was a *mahrec*-level appointment, Istanbul ulema grew increasingly reluctant to follow Nûrullâh Efendi. The road across Anatolia was long, arduous, and dangerous for a

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à Alep à la fin du XVIII[ème] siècle," in *Mouvements communautaires et éspaces urbains au Machreq*, ed. Mona Zakaria et al. (Beirut: Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Moyen-Orient Contemporain, 1985)," 125.

[132] Ibid. Kunt, *Bir Osmanlı Valisinin Yıllık*, 52.

[133] For a plan of the city, see Mükrimin H. Yınanç, "Diyarbekir," *İA* 1: 603–4.

[134] For a detailed description of the both the military-administrative and judicial-religious hierarchies in the city, see Yılmazçelik, *Diyarbakır*, 185–244.

[135] See Barbir, "From Pasha to Efendi."

[136] On these positions, see Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety*. In the seventeenth century, a position in the *medrese* was at the top of the hierarchy and its teacher was paid a 30–40 *akçe* daily salary. Van Bruinessen, *Evliya Çelebi in Diyarbekir*, 46.

[137] Çesmi-zâde Mustafa Reşid, *Çesmi-zâde Tarihi*, ed. Bekir Kütükoğlu (Istanbul: Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1959), 46, 59, 81, 26; Yılmazçelik, *Diyarbakır*, 225.

man and his family. Moreover, Amid did not lack for well-trained scholars and lawyers who had graduated from its many fine religious academies. Thus, Istanbul appointees began to delegate their authority and duties, albeit at the lower rank of deputy judge, *naib*, to local dignitaries.[138]

Graduates from the Amid academies also held temporary and full-time positions in other municipal offices, including clerkships in the courts. Occasionally, as we saw in chapter 2, a talented and ambitious man might make his way into the ranks of the central-state bureaucracy. Perhaps the increased opportunity for service within the province contributed to a lack of "outward" mobility. The Porte certainly recognized the substantive contribution of the ulema to the order of urban life, and it rewarded Amid's scholars and the leaders of the local Gülşeni and Naqshbandiyya brotherhoods with special stipends and honoraria. This was a regular part of the *voyvodalık* budget under the heading of *du'â-güyân*, guardians of local morality.[139] Their tax-exempt status was reconfirmed by the *Şeyh'ül-İslâm*, who also verified claims of membership in the *eşrâf*, descendants of the Prophet.[140]

Rather than being strictly representatives of the central state, the provincial officers who staffed the citadel and the fortresses of the province and who acted as the urban gendarmarie functioned as a bridge between Istanbul and Amid. Although there is no evidence of a parallel corps of janissaries the so-called *yerli* recruits, as in Damascus or Aleppo, the members of Amid's corps cultivated connections in many directions. On one hand, they maintained close ties to central authority, through the governor, who could recommend promotions to the rank of fortress captain (*kale kethüdası, dizdar*). Local officers remembered to offer the captain of the janissary corps in Istanbul "gifts" (*câize*) to obtain new postings, such as Cairo.[141] Not

[138] Yılmazçelik, "XIX. Yüzyılın ilk Yarısında," 436–37, 431. Other court positions, such as *başkatıp*, also appear to have been filled by local appointees.

[139] D.BŞM 6772; 7336; 1814; MMD 19,080. Compare with Damascus: Barbir, *Ottoman Rule in Damascus*, 81; Van Bruinessen, *Evliya Çelebi in Diyarbekir*, 51; Hamid Algar, "The Naqshbandi Order. A Preliminary Survey of Its History and Significance," *Studia Islamica* 44 (1976): 123–52.

[140] DA III:216; DA III:158; DA III:153–54; DA III:55; DA I:16. This in part explains the ambiguous role of the local ulema during this period; they actively sought perquisites like tax farms and *malikâne* and yet often seconded petitions by peasants against spurious taxation. DA I:25.

[141] Jane Hathaway, "Years of Ocak Power: The Rise of the Qazdagli Household and the Transformation of Ottoman Egypt's Military Society, 1670–1750 (Egypt)"

a few of Istanbul's *kapıkullar* may have traced their ancestry to the region, including Emin Mehmed Ağa and his brothers İbrahim, Mustafa, and Mehmed, sons of Abdülvehab Ağa, who bid successfully on the office of the registrar (*kitaplık*) of Diyarbekir (1,230 *kuruş*); Ahmed and Mehmed Ağa who won an aggregate *mukataât* in the district of Siirt (3,200 *kuruş*); and Ömer Ağa, son-in-law of the head of the mounted janissary corps (*sipahi ağası*), who placed a 750 *kuruş* bid on another provincial tax farm.[142] On the other hand, janissaries posted to Diyarbekir became well integrated in the urban and rural fabric. Participating in the life-lease system in town and countryside,[143] they must have passed at least some of these shares and investments, along with their connections to the military establishment, to their male offspring.[144]

The contracting of agrarian revenues generally and urban offices specifically was another way in which Amid's government took on a vernacular cast. Yet not all of the city's key offices were sold off. Many officials continued to be chosen directly by the central-state authorities or in consultation with the urban population. This included some of the key positions overseeing the urban market, such as the *gümrük emini*, director of the local tariff station; the *ihtisab nâzırı*, who was in charge of collecting of guild taxes; the *muhtar*, who was responsible for public security and decorum within the city; and the *şehir kethüdası*, who helped adjudicate urban and rural tax burdens and at times aided in recruiting part-time soldiery.[145]

The nature of the position *voyvoda* of Amid, chief intendant of the province, defies simple classification.[146] Over the century, the *voyvoda*

(Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1992), 82–83; and İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatından Kapıkulu Ocakları. Acemi Ocağı ve Yeniçeri Ocağı* (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1943), vol. 1, 329–30.

[142] MMD 4748:79–80.

[143] MMD 3677:1–3, 12–15. MMD 9518:67, 101. Two janissaries within the inner court, perhaps from Amid or certainly relying on their local connections, accepted the contract on the excise tax on coffee (*tahmis-i kahve-i Diyarbekir*) in the city in lieu of salary as well as the secretariat of the janissaries of Diyarbekir (*kitabet-i gilmanân-ı Amid*).

[144] Yılmazçelik, *Diyarbakır*, 23, 208. There were about three hundred soldiers posted to the citadel. Compare with Abdul-Karim Rafeq, "The Local Forces in Syria in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," 304. An expropriation order for Ahmad b. İbrahim, a janissary from Amid who died on campaign between Belgrade and Nish in 1739 (DŞS 315:20–23).

[145] Musa Çadırcı, "Tanzimat'ın Sıralarında Türkiye'de Yönetim (1826–1839)," *Belleten* 51 (1987): 1215–40.

[146] In 1670, the position was held by a certain Kurd Mehmed Ağa, who turned

absorbed many of the functions of the executive in urban administration, in addition to his tasks within the larger agrarian economy. The position was held by both central-state and local appointees, generally for periods of two to three years. Although the exact composition of his charges changed over the century, among his chief responsibilities were the local tariff station, the main dye house, the wheat scales, the black stamp tax on cloth coming into the city, and many villages and fields. Some *voyvoda* derived their income from a share of the profits on the aggregate tax farm as subfarmers; others were salaried employees of the central state. In 1797–98, the salary allotted to the *voyvoda* was 22,500 *kuruş* per year. According to the state's calculus, this equaled the profits on a quarter share of the contract itself.[147]

In truth, the central state was particularly loath to delegate its authority to the gentry in the area of regulation of the local market. The Porte directed the officer who conducted the first sale of contracts in Amid to withhold the revenues from the tariff station, stamp tax, dye house, and market dues and other urban duties from the local public auction.[148] Although military officers and Diyarbekir gentry did obtain some prized commercial revenue contracts, Istanbul's motive was not only to reserve such high-yielding contracts for the privileged central state market;[149] it was also to retain direct control over the urban market itself.

Despite such concerns, contracting did affect the organization of economic life and, by extension, touched the many workers and tradesmen who populated the city. The primary modality of mem-

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the income (*voyvoda kalemiyesi*) over to the governor. At this time, the *voyvoda* was responsible for collecting the *avârız* and the *bedel-i nüzül*; he received fees for the military district (*sancak*) and military appointments (*tahvil*); the son, Yunus Bey was appointed the revenue agent (*emin*) of the stamp tax on cloth (*damga*) as well as supervisor of the *çeske* (once the estate of the provincial *defterdar*). Kunt, *Bir Osmanlı Valisinin Yıllık Gelir Gideri*, 42,49, 53, 70, 204, 255, 280–81, 329, 159, 144; CD 2819 (1777) suggests a three-year appointment. See also Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler*, 454–56; Yılmazçelik, *Diyarbakır*, 200–3.

[147] D.BŞM 6538 (1798) audit of the income of the *voyvodalık* from 1797 onward.

[148] MMD 10,143:233.

[149] Nonetheless, local bidders were successful in this sector. They included Küçük Ali, whose large farm on the excise tax (*bac-ı ubur*) was later rescinded; an associate of Hadarzâde, Mehmed Emin the janissary Mustafa, the *çavuş ağası* Kara Ali; as well as a merchant (*bazirgân*) and Kasim Efendi one of the two muftis of Amid. MMD 3139:247, 369. For registers of certificates see the *kalemiye* register, MMD 777:21.

bership in the urban community was not only the mosque or the church but also the trade association, or *esnaf*.[150] Craftsmen, shopkeepers, and small-time traders all participated in such associations. Although we lack a complete roll of all such professions or a full description of their organization, a 1792 register of taxes carried out the *kadı* lists forty-two individual associations. They include wholesale and retail businesses such as coffee sellers and cotton wholesalers (*pembeçiyân*), dealers in ready-made goods (*oturakçı*), and associations that come closest to the notion of a guild, such as the manufacturers of mixed cotton and silk cloth (*bezzazân*). At this time, the highest dues were paid by the wealthiest tradesmen, such as the grocers (*bakkalân*) and dyers (*boyaciyân*), and by a guild whose trade was probably the most widely practiced in the city, the weavers (*hallacân*).[151] A traveler who visited the city in 1815 estimated that there were some 1,500 workshops, among them 500 were devoted to cotton-stamping, 300 to leather working, and 100 to ironsmithing.[152]

The contracting of guild dues affected both guild leaders or shaykhs and the rank and file in unpredictable ways. To the extent that it turned the position of head of the guild into a venal office, it may merely have given official sanction to a preexisting trend toward concentrating the position of shaykh, and therefore power within the guilds, among certain families.[153] This seems to have been the case with the position of *maktuât* of the cotton-fluffers (*cullahân*). It was sold in 1715 for 100 *kuruş* to two men wealthy enough to have made the pilgrimage to Mecca, residents of the quarter named for the Iskender Pasha Mosque, and their nephew, who lived near the Mardin Gate. The family retained at least a 25 percent share of the contract

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[150] Gabriel Baer, "Ottoman Guilds: A Reassessment," in *Türkiye'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi (1071–1920)*, ed. Osman Okyar and Halil İnalcık (Ankara: Meteksan/Hacettepe University, 1980), 96; Haim Gerber, "Guilds in Seventeenth-Century Anatolia Bursa," *Asian and African Studies* 11 (1976): 59–86. Compare this case with Manisa; see M. Çağatay Uluçay, *XVII inci Yüzyılda Manisa'da Ziraat, Ticaret ve Esnaf Teşkilâtı* (Istanbul: Resimli Ay Matbaası, 1942).

[151] MMD 9519:81; see also D.BŞM 1069:4. In 1717, the total protoindustrial installations in Çünküş yielded 10,200 *kuruş* in taxes; the dye house alone was worth 1,025 *kuruş*. See Yılmazçelik, (*Diyarbakır*, 605–10) for another list.

[152] Buckingham, *Travels in Mesopotamia including a Journey from Aleppo*, 80, 195, 214.

[153] In an important manufacturing city such as Aleppo, the intrafamilial nature of guild appointments in this period is very pronounced; for empirewide trends, see Tuncer Baykara, *Osmanlı Taşra Teşkilatında XVIII. Yüzyılda Görev ve Görevliler (Anadolu)* (Ankara: Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü Yayınları, 1990), 118–37.

until 1780.[154] More research is required to determine the status of the contractors involved in the guild dues (*müstahak*) of the weavers and dyers, both quite substantial, which were auctioned as *malikâne* in 1715 and 1725, respectively.[155]

In other cases, the sale of offices, particularly those affecting wholesale distribution, might have sped the transition of military officers into tradesmen. Three janissaries—Mehmed Emin Ağa, Mustafa Ağa, and another officer in the retinue of an Azizzâde—held the title to the venal office of "head of the brokers of linen and red cotton cloth and other stuffs" as a *malikâne mukataa* in 1721, for which they pledged a surety of 200 *kuruş*, and committed themselves to an annual payment of 10,000 akçe.

Precisely because of the high return on many of these urban contracts, they also attracted central-state investors. However, Istanbul elites who purchased contracts on Amid's guild offices needed to be wary: they had to contend with the politics of the provincial city and with the elders of the association who enjoyed the backing of their fellows in the *esnaf*.[156] Indeed, investments from Istanbul raised new concerns about the autonomy of the *esnaf*.[157] Although the court might rule in favor of a high-ranking member of the Istanbul elite, the judge could not entirely ignore their opinion without risking a reaction from tradesmen. For example, members of the association of weavers of *kutnu*, a costly fabric of mixed fibers complained that the subfarmer who administered the farm on their taxes for the Istanbul *malikâne* holder, Seyyid Ali, had overstepped his authority, committing "cruelty and injustice" by interfering in guild affairs. Championed by the *voyvoda* and the judge, the guildsmen sought a change in staff. They were granted their wish: the office was restored to a local contractor.[158]

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[154] MMD 9518:68; MMD 9519:102.

[155] MMD 9518:62, 68; MMD 9519:95, 102.

[156] CM 14,097. One of Istanbul's *müderris*, Seyyid San'allah Efendi, petitioned in 1786, complaining that his share on the weavers' association dues was being mismanaged by his local partner, Süleyman "so and so," who engaged in pilfering monies and illegally collecting duties (*fuzulî ahz ve kabz*). Despite holding a smaller share (only one-fifth), the local partners' familiarity and proximity gave them undeniable advantages. The complaint prompted an audit by an officer from the palace, the *silahşör* Abdullah Ağa, and a ruling in favor of the Istanbul partner.

[157] A *malikâne* contract conferred upon the position of head shaykh (*şeyhlik*) of the guilds was awarded in 1743.

[158] CB 1375. Elhac Osman had held the office of *kethüda* or steward of the mar-

Although the state was wary of relinquishing direct control over offices that regulated the urban market as a whole, over time select contracts did come to auction. Among them were the venal office of the secretariat of the tariff station (*kitâbet-i gümrük*) and the "directorship of the market and other [whole] sellers in the market." In 1777, the position of "second" registrar of the Diyarbekir customs (*kitâbet-i sani gümrük-ü Diyarbekir*) was sold to a local bidder, Seyyid Hüseyin Efendi, who later passed it to a son, Derviş Ali.[159]

Among urban tax farms, the tariff system not only stands out as one of the single most important sources of revenue within the large block of tax farms administered directly by the *voyvoda.* It was also a retaining wall of rights that ringed the urban economy. Lacking city charters or official recognition of their corporate status, variations in tax liabilities and rights to private property separated the town from countryside.[160] Even villagers within the capital district of Amid recognized their long-standing subordination to the city. Although they were exempt from the higher rates of the interurban tariff, the *gümrük*, town officials charged them market taxes on the sale of their grain, animals, and garden vegetables.[161] So, too, weavers and spinners who lived in the villages and towns immediately surrounding Amid (*Savur ve Genç ve Çermik ve sair kasabât ve kurâ*) were forced to pay duties on a cheap, unfinished cloth called "yuban" (*ham yuban bezi*), also a tax farm auctioned in the city.[162]

An annotated tariff schedule dating to the period between 1793 and 1814 illustrates the manner in which vernacular government rested on a fundamental compromise among central-state, regional, and urban interests.[163] Traders in bulk consumer commodities such

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ket (*bedestan*) as a three-year tax farm or *iltizam* with an annual payment of 25 *kuruş* until the farm was converted into a *malikâne* contract.

[159] MMD 9518:62, 77; MMD 9519:111.

[160] On this point, see Baber Johansen, "Amwal Zahira and Amwal Batina: Town and Countryside as Reflected in the Tax System of the Hanafite School," in *Studia Arabica* and *Islamica Festschrift for Ihsan 'Abbas on his 60th Birthday*, ed. Widad al-Qadi (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1981), 247–63.

[161] Ömer Lûtfi Barkan, *XV. ve XVI. inci Asırlarda Osmanlı Imparatorluğunda Ziraî Ekonominin Hukukî ve Malî Esaslari* (Istanbul: Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Türkiyat Enstitüsü Neşriyatı, 1943) vol. 1, 549–52.

[162] CM 12,742, "maktû dellâllık-ı yuban bezi der Diyarbekir."

[163] KK 5249. The document consists of two main sections: a lengthy itemized section dating from the 1790s and an appendix dating from 1807–13, when Şeyhzâde İbrahim became the de facto ruler of the city. The annotations, which were added by the judge, appear to have been made after İbrahim Pasha's death in 1814.

as coffee, tobacco, aloe, fragrances, and sugar, and even sundry Indian cotton textiles and twist that were destined for the Istanbul market, paid low rates of taxation. They were spared all but a minimal transit tax, taken in kind as a percentage of weight.[164] By contrast, merchants of specialty goods, which included the most famous textiles manufactured within the empire itself and which were listed in a lengthy itemized list within the schedule, paid particularly stiff tolls: ad valorem duties (*amediyye*) of 5 percent against current value. Although burdensome for distributors and importers, such taxes shielded urban artisans. Profit margins were narrow, and it was high-quality, local raw materials and regional specialties that helped preserve the artisans' share in a highly competitive domestic market.[165]

Because the conversion of taxes and tariffs into contracts served to anticipate revenues without changing the form of the taxation itself, contracting did little to alter the basic premises of the region's political economy. Indeed, by reflecting older fiscal jurisdictions, the award of *mâlikane* leases may have actually helped freeze long-standing patterns of interaction between town and country, shoring up the urban monopoly over labor-intensive and value-added specialties. Tax farmers and the guilds shared interests in maintaining standards, in "collective" bargaining for raw materials, and in establishing prices for goods and services.[166]

This was particularly true for value-added techniques such as the dyeing and stamping of cloth. One of the more prestigious and certainly wealthier esnaf, the dyers' association, was particularly vigilant about maintaining its monopoly over dyeing. It had need to be; even

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[164] Ibid. Indian generic cotton stuffs (*metâ'i*) (and perhaps yarn) were taxed in bulk. Kurdistani and Syrian goods warehoused in the city and taxed by animal-*load* (*donkey load, 68 para* [60 *para* equaled one *kuruş*]; camel-load, 820 *para*; and horse-load, 34 *para*), such as soap, *mazu* dye, henna, and possibly Mosul cloth, and in the late eighteenth century, the copper processed in the local refinery (*kalhâne*), which was exempt from such taxation. A. S. K. Lambton ("Persian Trade Under the Early Qajars," in *Islam and Trade in Asia*, ed. D. S. Richards (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 221) estimates a camel load as 400 pounds, a mule load at 240, and a horse load at 130.

[165] For the scale of proto-industrialization, see Peter Kriedte, *Peasants, Landlords and Merchant Capitalists: Europe and the World Economy, 1500–1800* (Warwickshire: Berg Publishers, 1983), 70–76. On the specificity of the regional market in manufactures, see comments by James Brant, "Journey through a Part of Armenia and Asia Minor in the Year 1835," *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society* 10 (1841): 383.

[166] J. S. Buckingham (*Travels in Mesopotamia*, 84, 214), notes that stamping cotton "renders the cloth in that state nearly double the price it bears when white."

the hamlet of Çünküş boasted an active proto-industrial base, including a tannery and a dye house large enough to warrant its own stamp tax (*damga*) on cloth.[167] There were dye houses in Çermik, Palu, Harput, and Hazzo as well, and important manufactories in the neighboring cities of Mardin, Ayıntab, and Urfa. So, too, centralization of value-added types of industries suited revenue contractors; in 1726, both the dyers' association and the *voyvoda* (whose charge included the tax farm on the dye house itself) requested a rescript from Istanbul to shut down the dye houses that had been opened in the countryside by "*bazı kurâ eshabı*" (some "owners" of villages).[168]

In privileging the city's manufactures or, alternatively, penalizing "foreign" manufactures "whether or not they were sold within the city," as the tariff schedule puts it, participants in the tax-farming systems were of one accord. City artisans produced many fine textile products, including *alaca* as well as stuffs destined for mass consumption such as the imitation cotton "chafarjanis," printed textiles, tent canvas, and a specially dyed red cotton yarn.[169] Even as a lively trade in cotton cloth exported to Europe (import substitutes for Indian fabric) spurred thread and textile production far into the countryside,[170] the tariff system to some degree stanched the spread of weaving beyond the city and lessened the profitability of goods produced in smaller towns within the province where costs might have been lower. A 5 percent import tax was imposed not only on the products of Iran or on those coming from the famous workshops of Ottoman Aleppo, Damascus, and Bursa but also on the most humble

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[167] MMD 9519:81; see also D.BŞM 1069:4. In 1717, the total protoindustrial installations of Çünküş yielded 10,200 *kuruşkuruşkuruş* in taxes yearly; the dye house alone was worth 1,025 *kuruş*.

[168] MMD 9916:110.

[169] The *kadı*'s glosses above the itemized section of KK 5249 already show considerable discrepancy between the "official" prices and current prices upon which ad valorem taxes (of 5 percent) were based. In an 1814 report (MMD 10,262:219), administrators noted that the gross underestimation of tax on Indian cloth resulted in an eight to ten times underpayment (at the rate of 30 *para* per *batman* of goods). Already in the last decade of the eighteenth century, the actual rates of internal *gümrük* stations were subject to much variation, depending on local agreements and rivalries between regimes. Also, Issawi, *The Fertile Crescent*, 178–79.

[170] Katsumi Fukasawa, *Toilerie et commerce du Levant au XVIII^e siècle d'Alep à Marseille* (Marseille: Groupe de Recherche et d'Ètudes sur le Proche Orient Centre Regional de Publication de Marseille, 1985).

cottons woven in towns like Mardin, Çermik, Hazzo, Palu, and Harput, all within Diyarbekir province itself.[171] When entrepreneurial janissaries attempted to purchase cotton manufactures or perhaps to engage in forms of putting out in the surrounding countryside,[172] the guilds had no need to rise to the occasion. Instead, the tax farmer defended the interests of Amid's weavers, objecting to the fact that the janissaries' actions allowed them to evade payment of the black stamp tax (*damga-ı siyah*).[173]

The main impact of tax farming seems to have been to reinforce the hierarchy of wealth, power, and influence within the *esnaf* and the primacy of the urban market. The privilege of holding such contracts was restricted to Muslims, a symptom of the progress of vernacular government generally. Did this privilege accentuate the differences between confessional groups? In economic terms, probably not. By early modern standards, Amid was a fairly integrated city; one of every three of its townsmen lived in a confessionally mixed neighborhood.[174] Both Muslims and Christians were counted among the largest *esnaf*, though they reported to different masters, shaykhs and *ostad*s, respectively.[175] Both groups benefited from the protectionism afforded by the tariff system and the emphasis on maintaining the city's monopoly on value-added, higher-skilled occupations in manufacturing. Contracts embracing aggregate resources spread liabilities among ordinary tradesmen, whether Muslim, Christian, or Jew. For example, the farm on the taxes on the sale of beeswax and leather (*mahsül-ü rusumât-ı bal-ı mum ve çarm*) actually affected primary materials for two different guilds, one dominated by Muslims (leather workers), and the other, by Christians (candle makers).[176]

The question, however, was not merely an economic one. In addition to reinforcing the trend toward the inheritance of offices such as guild shaykh, which widened the political and economic gap between rich and poor tradesmen, tax farming must have altered the expectations of Muslim elites toward government generally. By

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[171] KK 5249; see also Cİ 432 (1797–98), a *malikâne* on the *damgha* for cloth produced in Çarşınacak and Palu.

[172] CM 12,742.

[173] MMD 10,246:119. In 1804, this tax, combined with the *ihtisab*, commanded a bid of 32,000 *kuruş*.

[174] Yılmazçelik, *Diyarbakır*, 30–31, 46–47, 115–17.

[175] CZ 1364.

[176] MMD 9518:62, 67.

becoming contractors themselves, the Muslim gentry interacted, albeit long distance, with powerful persons in Istanbul and established themselves within local governing circles. Furthermore, although a tax farm might involve a seemingly insignificant sum, its actual political clout must be measured in terms of the number of people it affected. Considering that the majority of Diyarbekir's urban population, male and female, worked in cotton weaving, as did a large percentage of the province's villagers and peasants who spun thread, the small tax farm on the weighing scales of white cotton twist (*maktuât-ı vazınlık rişte-i beyaz der Diyarbekir*), which netted the state a mere 25 *kuruş* a year, nevertheless yielded considerable dividends, in terms of influence and reputation, for the family who held it for three decades from 1726 to 1757.[177] How much more so for the contractors of the stamp tax on colored silk (*mahsül-ü damga-ı harir-i elvân*), the tax farmer of cloth produced in the "mountain" and Sağman (*damga-ı kûh ve Sağman*), the revenue agent who collected the taxes from the leather market (*bazaar-ı çarm-ı Amid*), or the operators and tax farmer of the tannery of the city (*debbağhane-i Amid*), all of whom were local Muslims? If contracting fostered a new sense of civic partnership especially among a middle class of Muslim tradesmen-contractors, janissary-brokers, and hereditary guild shaykhs-revenue collectors, at best it brought ordinary workers and non-Muslims along in a paternalistic fashion.

Checks and Balances

In reshaping our notion of "center" and periphery," our ledger casts a wide net over contractors, claimants, and tax payers. In doing so, it aids us in resituating the larger-than-life individuals who figure so prominently in the narratives of the late eighteenth century. Certainly the emergence of the gentry and magnates—the *derebey*, or rural lords, of Anatolia, the magnates of the Balkans; the tax farming gentry of Syria and the Aegean; and the quasi-autonomous regimes of Cairo and Baghdad at the geopolitical fringes of the empire—was also a product of the overarching rhythms of imperial history.[178] The

[177] MMD 9518:68; MMD 9519:102.

[178] Halil İnalcık ("Military and Fiscal Transformation," 331–32) considers them a "well-defined" group. See also Albert Hourani, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables," in *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century*,

contracting out of rural taxes in the form of *iltizam* or *malikâne mukataât* facilitated their ascent.[179] Grand Vizier Muhsinzâde Mehmet Pasha tried, from his first term in office in 1765 and again in 1771, to forge a direct link between the provincial elite and the state in the area of military recruitment, food provisions, and munitions.[180]

If central-state policymakers and historians failed to make finer distinctions among the gentry, the so-called *ayân ve eşrâf*, modern researchers, as Engin Akarlı argues,[181] cannot ignore the fact that magnates, such as the ʿAzms of Damascus and the Jalilis of Mosul, whose roots lay outside the cities in which they came to power, served the strategic interests of the state in a different manner than a home-grown urban gentry. Damascus and Mosul were "frontier" posts where military might was of paramount concern. By contrast, in a trading city like Aleppo, rival clans, the Shayhbandaris, the Hunkârlızâde, and the Tahazâde, vied over the stewardship of the main "block" of tax farms, the *muhassıllık*. These great families were part of an oligarchy of some one hundred families who held many of the offices and tax farms in their city and province.[182]

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ed. William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 41–67. İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, "Çapan Oğluları," *Belleten* 38 (1974): 216–65.

[179] Genç, "Osmanlı Ekonomisi ve Savaş," 55. In many sectors before 1768, returns amounted to 35 percent or even 40 percent, and though they declined after 1770 to 18–22 percent, this was still a handsome profit (Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikâne Sistemi," 252). The ʿAzm clan could fall back on tax farming networks as a source of influence within Damascus and the countryside of Syria and especially in their places of origin in Maʿarrat al-Nuʿman and Hama. Abdul-Karim Rafeq, "Economic Relations between Damascus and the Dependent Countryside, 1743–71," in *The Islamic Middle East, 700–1900*, ed. Abraham Udovitch (Princeton, N.J.: Darwin Press, 1971), 654–55.

[180] Yuzo Nagata, *Muhsin-zâde Mehmed Paşa ve Âyânlık Müessesesi* (Tokyo: Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa Monograph Series, 1982), 5, 28–31. Nagata disputes the date of this event; differences, however, might be attributable to administrative forms in the Balkans and Anatolia.

[181] Akarlı, "Provincial Power Magnates in Ottoman Bilad al-Sham and Egypt," 43. For an overview of economy of the city of Mosul, see Dina Rizk Khoury, "The Political Economy of the Province of Mosul, 1700–1850" (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 1991), 68–77. And generally, Necdet Sakaoğlu, *Anadolu Derebeyi Ocaklarından Köse Paşa Hanedanı* (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1984), 59–60; and Özcan Mert, *XVIII. ve XIX. Yüzyıllarda Çapanoğulları* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1980).

[182] See CM 25,002 1760–61; MMD 9740:82. For the links between Aleppo gentry and central-state *rical*, see the accounts of the court banker, Musa covering the period from 1769 to 1775 (D.BŞM 4047); also Margaret L. Meriwether, *The Kin Who Count: Family and Society in Ottoman Aleppo, 1770–1840* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999), 43.

The gentry government in Amid seems closer in form to Aleppo's oligarchy than the one-family rule of the Jalilis in Mosul. Yet each city responded to the shifting patterns of provincial power during the second half of the eighteenth century in its own fashion, infusing a distinctive type of local leadership into the amalgam of claims and counterclaims making up vernacular government. Among the families of the ulema and dozens of members of the great gentry, the Şeyhzâde clan stands out.[183] Although the clan's name suggests a link to individuals holding provincial offices from the seventeenth century onward, convention traces their lineage to Shaykh Yusuf Veli.[184] Yet it was only in the second half of the eighteenth century, and particularly with İsmail (d. 1799), who repeatedly held the position of Diyarbekir's *voyvoda*, that the clan attracted the attention of authorities in Istanbul and Baghdad.[185] İsmail's son, İbrahim (1747–1813), followed his father into provincial office, assuming the position of *voyvoda* in 1787–88, at the rank of *kapucubaşı*.[186] İbrahim's career led beyond his native city to deputy governor (1789–90) and later governor of Urfa in 1797. One of a few dozen officers to answer the call for soldiers to fight Napoleon in Egypt,[187] he returned to take up the post of governor of his native province of Diyarbekir for the first time in 1799–1800. Local biographers remembered him as the quintessential gentry-pasha—"both a man of the state (*rical-ı hükümet*) and native of the region (*ahali buldan*)."[188]

Şeyhzâde father and son cut their teeth on the office of *voyvoda*.[189] As we have seen, the Diyarbekir *voyvoda* emerged as the chief fiscal

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[183] MMD 2931:122. A certain Şeyhzâde Ebu Bekir, who took the office of *voyvoda* in 1683 with the financial backing of a certain Abidin (based in Istanbul?).

[184] Ali Emiri, *Tezkere-i Şu'arâ-i Amid* (Istanbul: Matbua-i Amidi, 1328/1910–1911) vol. 1, 222–30, 239, 253–54, 115–17, 368–69. Thanks to David Waldner, I was able to obtain a copy of M. Fahrettin Kırzıoğlu's "Kara-Âmid'te 1819 da A'yandan Şeyhzâdeler'in Öncülüğünde Milli Deli-Behram Paşa'ya Karşı Ayaklanma Ve Sonucu," *Kara Âmid Dergisi* 2–4 (1956–58): 350–378, which refers extensively to Abdulgani Bulduk's (1864–1951), *El-Cezire'nin Muhtasar Tarihi*, an important source that was otherwise unavailable to me.

[185] İnalcık, "Centralization and Decentralization," 33.

[186] CZ 541; CM 25,214 (December 1813) pertains to the expropriation order of İbrahim among others.

[187] Sakaoğlu, *Anadolu Derebeyi Ocaklarından Köse Paşa Hanedanı*, 105. The *voyvoda* of Eğin also volunteered according to Yılmazçelik, *Diyarbakır*, 108.

[188] CZ 541 (1790–91); Mehmed Süreyya Bey, *Sicill-i Osmanî; yahut Tezkere-yi Meşahir-i Osmaniye* (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Âmire, 1308–15/1890–97), 1:151; Yılmazçelik, *Diyarbakır*, 43–44, 91.

[189] MMD 2931:122. The evolution from tax farmer to intendant occurs over the

officer of the province and the main intendant overseeing a valuable set of revenue sources within the city. Unlike the position of *voyvoda* of Ayıntab or Mardin[190] which was subordinate to the command of a larger administrative city, by the eighteenth century, the *voyvoda* residing in Amid at times performed duties that made him all but indistinguishable from a deputy or civil governor.[191]

It was this range of responsibilities over territory and government that made the position far more than the sum of its fiscal parts.[192] During the last quarter century, such duties included those of military recruiter and chief probate officer, the latter responsible for conducting an inventory of the property of officials who died in office. Each of these duties brought the *voyvoda* political preeminence in the city and region, and he did not hesitate to use his powers against his rivals.[193] As the inventory and wide-ranging investments of one former *voyvoda*, Mustafa Ağa ibn Abdulveheb Ağa ibn elhac Hüseyin, in 1739 demonstrate, the office also brought its holder into contact with the financial, economic, and political nexus of the empire.[194]

In Diyarbekir, there is little doubt that the growing coercive force and multiple institutional hats of the *voyvoda* increased the potential

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second half of the seventeenth century. In 1683, Ebu Bekir needed a guarantor, a certain Abidin (based in Istanbul?), to take charge of three-year *iltizam*. His duties included collection of revenues totaling 19,607,908 *akçe*, of which 2,430,180 *akçe* were the *avârız* and *bedel-i nüzül* (100 *akçe*/kurus) In 1689–94 (TT 831:38 [1689–94/1100–1105]), the *voyvodalık* (both the position and its revenues) was held twice as a two-year tax farm by other tax farmers, şahban Ağa, Uzun Ali Ağa, and Mehmed Ağa, all of whom were probably local janissaries. Uzun Ali had a guarantor named Ahmed Ağa.

[190] In other cases, such as eighteenth-century Ayintap, the position of *voyvoda* was venal and held as a three-year *iltizam*. See Güzelbey, *Gaziantep şeri'i Mahkeme Sicilleri*, 103–4. MMD 2931:122 (1683).

[191] DA I:151. Yılmazçelik, *Diyarbakır*, 200.

[192] Van Bruinessen, *Evliya Çelebi in Diyarbekir*, 124–27.

[193] Yılmazçelik, *Diyarbakır*, 238.

[194] DŞS 315:73–80. He owed money to Vezir Mimeş Pasha, and Çeteçi Abdullal Pasha of Kerküt; he left his wife 28,454 *kuruş*. For the follow-up investigations, see D.BŞM 12,532 (1741). For some of the financial networks in Diyarbekir, see the case of Halil, a former *voyvoda* at the rank of *kapucubaşı*, who lent 7,625 *kuruş* to Mahmud, the *sancakbeyi* of Çermik (DA I:151). Compare with MMD 9740:82 (1782–83) concerning the former *muhassıl* Hunkârlizâde elhac Ahmed Ağa and his son Mehmet. MMD 10,000:368 (1768–69) is an example of subfarming of a share in the *voyvodalık* by the *voyvoda*. Compare Suraiya Faroqhi, "Wealth and Power in the Land of Olives: Economic and Political Activities of Muridzâde Haci Mehmed Agha, Notable of Edremit," in *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East*, ed. Çağlar Keyder and Faruk Tabak (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 77–96.

for abuse. But even a *voyvoda* could not operate with impunity. He came under the scrutiny, on one side, of a variety of contractors, venal officeholders, and provincial authorities; on the other, of the shareholders in the super-tax farm for which he served as either an employee or intendant. As a contractor himself, he could see his lucrative holdings retracted and reassigned to others.[195] Overall, this division of labor between shareholders and administrators in the peculiar type of tax farm known as the *voyvodalık* provided an additional firewall against a monopolization of legal, financial, and coercive control.[196] But the system of checks and balances worked only so long as the largest shares remained in the hands of central-state investors. It broke down, in 1784, for example, when the *voyvoda* İsmail Ağa and a son, İbrahim, obtained half the shares themselves.[197]

It was the inherently divergent interests in the institution of tax farming, as Jürgen Habermas has opined, that provided an opening for the "public" in local governance.[198] Petitions to Istanbul and records of subsequent investigations document the misdeeds of then *voyvoda* İsmail Şeyhzâde, who had conspired with the janissary commander (*serdar*) Gavuroğlu in Diyarbekir to extort money from many of the city's residents, including its most prominent citizens.[199] According to a final resolution in 1777, their operations had apparently

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[195] Meriwether, "Urban Notables and Rural Resources in Aleppo," 69. The former *nakîb'ül-eşrâf* of Aleppo, Muhammad Tahazâde, who held nearly one-fifth of all *malikâne* lands in the surrounding districts in the last quarter of the century, provides an apt example. He was exiled and his holdings were expropriated in 1775; reinstated a decade later, he was shorn of many of his tax farms.

[196] In this way it functioned better than Aleppo's *muhassıl*: On his "bankruptcy," Ahmed Efendi Vâsıf, *Mehâsinü'l-Âsâr ve Hakâikü'l-Ahbâr*, trans. and ed. Mücteba Ilgürel (Istanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1978), 189. In 1798–99, Aleppo's *muhassıllık* farm was placed in the *esham* system.

[197] MMD 9896:29–30. An early account of the *malikâne* on the *voyvodalık* gives its value as 764,334 *kuruş tâm*. In 1700–1701 (MMD 19,080:1), the annual payment (*mal*) totaled 13,023,123 *akçe*; in 1781, the annual remittance from the farm was 10,928,630 *akçe* (MMD 9518:1, MMD 9519:1–4). The *voyvoda* held shares in the *voyvodalık* during the following years: 1697; 1700–1704 (MMD 1637:152); 1705–6 (MMD 9896:29). Naturally, the entire family, in the case of a local notable might benefit from these political connections. In 1777, while his father served as *voyvoda*, İbrahim himself took hold of five-eighths of the total shares in the highly valued contract on the tobacco taxation (MMD 9519:22).

[198] Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1991), 16–19.

[199] CD 2819 (1777). On the plague of 1799–1800, which took the life of İbrahim Pasha's father İsmail Ağa (as noted by our Baghdad-based historian), see Yasin al-'Umari, *al-Durr al-Maknûn fî al-Ma'âthir al-Mâdiya*, 487.

continued for quite some time before Amid's enraged citizenry denounced both men for collusion and oppression of local taxpayers.[200]

Townsmen not only brought their prestige to the prosecution of their case against the *voyvoda* but also took advantage of personal experience and involvement in Amid's system of vernacular government. As we have seen, more than a hundred of the city's residents, including the leading members of the ulema, were contractors themselves. They understood the conditions placed on those who held contracts. They were familiar with the apparatus in Istanbul and had personal links to members of the religious and administrative hierarchy. Having identified the parties and interests involved, the townsmen pursued their greivance. They addressed a petition to the Istanbul bureaucracy. They also sent separate letters (*ferdân ferdân*) to Abdul Rahman Efendi, Mehmed Tahir Ağa, and Ahmed Efendi, the aristocratic shareholders of the *malikâne* in Istanbul.

Their strategy worked well enough. The *malikâne* contractors, who had invested a very large sum—78,512.5 *kuruş* to be exact—as surety, were naturally concerned about the management of their investment. The *voyvoda* was already in arrears in payments.[201] The contractors joined their voices to those agitating for the dismissal of the gentry-*voyvoda*, İsmail Ağa. He was replaced by a certain Seyyid Ahmed Bey who hailed from nearby Ergani.[202]

The treasury, however, in the throes of fiscal crises brought on by the conclusion of the Russo-Ottoman war, including the huge war indemnity demanded under the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774, used the uproar as a pretext to take over the tax farm and reassess its value. A revenue agent was dispatched from Istanbul.[203] In what turned out to be the beginning of a more activist posture by the state, at least once in every decade (1777, 1785, 1786, 1798, and 1802) the central treasury intervened and replaced local agents with salaried central-state employees. In doing so, the bureaucracy acted as a trustee of the *voyvodalık*, dividing the "earnings" among

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[200] Yılmazçelik, *Diyarbakır*, 113–14.

[201] That is not to say that the system in Diyarbekir was trouble free. See CM 29,248 (1761), addressed to Mustafa Pasha and the *kadı* of Diyarbekir regarding collection of 30,386.5 *kuruş* arrears.

[202] MMD 10,190:170.

[203] Yılmazçelik, *Diyarbakır*, 198. The *voyvodalık* was an *emanet* in 1777, 1785, 1796, 1802, 1803, and 1819.

the imperial treasury and the contractors who held the *malikâne*.[204]

The tenacity of vernacular government was proven in the face of the *Nizam-ı Cedid*, "New Order," a program of military and fiscal reforms initiated after 1793. One of its aims was to reintroduce state control by the appointment of *rical* to provincial offices or by reshuffling local magnates within the larger region of Syria, Eastern Anatolia and Kurdistan.[205] In Diyarbekir, gentry-pashas and appointees from the aristocracy of service alternated the office of governor. The mobility of gentry-pashas continued to be circumscribed regionally. After a brief tour of duty as governor of his native province,[206] Şeyhzâde İbrahim, one of the former *voyvoda* İsmail's sons, was assigned to other posts within West Asia, including the governorship of Jidda in 1800, before returning to Diyarbekir again in 1801. Diyarbekir's governorship was also awarded to other provincial elites, including leaders of the Kiki and Milan tribes, members of the Köseoğlu clan of Sivas, and İbrahim Ağa, a retainer of Muhmamad Tahazâde of Aleppo.[207] The differences in career paths remained striking. A central-state appointee like Yusuf Ziya Pasha, who rapidly rose from clerk to intendant of mines, to grand vizier, and to provincial governor, might dabble in both center and periphery—indeed, his sons and associates purchased many village contracts in Diyarbekir during his tenure.[208] Where Yusuf Ziya Pasha's investments spanned the empire, İbrahim Pasha made his investments locally. Where Yusuf Ziya Pasha climbed to the grand vizierate, only with the interregnum between 1807 and 1813, could İbrahim Pasha aspire to rule uncontestedly in his native province.[209]

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[204] Ibid.

[205] To name but two: Cezar Pasha in Sidon who resisted Napoleon; the reform-oriented Capanoğlu of Central Anatolia who countered the Canıkli of Trebizond and Erzurum.

[206] CZ 541 (1205); *Sicill-i Osmanî*, vol. 1, 151; See also Yılmazçelik, *Diyarbakır*, 43–44, 91–92, 112–13, 172–73, 191–96, 200–202, 250–53.

[207] Meriwether, *The Kin Who Count*, 61.

[208] Ali Emiri, *Tezkere-i Şu'arâ-i Amid*, vol. 1, 141. Mehmed Süreyya Bey, *Sicill-i Osmanî*, vol. 4, 670–71. His sons and associates held numerous tax farms in the region, beginning with his first tenure in office. (For holdings of sons Mehmet Beg and Sabit Yusuf Beg, MMD 9518:27, 28, 33, 38, 57, 78, 98, 104, and 106; and of his retainers, 84, 85, and 91.) For his income as grand vizier, see D.BŞM 7016 (1802–5). He also held a half share in the copper refinery in Amid in 1795–96 (MMD 9519:9). For his earlier career see n. 49 above.

[209] Mehmed Süreyya Bey, *Sicill-i Osmanî*, vol. 1, 151; *Diyarbekir Salnamesi* (1286/1869–70), 26; CM 25, 214 (1813).

The Sublime Porte's new policies toward vernacular government failed to take local conditions into consideration. The program of centralization found the city and province of Diyarbekir in the depths of a severe economic crisis. Imperial demands for emergency supplies and manpower had increased during the last two decades of the eighteenth century to pay for the wars with Russia and France.[210] New impositions burdened the urban marketplace. Textile producers—spinners, weavers, cloth printers, and dyers—who formed the core of Diyarbekir's artisan class, faced increased taxation on cotton thread, dyes, and cloth, as well as on chemicals such as alum, which were vital to treating and dyeing textiles.[211] Plague stuck the region again in 1799–1800 and took the life of the former *voyvoda*, İsmail.[212] Increasingly bold attacks by the Wahhabis on southern Iraq, including the sack of the Shi'i shrines in the cities of Najaf and Kerbala, delayed the caravans traffic that transited the city and neighboring towns.

The combination of new forms of state intervention, natural disasters and empirewide economic stresses and strains eroded the separation of powers that had contained the impact of poor administrators.[213] Suffering from the rapaciousness of a deputy governor left in place by İbrahim Pasha himself, townsmen regarded the arrival and billeting of 1,602 troops belonging to the 31st battalion (*orta*) of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* army, as the final straw. In the best of times, the introduction of a new political group into the city—in this case, soldiers whose number equaled that of Amid's gendarmerie, guards, and janissaries combined—would have heightened tensions. But in 1802, the town's precarious economic circumstances made the prospect of assimilating a new social, economic, and political element into the urban fabric unthinkable.

Vernacular government had been based on a careful balance of force, taxation, and historic rights and forged over a century of negotiation between guildsmen, janissaries, and contractors. By violating the century-long compact between state and society, the soldiers' bullying, threats, and outright violence in the streets of Amid sparked

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[210] Yılmazçelik, *Diyarbakır*, 208.

[211] CD 2173. In May 1801, increases in the alum tax were announced in the Asian provinces Karahisar-ı Şark, Aleppo, Damascus, Arabia, Van, Kars, Tokat, Erzurum, Sivas, Diyarbekir, Rakka, Beyrut, and Iskenderiye.

[212] *Süleyman Efendi, Mur'i't-Tevarih*, vol. 2A, 25.

[213] Yılmazçelik, *Diyarbakır*, 110–13, 247–51.

the great *ihtilal*, or insurrection of 1802.[214] That summer, townsmen did not assault the troops. Instead, they vented their anger at a particularly egregious symbol of the state's new fiscal program. Chanting, "Destroy them [the *mengene*, the presses]," and "They have no precedent and are illicit [*muhadis deyü*])," [215] the largely Muslim crowd surged against the building that housed both the machine that pressed and sized textiles and the station that levied the taxes on the export-quality cloths produced in the city.[216] In three days of rioting, the crowd leveled the presses and razed the entire Haci Osman quarter of the city, including shops, manufactories, and homes.[217]

Could the crowd have known that main contractor of the presses was none other than İbrahim Reşid Efendi,[218] one of the architects of the program of centralization and the controller of the New Order fisc?

The state's response was swift. The ninety-eight guildsmen who led the rebellion did not await the deputy governor's reaction but immediately fled the city. Amid's Hanefite mufti, Mesüd Efendi, was immediately exiled to Cyprus. Thirty-one members of the ulema were also threatened with expulsion. İbrahim Pasha, though away on campaign, was held responsible for his deputy's dereliction of duties and his inability to control the city.[219] With a new governor appointed, the state planned to take the local gentry to task for this incident and prevent further provincial "interference" in urban governance.

Intentions notwithstanding, it should not surprise us that Porte found it difficult to reach a final agreement without reconvening

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[214] CZ 1364 (30 July 1803) contains a summary of events and includes a copy of the deposition.

[215] Ibid. In his dissertation ("XIX. Yüzyılın ilk Yarısında," 221 [based on DŞS 336:79–80]), Yılmazçelik notes that there was only one non-Muslim among the ninety-eight "rioters" involved.

[216] MMD 9518:62, 77; MMD 9519:111. The *malikâne* contract dates to 1755. On the *mengene* taxes, see MMD 9519:10; Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım*, 325. In May of 1797 (CI 199; CM 14,123), and repeated on October 1804 (MMD 10,246:230): all cloths—*alaca*, *beyazlı*, *kutni*, *gazi*, and *atlas*—were to pay at 30 *akçe* per bolt.

[217] Yılmazçelik (*Diyarbakır*, 113–14) describes this event in detail, referring not only to the relevant court documents (DŞS 536:79–80) but also to the memoirs and papers of an early-nineteenth-century administrator, İbrahim b. Muhammed ("Diyarbakır Mutasarrıfı İbrahim b. Muhammed'in Hatırat ve Mektupları," found in the Elazığ Museum Archive [Ms. 137]).

[218] CM 8741; Cİ 697. In 1800–1801, İbrahim Reşid Efendi, held three-quarters of the contract; one-quarter was in the hands of the *voyvoda* Halil Ağa.

[219] Yılmazçelik, *Diyarbakır*, 238, 255.

vernacular government. Negotiations continued for a year. The deposition that was drawn up in August 1803 required considerable mediation. The imperial court solicited the signatures of the city's five leading professors (*müderris*), the clerks of the court, the chief bailiff, and the court translator, presumably for those who spoke Kurdish or Armenian. The notarial document named twenty-five Muslim shaykhs and master guildsmen along with twenty-three non-Muslim *ostad* responsible for payment of a fine of 30,000 *kuruş* to "restore the presses to their former state." Those damages compensated the presses' main investor, the chief treasurer, for his losses. In addition, guildsmen promised to share a bond of 389,000 *kuruş* guaranteeing the banning of those who had fled the city.

It was a harsh punishment. Yet local society also scored a pyrrhic victory: the 31st battalion had been withdrawn from the city in July 1803. The guilds would comanage the presses in the capacity of subfarmers.[220]

Final Entries

Conserving space in the half page allotted him in our register, a clerk entered the last transaction under the tax farm on two villages in the province of Diyarbekir in 1791. The entries grow sparser in the register during the last decade of the eighteenth century.

The clerks in Istanbul were determined to put Diyarbekir's accounts in order. In 1799 they opened a new set of books. An unusual attentiveness to form may be discerned in a summary of the *malikâne* contracts under the *voyvodalık* that was drafted on a series of unbound folios (Fig. 6).[221] In place of the swirl of notations, dates, and fractions of shares that marked the diachronic approach to which have referred thus far, this new register presents its documentation in a strictly synchronic and synoptic fashion. The tax farms are entered neatly side by side; each row repeats the same form of entry, with the name of the type of revenue preceding the name or names of the contractors. Its historical sweep has gone; its accounts are cur-

[220] Ibid., 219–20. In 1804, the *esnaf* split the cost with the contractor for the repair of the building (MMD 9519:10).

[221] D.BŞM 14,094.

Fig. 6 Note the difference in the style of a *Nizâm-i Cedid* register. The top entry on the last page records the *maktu* (lump sum tax) owed by several villages in the *kaza* of Hani. The lower two entries furnish names of contractors holding various urban offices, including the *kethudalık* of the *bedesten* of Diyarbekir, the *delalbaşılık* of the "black" *bazar* and the *delallık* of the city's *beyt' ül-mal.* In his summary, the clerk disparages local authorities.

rent only for a given year. Written in the well-formed *nesih* script, its pages are free of shorthand, *siyakat*, the bane of the modern researcher. Despite the remarkable clarity and uniformity of his expression, the clerk concludes on a sour note. He complains that he was forced to write the contents out in full: provincials "are unable to read *siyakat*," the trademark of a properly trained bureaucrat.

Feigning mutual unintelligibility, the Istanbul clerk distances himself in culture and in social status from his provincial counterparts. He too was complicit in the denial of a system of government that had existed with the full approval of the statesmen in Istanbul. Without formal redrafting, provincial boundaries were redrawn by combinations of economic and social pressures. Throughout the Balkans, Anatolia, Syria, and Kurdistan, the treasury awarded hundreds of small contracts on villages and commercial taxes. The contractors, by default, assumed their place in provincial government; brokers expanded their networks across the province and cultivated links to larger, transimperial circuits of credit and finance. Although unwilling and probably unable to assume their duties, clerks and bureau chiefs in Istanbul used reports and marginalia to vent their accumulated resentment toward the "petty oligarchy" of local gentry, ulema, and officers who constituted the de facto vernacular government.[222] In his audit of the finances of Aleppo in 1776, another Istanbul bureaucrat commented that "for many years, [the tax farm on the *muhassıllık*] has been assigned to persons living in the region; the greatest part of the holders of *mukataât* being *âyan-ı memleket*, their relatives, and their clients (*taâllukât*) who are chiefly concerned with their own interests and not with the affairs of the *muhassıllık* itself . . ."[223] Not only are the gentry unworthy of their responsibilities and devoid of civic virtue, it is impossible to ascertain the true state of affairs because "the records of the *muhassıllık* in Aleppo are unreliable and full of falsification."[224]

Indeed, in 1785 the treasurer ordered a full-fledged investigation of provincial accounting. He targeted provinces with "*müfrez*" (inde-

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[222] Tocqueville (*The Old Régime*, 43) expresses essentially the same sentiment. Municipal government was run by a "petty oligarchy," who kept "a watchful eye on their own interests, out of the sight of the public and feeling no responsibilities toward less privileged citizens."

[223] Cited in Thieck, "Décentralisation ottomane et affirmation urbaine à Alep à la fin du XVIII[ème] siècle," 125.

[224] Ibid.

pendent) treasuries, such as Crete and Damascus, or *voyvodalık* types of administrations, such as Tokat and Diyarbekir.[225]

More than an intractable reality in the provinces or evidence of the collapse of the imperial economy, the utterances of contemporaries should remind us of the parallax that was setting in between the state bureaucracy and the actors in vernacular government. It was stamped in the changing paleography of a register in the mold of the old regime and one produced in the first flush of the new. Buried between formulae and routine entries was the evidence of a growing semantic distance between the modern, unitary state and the compromised capacities of the past. In the countryside, tax farmers filled in the gaps in the rural order as the *timar* system receded. In cities such as Amid, gentry participation in local governance helped forge an underlying consensus in the key areas of the economy, such as manufacturing, that affected the vast majority of townsmen. Even the *malikâne* system, which stamped diverse societies with the terms of a single charter, offered channels for transmuting conflicts into alliances between parties and avenues of redress for pursuing protests through the imperial judiciary or to the Sublime Porte itself. But as the bureaucrat, pressed to find new resources for war, as much as to reorder society itself,[226] began to dismantle vernacular government, what would happen to the tacit compact about the limits of state power?

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[225] Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım*, 331–33 (CM 12,343, document dated June 24, 1785). A year before the announcement of the New Order Treasury (*Irade Cedid Hazinesi*) in 1793, the director of the fisc circulated a summary of an investigation that claimed that the largest portion of the new share-system (*esham*) had passed into the hands of "obscure ladies" and "unidentifiable men" resident in the provinces (see MMD 11,669:2).

[226] Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım*, 156, 169; Stanford Shaw, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III 1789–1807* (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 19.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION: THE PATHS NOT TAKEN

> Hardly were we masters of Algiers than we hastened to gather up every single Turk, from the dey to the last soldier of his militia, and transported the lot of them to the coast of Asia. In order to make the vestiges of the enemy domination disappear, we first took care to tear up or burn all written documents, administrative records, and papers, authentic or otherwise, that could have perpetuated any trace of what had been done before us. The conquest was a new era . . .
>
> Alexis de Tocqueville, "Second Letter on Algeria," August 22, 1837.

By the time Tocqueville gathered his notes for *The Old Régime and the French Revolution*, a tidal wave of images, words, and armies had washed away many of the semblances between the old regimes of Europe and Asia.[1] The ideological and material forces unleashed by the French Revolution, the Empire, the Bourgeois Monarchy, the revolutions of 1848, and finally, Louis Napoleon's power seizure had all but submerged reliable if largely descriptive and chronological narratives of the Ottoman past written at the turn of the century.[2] The bureaucratic state appeared triumphant in the West while the government of the Ottoman Empire, once the paragon of despotic centralism, seemed to shatter against the shoals of modernity. Blending

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[1] Orientalist painting played a role, to be sure. Eugene Delacroix's "Collection of Arab Taxes" (1863), today in the National Gallery in Washington, D.C., might illustrate Tocqueville's notion that the Ottomans were a "government by conquest." A horseman, with drawn sword, is ready to pounce on a hapless peasants. See also, Henry Laurens, *Les origines intellectuelles d'expédition d'Égypte, l'orientalisme Islamisant en France (1698–1798)* (Istanbul: Isis, 1987); Alain Grosrichard, *The Sultan's Court: European Fantasies of the East* (New York: Verso, 1998); and M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774–1923, A Study in International Relations* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Education, 1987).

[2] Mouradgea D'Ohsson, *Tableau général de l'Empire othoman, divisé en deux parties, dont l'une comprend la législation mahométane; l'autre, l'histoire de l'Empire othoman* (Paris, Imp. de monsieur [Firmin Didot] 1787–1820) 12 vols.; Joseph Freiherr von Hammer-Purstall's (1774–1856) monumental *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches* (*Histoire de l'Empire ottoman depuis son origine jusqu'a nos jours*), 18 vols. [Paris, Bellizard, Barthes, Dufour & Lowell, 1835–43) was to be republished in 1859 in Tours by the Bibliothèque de la jeunesse chrètienne (Ad Mame).

the revolutionary strains of Volney with a new imperialist fervor, in his speech on "The Eastern Question" the deputy from Valognes weighed the dangers of a great-power conflagration over Ottoman lands against the new opportunities for territorial expansion offered by Mehmet Ali's occupation of Syria.[3]

Among many draftsmen, Alexis de Tocqueville lent his hand to the redrawing of the modern historical map. From his youthful enthusiasm for the colonization of Ottoman Algeria to his last diplomatic mission in Rome where he negotiated the fate of the Polish and Hungarian refugees of 1848 with the representative of the Sublime Porte, his political career was deeply intertwined with France's Middle Eastern and North African policy.[4] If the monarchy saw the colonial project as a means of diverting public opinion and a way to relieve its Malthusian burden, Tocqueville regarded colonialism as more than a land grab. It was France's manifest destiny. Empire restored the great-power status of a nation defeated and secured its naval hegemony over the central Mediterranean. A century after the loss of its Indian Ocean and Atlantic colonies, the "American" experiment would again. The colon would bring "civilization" to the "wilderness" and build a new democratic community free of the inhibitions of the Old World's social and economic inequality.

In his letters and reports, written after official tours of the European enclave in Africa, Tocqueville expressed outrage over the heavy-handiness of the military administration. He decried the wanton destruction of Ottoman archive as a loss to efficient colonial administration.

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[3] His involvement in Algerian politics dates to 1828. André Jardin, *Tocqueville: A Biography* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1988), 62, 322–34. See also Alexis de Tocqueville, *Oeuvres compléte: Écrits et discours politique*, ed. Jean-Claude Lamberti (Paris, Gallimard, 1991) 2: 288–309; compare, C. F. Volney, *The Ruins, or Meditation on the Revolution of Empires: and The Law of Nations* (Baltimore: Black Classics Press, 1991), 49. M. Alexandre Laya (*Études Historiques sur la vie Privée politique et Littéaire de M. A. Thièrs* [1830–1846] [Paris: Chez Furne, 1846] 2:133) the political biographer of Thièrs, Tocqueville's archpolitical rival, considered this moment a watershed in Europe's perspective on Ottoman sovereignty, commenting that "no more could the Ottoman Empire be regarded as eternal, as [an entity] that could not die, or even that it must be saved . . ." For English perspectives on Mehmet Ali Pasha, see Khaled Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, his Army, and the Making of Modern Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[4] Jardin, *Tocqueville*, 66, 249–250, 267, 322, 334–335. For a selection of his writings on these subjects including the epigraph on the previous page, see Alexis de Tocqueville, *Writings on Empire and Slavery*, ed. Jennifer Pitts (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).

As for the Algerians themselves, his attitude wavered between paternalism and ruthless expedience. At times he opposed the military's scorched-earth policies toward peasants and herders;[5] on other occasions, he urged brute force to repress the rebellion of ʿAbd al-Qadir and to sendentarize nomadic populations.[6] While abhorring the reductionist and race-based logic of his contemporaries Alfred de Gobineau and Ernst Renan, Tocqueville remained firm in his belief that representative government was the exclusive right of a small number of the world's peoples.[7] Thus, although he rejected calls for the ethnic cleansing of the Arab population in its entirety, he proposed, instead, the creation of native ghettos among the European settlements. This liberal colonial plan prefigured not only the dualism of Algerian society for the next century but settler-colonial policies elsewhere, from the Bantustans of South Africa to contemporary Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank and Gaza.[8]

'Cantonnement' is also an apt metaphor for Tocqueville's vision of Europe's early modern past. Like many of his Enlightenment mentors, he zealously maintained the vigil before the frontier of Western Europe, as both a religious and civilizational crusade. However, despite his unmistakable debt to the political philosophy of Montesquieu, his approach to the relative evils of absolutism and the global landscape of power, including colonialism, differed importantly from the eighteenth-century's perspective.[9] Why, unlike Voltaire and Edward

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[5] His interest in Algerian affairs dates to 1828. Jardin, *Tocqueville*, 62. Andre Jardin's comments (*Tocqueville*, 322–34) on his attachment to colonial project are balanced but unsparing.

[6] Jardin, *Tocqueville*, 318. In *De la Démocratie en Amérique* I (1835) (*Oeuvres Complètes*, ed. Jean-Claude Lamberti and James T. Schleifer [Éditions Gallimard, 1992], vol. 2, 104). Tocqueville argued that "Turkish populations never took part in the direction of the affairs of their society; had they not witnessed the triumph of the religion of Mohammed with the conquests of the sultans they could have accomplished great things. Today, religion is gone; all that remains is despotism." For the some of the key texts, see Pitts, *Writings on Empire* as well. Melvin Richter, ("Tocqueville on Algeria," *Review of Politics* [1963]: 362–98) is of the opinion that Tocqueville's colonial politics are in flagrant contradiction to his theories of democracy.

[7] Pitts (*Writings on Empire*, "Introduction," xxxiii) notes that although Tocqueville at the outset disagreed with J. S. Mill on the need for despotic government to control "barbarism," he does not seemed to have opposed the 1848 provision that demanded Algerians renounce Islam in order to gain French citizenship. See Uday Singh Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

[8] Jardin, *Tocqueville*, 334–35.

[9] In 1848, Algerians who wanted to gain French citizenship were forced to

Gibbons, whose wide-angle lens on the Roman Empire placed the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople at the birth of modernity, did Tocqueville simply dispense with the eastern portions of the empire, as if Asia and Africa were so much ballast to the Europe's soaring trajectory?

Absent too is the philosophe's admiration of the religious tolerance within Muslim world and his appreciation of the meritocracy of the Asian bureaucracy. As Voltaire noted, Ottoman "military democracy" permitted even the humblest servant to rise to the rank of a general or prime minister.[10] Indeed, more disturbing than the figure of the Oriental despot who still merits mention, albeit as the butt of the denigrating satire of the Enlightenment, is the banishment of Eurasia's most powerful state from the early modern landscape. It is by refusing to utter the name of the Süleyman I in conjunction with Francis I, that Tocqueville's silence achieved a rupture with the West's longtime rivals that the Enlightenment could never conceive. By appropriating the origins of the modern state, he laid one of the cornerstones of the great conceptual wall of European social science, encircling its past, present, and future.

The Common Origins of the Modern State

Rewriting the eighteenth century was not a uniquely Western European preoccupation. Unbeknownst to Tocqueville, his slightly younger contemporary, the Ottoman historian Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, also pressed the old regime in his twelve-volume historical suit for the *Tanzimat* reforms (1839–76) and the building of a unitary state.[11] Where

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renounce Islam. Compare, Ann Thomson, *Barbary and Enlightenment: European Attitudes toward the Magreb in the Eighteenth Century* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1987). Sudhir Hazareesingh, *From Subject to Citizen: The Second Empire and the Emergence of Modern French Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 232.

[10] Voltaire criticized Montesquieu's indiscriminate application of the term despotism to all Asian governments. ("Commentaire Sur l'Esprit des Lois") *Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire* (Paris: Chez Th. Desoer, Libraire Rue Christine, 1817) vol. 6, 968; see also comments in Vol. 4, 79. In *History of the Latin and Teutonic Nations*, Francis I's alliance with the Ottomans became an act of betrayal that Leopold von Ranke held against the French in particular.

[11] Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, *Tarih-i Cevdet* (Istanbul: Matbaa-yı Osmaniye, 1309/1893) vol. 2, 256. The loosening of the reins over state and government in the periphery was a constant worry of the bureaucracy as Yaşar Yücel, ("Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Desantralizasyona (Adem-i Merkeziye) Dair Genel Gözlemler." *Belleten* 38 (1974):

Tocqueville sought institutional continuity in the endurance of traditional social values and vestigial social hierarchies—Cevdet took a different tack. Staring unflinchingly at the less admirable traits of the past century, he blamed the impasse of the late eighteenth century on the ills of decentralization: the usurpation of state power by the gentry and janissaries, the desperate plight of the peasantry, the greed of tax farmers and the unreliability of gentry armies. The anarchy of the eighteenth century and the vulnerability of disunion are tropes that carry over into his successors. For the Turkish, Armenian, Balkan, and Arab nationalists of the first decade of the twentieth century, it was the dangerous disintegration of the old regime or simply the decay left by the "Turkish yoke" that served as the premise for their programs of political and cultural renewal.

Yet neither the Ottoman bureaucrat nor sultan needed to correspond with the philosophes to discern the waning of the old regime geopolitical order in the eastern Mediterranean.[12] French retrenchment from eastern Europe and the Sublime Porte's failure to win Prussian support as a counterweight to the Habsburgs left Istanbul isolated.[13] Unimpeded, the czarina expanded into the Black Sea and Mediterranean. Long before Campo Formio (1797) crowned France's arrival at the Adriatic, Russian navies had twice destroyed the Ottoman fleet. Over the course of the next half century, Russia courted discontent among the Ottomans' Muslim and Christian subjects along its outlying provinces, from Ali Bey al-Kabir (d. 1773) of Egypt, Kara George and the Serbian rebels of 1802–1806, to the magnate of Trabizon, Canikoğlu Tayyar Pasha.[14] The principalities of Moldavia,

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149–52, 657–708) points out. For his advocacy of the policies of the New Regime, see Christoph K. Neumann, *Das indirekte Argument: ein Plädoyer für die Tanzimat vermittels der Historie. Die geschichtliche Bedeutung von Ahmed Cevdet Paşas Ta'rih*. Münster: Lit Verlag, 1994.

[12] On the impact of Küçük Kaynarca on political and military thinking see Virginia Aksan, *An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace, Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700–1783* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995); and Mariia Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

[13] Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 5–23; Stanford Shaw, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III 1789–1807* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 55–73; Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *The Ancien Regime: A History of France, 1610–1774* (Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1996), 447.

[14] See Norma Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean, 1797–1807* (University of Chicago, 1970).

Wallachia, and Bessarabia became stepping stones for their advance on the Bosphorus Straits.

In many respects the empire's institutional predicament was not unique. If the second partition of Poland among Prussia, Austria, and Russia in 1792 provided an object lesson in the perils of decentralization,[15] it was the cudgel welded by France's citizen army, as well as the threat of contagion by the new ideas of popular sovereignty that hastened the consolidation of its neighbors in Central Europe.[16] Successful adaptation of the techniques of bureaucratization and direct government did not only preserve them. These organizational tools also furthered the aims of the new imperialism. The French troops who disembarked in Alexandria in 1798–99 bore one variant of the modern state apparatus. Across the Indian Ocean, the charter-company system of government had outlived its utility for Britain. The final battles of conquest against the last autonomous governments of Mysore set the stage for a radical reorganization of Indian agricultural taxation beginning with the new British property code for Bengal.[17]

Teetering on the precipice of bankruptcy and frantically rebuilding its navy, the Sublime Porte could offer little other than sympathy to Tipu Sultan's ambassador who made his way to the court from Basra in 1786.[18] In comparison to the new imperialism and Prussia's forced-march program of administrative reorganization,[19]

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[15] After the second partition of Poland, Carl von Clausewitz (*On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret [London: Everyman's Library, 1993], 449–450) asks: "Could Poland really be considered a European state, an equal among the European community of nations . . ." No, he concludes. It was for that reason that Europe "yielded Poland like the Turks yield the Crimean Tatar state." On Ottoman-French relations during the republican period, see Ismail Soysal, *Fransiz İhtilâli ve Türk-Fransiz Diploması Münasebetleri (1789–1802)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu 1999) and the special issue of *RMMM* 52/53 (1989) entitled, "Les Arabes, Les Turcs et la Révolution Française," ed. Daniel Panzac.

[16] See Brendan Simms, *The Impact of Napoleon: Prussian High Politics, Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Executive, 1797–1806* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[17] See Ranajit Guha, *A Rule of Property for Bengal: An Essay on the Idea of Permanent Settlement* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1996).

[18] Ahmed Efendi Vâsıf, *Mehâsinü'l-Âsâr ve Hakâikü'l-Ahbâr*, transcr. and ed., Mücteba Ilgürel (Istanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1978), 367–368; Abd al-Rahman Jabarti, *Napoleon in Egypt: Al-Jabarti's Chronicle of the French Occupation, 1798*, ed. and trans. S. Moreh (Princeton, NJ: Marcus Wiener Publishers, 1993), 64.

[19] Simms, *The Impact of Napoleon*, 305–312.

the Ottoman planners contended with the sheer scale of its territories and the multiplication of potentially hostile fronts, especially with the escalation of British and Russian expansion in Asia.[20] Istanbul had lost suzerainty over the restive Crimean khans and was forced to concede Russian sovereignty over Georgia. While countering British, French, and Russian overtures to the magnate-governments of Ali Pasha in Albania and Pasvanoğlu Osman Pasha in Bulgaria,[21] the new sultan's advisors looked nervously across the Kurdish frontier to Iran, where the last of the Safavid's tribal offshoots, the Qajars, had begun to install a more enduring ruling structure. With uncertainty hanging over the succession to pashalik of Baghdad as well, a leading religious intellectual, Tartarcık Abdullah Efendi tendered a new administrative map of Iraq. He foresaw the subdivision of the province into smaller administrative units to contain the Kurdish tribes and to prevent concentration of powers in Baghdad. Istanbul-appointed governors would take charge of provincial finance and military recruitment, duties that had long been delegated to the local lords and gentry.[22]

It is such plans for sweeping organizational change that have led nineteenth-century the regime of scholars, like Cevdet Pasha to compare the regime Sultan Selim III (r. 1789–1807) with the enlightened policies of earlier sultans, including Ahmed III.[23] Attentive to military training, the sciences and engineering, the new sultan also

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[20] André Raymond, *Les commerçants au Caire au XVIII^e siècle* (Damas: Institut Français de Damas, 1973–74) vol. 1, 43–50. See also Shaw, *Between Old and New*, and François Crouzet, "Wars, Blockade and Economic Change in Europe, 1972–1815." *Journal of Economic History* 24 (1964): 567–88.

[21] See Katherine Elizabeth Fleming, *The Muslim Bonaparte: Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasha's Greece* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

[22] Abdullah Efendi Tatarcık, "Selim-i Sâni Devrinde Nizâm-ı Devlet Hakkında Mutâla'ât," *Türk Tarihi Encümeni Mecmuası* 8 (1333/1914–1915), 18–19. The council, as Uriel Heyd ("The Ottoman 'Ulemâ and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II," in *Studies in Islamic History and Civilization*, ed. U. Heyd [Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1961] vol. 9, 83) points out frequently met in the villa of the *Şeyh'ül-Islam*. Istanbul could not, however, prevent Davud Pasha's rise to power 1816 and enlistment of European advisors for his military. *Rabbi David D'Beth Hillel, Unknown Jews in Unknown Lands: The Travels of Rabbi David D'Beth Hillel (1824–1832)*, ed. and trans. Walter J. Fischel (New York: Ktav Publishing House, Inc., 1973), 83; and generally, T. Niewenhuis, *Politics and Society in Early Modern Iraq* (The Hague-Amsterdam: International Institute of Social History, 1982).

[23] Avigdor Levi, "Military Reform and the Problem of Centralization in the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century," *Middle Eastern Studies* 18 (1982): 227–49.

shared his grandfather's love of music, poetry, and evening soirées amidst lanterns and tulips.[24] However, Selim's financial policies could scarcely be more different from those of his gold-scattering ancestor. The timing of reform was not surprising. Although the Swedish subsidy of 1789 had staved off imminent financial collapse,[25] the combined impact of a large war indemnity to Russia, the upheaval in global financial markets following the French Revolution, the rapid devaluation of Ottoman currency, and finally the continental blockade, put the imperial treasury in a perpetual state of crisis.[26]

Indeed, if comparisons are made, the Ottoman dilemma of 1793–1807 mirrored the plight of the Bourbon Louis XVI in 1788–92.[27] The gradual consolidation of financial oversight and policy-making under the grand vizier and the military reforms of Mustafa III (r. 1757–74) gave way to more concerted efforts. As we have seen in the last chapter, the announcement of new infantry units in 1793 the *Nizam-ı Cedid* ("c'est-à-dire, le nouveau réglement") was a part of a multi-faceted program that promised an overhaul of taxation, new forms of military training and recruitment, as well as increased central state oversight of provincial government.[28] Responding to fiscal emergencies domestically and upheaval in global financial markets,[29] neither sovereign foresaw the consequences of pulling the warp

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[24] Cevdet, *Tarih*, vol. 6, 143.

[25] See Alan Fischer, *Russian Annexation of the Crimea 1772–1783* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

[26] In Egypt (Raymond, *Les commerçants au Caire*, vol. 1, 43) the silver *para* lost half of its value between 1770 and 1798; Edhem Eldem ("Le commerce Français d'Istanbul au XVIII[e] siècle," Ph.D. Diss. Université de Provence-Aix-Marseille I, 1988, 188) notes that Istanbul witnessed an equivalent devaluation a decade later: between 1800 and 1812 the *kuruş* fell from two francs to one.

[27] Gabriel Ardant ("Financial Policy and Economic Infrastructure of Modern States and Nations," in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975], 216–7) in many ways concurs with Tocqueville, noting that "the French Revolution manifested itself by the disintegration of the state due in large part to the illusion of reformers."

[28] Mouradgea D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, vol. 3, 367; As Kemal Beydilli points out (Ignatius Mouradgea D'Ohsson [Muradcan Tosunyan]: Ailesi Hakkında Kayıtlar,' "Nizâm-ı Cedîd'e dâire Lâyihası ve Osmanlı Imparatoluğlyndaki Siyâsî Hayatı" in Prof. Dr. M. C. Şehâeddin Tekindağ Hatıra Sayısı (Special issue) ed. M. Cavîd Baysun, *Tarih Dergisi* (Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi 34 (1983–84): 247–314) remained an Ottoman patriot.

[29] On the impact of the French Revolution on financial markets throughout Europe: Larry Neal, *The Rise of Financial Capitalism: International Capital Markets in the Age of Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 180–214.

of fiscal privilege from the social fabric woven by the old regime. The state pressured its creditors. It exacted forced loans from non-Muslim bankers and compelled them to assume direct financial responsibility for provincial audits and accounts.[30] To raise funds for the *Irade-i Cedid* treasury and pay the salaries of the new army, the Sublime Porte redirected agricultural revenues from the resident cavalry and tapped into the life-lease market. Proceeding cautiously at first, the bureaucrats of the new treasury recycled revenue revenues into general funds upon the death of the contractor or by attrition.

But there was no mistaking the ultimate aim of the New Order: to phase out both the classical organizational infrastructure of the empire, particularly the old-regime military orders, the *timar*-cavalry and the janissaries, and to dissolve the semiprivatized revenue system that structured of vernacular government.[31]

Across empire, *Nizam-i Cedid* policies provoked mistrust, consternation, dissatisfaction and protest. The creation of new military units and alterations to organizational charters threatened long-standing immunities of the military corps, such as the janissaries.[32] Expropriation of life-leases over and above a general decline in the income of shares that had once yielded returns of 35 to 40 percent per annum as well as increased state fees, struck at the very foundation of the corporate patrimonialism of the Istanbul elite.[33] In provincial cities

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[30] Sultan Selim III's decree (Yücel Özkaya "III. Selim'in İmparatorluk hakkında Bazı Hatt-ı Hümâyûnları," *Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi* 1 (1990): 341) refers to the "rural gentry and magnates (*derebey*)" as "usurpers who fleece the peasantry as tax-farmers . . . [and the] *voyvoda*s and police . . . [as those who] oppress the poor and have come to have the power of viziers and military commanders."

[31] Yavuz Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi* (*XVIII. Yüzyıldan Tanzimat'a Mali Tarih*) (Istanbul: Alan, 1986), 155–7; 302–9. See also Joshua M. Stein, "Habsburg Financial Institutions Presented as a Model for the Ottoman Empire in the *Sefaretname* of Ebu Bekir Ratib Efendi," in *Habsburgisch-osmanische Beziehungen* (Colloque sous le patronage du Comité international des études préottomanes et ottomanes, Vienna 26–30, Sept. 1983), ed. Andreas Tietze (Vienna: Verlag des Verbandes der Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaften Österreichs, 1985), 233–242.

[32] By 1804–1805 (KK 4499), the number of beneficiaries in the tobacco tax discussed in chapter 2 fell from 1,586 (in 1774–5; KK 4484) to 763 individuals; more than half (386) were wives and daughters of religious figures.

[33] Mehmet Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikâne Sistemi," in *Türkiye Iktisat Tarihi Semineri*, ed. Osman Okyar and Ünal Nalbantoğlu (Ankara: Hacetepe Üniversites Publishers, 1975), 246, 252. On the decline of tax-farming rents in Egypt after mid-century, Kenneth M. Cuno, *The Pasha's Peasants: Land, Society and Economy in Lower Egypt, 1740–1858* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 44.

like Diyarbekir, rising prices for raw materials and loss of markets, and a variety of taxes, including special wartime levies, pushed artisans into outright rebellion.

While the specific conditions varied widely across Europe and Asia, ultimately, key aspects of the old-regime impasse remained the same: an enormous gap in capacities and powers that left the "state" unable to extract the wealth necessary to pay for its military upkeep or to subdue the many vernacular governments of the provinces.

With no history of aristocratic assemblies, Selim III could not summon the third estate to Istanbul to ratify its his program. Instead, court and bureaucracy steered a course of contradictory policies. On one hand, they tried to undercut local power by the abolishment of gentry-held offices, such as the city-steward and the army-recruiter, and by transferring important tax contracts to in-coming governors. On the other, still undermanned militarily and administratively, Istanbul encouraged the powerful magnates along its perimeters, such as Cezzar Pasha who controlled the Lebanese coastline, Mehmet Ali Pasha of Cairo, and Bayraktar Mustafa Pasha, heir to Tirşinikli İsmail in Thrace and Rusçuk, to built up private armies.[34] Both Suleyman Pasha in Baghdad and Cezzar Pasha in Sidon trained modern military units.

These appeasements notwithstanding, the advocates of state consolidation found their fiercest critics in the capital. A janissary coup d'état overthrew the new regime in 1807.[35] Although the Istanbul barracks fired the first shots, many parties in the Ottoman court and in the mosques who feared the end of fiscal privilege and actively encouraged the soldier's actions.

From the provinces this turn of events seemed ominous. Many gentry and not a few townsmen who had embraced the New Order with reservations realized they had more to fear from a janissary-controlled state and the reassertion of a rigid estate hierarchy. Rural magnates and the urban gentry of Anatolia and the Balkans rallied in Rusçuk under the leadership of Bayrakdar Mustafa, one of the

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[34] Bruce McGowan, "The Age of the Ayan," in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Halil İnalcık with Donald Quataert, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 666. Amnon Cohen (*Palestine in the Eighteenth Century* [Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1973], 163) estimates that agriculture provided much of Cezzar Pasha's wealth.

[35] Shaw, *Between Old and New*, 23.

leading commanders on the Russian front. Using the pretext of paying homage to the new sultan, the janissaries' candidate, Mustafa IV, an army loyal to the former sultan entered the city. By midsummer 1808, Bayrakdar Mustafa's army had put down the insurrection.

The loyalists, who failed to save the life of Selim III, replaced Mustafa IV with his last surviving male cousin, Mahmud II (r. 1808–38). The gentry assumed ministerial positions. With the new sultan still in his minority, the direction of the state apparatus fell fully on the shoulders of the new grand vizier, the upper-ranking *rical*, and the bureaucracy.[36]

That autumn, two decades after the famous appeal to convene the Estates General brought delegates to Paris, Istanbul was itself the scene of an extraordinary gathering of the third estate. Gentry-intendants and magnates came to the capital from western Anatolia and the eastern Balkans in the company of their militias. Although those from more distant provinces such as Egypt and Syria were unable to attend in person, their agents represented their interests at court. In a reversal of roles, the Ottoman court prepared the pavilions of the Golden Horn for the festivities to receive the gentry. The sovereign feted his guests and conferred robes of honor on his subjects. In an unadorned speech to those assembled, the grand vizier, Bayraktar Mustafa, appealed for unity. Stressing the common origins of the great gentry and the men of the state, he implicitly established the equality of the second and third estates.[37] Together with the members of the religious establishment, the captains of the chartered military units, and the bureau chiefs of the Sublime Porte, the gentry hammered out new principles of unity in the form of a short agreement, the *Sened-i İttifak*, the Charter of Federation.[38]

Contemporary historians have debated the meaning of this document and its role in the transformation of imperial governance.[39]

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[36] Ibid., 397–98; Anatolii F. Miller, *Mustafa Pasha Bayraktar* (Bucarest: Association International d'Études du Sud-Est européen: 1975), 298–99.

[37] İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Meşhur Rumeli Âyanlarından Tirsinikli İsmail Yılık Oğlu Suleyman Ağa ve Alemdar Mustafa Paşa* (Istanbul: Türk Tarıh Kurumu Yayımları, 1942), 141–42; note the variation in texts found in Ataullah Mehmet Şanizade, *Tarih-i Şanizade* (Istanbul: Ceride-Havadis Matbaası 1290/1873) vol. 1, 63 and Cevdet, *Tarih*, vol. 9, 5.

[38] Halil İnalcık, "Sened-I İttifak ve Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümâyunu," *Belleten* 28 (1964): 607–69. The text is found in Şanizade, *Tarih-i Şanizade*, vol. 1, 66 and Cevdet, *Tarih*, vol. 9, 178.

[39] Shaw, *Between Old and New*, 90; compare. Bernard Lewis, "Dustûr," *EI*^{2} 2:

Some consider the agreement to be a step backwards. Certainly, a century of decentralized administration and vernacular government provided precedents and geared the participants' expectations. Its formulation in the terminology of contract (*sened*) may harken back to the language of the life-lease edit of 1695, which also established a parity of fiscal agency between gentry and *rical*. Yet it would be a mistake to reduce the Charter of Federation to a simple restoration of the status quo ante, much less equate it to a type of feudalism. The agreement between subject and sovereign reflected a sense of partnership. In exchange for mutual defense, past privileges were elevated to permanent rights. Moreover, as Halil İnalcık notes,[40] the devolution of powers was explicitly conditioned on respect for the overarching framework of imperial law. Signatories were obliged to protect the state-mandated rights of all subjects, Muslim, Christian, and Jew.

A Federalist Alternative?

From the perspective of world history, the experiment in federalism in the Ottoman Empire, a brief interlude between two attempts to implant a unitary state apparatus, has not been given the attention it deserves. Certainly the reflexive segregation of Asia from the political time line and the poverty of the modern political lexicon are partially responsible. For Tocqueville, the failure of federalism was a foregone conclusion. The success of the government depended on the cultural community itself and could only be the expression of the religious, social and economic exceptionalism of Anglo-North America.[41] Yet Tocqueville never understood that the system of decentralized administration that he had encountered in North America was itself an interim agreement. In many ways the Ottoman civil wars of the period between 1812–40 did not resemble the counterrevolution of the Vendée so much as foreshadow the more violent

640–47; and Kemal Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789–1908," *IJMES* 3 (1972): 252–54.

[40] İnalcık, "Sened-i İttifak," 610.

[41] Jardin, *Tocqueville*, 208–9. Sudhir Hazareesingh, *From Subject to Citizen: The Second Empire and the Emergence of Modern French Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 182–83.

stage of state integration of the American Civil War of 1861–65.[42]

Whatever its shortcomings, a Philadelphian compromise might have proven better suited to the Ottoman dilemma.[43] Like all such agreements, the Charter of Federation brought together unequal parties possessing widely divergent political and economic agendas. Its principles of unity were narrow and the problems of enforcement, legion. The powers allotted to the center were too limited to restrain the most exploitative and violent provincial actors, whose oppression of the tax-paying population continued unabated. Once again, Istanbul relaxed its grip over provincial revenues, relinquishing *malikâne* offices and rural resources to the gentry; clerks who had begun to compile audits anew, returned to registering transactions in the old-regime style.[44] Nevertheless, these deficiencies might be considered the price for the incremental bridging of the institutional chasm between "state" and "government" across such a vast territorial polity. In retrospect, the contradictions resulting from the bargains struck in Istanbul in 1808 must be judged in their context or in relation to a constitution crafted two decades earlier in Philadelphia, a document that in one breath declared the equality of all men while legalizing the enslavement of tens of thousands of inhabitants of African and native American ancestry.

Unfortunately, what little that we know about the practice of federalism in the Ottoman Empire has all too often been gleaned from the Mediterranean coastline, where military elites supported by foreign merchants and rival European powers exerted monopolistic con-

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[42] See Richard Franklin Bensel, *Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859–1877* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[43] Miller, *Mustafa Pasha Bayraktar*, 318.

[44] Although this did not mean that attempts to consolidate the fisc stoped entirely (Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım*, 243), Mehmet Genç ("Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikâne Sistemi," in *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi Semineri*, ed., Osman Okyar and Ünal Nalbantoğlu [Ankara: Hacetepe Üniversites Publishers, 1975], 282) calculates that the percentage of overall investments held by provincial life-lessors rose from a low of 19.8% in 1801 (during the New Order) to 23.6% in 1810. Note the trends in provincial investments in life-leases:

	1787	1800	1812
Diyarbekir	147,864.5	103,332	155,375.7
Aleppo	198,271.5	178,888.75	273,120.5
Tokat	234,393.5	286,238	366,340.5

Sources: MMD 9561:109–115; KK 5161:29, 77, 53, 18–29, 18; MMD 9624:182, 309, 307, 218. (Figures in *kuruş*).

trol of rural production and the flow of trade. Urban politics in Syria, Palestine and Western Kurdistan, though not free from interparty violence, were of a qualitatively different character. Here the federalist opening allowed for the emergence of new forms of representation. As Elizabeth Thompson points out, the citizens of Damascus appeared well prepared for self-governance with the arrival of formal administrative councils, under both Egyptian rule in the 1830s, and later, Istanbul's *Tanzimat* (1839–78) programs.[45]

In Diyarbekir the declaration of federalism did not bring into being parliament or male suffrage. But it did result in a stable, responsive, albeit oligarchic government under the leadership of one of Amid's foremost families. Following the 1808 meeting, İbrahim of the Şeyhzâde clan sent a deputy to lay claim to the governorship, a position he would hold until his death in 1814. Although he did not have an unblemished record as a civil servant, many years in state service within the city and in tours of duty in neighboring provinces, including a stint with the Ottoman army that routed the French from Egypt, had seasoned İbrahim as an administrator and commander.[46] Politically, too he may have learned the value of appeasement, if not consensus. A petition for clemency that İbrahim forwarded to the Sublime Porte on behalf of those accused of participation in the 1802–3 riots might have helped repair relations with townspeople and earn him begrudging respect from rival clans.[47] His family connections were not limited to the city. With their extensive tax farms in the fertile farmlands around Hani, the Şeyhzâde had a following among rural communities as well.[48]

Although lacking channels for direct representation, Amid's townsmen could count on İbrahim's government to champion the city's interests. The interurban trading system was arguably the most important of these concerns. Throughout his tenure, the pasha refused to capitulate to Baghdad or Istanbul on the question of manufactured

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[45] Elizabeth Thompson, "Ottoman Political Reform in the Provinces: The Damascus Advisory Council in 1844–45," *IJMES* 25 (1993): 457–475.

[46] On the life and times of Şeyhzâde İbrahim Pasha, CZ 541 (1789); CZ 1298 (1795); CZ 3392 (1812); CM 30,953. Ali Emiri, *Tezkerei*, 1:222–230; Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmanî*; 1:151. M. Fahrettin Kırzıoğlu, "Kara-Âmid'te 1819 da A'yandan Şeyhzâdeler'in Öncülüğünde Milli Deli-Behram Paşa'ya Karşı Ayaklanma Ve Sonucu." *Kara Âmid Dergisi*, 2–4 (1956–58): 356.

[47] Yılmazçelik, "XIX. Yüzyılın ilk Yarısında," 484.

[48] MMD 2931:122.

imports. His tariff agents continued to impose the full *gümrük* tax (and not simply a fee, the *bac*) on the transit trade that passed through the city.[49] In a particularly troubled decade, when Wahhabi incursions into Najd and the resulting disruption of traffic through Basra cost Baghdad some quarter million *kuruş* in customs revenues, his militias policed the highways leading southward and guarded traffic from the depredations of Kurdish tribes.[50] Personal wealth was invested in infrastructure. İbrahim dedicated one of several large family waqf to the building of a forty-one room caravansaray complete with stables within the city walls.[51]

The ruling elite's portfolio of assets, private and public, also suggests a certain balance in policies and a vested interest in reconciling the concerns of the city's long-distance and regional merchants with those of its artisans and tradesmen. The pasha, his family, and members of his advisory council, the *divan*, maintained their holdings in contracts on local and regional products. In addition to agricultural rents and revenues, they possessed contracts on local manufacturing taxes, such as the fees on white cotton twist.[52] Since his first public office as intendant in 1796, İbrahim had held the lucrative *malikâne* on the excise tax on the interregional trade in snuff.[53] That is not to say that İbrahim opposed opening the town's market to long distance goods. A notarized appendix to the Diyarbekir tariff lists the new commodities that the governor's "own traders" introduced into the city. Most were European goods, including Flemish, presumably, manufactured cotton thread.[54]

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[49] On inter-urban rivalries over tariff: MMD 10,241: 230 (1798); CD 3582 (1811); CI 990 (1815).

[50] İbrahim Yılmazçelik," XIX. Yüzyılın ilk Yarısında Diyarbakır 1790–1840," 2 vols. (Ph.D. diss., Fırat University, 1991), 216–217; İbrahim Şeyhzâde 1784–85 merited an entry in Yasin al-'Umari's contemporary history of Iraq (*al-Durr al-Maknûn fî al-Ma'âthir al-Mâdiya min al-Qurun*, critical ed., Sayyar Kawkab 'Ali al-Jamıl (Ph.D. diss. University of St. Andrews, U.K.), 443; CD 9713.

[51] Yılmazçelik, "XIX. Yüzyılın ilk Yarısında Diyarbakır," 178.

[52] MMD 9519:102,80,23. One of the shareholders in 1816–1817 was Ishak Efendi, "*müderr*is (scholar) and the secretary of the administrative council (*divan*) of the defunct Şeyhzâde İbrahim."

[53] MMD 9519:22. MMD 9722:43. Şamlu Ebü Bekir (d. 1793–94) was an appointee as tariff keeper (*gümrükçü*) as early as İbrahim Pasha's tenure as *voyvoda*.

[54] KK 5249:18. Stamped by the judge of Amid, Seyyid Mehmed, it lists the goods transported by "his [Şeyhzâde's] merchants."

Despite these extensive regional powers, İbrahim Pasha remained a loyal public servant of the empire. Upon his death, the family surrendered the pasha's accounts and wealth to the probate office for assessment and expropriation. His *malikâne* contracts and household effects were auctioned for the benefit of the fisc. But the bureaucrats in Istanbul did not touch other assets. The pasha's considerable endowments, including the family villas and a caravan saray, remained intact.[55] Members of his family would continue to play a significant role in local government and enjoy the political and economic fruits of privilege through their *malikâne* contracts and city offices.

The Diyarbekir Commune of 1819

As this brief history of Amid's interregnum history suggests, vernacular government might have provided the basis for a type of federalism within the empire. But the agreement was short lived. In fact, the Istanbul elite may never have regarded the charter as a binding agreement and certainly did not consider it the forerunner of a constitutional monarchy.[56] After Bayraktar Mustafa Pasha's death, it did serve to temporize with the gentry until such time as bureaucrats and statesmen could mount the next phase of state centralization. Freed from other commitments with the conclusion of the war with Russia in 1812 and buffered by Western Europe's preoccupation with the Napoleonic Wars, Mahmud II initiated a series of campaigns to install central authority in the Asian provinces. Fanning out across Anatolia, by 1818, his commanders contemplated the eastern frontier. One of their major targets was the regime of Mehmed

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[55] CM 25,214.

[56] On the Young Ottomans, see Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962); and İlber Ortaylı, *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Yerel Yönetim Geleneği* (Istanbul: Hil Yayınları, 1985); idem, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı* (Istanbul: Hil Yayınları, 1987). For later variations, see Yusuf Akçura's *Osmanlı Devletinin Dağılma Devri* (*XVIII ve XIX asırlarda*) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988). For more on decentralization, see Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye'de Cağdaşlama* (Istanbul: Doğu-Batı Yayınları, 1978), 102. The emphasis on centralization in late Ottoman and Turkish Republican political thought is often attributed to Durkheim. See also, Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, *The Sociology of the State*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983), 12.

Derviş Pasha, the lord who controlled the critical leg of the transit route between the Iranian frontier and Diyarbekir, on one side, and the Black Sea region on the other.[57] His regime was well entrenched. Troops from Erzurum, Muş, Çıldır, Sivas, Bozuk (Yozgat), Trabzon, and Diyarbekir were needed to carry out the final assault on the fortified city of Van.

The province of Diyarbekir lay south of Van. According to the strategic map of the modern state drawn by the sultan's advisors, its capital, Amid, was next on the list of governments to be brought back into the imperial fold. Here, however, the state was forced to consider other tactics. Unlike Van, Diyarbekir's government was not merely one-man rule. Undoubtedly fearing popular resistance, Istanbul searched for a pretext for intervention. It found one in a controversial candidate for the governorship. Behram Pasha, the new governor, was a member of the Deli branch of the Kurdish Milan tribe and a sworn enemy of the house of the Şeyhzâde. His appointment seems to have been calculated to incite the urban elite. His mission, as the historian Şanîzade sanitizes it, was to put "in order" (*tertib edüp*) Diyarbekir's urban affairs, ending, once and for all, gentry's hold on the deputy governorship.

Although official and provincial accounts differ widely, there is no dispute over the scale and intensity of popular resistance to Behram Pasha. In the official annals the city's opposition to the new governor was no long a matter of rebellion (*ihtilal*) as it had been recorded in 1802. In 1819, the town's defiance constituted outright civil war (*fitna*).[58] Absent local testimony, there might be no means of challenging the Istanbul version of the last days of federalism in Diyarbekir. Fortunately, one witness' account is preserved in a later provincial history.[59] Its author, Hacı Ragıb Bey, who suf-fered exile because of his involvement, described the denouement of the rebellion: The new governor entered the city's basalt portals on July 18, 1819. Behram

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[57] Local opinions on the government of Van prior to the campaign of 1818 were not unfavorable to the lord according to James Brant, "Journey through a part of Armenia and Asia Minor in the Year 1835," *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society* 10 (1841): 395.

[58] Şanizade, *Tarih* vol. 3, 54.

[59] The manuscript has been lost. Kırzıoğlu's source ("Kara-Âmid'te 1819'da A'yandan Şeyhzâdeler," 350–58, 375–76) is the manuscript of Abdulghani Bulduk, an early twentieth-century historian of the city of Diyarbekir, who cites from it extensively.

Pasha summoned the urban leadership to hear his mandate. "I was sent [by the state] to destroy you," he proclaimed to Amid's townsmen, "to scatter your belongings [to the wind] and to burn your houses [to the ground]." With this declaration of war, he beat a hasty retreat to the citadel. From this heavily fortified position, troops began an artillery assault on the city, raining death and destruction on the villas of the gentry as well as the workshops and residences of artisans in the adjoining quarter.

In self-defense, townsmen attacked the citadel. Merchants and craftsmen withdrew goods from the market and stopped paying taxes. The gentry coalesced under the leadership of a member of the Şeyhzâde clan, Mehmed. They blockaded the external door of the citadel. For a time, these actions prevented the governor from obtaining fresh supplies from the Tigris or from summoning help from the Ergani mine. Yet word eventually reached its intendant, Nurullah Pasha, who dispatched troops to the governor's aid southward along the main highway bisecting the province.

For three months this city of some forty to fifty thousand inhabitants repelled the sultan's armies at its gates. In addition to the horsemen of the Milan Kurds and troops from Ergani, reinforcements and armaments poured into the province from the northern Anatolian cities of Erzurum, Van, and Çıldır, as well as from Aleppo, Adana, and Sivas.

A brutally long siege and the superior firepower of the army finally brought the city to its knees on October 26, 1819. The rebellion exacted a staggering toll on the city which would be felt long into the century. Nearly a third of the population suffered casualties. Seven to eight hundred families were sent into exile. The Şeyhzâde themselves took refuge in the outskirts of Hani while many other leading townsmen, master craftsmen, and merchants resettled in Baghdad, Damascus, and Basra. With the communards defeated, Behram Pasha's successor could easily complete the task of extirpating local government. The new governor expropriated the tax-farms and retracted the venal offices from the rebellious gentry. After Diyarbekir, Istanbul's campaign of consolidation would move on to northern Syria.[60]

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[60] See Cemal Tukin, "Mahmud II. Devrinde Halep Isyanı: 1813–1819," *Tarih Vesikaları* 1 (1941): 256–264.

Of Democracy and the New Despotism

The Diyarbekir commune represented one of unfinished revolutions at the end of the old regime. Cevdet Pasha's *History* faithfully recorded the Charter of Federation and devoted pages to the 1819 Diyarbekir rebellion. The *Tanzimat* historian betrayed no sympathy for the grievances of provincial city. Instead, his account suggests that factional struggles, specifically blood feuds between local gentry and the Kurdish tribes, were the root cause of the violence.[61]

Hindsight left little room for another explanation for the surge of resistance to state centralization. By the mid-nineteenth century, the historian's vantage point was transfixed: Selim III and his successors had begun to "bring everything into order;" they reconstructed a state that the gentry and magnates had nearly torn apart.[62] The wages of decentralization in the context of a newly emerging political order based on unitary states seemed all too clear: in the course of the first four decades of the nineteenth century, Greece, Algeria, and ultimately Egypt had all but been lost to the empire. The *Tanzimat* programs of 1839–76, premised on top-down administrative reforms, seemed to succeed where the loose federalism of the previous century had failed. Bureaucrats and state officials made new institutional inroads into provincial governance; they implanted new land codes and uniform urban administrations from Bulgaria to Iraq.[63]

While the trappings of culture, the imbalance of power and blinders of ideology severed the ties between adjoining regions and gave European thinkers the illusion of a chronology all their own, *Tanzimat* bureaucrats were also collaborators in the theory and praxis of the modern state.[64] Where the Ottoman elite blamed late centralization and disunity for their vulnerability in the face of European military power and colonial expansion, French intellectuals tied the question of centralization to domestic struggles over the extent of popular sov-

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[61] Cevdet Pasha (*Tarih*, vol. 11, 65, 67–9, 83) refers to İbrahim's brutal repression of the Viranşehir branch of the Milan tribe and his repeated reprisals against the Deli Milan during his long tenure between 1807–8 and 1814.

[62] Cevdet, *Tarih*, vol. 6, 221.

[63] See Huri Islamoğlu, "Property as a Contested Domain: A Reevaluation of the Ottoman Land Code of 1858," in *New Perspectives on Property and Land in the Middle East*, ed. Roger Owen (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 3–63.

[64] A point taken up Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998).

ereignty, particularly in the wake of the revolutions of 1789 and 1848. In contrast to the French Legitimists, including Arthur de Gobineau and Ernst Renan, who sought institutional decentralization and the restoration of feudal privilege as means of restraining France's teaming masses,[65] Tocqueville believed in the dialectic evolution of democracy and institutional centralization. Increasing state centralization, he argued, would yield stable government and economic prosperity. If this formula had failed elsewhere, Tocqueville maintained, it was due not to race or climate, as Gobineau claimed, but to religion and civilization.

Christianity played a critical role in Tocqueville's political theory. Repeatedly in *The Old Régime* he reminds his readers of the need for the counterweight of the Church against the ever-present threat of despotism. Religious difference also allowed him to reconcile his belief in human equality with his advocacy of colonialism. Dispensing with a thorough study of Islamic history and thought, a cursory reading of the Qur'an was sufficient to construct a world contrary to Western civilization. For Tocqueville, Islam constituted a polity out of kilter, an unforgiving and unyielding ideology that pitched societies between the extremes of super-centralized authority and destructive anarchy. In Kantian terms, Muslim society did not exemplify "stasis," but rather the absolute terror of social regression (a "step backward from paganism") and a generalized threat to civilization ("deadly" to mankind). As such, Tocqueville's ideas are very much in harmony with the segregation practiced by French colonialists in Algeria. Membership in the republic might not demand a single national or racial origin, but it did require a common religious affiliation.[66]

Despite the underlying religious prejudices that sustained his political philosophy and practice, Tocqueville was well aware of the perils and pitfalls of the modern state. From his first explorations in North America, where he sought to elucidate key relationships between cultures and systems of government, he scanned the world for evidence and comparative cases. He offers analyses on states from Russia to Mexico and from Britain to the Ottoman Empire.[67] Even at this early stage of his career, Tocqueville was well aware that the unitary state had proliferated far beyond its prototype in revolutionary

[65] Hazareesingh, *From Subject to Citizen*, 96–7, 130–31; 171–72; 191.
[66] Jardin, *Tocqueville*, 203, 208, 318–22.
[67] Ibid., 248; Tocqueville, *Oeuvres compléte*, vol. 3, pt. 1, 29–253.

France. With it, came the dangers of despotism: the full, unmediated force of the world's most dangerous weapon on the individual was no longer blunted by the peculiar government-state relationship of the old regime or the aristocratic hierarchy. At one extreme the modern state could be a prison, like Czarist Russia. In a country of pashas and paupers, like Mehmet Ali's Egypt, the state could become forced-labor factory.[68] Although Tocqueville regarded these examples as a travesty of modern polity and assured himself that only the most extraordinary conditions, such as a state of total anarchy or revolution, could bring despotism to Western Europe,[69] he realized that Europeans had reason to be wary. The future of democratic government would rest more heavily on the individual. As in nineteenth century Britain, it could be corrupted by the passivity of its citizenry or the excessive influence of money.

With the 1851 coup d'état that suspended the bourgeois constitution and brought Napoleon III (r. 1852–1870) to power, Tocqueville confronted the perils of the modern state close at hand. Although he retired from active participation in the political arena, his biographer André Jardin notes that his voluminous correspondence between 1851 and his death in 1859 continued to run the gamut of domestic and foreign policy.[70] Despite poor health, he eagerly awaited Gobineau's letters from Iran and continued to condemn slavery as a violation of the most basic concepts of Christianity.[71]

On one topic, however, Tocqueville is inexplicably silent. For a politician who had been consumed by colonial affairs for decades, it is remarkable that he ceased to comment on France's colonial policy in Africa. Was he frustrated by the character of colonial rule after the defeat of ʻAbd al-Qadir in 1847 and the incorporation of the colons as citizens after 1848? Did his inclusion of an appendix on Canada in *The Old Régime* merely express nostaglia for empire lost or was the comment "colonies bear the imprint of the metropole," in fact a pointed reminder to his countrymen that posterity would judge the nation by its legacy of imperialism in North Africa?

Or had his political philosophy itself been altered? One might ask whether his silence might have signaled that the neat, binary divi-

[68] Jardin, *Tocqueville*, 69–70; 375, 266. Tocqueville, *Oeuvres compléte*, vol. 2, 300–13.
[69] Jardin, *Tocqueville*, 267–68.
[70] Jardin, *Tocqueville*, 333.

sion between European states and their non-Western rivals had begun to disintegrate. Recent experience had given him reason for pause. In contrast to the cooperation of the Ottoman representative in Rome who readily agreed to take in the refugees from 1848, a down payment on their obligations as a future member of the Concert of Europe, there was the utter intransigence of the Vatican. While Istanbul embraced reforms, the Papacy rebuffed even the most minor effort toward political change. And then there were the events in France itself: in what way did the caudillismo of Latin America differ from Bonapartism? Although the Congress of Vienna had insured France's territorial integrity, did not the rocky transition from the old regime, the radical swings between revolution, monarchy, republic and empire, mirror to an uncomfortable degree, the decades of civil war, restoration, and the quasi-constitutional sultanate of the Ottoman Empire?

Tocqueville might have reassured himself with the thought that barring extreme conditions, European societies could not produce a despotism like that of Russia or the "Turks." However, in the wake of the Revolutions of 1848 and the putsch of 1851, such confidence in the internal regulating principles of Europe's political society was no longer firm.[72] In his last political essay, *The Old Régime and the French Revolution,* he turned away from the present to search for the roots of modern institutions and social relationships in the last century of the ancien régime. By turning the clock backward, long before the French Revolution, he may have hoped to find in those *cahiers* evidence of the enduring virtues of the nation, to cast a conceptual anchor amid the turbulent nineteenth-century political sea.

In writing the first of what was planned to be two volumes on the history of the French Revolution, Tocqueville carefully demarcates the geographical limits of his inquiry. Despite furnishing ample evidence to the contrary, he repeatedly reminds his readers of the inevitable emergence of the modern state from the baroque cocoon of the old regime. In rehabilitating the eighteenth-century, he admits many of the paradoxes while creating an overarching sense of order,

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[71] For his correspondence with Arthur de Gobineau from Switzerland and Iran, after 1851 see Tocqueville, *Oeuvres complètes*, 9: 157 ff.

[72] Hazareesingh (*From Subject to Citizen*, 231–32), calls this the "liberalism of fear." John Keane, "Despotism and Democracy," in *Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives*, ed. idem (London: Verso, 1988), 65.

a vision of political progress amidst the anticipated upheaval of revolution and the hubris of empire. In such an ideologically-motivated treatise, it should be expected, therefore, that he purge any embarrassing connections between the Bourbons and their long-standing Muslim allies. Although he credits the Physiocrats, only grudging mention is made of the profound influence of Asian statecraft on Europe's political imagination.[73]

Yet even in text that consciously eschews all of the barbed comparison between the Bourbon monarchy and "Oriental despot" that was signature of the Enlightenment critique of absolutism, Tocqueville makes but one, albeit highly evocative, reference to Islam. Oddly, the lone reference occurs in an introductory passage in which the author takes on one of the intellectual ghosts of his own age, Edmund Burke, on the place of the French Revolution in modern history. He defends the necessity of the Revolution within the larger scope of Western political development even as he distances itself from its radicalism and admits the exceedingly dangerous combination of mass mobilization with the machinery of the modern state. Even as he lays claim to his national heritage, he grasps at the rhetorical means of separating himself from the fury its ideologies of equality and the violence of its citizen armies. It is as if the author cannot bear the thought that roots of the Terror and Napoleon's European empire might reside within French society or the centralized state.

Reaching for an historical analogy with which to denounce Jacobinism, as well as to blame its ideological contagion on a world beyond France, momentarily, Tocqueville looks across the Mediterranean.[74] In a metaphor that he will repeat again in the notes to the second volume of this study, he transforms these ideologies of

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[73] Tocqueville, *The Old Regime*, 197, 204–5.

[74] "Because the Revolution seemed to be striving for the regeneration of the human race even more than the reform of France, it lit a passion which the most violent political revolutions had never before been able to produce. It inspired conversation and generated propaganda . . . it itself became a new kind of religion, an incomplete religion, it is true, without God, without ritual, and without a life after death, but one which nevertheless, like Islam flooded the earth with its soldiers, apostles, and martyrs. *The Old Régime*, 101. He repeats this metaphor. Tocqueville, *Notes on the French Revolution and Napoleon, The Old Regime and the French Revolution* (*L'ancien régime et la Révolution*), ed. François Furet and Françoise Mélonio, trans. by Alan S. Kahan (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1998) vol. 2, 180, 263, 446, 459. As Furet and Melonio (ibid., 459) point out, for this metaphor as well, he is indebted to a royalist writer, Mallet du Pan.

liberation into an alien religion. Instead of crediting Napoleon with building the modern state or praising his advocacy of religious tolerance, he casts the First Consul as a "Rights of Man" thumping missionary who wins converts with the promise of equality, a sword-bearing prophet who respected neither the integrity of borders nor the differences between civilizations. Above all, he betrays his fear of the unfathomable power of the modern state and a revolution that had not yet run its course but, which had "like Islam flooded the earth with its soldiers, apostles and martyrs."

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COLOUR PLATES

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Plate 1. The procession of the *esnaf* (guilds) began with the farmer, the miller and the bread maker. A young man reads verses from the Qur'an on camel-back. From Levni's illustrated *Surnâme-i Vehbi* (TKSK Ms. A 3593, fol. 72a). Courtesy of Topkapı Sarayı Museum.

Plate 2. Sultan Ahmed III and his son-in-law, Grand Vizier İbrahim Pasha view the festivities. From Levni's illustrated *Surnâme-i Vehbi* (TKSK Ms. A 3593, fol. 71b). Courtesy of Topkapı Sarayı Museum.

Plate 3. A vision of order: the *Şeyh' ül-İslam*, jurists and ulema are at the top rung; they are followed by viziers, ministers, generals, members of the *divan-ı hümayun*, and finally the treasurers. Janissaries guard the perimeter. From Levni's illustrated *Surnâme-i Vehbi* (TKSK Ms. A 3593, fol. 21a). Courtesy of Topkapı Sarayı Museum.

Plate 4. A vision of disorder: the janissaries trip over themselves and one another in a mad dash to claim their plates of rice. From Levni's illustrated *Surnâme-i Vehbi* (TKSK Ms. A 3593, fol. 23a). Courtesy of Topkapı Sarayı Museum.

Plate 5. The French ambassadors seated in front of the stern faced Russian emissaries seem to be amused by the scene of raucous firemen, clowns, and the float of the weavers of gold cloth. From Levni's illustrated *Surnâme-i Vehbi* (TKSK Ms. A 3593, fol. 140a). Courtesy of Topkapı Sarayı Museum.

Plate 6. The sultan has returned to the palace at the conclusion of the festivities. He rewards his servants with a distribution of gold coins. From Levni's illustrated, *Surnâme-i Vehbi* (TKSK Ms. A 3593, fol. 175a). Courtesy of Topkapı Sarayı Museum.

GLOSSARY

Akçe	Small silver coin (or asper)
Ağa	Military officer or landlord
Askeri	Belonging to the tax-exempt estate
Âyan	Gentry, town fathers
Bab-ı Âli	Sublime Porte, the state apparatus
Bac	Toll, market tax
Berat	Diploma, certificate.
Beylerbeyi	Provincial commander, military governor
Beyt'ül-mal	Public weal, trust of the Muslim community
Cebelü Bedeliyesi	Wartime payment in lieu of military service
Cizye	Poll tax
Çiftlik	Unit of plowland, field, or plantation.
Defter	Register, any type of bound record
Defterdar	Controller, imperial treasurer
Divan	Advisory council
Du'â'güyân	Religious dignitaries receiving state stipends
Dar üs-Saâde Ağası	Senior Black Eunuch
Efendi	Title for high-ranking official or dignitary
Esnaf	Occupational or artisanal association
Eşrâf	Descendants of the Prophet
Eyalet	Province (also *vilâyet*)
Fatwa	Religious opinion issued by a mufti
Gedik	Bureaucratic or military post, life tenure
Gümrük	Taxes on inter-urban and interstate commerce
Hass	Crown estate or benefice (also, *hass-ı hümayûn*)
Hatt-ı Hümayūn	Imperial rescript
Hükümet	Hereditary, semi-autonomous estate
Hükm	Judgement on a petition, an order
İlmiye	Judiciary, the state ulema
İltizam	Revenue contract
Kadı	Ottoman judge
Kalemiye	Bureaucracy, clerks
Kanun	Imperial statute
Kanunnâme	Code, charter, or compilation of statutes
Kâtib	Secretary, clerk, or scribe

Kaza	Judicial subdistrict within a *sancak*
Kapı	Household, retainers and staff
Kapıkulu	Salaried military corps
Kapıcıbaşı	Palace chamberlain
Kuruş	Silver coin equivalent to 120 *akçe*
Malikâne Mukataa	Tax contract for the life of the contractor
Maktu	Tax paid in a lump sum by a group
Miri	Pertaining or belonging to the state
Muaccele	Surety or down payment on a *malikâne mukataa*
Mukataa	Fiscal unit (pl. *Mukataât*)
Mufti	Leading Muslim religious authority
Mülk	Personal or private property
Mültezim	Tax farmer
Müsadere	Expropriation of an official
Mütesellim	Deputy governor
Nahiye	Canton, a subcomponent of a *kaza*
Ocaklık	Revenue "tagged" for an individual or group
Poliçe	Letter of credit
Reaya	Tax payer, the third estate
Re'is'ül-Küttâb	Secretary of state
Rical-ı Devlet	Ranking officials and officers
Sancak	Military district, also known as *liva*
Şeyh'ül-İslam	Chief justice of the empire
Sipahi	Ordinary cavalry officer/administrator
Tanzimat	Ottoman reform programs of 1839–76
Timar	Tax benefice of an ordinary *sipahi*
Ulema	Muslim religious scholars, lawyers
Vali	Provincial governor-commander
Voyvoda	Financial agent, tax-farm supervisor
Voyvodalık	Block of tax farms supervised by a *voyvoda*
Waqf	Endowment established under Islamic law
Zeamet	Intermediate-sized tax fief or benefice

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