Extremism and Democracy

POPULISM AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY

COMPARING FASCIST LEGACIES IN WESTERN EUROPE

Luca Manucci



Populism and Collective Memory

Right-wing populism is a global phenomenon that challenges several pillars of liberal democracy, and it is often described as a dangerous political ideology because it resonates with the fascist idea of power in terms of anti-pluralism and lack of minorities' protection. In Western Europe, many political actors are exploiting the fears and insecurities linked to globalization, economic crisis, and mass migrations to attract voters. However, while right-wing populist discourses are mainstream in certain countries, they are almost completely taboo in others. Why is right-wing populism so successful in Italy, Austria, and France while in Germany it is marginal and socially unacceptable? It is because each country developed a certain collective memory of the fascist past, which stigmatizes that past to different levels. For this reason, right-wing populism can find favorable conditions to thrive in certain countries, while in others it is considered as an illegitimate and dangerous idea of power. Through a comparative study of eight European countries, this book shows that short-term factors linked to levels of corruption, economic situation, and quality of democracy interact with long-term cultural elements and collective memories in determining the social acceptability of right-wing populist discourses.

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L.M.

Figueira (Portugal), Spring 2019

Introduction

Populism and fascist legacies

Giving a definition of democracy is not a trivial task, while fascism is a complex mixture of right- and left-wing ideas. Alas, populism is much worse. Like a Fata Morgana, populism appears to be everywhere because the term has become a passe-partout, a keyword supposed to explain every development of contemporary politics.[1] This is far from true, but studying the links between populism, democracy, and fascism allows us to better grasp what is going on in Western Europe and why many commentators and scholars evoke the 1930s, the Great Depression, and a certain fascist *Zeitgeist*. The impression is that while liberal democracy lost its appeal, a populist idea of democracy has been gaining momentum.

However, this phenomenon is not taking place in every country with the same intensity. Populism, in fact, is not equally accepted in every public debate across Western Europe, and while it is safe to claim that its relevance and electoral success are steadily increasing, it would be premature to celebrate the funeral of liberal democracy. Populism is testing the limits and strengths of liberal democracy, and by challenging certain ideological pillars, it shows what politics could become in the future. For this reason, understanding under which conditions populism thrives or fails is a crucial task.

The aim of this book consists precisely in understanding why populism blooms in certain countries while it remains a *taboo* in others. The current wave of populism in Western Europe is generating a lot of confusion because short-term economic and political factors often fail to explain the social acceptability of populist discourses across countries. While the vast majority of studies point to contingent demand- and supply-side factors that are supposed to explain the electoral success of populist discourses, this study shows the importance of considering populism from a long-term, historical perspective in order to understand its social acceptability. The populist idea of power circulates in every public debate across Europe, but its social acceptability is strongly determined by the collective re-elaboration of the European fascist past.

Losing sight of the historical dimension of populism and – in particular – of its resonance with the authoritarian turn that Europe experienced in the 1920s and 1930s, one would fail to explain why populism is socially acceptable in certain countries while it is highly stigmatized in others. The presence of high levels of

corruption combined with poor economic performance and growing inequalities, for example, might not automatically lead to a populist triumph. Similarly, populist actors might thrive in a country characterized by a growing economy and a responsive political system. This can only be explained by adopting a long-term perspective that focuses on the stigma generated by different collective memories of the fascist past.

Naturally, long-term legacies that determine the *Salonfähigkeit* (social acceptability) of populism always interact with short-term socio-economic and political-institutional factors. It is impossible to ignore that, in Western Europe, populist movements, parties, and leaders often settle the political debate and obtain remarkable electoral results. Populist discourses have become *mainstream* in liberal democracies to the point that the political climate characterizing the last two decades has been described as populist *Zeitgeist*.[2] When the political system is out of touch and isolated in its ivory tower, and those in power do not deliver on their promises, citizens want to be heard and to hold their representatives accountable. If the media add fuel to the fire of supranational integration and the refugee crisis, the perfect Molotov cocktail is served, and populism becomes a very effective way to mobilize resentment by offering redemption from the *old politics* and by exploiting the fears of constituencies disoriented by modernization.

In 1922, Antonio Gramsci was witnessing the rise of fascism in Italy, and he perfectly understood the social climate of the time: dense of fears, resentment, and anti-politics feelings. In his words, "fascism presented itself as the anti-party, opened the doors to every candidate and – with its promised impunity – allowed a motley multitude to cover with a fresh paint of vague and nebulous political ideas the wild flood of passions, hatreds, and desires."[3] A century later, populist parties tap into popular resentments and insecurities, exploit the shortcomings of established political parties, and take advantage of disillusioned voters through an anti-elitist rhetoric that promise to give back the power to the confused multitudes that Gramsci was describing.

In times of protracted economic crisis and deterioration of the credibility of political parties and institutions, the growing political weight of populist actors should not come as a surprise. Populism gains traction when the gap between representatives and represented grows to a critical point, which is why it can be considered as a potential "barometer" of the health of representative politics (Taggart 2002, 71); high levels of populism might indicate the malfunctioning of liberal and constitutional democratic mechanisms. Moreover, by observing previous waves of populism, one can see that socio-economic turbulence and political transformations have always been key factors for the success of populism. If one considers that the last three decades in Western Europe have been marked by the Great Recession, a process of supranational integration, and a flow of migrants from the Middle East and Northern Africa, the boisterous success of populism seems to be the obvious ending of a well-known story rather than a flash in the pan.

When trying to understand the mechanisms determining the social acceptability of populist discourses across countries, one must constantly bear in mind that populism is increasingly successful in elections and often accepted in the political

debate. Indeed, the data examined in this work confirm a growing presence of populist discourses in West European party manifestos. This indicates that short-term supply- and demand-side conditions are favourable for populism to thrive. Socio-economic and political-institutional factors, however, are only part of the explanation, and they must be considered in *interaction* with the national political culture of each country, which can either prevent or foster the *Salonfähigkeit* of populism. Indeed, it is remarkable to observe that the social acceptability of populist discourses greatly varies across countries which are experiencing the same transformations and turbulences across a similar timescale. This suggests that, in some countries, populism thrives despite unfavourable conditions, and vice versa. While certain countries can be considered as 'populist paradises' (e.g. Italy, Switzerland, Austria), in other countries populist discourses do not have sufficient legitimacy to leave the periphery of the public debate and become a credible alternative (e.g. Sweden, Germany, Portugal). Why is that the case?

To understand the cross-country variation of populism's social acceptability, one must observe how short-term social, economic, and political factors interact with *cultural* elements. In particular, different collective memories of the fascist past can open up or, conversely, close down windows of opportunity for the social acceptability of populist discourses. By observing different re-elaborations of that past, it is possible to determine the degree of stigma attached to it and therefore determine the *Salonfähigkeit* of populist discourses in a given society. This explains why populist discourses are widespread and electorally successful in countries where short-term factors seem unfavourable, and vice versa.

Four different types of collective re-elaboration determine the degree of stigmatization of the fascist past: culpabilization, heroization, cancellation, and victimization. In countries characterized by *victimization* – producing a very low degree of stigma of the fascist past – populism is particularly acceptable. By contrast, in countries characterized by *culpabilization* – producing a very high degree of stigma – populism is taboo and therefore socially unacceptable, at the margins of the public debate.

It is not surprising to observe that, in particular, it is the social acceptability of *right-wing* populism that proves to be linked very strongly to the levels of stigma of the fascist past. Indeed, the authoritarian past in Western Europe is represented by the *fascist* regimes in power in Italy and Germany between 1922 and 1945.[4] Countries which did not deal with the fascist past in a profound and responsible manner are therefore supposed to constitute a fertile ground for right-wing populism to thrive. For example, while Germany took responsibility for its past and admitted its guilt (a process called *Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit* or *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*), Austria shifted the blame and refused to critically deal with its past (Art 2006). These two opposite types of collective memory produce, respectively, a very high and a very low degree of stigmatization of illiberal elements. Given the fact that the two countries have similar levels of economic development or accountability and responsiveness of the political system, one can hypothesize that their different types of collective memories about the fascist past either trigger or block the social acceptability of populism.

A key element of this argument is represented by the *elective affinities* between populism and fascism. On the one hand, the two are extremely different phenomena, and the aim is not to collapse the two concepts into each other to the point of making them undistinguishable.[5] On the other hand, what matters here is the fact that the populist idea of power is often portrayed as a dangerous political ideology vis-à-vis liberal and constitutional ideas of power precisely because of its *illiberal elements*, which strongly resonate with certain traits of the fascist idea of power, in contrast to liberal and constitutional democracy. This negative characterization of populism is very much present in the European collective imagination. Politicians accused of being populist are often implicitly linked to the cumbersome legacy of the twentieth century and hence to the absence of democracy.[6]

Indeed, the term *populist* is often evoked in European politics in order to label someone as an anti-democratic demagogue, and populism is ultimately seen as a proto-totalitarian and illiberal ideology because the populist idea of power is at odds with the liberal and constitutional types of democracies which became dominant in Western Europe in the aftermath of World War II.[7] The tension between liberal and populist ideas of power is the expression of opposite types of democratic qualities: rule of law versus majoritarianism; checks and balances versus unmediated exercise of power; constitutionalism versus unconstrained will of the people; and division versus concentration of powers.[8] The fascist past resonates as soon as politicians articulate one of these points and criticize representative politics.

This study does not constitute the first attempt to explain cross-country and longitudinal variations in the presence of populism. Nonetheless, it displays three innovative elements concerning the measurement of populist messages, the amplitude of the data used for the analysis, and the introduction of a novel condition linked to the presence of populism. First, the discursive dimension of populism is considered. This means that the phenomenon to be explained is the *Salonfähigkeit* of populist discourses, measured as the combination of levels of *populism in party manifestos*, the parties' degree of *radicalism*, and their *electoral performance*. Second, the presence of populist discourses is measured in eight West European countries since the 1970s through an extensive content analysis of 173 party manifestos.[9] Third, this study introduces the idea that collective memories are connected to the social acceptability of populism and starts from the assumption that socio-economic and political-institutional factors are complementary to cultural opportunity structures in explaining different levels of populist discourses.

Structure of the book

This work follows several steps in order to test whether the levels of stigma of the fascist past – in interaction with traditional demand- and supply-side factors – can explain the social acceptability of populism. The first task consists of illustrating the theoretical framework used in order to operationalize and measure

populism, as well as the link between the populist idea of power, fascism, and liberal democracy (Chapter 1). Once it is clarified how populism is understood and conceptualized, Chapter 2 presents the existing literature about the conditions that are supposed to explain the electoral success of radical right-wing parties. This literature, however, focuses on a mono-dimensional idea of populism as a right-wing and often extremist political ideology. Moreover, short-term supply- and demand-side factors appear to leave unexplained part of the cross-country variation in terms of populism's social acceptability. Hence, the idea that different collective memories determine different degrees of stigmatization or acceptation of populism, and therefore play a role in triggering or blocking the social acceptability of populist discourses, is introduced (Chapter 3).

The research design is presented in Chapter 4. This provides all the details concerning the operationalization and measurement of populist discourses in party manifestos, a discussion of the case selection, and a brief description of the methodology implemented. Chapter 5 presents the results of the content analysis and offers an overview of the presence of populism. The percentage of populist statements in party manifestos is weighted by the vote share and degree of radicalism of each party, thus providing a measure for the social acceptability of populism across countries and over time. Chapter 6 presents the relevant literature about each country's type of re-elaboration in order to establish, for each case, the overall level of stigmatization of the fascist past.

Chapter 7 tests the role of several conditions usually associated with the electoral success of populism. Derived from the literature review presented in Chapter 2, these supply- and demand-side factors are supposed to trigger the social acceptability of populism. The analysis assesses the presence of sufficient and necessary conditions for the social acceptability of populist messages in eight West European countries over the last three decades. Finally, Chapter 8 tests the impact of the degree of stigma associated with the fascist past. It shows to what extent long-term cultural factors are essential in explaining the social acceptability of populist discourses. The Conclusions aim at proposing directions for future research, as well as assessing the generalizability of the findings outside Western Europe.

Notes

1 "The word evokes the long-simmering resentments of the everyman, brought to a boil by charismatic politicians hawking impossible promises. Often as not, populism sounds like something from a horror film: an alien bacteria [*sic*] that has somehow slipped through democracy's defences – aided, perhaps, by Steve Bannon or some other wily agent of mass manipulation – and is now poisoning political life, creating new ranks of populist voters among 'us.'" *The Guardian*, "'We the people': the battle to define populism," by Peter Baker, January 10, 2019, available online (consulted in March 2019): www.theguardian.com/news/2019/jan/10/we-the-people-the-battle-to-define-populism.

2 This idea has been introduced by Mudde (2004), and it has remained at the centre of the debate on populism ever since.

3 Translation of the author. The article was published by *L'Ordine Nuovo*, April 26, 1921. Published in Gramsci (1966).

4 In Portugal, António Salazar's regime remained in power until 1974 and Francisco Franco in Spain until 1975. Given the different timing and length, the memories of these two regimes after 1945 follow a different trajectory compared to the one relevant for the present study. These issues are discussed in more detail in the Conclusions.
5 For example, contrary to populism, fascism also includes para-militarism, corporatism, and imperialism. Similarities and differences between populism and fascism are thoroughly discussed by Eatwell (2017). Among other things, the author argues that, unlike fascism, populism is a form of democracy, albeit not liberal democracy.
6 In 2012, then EU President Herman van Rompuy and then European Commission President Barroso warned against the danger for democracy represented by populism, followed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, and Prime Minister of Norway Erna Solberg.
7 As will become evident in Chapter 1, whether or not populism is a threat depends on the normative idea of democracy used as a yardstick for comparison.
8 Slater speaks of a "tension between democratic inclusivity and democratic constraints", and a "friction between vertical and horizontal accountability" to describe the relationship between different ideas of democracy based on different levels of liberalism (2013, 732).
9 Such an extensive content analysis has been possible thanks to the NCCR Democracy programme: *Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century* (Module 2: *Populism in the Context of Globalization and Mediatization*).

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1 Taxonomy of a chameleon

The populist idea of power

This chapter clarifies the object of this study; since we are dealing with populism, this task is anything but obvious. It is essential to situate the chosen approach to populism within the burgeoning literature on the topic, which originates from different disciplines and relies on different concepts. What is populism, and how can its presence be measured in party manifestos? How is it possible to understand the relationship between populism and democracy, and how does this impact the possible explanatory models for its social acceptability?

Christoph Blocher in Switzerland, Luigi Di Maio in Italy, Nigel Farage in the United Kingdom, as well as Jean-Luc Mélenchon in France – despite being erratically positioned along the right – left and authoritarian – libertarian (or GAL – TAN) axes – share a common element: they articulate populist discourses. They express an ideology, a vision of the world, which on the one hand celebrates the common people as the only legitimate source of power and on the other hand represents the economic, cultural, and political elites as the enemy, a cancer of society, a clique of intrigues and corruption that must leave the stage to the *vox populi*. This logic entails that only the truly populist leaders and parties may redeem the common people and implement radical, direct, or simply legitimate forms of democracy.

Given the gargantuan variety of approaches to populism, however, the popular use of the term is often inaccurate or misleading: the misuse and abuse of the term have contributed to increase its aura as an elusive concept.[1] Even inside academia there has been much tug-of-war around definitions and applications, and the impression is that since the seminal work of Ionescu and Gellner (1969), the fuzziness has done nothing but increase. Populism seemed to be like the *Teumessian fox* of Greek mythology, destined never to be caught. Since the 1960s, scholars have been baffled by the "chameleonic" nature and "conceptual slipperiness" of populism (Taggart 2000). Isaiah Berlin argued that studies about populism suffer from a "Cinderella complex":

> There exists a shoe – the word "populism" – for which somewhere exists a foot. There are all kinds of feet which it nearly fits, but we must not be trapped by these nearly fitting feet. The prince is always wandering about with the shoe; and somewhere, we feel sure, there awaits a limb called pure populism.[2]

The concept of populism has become increasingly present in the public debate also because of its slipperiness and adaptability to several contexts. It is erroneously used as a synonym for nationalism, anti-elitism, and chauvinism but also to denote simplistic or even vulgar political positions. Duncan McDonnell and Ben Stanley have coined the term "schmopulism" to describe the fact that "populism" has become a popular buzzword in media and academia alike.

Figure 1.1 shows how scholars and journalists are talking about populism more than ever before.[3] In newspaper articles (plot on the left), the term started gaining popularity in the 1990s, then it grew steadily; in just one year (between 2015 and 2016), the term became literally ubiquitous, with a jump from around 34,000 articles mentioning the term to more than 65,000 articles. The development in academic peer-reviewed journals is similar, although the term populism already appears in a significant number of articles since the 1970s. From the 2000s, the growth is considerable: from 57 articles in 1999 to 446 in 2016. This is just a rough measure that contributes to understanding the extent to which populism has become one of the most discussed topics both inside and outside academia in Western Europe.



Figure 1.1 Populism in Newspaper Articles and Academic Journals

To avoid any conceptual slipperiness, and in order to adopt a clear theoretical framework, this study situates itself in a precise strand of literature which considers populism as an ideology – or a worldview – articulated discursively. This conceptualization has provided a theoretical and analytical toolbox which finally allows the study of populism in a consistent and comparative way. The next sections expose the extreme variability of populist discourses in order to grasp populism's ideological essence and eventually propose a minimal definition, which will constitute the base for the operationalization and measurement of populism in Chapter 4. Next, the relationship between populism and liberal democracy, and which elements of the populist idea of power resonate with the fascist past, are clarified.

Populism in historical perspective

From a populist perspective, true democracy – the rule (*krátos*) of the people (*demos*) – exists only when the will of the common people is respected as sovereign.[4] It follows that populism becomes successful especially because it promises to introduce (or restore) accountability and responsiveness by involving the people in the decision-making process, thus reviving the idea of direct democracy introduced in Ancient Athens 25 centuries ago.[5] However, political structures such as the Greek *poleis* do not exist anymore, and direct democracy in the context of nation-states is not at stake (Dahl 1989).[6]

Several historical manifestations of modern populism across the world show that the centrality of the people is constantly evoked in times of rapid socio-economic and political developments which leave large portions of the population without a credible representation of their interests. Globalization and modernization constitute the two main triggers for the formation of a breeding ground for populism not only in the twenty-first century but throughout history. For example, both agrarian populism and anti-Catholic nativism in the nineteenth-century United States developed in times of socio-economic turmoil as a response to the profound socio-economic and cultural challenges of the time (Swank and Betz 2003). The Russian Narodniki[7] – around the 1860s and 1870s – originated from similar socio-economic conditions: a group of intellectuals tried to convince the peasantry to fight an egalitarian struggle aiming at land redistribution, believing in the peasants' inherent socialism (Pedler 1927).[8]

Völkish movements[9] – which developed in nineteenth-century Germany as a mix of populism, Romantic Nationalism, and German folklore (Trägårdh 2002; Olsen 1999) – were the expression of an anti-modernity reaction to the Industrial Revolution. Kurlander (2002, 36) argues that, in order to survive, liberalism in Germany had to become *völkish* and eventually created the space for the emergence of National Socialism.[10] Similarly, in Austria and France, at the end of the nineteenth century, right-wing populist actors such as Karl Lueger and Georges Ernest Boulanger became very popular.

Since the 1970s, populism has resurfaced in Europe in its right-wing, nativist form as a reaction to the New Left and to the de-industrialization process,

focusing on issues positioned on the cultural axis of competition, such as immigration, crime, and nationalism. Parties such as the Front National in France, the Danish People's Party, and the Vlaams Belang in Belgium mobilized disillusioned constituencies in opposition to the mainstream parties and the political, economic, and cultural elites while proposing an ethnocentric vision of the people. In the following years, many other populist parties with similar agendas emerged all over Europe, such as the Sweden Democrats, the United Kingdom Independence Party, and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands. This is the most studied and best-documented wave of populism, and it generated such tremendous attention that it often overshadowed every other historical populist manifestation.[11] As a result, extreme and radical right-wing populism became a (wrong and misleading) synonym for populism *tout court*.

More recently, increasing attention has been devoted also to left-wing populist movements and parties, such as Podemos in Spain and SYRIZA in Greece (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014), or the Occupy movements (Pickerill 2015). These political experiences gained traction in the context of a protracted and generalized economic crisis by proposing to fight inequalities and corruption and to restore the sovereignty of the people vis-à-vis supranational economic institutions.

This far from exhaustive historical overview – which focuses mainly on Europe while ignoring many other populist manifestations in Asia, Latin America, and Africa – clarifies how heterogeneous populism can be and in how many different organizational and ideological ways it can be declined. The purpose was to illustrate the extreme variability of parties and movements articulating populist discourses in order to understand which is the lowest common denominator and therefore propose a minimal definition of populism which allows study of the phenomenon in a comparative and longitudinal way (Rooduijn 2014b).

Populism: its ideological dimension and a minimal definition

This study, in order to analyze the presence of populism in several countries over time, adopts the ideational approach proposed by Mudde (2004). This represents the best way to grasp the essence of a political phenomenon that varies so heavily over time and across countries. If the last section illustrated the populist phenomenon by exposing some of its manifold empirical manifestations, this section aims at re-composing the idea of populism by following the *fil rouge* which allows the identification of its ideological core.

Every populist manifestation in first place shares the same *idea of power*. Only at the second stage does it matter whether a particular manifestation of populism follows a right- or left-wing agenda, whether it is a bottom-up movement or a top-down project, whether it relies on a charismatic leader or not, whether it opposes or proposes certain policies, whether it stands in government or in opposition. The aim of this study is to understand the conditions triggering the social acceptability of populist discourses across eight West European countries, and for

this purpose it is essential to identify a set of common elements that characterize every empirical and, in particular, discursive manifestation of populism.[12]

For this purpose, the ideational approach appears to be the most suitable and convincing.[13] It defines populism as a particular ideology or worldview based on a Manichean distinction between the pure people and the corrupt elite. Since it entails a very narrow set of ideas, populism is often described as a *thin-centred ideology.*[14] In order to gain political depth, thin-centred ideologies such as populism are most commonly combined with more developed political ideologies such as socialism, nativism, or liberalism, depending upon the specific socio-political context and the type of actor articulating them.[15] Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012, 12) claim that "in practice, populism is almost always combined with one or more other ideological features." This study adopts the ideational approach and therefore identifies populism as a combination of *people-centrism* and *anti-elitism*. This leads to the following definition (Wirth et al. 2016, 15):[16]

> Populism is a thin-centered ideology, which considers – in a Manichean outlook – society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and postulates unrestricted sovereignty of the people.

The ideational approach, compared to the other existing ones, presents a main advantage: since it conceives of populism as a set of ideas, it become possible to clearly assess whether an actor is articulating a *populist discourse*.[17] Indeed, the populist ideology becomes measurable as soon as an actor articulates it discursively.[18] It also overcomes the typical dichotomous classification of political actors and journalists as either populist or not. In fact, it reflects the spectrum of different levels and varieties of populist discourses (Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2009; Rooduijn, de Lange, and van der Brug 2014).

Moreover, the ideational approach makes it possible for scholars to study both the demand- and supply-side of populist ideas. Conceptually, if populism is considered only as a style, as a type of party organization, or as a type of mobilization, it is difficult to understand which factors determine its dynamics of demand-and-offer on the political arena. It might allow us to know that citizens prefer grassroots organizations or flamboyant personalities (two traits that do not necessarily correlate with populism) but not why they vote for political actors articulating populist discourses. Similarly, it would not be possible to understand why political actors with populist ideas are able to find their place on political arenas already populated by many different actors with different ideologies.

Consistently with the ideational approach, populism is here presented as a type of discourse available to every political actor, who can employ "populism as a flexible mode of persuasion to redefine the people and their adversaries" (Panizza 2005, 8). This does not imply that every actor should be labelled as populist; at the empirical level, researchers can draw a distinction between populist or non-populist actors by establishing how often a certain actor has to articulate anti-elitist and people-centric messages in ordered to be labelled as a populist. On the

other hand, it becomes possible to establish that an actor is more populist than others and that their discourses are populist in different ways because they use different rhetoric strategies and are attached to different full ideologies. In this study, the aim is to establish when a certain country – at a certain time in point – displays a high social acceptability of populism.[19]

After having defined populism as a thin-centred ideology that can be articulated discursively, a definition that encompasses all the historical manifestations of populism, it is essential to describe the populist idea of power and how this is in tension with liberal and constitutional ideas of power. Hence, the next sections present the relationship between the elite and the people as antagonistic elements of society in the populist ideology, as well as the substantial differences between the populist idea of power and liberal democracy. These aspects must be discussed for two reasons. First, they are central to the development of the argument presented in Chapter 3 because they clarify the link between populism and illiberal ideas of power, and therefore the link between the fascist past and the present social acceptability of populism. Second, they clarify the operationalization of populism presented in Chapter 4.

The people and the elite

By adopting the ideational approach and therefore defining populism as a thin-centred ideology, it follows that the categories of 'people' and 'elite' can assume different connotations over time and across cases or to say that *à la* Laclau, the elite and the people remain "floating signifiers" (2005). In other words, the full ideology attached to populism defines how the social cleavage between the pure people and the corrupt elite is declined. While the cleavage is a constant element of the populist ideology, it can be interpreted in many different ways by different actors by excluding different portions of the demos and targeting different kinds of elites. The Manichean opposition between *good* and *evil* remains, but the boundaries of inclusion and exclusions vary.

At the center of the populist worldview, there is the idea of *demos* and consequently *demoticism* (closeness to the ordinary people).[20] The people are characterized as a homogeneous entity expressing a common will, or *volonté générale*. Moreover, the people are often portrayed as a virtuous and inherently good group, with their will constituting the only source of legitimacy and authentic democracy (March 2011; Stanley 2008; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008; Kriesi 2014; Taggart 2000). The duty of populist politicians is to embody and implement the *vox populi* in the most direct and faithful way. Indeed, only populist politicians are supposed to instinctively know what the people want and be able to voice their needs. As Pasquino noted, "populist leaders do not represent the people, rather they consider themselves – and succeed in being considered – an integral part of the people. They are of the people" (2007, 21–22).

When the thin populist ideology is associated with a full ideology, usually it becomes explicit who belongs to the demos and who does not: a more or less neat division line is established between 'us' and 'them.' In general, it is possible

to identify three different conceptions of the people which refer to three different social dimensions: political, cultural, and economic.[21] In empirical terms, the three conceptions of the people are not necessarily distinguished. In fact, they might be combined in a single populist discourse, and potentially they can even be present all at the same time.

Politically, populism identifies the people as sovereign. Therefore, there is a perfect overlap between the people and the *demos*: all of the people are included.[22] This is generally the most inclusive articulation of populism, although its conceptualization greatly varies across countries and over time. The *cultural* conception considers the people in an ethnic sense: in fact, the people is not understood as *demos* but rather as *ethnos*, and the dividing line excludes part of the national community such as migrants and other minorities, considered as aliens or outsiders. This is normally the most exclusionary articulation of the boundary of the *demos*, as it is typically interpreted by extreme right-wing populist parties. The *economic* conception describes the people as a class and distinguishes between 'ordinary people' and the rich ones (or the 'one percent') – in other words, it draws the line between the privileged and the common ones. Similar to the political conception, it is rather inclusive, but the dividing line here is articulated on the economic axis, and it is particularly common among – but not exclusive to – left-wing populist parties. As illustrated by the historical excursus presented above, different conceptions of the people are articulated by different actors according to different social-political contexts, but the opposition of 'people vs elite' remains constant.

As in every 'good and evil' dichotomy, while the people are the collective hero, there must be a (collective) villain of the story: in this case, the elite. Indeed, its members are often portrayed as corrupt or conspiring, as well as unaccountable and incompetent (Jansen 2011; Hawkins 2009; Rooduijn 2014b). Mudde (2004, 544), incisively defined the populist interpretation of the elite as the people's *nemesis*. Similar to the concept of the people, the concept of the elite can also be declined in different ways. It can refer to a *political* dimension, thus including the government as well as mainstream parties and other national and international actors (at the moment, the EU is the main target). It can refer to a *cultural* dimension, targeting in this case the mass media system, as well as writers and more generally the *intelligentsia*. Moreover, the elite can be defined in *economic* terms and refer to bankers, managers, and, generally speaking, national and international economic institutions. As illustrated by the historical excursus presented above, different elites are targeted according to different social-political contexts. Once again, however, they are always portrayed as having interests and values opposed to those of the common people.

Populism and democracy

Based on the definition of populism provided above, it is now possible to highlight the differences between the populist idea of democracy compared to the liberal (or constitutional) one. It is important to notice that these considerations concern the *thin* ideology of populism, meaning that these characteristics are

present in both right- and left-wing declinations of populism, no matter what full ideology is attached to the populist nucleus. For this reason, in the following chapters, the analysis will concern the overall levels of populism before testing the same conditions for right- and left-wing populism separately.

First of all, the two counterparts of populism must be identified: *elitism* and *pluralism* (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; Caramani 2017). Like populism, elitism splits society into two homogenous parts but operates a symmetrical division; it praises the elite and considers the people as incapable of making informed decisions. Pluralism, on the other hand, opposes the Manichean perspective present in populism and considers diversity of opinions and compromises as a value.

The lack of pluralism in the populist idea of power has lead several authors to conclude that populism can threaten (or be disadvantageous for) democracy, thus constituting a "syndrome" or a "pathology" (Taggart 2002; Rosanvallon 2008). Others, on the contrary, have argued that the presence of anti-elitism entails a watchdog-type of relationship between those in power and the opposition, and for this reason populism should rather be considered as a corrective or at least an intrinsic part of democracy, thus being its "shadow" or "mirror" (Tännsjö 1992; Canovan 1999; Arditi 2004; Laclau 2005; Panizza 2005).

This long-lasting academic controversy is particularly slippery because the debate is framed in the wrong way. The point is not whether populism constitutes a threat or a corrective for democracy but rather *to what extent different types of populism can have a positive or negative impact on different forms of democracy*. For this reason it is advisable to follow Rovira Kaltwasser's argument about the necessity of a minimal approach: populism represents a threat from a liberal perspective on democracy and a corrective from a radical perspective (2012). Consequently, different ideas about the relationship between democracy and populism are too strongly based on normative assumptions about democracy itself.

This study, however, is not purely theoretical. Since it focuses on the presence of populism in Western Europe from the 1970s until today, the debate focuses mainly on the potential threat that populism can represent for liberal democracy. As Dahl pointed out, a populist democracy differs from a liberal "Madisonian" democracy in its disregard of constitutionalist elements such as the rule of law, the division of power, and respect for the rights of minorities (1956). In a similar vein, Abts and Rummens (2007) observed that the populist demand for unrestricted power of the people distinguishes the populist idea of democracy from constitutional and liberal logics of democracy. Also, Mény and Surel (2002, 10) highlighted the fact that populism is against counterweights to the unbalanced supremacy of the people, including "enforceable human rights, constitutional courts, the territorial and functional division of powers, and the autonomy of the central banks." These positions are effectively summarized by Pappas (2014), who defined populism as "democratic illiberalism" (although populism is not necessarily combined with democratic features).

Figure 1.2 summarizes the traits of the populist idea of power that are inherently illiberal and that therefore are in contrast with a liberal and constitutional idea of power. The link between the populist and the fascist idea of power rests



Figure 1.2 Populist Democracy and Its Illiberal Elements

upon the *illiberal* elements they have in common, and for this reason it is possible to hypothesize that the present social acceptability of populism is linked to the collective re-elaboration of the fascist past. This does not imply that populism is a threat for democracy per se, but since it is inherently based on illiberal elements, it strongly challenges the only form of democracy present in Western Europe since 1945: liberal and constitutional democracy.

It is important to stress once again that populism and fascism are not the same but that populism embodies illiberal and authoritarian tendencies. In other words, it is possible to say that all fascists may be populists, but not all populists are fascist. This reflects the dispute summarized by Stavrakakis and Jäger (2017). Populism per se is not the synecdoche of all kinds of political evil, as Müller (2016) seems to imply. Populism is not a threat when it reduces inequalities or increases political participation. Moreover, populism is not the only ideology that relies on moralistic categories or that proclaims the moral superiority of a segment over the rest of the electorate. In fact, advocates of liberal democracy can be moralistic as well, and they often are when taking anti-populist positions.

In a similar vein, liberal democracy per se is not a solution or the only legitimate form of power. On the one hand, the liberal-democratic state is continuously struggling to balance (capitalist) accumulation and legitimacy. On the other hand, it is definitely advisable when it fights authoritarian tendencies, racism, and sexism or when it protects checks and balances, press freedom, and civil liberties. On this aspect (as in many others), it is advisable to keep in mind the lesson of Margaret Canovan (1999, 9–10). Despite the tensions between 'the politics of faith' and 'the politics of skepticism,' the two styles are inseparable in modern politics to the point that "the two faces of democracy are a pair of squabbling Siamese twins, inescapably linked, so that it is an illusion to suppose that we can have one without the other."

In other words, it is interesting to observe the relationship between populism and liberal democracy given that they are deeply in tension: for example, populism constitutes an effective critique of liberal democracy because it highlights some of its shortcomings, pitfalls, and paradoxes, such as lack of direct democracy or the process of cartelization of political parties and their corruption. This is possible because populism opposes two pillars of liberal democracy: the rule of law and the protection of individual and minority rights (Plattner 2010).[23] The implementation of the populist idea of power would solve the tension inherent to liberal democracy, but it would also foster a model where the protection of minority rights is replaced by the indisputable decision of the majority and potential conflicts are solved through a purely majoritarian approach targeting the 'common good' as final goal.[24]

If there are any lessons that European politicians should have assimilated from the tragic events that led to World War II, respect for minority rights and the importance of the rule of law are two of the most important ones. For this reason, institutions and political actors often reject the populist idea of power because it is perceived as a dangerous ideology that might threaten some of the key Western values developed as a reaction to the barbarism of World War II and the Holocaust. Müller (2016) argues that European political systems were built on a *distrust* of popular sovereignty fueled by the experience of fascism. Hence, he maintains that politicians and the media should address the issues raised by populists not by ignoring or excluding them but by *challenging their framing* – in other words, by taking the liberal and democratic principles more seriously.

In conclusion, modern democracies should not simply dismiss populism as a threat but rather incorporate its critiques in a political context characterized by checks and balances, press freedom, and civil liberties while keeping in mind that liberal democracy is not the only possible way to translate the will of the people. The tension between different ideas of power is what keeps democracy alive, and we should not reduce every conflictual and dissenting voice to a threat. At the same time, we cannot underestimate the potential consequences of the erosion of liberal traits of democracy, as well as the emergence of nationalist and authoritarian regimes across the globe.

Notes

1. For an interesting study concerning the use of the term in the British media, see Bale, van Kessel, and Taggart (2011). A telling statement form Moffitt and Tormey (2014, 382) reads as follows: "It is an axiomatic feature of literature on the topic to acknowledge the contested nature of populism. . ., and more recently the literature has reached a whole new level of meta-reflexivity, where it is posited that it has become common to *acknowledge the acknowledgment* of this fact."
2. This quote was found in Margaret Canovan's book *Populism* (Canovan 1981, 7).
3. Both plots show the number of articles mentioning populism or related terms (populis* or populist* or populism*) in six languages (English, German, French, Italian, Swedish, and Dutch) between 1969 and 2016. On the left, through *Factiva*, the major newspapers are included (the pre-1985 levels are particularly low also because only a few newspaper articles are available, but what matters most is the increase after 2010). On the right, through *Web of Science*, the major academic peer-reviewed journals are considered.
4. Themistocles, Athenian politician and general, is sometimes described as a paleo-populist since he decided to move to Keramikos, a down-market part of Athens, in order to be perceived as a man of the people. According to Plutarch, his role of attorney and arbitrator gained him further popularity among the *hoi polloi* (the many, the majority).
5. The negative connotation of the word *Idios* (the Greek term for 'private person'), speaks volumes about the political role of the citizens in Ancient Athens. However, 'direct' does not mean 'inclusive.' In fact, it was a very restrictive idea of democracy. It excluded women, slaves, and those who did not have the Athenian citizenship.
6. Jordan Bardella, spokesperson of the *Rassamblement National* (former *Front National*) and leader of the youth organization of the party (*Génération nation*), in a meeting with other movements of the European far right recently declared (translation of the author): "Europe is the Athenian democracy, not Brussels' technocracy. Europe is imperial Rome, not the Treaty of Rome. Europe is Le Pen and Salvini, not Juncker and Moscovici." *Internazionale*, "L'incontro dei giovani sovranisti a Roma non è andato come previsto", by Giada Zampano, April 2, 2019, available online (consulted in April 2019): www.internazionale.it/notizie/giada-zampano/2019/04/02/giovani-sovranisti-roma
7. Narodniki comes from the Russian word *narod*, translatable as "people" or "folk."
8. The Narodniki is one of the rare examples of exclusively top-down populist movements.
9. From the German word *Volk*, again translatable as "people."
10. "[I]n so far as German liberalism was universalist and inclusive, it was ultimately rejected by a völkish constituency. Conversely, in so far as the liberals assimilated and promoted certain tenets of the völkish *Weltanschauung,* German liberalism clearly helped to pave the way for Hitler and National Socialism."
11. To mention just a few studies, among others one could list: Betz (1994); Kitschelt and McGann (1995); Kazin (1995); Taggart (1995); Rydgren (2005); Mudde (2007).
12. The framework of analysis must be at the same time precise enough and flexible enough to include every instance of populism while excluding other types of discourses, this avoiding both type I and type II errors.
13. On this point, there seems to be quite a large consensus among scholars: Jagers and Walgrave (2007); Stanley (2008); Hawkins (2009, 2010); Pauwles (2011); Rooduijn, de Lange, and van der Brug (2014); to mention just a few.
14. The term was introduced by Michael Freeden (1998). However, the same author is uncertain about the applicability of the concept to populism. See: Freeden (2017).

15 The combination of a thin (populist) ideology with a thick (or full) one describes the vast majority of populist manifestations. Indeed, it is very rare to find populism in its purely thin form. The case of the Italian *Five Star Movement* could go in this direction, since the party refuses to be labeled as right- or left-wing, and indeed seems to rely on a vague post-ideological approach. On this topic: Manucci and Amsler (2018).

16 This definition of populism, used by the whole module on *Populism in the Context of Globalization and Mediatization* of the *NCCR Democracy* program, is mainly derived from Mudde (2004), and Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008).

17 Other approaches, for example, define populism in stylistic terms (Kazin 1995), according to its organizational features (Weyland 2001), or as a type of mobilization (Jansen 2011).

18 This can happen, among other ways, through speeches (Hawkins 2009), party manifestos (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011), newspaper articles (Rooduijn 2014), and also interviews and parliamentary discussions. Moreover, different types of actors can articulate populist discourses: while politicians and journalists play a crucial role in circulating populism in the public debate, also common people as well as celebrities and representatives of NGOs and famous brands or other organizations, can articulate populist discourses.

19 The methodological aspects concerning calibration are discussed in detail in Chapter 4 and in Chapter 7.

20 About demoticism and populism, see March (2017).

21 In the historical manifestations of populism presented in section Populism in historical perspective, it is possible to identify each of the main conceptions of *demos* presented here.

22 Here it is important to introduce a caveat: all the people belonging to a certain territory (generally a country but also existing and even imaginary regions, like *Padania* in Italy) are included. Moffitt (2017) wrote about how populists construct "the people" above the national level. De Cleen (2017) argues that in nationalism concepts such as state, democracy, and culture acquire meaning in relation to the nation, while for populism this is not necessarily true. Moreover, while nationalism constructs the nation as an organic community that all members of the nation are part of, populism often divides the nation internally between people and elites. Indeed, populism divides society on a vertical, down/up axis and does not necessarily construct 'the people' as nation. Moreover, while nationalism is intrinsically national, populism can be a transnational phenomenon. Examples in this sense are the Occupy movement as well as Yannis Varoufakis' Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (DiEM 25). While several populist radical right parties stand united in presenting themselves as defenders of European identity and civilisation against immigration and 'Islamisation,' this is an example of an international rather than transnational phenomenon. Finally, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017, 72) argue that "for the European populist radical right ethnicity is not part of the populist distinction between the people and the elite, who are part of the same ethnic group, but rather of the nativist distinction between 'natives' and 'aliens'. . . . In the case of Latin American ethnopopulism, on the other hand, the nation is defined as a multicultural unit, within which the people and elite are divided by both morality and ethnicity."

23 It might seem counterintuitive to link left-wing populism to the lack of minority protection, while it might seem more obvious for right-wing populism. However, in principle, both left- and right-wing populism rely on a majoritarian and anti-pluralistic approach, therefore it is possible to claim that populism per se is a threat to minority rights.

24 The paradox is based on the coexistence of a democratic pillar and a liberal pillar. This implies that even if every person belonging to the demos has equal rights

(liberal pillar), on the other hand it must be established who belongs to the demos and who does not (democratic pillar), and this inevitably triggers inequality. "What cannot be contestable in a liberal democracy is based on the idea that it is legitimate to establish limits to popular sovereignty in the name of liberty. Hence its paradoxical nature" (Mouffe 2000, 4). Moreover, as Abts and Rummens argued, "populist resentments arise when constitutional democracy is perceived to be out of balance in favour of the constitutional pillar" (2007, 410).

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2 The natural habitat of populism

Favourable conditions and triggers

Explaining why populist discourses are more socially acceptable in certain countries than in others is certainly no easy task. What makes it even more complicated is the fact that – for decades – scholars have directed their efforts in other directions. In particular, only a part of the story that this book tries to tell has been extensively investigated: first, because rather than dealing with the social acceptability of populism, countless articles and books have tried to make sense of the electoral performance of populist parties; second, because the focus has been almost exclusively on a sub-type of populist parties: radical and extreme right ones. As a result, virtually no literature on populism goes beyond its electoral dimension, while (so far) few studies include populist parties from the centre or the left of the political spectrum.

This means that the phenomenon to explain here is substantially different (but for certain aspects similar) to the object of a vast literature. As Chapter 4 will clarify, the *social acceptability of populism* is in fact a combination of three factors. First, the percentage of populist statements in a manifesto (discursive dimension); second, the degree of radicalism of the party author of the manifesto (political and ideological dimension); and third, the vote share of the party at the elections for which the manifesto was written (electoral dimension). Naturally, the type of phenomenon to explain has consequences on the types of conditions that – on a theoretical and empirical base – it makes sense to test. It follows that the selection of the relevant conditions is inspired by a certain scholar tradition but inevitably transcends it. For this reason, it is necessary to introduce two caveats for the selection of conditions to be tested.

First, while most research on Europe focuses on radical right populist parties, this study aims at identifying the factors that can explain the presence of populism as a thin ideology, independently from the full ideology attached to it. Several variables analyzed in the literature refer to the success of far-right or extreme right-wing parties, but they will not be included unless they are supposed to explain the acceptability of populism as a thin ideology. Second, while most studies focus on the international dimension of populism understood as a global phenomenon manifesting itself in virtually every democracy, this study aims at explaining *why populism thrives in certain countries but not in others*. Therefore, factors that manifest themselves in each country with a similar timing will not be included.

Finally, the choice of conditions to be tested is further restricted by methodological issues as well as by data availability. Methodologically, since the cases included in the study are 23, it is not advisable to use more than five total conditions.[1] Considering that one condition will be the level of stigma of the fascist past (long-term factor), four conditions (short-term factors) can be extrapolated by the relevant literature.[2] Concerning the availability of the data, the analysis includes eight West European countries from the 1990s to now; hence, a condition can be tested only in case the data are consistently available. Bearing in mind these premises, the chapter is structured as follows.

The first section illustrates the theoretical framework linking the presence of populism to large-scale processes such as modernization and globalization. The second section illustrates and discusses the results produced by the empirical research testing the factors linked to the above-mentioned processes. The third section presents the conditions that are relevant for the present study and therefore selected for the analytical section. The aim is to produce an explanatory model able to keep together socio-economic and political-institutional factors that might explain the social acceptability of populism. Finally, a formal hypothesis is formulated.

Populism as a by-product of modernization and globalization

The growing presence of populism in Europe is often considered as the result of two interconnected transformations: first, the shift from materialist to post-materialist values that occurred during the 1960s and 1970s, as symbolized by the protests of 1968, and second, the transition from industrial to post-industrial societies that took place during the 1980s and 1990s. In the first case, the 'New Left' mobilized a young electorate which shared post-materialist and cosmopolitan values revolving around civil rights, gay rights, abortion, environmentalism, and gender roles; in the second case, radical right-wing populist parties were able to counter-mobilize the so-called *losers of globalization* along the new cultural cleavage. The two phases are connected to each other, and they are supposed to constitute the transmission chain that has made right-wing populism so widespread since the 1990s.

The process of electorate de-alignment and re-alignment along new dividing lines has been labelled as a 'silent revolution' in its first – mainly left-wing – phase (Inglehart 1977) and a 'silent counter-revolution' in its subsequent – mainly right-wing – articulation (Ignazi 1992). This shows that populism becomes a successful political resource as soon as the traditional class and religious cleavages fail to structure the political struggle within society.

In more detail, during the 1960s and 1970s, European societies witnessed the end of the stability of the traditional cleavage structure, and a generational and educational revolution brought to the fore values such as pacifism, feminism, civil rights, and environmentalism. New generations without major concerns for material subsistence started attributing greater importance to post-materialist

values based on autonomy and self-expression, and this produced the fading of established partisan loyalties of the electorate. The re-alignment occurred along new lines of conflict (cosmopolitan vs communitarian, or libertarian vs authoritarian) together with the old redistributive axis of conflict (Kitschelt 1994). The new cleavage structure favoured left-wing movements and political experiences able to mobilize a new constituency that could not find any representation in the previous cleavage structure, while norms and values opposed to the libertarian movements emerged only later on.[3]

Indeed, the political mobilization of traditional and authoritarian values became widespread only after a second transformation occurred. During the 1980s and 1990s, the decline of the secondary sector, the privatization of public sector enterprises, the cross-border mobility of workers, and the delocalization of the production processes marked the transition from industrial to post-industrial societies. These transformations, rooted in processes such as modernization, globalization, and de-industrialization, produced a dividing line between the so-called *winners and losers of globalization* (Kriesi et al. 2006; Kupchan 2012).

In particular, the latter felt that higher unemployment, growing inequalities, and decreased social services threatened their style of life and social status (Cox and Sinclair 1999; Zimmerling 2005). Moreover, the perceived threat originated also in the weakening protection of the traditional national boundaries, thus engendering a reaction that invoked protectionist measures and national independence (Cerny 1999). By fighting the universalistic values mobilized by the 'New Left' and by articulating new discourses and issues related to nativism on the cultural axis (Betz and Johnson 2004), right-wing populist parties have become increasingly successful since the 1980s.

Concerning the mechanisms behind this transformation, while for Kitschelt and McGann (1995) the impact of post-industrial societies triggered *preferences* for ethnocentrism and authoritarianism, a complementary approach based on *emotions* (such as resentment, anxiety, and hostility) has been proposed by Betz (1993, 415). He identified the success of right-wing populist parties as being inherent in their "ability to mobilize resentment and protest and their capability to offer a future-oriented program that confronts the challenge posed by the economic, social, and cultural transformation of advanced West European democracies."

The point of convergence is the strong link between socio-economic and cultural transformations and the loss of credibility and accountability of the elite. As Kitschelt and McGann observed, "the rise of radical right-wing populist parties has coincided with a marked increase in public disaffection and disenchantment with the established political parties, the political class, and the political system in general" (1995, 169). In particular, the transformations of the traditional cleavage structure created the political opportunity structures for populist parties who mobilized electoral constituencies traditionally linked to social-democratic parties (Kitschelt 1994).

Bornschier (2010a) found that while the traditional cleavage based on class conflict gradually lost its salience, the cultural divide increasingly structures

the political competition. In particular, the salience of the opposition between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values is a central element for the success of the populist right, linking it to the transformation that took place starting from the 1960s.

Although there is consensus in the literature about the salience of the cultural cleavage in explaining the success of right-wing populist parties, this does not imply that economic issues are not relevant anymore. In fact, following the Great Recession that characterized the period 2008–2012, the constituency identifiable as 'losers of globalization' has expanded considerably. It started to include an increasingly wider portion of the middle-class, and this allowed left-wing populist parties to obtain remarkable electoral performances. The effects of the economic crisis could explain the success of left-wing populist parties such as SYRIZA in Greece and Podemos in Spain, although this link has not been yet confirmed empirically (Kriesi and Pappas 2015).

Besides the profound socio-economic and cultural transformation that provoked the de-alignment and re-alignment of the European electorates along a new interpretation of the cultural cleavage, two additional factors have been recently associated with the breakthrough of populist parties: supranational integration and the mediatization of politics. These factors characterized virtually every European country, and they are supposed to trigger the electoral success and persistence of populist parties. They do not offer an alternative explanation compared to the traditional cleavage model but rather reinforce the effects produced by the mass values change and the de-industrialization process.

European elites and institutions have been described as too distant from the people, and this, in turn, has reinforced the lack of a fully developed European identity. Given the fact that it has not been possible to identify a unified European demos, some authors have proposed the concept of European "demoicracy" (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013), while the democratic deficit of the European institutions has become a widespread refrain among politicians and commentators.[4]

Unsurprisingly, the critique of supranational institutions has been a distinctive mark of both right and left populist parties (Gifford 2006; Benedetto and Quaglia 2007). Indeed, they consider multilevel governance as an element further fraying the accountability chain and creating a dimension of contestation between supranational integration and national independence (Marks and Wilson 2000). Hence, the process of supranational integration – combined with the effects of the Great Recession – is supposed to have long-term effects on the tension between the responsibility and the responsiveness of the political parties (Mair 2013; Bardi, Bartolini, and Trechsel 2014).

On the one hand, the elite must act responsively towards international markets and supranational institutions; on the other hand, this diminishes their responsiveness towards the voting public (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). In other words, since the process of European integration entails the creation of supranational institutions and the implementation of models of multilevel governance, this can pose problems of democratic inclusion, accountability, responsiveness, and transparency (Papadopoulos 2010; Lavenex 2013).

Last but not least, the so-called process of *mediatization of politics* has been identified as a relevant factor linked to the growing alienation of the voters from the traditional political process and therefore as a trigger for populism.[5] Commercial media are supposed to lend more visibility to populist actors because of their flamboyant style of communication (Mazzoleni 2003, 2008). In turn, populist actors are supposed to exploit the climate of cynicism and disillusionment generated by the media. As a result, populist actors have access to the public debate, and their critique of the establishment is backed by media news coverage focused on scandals and corruption. This process has been labelled *video-malaise* and is considered to trigger the success of populist actors while harming democratic quality.[6]

Several authors have highlighted the decisive role of the media in providing an essential space in the public debate to populist actors. According to Ellinas, without the spotlight of the media, "Far Right movements might be doomed to political irrelevance and relegated to the margins of political discourse" (2010, 32–33). Art claims that the failure of the populist radical right in Germany is related to the media's attacks on these parties (2006), while Kitschelt and McGann maintain that unless the media are willing to disseminate their messages, "Far Rightists will not be able to capitalize on the opportunities that are made available in the electoral arena" (1995, 130). In general, the role of the media is considered as a crucial factor both for the emergence of populist parties and for their legitimization (Eatwell 2003; Norris 2005; Rydgren 2007).

All in all, virtually every European country seems to constitute a fertile ground for populist parties to thrive. As summarized by *The New York Times*, a few factors seem to be unequivocally linked to the breakthrough of far-right parties: "Amid a migrant crisis, sluggish economic growth and growing disillusionment with the European Union, far-right parties – some longstanding, others newly formed – have been achieving electoral success in a number of European nations."[7] The next section provides an extensive review of the most relevant studies on the topic, and it shows that, for several reasons, the puzzle is far from easily solvable. First, populism does not coincide with far-right parties. Second, different studies offer different interpretations about the same phenomena according to different methods and operationalizations. Third, although every European country is experiencing the same transformations across a similar timescale, populism is not equally widespread in each country. Since the aim of this study consists in explaining cross-country variance in the social acceptability of populist discourses, these aspects are crucial and will be examined in the next sections.

Empirical findings in the literature

A vast literature analyzes the factors linked to the electoral success of (mainly right-wing) populist parties, and most of the studies rely on the theoretical framework presented above: radical right populism is widely considered as a *counter-revolution* triggered by the effects of modernization and globalization and fuelled by processes such as the mediatization of politics and supranational integration. There are important empirical results that should be taken into consideration

about demand-side as well as supply-side conditions for the electoral performance of populist parties. Supply-side explanatory variables concern the conditions that are supposed to create the favourable political opportunity structures for populism, while demand-side factors concern the reasons why people vote for populist parties (or show populist attitudes). Several authors emphasize the importance of considering the interaction between these two sets of factors (Eatwell 2003; Norris 2005; Mudde 2007), and here they are presented separately only for the sake of clarity. All the main factors mentioned in relevant studies are included, whether or not they will be tested in the analytical section.

For each factor, the results of the relevant empirical research are presented. The following section presents and justifies the final choice of the conditions that can be considered as relevant for the social acceptability of populist discourses – and not only for the electoral performance of radical or new right-wing populist parties. The aim is to create a set of conditions that are supposed to trigger the social acceptability of populism and in particular to explain the cross-country variance of populism's social acceptability.

Supply-side factors

Several supply factors have been identified as relevant for the electoral success of populist parties: low quality of representative democracy; corruption scandals; ideological convergence of the mainstream parties; the presence of a proportional electoral system; and the process of mediatization of politics.[8]

1 Concerning the relationship between democracy and populism, the protest-voting model argues that people vote for a populist party in order to express their distrust towards the political elite (Fieschi and Heywood 2004). Betz noted that populist parties "became popular at a time when there was a dramatic rise in public disenchantment with traditional parties, political leadership, the political process, and even the way democracy works in developed democracies" (2002, 199). In other words, there is space for new political parties (including populist ones) as soon as the political system is inefficient and unstable, and people show dissatisfaction and resentment towards traditional politics.

For example, negative public attitudes towards mainstream parties might be engendered by *cartelization*: colluding parties employ the resources of the state to limit political competition and to ensure their own survival and electoral success (Katz and Mair 1995). Cartelization is usually linked to "the rise of populist anti-party-system parties that appeal directly to public perceptions that the mainstream parties are indifferent to the desires of ordinary citizens" (Katz and Mair 2009, 759). However, van Kessel found that "populist parties have done well in low-trust countries . . . but also in countries . . . where people have been relatively satisfied with the way democracy works and where trust in parliament and political parties has been relatively high" (2015, 97).

Empirical research on this topic remains scarce and unsystematic. However, several studies analyzing the link between political discontent and radical right voting found that political distrust has an impact on the probability to vote for a radical right party (Norris 2005; Hooghe, Marien, and Pauwels 2011; Caiani, Della Porta, and Wagemann 2012).

2 A similar and interconnected aspect concerns the perception of corruption, which is supposed to trigger *Parteienverdrossenheit* (Mair 1998).[9] Unsurprisingly, a correlation has been established between perception of corruption and low levels of trust in political parties (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Slomczynski and Shabad 2012). In particular, one of the first attempts to identify corruption as a trigger for populism is present in Hawkins' book on Chavismo (2010, 153), which confirms the existence of a strong relationship between corruption across countries and the level of populism in the chief executive's discourse. The author concludes: "the results strongly suggest that widespread corruption is at least a necessary condition for the emergence of populism." On the other hand, corruption emerges as an insufficient explanation, since many countries with high levels of (perceived) corruption lack any noticeable populist leader.

In conclusion, according to van Kessel (2015) and Ivarsflaten (2008), perception of corruption does not have a significant impact on the success of populist parties.

3 When political parties *converge* towards the centre of the political spectrum, this provides expanding political opportunity structures for new right-wing populist parties (Ignazi 1992; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). More generally, the widespread feeling among the electorate that all the parties are "the same" opens a space for new political parties at the extremes of the spectrum and can facilitate the creation of niches within the political space (Kriesi 1999).

Several studies have confirmed the convergence thesis (Abedi 2002; Van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie 2005), although Bornschier (2010b) criticized previous works for either assuming that party positions can be represented on a single right-left dimension or assuming that voters will only support parties that adequately represent them on both dimensions.

4 The presence of a *proportional* rather than a majoritarian electoral system is supposed to create favourable conditions for the electoral performance of populist radical right parties (Swank and Betz 2003). Although several studies[10] have found support for this hypothesis, Arzheimer and Carter (2006) found that, after controlling for socio-demographic variables, the presence of a proportional electoral system has a negative impact on the performance of radical right parties. Different thresholds for entering the parliament are another aspect of the electoral system that has been considered, but the empirical findings tend to disprove this hypothesis.[11]

5 Finally, the process of 'mediatization of politics' has been linked to the growing success of radical and populist parties. The idea is that the media-logic and the political-logic are converging; therefore, media actors and political actors have common interests in providing and broadcasting emotional and conflictive stories. This means that political actors are increasingly aware of how to 'use' the media to gain visibility (a process called 'self-mediatization'),[12] while the media find the presence and actions of populist actors newsworthy and economically successful. The two aspects converge and create a relevant opportunity structure for the presence of populism in the public debate.

There is empirical evidence that the media system plays an important role in giving visibility to radical and populist parties.[13] Another aspect of the connection between political and media actors concerns the populist attitude of different media outlets. In particular, it has been argued that while the tabloid press and commercial television are supposed to work in 'complicity' with populist movements, quality newspapers are supposed to act as 'paladins' of mainstream parties (Mazzoleni 2003).

Demand-side factors

Several demand-side factors have been identified as favourable for the electoral performance of radical right-wing populist parties: economic hardship; high presence of immigrants and salience of the issue in the public debate; low welfare protection; and demographic factors.

1 It is intuitive to link the poor economic performance of a country with a bottom-up critique of its political and economic elites. In turn, this critique is supposed to create the space for populist attitudes among the electorate. However, empirical findings largely contradict this theoretical expectation. Swank and Betz (2003) did not find any evidence that poor economic performance – which includes growth, unemployment, and inflation rates – affects the vote share for radical right-wing parties independently from other factors, in particular the presence of a strong welfare state. Several authors focused on the levels of unemployment, again with no results confirming the theoretical expectations.[14] On the other hand, Jackman and Volpert (1996) found that higher rates of unemployment provide a favourable environment for radical right parties, while Mughan, Bean, and McAllister (2003, 631) claim that job insecurity explains "voting support for populist right-wing alternatives in preference to established parties of government."

Recent studies argue that voters' preference for populist parties has little to do with the objective economic situation. Mols and Jetten (2016) found that *perceived relative deprivation* better explains the preference for right-wing populist parties than objective relative gratification. In a similar vein, Elchardus and

Spruyt (2016) claim that support for populism is a consequence of 'declinism' (a very negative view of the evolution of society) and the feeling of belonging to a group of people that is unfairly treated by society.

2 The role of immigration is probably the most controversial of the demand-side explanatory variables for the success of populist right-wing parties. The presence of immigrants (or refugees), combined with the salience of the topic in the public debate, is considered as either extremely relevant[15] or negligible[16] according to different authors. In isolation, it seems not to constitute a powerful predictor of the electoral performance of radical right-wing populist parties. Overall, the empirical results are contradictory, and the levels of immigration might have different effects according to aspects such as different national political cultures, the presence of a colonial past, or the role of the media.
3 In a context of economic hardship, the presence of a strong welfare system is supposed to reduce the appeal of the extreme right. For example, Swank and Betz (2003) found that universal welfare states decrease the positive effect of immigration on votes for radical right-wing parties. On the other hand, the erosion of the welfare system might constitute an advantage for right-wing political parties proposing its retrenchment in order to exclude non-nationals (Afonso and Papadopoulos 2015). Indeed, populists with a welfare-chauvinistic position normally blame the elite for cutting the welfare rights of deserving 'natives' and the non-natives for their excessive claims on the welfare state.
4 Finally, there are several voters' socio-demographic features that show a high correlation with the likelihood of voting for populist right-wing parties: for example, being male, under 25, and a manual worker compared to being female, middle-aged, and a professional (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Spierings and Zaslove 2017). On the other hand, family income and level of education are not linked to party preference on the cultural axis, namely concerning pro- or against-immigration parties (Van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie 2005). Moreover, manual workers, self-employed, routine non-manual workers, and the unemployed are more likely to vote for extreme right-wing parties. However, when economic characteristics are added to the model, the relationship between unemployment and voting for right-wing parties becomes negative (Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002).

Building an explanatory model

After having illustrated the main demand- and supply-side factors usually considered in the relevant literature, the next step consists of selecting the relevant conditions that are supposed to bear some explanatory power concerning the *Salonfähigkeit* of populism. Four criteria, as already mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, have to be considered in this process. First, the conditions must be related to populism as a *thin-centred ideology*, independent from the full ideology attached to it. Second, the aim is to explain the cross-country variations in the social acceptability of populism; therefore, conditions that are equally present in each country are not helpful in this regard. Third, the data must be available from

the 1990s onwards for each of the eight West European countries considered. Fourth, no more than four conditions shall be selected.

For all these reasons, not all the conditions illustrated in the literature review can be adopted and tested. Moreover, there is a further crucial aspect that must be considered in order to select the relevant conditions. A condition becomes relevant for this study as soon as it is related not only to the electoral dimension of populism but more generally to the social acceptability of populism, given by the combination of three factors forming the outcome to explain: the percentage of populism in electoral manifestos, the degree of radicalism of the party, and its electoral performance.

Populism is here understood as an ideology expressed discursively because it makes it possible to measure *how often* populist messages are articulated over time and across countries.[17] However, while the electoral performances of populist parties vary greatly between countries, it is not clear whether this is reflected in the social acceptability of populism. This generates two crucial questions: first, to what extent can the variables used to explain the electoral performance of populist parties also explain the social acceptability of populist discourses in party manifestos? And second, to what extent do the electoral success of populist parties and the presence of populist messages in party manifestos overlap?

Concerning the first question, the existing literature often fails to explain what part of the electoral success of populist parties is linked to their radical features rather than to their populist nature. These studies often (wrongly) consider extreme right-wing parties as automatically populist and attribute their electoral success to the populist dimension of their ideology (while it is very likely that it should be linked to their nationalist or authoritarian agenda). Moreover, until recently there has been almost no space for the analysis of European left-wing populist parties. In a similar vein, some of the factors tested in the literature relate to new or radical parties, which are often considered as automatically populist. Table 2.1 summarizes the main differences between the focus of the existing literature compared to the approach used in this study.

Table 2.1 Different Approaches to Populism

	Understanding of Populism in the Academic Literature	*Understanding of Populism in This Study*
Ideological Dimension	Mainly right-wing, rarely left-wing, (virtually) never combined	Populism as thin ideology attached to any possible full ideology
Radicalism	Mainly radical/far/extreme right parties are considered	Populist messages are not necessarily radical
Parties	Mainly new parties, niche parties, social movements	Every party can articulate populist messages
Empirical Manifestation	Electoral component: success and performance in electoral competition	Discursive component: the populist ideology is articulated discursively

Concerning the second question, empirically it is possible that a poor electoral performance of populist parties happens in a context characterized by a high social acceptability of populist messages. For instance, this might occur in cases whereby mainstream parties articulate highly populist messages and populist parties score poorly in elections. On the other hand, good electoral results of populist parties can be coupled with a very low presence of populist messages in party manifestos. This might happen in cases where both allegedly populist parties and mainstream parties seldom rely on populist messages.

In this study, the discursive and electoral approaches, rather than being considered as mutually exclusive, are seen as *complementary* aspects. Indeed, they relate to two distinct but interconnected elements of populism: how often a (more or less radical) political party discursively articulates populist messages and how well the same party performs in elections. Despite the fact that conditions triggering the electoral performance of populist parties and those determining the social acceptability of populist discourses might partially overlap, they are not necessarily the same.

After all the caveats, considerations, and aspects introduced above, it is time to select conditions that will be tested in Chapters 7 and 8. Starting from supply-side factors, two of them are not included in the analysis. First, the process of mediatization of politics is not selected because it is a common feature of all the countries considered in this study, and also the timing of its development is not significantly different across cases. It would be a relevant condition if one were to study how widespread are populist messages in newspaper articles, TV shows, or social media, but this is not the case. Second, the presence of a proportional electoral system is discarded: first, because it relates to the electoral dimension of populism (but not necessarily to its discursive dimension); second, because empirical research shows that the presence of a proportional electoral system seems to have a negative effect on the performance of radical right parties.[18]

Considering supply-side factors, three of them are not included in the analysis. First, the levels of migrants and asylum-seekers in a country, as well as the relevance of the topic in the public debate, cannot be selected as a relevant factor for this study. Here the aim is to explain the presence of populism as a thin ideology, while these aspects mainly relate to the breakthrough of far-right parties (which are not necessarily populist) and considerably less to left-wing and centre parties. Moreover, several empirical studies have failed to find any conclusive evidence about the correlation between nativism or the number of asylum-seekers and the extreme right vote.[19]

Second, the idea that the presence of a strong welfare system is supposed to reduce the appeal of right-wing populist parties is also discarded. By observing empirical cases, it would be difficult to explain the presence of populist parties in Scandinavian countries since they have a strong welfare system. In fact, populist parties such as the Finns Party, the Sweden Democrats, and the Danish People's Party have not only existed for many years, but they have also obtained significant electoral results. In fact, it could be argued that *universal* welfare protection – when considered as too inclusive – might constitute an advantage for those parties proposing welfare chauvinism.[20] Including a strong welfare system would be

problematic since it is empirically unclear whether it triggers or undermines the social acceptability of populist discourses.[21]

Third, at the micro-level, several voters' socio-demographic features might be linked to the electoral performance of populist parties, but there are no reasons to consider them since they are relatively equally distributed across the eight countries included in the study. In particular being male, under 25, and a manual worker is a characteristic that is fairly distributed across countries (see Table 2.2).[22]

More interestingly, some studies have recently investigated the presence of 'populist attitudes' among the public (Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2013; van Hauwaert and van Kessel 2018). It is feasible to suggest that supply- and demand-side factors activate these predispositions. While it is not possible to exclude the relevance of socio-demographic factors, it appears premature to claim that individual populist attitudes can explain the cross-country variations.

In conclusion, Table 2.3 presents the four factors can are selected for the present study and that will be tested in the analytical section: poor economic performance, democratic gap, widespread corruption, and ideological convergence of the party system.

Table 2.2 Socio-Demographic Factors

Country	*Proportion population aged 20–24*	*Educational attainment 15–24 years (male)*	*Employment in high-tech sectors (male)*	*Employment in low-tech manufacturing (male)*	*Ratio men*	*Median age*
Austria	6.4	11.67	4.9	5.9	48.99	43
France	5.7	12.28	5	5	49.15	41.2
Germany	5.6	12.4	5.2	5.2	49.21	45.8
Italy	5	12.96	4	7.1	48.70	45.5
Netherlands	6.3	13.18	5.2	5.4	49.73	42.4
Sweden	6.7	13.98	6.5	4.5	50.01	40.9
Switzerland	6	11.22	NA	NA	49.52	42.3
United Kingdom	6.6	13.72	6.3	4.1	49.31	40

Table 2.3 Supply- and Demand-Side Factors

Factor	*All Factors*	*Selected Factors*
Demand-Side	Economic Hardship	✓
	Immigration Flows and Their Salience	*X*
	Low Welfare Protection	*X*
	Socio-Demographic factors	*X*
Supply-Side	Democratic Performance	✓
	High Levels of Corruption	✓
	Ideological Convergence	✓
	Proportional Electoral System	*X*
	Mediatization of Politics	*X*

Following the discussion of each condition, it is possible to hypothesize that:

H1: the more unfavourable the socio-economic and political-institutional conditions, the higher the social acceptability of populism.

Four sub-hypotheses can be formulated concerning the four factors in isolation.

H1A: the higher the economic hardship, the higher the social acceptability of populism.
H1B: the higher the democratic gap, the higher the social acceptability of populism.
H1C: the higher the perception of corruption, the higher the social acceptability of populism.
H1D: the higher the ideological convergence of the political system, the higher the social acceptability of populism.

These conditions are operationalized and tested in Chapter 7. Chapter 3 discusses the importance of considering not only socio-economic and political-institutional factors but also cultural ones, in particular the role of collective memory and the re-elaboration of the past, in order to explain cross-country variation. The analysis, with the inclusion of the levels of stigma of the fascist past, is repeated in Chapter 8.

Notes

1 Given the number of cases considered in this study (23) and the type of method employed in the analytical section (fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis), the number of total conditions tested should not be higher than five in order to (reduce limited diversity and thus) produce more credible results. Since the stigma of the fascist past will be tested afterwards, no more than four variables will be extracted from the relevant literature. This is not a rule but rather a standard of good practice. A sixth condition could have been tested, but this would have reduced the reliability and credibility of the results (Schneider and Wagemann 2010).
2 In Chapter 3, an additional condition (the role of different levels of stigma of the fascist past) will be introduced. However, the aim here is not to explain the social acceptability of populism through an all-encompassing factor but rather to understand how short-term and long-term conditions interact and contribute to make populist discourses more or less acceptable across countries and over time. Therefore, the levels of stigma are supposed to interact with other (short-term) factors discussed in the literature.
3 Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (2002) define the new cleavage as the opposition between GAL – TAN values: *green, alternative,* and *libertarian* positions versus *traditional, authoritarian,* and *nationalist* positions.
4 For an overview about the democratic deficit of the European institutions: Follesdal and Hix (2006).
5 Studies about the *mediatization of politics* are mainly theoretical, while empirical studies are still in their initial phase. On this topic, see Manucci (2017).
6 Many authors make reference to the concept of *video-malaise*, from Robinson (1976) to Mutz and Reeves (2005).

7 *The New York Times*, "Europe's Rising Far Right: A Guide to the Most Prominent Parties," December 4, 2016, available online (consulted in October 2017): www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/world/europe/europe-far-right-political-parties-listy.html.
8 Another element has been mentioned in the literature: the presence of an appealing and well-organized populist party (Taggart 2000; van Kessel 2015). However, the presence of a credible populist party in a certain country might be associated with the national political culture of the country and indirectly with the collective re-elaboration of the fascist past. Including that as a relevant condition would be a tautology, and, more importantly, it would generate an endogeneity problem. Therefore, this condition will not be further examined.
9 *Parteienverdrossenheit* is translatable as "anti-party sentiment" or "disenchantment with the political parties."
10 For studies about the impact of electoral systems, see among others: Jackman and Volpert (1996); Golder (2003).
11 Jackman and Volpert (1996) found that higher electoral thresholds reduce the support for extreme right parties, but Swank and Betz (2003) and Golder (2003) disproved their findings.
12 The concept of self-mediatization was introduced by Meyer (2002) and developed by Strömbäck (2008) and Esser (2013). It refers to the ability of political actors to adapt to the media-logic in order to gain visibility.
13 In particular, Plasser and Ulram (2003); Biorcio (2003); Birnenbaum and Villa (2003), and Hellström, Nilsson, and Stoltz (2012) linked the success of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria, the Lega Nord in Italy, the Front National in France, and the Swedish Democrats in Sweden to the role of the media. For an overview on this topic, see Manucci (2017).
14 For The effects of unemployment, see among others: Knigge (1998); Arzheimer and Carter (2006); Bjørklund (2007). Arzheimer and Carter argue that perhaps voters turn to mainstream parties in times of high unemployment because they are considered more experienced.
15 Immigration has a relevant role according to Thränhardt (1992); Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers (2002); Anderson (1996); Knigge (1998); Golder (2003).
16 Immigration has a negligible role according to Mayer and Perrineau (1989); Kitschelt and McGann (1995); Norris (2005); Arzheimer and Carter (2006).
17 It is important to notice that, according to Rovira Kaltwasser (2014, 497), by considering populism as an ideology it is possible to "grasp that its rise and fall is related to both supply side and demand side factors."
18 To be fair, there is not full consensus among scholars on the effects of different electoral systems on the performance of radical right-wing populist parties.
19 According to Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers (2002), the effect of different levels of anti-immigrant attitudes is large in Norway, the Netherlands, and Denmark but much smaller in Austria, Italy, and Sweden. Moreover, among the European countries with the highest number of migrants per 1000 inhabitants, there are Austria and Switzerland (displaying high levels of populism), while among those with the lowest number of migrants there are Italy, France, Poland, and Hungary (also with high levels of populism). Source: Eurostat (online data codes: migr_imm1ctz and migr_pop1ctz). This means that one should also consider other factors such as the salience of the topic in the public debate, as well as the framing and the attention devoted by the media to the topic. However, the data concerning these elements are extremely difficult to obtain in a reliable and comparable way for a period of several decades across eight countries.
20 The work of Ennser-Jedenastik (2018) seems to confirm this impression, although with several caveats. In general, the relationship between right-wing or left-wing populism and types of welfare system remains unclear.

21 It is also possible to argue that the economic performance of a country, which includes the Gini coefficient after redistribution, already contains some elements that resonate with the type of welfare system and how inclusive and universal it is.
22 The statistics about age, ratio of men to women, and median age were obtained through Eurostat. The remaining data were obtained through the database of QoG (Quality of Government), and they all refer to the last measurement performed.

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3 Populism, collective memory, and stigma of the fascist past

This chapter introduces the main conceptual novelty of the study: the idea that the populist ideology might be more or less legitimate in different countries because of *cultural and historical reasons*. Indeed, it is possible to claim that every country presents a certain political culture, which in turn legitimizes or stigmatizes different ideas of power. In particular, the collective memory of the *fascist* past might explain the legitimacy of the populist idea of power in a certain country. This step is necessary since socio-economic and political-institutional factors do not fully explain the cross-country variation of the social acceptability of populism. The model produced in Chapter 2 is supposed to explain why populism thrives or not, but the literature clearly points to the fact that those conditions do not have the same effect in every country. This indicates that country-specific elements should be considered as well.

This means that the social acceptability populist ideas of power is a fascist legacy, and the same can be said of the rejection of populism.[1] To understand what kind of fascist legacy is present in each of the countries analyzed in this study, it is essential to observe the following cultural structure:

1 The country's re-elaboration of World War II and the collective memory of its own role during the fascist past.[2]
2 According to the type of collective memory of the fascist past, a certain level of stigmatization of that past is present in the country.
3 A strong stigma of the fascist past produces *unfavourable* cultural opportunity structures, and conversely a weak stigma produces *favourable* cultural opportunity structures.

Short-term factors interact with long-term legacies. On the one hand, the conditions for populism to thrive can be more or less favourable according to the economic situation of the country, the levels of corruption, the levels of accountability and responsiveness, and the ideological convergence of the political system. On the other hand, unfavourable cultural opportunity structures might close down the window of opportunity for populism even in countries where the political opportunity structures are favourable, and vice versa.

Since legacies are mentioned, it is essential to delineate what kind of past is discussed in relation to populism: the fascist past. This choice is linked to the fact that the fascist past resonates with the populist present because both fascist and populist ideas of power are based on *illiberal* elements. The way a society collectively remembers the fascist past and its role vis-à-vis fascist regimes determines to what extent the fascist idea of power is legitimized or stigmatized. In turn, this is supposed to affect the social acceptability of populist discourses in a certain country. The idea is that a high stigmatization of the fascist past closes down the cultural opportunity structures for the social acceptability of populism (both right- and left-wing, as explained in Chapter 2).

The chapter is structured as follows. First, it illustrates the concept of cultural opportunity structure and its importance in explaining the cross-country variation in populism's social acceptability. It then describes a new typology of collective memory and its four different types: culpabilization, heroization, cancellation, and victimization. Each type of collective memory is associated with a certain degree of stigmatization of the fascist past.

Cultural opportunity structures

The strands of literature examined in Chapter 2 converge in acknowledging that the country level plays a crucial role in explaining different electoral performances of radical right-wing populist parties. Arzheimer (2009, 274) tested the most common factors linked to the electoral performance of extreme right-wing populist parties. He concluded that:

> [T]here are striking differences between countries. . . . Put differently, given the levels of the variables included in the model, in Austria, Italy, and Denmark the extreme right is persistently much stronger and in Spain, Sweden, and Finland, it is much weaker than one would expect it to be.

Similarly, Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers (2002, 366) found that cross-country variance is linked to the fact that individual political attitudes are unevenly distributed across countries: "[V]ariations in the composition of the population, not in social background but in political attitudes, helped account for cross-national differences too. Thus, a considerable part of the original country-level variance was explained." Indeed, the effect of education is small in Austria and Italy, but particularly significant in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway. On the other hand, the effect of different levels of anti-immigrant attitudes and dissatisfaction with democracy is large in Norway, the Netherlands, and Denmark but much smaller in Austria, Italy, and Sweden.

These findings resonate with the work of Inglehart and Welzel (2010, 554), which considers socio-cultural changes as path-dependent since religious and historic legacies are long-lasting. When trying to explain the passage from traditional and materialist to modernization-linked and post-materialist values (from

survival to self-expression values and from traditional to secular-rational values), the authors found that "the nation remains a key unit of shared socialization, and nationality explains far more of the variance than factors such as education, occupation, income, gender or region."

Accordingly, it seems safe to assume that national cultural elements play a pivotal role in determining the presence of populist discourses. In other words, besides structural and short-term elements, country-specific characteristics might have an impact on the social acceptability (*Salonfähigkeit*) of populist messages.[3] The concept of political opportunity structures remains important to understanding and explaining the presence of populism, but long-lasting cultural elements should also be considered. This means that political (short-term) and cultural (long-term) opportunity structures can – if considered *in combination* – explain the presence of populism in different countries.

Implicitly developed by Lipsky (1968) and formalized by authors such as Tilly (1978) and Tarrow (1983), the concept of political opportunity structures refers to "specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others" (Kitschelt 1986, 58). In a broader sense, political opportunity structures emphasize the *exogenous* conditions for party success and combine the presence of stable institutional features with volatile or conjectural factors. The combination of supply- and demand-side factors for the success of populist parties can be considered as a set of *political opportunity structures.*

As already mentioned, however, socio-economic and political-institutional opportunity structures are of little use in explaining cross-country variations in the social acceptability of populism. The limitations of the classic approach to political opportunity structures and populism can be overcome by introducing into the picture Putnam's idea that civic traditions are important factors for the political performance of a country (1993, 2002). Putnam argued that differences in the design of institutions are of secondary relevance and that *civic traditions* account for most of the differences in explaining a community's *political performance.* In a similar vein, it is possible to argue that different political cultures influence the perception of different ideas of power and, therefore, the social acceptability of populist discourses.

As defined by Almond and Verba in their seminal work (1963, 13), political culture is "the particular distribution of patterns of orientation towards political objects among the members of a nation." Since political cultures include all politically relevant beliefs, values, and attitudes among the population, they determine social and political norms at the collective level. In turn, these norms become observable through the ritualization of political behaviors. Different narrations and re-elaborations of the fascist past retrospectively illuminate different national political cultures and allow estimation of the degree of stigma attached to fascism (Connerton 1989). To determine whether there are favourable cultural opportunities structures for populism in a particular country, it is pertinent to observe the collective memory of the fascist past.

The main idea proposed here, is that certain types of collective memory highly stigmatize the fascist past, and therefore create unfavourable opportunity structures for populism. Other types of collective memory do not stigmatize the fascist past and therefore create favourable opportunity structures for populism.

I define cultural opportunity structures as *specific configurations of symbolical, memorial, and historical elements that shape the range of legitimate and stigmatized political behaviors, discourses, and ideas of power*. A central role is played by the collective memory and re-elaboration of the past. Although other elements such as collective customs and traditions can concur in forming cultural opportunity structures, collective memories can be used as a valid proxy because they are more easily observable.

Figure 3.1 illustrates the mechanisms linking populism to the presence of political opportunity structures interacting with cultural opportunity structures. In stage I, every country displays a certain pattern of supply- and demand-side factors for the presence of populism, which in turn form favourable or unfavourable political opportunity structures. However, favourable political opportunity structures are not enough to predict the acceptability of populism. In fact, in stage II, a collective memory which highly stigmatizes the fascist past can make the populist idea of power socially unacceptable and outside the realm of 'what can be said.' This creates unfavourable cultural opportunity structures, and therefore populism is supposed to be socially unacceptable.

The link between fascism and populism

Some authors have already linked the presence of populism to different political cultures, while several studies mention the role of traumatic collective memories in blocking the social acceptability of populist discourses, especially concerning the case of Germany (e.g. Art 2006). However, this link has never been analyzed in a systematic way, given the difficulties in measuring something as intangible as collective memories.[4] Despite the absence of comprehensive and systematic analyses, the relevant literature seems to take for granted that different national political cultures can explain why a populist radical right party is conceived as "a major democratic threat in a country or as a reliable ally for a government coalition in another country" (Rovira Kaltwasser and Taggart 2016, 211).

The examples in this sense are numerous. In Germany, extreme right-wing populist parties have never become relevant because the debates about the Nazi past of the country blocked the possibility for them to emerge (Art 2006, 196; Betz 2002; Bornschier 2012; Decker 2008, 125; Rovira Kaltwasser 2014, 212–13; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). On the other hand, in Austria the elite reactions shaped the legitimacy of the far-right in a totally opposite way (Art 2007, 338). In Spain, the ideological links of *Fuerza Nueva* and *Alternativa Española* with fascism and Franco's regime always made these parties "morally distasteful to the great majority of Spanish citizens" (Alonso and Rovira Kaltwasser 2015, 26). Similarly, in Italy its fascist heritage still influences the actions of mainstream parties and the public responses (Tarchi 2002, 135–36), while in



Figure 3.1 Opportunity Structures for Populism and the Role of Memory

the United Kingdom the British National Party's links to Nazism are perceived as particularly negative (Fella 2008, 195).

Concepts such as 'historical burden,' 'long-lasting legacy,' 'heritage,' 'shadows of the past,' and 'collective memory' are often associated in the relevant literature with penalizing effects on the electoral performances of radical right-wing political parties. In a similar vein, notions such as 'stigma,'[5] 'ostracism,' and 'cordon sanitaire' are commonly used to describe the reaction of mainstream parties vis-à-vis far-right parties (Demker 2011; Widfeldt 2004). *In nuce*, this is the core of the concept of cultural opportunity structures: a certain idea of power is more or less acceptable not only because of socio-economic and political-institutional factors but also because of long-lasting political cultures and collective memories.

Since the literature about populism has only fleetingly interacted with the literature on collective memory, the role of collective re-elaborations of the past has been acknowledged but not studied in a systematic and comparative way.[6] This study aims at connecting different strands of literature (including history, memory studies, and political science) assuming that when a country is confronted with an authoritarian regime, in the case of Western Europe *fascist* regimes, it can either stigmatize or legitimize that type of regime and that particular idea of power according to different types of collective memories.[7] In turn, different collective memories indicate favourable or unfavourable cultural opportunity structures, thus opening or closing cultural windows of opportunity for the presence of populism.

As visualized in Figure 3.2, the link between populism and fascism is based precisely on a set of illiberal elements they both share.[8] This does not mean that fascism and populism are perfectly overlapping concepts. For example, if a populist party or regime respects democratic procedures (in particular, free elections), it clearly has democratic features, but it might still share some *illiberal* elements with fascism. Indeed, while fascism was historically against electoral representation, populism channels elections in authoritarian terms (Finchelstein 2017, 96). The mechanism linking the fascist past with the present populism is based on the



Figure 3.2 Populism Between Democracy and Fascism

fact that, even if at different levels of radicalism, populism includes core elements of fascism at odds with a liberal and constitutional interpretation of democracy.[9]

Historically, fascism in Europe has been a form of political power based on a Manichean separation between the common good of the nation and the threat represented by the conspiracies of evil and foreign elements. While it claimed to interpret the unitary will of the masses, fascism implemented a nationalist, totalitarian, and racist ideology. According to Griffin, for example, historically fascism was a fascist populism (1995).

This resonates with the three pillars of the fascist ideology provided by Eatwell (2017, 367): "the creation of a new man," "the forging of a holistic nation in order to survive internal and external threats," and "the creation of a neither capitalist nor communist third way authoritarian state (which involves government for, but not by the people)." In turn, it confirms the observation of de la Torre (2014, 463), who argued that "populist disrespect of pluralism is explained by their view of the people as a subject with a unitary will and consciousness, and of rivals as enemies of the virtuous people."

Accordingly, it is possible to disentangle three relevant elements concerning the relationship between fascism and populism in theoretical and empirical terms:

1. Both fascism and populism claim that the *locus* of power, instead of remaining empty as in liberal democracy (Lefort 1988), must be filled by a substantive image of the people as a homogeneous unity (Abts and Rummens 2007). For this reason, Urbinati argues that a populist regime can only survive if it becomes authoritarian and despotic (1998, 122), while Panizza maintains that the need to protect the fictitious unity of the people might ultimately lead to totalitarianism (2005, 29). In other words, populism can be considered as a *proto-totalitarian* ideology, but it is important to stress that populism does not necessarily display strictly fascist characteristics such as refusal of democratic elections, para-militarism, corporatism, and imperialism.
2. Both fascism and populism share an illiberal approach based on an unconstrained popular will and an unmediated relationship between elite and people. Accordingly, they distrust political parties and their competition because every type of intermediary body – apart from populist movements – is seen as a carrier of particularistic interests in contrast with the common good. For these reasons, checks and balances are considered as unnecessary obstacles to the implementation of the popular will.
3. Fascism and (mostly radical right declinations of) populism share a nativist definition of the people based on exclusionary criteria. When populism is attached to a nativist full ideology, it can be understood in terms of a proto-totalitarian ideology because it goes against minority protection and implements a dictatorship of the majority (Abts and Rummens 2007).[10]

Between 1945 and 1948 – as a reaction to the tragic events that led to World War II and the Holocaust – every Western country adopted liberal democracy, which emphasizes "checks on the power of each branch of government, equality

under the law, impartial courts and tribunals, and separation of church and state" (Fareed 1997, 26). However, the stigma attached to the fascist past is not equally strong in every country, and therefore the cultural opportunity structures for populism are not the same everywhere.

While modern populism entails cathartic elements that might constitute a "useful safety valve for discontent in contemporary democracies," it can also pose a threat to liberal democracies as soon as it shows traits such as "egocentric leaders, Manichean demonization and loss of faith in a liberal system based on representative government, compromise and legal rights" (Eatwell 2017, 382). Modern populism "is rooted in a post war reformulation of fascism" and although it is *now* essentially democratic, it is impossible to ignore the fact that populism effectively became fascist *in the interwar years*, switching back to democracy after 1945 (Finchelstein 2014, 474–76).[11]

Indeed, when a country is confronted with populist discourses, the literature seems to indicate that the collective memory of the fascist past provides the guidelines for the rejection or acceptance of the illiberal elements of populism, such as lack of minorities' protection, absence of separation of powers, and refusal of pluralism. In other words, a certain type of re-elaboration of the past may open up or close down the cultural opportunity structure for populism to be socially acceptable in given countries because collective memories shape and determine the field of 'what can be said' and the ideas of power that can be expressed.

This leads us to hypothesize that:

H2: the lower the degree of stigmatization of the fascist past, the higher the social acceptability of populist discourses.

Collective memories of the fascist past and stigma for populism

Determining which type of collective memory of the fascist past has become mainstream in a given country, and whether secondary narratives have emerged, is crucial in order to understand the level of stigmatization of the fascist past and therefore of the populist idea of power.[12] This task is particularly complex since the formation of collective memories is the outcome of a complex process of *Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit*, a concept that expresses the idea of '*working through* the past.' Alternatively, the term *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* can be used, translatable as '*coming to terms* with the past.' However, the latter expression has a crucially different meaning since it implies the idea of 'let bygones be bygones,' thus silencing the past instead of problematizing it (Adorno 1977).[13]

Here, collective memory is defined as the outcome of a social and political process that selects parts of the past in order to create a collective identity (Gildea 2002, 59; T. Berger 2002, 80).[14] The process can be characterized by collective amnesia, removals, and reinterpretations. When divergent historical narratives of the same past exist, this generates a conflict and possibly the adoption of secondary narratives along the master (or mainstream) narrative.

The process of memory-building takes place at different levels. Institutional commemorations and holidays, names of public streets and squares (odonyms), textbooks, movies and TV shows, symbolic actions, speeches – they all contribute to the formation (and ritualization) of collective memory. All these aspects create layers of narrations, symbols, and discourses, which become part of the collective memory of a country. The result of this process is shaped by the country's political culture and at the same time contributes to shaping it (Berger 2002, 81).

Different types of historical critical junctures can create a process of *working through the past*, such as revolutions, wars, and regime changes. In the words of Capoccia and Kelemen (2007, 348), critical junctures are "*relatively* short periods of time during which there is a *substantially* heightened probability that agents' choices will affect the outcome of interest." The fascist past in Europe (*a relatively short period*) can be considered as a critical juncture determining the ideas of power (*outcome*) that are legitimate or stigmatized in a given society (*the agent*).

It is possible to argue that, for Western Europe, 1945 represents the 'year zero' of collective memory and democracy and the fascist past is a critical juncture for the development of democratic ideals in Europe. After the end of World War II, every country had to re-elaborate its past, offer a narration of its role during the war, and take up a position regarding the fascist regimes that directly or indirectly affected the country. Every European country had to make sense of the Shoah, the fascist and National-Socialist regimes, and had to define the type of collective memory to transmit to future generations. In other words, every country had to define its own *new collective identity*.

More precisely, the fascist past is the most important moment of definition of national identity for modern nations,[15] and it is a common European-wide defining moment. Moreover, contrary to what happened with other historical and social moments of fundamental change (such as imperialism, World War I, civil wars, or state formation), the re-elaboration of the fascist past took place in conditions of full democratic mobilization, thus involving the masses in the formation of the collective memory.

It is important to note, however, that it is almost impossible to define the type of collective memory adopted in a given country immediately after World War II. This is the case because – like after any traumatic event – the process of re-elaboration is initially blocked by removal and refusal. This initial phase can be labelled as the *silencing phase*. It can be more or less protracted over time, and it is characterized by the fact that thorny topics are avoided and the past is not confronted. During this phase, it is not possible to form any collective stigmatization, and hence, not surprisingly, right-wing populist movements such as *Poujadisme* and *Uomo Qualunque* had the opportunity to emerge in France and Italy in the 1950s. Even in Germany, until the end of the 1950s, a clear distinction between "evil Nazis and good Germans" was present in the public debate (S. Berger 2010, 121) because the country had not yet faced its past.[16]

After the silencing phase, normally in the 1960s but sometimes not before the beginning of the 1970s, countries started examining their role vis-à-vis the fascist past and World War II. Usually, the *self-critical* phase is highly conflictual because

opposite interpretations collide and the outcome of intellectual and political negotiations determines the country's collective memory. During the self-critical phase, countries decide what has to remain in the mainstream narrative and what has to be excluded because it is embarrassing or contradictory. It is worth mentioning, however, that some countries might never engage (or engage only to a minimum degree) with such a stage of memory-building, thus simply removing and ignoring their own role. In other cases, countries might face their past only when forced to do so by external or internal pressure.

Normally, collective memories emerge as the result of the self-critical phase and crystallize into official and – possibly – secondary narratives. It is in this moment that a main narrative clearly emerges and alternative memories either become irrelevant and disappear or become accepted as secondary narratives. This means that in certain cases diverging interpretations maintain a certain acceptability and credibility in the public discourse, while in other cases only an official and mainstream memory is allowed. Once the self-critical phase is concluded, the mainstream and (when present) secondary narratives are established and crystallize into an official collective memory.

Moreover, while a correct process of socialization can prevent the fading of collective memories, a natural generational change combined with the advent of new critical junctures (e.g. the end of the Cold War, the September 11 attacks, the Great Recession) might change the approach towards official narratives of the past. In particular, it is possible that – over time – societies perceive the 'remote' past as less and less relevant for the present and that the strength of certain cultural opportunity structures fades away.

Before describing the different types of collective memory and assigning one type to each country (this will be performed in Chapter 6), it is important to explicate four caveats concerning the nature of collective memory and its evolution over time. First, this study does not consider the pre-1970 period because the silencing phase makes it impossible to define any collective memory. Second, collective memories can evolve over time. This evolution is triggered by several factors, such as debates among historians, international controversies, trials, movies and TV shows, and school programmes and makes memories vulnerable to variations caused by short-term junctures as well as by long-term processes. Third, the process of memory-building is not relevant for the present analysis; therefore, it is considered as a *black box*. In other words, the only relevant aspect is the type of collective memory that emerged as the *outcome* of the process, not the process itself. Fourth, not all countries necessarily fit perfectly with only one type of collective memory. Indeed, the process of re-elaboration can lead to the formation of two or more coexisting collective memories. In this case, along with a mainstream narrative, it is possible to identify one or several secondary narratives.

Types of collective memory and levels of stigma

Operationalizing and measuring different types of collective memory in a comparative way constitutes a relatively unexplored field. One could just consider

the historic role of a certain country during the fascist past (victim, perpetrator, or bystander) in order to determine the degree of stigmatization of the past, but this would be highly misleading since the memory of past events does not coincide with the events themselves. What matters is not the role of the country but the memory of the country's role and the legitimacy or stigma attached to the country's past actions.

According to the existing literature, it is possible to identify a typology with four ideal-types of collective memory regarding the fascist past: culpabilization, heroization, cancellation, and victimization. Each type entails a specific idea of the role of the country during World War II and vis-à-vis the fascist regimes. This in turn determines different degrees of stigmatization of the illiberal elements that fascism and populism have in common. Indeed, populist discourses are seen as dangerous because of the unmediated idea of popular sovereignty and the disregard for checks and balances that characterize the populist interpretation of democracy. In a country where the memory of fascism is strongly negative, these elements of populism can be seen as worrying signs for the strength of liberal democracy, while the same elements can be socially accepted in countries where the memory of fascism is more nuanced.

Culpabilization and *heroization* have in common the fact that they imply a confrontation with the fascist past and its condemnation, which generates, respectively, very high and high levels of stigma towards illiberalism. When a country elaborates a collective memory based on culpabilization, the fascist past is condemned, the country takes responsibility for the past, and a thorough, self-critical examination takes place. The country considers itself to be guilty and assumes the burden of guilt for the fascist regime and its perpetrations. This indicates a very high degree of stigmatization of illiberal elements by making amends and compensating in various forms.[17]

Opposed to culpabilization, there is a type of collective memory based on heroization. It also involves a strong condemnation of the fascist past but for completely different reasons. This type of memory is based on a narration of the country as acting heroically against the fascist threat to defend liberal values and democratic institutions. The degree of stigmatization of illiberal elements is high, but less high compared to culpabilization, since the country was not responsible for the fascist past and does not have to take responsibility.[18] In other words, heroization strongly condemns the fascist past – but not as strongly as culpabilization – because the country was not "infected" with the "fascist virus," and therefore could not fully develop the antibodies needed to combat it, including stigmatization.[19]

Cancellation and *victimization* have in common the avoidance of responsibility – in other words, they are based on denial.[20] A collective memory based on cancellation takes place when a country decides to forget its role vis-à-vis the fascist past and avoids responsibility since it considers itself as an external actor. In other words, the country does not problematize its implicit or explicit complicity with, and accommodation of, fascist regimes. The resulting degree of stigmatization of illiberal elements is low because the country avoids the process of *working through the past*.[21]

Contrary to cancellation, a re-elaboration based on victimization confronts the past. However, this is done in order to overturn it and escape responsibility. It is worth clarifying that in this study victimization is understood as *self-victimization* or victim playing and therefore cannot be applied to countries which were actually victims of fascist regimes[22] – in other words, only cases where the country was at least partially ascribable to the group of perpetrators. Indeed, the country was directly or indirectly supporting a fascist regime, but its refusal to 'work through the past' makes it ignore its responsibilities while standing as a victim. Moreover, the country shifts the blame to external forces while presenting its own national experience in a positive light. This type of memory therefore presents a strong form of *alteration* which makes it possible for alternative narratives to be perceived as legitimate: no narrative is really stigmatized – including nostalgic and revisionist ones. The degree of stigmatization of illiberal elements is extremely low because a strong self-delusion blocks the formation of negative attitudes towards illiberalism.

Figure 3.3 shows that the different types of collective memories have a nominal value, but, in terms of degree of stigmatization, the four types of narratives can be conceived as a single variable with an ordinal value. At one extreme is culpabilization, with a very high level of stigma due to a combination of two factors: a total acceptance of guilt and an existential stigmatization of fascism (++). A step lower there is heroization, which stigmatizes fascism without fundamentally questioning the country's identity and national culture (+).

Culpabilization is expected to close down the space for right-wing populism because the fascist past is completely condemned and becomes a *no-go area*. Collective feelings of guilt and shame, acquired through socialization over generations, make any link with the past unacceptable. Responsibility and guilt are internalized and undisputed, while holding views associated with the fascist past is socially sanctioned. Heroization is expected to close down the space for right-wing populism as well because any link to a past fought through sacrifice becomes shocking and socially sanctioned.

Cancellation, being a type of non-narrative where the past is avoided, neither discusses nor alters the past, hence preventing the formation of stigma (-).[23] In the case of victimization, responsibility is rejected, and the past is altered and therefore not stigmatized at all (–). In these two narratives, the stigma associated with the fascist past is weak or absent – and even when present it can be contested. This is the case because the past, being either ignored or altered, has no negative connotations, and hence holding views in line with that past remains acceptable or not socially sanctioned. In the case of cancellation, this is due to the lack of public debate.[24] In the case of victimization, this is due to the alteration of past roles and to blame-shifting toward external forces.

Chapter 5 will discuss the amount of populism in each country, and Chapter 6 assigns a type of collective memory to each country. Before moving towards this, however, it is necessary to introduce the case selection and the operationalization used to measure populism in party manifestos, as well as the methodology implemented in order to determine the impact of collective stigmatization of the fascist past.



Figure 3.3 Collective Memories as Proxy for Cultural Opportunity Structures

Notes

1 There is little consensus on how to conceptualize historical legacies (Wittenberg 2015; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017). The situation is even more complicated when it comes to empirically measure those legacies and establishing their effects (Simpser, Slater, and Wittenberg 2018). However, given that the work on communist legacies is more developed and uniform compared to studies concerning fascist legacies, those dealing with the latter can learn from the former. Indeed, Eastern Europe has been studied through the lenses of communist or pre-communist legacies, and many outcomes have been linked to the concept of historic legacies: patterns of democratic consolidation, electoral behavior, state-society relations, and cultural attitudes.

Classic works assessing authoritarian legacies alongside legacies of the "mode of transition" include Crawford and Lijphart (1997). The authors claim that the legacy of communism has an impact on centralized economic planning. At the same time, they warn that historic legacies do not act in a vacuum but rather co-exist with other forces. For example, the influence of historical legacies in this case compete with incentives for liberalization from the US and the EU.

Pre-communist legacies are equally relevant and have been considered as well. For example, Kitschelt et al. (1999) found that in Eastern Europe the level of social and administrative modernization before communism influence the choice of post-communist political institutional arrangements. Moreover, they argue that the type of political regime and nature of political mobilization before communism influenced the degree of bureaucratization (and repression) employed during communism.

Other studies tested the impact of communist legacies on a vast array of political outcomes. Grzymała-Busse (2002) linked the legacy of communism to the skills necessary to navigate politics, while Pop-Eleches (2007) found that different legacies drive different aspects of democratization. In their essential book on "Communism's shadow," Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017) show that the communist legacy brings overall diminished mass support for democracy and markets. They also studied the relevance of fascist memories: where the right bore the stigma of fascism, the pull of communism was stronger and resulted in a larger leftist bias.

Fascist legacies have been studied less systematically than communist ones, and their link to political outcomes appears only occasionally in the literature. For this reason, it is important to consider the existing studies on communist legacies in order to adapt similar concepts, methodologies, and practices to the study of fascist legacies. In particular, two main lessons can be incorporated. First, several possible mechanisms can link a certain past to an outcome. Wittenberg (2015) identifies three possible mechanisms. In this study, the first of them is adopted: the concept of legacies is here employed to study an outcome (partially) unexplainable given the circumstances contemporaneous with that outcome. In particular, the fascist legacy is used to explain different degrees of social acceptability of populist ideas of power. Second, when studying a certain type of historic legacy, it is important to consider that pre-existing legacies might play an important role. In particular, in this study, it is important to consider features of national political cultures that predate the fascist experience.

At the same time, crucial differences exist between this study and the existing literature on communist legacies. First, the focus here is not on individual values and behaviors but on macro mechanisms. There clearly is a link between the social acceptability of populist ideas of power and individual attitudes, but they are not the same phenomenon. Second, what matters here is the role of collective memories in forming different fascist legacies; therefore, it is possible to include countries that experienced fascism in some form without having being ruled by fascism, while studies on communist legacies focus exclusively on post-communist

countries (opposed to countries without a communist past). Third, since here it is irrelevant to determine the effects of the fascist legacy on individuals' values and behaviours, it is possible to study fascist legacies on communities that bear no direct memory of fascism. This is linked to the fact that collective memories are intergenerational.

2 As already mentioned, the general argument refers to any authoritarian past that a country has experienced. Since the focus of this study is on Western Europe, the authoritarian past is here represented by the *fascist* past.

3 On the concept of *Salonfähigkeit* and its link to the study of populism, see Art (2006, 103).

4 A notable exception is represented by Art (2011b). More generally, the link between collective memory, political culture, and populism has not been applied to comparative studies but rather to case studies or binary comparisons. Most of them are mentioned in the following pages when analyzing the type of collective memory present in each of the eight countries considered. The situation is certainly different when it comes to the study of communist legacies in Eastern Europe, which are the object of a much more consistent strand of literature (Wittenberg 2015).

5 The term 'stigma' is often used by researchers examining how mainstream parties interact with the radical right (Art 2011a; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2015; Van Spanje and van Der Brug 2007). Erving Goffman defined stigma as "the situation of the individual who is disqualified from full social acceptance" (1963, 12). The same definition can be used for parties instead of individuals.

6 Historical studies sometimes consider the role of previous regimes on the formation of political cultures. For example, Aguilar and Humlebaek (2002) examine the impact of the authoritarian past on Spanish political culture. Similarly, Power and Zucco (2009) wrote about Brazilian political culture and noted that the transition to democracy after a right-wing authoritarian regime generated the so-called *direita envergohada* ('ashamed right').

7 A country can be directly under an authoritarian regime or have to deal with neighboring countries led by an authoritarian regime. The fascist past in Western Europe directly affected only a few countries (Germany, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Spain, and those temporarily invaded by them), but indirectly every other West European country has had to take a position and subsequently re-elaborate that past.

8 Many authors described the illiberal elements of populism. Among them: Abts and Rummens (2007); Canovan (1999); Pappas (2014); Pinelli (2011); Plattner (2010); Riker (1988); Rovira Kaltwasser (2012); Urbinati (1998).

9 In Umberto Eco's (1995) list of traits typical of the fascist ideology, there is *selective populism*: "Since no large quantity of human beings can have a common will, the Leader pretends to be their interpreter. Having lost their power of delegation, citizens do not act; they are only called on to play the role of the People. Thus the People is only a theatrical fiction. To have a good instance of qualitative populism we no longer need the Piazza Venezia in Rome or the Nuremberg Stadium. There is in our future a TV or Internet populism, in which the emotional response of a selected group of citizens can be presented and accepted as the Voice of the People."

10 Of course, the link between populism and fascism (and the corresponding stigma) is stronger for neo-fascist and radical right parties articulating populist discourses. For this reason, the levels of populism in party manifestos will be weighted by the degree of radicalism of each party. See Chapter 4 for more details.

11 Peronism in Argentina is probably the first example of post-war populist democracy. Finchelstein (2014, 476) observes how "Peronism is not fascism, but fascism represents a key dimension of its origins."

12 For a seminal study on the differences and commonalities between individual and collective memory see Halbwachs (1950). For a comprehensive collection of papers on the topic: Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Levy (2011).

13 The fact that the German language provides the most appropriate terms to define the process of elaboration of the past is clearly not a coincidence. In fact, Germany is the country that, more than others – in Europe, certainly, but probably all over the world – has had to face and re-elaborate its past in order to build a new identity and redefine its political culture.
14 Other seminal works about the link between collective memories and identities are Todorov (1995) and Ricoeur (2000).
15 Another key moment of definition of national identity for modern nations has been the process of state formation in the nineteenth century.
16 Pakier and Stråth (2010) describe in detail the silencing phase and its characteristics. The silencing phase is also the reason why it is not possible to compare countries like Portugal and Spain with the rest of Western Europe. The process of memory-building here did not start until the 1990s, and therefore the temporal comparison with the other countries would be compromised.
17 The popular expression "once bitten, twice shy" could be applied here to explain why culpabilization implies a higher degree of stigma than heroization.
18 To be clear: the countries' past is only partially endogenous to their memory. Collective memories are intrinsically linked to the process of collective re-elaboration which, in turn, is linked to the country's role but also to the construction of memories of the country's role which are not necessarily historically accurate and serve as ex-post justifications.
19 In this case, the pre-existent national political culture is quite important. If a liberal and democratic political culture has flourished for a long time, it can provide the necessary antibodies against illiberal elements. Otherwise, the stigmatization of illiberal elements might be weakened.
20 In the Oxford Dictionaries, "denial" is defined in one of its meanings as "Failure to acknowledge an unacceptable truth or emotion or to admit it into consciousness, used as a defence mechanism." Available online: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/denial (consulted in November 2017).
21 In this case, pre-existent national political cultures are extremely important. Since the country does not distance itself from that past but rather refuses to deal with it, the stigmatization of illiberal elements is mainly linked to the long-lasting effect of a pre-existent national political culture.
22 A case in this direction would be Poland, which neither collaborated with the Nazis nor surrendered.
23 This does not mean that the mechanism described here as cancellation is based on inaction. To the contrary, a process of cancellation takes place deliberately, *proactively*. When a country *decides* to "conveniently forget" certain elements of its own past (in this case it could be its complicity with the Nazis), this has profound political implications since it actively blocks the formation of stigma. In this sense, cancellation is not true forgetfulness but rather forced removal, intentional *tabula rasa*.
24 The absence of a public debate might be linked to a bottom-up lack of interest in the population but also by a top-down decision to restrict the access to public archives or by the absence of political actors that want to capitalize on historical controversies.

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4 Methodology

Measuring populism and testing its social acceptability

This chapter illustrates the operationalization of populism, and its measurement through a process of semi-automated content analysis. Moreover, several key elements of this study are explained and justified, such as the case selection, the time frame, the criteria for the selection of party manifestos, and the methodology used in the analytical section. Before one can understand under which conditions populist discourses thrive or are considered as a taboo, it is essential to understand how much populism there is in a certain country in a certain point in time and to what extent it is socially acceptable.

Measuring the presence of populism over several decades and across eight countries is a task that greatly exceeds the possibilities of a single researcher. The tools employed for the semi-automated content analysis of populist discourses have been designed in the context of the NCCR Democracy project at the University of Zurich. A four-year joint effort has produced a common codebook for the analysis of the texts, the training of a large number of highly skilled coders, and the production of an electronic interface (*Angrist*) that enables the coders to input relational data in a quick and efficient way.[1]

In particular, a team of 76 coders has been trained to analyze several types of media outlets. For the present study, only party manifestos for eight countries in the period 1970–2014 are considered.[2] All coders passed a reliability test to assess the validity of their decisions, with a mean agreement of 85.7% in identifying units of analysis within the texts and a mean inter-rater reliability of Kappan = 0.813 in coding the content of these units of analysis.[3]

First, a test was conducted on coder validity (checking the coders' agreement with a gold standard solution), and then a hidden reliability test was conducted. During the content analysis, and without notification, coders were assigned single texts from a corpus of 29 texts in German and English. The results of these two tests for every aspect of populism are generally acceptable, with average levels of Cohen's Kappa of 0.73 for the 'gold standard' test and 0.76 for the hidden reliability test. Table 4.1 shows the Kappan coefficients for each variable.[4]

Reliability and validity are just a part of the complex issues that one faces when measuring populism, considering the many different approaches that emerged in the literature.[5] The nature of this study, however, is essentially comparative, and the absolute levels of the acceptability of populism are less relevant insofar as the

Table 4.1 Kappan Coefficients Coding Populism

Variables Measuring Populism	*Kappan Coefficient*
Praising the people's achievements	0.984
Blaming the elites	0.629
Expressing closeness to the people	0.983
Denouncing the elites	0.778
Excluding of the elite from the people	0.889
Stating a monolithic people	0.740
Claiming power for the people	0.988
Denying power to the elites	0.946
Stressing the virtues of the people	0.980
Summary	0.813

differences across countries are correctly represented. Nonetheless, many aspects have to be thoroughly discussed in order to make sure that the measurement is performed in accordance with the definition of populism provided in Chapter 1 and that it allows the highest degree of comparability between countries.

Finally, it is important to highlight why fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) is the most appropriate method for this study. Since the aim is to understand under which socio-economic and political-institutional opportunity structures populist discourses are more or less socially acceptable, fsQCA allows determination of the extent to which each condition is necessary for the outcome to occur and which (combination of) conditions are sufficient. Moreover, it becomes possible to assess to what extent the levels of stigma contribute to forming a better explanation for the phenomenon.

Populist discourses in party manifestos

Consistent with the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 1, this study considers populism as an ideology articulated discursively. Hence, the populist ideology becomes empirically measurable as soon as an actor articulates it discursively. This allows measuring populism in a consistent and comparable way across countries and over time (Aslanidis 2018). Ideally, the best measurement for the acceptability of populism – in a certain country at a certain point in time – would include each type of discourse circulating in the public debate, as well as every type of speaker.[6]

However, discourses articulated by different types of actors (politicians, journalists, celebrities, common people, or religious leaders) in different media outlets (party manifestos, social media, newspapers, TV shows, or blogs) are not necessarily comparable, and analyzing them can be extremely expensive and time consuming. Moreover, the hypothesis developed in this study stipulates that populist discourses are more or less legitimate according to different levels of stigmatization of the fascist past. Therefore, party manifestos are the most suitable and convenient type of document to observe for several reasons.

First, by analyzing party manifestos, it is possible to observe how often political actors rely on populist discourses when they are free to communicate directly to the electorate, thus articulating – in an unmediated way – their idea of society and, ultimately, their idea of power. Second, non-political actors are less affected by the possible stigma attached to the fascist past. It might be more socially acceptable for non-political actors to articulate populist discourses than for political actors, who have an institutional and official role, to do so, thereby making a comparison highly problematic. Third, the decision to investigate the presence of populism in party manifestos is linked to previous studies which consider this type of material as appropriate for comparative content analysis and "an authoritative document that gives a clear overview of the ideas of a party at a certain point in time" (Rooduijn, de Lange, and van der Brug 2014, 566).

The advantage of a semi-automated content analysis over expert survey data is self-evident. Instead of relying on data that might be biased by theoretical expectations regarding how populist a certain party or politician is, this method provides fine-grained and objective measures of the levels of populism in the electoral manifestos of different political actors. In other words, rather than assuming that certain actors are populist by definition, the content analysis indicates how often each actor articulates populist messages.

Given that analyzing party materials is labor intensive, most studies in this strand of literature focus on specific country cases or engage in small-sample cross-national comparisons. One of the strengths of the present study is the combination of a large cross-national sample (eight countries) over a considerable longitudinal extension (from the 1970s to the 2010s).[7]

Semi-automated content analysis is not the only possible way of measuring populism, but it is certainly the one providing the most fine-grained information about populist messages. Other methods used in the literature, and relying on a very similar ideational definition of populism, are holistic grading (Hawkins 2009, 2010) and the content analysis proposed by Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011). In holistic grading, coders read an entire speech (or manifesto) and assign a grade of populism that can be 0, 1, or 2. In the method created by Rooduijn and Pauwels, coders indicate – for each paragraph – whether it contains people-centric and anti-elitist discourse. The final score is composed by the proportion of populist paragraphs in a manifesto (from 0% to 100%). These methods share with the one used here a common understanding of populism as an ideology that can be articulated discursively but also a very similar operationalization. The main difference is the unit of observation: a whole text, paragraphs, or statements.

Case selection

This study focuses on eight West European countries: Austria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. There are several reasons behind the selection of the countries. First, it is in Western Europe – among the world's established democracies – that populist actors are becoming increasingly successful in elections (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008,

2015) and often manage to set the tone public debate with fiery statements and vicious attacks on their opponents (Mény and Surel 2000). In other words, populist actors often set the agenda of the political debate, forcing mainstream actors to strategically adapt and react (Rooduijn 2014). Therefore, the growing political impact of populism in Western Europe (Mudde 2013) is extremely relevant because it speaks to the nature and future of democracy itself.

Second, Western Europe represents a privileged observation point for several varieties of populist discourses: from extreme left to extreme right actors, from niche to mainstream parties, in West European countries political actors articulate virtually every possible type of populist discourse. Moreover, given the longitudinal and comparative dimension of this study, it is important to note that in Western Europe the archives of party manifestos – both online and offline – are often complete and easily accessible.

Third, the electoral success of populist parties is not uniform across the eight countries analyzed. While in countries such as Austria, Italy, Switzerland, and France they are consistently successful over time, in other countries, such as Sweden and Germany, they are not, with the Netherlands and the United Kingdom as intermediary cases (van Kessel 2015). As Rooduijn (2014) has shown, the diffusion of populist discourses in the public debate varies according to the electoral success of populist parties, and therefore the variances between the selected countries is important.

Fourth, following a *most similar* systems design (MSSD), these countries display different levels of populism but share similar patterns of state formation, nation-building, and democratization.[8] On the other hand, following a *most different* systems design (MDSD), it might be the case that countries with similar levels of populism have different political cultures. While Switzerland and Germany are consensus democratic systems and the United Kingdom is a clear majoritarian democracy, France is a unique example of a premier-presidential system and the other cases are parliamentary systems (Lijphart 1999, 2012).[9] Moreover, the selected countries show a fair amount of variability in terms of accountability and responsiveness of the political system, perception of corruption, and economic performance. This variance is important in order to test which socio-economic and political-institutional conditions are necessary or sufficient for the social acceptability of populism.

Finally, every West European country has been confronted – more or less directly – with fascism and World War II. Consequently, each country had to develop a narrative of those events in order to define its new collective identity. This means that they have formed collective memories about the same authoritarian past – in this case, the *fascist* past – therefore making it possible to test the impact of stigmatization of the past on the presence of populist discourses.

Moreover, on a pragmatic note, it was not possible to include every West European country in the content analysis, mainly due to practical reasons linked to the amount of time available and to obvious financial restrictions. However, the eight selected countries are thought to represent other countries such as Denmark, Norway, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Ireland since they show

Table 4.2 Corpus Manifestos: Overview

Country	*Election Years*	*N. Manifestos*	*Statements in Manifestos*
Austria	1975, 1983, 1994, 2002, 2013	21	1,723
France	1974, 1981, 1995, 2002, 2012	22	1,812
Germany	1972, 1983, 1994, 2002, 2013	19	1,489
Italy	1972, 1983, 1994, 2013	17	2,470
Netherlands	1972, 1982, 1994, 2002, 2012	24	2,429
Sweden	1973, 1982, 1994, 2002, 2014	29	1,113
Switzerland	1975, 1983, 1995, 2003, 2011	26	1,185
United Kingdom	1974, 1983, 1992, 2001, 2010	15	1,843
SUM		173	14,064

similar institutional features, political systems, socio-economic conditions, and collective memories of the fascist past when compared to the included countries.

On the longitudinal dimension, five time points have been selected. In particular, for each country, one national election per decade has been chosen.[10] The aim is to have, for each decade, elections as close as possible to those in the other selected countries, in order to provide the maximum degree of comparability. Moreover, in France the first round of presidential elections is preferred to legislative elections, given France's unique semi-presidential system and the importance that presidential elections play in its political system.[11] Finally, Italy in the 2000s has been excluded since the two different electoral systems used in 2001 and 2006 forced the parties to form broad coalitions rather than participating alone, and therefore separate manifestos are not available.[12]

The party manifestos issued before the election periods were selected on the basis that they are supposed to be particularly well suited to observe populist discourses. Indeed, during election campaigns, political actors are especially active in communicating their positions to voters. In particular, they might express more frequently their opinion concerning different ideas of power and about the role of the elite and the people in the decision-making process. The party manifestos have been retrieved from the *Comparative Manifesto Project* (Lehmann et al. 2016) or from party websites. Additionally, in some cases, the author personally contacted political parties and asked for copies of missing manifestos. As Table 4.2 shows, the content analysis concerns 173 party manifestos and a total amount of 14,064 coded statements. Appendix 1 (Tables A1.1 to A1.5) provides some descriptive data about the manifestos, while Appendix 3 (Table 3.1) lists the total number of statements and populist statements for each analyzed manifesto.

Measuring the social acceptability of populism

The social acceptability of populism is here measured as the percentage of populist statements in a party manifesto, which is then weighted by two other factors: the degree of radicalism of the party and the vote share the party received in

that election. Populist statements are identified according to the ad-hoc codebook, and six indicators are used to detect the presence of populist messages (Table 4.3). This section describes in detail the procedure for the measurement of populism in party manifestos.

Populism is measured, in each party manifesto,[13] as the percentage of populist statements compared to the total amount of political statements, which constitute the unit of measure. Those statements which do not contain either an evaluation of a social actor or a position regarding a political issue are removed from the total amount of political statements because they do not contain any relevant information about the speaker's ideology, idea of power, or issue positioning.[14] In other words, a speaker (in this case, a political party) articulates a political statement as soon as an evaluation is expressed:

1 About other social actors. These actors can be political actors (politicians, parties, parliaments, or governments) but also economic actors, national and supranational organizations, the people, judiciary actors, the police, or the army, as well as religious actors or the media.
2 About a political issue. A set of 12 issue-categories was used, which includes: economy, culture, welfare, budget, army, immigration, Europe, security, institutional reforms, army, ecology, and infrastructures. Each statement in which a position on one of these issues is expressed has been coded.

Table 4.3 Operationalization of Populism

Dimensions	*Questions in the Codebook*
Closeness to the people	Does the speaker claim to belong to/be close to/know/speak for/care for/agree with/perform everyday actions like/represent/embody the people?
Stating a monolithic people	Does the speaker describe the people as homogeneous, sharing common feelings, desires, or opinions?
Stressing the virtues of the people	Does the speaker describe the people in a positive way (moral, credible, competent, no lack of understanding, etc.)?
Praising the people's achievements	Does the speaker stress positive actions and positive past and future impacts of the people (responsible for a positive development/situation, not being responsible for a mistake, etc.)?
Exclusion of the elite from the people	Does the speaker describe the elites as not belonging to/not being close to/not knowing the needs of/not caring about/not speaking on behalf of/not empowering/deceiving the people?
Claiming power for the people	Does the speaker argue that the people should have/gain/not lose power? Does the speaker give the people the competence to act or decide on a specific political issue? Does the speaker demand institutional reforms for more participation of the people in politics?

In order to make the measurement as strict and objective as possible, and with the aim of reducing, if not eliminating, type I errors (false positives), the coders were trained to code only explicit statements. Implications, hints, and context knowledge are never applied to the coding process. Even if a coder realizes that, reading between the lines, a message has a certain implicit meaning, this is irrelevant since the statement is only coded if the meaning is explicit.[15] Another relevant aspect concerns the absolute number of coded statements. Indeed, only one statement about each issue or target is coded for each speaker in a party manifesto. This means that if the speaker makes several statements on a specific issue (e.g. 'welfare') or target (e.g. 'the journalists'), these are considered as one single statement, although the message is articulated over several sentences. If the speaker criticizes the government several times in the text because 'it does not listen to the people,' this is coded only once.

After having identified the main characteristics of the unit of measure (political statements), it is crucial to identify populist statements. A statement is coded as populist – according to the conceptualization outlined in Chapter 1 – whenever a party:

1. Claims to be close to the people;
2. Mentions the people as a monolithic actor with a common will;
3. Stresses the virtues of the people;
4. Praises the positive achievements of the people;
5. Introduces a cleavage between the elites and the people; and
6. Demands more power for the people.

Moreover, three caveats are crucial in order to fully describe the operationalization of populism used in this study. First, 'exclusion of the elite from the people' is coded as present only in cases where the target of the critique is the elite as a whole. Therefore, a critique targeting only part of the elite – such as a specific party, or a certain politician – is not considered as a populist statement.

On the other hand, the *type* of elite as a whole which is criticized varies according to the broader ideology of the speaker. The critique might target political elites ('established parties' or 'the government') but also financial ('the capitalists'), economic ('the banks'), cultural ('the academics,' 'the media'), or unspecified elites ('the mighty ones'). Moreover, in this way a critique of the elite as a whole is coded as populist only if the critique is made with a reference to the people.

Second, the concept of 'the people' can also be declined in different ways according to the speaker's full ideology. The codebook includes generic expressions concerning the people but also expressions defining the people as ethnos ('the Dutch'), as a function ('the voters'), as a hypothetical prototype of the people ('the man in the street'), or any other term which can stand for 'the majority in the society.'

Third, contrary to other studies (Rooduijn 2014, 734; Rooduijn, de Lange, and van der Brug 2014, 567), the co-occurrence of people-centrism and anti-elitism is not required since each statement containing one of the six elements can

be considered as populist. An alternative operationalization in line with previous studies, therefore using the co-occurrence principle, is presented in Appendix 10, and it is possible to observe that the main results of this study remain consistent (Appendix 11).

This operationalization, compared to the one based on the co-occurrence principle, has several advantages. For example, it reduces the number of manifestos with no populism, thus making more meaningful the quantitative comparison.[16] Moreover, it eliminates cases in which a manifesto contains high levels of people-centrism but no anti-elitism, thus resulting in a 'zero' as the percentage of populism, while with just one anti-elitist statement the percentage of populism would have been much higher.[17] On the other and, since this study relies on a definition of populism based on both anti-elitism and people-centrism, this operationalization also requires several adjustments and clarifications.

For example, a critique of the elite is not coded as populist unless it explicitly refers to the people. Since following this kind of operationalization a critique of the elite can be sufficient to speak of populism, it would be highly problematic to code every critique of the elite as populist. Therefore, this is done only in cases where the anti-elitist critique is carried on in the name of the people (and, as explained before, in cases where the elite is considered as a whole and not a specific actor).

On the other hand, the opposite is not necessarily true: a people-centric message, if coded as proposed here, does not require explicit anti-elitism in order to be coded as populist because it already incorporates it. For example, political statements like those listed below are coded as populist even without an explicit critique of the elite because they clearly embed it: "The people are tired of this dramatic situation" (stating a monolithic people, as in a purely populist fashion), "The people should decide what is better for the future of this country" (stressing virtues of the people, as opposed to those of the elite), "It is thanks to the courage of the common people that the situation improved" (praising the people's achievements, as opposed to a passive or negative role of the elite), or "The people should decide on this issue through a referendum" (claiming power for the people, as opposed to the power of the elite). Indeed, when a party takes the side of the people in its electoral manifesto, it is clearly doing so in opposition to the other parties.

Moreover, not counting people-centric statements as populist would be highly problematic. Indeed, the vast majority of anti-elitist critiques are directed towards *political* elites (such as the government, the parliamentary majority, or the established parties) and therefore almost exclusively oppositional and non-mainstream parties would be able to articulate anti-elitist statements (hence being able to show traces of populism in their manifestos). This means that by using an operationalization of populism that relies on the co-occurrence of people-centrism and anti-elitism, governmental parties and mainstream parties would almost never turn out to be populist, thus generating type II errors (false negatives).[18]

Even with the operationalization applied in this study, which evens out differences between mainstream and non-mainstream parties, it clearly appears that

new non-mainstream parties (the 'usual suspects', so to speak) are much more populist compared to mainstream parties. The results are not much different from those that would have been obtained by using a co-occurrence principle, which are fully reported in Appendix 10.[19]

According to the description of the measurement offered above, the overall amount of populism for each manifesto can theoretically range from 0 (none of the coded statements is populist) to 100 (every coded statement is populist). The results of the content analysis are presented in Chapter 6, but for the moment it is possible to anticipate that 715 out of 14,064 political statements (almost 5.1%) have been coded as populist. The populism scores of the manifestos empirically range from 0% (which is the case for 47 of the 173 manifestos, 24 of which are from Swedish parties) to 30% (e.g. the Green Party of Germany in 2013)[20] of populist statements, and on average a manifesto contains 4.9% of populist statements.[21]

In order to determine whether populism is socially accepted in a particular country, two additional steps are implemented. First, the percentage of populist statements is weighted by two additional factors: the *vote share* and the *degree of radicalism* of the party.[22] Figure 4.1 presents a three-dimensional overview of the composition of the outcome (or dependent variable). Second, the levels of populism in a certain country at a certain point in time (country-decade) are obtained by *aggregating* the weighted levels of populism from all the manifestos containing populist statements in that particular election.

The percentage of populist statements is weighted by radicalism and vote share because what is relevant in this study is the degree of acceptability of populist discourses in a certain country. If a manifesto contains remarkable levels of populism (say 10%) but the party is not radical (1.5 on a 1–6 scale, where 1 is non-radical



Figure 4.1 Salonfähigkeit of Populism in Three Dimensions

and 6 is very radical) and it obtained only 5% of the vote share, the weighted level of populism for that manifesto will be *75* (10*1.5*5). On the other hand, if a manifesto containing the same amount of populism (10%) is written by a very radical party (say, 5 out of 6) which obtained a striking electoral result (say, 25% of the vote share), the weighted level of populism for that manifesto will be 1,250 (10*5*25). This means that a party can articulate more or less populist messages in its manifesto, but what also matters in order to understand how acceptable populism is in a certain country is how radical and successful that party – and therefore its discourse – is. If a very populist manifesto written by a very radical party obtains less than 1% of the votes, it is safe to assume that the party's message is insignificant in the public debate.

Following a similar approach, the level of populism in a certain country is obtained by aggregating the weighted levels of populism of all the manifestos containing populist statements in that particular election. This means that if one single moderate party (say, 2 out of 6) with a populist manifesto (say, 10%) obtains 40% of the vote share, while none of the other parties participating in that election articulate populism, the total amount is 800 (2*10*40). The same amount is reached in a case whereby four moderate parties (2) with equally populist manifestos (10%) each obtain 10% of the vote share. Calculating the average amount of populist messages among all the manifestos would render irrelevant the fact that in a certain country there are several credible populist actors and would assign higher scores to countries with one mainstream party articulating populist discourses. On the other hand, in this way it is possible to compare the United Kingdom to other countries since one single party with a considerable vote share can count as much as several smaller parties.

Theoretically, a country at a certain point in time can have a level of weighted populism ranging from 0 to 60,000.[23] The higher end is empirically unimaginable since it describes a country in which extremely radical parties (6 on a scale from 1–6) obtained 100% of the vote share while only articulating populist statements in their manifestos (6*100*100). The observed values are, of course, much lower. The highest level of weighted populism registered consists in the 3,418 total points scored by Austria in 2013. In particular, this level is linked to the presence of the manifesto of the Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs – FPÖ), which alone scores 2,028 (more than 21% populist statements, 4.7/6 in radicalism, 20.5% of the vote share). Apart from the manifesto of the FPÖ, it is worth noting that the other five coded manifestos in the same election also have significant levels of populism: SPÖ (3.3%), NEOS (5.1%), Grüne (7.1%), ÖVP (11.9%), andTeam Stronach (13.9%); altogether, these six parties cover 94.4% of the vote share.

Methodology

The hypotheses formulated in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 will be tested through fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). This method postulates that the presence (or absence) of an outcome can be explained by a combination

of different conditions, thereby identifying multiple causal patterns.[24] This is in contrast with the concept of additivity, which postulates that single variables have their own independent impact on the dependent variable. This work follows the reasons presented by van Kessel in his book that employs QCA to study the conditions for the electoral success of populist parties in Europe (2015, 29–30).

Indeed, several key concepts of QCA are essential in explaining why this particular methodology fits the task of this study. The principle of *equifinality* states that the same outcome can be explained by different (combinations of) conditions. At the same time, QCA is also based on *multifinality*, meaning that the same (combinations of) conditions can explain different outcomes. Another central concept in QCA is *conjunctural causation*, meaning that it is a configuration of combined conditions that relates to a certain outcome. This implies that single conditions are not thought to affect the outcome independently but in combination. Finally, QCA relies on the concept of *causal asymmetry*, meaning that the presence or absence of a certain outcome might be explained by different configurations of conditions. All these factors are particularly relevant considering that the literature examined in Chapter 2 clearly points to the presence of multiple factors and their combinations in order to explain the presence of populism.[25]

Moreover, the ultimate goal of QCA is to analyze set-theoretic sufficiency relations. The aim is to verify whether a single condition always leads to the same outcome.[26] Indeed, the main feature and aim of QCA consists in determining necessary and sufficient conditions for a certain outcome to occur (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). The first step is to assess the presence of any explanatory condition that is necessary for the presence of the outcome. At the same time, the presence of any condition necessary for the absence of the outcome (or, in other words, for the presence of its negation) is also determined. In a further step, through Boolean minimization, the analysis determines the presence of (combinations of) conditions whose presence is sufficient for the presence (or absence) of the outcome. This normally brings to the definition of a solution formula showing the sufficient (combination of) conditions for the occurrence of the outcome. The solution can be conservative, intermediate, or parsimonious, according to the assumptions made about the logical reminders (a discussion of this aspect is present in Chapter 8). Each solution has a value for consistency and a value for coverage, which illustrates how 'precise' the solution formula is in explaining the occurrence of the outcome (consistency or inclusion) and how many cases are covered by that solution formula (coverage).

In this study, the outcome to be explained is represented by the social acceptability of populist discourses, measured as the levels of populism in party manifestos weighted by the degree of radicalism and vote share of the party. In order to obtain a deeper understanding of the conditions linked to the social acceptability of populism (POP), the impact of the conditions on the acceptability of *left-wing* (POP_L) and *right-wing* (POP_R) populism was also tested separately, for a total of three different outcomes. This is done because the social acceptability of right-wing populism might be explained by a different combination of conditions compared to left-wing populism.

The cases observed are represented by eight countries, each analyzed during three election points in the period 1990–2015, bringing the total of cases to 24. Given the peculiar electoral law used in Italy for the elections of 2001, it was not possible to find electoral manifestos for the single parties, only the manifestos of the two main coalitions. Therefore, the number of cases dropped to 23 (see the section in Chapter 6 about populism in Italy). The first part of the QCA analysis, presented in Chapter 7, is performed in order to assess the impact of high levels of corruption, poor economic performance, low levels of accountability and responsiveness, and high ideological convergence on the social acceptability of populism. The second part of the analysis, presented in Chapter 8, introduces the level of stigma, a newly constructed condition aiming at assessing whether the level of stigmatization of the fascist past can contribute to a better explanation of the same outcomes.

Notes

1 For more information about *Angrist*, see Wettstein (2014, 2016). The documentation (retrieved in March 2019) about Angrist is also available online: www.tarlanc.ch/angrist/ANGRIST_Dokumentation.pdf.
2 The actual number of coders involved in this particular research project was 43. Data about populism in party manifestos before the 1970s are not available. However, given the silencing phase described in Chapter 3, it would have been empirically less relevant for the present study since the effects of fascist legacies before the 1970s would have been non-existent or less strong.
3 On Brennan and Prediger's Kappa, see Brennan and Prediger (1981).
4 The coefficients are presented for all the variables, including those used uniquely for the alternative operationalization.
5 An extensive overview about the possible measurements of populism is offered in Aslanidis (2018).
6 Following previous studies about the presence of populist discourses, I define public debates as the public discussion of ideas, facts, feelings, and opinions relevant to politics and involving citizens, politicians, and experts, with the media acting at the same time as 'gatekeepers' and actors themselves (Rooduijn 2014; Bennett and Entman 2001; Vliegenthart and Roggeband 2007). National newspapers, magazines, television programs, and internet fora all constitute places where the public debate takes place.
7 Once again, this tremendous and unprecedented effort to understand and measure populism has been possible thanks to the third phase of the NCCR Democracy programme, the many researchers that worked on it, and the coders that have been trained to provide the most reliable (and comparable) results.
8 On the issue of state formation and nation-building, see Bartolini (1993) and Sartori (1991).
9 Papadopoulos (2002, 53) discusses in detail the impact of the institutional dimension on the degree of populism.
10 Although populist parties perform even better in the context of the elections for the European Parliament, national elections are more appropriate than European ones as the latter are mostly second-order national elections (Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996).
11 In the first round of presidential elections all the candidates are still participating in the electoral campaign, and therefore it is possible to retrieve an electoral

manifesto for each party. Legislative elections, on the other hand, are relatively less relevant, given the French semi-presidential system.

12 In 2006, the centre-left coalition “L’Unione,” for example, counted nine founding parties. The Italian election of 2008 would have been technically available because the different parties presented separate electoral manifestos. However, this would have been in contradiction to one of the criteria stated above: since all the other countries under consideration held elections in the period 2001–2003, selecting an election from 2008 would have diminished the degree of comparability.

13 Other authors use paragraphs as the sample unit. The whole manifesto, as explained by Aslanidis (2018, 1250), is better than paragraphs because they “frequently contain bullet-pointed lists and short motivational sentences or quotes, features that further undermine comparability. . . . segmentation into paragraphs still involves a discount in semantic resolution, since mildly populist paragraphs receive identical scores with intensely populist ones that carry greater informative content.”

14 A statement that is discarded from the coding process because it does not include any actor evaluation or issue positioning, might sound like this: “Next year there will be elections and our party will participate” or “This manifesto aims at illustrating the goals of our party.”

15 The golden rule expressed in the codebook about this aspect is “If you have to ask yourself whether a statement is explicit enough to code it, it is not.”

16 The number of manifestos that would have ‘zero’ populism with the co-occurrence principle but that in fact show populism with this operationalization is 56 (around 30% of the sample): 8 in the 1970s, 10 in the 1980s, 15 in the 1990s, 10 in the 2000s, and 13 in the 2010s. Of these, 13 are Swedish manifestos, but the levels of populism are always extremely low; therefore, coding them as non-populist does not change substantially the image of Sweden as a country without populism.

17 For example, the SVP (CH) in the 1990s, the ÖVP (CH) in four occasions, and the FDP (CH) and the FPÖ (AT) in the 2010s would have been coded as having no populism, precisely because they show people-centrism but no explicit anti-elitism. In a similar way, several left-wing parties would have been coded as non-populist: the SPÖ in Austria (in four occasions), the Left Party in Sweden (in five occasions), and the French Socialist Party (in four occasions).

18 Rooduijn et al. (2014, 567), for example, use the co-occurrence operationalization, and indeed nearly all mainstream parties have a very low populism score.

19 Appendix 10 shows the variables used for the alternative operationalization (Table A10.1), the amount of populism in each manifesto obtained with the alternative operationalization (Table A10.2), as well as the raw and fuzzy values of populism according to the alternative operationalization (Table A10.3).

20 The Socialist Party in Italy in the 1970s has a score of 40%, but the populist statements are 2 out of 5, therefore the reliability of such a measurement is questionable.

21 In a paper with Edward Weber (2017) we measured populism in manifestos and newspaper articles, and we used a metaphor to make sense of the presence of populism: “one can think about the difference between apple cider, beer, and wine: the presence of populist statements can be compared to the percentage of alcohol in the three drinks. For example, the manifesto of a highly populist party – like the SPD (Germany) in 1983 or the FPÖ (Austria) in 2013 – with 20–30% of populist statements, would be a Martini cocktail, while the manifesto of a moderately populist party – 5% populist statements, as in the case of the new Austrian party NEOS in 2013 – would be a pilsner beer.” To provide an extra element of comparison, one can think about the fact that 5.1% of the statements coded in manifestos contain the populist ideology, while 4% of statements are about immigration politics and 7% about European integration and EU-politics.

22 When possible, in order to determine the levels of radicalism, the Chapel Hill survey is used (Bakker et al. 2015). However, the survey does not cover the 1990s, for which the Party Manifesto Project is used (Lehmann et al. 2016). The values from the two datasets are then normalized and standardized. The data concerning the electoral results are obtained via Caramani (2000, 2015).

23 The levels of the outcome are then transformed into a 0–1 scale in order to perform the analysis; the thresholds for cases to be considered as being members of the outcome or not are explained in detail in Chapter 7. A simple logarithmic normalization from 0–100 based on maximum and minimum values would leave most of the cases below 50, for example, thus making the interpretation of the values even harder.

24 Outcome and conditions could be understood as dependent and independent variables, but it is not advisable to create terminological confusion since they are not fully overlapping concepts. The underlying logic of QCA, in fact, is different from the one characterizing statistical techniques (Schneider and Wagemann 2010).

25 The most important theoretical works about the concepts used in QCA are: Ragin (1987, 2000, 2008) and Schneider and Wagemann (2012).

26 This is a general principle of every comparative method, and it goes back (at least) to John Stuart Mill (1906), who did not believe it was possible to apply the method to social sciences, as explained in Caramani (2009).

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5 Populism in eight West European countries since the 1970s

This chapter presents the results of the content analysis described in Chapter 4. In particular, it illustrates the trend for the presence of populism in party manifestos in eight European countries from the 1970s to now. Moreover, it disentangles left- and right-wing variants of populism. Finally, it describes each country in detail, explaining which party manifestos articulate populist discourses and discussing whether the findings are in line with the literature on the topic.

The data presented also concern two time points that are not included in the analysis because the data used to operationalize the conditions are inexistent or incomplete for the decades before 1990. Hence, only the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s are part of the QCA analysis (Chapters 7 and 8). However, it is interesting to present a more long-term picture concerning the development of populism in Western Europe. In particular, by including the 1970s and 1980s, three considerations arise. First: the last elections feature unprecedented levels of populism. Second: it is not only since the 1990s that populism started growing. In fact, the overall levels for the 1970s are higher than for the 2000s. Third, a fact that is often neglected in the literature, the manifestos of left-wing parties average higher levels of populism compared to those of right-wing parties. Appendix 1 reports the full data (Tables A1.1 to A1.5).

Figure 5.1 illustrates the average percentage of populist statements in manifestos. In other words, it describes how much populism there is on average in party manifestos over time. The first element that stands out when observing the trend is that populism in manifestos shows higher and higher levels over time. On average, a right-wing manifesto in the 2010s contains much more populism than in the 1970s; in fact, the percentage of populist statements almost triples, going from 2.09% to 5.68%. An average left-wing manifesto was more populist in the 1970s compared to the three following decades, but (describing a sort of u-curve) it reaches unprecedented levels in the 2010s. As a result, the percentage of populist statements in *all* party manifestos together (solid line) shows that the manifestos written for the last elections have been the most populist. While an average manifesto contained 4.30% of populist statements in the 1970s, the level rises to 6.62% in the 2010s.

Figure 5.2 shows the evolution of the social acceptability of populist discourses. These values are the result of the average percentage of populist statements in

Average Percentage of Populism per Manifesto (Unweighted)



Figure 5.1 Average Populism in Manifestos (Percentage)



Figure 5.2 Average Populism in Manifestos (Weighted)

each manifesto (showed in Figure 5.1) weighted by the degree of radicalism and vote share of the party author of the manifesto. The reader should therefore understand "weighted populism" and "social acceptability of populism" as two equivalent concepts. The former refers to the mathematic process of weighting populism levels by electoral results and radicalism, while the latter refers to the concept obtained through this operation: populism's *Salonfähigkeit*. Similarly, both labels "unweighted" and "raw" populism refer to the percentage of populist statements in party manifestos.

When considering the social acceptability of populism – compared to the simple presence of populist discourses – a different picture emerges. Overall populism does not seem to have significantly increased its social acceptability over time. Interestingly, left- and right-wing populism followed opposite patterns. In the 1970s and 1980s, left-wing populism was much more socially acceptable than right-wing populism, but its *Salonfähigkeit* drastically decreased between the 1970s and the 2000s (from 517.73 to 123.1). Right-wing populism, in the meantime, has become more socially accepted than in the 1970s (72.69), although the levels are not much higher now (281.17) than in the 1990s (263.76).

Comparing Figure 5.1 with Figure 5.2, one can conclude that while right- and left-wing manifestos are more populist than ever, their social acceptability is not following a similar upturn. Indeed, the overall levels of populism were almost identical in the 1970s (295.21) and the 2010s (294.45). This means that the data show no 'populist wave' taking place in Western Europe, at least not when it comes to the social acceptability of populist messages in party manifestos. The two statistical tests presented in Appendix 2 (Table A2.1 and A2.2) show that the development over time is not statistically significant, with only the 1980s compared to the 2010s having a significant negative coefficient with a confidence interval of 95%.[1]

Despite the intrinsic interest of visualizing such a temporal trend, the focus of this study is to understand how acceptable populist discourses are in a given country compared to other countries rather than the average content of populism in manifestos over time. For this reason, Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show the average amount of populism at the country level. Now the focus is on the average level of populism across countries and the unit of measure is country-decade, not the party manifesto. In other words, each country has a value for both right- and left-wing populism in each decade, the sum of which gives the overall amount of populism. Table 5.1 presents the full data, while Appendix 1 (Tables A1.4 and A1.5) reports the averages values across country and over time.

These data will be discussed in detail in the remainder of the chapter, analyzed country by country. For the moment, it is interesting to note that when considering the total levels of populism across countries (solid line in Figure 5.3), the last decade is remarkably "more populist" than any other before. Unsurprisingly, this reflects the average amount of populism found in manifestos (Figure 5.1). Also at the country level, the presence of populism in manifestos is higher now than at any other point during the previous four decades, more than doubling between the 1970s and the 2010s.

Table 5.1 Populism by Country-Decade Raw and Weighted

Country	*Decade*	*R.W. Populism (weighted)*	*L.W. Populism (weighted)*	*Total Populism (weighted)*	*R.W. Populism (%)*	*L.W. Populism (%)*	*Total Populism (%)*
AT	1970	206.56	790.05	996.61	3.70	5.41	9.11
AT	1980	353.06	2,281.86	2,634.92	12.24	15.46	27.70
AT	1990	2,341.72	523.50	2,865.22	26.12	7.14	33.26
AT	2000	419.56	205.55	625.12	4.25	4.80	9.05
AT	2010	2,967.76	450.43	3,418.19	51.96	10.39	62.35
CH	1970	0.00	591.42	591.42	0.00	11.81	11.81
CH	1980	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
CH	1990	1,269.66	800.09	2,069.75	26.66	15.40	42.06
CH	2000	1,724.37	436.78	2,161.15	21.05	6.43	27.48
CH	2010	745.85	1,143.04	1,888.89	22.83	11.88	34.71
DE	1970	0.00	196.29	196.29	0.00	1.79	1.79
DE	1980	1,312.93	2,050.57	3,363.50	12.78	37.23	50.01
DE	1990	331.63	1,264.73	1,596.36	6.05	17.15	23.20
DE	2000	177.24	309.67	486.91	5.68	5.12	10.80
DE	2010	0.00	2,546.25	2,546.25	0.00	69.72	69.72
FR	1970	381.47	752.00	1,133.48	12.63	12.78	27.98
FR	1980	459.73	600.52	1,060.25	12.16	8.12	20.28
FR	1990	801.74	1,089.85	1,891.59	16.38	25.26	41.64
FR	2000	1,358.75	296.31	1,655.06	25.19	9.56	34.75
FR	2010	437.39	295.50	732.88	8.07	9.51	17.58
IT	1970	0.00	2,312.95	2,312.95	0.00	45.00	45.00
IT	1980	21.64	277.77	299.42	3.09	6.76	9.85
IT	1990	1,174.21	24.40	1,198.61	29.73	1.18	30.91
IT	2010	637.43	547.87	1,043.83	26.93	14.56	33.60
NL	1970	0.00	470.55	470.55	0.00	12.22	12.22
NL	1980	0.00	866.57	866.57	0.00	9.20	9.20
NL	1990	120.48	108.98	229.47	2.41	3.91	6.32
NL	2000	562.84	513.06	1,075.91	8.64	22.92	31.56
NL	2010	631.90	183.98	815.88	12.21	3.34	15.56
SE	1970	0.00	258.61	258.61	0.00	3.03	3.03
SE	1980	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
SE	1990	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
SE	2000	73.24	0.00	73.24	2.44	0.00	2.44
SE	2010	233.81	207.00	440.81	4.42	11.11	15.53
UK	1970	211.55	1,462.64	1,674.18	4.55	16.22	20.76
UK	1980	438.28	720.21	1,158.50	5.93	5.33	11.25
UK	1990	290.81	972.61	1,263.42	1.83	9.06	10.89
UK	2000	516.37	454.48	970.85	4.40	12.85	17.25
UK	2010	1,093.86	472.82	1,566.68	9.77	13.24	23.02

In the 1970s and 1980s, left-wing populism was dominant compared to right-wing populism, but this situation was reversed in the 1990s and 2000s. Again, this is consistent with the average levels of populism in manifestos presented above: from the 1990s onwards, right-wing populism becomes increasingly widespread, while left-wing populism follows a u-curve. In the 2010s elections, however, the



Figure 5.3 Average Populism per Country (Percentage)

levels for the two types of populism are almost identical, and this might point to a new change of scenario in the future.

When taking into consideration not only the amount of populism in party manifestos at the country level but also the degree of radicalism of the parties as well as their electoral performance (Figure 5.4) – in other words, the social acceptability (*Salonfähigkeit*) of populist discourses – the picture that emerges somehow discredits the idea of a populist surge. Once again, populism increases over time but not dramatically. The downfall in the 2000s, in particular, is difficult to explain given the steady increase in the decades preceding and following the 2000s (although this phenomenon does not occur with the operationalization based on co-occurrence, see Figure A10.3).[2] Moreover, similarly to what observed in Figure 5.2, left-wing populism is more acceptable in the 1970s and 1980s, while right-wing populism shows a higher acceptability in the 1990s and 2000s. Finally, the levels of both types of populism converge in the 2010s elections.

Once again, by comparing the data of populism with or without considering degree of radicalism and electoral results, it appears that the total amount of populism for the last elections is unprecedented in absolute terms (Figure 5.3), but this is not evident when considering its social acceptability (Figure 5.4). While party manifestos contain more and more populist statements over time, the social



Figure 5.4 Average Populism per Country (Weighted)

acceptability of populism does not rise as steadily. This is consistent with the trend observed from the comparison of average levels of populism at the manifesto level (Figures 5.1 and 5.2).

The results of the content analysis signal that while populist discourses are increasingly present in public debates and elections, their social acceptability finds some sort of resistance. Researchers on populism might have overestimated the electoral results of parties proposing populist messages, as well as their degree of radicalism. Including data that go beyond the electoral dimension of populism makes one think that liberal democratic systems reward radical populist ideas of power less than expected.

This might also indicate that *parties articulating populist discourses are becoming less and less radical* or, in other words, more mainstream. Indeed, if one considers only the 68 manifestos with at least 5% of populist statements, the average value of radicalism (on a scale from 1–6) was 3.1 in the 1970s, 3 in the 1980s, 3.2 in the 1990s, 2.8 in the 2000s, and down to 2.7 in the 2010s.

These data point to three important consideration. First, it is difficult to understand how the *globalization and mediatization* of politics influence the levels of populism in party manifestos and, in particular, their social acceptability. The predicted rise in levels of populism from the 1990s appears in the findings

but is less evident than expected especially when it comes to social acceptability.[3] One could argue that these mechanisms bear a stronger explanatory power in relation to right-wing populism only, but, in this case, the effect is not particularly visible. Second, although most of the literature focuses on right-wing parties, populism is more present in the manifestos of left-wing parties and has been for a longer time; this aspect should be investigated with greater attention. Third, while populism seems to grow over time, it is better to interpret it as a somewhat cyclical phenomenon since its levels and its social acceptability go up and down over time.

The pervasiveness of populist messages might appear more vividly if one would consider also the post-2015 elections (not included in this study). In Sweden, Germany, and Italy, for example, the electoral performances of populist and (relatively) radical parties seem to indicate that the social acceptability of (especially right-, but also left-wing) populism reached unprecedented new heights. Collective memories of the fascist past will resonate even stronger in case liberal democracies in Western Europe continue their process of populistization. However, it would not be wise to speculate further in this direction since the data available in this study do not include the most recent elections.

The remainder of this chapter presents the results of the content analysis country by country in alphabetical order, describing which parties have consistently articulated populist discourses in their manifestos and whether this is in line with the relevant literature. Each section discusses the levels of right- and left-wing, as well as overall populism. While providing examples of populist sentences extracted from the party manifestos would help the reader understand what type of messages the different political parties send, this is unfortunately impossible. Mother-tongue coders have analyzed manifestos written in several languages (not all known by the author). Providing examples for some countries but not others seems unfair and counterproductive. For those interested in reading the manifestos, most of them are available on the database of the Manifesto Project (Lehmann et al. 2016).

Austria

Several factors are often used to explain the *Systemverdrossenheit* (alienation and hostility to those in power), and consequently the success, of populist parties in Austria: e.g., '*partocracy*' (Kitschelt and McGann 1995), cartel politics (Müller 2002), lack of transparency, the structure of the proportional system (Heinisch 2002), and, in general, a process of de-alignment of the electorate.

In particular, the literature points to the Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs – FPÖ) as one of the main examples of a populist party. The reason for its success seems to be in line with expectations; in Austria, the collective memory of the fascist past is one of victimization (Chapter 6). Indeed, as Heinisch argues, Austria's unapologetic stance regarding its role during World War II "allowed the party to take political advantage when many Austrians were irritated by international criticism that the country had not

come to terms with its culpability in World War II and the Holocaust – particularly during the '*Waldheim affair*' in 1986" (2002, 70–71).

In a similar vein, Bischof and Pelinka claim that the FPÖ, which was founded in the 1950s by former Nazi and SS officers, offered representation to German nationalists who ended up being the political losers of post-war Austria (1997). Quite unsurprisingly, "the FPÖ's political opponents have indeed claimed that its policy proposals conflict with those values central to liberal democracies" (Müller 2002, 173).

Its former leader, Jörg Haider – who died in a car crash in 2008 – insisted that the Austrian nation was an ideological miscarriage. Tellingly, Haider was born in Carinthia, considered Austrian's stronghold of pan-German nationalist thinking. In 2005, Haider split from the FPÖ and founded a new political formation called Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich – BZÖ).

The BZÖ is usually considered a populist radical right party, but since it failed to cross the electoral threshold in 2013, it is not included in the content analysis. Finally, the short-lived Team Stronach, launched by the millionaire Frank Stronach and dissolved in September 2017, was supposed to articulate a populist discourse based on Euroscepticism and anti-bureaucracy when it participated in the 2013 elections (Akkerman, de Lange, and Rooduijn 2016).

The content analysis on party manifestos confirms that the FPÖ is highly populist. Its 2013 manifesto is one of the most populist of the whole corpus (21%), and the 1994 manifesto is above average as well (10.6%). However, in the 1970s and 2000s, the manifesto of FPÖ was either not particularly or not at all populist. This speaks volumes about the importance of conceptually differentiate radical and populist ideologies since they do not necessarily overlap. To remain on the right-wing side, the Austrian People's Party (Österreichische Volkspartei – ÖVP) also articulated populist messages on a consistent basis (almost 12% in 2013), while Team Stronach and NEOS show above-average levels of populism in their manifestos for 2013. Also on the left-wing side, both mainstream and new left-wing parties emerge as extremely populist over time. With the exception of 2002, the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs – SPÖ) articulated high levels of populism in its manifestos (with 15.5% in the 1980s), as did the Green Party (Die Grünen). Overall, Austrian party manifestos appear to contain particularly high levels of populism. Figure 5.5 presents the levels of populism's social acceptability for each country in grey, with the levels for Austria highlighted in black.

Concerning right-wing populism's social acceptability, Austria has always shown very high levels. More particularly, while in 1994 and especially in 2013 the levels are above average, the 2002 levels are notably low compared to the other decades.[4] Concerning left-wing populism's acceptability, the levels during the elections of 2002 are once again exceptionally low, but the levels are extremely high in the 1970s and 1980s. The other two elections points show levels of populism in line with (1994) and above average (2013), as compared to the other countries.





Figure 5.5 Populism in Austria

France

In France, the link between monarchism and fascist tendencies was already established before World War II; the factor cementing the union was the fascination for "an authoritarian order with anti-capitalist, anti-market sentiments" which kept together Catholic, populist, and Bonapartist movements (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, 92). These traits were at the basis of *Vichy France*, which, under Philippe Pétain, collaborated with the Nazis from 1940 to 1944.[5]

In the 1950s, the Poujadist movement, founded by Pierre Poujade, continued on this track combining anti-capitalism and authoritarianism. It peaked at the 1956 elections when it achieved almost 13% of the vote share (under the name *Union et fraternité française*); for a brief moment, it seemed to constitute a serious threat to the very foundations of the French Republic (Eatwell 1982). In the 1950s, the process of memory-building was still fluid; therefore, it is difficult to

identify the type of mainstream collective memory developed shortly after World War II. However, it might not be a coincidence that this type of movement was successful also (with the Common Man's Front) in Italy – another country characterized by a collective memory based on victimization (see Chapter 6).

The Poujadist experience, often labeled as populist (Winock 1997), was important also because the French populist par excellence – Jean-Marie Le Pen – started his career as a national delegate of Poujade's movement. Le Pen's party, the National Front (Front National – FN) was founded in 1972, and it was able to unite a fragmented right. It was not particularly successful in the 1970s but increasingly so from the 1980s. Kitschelt linked the party's success to two factors: on the one hand, it abandoned the anti-capitalist approach of Poujadisme; on the other hand – as a reaction to the movement of 1968 – it showed that it was possible to have a new right-wing ideology beyond the traditional extreme right.[6] While ethno-nationalism remained a core message of the party, other issues have been more or less relevant in the party's message over time, such as anti-communism, anti-immigration, and welfare chauvinism (van Kessel 2015b).

Moreover, the party always maintained a strong anti-establishment stance in its discourses, calling the establishment "a nomenklatura that pursues its own interests at the expenses of the national good" (Flood 1998, 28) while claiming to be "the only force to defend the people," the "ordinary folk," and the "excluded" (Balent 2013, 177).

The structural reasons associated with the success of the FN and other populist movements in France usually include the dissolution of the two major parties blocs, media attention, and the strategic response of the established parties (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, 96 ff.). Rydgren mentions also *political alienation and discontent* and argues that although ethno-nationalism has re-emerged periodically in France, it was not electorally successful before the FN because extreme right parties usually endorsed elements of the *Nazi ideology* (2008a). Surel argues that the new Constitution from 1958 and its focus on the people can be considered as a condition for the re-emergence of populism in France, as well as economic difficulties, financial scandals, and the end of the traditional alignment across parties and within voters (2002, 144).

The impact of the FN on French politics goes beyond its electoral performance. For example, Surel argues that in 1995 even Jacques Chirac "pursued the strategy of embracing a number of populist themes and ideas in order to create a space within the party system and to establish himself as the alternative candidate" (2002, 149). Similarly, Mondon identifies Sarkozy as being among those who followed the FN's message by trying to present himself as "the candidate of the people against the elite" (2014, 306). In other words, themes and messages typical of the French extreme right have been exploited by *mainstream* parties as well.

The FN survived both a split (2007) and the replacement of Jean-Marie by his daughter Marine (2011). In 2017, Marine Le Pen reached the second round at the presidential elections like her father did in 2002, while the party (recently re-branded *Rassemblement National*) continued its process of *dédiabolisation* trying to distance itself from political extremism and anti-Semitism (Crépon, Dézé, and Mayer 2015).

The content analysis confirms that the FN articulates populist messages in its party manifestos but not as much as it was expected. The level in 1995 is above average (5.9% of populist statements), and in 2002 it is definitely high (10.4%), but surprisingly it drops in 2012 (1.7%).[7] This does not mean that France is alien to populist discourses. To the contrary, the analysis reveals that the mainstream right-wing party Rally for the Republic (Rassemblement pour la République – RPR)[8] has been consistently populist: from the 1970s to the 1990s, the levels of populism in its manifestos have been very high (12.6%, 12.2%, and 6.1%). It merged into the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) of Nicolas Sarkozy in 2002 and continued to show traces of populism (2.9% and 2.5%). Even the moderate and rather centrist Union for French Democracy (UDF) in the 1990s and 2000s showed high (4.4%) and very high (12%) levels of populism, thus confirming that also the mainstream parties in France articulate populist discourses.



Figure 5.6 Populism in France

Similarly, mainstream parties on the left are prone to articulate highly populist messages, as the case of the Socialists (PS) illustrates. For the 1970s, their manifesto shows a very high 15.3% of populism (thus being the most populist of the French manifestos analyzed), and it constantly remained populist over time (2.3% in the 1980s, 13.9% in the 1990s, 7.9% in the 200s, and still 2.1% in 2012).

Concerning the non-mainstream left, the Communist Party (PCF), which shared the manifesto of the PS in the 1970s, also remained populist over time. Workers' Struggle (Lutte Ouvrière – LO), the Left Front (Front de Gauche – FdG), and The Greens (Europe Écologie Les Verts – EELV) also show high levels of populism but, paradoxically, less than the mainstream left.

Concerning right-wing populism's social acceptability, France shows very high levels. The trend over time, however, goes against the general one; in fact, there is decreasing populism in right-wing party manifestos since the 1990s. With regard to left-wing populism's acceptability, the levels are rather high, but there is a consistent decrease over time. Figure 5.6 presents the levels of populism's social acceptability for each country in grey, with the levels for France highlighted in black.

Germany

Germany is a country with a collective memory based on culpabilization (see Chapter 6), and this is reflected in the historically poor electoral performance and credibility of populist parties. The *Historikerstreit*, the controversy about the past, spanned the years 1986–1989 and concerned the nature (uniqueness or comparability) of the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime. This already signals how Germany was the only country working through its past, taking full responsibility for its actions and making amends, thus generating a strong stigma that was always a major disadvantage for right-wing populist actors.

The social stigma appears very clearly, for example, when examining the case of the Republicans (Die Republikaner – REP), an extreme right party quite popular during the 1980s and 1990s founded by Franz Schönhuber (former Waffen-SS). The *Republikaner* demanded the decriminalization of the German past because they argued that Germany should no longer be reduced to Auschwitz and the gas chambers. The party used the widespread resentments associated with the process of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* and suggested that Germany should hence historicize its Nazi legacy and be a normal country (Betz 2002, 200). This suggestion, however, was heavily criticized, and the party never entered parliament, consistently losing votes over time.

More generally, after 1949, Germany never saw the emergence of legislators of a Nazi successor organization, contrary to what happened, for example, in Italy and Austria. Since international vigilance was focused primarily on Germany, the new German democratic regime was forced to "exercise more political control when successor organizations of the Nazi party attempted to stage a comeback than the Italian postwar governments when facing neofascist movements" (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, 205). All the other extreme right parties failed to capture any significant vote share. For example, the NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei

Deutschlands – National Democratic Party) never made it into the Bundestag, and the law-and-order Schill Party (Partei Rechtsstaatlicher Offensive) failed to expand nationally after having performed exceptionally well in Hamburg in 2001.

This has been true until very recently, at least until the creation of Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland – AfD). It began in 2013 as a bourgeois party founded by a group of Eurosceptic professors, but over time it proposed increasingly radical and anti-democratic ideas. Since 2019, AfD most extreme members are observed by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV, Germany's domestic security agency). One of them, Björn Höcke, called for a 180-degree U-turn in Germany's *politics of remembrance*, and this is particularly relevant because now AfD sits as the main opposition party in the Bundestag (at the 2017 elections, they obtained 94 seats with 12.6% of the votes). Without any doubt, AfD it is the most successful party to the right of CDU since World War II, and its success is a systemic shock and potential critical juncture in Germany's collective memory.[9]

Although Germany seemed to show the right conditions for populism to thrive, *right-wing populist parties were never successful* (with the partial exception of AfD in last elections). In the 1980s, post-industrial transformations and a growing number of asylum-seekers seemed to offer the perfect opportunity structure, but in the 1990s, the emergence of right-wing populist parties "was constrained by the long-term historical legacy of Germany's Nazi past" (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, 221). In Germany, the process of European integration, which is normally associated with the success of populism, was not perceived as a threat to national identity and sovereignty. On the contrary, even left-wing intellectuals argued that it would have represented a complement to the national identity which might "release Germany from the legacy of the real trauma, the disastrous attempt to realize the utopia of *völkish* nationalism under Hitler" (Trägårdh 2002, 103).

Among the reasons for the weakness of right-wing populism in Germany, Decker identifies the institutional framework and political opportunity structures but also "the historical burden that weighs on Germany's political culture." In his words, the Nazi past and the way it was re-elaborated created "a deeper stigma attached to right-wing extremism in Germany than in any other European country" (2008, 125).

The content analysis confirms that Germany has low levels of populism and that no purely "populist" party ever collected more than 5% of the vote share. For this reason, none of the Republican or NPD manifestos have been coded, while the AfD almost made it in 2013 (Arzheimer 2015) and entered the parliament at the next elections in 2017 (not included in the analysis).[10] The content analysis shows, therefore, that only mainstream parties such as the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) articulate populist discourses in their manifestos. However, the levels are usually way below the average (with an interesting exception in the 1980s, which, however, is not included in the following analysis).[11]

The situation changes completely when analyzing left-wing manifestos. In this case, populist discourses are present in both mainstream and niche party

manifestos. More importantly, the levels are constantly in line with other countries presenting very high levels of populism. Indeed, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) consistently articulated populist discourses in its manifestos from the 1970s, with exceptionally high levels in the 1980s (29.2%) and 2010s (19.2%). The same applies to the Green Party (Grüne), which has articulated populist discourses since the 1980s but scores exceptionally high in the 2010s (29.6%). The Left (Die Linke) in the 2010s presented an extremely populist manifesto as well (20.8%).

Germany usually has high levels of left-wing populism; in 2013, the amount of left-wing populism is actually the highest recorded in a single country. This seems to imply that the collective stigmatization of the Nazi past does not affect left-wing German parties. Decker is probably right when he argues that Die Linke "is immune in every respect to any suspicion of fascism" despite its roots in the ruling socialist party of the German Democratic Republic. Therefore, Die Linke





Figure 5.7 Populism in Germany

can now address issues and resort to methods "that are normally associated with right-wing populism" (Decker 2008, 134).

The opposite scenario appears as soon as one considers only populism in right-wing party manifestos and their social acceptability. As Figure 5.7 shows, Germany (black line) – with the partial exception of the 1980s – constantly scores way below the average for the other countries for the social acceptability of right-wing populism.[12] The already low levels of the 1990s continued dropping in the 2000s and in the 2010s. Moreover, it is not possible to argue that mainstream parties incorporated populist issues over time because there is no right-wing populism at all in the 2010s manifestos (unique case).

Overall, it seems safe to assume that the stigma associated with the Nazi past plays a crucial role in blocking right-wing populist parties, while this is not the case for left-wing parties. Possibly, the stigma associated with the Nazi past works in only one direction and leaves untouched the cultural opportunity structure for left-wing populism to thrive. This might be the case because the Nazi past resonates strongly with new radical right parties but not with the full ideology articulated by left-wing parties, and it will be discussed in the next chapters.

Italy

The historic development of populism in Italy has been completely different from the German case and much more similar to the French and Austrian ones, with whom Italy indeed shares a collective memory based on victimization (see Chapter 6). Immediately after the end of World War II, the Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano – MSI) was founded by supporters of Benito Mussolini. The party was highly nostalgic of the fascist *ventennio*, and it could not adapt to the changing political scenario in the 1990s (Kitschelt and McGann 1995). Under the leadership of Gianfranco Fini, the MSI transformed itself into a more modern, post-fascist movement: National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale – AN).

The party, after the "Fiuggi turning point", could finally present itself as fully democratic. This opened the doors to all the three coalition governments led by Silvio Berlusconi together with the Northern League (*Lega Nord* – LN). National Alliance eventually merged into the People of Freedom (Popolo della Libertà – PdL) in 2009. Northern League, on the other hand, remained an independent party and continued its own transformation. Born as Liga Veneta and then Liga Lombarda, from the 1990s they presented themselves as a populist movement of protest and identity (Taguieff 1995).[13] However, they eventually became a national party insisting mainly on issues such as immigration and Euroscepticism but less and less on issues concerning regionalism and separatism. In other words, the party first "re-opened a centre-periphery cleavage which was never completely sealed" (Tarchi 2008, 87) but then became a more traditional far right populist party focusing on immigration and law enforcement.

In Italy, populism seems to be so widespread that even Silvio Berlusconi – the most mainstream of the populist actors and charismatic leader of Go Italy[14]

(Forza Italia – FI) – continued throughout his career to depict himself as the embodiment of the popular will against the corrupt political parties, the Communists, the judiciary system, and the mass media. It is quite hard to imagine Berlusconi as a man of the street, given the fact that for several decades he has consistently remained among the richest persons in Italy. However,

> paternalistic and reassuring, Berlusconi never misses an opportunity to proclaim himself as the interpreter and defender of the popular will. . . . 'Abstract principles' and 'complicated ideologies' are, therefore, explicitly banned from Forza Italia which must remain 'a movement' and expresses an open 'aversion to party politics.'
>
> (Tarchi 2008, 93)[15]

Anti-establishment positions; discourses against political, economic, and media elites; appeals to popular sovereignty, post-fascist and regionalist movements: Italy seems to represent the perfect *thriving ground for populist actors* (Zanatta 2002). Indeed, many scholars pointed to a multiplicity of reasons for this: e.g. '*partocracy*' and ideological convergence (Kitschelt and McGann 1995), as well as public disaffection and cynicism with the political system (Betz 1994) – traits which emerged in the 1940s with the populist movement Common Man's Front (L'Uomo Qualunque), similar in many regards to the Poujadist movement in France (Setta 2005).[16] The general discontent was fueled by, among other things, one of the most notorious corruption scandals of the twentieth century: *Bribesville* (Morlino and Tarchi 1996). Between 1992 and 1994, all the previously existing political parties disappeared (apart from the Northern League), and after ten years of *pentapartito* led by the Christian Democrats, the first Republic collapsed leaving the stage for the success of Berlusconi in the 1990s and 2000s, as well as Lega and Five Star Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle – M5S) in recent years.[17]

However, despite all the favourable conditions for the success of populist discourses, the content analysis shows that the social acceptability of populism in Italy is less outstanding than expected (Figure 5.8, black line). Moreover, it was not possible to measure the levels of populism in 2001 given the special conditions of those elections: because of the complex electoral law adopted at the time (the so-called "Mattarellum"), the parties had to form broad coalitions rather than participating alone. Hence, the single parties did not even write separate manifestos in that occasion. Again, it is important to remember that the values for 2001 are reported as zero but they are actually missing data (the same applies to right-wing populism in the 1970s since most of the manifestos were not found). Therefore, the only two time points considered in the following analysis will be 1994 and 2013.

The results of the content analysis offer contrasting insights. While populism is present in each manifesto of right-wing parties, the levels are often not very high. For example, populism does not emerge "as the basic feature in the programs and communicative style of Forza Italia" (Tarchi 2008, 133).[18] In both 1994 and 2013, Berlusconi's party articulated some populist messages in its manifestos (1.7% and 5.9%) but with much lower levels compared to other parties typically





Figure 5.8 Populism in Italy

referred to as populist. In this sense, it is possible to concur with McDonnel's argument that Berlusconi's parties might be personal rather than populist (2013).

The fact that even the manifesto of Civic Choice (Scelta Civica – SC), the party founded by the former technocratic Prime Minister Mario Monti, scored an astonishing 13.1% in 2013 speaks volumes about the unexpected levels for Berlusconi's party. The manifestos of National Alliance and Northern League in 1994 both show traces of populism (7.4% and 5.3%), which is not low but is again below expectations. However, it is crucial to observe that each and every one of the eighteen coded manifestos contains traces of populism, meaning that right-wing populist discourses in Italy have always been largely acceptable, no matter its degree of radicalism and electoral success.

Left-wing party manifestos were highly populist in the 1970s, with a remarkable 40% for the Socialist Party (which can, however, be explained with the five

total coded statements) and – to a lesser extent – with the Communist Party, which scored 5% and 1.7% in the 1970s and 1980s. The Democratic Party (PD) led by Matteo Renzi scores 6.7% in 2013, in line with the PDS (PD's predecessor, the Democratic Party of the Left), which scored 7.5% in the 1990s.[19] The Five Star Movement, which is coded as both right- and left-wing because it is the only unclassifiable party in the sample, scores 7.9% in 2013.[20] This value is not astonishing per se, but it is comparatively high since it is the third most populist manifesto coded for Italy.

Concerning the social acceptability of right-wing populism, Italy follows expectations, especially in 1994, whereas the 2013 levels are lower than expected.[21] The trend is similar for the levels of left-wing populism: they are relatively low in 1994, but closer to the average in 2013. Overall, it is possible to claim that, compared to the expectations generated by the relevant literature and taking into consideration the collective memory based on victimization, Italy shows lower levels of populism, but, on the other hand, every party in Italy seems to articulate populist messages to a certain extent.

Netherlands

Concerning supply- and demand-side factors for populism, the Netherlands is probably the most interesting case among the eight countries included in this study. Here populism seems to be articulated mainly by flamboyant personalities able to exploit a favourable political-institutional context, such as Pim Fortuyn, Geert Wilders, or Thierry Baudet. The perfectly proportional system and the fragmented party system, combined with economic stagnation and immigration (Lucardie 2008), are supposed to create a mix of favourable socio-economic and political-institutional factors, but the success of populist actors has always been discontinuous in the country. This is even more puzzling given the country's collective memory based on cancellation (see Chapter 6), but the limited success of populist actors might be linked to deeper traits of the country's political culture, such as liberalism and multiculturalism.

In 2002, Pim Fortuyn was among the most notable exceptions to the electoral failure of populist actors in the Netherlands. A former Marxist and member of the Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid – PvdA), his movement gained 17% of the vote share, partly due to the emotional situation provoked by Fortuyn's assassination 10 days before the elections.[22] In 2006, the list of Pim Fortuyn did not gain any seat (only 0.2% of the votes), but Geert Wilders, founder of the one-man Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid – PVV) and former VVD member (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie), gained six seats and replaced Fortuyn's list in the parliament.

While Fortuyn's former party Liveable Netherlands (Leefbaar Nederland) disappeared very quickly, Wilders continued the populist discourse centred on restoring democracy and returning the power to the people, while appealing to the "ordinary people" even more explicitly (van Kessel 2015a). In 2010, Wilders received a surprising 15.5% of the vote share (entering also a short-lived coalition

government). In 2019, a new populist actor made his appearance on the national stage: by winning the most votes in provincial elections, Forum for Democracy (Forum voor Democratie – FvD) – founded in 2016 – obtained two seats in the House of Representatives. Thierry Baudet, the current party leader, presented himself as a political outsider that wished to lead the attack on what was consistently called the 'political cartel,' and he declared that his political views have been influenced by two events: the September 11 attacks and the assassination of Pim Fortuyn.

Beyond the occasional presence of right-wing parties based on charismatic leadership, the electoral results of populist actors have never been particularly striking when compared to other European countries. Moreover, another peculiarity of Dutch right-wing populists is their relatively liberal attitude towards cultural issues such as the emancipation of women and gay people (Inglehart and Andeweg 1993). Pim Fortuyn – who was openly gay himself – was concerned





Figure 5.9 Populism in the Netherlands

about the preservation of Dutch liberal values, and Wilders, too, embraces liberal values and stresses how Islam threatens them (Akkerman 2005).

On the left, populist discourses have been initially more socially accepted than right-wing ones. Indeed, during the 1970s and 1980s, populist discourses were articulated almost exclusively by left-wing parties such as the Labour Party. The Socialist Party (SP) is another case usually associated with populism, although it is included in the analysis only from the 2000s, by which time it had toned down its radicalism and dropped references to its communist past (March 2011). Before 2002, it never reached 5% of the vote share; in 2006, it obtained its best result so far, with 16.6% of the votes. Indeed, its two analyzed manifestos contain medium (4.7% in 2002) and low (0.7% in 2012) levels of populism.

Overall, according to the content analysis illustrated in Figure 5.9, the Netherlands (black line) represent a borderline case, and often it is difficult to classify the country and determine whether populist discourses are socially acceptable or not. Concerning right-wing populism, it shows high acceptability in 2002 and 2012, when, as well as Fortuyn and Wilders, the mainstream VVD and the Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen-Democratisch Appèl – CDA) articulated populist discourses. In 1994, however, the levels were particularly low.[23] Left-wing populism was exceptionally acceptable in the 1970s and 1980s but much less so in the 1990s and 2010s (in line with the general trend). On the other hand, in 2002, when all four left-wing parties articulated populism in their manifestos, the country has the highest levels of left-wing populism amongst all countries.

Sweden

When dealing with populism in Western Europe, Sweden always represents an exceptional case (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Dahlström and Esaiasson 2013). Indeed, Sweden is often labelled as a *negative case*: despite favourable conditions for the presence of populism, and while all comparable countries on the continent (and in the region) witness the growing success of populist actors, in Sweden there is virtually no trace of populism. This has been substantially true over several decades, but as the 2018 elections showed, it is time to consider that Sweden might no longer be a negative case (Rydgren and van der Meiden 2018).

Sweden's exceptionalism has always been linked to its political culture. Developed by the Social Democrats, the core concept of 'people's home' (*Folkhemmet*) has merged demos and ethnos into one concept, hence creating a strong link between being Swedish and being democratic (Trägårdh 2002, 77). This approach allowed the Social Democrats (Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti) to fight the national socialist appeal of the Nazis by declining concepts revolving around the idea of *folk* (and not *klass*, after 1929) in a democratic way. By studying the national political culture of the country, it is possible to find several other reasons why Nazi groups in Sweden were never successful, and this might explain why, despite its collective memory based on

cancellation, in the 1970s and 1980s the country never experienced high levels of populism and eventually developed a memory based on culpabilization (Chapter 6).

For example, Sweden – together with Switzerland – claimed to have the most ancient tradition of popular rule, and the tradition of nation-statism became central after the war, contrary to Germany, where civil society became the key figure of the new state. Moreover, concepts such as ‘national community’ have been invested with positive connotations because in the collective memory they are linked to the resolution of the political and social crisis of the 1930s. The process of nationalization went hand in hand with the concept of welfare and solidarity, thus gaining a positive connotation.

The “lucrative neutrality” the country decided to adopt during World War II (Colla 2002) was never fully investigated, and the country decided to impose upon itself a ‘silent treatment’ of the issue and to describe itself as a ‘moral superpower,’ always on the side of the oppressed, thus protecting the purity of the *Folkhemmet* (Dahl 2006). Nonetheless, Sweden apparently did not need to fully acknowledge its responsibility in order to develop a strong stigma attached to the fascist past. Other characteristics of the country’s political culture can probably help to explain the Swedish approach to populism.

Kitschelt and McGann suggest that the lack of a credible far-right in Sweden is linked to *historical events* and to the country’s unique political organization (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, 124):

> [I]n Scandinavia there was little basis for a strong antidemocratic fascist mobilization in the Great Depression of the late 1920s. The German occupation of Norway and Denmark during World War II and the puppet regimes set up by the Nazi state further discredited right-wing mobilization after the war and prevented any kind of extremist mass appeal.

However, while this is true for Sweden, it was not the case for Denmark and Norway, where extreme right-wing parties have been relatively successful since the 1970s (Betz 1994).

One party which is usually labelled as populist might have not been included in the content analysis: New Democracy (Ny Demokrati). It gained 6.7% of the vote share in 1991, while for the 1990s in Sweden, the 1994 election has been selected. Considered as a typical anti-establishment right-wing party, New Democracy was launched in 1991 by two media personalities but rapidly disappeared and never repeated its first electoral endeavour.

In general, as Figure 5.10 clearly shows, populism in Sweden is almost non-existent and therefore unacceptable. Only 5 out of 29 analyzed manifestos show any trace of populism, and 3 of them are from the 2014 elections. The manifesto of the Moderate Party contains very low levels of populism (0.6%), while the manifestos of the Sweden Democrats in 2014 (3.8%), the Christian Democrats in 2002 (2.4%), and the Centre Party in the 1970s (3%) contain average amounts of populism. The only clearly populist manifesto is the Green Party’s manifesto of 2014 (11.1%).





Figure 5.10 Populism in Sweden

As already mentioned, the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna – SD) articulate populist messages in their manifesto, but the levels seem to be rather low compared to the manifestos of other right-wing populist parties.[24] From the second half of the 1990s, they tried to build a respectable façade and break their links with fascism (Rydgren 2008b); this translated to better electoral performances. Indeed, the Sweden Democrats polled the third most vote share at the 2014 and 2018 elections, with 12.9% and over 17.5%, although they have been participating in elections since 1988.

This shows that a party proposing anti-immigration policies might now exploit the existing socio-cultural situation. Rydgren and van der Meiden (2018) link the recent success of the Sweden Democrats to four elements that characterized the country's political scenario in the last decade. Class politics declined, the immigration issue gained salience, the mainstream parties increasingly converged on

the socioeconomic dimension, and the SD have distanced itself from its own cumbersome past in order to build a more respectable façade.

It is remarkable, however, that despite political discontent, alienation, declining party identification, and de-alignment and re-alignment processes providing favourable political opportunity structures for emerging populist parties, populism has been absent in Sweden until very recently. Since the 1990s, the country has not displayed high levels of populism on either the left or the right. This is a unique case among the eight countries analyzed. It remains to be seen whether the favourable conditions will eventually allow populism to thrive in Sweden as pointed out by Rydgren: "First, widespread xenophobia exists in Sweden. . . . Second, Sweden has a high level of political distrust in and discontent with political parties and other political institutions. . . . Third, there is possibly potential for an emerging RRP party to exploit anti-EU sentiments" (2002, 48). So far, this does not seem to be the case, and populism remains largely unacceptable. However, recent developments might indicate that the electoral success of the SD, like the success of AfD in Germany, marked a new era in the country's political culture.

Switzerland

The Swiss Confederation is often portrayed as a *populist paradise* because the peculiar features of the country's political system and culture make "the gap between democracy and populism . . . very narrow, since self-determination and participation are part of the Swiss democratic system" (Albertazzi 2008, 102). In other words, the Swiss political system, based on direct democratic elements, already leans towards a populist democracy. This means that political-institutional conditions have always been favourable for the presence of populism. Mechanisms such as *consociationalism and direct democracy* produce a constant bottom-up pressure on policy-making processes and in general on the established parties (Kriesi 2005). Moreover, the Swiss political culture is based on concepts such as *self-government, participation, neutrality*, and *localism*, which, over time, also produced different forms of discrimination for the new minorities (Albertazzi 2008). Finally, its type of collective memory, based on cancellation, is supposed not to block populism (Chapter 6).

The history of political movements and parties considered as populist is therefore quite dynamic. Between the 1960s and 1980s, two anti-foreigner movements were rather widespread: National Action – now Swiss Democrats (Schweizer Demokraten – SD) – and the Republican Movement, which dissolved in 1989 when most of its members joined the Federal Democratic Union (Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union – EDU). Between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, the Automobile Party (Autopartei) and the Swiss Democrats were quite successful thanks to their message against established parties and state bureaucracy. In 1991, the Ticino League (Lega dei Ticinesi) was founded, exploiting the center – periphery cleavage and claiming to represent the interests of the common people against environmentalists, the state, and the political establishment (Betz 1994).

However, none of these parties collected more than 5% of the votes during the 1970s or 1980s.

Populism started becoming part of mainstream politics in Switzerland from the 1990s, and populism in Switzerland nowadays means Swiss People's Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei – SVP), not only in terms of electoral results but also in terms of organization and funding (Bornschier 2010; Zaslove 2012). The party was formed in 1971 following a merger of the Party of Farmers, Traders and Independents, and the Democratic Party. It was only from the 1990s, however, that the party started a process of radicalization, following the Zürich party-branch led by Christoph Blocher, eventually transforming into a radical right populist party (Afonso and Papadopoulos 2015).

In line with the SVP's campaigns, and in fact led by Blocher himself from 1986 to 2003, the organization "Campaign for an Independent and Neutral Switzerland" is highly active in launching and opposing referenda. Among other things, the organization founded by Blocher and Otto Fischer from the Free Democratic Party (Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei – FDP) campaigned to maintain the Swiss military, opposed Switzerland joining the EU, and campaigned to end "mass immigration."

The SVP is the leading party in terms of vote share since 2003; in 2015, it obtained its best result with almost 30% of the votes. In 2005, the *Geneva Citizens' Movement* was founded, but like other Swiss populist movements, they barely manage to obtain a seat in the parliament. The SVP, on the other hand, changed the *Swiss magic formula*, the unofficial way of dividing the seven executive seats of the Swiss Federal Council. Since 1959 the FDP, the Christian Democratic People's Party (Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei der Schweiz – CVP) and the Social Democratic Party (SP) each got two seats, while the SVP received the remaining one. The SVP took one seat form the CVP in 2003; in 2008, some SVP members split from the party and created the Conservative Democratic Party of Switzerland (Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei Schweiz – BDP). Nonetheless, the SVP obtained its best electoral results after the split, in 2015.

As Figure 5.11 shows, Switzerland (black line) had a rather high social acceptability of populism in the last three elections, while this was not the case in the 1970s and 1980s. This is in line with the expectations derived from the relevant literature. On the right, there are no traces of populism until 1995, when three parties articulated highly populist messages: SVP (6.8%), CVP (12.1%), and FDP (7.7%). In the two following decades, the CVP did not articulate any populist message in its manifestos, leaving FDP and SVP as the only two parties articulating populist messages. On the left, two parties have been consistently populist since the 1990s: the Social Democratic Party (SP) and the Green Party (Grüne Partei der Schweiz – GPS). The SP was already populist in the 1970s (but not in the 1980s), together with the Alliance of Independents (Landesring der Unabhängigen – LdU). In the 2011 elections, both the SP and the SVP have been extremely populist in their manifestos (9.7% and 18.7%). Overall, Switzerland emerges as one of the cases where populism is most socially acceptable, in line with expectations.





Figure 5.11 Populism in Switzerland

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom, having a collective memory of World War II based on heroization (Chapter 6), was not supposed to show high levels of populism's social acceptability. However, a quick glance at the results of the content analysis (Figure 5.12) is enough to show that this is not the case. *Populism exists, and it is mainstream*. This result is even more puzzling if one considers that in the 1990s, the United Kingdom was supposed not to have favourable political-institutional conditions for the emergence of radical right-wing parties (Kitschelt and McGann 1995). On the other hand, favourable opportunity structures subsequently developed: indeed, there has been a decline in identification with, and support for, the two main parties, and tabloids such as *The Sun* have a fierce populist agenda (Fella 2008).



Figure 5.12 Populism in the United Kingdom

However, populism in the United Kingdom seems to be unsuccessful when combined with radicalism. Given the high level of populism in the mainstream parties, it seems plausible to observe that Britain entered the realm of *populist democracy* (Mair 2002), as the whole debate about Brexit seems to remind us. Freeden points out that the ideological and institutional relationship between state and government is at stake, and the United Kingdom might no longer be a liberal democratic state because it lacks a liberal government. One of the aims of Theresa May's government, Freeden argues (2017, 1), "has been to translate certain strands of populist sentiment into a fundamental restructuring of the state itself, without Parliamentary approval."

The United Kingdom certainly constitutes a surprising case, and the levels of populism are always higher than expected. However, it is important to notice how populism is virtually never present in combination with radical or extreme

parties. For example, the *National Front*, a far-right party founded in 1967, has always been almost irrelevant in elections (it has never reached even 1% of the vote share or had an elected representative at any level). Successful populism is not combined with radical and extreme parties but rather with the mainstream Conservative party. It was British conservatism that, through Thatcherism – "their own unique right-wing populism" (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, 242) – drained attention away from the National Front. No fringe or niche party ever used the so-called 'winning formula': economic liberalism combined with political and cultural authoritarianism. The British National Party (BNP), despite the attempts of Nick Griffin – chairman between 1999 and 2014 – to distance the party from its fascist roots, also never held any seat, and the best electoral result they achieved was 1.9% of the vote share in 2010.

Regarding the failure of extreme right movements in the 1970s and 1980s, Kitschelt and McGann explain that, contrary to what happened in Germany or Italy, "whatever constraints the extreme Right was facing had more to do with the position of the major parties in the dominant competitive arena than with the historical legacy of the extreme Right" (1995, 242). Apart from the British culture of deference which makes it difficult for new parties to challenge the political system (Almond and Verba 1963), there is indeed a further obstacle for populist parties; the first-past-the-post electoral system makes it almost impossible for new parties to effectively challenge the two major parties. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that, according to the content analysis, populism in the United Kingdom is a permanent feature of the two mainstream parties. Both the Conservatives and the Labour Party have consistently articulated populist messages since the 1970s, as well as the Liberal Party, with the result that all 15 analyzed manifestos show traces of populism.

The Conservatives were moderately populist both in the 1970s (4.5%) and in the 2000s (4.4%) and very populist in the 2010s (9.8%) but showed almost no traces of populist messages in their manifestos in the 1980s (1.2%) and 1990s (1.8%). The Labour Party has been constantly populist, with average levels in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2010s (5.3%, 5.7%, and 4.8%) and rather high levels in the 1970s and 2000s (7.6 and 8.1%). Because of the structure of the electoral system, UKIP did not win a seat in the House of Commons until 2015 (losing it again in 2017), when for the first time it also scored better than the 5% threshold used for the content analysis.[25]

However, the last British election considered was in 2010; therefore, the only other political movement included in the analysis apart from the two mainstream ones is the liberal democratic party, which was the result of a union between the Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party in 1988. The Lib Dems, always considered left-wing apart from during the 1983 elections, articulated similar levels of populism compared to the manifestos of the Labour Party, with particularly populist peaks in the 1970s (8.6%) and 2010s (8.4%).

Overall, the levels of populism's social acceptability in the United Kingdom are puzzling because, on the one hand, there is no single manifesto showing more than 10% of populist statements, yet, on the other hand, each and every

manifesto shows traces of populism. Moreover, the levels of right-wing populism seem to be higher than expected for a country whose memory is based on heroization. In particular, the 2010 elections show very high levels of populism, with only Austria scoring higher. The levels of left-wing populism, although never particularly elevated, are also rather high compared to other countries.

Conclusions

The content analysis of 173 party manifestos from 8 countries in 5 elections reveals that 5 of the 6 manifestos containing the highest percentage of populist statements were written either in the 1970s or in the 2010s.[26] Moreover, it is interesting that they are written by left-wing parties: the Socialist Party in Italy (40%) in the 1970s; The Greens, The Left, and the Social Democrats in Germany in 2013 (29.6%, 20.8%, and 19.2%); and the FPÖ in Austria in 2013 (21%).[27]

Concerning the social acceptability of populism, the picture is similar but not identical. Once again, in the top six, there are mainly left-wing parties from the 1970s and 1980s, as well as the right-wing FPÖ in the 1990s and 2010s. This also confirms that *left-wing populism is available to mainstream parties, while right-wing populism is mainly articulated by niche or extreme parties and not by mainstream and established parties.*

Concerning right-wing populism, among the 12 most populist manifestos, 11 come from only 3 countries: France (4), Austria (4), and Switzerland (3). Surprisingly, the remaining one is from the Italian Civic Choice, Monti's (technocratic) party. Among them, only two are not from the 1990s–2010s, and they are both French: the UDR (in the 1970s) and the RPR (in the 1980s). Around 69% of the coded manifestos from right-wing parties contain populism (63 out of 91).

Concerning left-wing populism, among the 15 most populist manifestos, all 8 countries are represented: Germany (5); France, Switzerland, and the Netherlands (2); Italy, Austria, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (1). Among them, nine are either from the 1970s or the 2010s, while none are from the 2000s. Around 77% of the coded manifestos from right-wing parties contain populism (64 out of 83).

Concerning the expectations at the country level, the results seem to be in line with the type of collective memory assigned in the next chapter but with some remarkable exceptions. The countries characterized by a memory based on victimization display a high social acceptability of populism, and this is especially true for right-wing populist parties. Austria and France seem to follow this pattern more precisely compared to Italy, which has slightly lower levels than expected. The countries characterized by a memory based on cancellation, on the other hand, are more difficult to interpret. Switzerland has very high values of populism – even higher than Italy, for example.

The Dutch case is a puzzling one because the levels of populism vary significantly over time and they are often lower than expected. Sweden, where in the 1970s and 1980s there is no trace of populism, seems to confirm that despite

favourable opportunity structures, populism is blocked by elements rooted in the country's political culture. Germany is in line with the expectations concerning the social acceptability of right-wing populism, but also shows exceptionally high levels of left-wing populism. Finally, the United Kingdom, the only case characterized by heroization registers a surprisingly high social acceptability of populism over time, concerning both right- and left-wing parties. These aspects are fully investigated in the next chapters.

Notes

1 Appendix 10 (Tables A10.2 and A10.3) shows the same descriptive data based on the alternative operationalization implementing the co-occurrence principle. The main difference consists in the fact that the alternative operationalization based on co-occurrence raises the amount of right-wing populism in the 2000s.
2 Figures A10.1 to A10.4 show the same type of data as Figures 5.1 to 5.4, but the calculations are based on the alternative operationalization that relies on the co-occurrence principle.
3 The measurement based on co-occurrence is different but gives similar results, and the rise over time is not statistically significant. See Appendix 11 (Tables A11.9 and A11.10).
4 In 2013, the weighted measure for right-wing populism in Austria is 2,968, the highest recorded for any country in any decade, and Austria holds the second position as well, with 2,341 in the 1990s.
5 Even before the beginning of the nineteenth century, the so-called Boulangism (from the founder Georges Boulanger) was considered a populist threat for the French Republic, although from rather left-wing positions (Chebel d'Appollonia 1996).
6 This transformation described for the Front National was similar to what the Italian Social Movement (MSI) was doing in Italy at the same time.
7 The 2017 election for France is not included in the content analysis.
8 Until 1976, it was called Union for the Defence of the Republic (Union pour la Défense de la République – UDR).
9 "It has become increasingly evident that some of the party's most prominent personalities have turned their backs on democracy altogether. . . . They have characterized refugees as "invaders", the German government as a "regime" and the Third Reich as nothing but a "speck of bird shit" on German history." *Die Spiegel*, "Germany Considers Monitoring Right-Wing AfD", October 16, 2018, available online (consulted in April 2019): www.spiegel.de/international/germany/germany-considers-monitoring-right-wing-afd-for-extremism-a-1232995.html.
10 The emergence of AfD and its electoral results in the last years might change the status quo and indicate that even Germany is changing its narrative. This will be discussed in the conclusions.
11 This is because the analysis focuses on the last three decades only. The data concerning the conditions to test are not available for the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, measured according to the co-occurrence principle, the value of populism would be zero (both CDU and FDP show only people-centrism but no anti-elitism).
12 The exception is only "partial" because with a different operationalization the value of right-wing populism would be zero.
13 Under the leadership of Matteo Salvini, in particular, the Northern League has become a fully-fledged national(-ist) party, and therefore dropped the reference to the North, thus becoming simply Lega.
14 Between 2007 and 2013, its name has been "People of Freedom" (PdL).

15 In Italy, members of the family Mussolini can be candidates for extreme right parties without raising any major scandal, a thing that would be unimaginable in Germany. For example, two Mussolinis ran for a seat in the 2019 European Parliament elections: Alessandra, experienced politician and already member of the EP, and Caio Giulio Cesare, who describes himself as "a post-fascist who refers to those values in a non-ideological way." *The Guardian*, "Mussolini's great-grandson claims Facebook suspended his account", by Lorenzo Tondo, April 9, 2019, available online (consulted in April 2019): www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/09/benito-mussolini-great-grandson-caio-claims-facebook-suspended-his-account.

16 Qualunquismo "presented itself as the voice of ordinary people, those excluded from the division of power, fed up with greedy and corrupt politicians, indifferent to ideologies they saw as a mere cover for elite ambitions of domination, skeptical of any program and mistrustful of electoral promises they expected to be systematically broken by those elected" (Tarchi 2002, 122).

17 *Pentapartito* was the five-party coalition that governed Italy between June 1981 and April 1991. It comprised: Christian Democracy (DC), Italian Socialist Party (PSI), Italian Democratic Socialist Party (PSDI), Italian Liberal Party (PLI), and Italian Republican Party (PRI).

18 Several other scholars consider Go Italy as a populist party. Among others: Raniolo (2006), Pasquino (2007), Ruzza and Fella (2009).

19 The *Democratic Party of the Left* is oddly coded as right-wing in 1994 according to the Party Manifesto Project. For the purposes of the analysis, this does not make any difference, although it is clearly debatable to what extent the PDS was proposing a truly left-wing manifesto at the time.

20 About the difficult classification of the M5S, see Manucci and Amsler (2018).

21 In 1994, even if the PDS would have been coded as left-wing (as it is normally considered), Italy would still belong to the outcome. On the other hand, it would not belong to the outcome for left-wing populism, although it would be close enough to the crossover point.

22 In 2002, Fortuyn's former party – Liveable Netherlands – also obtained two seats in the House of Representatives.

23 On that occasion, the centre party D66 (Democraten 66) is coded as left-wing according to the Manifesto Project. However, even if it were coded as right-wing, the Netherlands in 1994 would still not belong to the outcome for right-wing populism.

24 It would be extremely interesting to know the levels of populism scored by the Sweden Democrats in the 2018 elections. Unfortunately, our data arrives only at the 2014 elections.

25 UKIP, contrary to the other right-wing movements mentioned above, has the advantage of being relatively free from any associaiton with the fascist past.

26 Five of the six manifestos containing the highest percentage of populist statements were written either in the 1970s or in the 2010s. The exception is the manifesto from the German SPD in the 1980s.

27 Among the coded manifestos, 47 (around 27%) did not show any trace of populism. They are mainly manifestos of Swedish parties (23), as well as Swiss manifestos from the 1970s and 1980s (11) and Dutch manifestos from the 1970s–1990s (6).

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6 Collective memory and fascist legacies in Western Europe

This chapter assigns to each country a type of collective memory and possibly one or more secondary narratives. This is done by analyzing the relevant secondary literature on each country's collective memory of the fascist past.[1] Longitudinal variations, potential secondary narratives, and disagreement among sources are taken into consideration, and eventually the levels of stigmatization of the fascist past are assigned to each country.

To determine which types of collective memory are present in a country and how they develop over time, secondary sources are used. By utilizing a large volume of single-country and comparative studies, it is possible to determine the outcome of decades of research in each country from several complementary perspectives such as history, sociology, and political science. The process of memory-building – understood as the dynamic relationship between conflicting narratives in the public debate, school programmes, and popular culture – here remains as a *black box*.

The present study does not aim at looking inside the box (although this is sometimes unavoidable) but rather at analyzing the outcome of that process, understood as the type of mainstream and (possibly) secondary narratives that emerged from that conflictual process. Only major academic publications are used as sources, and despite the impossibility of including every relevant publication, it is safe to assume that the type of collective memory and the degree of stigmatization of the fascist past are correctly identified.[2]

This approach is *case-oriented*, and the *intensive knowledge* of cases is decisive in the attribution of values and can be defined as a direct method of calibration (Verkuilen 2005; Ragin 2008). Each country can display each type of collective memory on a scale from 0–1: 0 (full non-membership) means that the country does not have any trace of that type of collective memory; 1 (full membership) means that the country fully belongs to that category. Finally, 0.5 (crossover value) means that the country neither belongs to nor is excluded from that category. When secondary narratives are present, the sum of the values cannot exceed 1.

This type of grading might be considered too fine-grained. However, a deep qualitative knowledge of the cases grants credibility to the values assigned while constituting a pillar of the logic on which QCA relies. The assignment of the values is not at all arbitrary. First, it is transparently discussed and justified. Second,

it derives from informed decisions that are based on a substantive familiarity with the topic. One might be conservative and assign only coarse thresholds such as 0–0.33–0.66–1 to indicate full membership and non-membership (1 and 0), or 'more in than out' and 'more out than in' (0.66 and 0.33). However, rather than constituting an advantage for the analysis, this approach would represent an unjustified loss of information.

Moreover, the final amount of stigma of the fascist past is calculated in a way that further reduces the disputability of the values assigned. In order to establish the level of stigma present in each country, the values for culpabilization are multiplied by 1 (highest stigma) and victimization by 0 (lowest stigma), while heroization and cancellation are multiplied by 0.66 and 0.33, respectively (confront with Figure 3.3). This means that, for example, when a country (like Austria) displays victimization – either 0.6, 0.7, or 0.8 – and cancellation – either 0.4, 0.3, or 0.2 – the level of stigma remains 0.1. To give a further example, in a country (like France), it would be possible to assign 0.1 to cancellation and 0.3 to heroization (instead of 0.2 to both), but the final level of stigma would be 0.2 in any case.

Now that the method followed to assign types of collective memories to each country has been discussed, it is possible to summarize the presence of collective memories. Culpabilization is present mainly in Germany, which constitutes the best example of a country that decided to deal with its own past and go through a process of *Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit*. Heroization, like culpabilization, is a rather unique memory: in fact, it is mainly a British prerogative. This is not surprising since the United Kingdom is the only country in the sample that does not have to deal with a cumbersome past.[3] Much more widespread is a type of collective memory based on victimization: it is present in Austria, France, and Italy. These countries shifted responsibilities and refused to admit their guilt. Finally, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Sweden decided to avoid a public debate, silence their past, and forget their role during World War II.

More in detail, alongside mainstream narratives outlined above, secondary narratives are often present, and they have an impact in determining the overall levels of stigma of the fascist past. As already mentioned, culpabilization is prominent in Germany, but it is present also in Sweden (as primary narrative from the 1990s). Since the 1990s, culpabilization has been present in Austria as well but only as a secondary narrative. For this reason, while Germany and Sweden show high or very high levels of stigma of the fascist past, Austria features mainly a memory based on victimization and hence shows a low stigma of the fascist past. Like Austria, also Italy and France display a very low stigma of the fascist past because they base their collective memory on victimization (together with secondary narratives of cancellation and heroization). The Swiss and Dutch public debates largely avoided the past: therefore, their selective memory based on collective amnesia and cancellation, completed by a secondary narrative based on victimization, produced a rather low stigma of the fascist past. Sweden's memory also has a component of cancellation, but since it co-exists with a narrative of culpabilization, the levels of stigma of the fascist past are high. Finally, heroization is a type of memory that in the UK is present in its purest form, while it represents

a secondary narrative in France and Italy. For this reason, the UK displays high levels of stigma whereas Italy and France have a strong component of victimization, hence producing very low levels of stigma.

Another very interesting exercise consists in observing how collective memories were formed, defended, or challenged between the end of World War II and now. Establishing new narratives of World War II and fascism was at first very difficult because of the proportions of the trauma and destruction; therefore, after the war, there has been a silencing phase. No country was able to start a process of re-elaboration of a 'past' that just ended. Crucial in this regard was the role of the Allies: after 1948, it was clear that their priority was to fight the communist East Bloc; with this in mind, they allowed countries like Austria, Italy, and France to rebuild a democratic culture and distance themselves from their past.

The precondition for this to happen was the presence of a scapegoat, one country that could only adopt a narrative of guilt: Germany had to pay the price. The Nazis became the absolute embodiment of pure wickedness (not a very difficult operation), and the rest of Europe agreed to blame the Germans. Italy forgot its racial laws and concentration camps, the Netherlands and Switzerland ignored the help they provided to the Nazis, and Austria pretended it never welcomed the arrival of the German Wehrmacht with Nazi salutes and flags. Each country, apart from Germany, was free to purge its own memory from thorny issues and traces of guilt.

Maintaining the Western Bloc cohesive and avoiding any tension or revenge was a necessity in times of Cold War; for this reason, the United States were ready to close an eye (or two) on the institutional continuity with fascism of certain European countries, as long as they kept the communist threat under control. Italy had to forget the Nazi responsibility for the 50,000 victims on Italian soil between 1943 and 1945 so that Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, and Greece could not claim a long list of Italian war criminals. Austria was allowed to depict itself as *first victim* of the Nazi aggression, while France started building a myth of popular resistance and self-liberation. Other countries decided to forget: Sweden, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. These countries' role during the war was not an argument that could interest any Superpower at the time, and nobody insisted to bring it to the fore. In this way, Germany was used as a lightning rod while all the other countries were allowed to ignore the skeletons in their own closets; in exchange, they had to follow a process of democratization and embrace a US-oriented capitalism against the communist pressure from the East.

After the protests of 1968 against military and bureaucratic elites, an increasing number of critical voices from several West European countries tried to shed a light on the fascist past, the close collaboration with the Nazis, and all those aspects that had been conveniently forgotten for two decades. This generated attention: in the 1970s, critical public debates focused on these issues, and historians started to examine the countries' past. However, it is not possible to say that this was enough to change any country's narrative. More often than not, heated debates did not translate in national awareness, and mainstream narratives were rather reinforced while critical voices were silenced. Left-wing social and political movements lost an occasion to make Western Europe face its dark past.

After the 1970s, public debates continued to take place but with varying levels of intensity and salience. Several phenomena constituted possible triggers for new controversies. Debates among historians (*Historikerstreit*), candidates with a Nazi past (Kurt Waldheim), books (Boëthius' *Sweden and the Second World War*), movies (*Le Chagrin et la Pitié*), trials of important personalities (Klaus Barbie, the *Butcher of Lyon*), official reports by commissions of historians (Volcker Commission): all these elements contributed to bring to the fore the responsibilities of West European countries. In some cases, the past was successfully re-discussed, and new narratives emerged (e.g. in Sweden). In other vases, however, the mainstream narratives were rather reinforced after polarizing debates. In particular, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, there was no need to re-discuss the past any further. Post-fascist parties could enter government coalitions, resistance movements were crystallized (and rendered harmless) into epic popular movements, and populist parties started becoming increasingly successful.

Table 6.1 summarizes the findings presented in the remainder of the chapter. The aim is to assign different types of collective memories (mainstream and

Table 6.1 Types of Memory and Levels of Stigma in Eight Countries

Country	*Year*	*CULP*	*VICT*	*HERO*	*CANC*	*Stigma*
Austria (AT)	1975	0	0.7	0	0.3	0.1
	1983	0	0.7	0	0.3	0.1
	1994	0.3	0.7	0	0	0.3
	2002	0.3	0.7	0	0	0.3
	2013	0.3	0.7	0	0	0.3
Switzerland (CH)	1975	0	0	0	1	0.3
	1983	0	0	0	1	0.3
	1994	0	0	0	1	0.3
	2003	0	0.4	0	0.6	0.2
	2011	0	0.4	0	0.6	0.2
Germany (DE)	1972	1	0	0	0	1.0
	1983	1	0	0	0	1.0
	1994	0.8	0	0.1	0.1	0.9
	2002	0.8	0	0.1	0.1	0.9
	2013	0.8	0	0.1	0.1	0.9
France (FR)	1974	0	0.6	0.2	0.2	0.2
	1981	0	0.6	0.2	0.2	0.2
	1995	0	0.7	0.2	0.1	0.2
	2002	0	0.7	0.2	0.1	0.2
	2012	0	0.7	0.2	0.1	0.2
Italy (ITA)	1972	0	0.6	0.2	0.2	0.2
	1983	0	0.6	0.2	0.2	0.2
	1994	0	0.8	0.1	0.1	0.1
	2001	0	0.8	0.1	0.1	0.1
	2013	0	0.8	0.1	0.1	0.1

(*Continued*)

Table 6.1 (Continued)

Country	*Year*	*CULP*	*VICT*	*HERO*	*CANC*	*Stigma*
Netherlands (NL)	1972	0	0.2	0	0.8	0.3
	1982	0	0.2	0	0.8	0.3
	1994	0	0.2	0	0.8	0.3
	2002	0	0.2	0	0.8	0.3
	2012	0	0.2	0	0.8	0.3
Sweden (SE)	1973	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.6	0.6
	1982	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.6	0.6
	1994	0.6	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.8
	2002	0.6	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.8
	2014	0.6	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.8
United Kingdom (UK)	1974	0	0	1	0	0.7
	1983	0	0	1	0	0.7
	1992	0	0	1	0	0.7
	2001	0	0	1	0	0.7
	2010	0	0	1	0	0.7

secondary narratives when present) to each country. Moreover, it is important to observe variations in the presence of different memories over time, explaining which turning points determined a change in the collective re-elaboration of the past. The countries are listed according to their levels of stigma: first are presented the countries with extremely low levels of stigma of the fascist past, and progressively the presentation moves towards those countries that present extremely high levels of stigma.

Italy

In Italy, the collective memory is one of *victimization* (De Luna 2011, 43) based on *selective amnesia* (Oliva 2006) and *removal* (Del Boca 1996) in order to forget the fascist past (Fogu 2006). The main recurrent element of this narrative consists in portraying Italians as "*brava gente*" (good folks), thus creating a myth which allows Italy to differentiate itself from Germany and distance itself from the guilt and responsibility associated with the Nazi and fascist regimes (Bidussa 1994; Del Boca 2005; Focardi 2013). Another goal of this myth consists in trying to whitewash the massacres of the Italian occupations in Africa and the Balkans (Consonni 2011; Conti 2008; Sluga 1999).

Italy's historical narrative revolves around victimization, with the aim of portraying the country not as the perpetrator but as a victim of the fascist regime and its propaganda, a victim of Hitler's decisions, and, essentially, a victim of history. The paradigm of victimization is effectively illustrated by Berger (2010, 122):

> [O]fficial memory policy . . . concentrated on Italian victims, above all the victims of German-occupied Italy after 1943, thereby highlighting the national struggle against a foreign enemy. The history of Italian fascism was

presented as a struggle of the Italian people first against fascism and then against foreign occupants.

This passage shows how *the victimization narrative works hand in glove with cancellation and heroization.*

Italians, according to the mainstream victimization narrative, were not supporters of fascism but rather its *victims*, and they heroically fought to free themselves from its yoke. The "victimizing storytelling," claims De Luna (2011, 43), has been possible because in parallel the real role of Italy and the Italians has been denied (Franzinelli 2002).[4] Indeed while prefects, superintendents, and public security commissioners remained largely the same after 1945 (Conti 2017), the government granted several amnesties to former fascists: in 1946, 1948, and 1966 (Franzinelli 2006; Ponzani 2008). This lack of justice made some speak of a missed "Italian Nurnberg trial" (Battini 2003).

As summarized by Fogu (2006, 159), the victimization memory in Italy was based on the following memory-building procedure: "hide the black *ventennio* below the glorious carpet of the red *biennio*." In other words, the political exploitation of the Resistance movement made it possible to portray the country as essentially anti-fascist and therefore to foster a secondary narrative of heroization. In this way, Italians reinvented themselves as anti-fascist by selectively remembering certain aspects of the past linked to the *Resistenza* while deciding to forget others (Poggiolini 2002, 224). As Consonni (2011, 215) stresses, Italians constructed a national memory as one of occupation "through the memory of patriotic resistance and the total negation of any aspect of collaboration with Germany."

The victimization narrative was questioned only by some isolated voices in the 1960s and 1970s (S. Berger 2010), which, however, did not manage to challenge the main narrative. After the collapse of the so-called 'First Republic,' partly due the corruption scandal *Bribesville*, other critical voices asked to confront the country's past. De Luna (2011) defined that critical moment as the end of the "memorial pact" (based on anti-fascism) of the old parties. Unsurprisingly, rather than losing its hegemony, the mainstream narrative based on victimization fully succeeded in marginalizing any other narrative. As will emerge clearly in analyzing other countries, debates do not always imply a re-definition of the mainstream narrative, and they can even lead to its reinforcement.

Elements of denial and cancellation have become so strong over time that post-fascist parties (such as National Alliance) managed to obtain the institutionalization of a 'memory day' to remember the Italian victims in the context of the conflict between Italy and Tito's Yugoslavia (Gobetti 2013). At the same time, the requests of the left-wing parties to commemorate the victims of fascism and Italian colonialism were not even discussed (Focardi 2013). Franzinelli (2002) explains that Italians have decide to "forget" German crimes in Italy in order to be able to make sure that others will "forget" the Italian crimes across Europe and Africa. The mainstream narrative remained one of victimization even after 1994, when an Italian magistrate found the so-called "armoire of shame": several

folders emerged, with 695 files documenting war crimes perpetrated on Italian soil under fascist rule and during Nazi occupation.[5]

To sum up, one can conclude that the myth of the "good Italian" is functional to the removal of every uncomfortable national memory (cancellation), thus fostering the idea that Italian fascism was less brutal than Nazism and that the undeniable merits of the resistance movement were sufficient to wash away the sins and redeem the popular support for fascism (heroization). The rebirth of the new democratic Italy, as Poggiolini puts it (2002, 225) was based "on both amnesia and remembrance of the Resistance." This kind of narrative made it possible for a long list of politicians to praise Benito Mussolini and his regime over the last decades, without provoking the same reactions that one would expect in countries like Germany or Sweden.[6]

Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective memory in Italy are as follows: during the 1970s and 1980s, it was composed mainly of victimization (0.6) and secondarily by both cancellation (0.2) and heroization (0.2). From 1992, after the end of the first Republic, the victimization narrative became even more prominent (0.8); in parallel, the actions of the Resistance movement became even less relevant (0.1), and cancellation was eroded (0.1) by a stronger narrative of victimization. Therefore, the degree of stigmatization of the fascist past moved from an already low 0.2 to an even lower 0.1.

France

The memory of fascism and the Second World War in France is characterized by a process of *cancellation and heroization* similar to the one described for Italy. The main difference consists in the fact that in France the *national myth* created by De Gaulle describing French people as "all participating to the resistance" was even stronger. This was the case because in France the Resistance movement was considered as homogeneous and national, while in Italy it was considered as a divisive heritage due to the prominent role of the Communists.

The Vichy regime is portrayed in the French collective memory as an "aberration," an "interlude," something totally alien to the national history and culture (Judt 1992, 96; S. Berger 2010, 123).[7] Moreover, the fascist Vichy regime, which collaborated with the Nazis, is considered as having been imposed by the Germans, although this is historically inaccurate and ignores the fact that the head of that regime, Philippe Pétain, was hugely popular in France (Jackson 2002).

During the 1980s, President Mitterrand strategically developed the Gaullist myth of the good German to portray both the French and the Germans as victims of the Nazi regime, thus fostering both cancellation and heroization (Gildea 2002). Since France decided to describe itself as inherently anti-fascist and not to question its own political culture but rather to create a myth of the resisting French (similar to the one describing Italians as inherently "good folks"), it follows that France can only be described as a victim of the Nazi regime (Gildea 2002, 75). This narrative made it possible to avoid and block out any type of responsibility (Michel 2011, 182).

A narrative based on victimization, like in the case of Italy, relies in parallel on elements of cancellation and heroization. On the one hand, the Gaullist myth of Resistance portrays the French population as heroically opposed to the fascist regime (Golsan 2006, 78) while all those who did not are labelled as 'traitors' (Jackson 2014). On the other hand, it presents a positively accentuated national history which denies the support for Vichy as well as the country's responsibilities towards former colonies (Bell 2013, 156; S. Berger 2010, 131).[8]

Since the 1960s, the "mythe résistencialiste" (Rousso 1990, 101) has crystallized into a sort of national *monument* which could not be broken even when France was confronted with its past. Following the protests of 1968, several events such as the movie "Le Chagrin et la Pitié" (1969), the Barbie trial (1972–84), and Paxton's publication (1972), put abruptly at the foreground the controversial role of France during World War II. However, instead of entailing a change of narrative, this resulted in a lost occasion, and the actual role of the country was never questioned (Rousso 1990). Even when in 1995 Jacques Chirac for the first time publicly acknowledged French participation in the Holocaust (Art 2011, 363), this did not result in taking responsibility, and the victimization narrative was even reinforced.

By considering the characteristics of the process of memory-building that took place in France and Italy, it is possible to conclude that in order to produce a main narrative based on victimization, two functional sub-narratives must be activated as well: cancellation and heroization. Indeed, in order to portray French people as victims of the Germans, one should first remove form the picture the collaboration operated during Vichy and then amplify the role of the Resistance. These three components are present in the Italian case as well because the victimization process has been based upon a heroization of the resistance movement and a cancellation of the popular support for the fascist regime and its crimes.

The Vichy period requires France to confront difficult questions about its own political culture, but the official narrative continues to consider it only as an occupation parenthesis. Like in Italy, the narrative of the Communist Party put emphasis on its own "martyrs" and developed a cult of its resistance heroes (Jackson 2014), thus creating a secondary narrative of heroization that reinforce certain aspects of victimization without helping the country to confront its past.[9] Including the vast majority of the French in the great epic of self-liberation surely contributes to let the bygones be bygones and create a unitary narrative, but it does not produce a sufficiently self-critical re-elaboration of the past.

Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective memory in France are as follows: during the 1970s and 1980s, it was composed mainly of victimization (0.6) and secondarily by both cancellation (0.2) and heroization (0.2). From the 1990s, the victimization narrative became even more prominent (0.7) and in parallel the cancellation narrative was eroded (0.1) because the past was confronted but altered and therefore considered acceptable. Accordingly, the degree of stigmatization of the fascist past has always remained at a low level of 0.2.

Austria

Similarly to the cases of Italy and France, the type of collective memory established in Austria is based on *victimization* (Ludi 2004), *amnesia* (Art 2007, 338), *self-delusion* (Pick 2000, 198), *distancing* (Berger 2010, 121), and *avoidance of any responsibility* (Judt 1992). The main difference consists in the fact that Austria could not develop any heroic narrative due to the lack of a Resistance movement.

The victimization narrative revolves around the *Anschluss* ("annexation") as a central element. Since in 1938 the country was invaded and incorporated into the Third Reich, the mainstream narrative goes, Austria cannot be blamed for World War II and the Holocaust (Pick 2000, 198). The tone of the narrative is apologetic and avoids any type of responsibility or admission of guilt and goes along with the strategy of the Allies and their effort to avoid any excessive emphasis on Austria's past in order not to alienate them from the Western Bloc (Judt 1992, 88).[10]

Uhl (2006) identifies the *Rot-Weiß-Rot-Buch* (Red-White-Red Book), a governmental publication from 1946, as the official source for the "victim theory." Building upon this text, collective memory has been developed based on the idea that Austria was not just *a* victim of Nazism, but rather *the* first victim of Hitler (Berger 2010, 120). This narrative, however, has no historical confirmation (Art 2006, 42) and ignores several facts, such as the overwhelming support of Austrians for the Anschluss.[11]

Two critical points marked the evolution of collective memory in Austria: the "Waldheim affair" in 1986 and the speech of then Chancellor Franz Vranitzky in 1991. Kurt Waldheim, former Secretary-General of the United Nations between 1972 and 1981, became in 1986 the ninth President of Austria, although it emerged during the electoral campaign that he had previously lied about having been drafted into the *Wehrmacht*. This sparked a long and heated debate. On the one hand, it produced a partial revision of the victim theory and "mainstream public opinion internalized the idea of Austrian responsibility" (S. Berger 2010, 126), introducing a modified "co-responsibility thesis" (Uhl 2006, 63). On the other hand, Heinisch (2002) stresses that despite the international community's criticism of Austria, Waldheim won those elections and, as a reaction, the FPÖ gained consensus. In fact, the debate initially produced a rather nationalistic and Anti-Semitic answer (Art 2006; Wodak 1990).

The change in the mainstream narrative, however, is certified in 1991, when for the first time in history an Austrian Chancellor, Franz Vranitzky, highlighted Austrian culpability live on TV (Pick 2000, 199). The country had to make formal amends for the past, and this created more debate, which translated into more polarization (Art 2011). The fact that it constituted such a delayed apology confirms how deep-rooted and difficult to challenge the victimization narrative was. However, it also stresses how important it was, at least at the symbolic level, an official admission of guilt and a partial adoption of the culpabilization narrative. Since then, Bischof argues, Austria can no longer be considered the "black sheep of Europe" when it comes to dealing with the Nazi past (2004, 25). In sum, it is possible to claim that a new secondary narrative based on culpabilization

emerged between 1983 and 1994, replacing cancellation, but the narrative based on victimization remained mainstream. Indeed, the party that most insists on that type of victimizing narrative, the FPÖ, could become a member of the government coalition in 2017.[12]

It is difficult to conclude to what extent a culpabilization narrative has really been adopted in Austria. On the one hand, several political figures finally formulated the necessary institutional apologies and made some efforts to confront the country's past. On the other hand, as Art argues (2006, 203), chauvinist language and anti-Semitic stereotypes are not rare in the Austrian public debate because politicians "shifted the bounds of the legitimate discursive space and rendered ideas previously associated with the extreme right acceptable." While apologetic narratives of the Nazi past are virtually impossible in Germany, Austrian politicians are "free to adopt revisionist positions without risking their careers."

Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective memory in Austria are as follows: during the 1970s and 1980s, it was composed mainly of victimization (0.7) and secondarily of cancellation (0.3). From 1994, the victimization narrative remained prominent (0.7), but cancellation was no longer possible and was replaced by culpabilization. Therefore, the degree of stigmatization of the fascist past changed from 0.1 to 0.3.

Switzerland

Contrary to victimization narratives, *cancellation* narratives imply that the past is not altered but rather neglected or denied. This is precisely what happened in Switzerland, where neutrality during World War II has for decades been considered as a sufficient reason not to look closely at the country's active and passive collaboration with authoritarian regimes at least until 1995 (Kellerhals-Maeder 2000). Ziegler (1997) claims that this has been done without guilt or question, generating what he calls *Swiss amnesia*. The construction of a Swiss common memory builds upon the concept of spiritual national defense (*Geistige Landesverteidigung*) against any totalitarian ideology, thus eliminating any inconvenient element (Kreis 2000).

As Ludi puts it "the common representations of the past have been *highly selective*, and most efforts to address thorny questions have been doomed" (2004, 119). Similarly, Judt describes the Swiss memory as "purged" (1992, 96). Switzerland decided to exclude from the public debate several thorny issues. Among them, the distinction the country made between Jews and non-Jewish Germans – with the former returned to the Nazis whenever they attempted to cross the border (Judt 1992, 96) – as well as the delivery of Swiss arms to Nazi Germany and the dismissal of Jews from Swiss companies (Berger 2010, 129).

The Swiss commander in chief during the war, General Henri Guisan, resolved to pull back his troops and establish an impregnable "redoubt" in the Alps. Switzerland expanded and refined its defensive system – based on the fortifications begun in the 1880s to secure the mountainous central part of Switzerland – to protect the country from a potential German invasion. However, the invasion

never took place, while the wealth generated by the cooperation with the Nazi (managing looted gold, help in purchasing raw materials, and fees for the use of Swiss rail links) continued to the last days of the war, long after Germany could have realistically threatened the country.

For the Swiss, *neutrality* is a pillar of their national identity (Lebow 2006, 20), and this is at the base of the mainstream narrative describing Switzerland as a *small country unable to defend itself against external enemies* (Berger 2010, 124). The idea of the Helvetic Confederation as the charitable home of the Red Cross with a long tradition of neutrality allowed the formation and consolidation of a traditional national identity and fostered the *Sonderfall Schweiz* myth, describing Switzerland as a 'special case' and therefore helping to avoid the debate (Ludi 2004, 126).

The absence of a public debate might be confused with an accidental lack of narrative, while in fact it was rather a proactive intervention of the institutions to prevent any public discussion of the country's past. For example, *the government restricted access to archives and documents*; Berger (2010) claims that the Swiss state "was extraordinarily active in preventing a different memory" by restricting access to archives and documents and sponsoring official publications. Therefore, the memory based on cancellation was not a non-narrative but an intended consequence of the government's policy (Ludi 2004, 124).

Although critical voices such as Edgar Bonjour existed at least since the 1970s, Switzerland could afford not to officially face its past until the 1990s, when (mostly external) pressures forced the country to take action.[13] In 1995, Swiss president Kaspar Villiger apologized to the Jewish people for the country's asylum policy during World War II, but the confrontation of the past became particularly pressing in 1996 when Jewish organizations forced Swiss banks to undercover dormant accounts of Holocaust victims, an issue that had been ignored for a long time and that created negativity. As a reaction, the Swiss government refused to acknowledge its past and take responsibility, while outbursts of Anti-Semitism characterized the public debate (Ludi 2004, 120–22).[14]

The reports published between 1998 and 2002 by the Volcker Commission (also known as the Independent Committee of Experts or ICE) did not help to settle a real mainstream narrative, partly because the media barely took notice of them. The Swiss collective memory remained based on denial and removal because the revision of the country's history was driven by "the urge to exculpate Switzerland," to "deny the necessity of acknowledging responsibility," and "to refuse to feel ashamed of what had happened in the Nazi era" (Ludi 2004, 138). In parallel to the consistent mainstream narrative based on cancellation, a secondary narrative based on victimization developed after 1995. Ludi claims that being forced to face its past between 1995 and 2002, and by refusing the allegations of wartime accommodation, Switzerland had to "turn the table," generating a secondary victimization narrative – similar to the Austrian one – that minimized the country's culpability and responsibility (2006, 212).

Switzerland's wartime neutrality was depicted by the Volcker Commission as being of dubious quality, but this did not translate into a self-critical public

debate. To the contrary, an active process of cancellation and collective amnesia remains the core element of the country's mainstream narrative. Switzerland continues to consider itself as a special case, thus refusing to join the European Union (while in 2002 it finally became a full member of the United Nations). In 2015, the Swiss People's Party became the largest in the Federal Assembly, and it is not surprising to notice that its nationalist and conservative views are rooted in the interwar period, when its predecessor (Party of Farmers, Traders and Independents) entered the mainstream of Swiss politics as a right-wing conservative party.

Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective memory in Switzerland are as follows: a value of 1 for cancellation between 1970s and 1994, while for the 2000s and 2010s the values are 0.4 (victimization) and 0.6 (cancellation). Indeed, the debate about the country's responsibilities was revitalized from 1996, but instead of resulting in culpabilization, it generated a secondary narrative based on victimization. The overall level of stigma therefore passed from 0.3 to 0.2.

Netherlands

Similar to the Swiss memory of cancellation, the Dutch national collective memory has been *highly selective* and, in line with the Italian and French narratives, fostered an inaccurate image of the 'Good Dutch.' This image was instrumental in distancing the Netherlands from the Nazi regime and made it possible to avoid controversial aspects of the country's role during World War II (Brants 2000; De Haan 2011; Judt 1992). In other words, the main narrative in the Netherlands portrayed the Dutch as *reluctant collaborators despite the complicity of the population* (Brants 2000, 229).

The Dutch self-portrayal focuses on the narrative of 'a small country without a choice' against external aggression and consequently ignores its collaboration with the Nazi regime, showing further similarities with the narrative developed in Switzerland. As Judt explains, "the active and enthusiastic collaboration of some Flemings and Dutch was stricken from the public record" (1992, 96).[15] Moreover, two other important and embarrassing elements were excluded: the fact that in the Netherlands Jews had the lowest chance of survival compared to any other European country and the fact that Queen Wilhelmina could have done more in fostering anti-German and pro-Jewish interventions during her radio speeches from the UK (Bovenkerk 2000). Traditionally, public debates about the country's past have always been avoided. For example, Jan De Quay became prime minister in 1959 "without even a single debate about his political past" (De Haan 2011, 81). During World War II, De Quay was one of the leaders of the nationalist *Dutch Union*, which promoted collaboration with the Germans, but his election did not provoke any confrontation with the past.

The narrative distinguishing between the categories of *goed* Dutch and *fout* collaborators remained the main paradigm in Dutch historiography and collective memory for decades (De Jong 1978). Like in other countries, only in the 1970s

and 1980s did "more critical voices [highlight] the extent of Dutch collaboration with the Nazi occupiers" (S. Berger 2010, 127). Although the country's role during World War II had become salient in the public debate, this was not enough to change the mainstream narrative, and in fact it rather reinforced it (De Haan 2011, 85).[16] As already mentioned, not only cancellation but also elements of victimization are present in the Dutch public discourse (Brants 2000, 229); the country can claim to have been the victim of the Nazi invasion, therefore rejecting any responsibility.

It has been particularly challenging to find sources about the formation of a collective memory in the Netherlands. In resonance with what happened in Switzerland, a debate has been avoided, and several elements conveniently forgotten. This has been possible because, contrary to what happened in other countries, the absence of international pressures, internal scandals, debates among historians, or ad hoc commissions brought no credible challenge to the mainstream narrative. The role of the Netherlands during the Nazi occupation remains a topic that political actors, journalists, and institutions prefer to avoid. Under these circumstances, a change of narrative is most unlikely to take place.

Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective memory in the Netherlands are as follows: a value of 0.8 for cancellation and 0.2 for victimization. The two values remain stable over time because there is no trace in the literature of a change of narrative. Even after an increase of the saliency of the country's past, it seems that denial and amnesia remained the glue of the national collective memory. The level of stigma, therefore, remains constant at 0.3 during the whole period.

Sweden

In Sweden, the collective memory about the country's role vis-à-vis fascism revolves around the "small state realism" narrative (Johansson 1997, 175). Similarly to Switzerland and the Netherlands, the country depicted itself as a small victim, a *bystander without any choice* against German aggression; limited concessions and neutrality were considered as the best possible outcome for the nation and its neighbors (Östling 2011, 128).

The Swedish narrative of *cancellation* is based on denial and removal; as Johansson puts it, difficult questions were "swept under the carpet" (1997, 176). According to Colla, many elements of the country's history were not only excluded from the national collective memory but were conveniently forgotten (2002). Similarly, Judt claims that abiding memories were "purged from the national collective memory" (1992, 96). The country decided not to address issues such as: the *Wehrmacht* being allowed to use Sweden for military transport; the trade of iron, wood, and coal, which maintained the German war machine; and the eugenics program of compulsory sterilization established from the 1930s. These and other memories were removed in the name of realpolitik (Gilmour 2010, 70; Spektorowski and Mizrachi 2004).

Through a process of cancellation, according to Östling, small-state realism became Sweden's patriotic narrative of the Second World War (2008). This created a myth, which describes values of solidarity and humanism as inherently Swedish.[17] The collective memory established wide "repressed areas" in order to protect the idea and purity of the *folkhemmet* (the "people's house" – in other words, Sweden and its welfare state as political culture). In parallel to cancellation, the myth of Sweden centered on humanitarian efforts that engendered a secondary narrative of heroism (Östling 2008, 203).

It is precisely this deeply rooted idea of *folkhemmet* that characterizes the Swedish collective memory and its uniqueness. Indeed, contrary to other cases of cancellation such as Switzerland and the Netherlands, pre-existing political cultural elements linked to the idea of *folkhemmet* closed the door for a nationalist interpretation of the events linked to World War II and enhanced the levels of stigmatization of that past (Trägårdh 2002). For this reason, Sweden interestingly displays a higher degree of stigma compared to other cases of cancellation.

This is due also to the presence of another secondary narrative based on culpabilization, which became dominant especially from the 1990s. The culpabilization narrative was articulated and legitimated by several schools of thought, and not necessarily for the same reasons: "The leitmotiv of this critical interpretation was that the coalition government, with its concessions to Nazi Germany, had pursued a morally irresponsible policy, whose only purpose had been unconditionally to keep Sweden out of the great power conflict" (Östling 2011, 132).

Although the culpabilization narrative was already present in the years immediately following the war, it was only from the "decade of debates" (Östling 2011, 139) – the 1990s – that it became prominent. This is a rare case, in which a critical public debate triggers a clear stigmatization of the fascist past – to the point of challenging the mainstream narrative. This was possible also because, in parallel, the small-state narrative progressively lost its monopoly. One book in particular created much debate about the country's role: Boëthius' *Sweden and the Second World War* (1991). The debates generated in those years paved the way for a more critical narrative and marked the beginning of the gradual transition from a narrative based on cancellation to a narrative based on culpabilization (Östling 2011, 137).[18]

Sweden was reticent in developing a clear *culpabilization narrative* (surely more than Germany, but less than Austria). However, after decades of cancellation, culpabilization became the mainstream narrative and the stigma of Nazism became "a powerful weapon in domestic debates" (Östling 2016, 152). This was also visible in the government's research program "Sweden's Relations with Nazism, Nazi Germany and the Holocaust," which was launched in 2000.[19]

Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective memory in Sweden are as follows: a value of 0.6 for cancellation, 0.1 for heroization, and 0.3 for culpabilization in the 1970s and 1980s. From the 1990s, the small-state realism narrative lost its monopoly and Sweden was more resolute in facing its past, hence culpabilization increased (reaching 0.6) while cancellation went down to 0.3. The levels of stigma thus increased from 0.6 to 0.8.

United Kingdom

The British narrative of the country's role during World War II is unanimously considered as one of *heroization*. The fight against fascist regimes is described as Britain's "finest hour" (S. Berger 2010, 124; Reynolds 2017, 194), in line with the *topos* introduced by Winston Churchill in one of his speeches from 1940 (commonly referred to as 'Their Finest Hour').[20] The British collective memory is based on the narrative of World War II as a "good" war that liberated Europe from evil (Bell 2013, 156). A people's war with *epic and heroic* connotations depicting Britain as a fortress standing alone against hostility (Reynolds 2013, 204), linked to the idea of British heroism as "totemic of an indomitable Albion" (Tombs 2013, 3).

The collective memory of the country's role is extremely consistent over time and does not contain any secondary narrative. Some elements have been omitted or underplayed, such as the contribution of the Commonwealth (Reynolds 2013, 204) or the question of whether Britain could have done more to protect European Jews (Bell 2013, 156). However, the total opposition to fascist regimes and the defense of liberal values has never been at stake.

One of the outcomes of Britain's unique type of experience was to set apart the country from Continental Europe, "creating a strong mental barrier against a common European memory of the war." This in turn contributed to enduring "suspicions of post-war continental European supranational integration, a sense of superiority compared to other Europeans, and a notion that the United Kingdom's role in European international politics was still that of a balancer of other continental powers" (Deighton 2002, 100). Well before Brexit, Deighton (2002, 106) observed that: "Euro-indifference and Euroscepticism did not develop simply as a matter of ideological or constitutional distaste for supranational integration" (2002, 106).

Heroic and positive memories of the war continued to dominate memory discourses for decades. Significantly, Luxembourg and Britain were the only two democratic countries "to experience no significant changes to the memory culture of the Second World War during the 1960s and 1970s" (T. Berger 2002, 124). Unsurprisingly, in Britain wartime films about the *finest hour* are broadcasted on all television channels (Berger 2010). Indeed, the film and publishing industries – similarly to what happens in the US – "continue to produce a stream of movies and books about the war, few of which problematize anything other than personal experiences of combatants" (Lebow 2006, 39).

The heroization narrative has remained the only accepted one in the public discourse, and it has never been questioned. As Berger claims (2010, 130), heroic and positive memories of the war and remembrances of solidarity in suffering "continued to dominate memory discourses up to the present day." It is therefore safe to claim that the main narrative of heroization has not been undermined by the passage of time (Bell 2013). However, as it will emerge in next chapters, a memory of heroization does not produce the (low) levels of populism expected.

Considering the literature on the topic, the value attributed to the collective memory in the United Kingdom is as follows: a value of 1 for heroization throughout the whole timespan. Therefore, the level of stigma has remained stable at 0.7.

Germany

Germany constitutes a textbook case of culpabilization. A large literature on *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (or 'coming to terms with the past') shows that Germany decided to face the past and to take responsibility for it (Art 2006, 19–20; T. Berger 2012, 63–64; Reichel 2001; Niven 2002; Olick 2007). This is rather unique, given that "the historical experience of other countries before and after the Nazi regime suggests that silence, avoidance, repression of the memory and past crimes are the norm rather than the exception" (Herf 2002, 184). The country did not have many options since the decision to blame everything on Germany "was one of the few matters on which all sides, within each country and among the Allied powers, could readily agree" (Judt 1992, 87).

Collective re-elaboration in Germany formed a memory built upon pillars such as collective guilt (Maier 1988), a culture of contrition (Art 2007, 338), the concept of *Nie Wieder* or 'never again' (Art 2006, 20), *Aufrechnung* or 'settling of accounts' (Moeller 2006, 111), and *Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit* or 'working through the past' (Adorno 1977). The German approach to the events which led to World War II and the Holocaust is based on acceptance of its own responsibility (Judt 1992, 87). However, it was not an immediate and spontaneous achievement. The pre-condition for the creation of a self-blaming memory of the Holocaust was the Allied military victory, which resulted in the Nuremberg trials and the de-Nazification process (Herf 2002, 185).

Initially, under Konrad Adenauer, Germany produced a victimization narrative portraying the people as victims of the Nazi regime (Moeller 2005; Niven 2010; S. Berger 2010, 91; Gregor 2008). In 1952, *Bundespräsident* Theodor Heuss ended this silencing phase and urged: "*Diese Scham nimmt uns niemand ab*! No one will lift this shame from us," a speech which entered in the German political culture and "began an elite tradition of political recollection that would eventually contribute to broader public discussion and action" (Herf 2002, 190–92), although it was not until the end of the 1950s that the country established its process of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (Kansteiner 2006, 102).

Once established at the end of the 1950s, the culpabilization narrative was never seriously challenged in Western Germany, and the main contrast was represented by the possibility of comparing the Holocaust with other events. In the period 1986–87, this debate was particularly intense, to the point that it was labelled *Historikerstreit*, the "historians' dispute" (S. Berger 2010, 131; Baldwin 1990). Subsequently, according to several authors, the country went through a process of 'normalization' (Olick 1998; T. Berger 2002, 99) which led to the possibility to show once again some degree of patriotism and to shed the ghosts of the past – for example, with the 2006 football World Cup and the 1999 NATO

campaign in Kosovo. Therefore, it is possible to claim that – in an effort to normalize the country's past – cancellation became part of the official narrative, particularly as a result of a politics of memory (*Geschichtspolitik*) fostered by Chancellor Helmut Kohl (Art 2006, 50).

The ritualization of the German guilt has been zealous, and "it is hard to maintain that the horrors of the Nazi past have been forgotten" (T. Berger 2002, 95). This type of re-elaboration created in Germany a very distinctive perception of power politics and nationalism as "fundamentally incompatible with democracy" and "a threat to peace" (T. Berger 2002, 97). In Germany, a critical confrontation with the Nazi past is a precondition for democracy, a way societies have to "inoculate themselves against pernicious ideas and, in the process, develop liberal democratic values" (Art 2006, 20). It is not surprising to notice that *contrition* is the only acceptable frame in the ritualized language characterized by political correctness for publicly discussing the Nazi past in Germany. It was Willy Brandt, the first SPD Chancellor (1969–1974), who promoted the so-called *Streitkultur* (culture of contention), while this frame was reinforced during the *Historikerstreit*: "the public debates of the 1980s changed the boundaries of the legitimate discursive space in Germany and produced what I term 'political correctness, German style' " (Art 2006, 82).

Another factor to consider is the impact of reunification on the country's collective memory (T. Berger 2002, 99; Herf 2002, 192). In the East, the collective memory was one of heroization because "Eastern Germany argued that it represented the opposition to fascism and thus bore no responsibility for the crimes of the regime it replaced" (Olick 1998, 559). In other words, "the communist narrative presented East Germans as heroic antifascists who had liberated themselves from the Nazi capitalists" (Art 2006, 43). This heroic narrative made it possible for the East to reject and deny any responsibility (Herf 1997, 2016).

The communist narrative is the opposite of the one developed in the other half of the country. By observing the geographic distribution of the support for the AfD, it is possible to argue that this is (at least in part) "a legacy of the DDR's externalization of the Nazi past" (Art 2006, 43). Indeed, Eastern German politicians, similarly to what happened in Austria, largely externalized the Nazi past by "blaming the western German capitalists for the crimes committed by Nazism" (Art 2006, 198). This type of memory in the East was formed on what seems to constitute a contradiction: in fact, it was the East German communists, also victims with Jews in the concentration camps, "who rejected any responsibility or restitution for Jewish victims, and even blamed capitalist Jews for fascism" (Herf 1997, 161). To build its own heroization memory, the East German regime "repressed the memory of the Jewish catastrophe and then moved on to anti-Zionist, at times anti-Semitic, ideology and policy" (Herf 2002, 204). However problematic its core elements, the heroization narrative definitely entered Germany's collective memory after the process of reunification.

Considering the literature on the topic, the values attributed to the collective memory in Germany are as follows. A value of 1 is given for culpabilization for the 1970s and 1980s since no other narrative challenged it. After reunification in

1989, the level of culpabilization drops to 0.8 because the process of normalization of the past begins – thus introducing cancellation (0.1) – while the Eastern German narrative introduces elements of heroization (0.1) linked to the fight against the Nazis. The overall levels of stigma are therefore 1 in the 1970s and 80s and 0.9 for the following decades.

Notes

1 This section builds on (and expands) the analysis presented in Caramani and Manucci (2019). The paper, which constitutes a first step in the direction of examining the role of collective memories in explaining populism, presents additional information concerning the classification of countries. In the online appendices, the relevant literature for each country is presented with the indication of the source, the relevant pages, and keywords that help assigning master and secondary narratives as well as to assess changes of narrative. Finally, in the online appendices are listed at least two experts per country who have been consulted in order to assess whether the literature included was relevant and complete enough.

2 The advantage of assigning collective memories through the analysis of secondary literature consists in effectively addressing two of the caveats identified in Chapter 3: the presence of *secondary narratives* and the *variation over time* of collective memories.

3 Since the type of past analyzed here is fascism (and not, for example, colonialism), the United Kingdom does not have to deal with a cumbersome past.

4 Italy describes as 'victims' even the fascist soldiers killed in the Northeast by Tito's partisans. Neo-fascist organizations, indeed, can openly celebrate the "victims of Communism" each February, during the recently institutionalized "National Memorial Day of the Exiles and Foibe." To diminish the atrocities of the fascist regime, the mantra of those "killed in the *foibe*" is highly recurrent, and not only among extreme right-wing activists but also in mainstream parties both from the right and from the left, anxious to put the past behind them and finally form a shared memory (Tenca Montini 2014). Tellingly, a picture that often circulates to represent "the atrocities against the poor Italian victims" actually depicts Italian soldiers killing civilians in Slovenia. In this way, 20 years of fascist violence in the Balkans are removed. What remains is the victimization of a country that pretends not to remember what Italians did in Istria and Dalmatia (Focardi and Klinkhammer 2004).

5 In 1994, the memorandum titled by the British Secret Intelligence Service *Atrocities in Italy*, was found in a wooden cabinet in Rome. The magistrate that exposed the content of the *armoire of shame* was Antonino Intelisano, who later condemned the SS commander Erich Priebke to a life sentence for participating in the Ardeatine massacre in Rome (March 1944) in which 335 Italian civilians were killed. Priebke could live for 50 years in Argentina after the defeat of Nazi Germany.

6 It will suffice to cite a very recent example. In March 2019, the president of the European parliament Antonio Tajani has declared that Mussolini had done positive things and, in particular, that he had a good record on developing infrastructure. Now, imagine a German politician (not necessarily as important as the president of the European parliament) who attributes positive traits to the government of Adolf Hitler. This simple thought experiment is quite effective in showing the opposite collective memories developed in the two countries.

7 In 2017, Marine Le Pen claimed that in her opinion France is not responsible for the *Vel d'Hiv*. She was thus denying that France (which in 1942 was governed by the Vichy regime) was responsible for the roundup of more than 13,000 Jews

who were then sent to Nazi death camps. Her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, has been convicted repeatedly for Anti-Semitic and racist comments such as calling the Holocaust a "detail of history."

8 It would be extremely interesting to observe whether a correlation can be established between the cancellation of the fascist past in Western countries and the denial of the atrocities committed in their former colonies.

9 Things might further evolve in the near future. In July 2017, French President Emmanuel Macron publicly denounced France's collaboration in the Holocaust and announced, "It is convenient to see the Vichy regime as born of nothingness, returned to nothingness. Yes, it's convenient, but it is false. We cannot build pride upon a lie." *The New York Times*, "Macron Denounces Anti-Zionism as 'Reinvented Form of Anti-Semitism'", by Russell Goldman, July 17, 2017, available online (consulted in July 2017): www.nytimes.com/2017/07/17/world/europe/macron-israel-holocaust-antisemitism.html.

10 A telling joke about Austria's collective memory is attributed to Billy Wilder, Austrian-born Jewish American filmmaker: "The Austrians have accomplished the feat of turning Beethoven into an Austrian, and Hitler into a German." *Der Spiegel*, "Späte Heimkehr", by Hellmuth Karasek, May 16, 1994.

11 In 2018, the Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz claimed that Austria was so quick to embrace fascism in the 1930s because of "the endless quarrels between the right wing and the left," which in turn made democracy slip into chaos. A dialogue "with all political sides" constitutes his recipe for a strong democracy. Coherently, Chancellor Kurz handed to the Freedom Party (which has roots in Austria's Nazi past) the posts for the interior and foreign ministries. The leader of the Freedom Party and now vice chancellor of Austria, Heinz-Christian Strache, has been photographed more than once participating in paramilitary exercises with banned Nazi groups. The quotes from the speech of Sebastian Kurz are in: *Time*, "Austria's Young Chancellor Sebastian Kurz Is Bringing the Far-Right Into the Mainstream", by Simon Shuster, November 29, 2018, available online (consulted in March 2019): http://time.com/magazine/south-pacific/5466661/december-10th-2018-vol-192-no-24-asia-europe-middle-east-and-africa-south-pacific/.

12 It is unclear to what extent Austria has really dismissed its former narrative, in particular after the formation of the coalition government between ÖVP and FPÖ in 2017. Christian Kern, former Austrian Chancellor, claims that Kurz and his allies are "shifting the red lines of what is morally and politically acceptable permanently to the right." *Financial Times*, "Sebastian Kurz: saviour of Europe's mainstream or friend of the far-right?", by Ben Hall and Ralph Aykins, January 6, 2019, available online (consulted in March 2019): www.ft.com/content/9396664c-044d-11e9-9d01-cd4d49afbbe3.

13 Edgar Bonjour, a Swiss historian, questioned the neutrality of the country and examined its implications. See Bonjour (1970).

14 The reactions of the Swiss public opinion remind the Austrian case in the aftermath of the Waldheim affair.

15 Tellingly, only a small number of collaborators were prosecuted, and none of them served a sentence of more than 15 years (De Haan 2011, 78).

16 It is remarkable to notice that the Netherlands state-owned train company, Nederlandse Spoorwegen (NS), decided to compensate individuals whose Jewish relatives were deported on its trains to concentration camps. The decision came only in November 2018, after the company already apologized in 2005 for its role in the WWII deportations of Jews. However, no real public debate took place about the country's past.

17 Although the myth does not necessarily contain only truth, since "myth and historical consciousness tend to be mutually exclusive as approaches to reality" (Colla 2002, 131).

18 The results of the Sweden Democrats at the last two elections (2014 and 2018) show that they established themselves as the country's third largest party. This might signal a new change of direction in Sweden's collective memory. The fact that a party with roots in neo-Nazism and that promises to "give Sweden back to the Swedish" can expect to participate in a government coalition in the near future reveals that the levels of stigma might have decreased in Sweden. However, it is also true that the Sweden Democrats toned down their radicalism in order to be accepted as a credible party. In the meantime, "the country's political discourse has so drastically transformed in both tone and content that the Sweden Democrats' worldview no longer appears as part of a radical fringe, but rather a prominent fixture of the mainstream." *Jacobin*, "The Far Right Comes to Sweden", by Petter Larsson, November 1, 2016, available online (consulted in March 2019): www.jacobinmag.com/2016/01/sweden-democrats-jimmie-akesson-far-right-europe/.

19 It also included a survey published (in English) in 2006, titled "Sweden's Relations with Nazism, Nazi Germany and the Holocaust."

20 A few passages of the speech delivered in Parliament at Westminster, 18 June 1940, are worth mentioning to better understand the British heroization narrative (author's italics): "Upon this battle depends the *survival of Christian civilisation*. Upon it depends our own *British life*, and the *long continuity of our institutions* and our Empire. . . . Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. . . . Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves, that if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say: '*this was their finest hour*'."

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7 Explaining populism "the usual way"

This is the first of two analytical chapters aiming at understanding which factors, or combination of factors, explain the different levels of populism's social acceptability in different countries over time. It presents the results of the fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), testing the impact of four conditions that are supposed to explain populism's *Salonfähigkeit*: high levels of corruption, low accountability and responsiveness, high ideological convergence of the political system, and poor economic performance. The selection of these conditions is rooted in the vast literature on the electoral performance of populist parties, and it has been adapted to the scope of this study, as explained in detail in Chapter 2. The results show that the factors tested in this chapter – at least with the current operationalization and calibration – fail to provide a convincing explanation for the social acceptability of populism in a consistent way across the three outcomes.[1] On the one hand, the conditions behind the acceptability of overall populism are quite in line with the expectations, and the solution formula has acceptable coefficients. On the other hand, the solutions obtained for right- and left-wing populism are far from satisfactory. As Chapter 8 demonstrates, the introduction of levels of stigma of the fascist past produces much better results, especially concerning right-wing populism.

Operationalization and calibration

In fsQCA, the data are expressed in fuzzy set membership scores ranging from 0 to 1. This means that a certain case (a country in a decade, say France in 1995) can be more or less part of a certain outcome (social acceptability of left-wing populism) or a certain condition (high levels of corruption). Set membership scores (between 0 and 1) express *how much* that case is part of an outcome or a condition. When France in 1995 scores 0.7 in the condition 'high levels of corruption,' it means it does show rather high levels of corruption. This chapter, therefore, presents the raw data collected through several databases (for the conditions) and the content analysis (for the outcomes), and in a second step it shows the calibration of the raw data into fuzzy set scores. Appendix 4 shows the conversion or raw values into fuzzy set membership scores for the four conditions (Table A4.1) and the three outcomes (Table A4.2).

Fuzzy – rather than crisp – membership scores offer the possibility to overcome a pure dichotomization of data (Ragin 2000). For example, while crisp scores would reduce the acceptability of populism to a 'yes or no' configuration, fuzzy membership scores describe *to what extent* populism is acceptable in a certain country – not simply whether it is acceptable or not (above or below 0.5) but rather how acceptable it is. The same applies to each of the conditions tested. It would be reductive to have only cases with low and high corruption when it is possible to determine *to what extent* corruption is present in each country. In this way, it is possible to make a better use of the data and to transfer to the analysis a more precise and detailed type of information.

The calibration procedure is a key element in order to obtain fuzzy set memberships as adequate as possible. For example, using the average of the raw values to set the 0.5 threshold is a possible strategy, but it might be devoid of any substantial meaning. For this reason, a deep qualitative knowledge of the cases is an essential pre-condition. As it will be clear reading the next sections, here calibration is not performed arbitrarily but through a substantive familiarity with the topic which allows to perform calibration in an informed way.

This section discusses the operationalization of conditions and outcomes, as well as their calibration.[2] Both substantive theoretical knowledge and empirical evidence constitute the main parameters for the calibration. When the direct method of calibration is used (based on minimum, average, and maximum values), the software calculates the membership scores for each case in the different sets by means of a logarithmic function. A value of 1 is assigned to cases which are fully members of that set, while 0.5 is the point of maximum ambiguity, which means that it is not possible to establish whether the case is a member or a non-member of the set, and 0 indicates full non-membership (Ragin 2008). As much as possible, purely data-driven calibrations are avoided, while a great amount of attention is devoted to the location of qualitative anchors.

Outcome: social acceptability of populism

The outcome to be explained is the social acceptability of populism, which is also further disentangled in left- and right-wing populism, for three total outcomes. Theoretically, the four selected conditions are supposed to explain populism per se, regardless of the thick ideology attached to it. However, it might be the case that the conditions fail to explain the social acceptability of populism's overall levels, while they explain the acceptability of either right- or left-wing populism. In other words, the four selected conditions are supposed to explain populism's acceptability in general, but it is relevant to observe whether they perform differently when it comes to explain precise ideological manifestations of populism.

The social acceptability of populism is measured as the percentage of populist statements in a manifesto that are then weighted by the degree of radicalism of the party as well as its vote share in that election (see Chapter 4). The values are displayed in Appendix 3 (Table A3.1). In the case that, during an election, more than one party manifesto had traces of populism, so the percentages were

aggregated. In order to assign full membership or non-membership for the cases in the outcomes, as well as the crossover points, it is essential to observe the empirical data. Each choice is here justified and explained in detail in order to transparently expose the process of calibration and link it to the intensive knowledge of each case.

As Table 7.1 shows, a country displays high levels of social acceptability of populism, and therefore is a full member of the outcome, if it shows a value which is equal to or higher than the one displayed in France in 1995 (1,891). Cases with even higher values than France in 1995 are considered as outliers and extraneous variation. France in 1995 is considered as a full member of the outcome because each and every manifesto analyzed contains populism. Three are from left-wing parties and three from right-wing parties. On the left, both mainstream (PS) and non-mainstream parties (PCF, LO) show average or very high levels of populism in their manifestos (between 4% and 13%). On the right, the situation is similar, with the mainstream RPR and UDF articulating populist messages (6% and 4%) as well as the Front National (5%). Moreover, the PS and the RPR together obtained more than 44% of the vote share, and the degree of radicalism of the non-mainstream parties is extremely elevated (between 4.3 and 6). These factors combined draw the conclusion that France in 1995 is a case which deserves

Table 7.1 Conditions and Their Calibration

Conditions	*Description*	*Calibration*
POP	Percentage (combined) of populist statements in the party manifestos per country in each decade (weighted by radicalism and vote share)	1 = 1,891 0.5 = 816 0 = 0
POP_L	Percentage (combined) of populist statements in left-wing party manifestos per country in each decade (weighted by radicalism and vote share)	1= 800 0.5 = 436 0 = 0
POP_R	Percentage (combined) of populist statements in right-wing party manifestos per country in each decade (weighted by radicalism and vote share)	1 = 802 0.5 = 419 0= 0
C	High levels of corruption	1 = 12 0.5 = 68 0 = 92
D	Poor democratic performance in terms of accountability and responsiveness	1 = 48 0.5 = 65 0 = 75
E	Poor economic performance: slow growth GDP per capita, high Gini Household Disposable Income coefficient, high unemployment rate	1 = 16 0.5 = 10 0 = 5
CNVG	High ideological convergence of the political parties	1 = 0.22 0.5 = 0.45 0 = 0.67
S	Low levels of stigmatization of the fascist past	1 = 0 0.5 = 0.5 0 = 1

full membership in the outcome. Switzerland in 2011 shows very similar values (1,888), and it could have been chosen as well. Moreover, there is a clear gap in the scale since both cases precede a jump in the values. Indeed, the next case (Switzerland in 1995) shows a much higher level (178 points difference).

The crossover point is identified at a value of 816, meaning that the United Kingdom in 2003 is considered as being a member of the outcome but the Netherlands in 2012 is not. There is an obvious gap in the levels of populism of these two cases but also more substantial reasons. It is true that all six coded manifestos in the Netherlands in 2012 show traces of populism, but all six are definitely below the average (5.7% for right-wing manifestos and 7.6% for left-wing manifestos), with only the PVV getting close to it (5.1%). This makes it particularly difficult to interpret the actual level of social acceptability of populism in the country at that time. Moreover, in the Netherlands the levels of radicalism are low or very low, once again with the exception of the PVV. On the other hand, in the United Kingdom in 2003, the three coded manifestos have average or high levels of populism (the Labour Party's manifesto reaches 8.1%), and together they cover more than 90% of the vote share. All the cases with values higher than the one for the Netherlands in 2012 are therefore considered as more in than out of the category concerning the social acceptability of populism, while those below are more out than in.[3]

Only 9 cases are below the crossover point, while 14 are above it. The fact that only a few cases are more out than in simply reflects the fact that, in Western Europe in the last three decades, *populism is a constant feature of party manifestos.* Moreover, considering the levels of radicalism and the voter share received by parties articulating populist messages, it is possible to observe how populism has become socially acceptable. This confirms how important the finer details and unique characteristics of each case are in order to perform calibration. Finally, the low number of cases which do not belong to the outcome suggests that it would be interesting to expand the analysis to countries with a lower social acceptability of populism (such as Portugal) in order to produce more generalizable results.

A country displays high levels of social acceptability of *left-wing* populism, and therefore is a full member of the outcome, if it shows a value which is equal to or higher than the one displayed in Switzerland in 1995 (800). Cases with even higher values are considered as outliers and extraneous variation. Switzerland in 1995 can be considered as a full member of the outcome because both coded manifestos from left-wing parties display levels of populism close to or greatly above the average percentage for populism in left-wing manifestos (5.6%). In particular, the Green Party has a level of 3.8%, while the Socialist Party displays a remarkable 11.6% which, combined with the medium level of radicalism (3) and a good electoral result (21.8%), confirms that in Switzerland mainstream left-wing parties can be highly populist and therefore left-wing populism is socially acceptable. On the other hand, the case considered below, Austria in 1994, cannot be regarded as a full member because there is only one left-wing populist manifesto (SPÖ, 7.1%).

The crossover point is identified at a value of 436, meaning that Switzerland in 2003 is considered as being the most borderline member of the outcome while

Germany in 2002 (310) is not a member at all. Apart from the clear gap in the levels, other significant reasons for the calibration exist. In Switzerland, both party manifestos contain populism; although the levels are below the average (they show levels of 3.1% and 3.3%, compared to an average level of 5.6%), the mainstream left-wing party (SP) is not only populist but also highly radical (4.8).[4] On the other hand, it is also true that in Germany both coded manifestos contain populism but at lower percentages (3.6% and 1.5%). Moreover, the mainstream left-wing party (SPD) is very moderate compared to the Swiss Socialist Party (2 on the radicalism scale). All the cases with values higher than that of Germany in 2002 are therefore considered as more in than out of the category concerning the social acceptability of left-wing populism, while those with values below are more out than in.

This time, the distribution is more even: while 11 cases are below the crossover point, 12 are above it. Compared to the overall levels of acceptability of populism, left-wing populism seems to be less socially accepted (this is certainly a result of the fact that the 1970s and 1980s are not included in the analysis; see Chapter 5, Figure 5.4). It would be interesting to expand the analysis to South European countries such as Spain and Greece in order to produce results that are more generalizable.

A country displays high levels of social acceptability of *right-wing* populism, and therefore is a full member of the outcome, if it shows a value which is equal to or higher than the one displayed in France in 1995 (802). Cases with even higher values are considered as outliers and extraneous variation. France in 1995 can be considered as a full member of the outcome because all three coded manifestos from right-wing parties display levels of populism close to or above the average percentage of populism in right-wing manifestos (4.5%). Moreover, the three parties combined obtained more than 54% of the vote share, with the Front National showing the highest possible degree of radicalism. Switzerland in 2011 has similar values and could have been used as well.

The crossover point is identified at a value of 419, meaning that Austria in 2002 is considered as being a member of the outcome while Germany in 1994 is not. In Austria, both right-wing party manifestos contain populism (3.5% and 0.7%), although the level is below average (4.5%). Moreover, they both present a high degree of radicalism, and the two parties combined obtained more than 46% of the vote share. On the other hand, although in Germany both party manifestos also show traces of populism (2.4% and 3.7%), the parties are less radical and obtained a smaller portion of the vote share than in Austria. All the cases with values higher than that of Austria in 2002 are therefore considered as more in than out of the category concerning the social acceptability of right-wing populism, while those below are more out than in. It follows that only 8 cases are below the crossover point, while 15 are above it. It would be interesting to expand the analysis to countries with a low social acceptability of right-wing populism (although currently they seem to be scarce) in order to produce more generalizable results. Appendix 5 shows the distribution of cases in the three outcomes (Figure A5.1 to Figure A5.3).

Condition 1: corruption

The first condition refers to levels of corruption. The raw data are obtained by scaling and standardizing the values from the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency International – measuring the overall extent of perceived corruption in the public and political sectors – and the data published by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) – assessing the levels of corruption within the political system.[5] I take into account the average levels of corruption for the four years preceding the election and then reverse them in order to obtain a value of 1 where the level of corruption is very high and 0 where it is very low. This is the case because populism is supposed to become more socially accepted when corruption scandals are widespread and corruption is perceived as problematic.

The determination of full membership and non-membership for the cases is based on the most extreme cases in the distribution. Sweden and Switzerland in the 1990s are the countries with the lowest perception of corruption, scoring values above 90, while Italy in both 1994 and 2013 has the lowest values (12). The average value for all countries is 68, and this is used to determine the crossover point. Hence, 8 cases are below average, while 15 cases are above it. Sweden, Switzerland, and the Netherlands are always members of the outcome, while Austria, Germany, and the United Kingdom two times out of three. Italy (2) and France (3) are never members of the outcome, meaning that they have a problem with (perceived and actual) corruption. This distribution mirrors the fact that in West European countries the levels of corruption are generally low, while at the same time it takes into consideration the average value in order to set a threshold.

Condition 2: accountability and responsiveness

The second condition refers to the levels of accountability and responsiveness, here unified in a single measure. The two intertwined concepts insist on democratic elements that play a prominent role in the populist critique of liberal democracy. While responsiveness consists in "reflecting and giving expression to the will of the people" (Pennock 1952, 790), accountability refers to politician's capability to respond to citizens for the decisions taken, and it is assessed in terms of the "ends achieved" and the "means employed" to achieve them (Moncrieffe 1998, 388–89).

Determining these aspects is a particularly complex task, and it was necessary to construct a (certainly rough) proxy by combining four indicators present in the Democracy Barometer (DB).[6] For responsiveness, two indicators have been selected from the DB: governmental capability and representation. The former combines measures for the government's length, stability, and popular support, while the latter combines measures for anti-government actions, political interference by the military and religion, and effective implementation of government decisions. For accountability, two indicators have been selected from the DB: transparency of the political process and fairness of competition. The former combines measures for freedom of information, informational openness, and the

transparency of government policy, while the latter combines measures for the openness and competitiveness of elections.[7]

The goal is to measure the quality of democratic mechanisms regulating the relationship between the people and their representatives, a key element of the populist critique to the liberal idea of democracy. The stronger accountability and responsiveness are, the less space there should be for a populist critique, therefore making populism less socially acceptable.

The final value of the condition is obtained by calculating the average values of the four indicators (two for accountability and two for responsiveness) in the four years before the elections (Table A4.3). The distribution of cases was considered to obtain the anchors for calibration. Moreover, since a low level of accountability and responsiveness is supposed to trigger populism, the DB's values have subsequently been reversed.

Switzerland in 2011 scores better than any other country (75), therefore it is taken as the anchor for full non-membership (in Switzerland democratic mechanisms of responsiveness and accountability seem to be particularly strong). The United Kingdom in 1995 has the lowest value (48), and it is therefore selected as the anchor for full membership (this might be linked to the country's institutional setting and electoral system). The average value for all countries is 62.5, but the selected crossover point is 65.

This is due to the fact that Austria and Germany in 2013 would have been members of the outcome by taking into consideration just the overall average, but if one considers the average for the specific decade (64.6) they fall below that level. The same applies to Austria in 2002, which scores below the average for the decade (64.7). Therefore, the crossover point is established at 65, and the only 3 countries included in the set are Sweden, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. On the other hand, Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom are always non-members of the condition. This shows a clear demarcation between countries delivering in terms of accountability and responsiveness and countries that do not deliver. Moreover, it suggests that – despite the fact that every Western Europe country can be considered as fully democratized – some democratic mechanisms such as those considered here can and should be improved.

Condition 3: economic performance

The third condition concerns the economic performance of the countries. It includes the average values in the four years before elections for three parameters: unemployment rate, Gini household disposable income, and the growth of GDP per capita. The final value consists of the sum of the data for unemployment and the Gini coefficient minus the value for unemployment (since the first two have high values when the situation is negative, while the last works in the other direction). High values indicate a poor economic performance, which in turn is supposed to trigger populism.

The data for unemployment are obtained from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)[8] and from the International Monetary

Fund (IMF)[9] for the missing cases. The Gini household disposable income is considered more precise than the general Gini coefficient because it measures inequality *after redistribution*, and it is obtained from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database.[10] It is important to consider inequality because the gap between the poor and the rich, which is supposed to be a key element in triggering populism, can explain the presence of populism also in rich countries. Finally, the data concerning the growth of GDP per capita are obtained from the World Bank.[11]

The determination of full membership and non-membership is based on the most extreme cases in the distribution (Appendix 4, Table A4.4). Sweden in 2002 scores better than any other country (5); therefore, it is taken as the anchor for full non-membership in the condition 'poor economic performance.' The Swedish economy in the 2000s was performing very well, in particular the GDP growth was remarkable (+14% in the four years preceding the 2002 election), while the Gini coefficient indicating inequality was particularly low (23). The country with the worst economic performance is Italy in 2013 (16), and it is therefore selected as the anchor for full membership. Italy in 2013 was still heavily affected by the economic crisis, certainly more than any other country included in this study: high inequality (32) was combined with high levels of unemployment (almost 9%), and the GDP per capita decreased significantly (-7.1%) in the four years before the elections.

The average value for all countries is 10.2, and this is used as the crossover point, making Switzerland in 2011 the most ambiguous case. This reflects the importance of including in the measure the levels of inequality after redistribution, in which Switzerland in 2011 scores rather poorly (27.5) while, for example, its unemployment rate was very low (only 3.4%). Overall, the distribution of cases is homogeneous (11 cases are members of the condition while 12 are not). Interestingly, no country is always a member or a non-member (apart from Italy, which is a member two times out of two). Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden are non-members in two cases out of three. Switzerland, France, and the United Kingdom are members in two cases out of three. This indicates that, in the short period, the economic performance varies more compared to rather stable elements linked to accountability and responsiveness of the political system.

Condition 4: ideological convergence

The fourth condition refers to the ideological convergence of the party system, and it is calculated following Dalton's formula (2008) which takes into account the number of parties, their vote share, and their positioning on the right-left scale.[12] The degree of radicalism is provided as explained in Chapter 4. The measurement includes all the parties which obtained at least 5% of the vote share. Since the formula measures polarization (going from 0 when all parties are located at the same position on the right-left scale to 10 when all parties are located at the extreme positions), the values for ideological polarization are reversed in order

to provide the degree of ideological convergence on a scale from 0 (lowest) to 1 (maximum convergence). This is done because the ideological convergence of the political spectrum is often considered as a trigger for the social acceptability of populism.

One might argue that the ideological convergence of the political system (measured with Dalton's formula and therefore taking into consideration the parties' vote share and degree of radicalism) is endogenous to populism's social acceptability (which also includes the parties vote share as well as their degree of radicalism). This, however, is not necessarily true. First, it is hard to think of any potential uncontrolled confounder causing both the ideological convergence and the social acceptability of populism. Second, it is unlikely that the social acceptability of populism could cause the convergence of the ideological space (while the opposite is definitely possible). For example, Ezrow et al. (2010) show that mainstream and niche political parties rely on different strategies to adjust their position on the right-left scale as a reaction to the shift of voters' positions. Therefore, it would be difficult to imagine that the social acceptability of populism explains the convergence of the ideological space. To be completely sure about the fact that including this condition does not alter the results because of endogeneity, several robustness tests that excludes convergence are performed.[13]

The determination of full membership and non-membership is based on the most extreme cases in the distribution. The Netherlands in 1994 has the lowest value for polarization (0.22), and therefore it represents the anchor for full membership. On the other hand, Switzerland in 2003 has the highest values for polarization (0.67), and hence it represents the anchor for full non-membership. The average is 0.45, and there are no theoretical reasons not to use it as crossover point. Accordingly, 15 cases belong to the outcome, while 8 cases do not. This means that a majority of the cases analyzed shows a (relatively) high level of ideological convergence. Appendix 5 (Figure A5.4) shows the distribution of the cases in the four conditions.

Results

This section presents the results of the fsQCA analysis. First, it tests whether it is possible to assess any necessary condition for the presence of the social acceptability of populism. Second, it tests whether any combination of conditions is sufficient for the presence of the outcome. The analysis is then repeated with the same conditions but considering first only left- and then only right-wing parties.[14]

According to the common notation system in QCA, all the conditions as well as the three outcome variables are indicated by a capital letter to indicate their presence (D) and a lowercase for the absence (d). Moreover, in Boolean algebra, the signs + (addition) and * (multiplication) are used to explain the relation between several conditions. The addition sign (+) stands for the logical 'or,' while the multiplication sign (*) means a logical 'and.' Finally, in QCA there are three possible solutions that can be reported: conservative (or complex), intermediate, and parsimonious solution. They differ with regards to the assumption

they make about logical remainders.[15] They are fully reported in Appendix 6, but the analysis focuses on the most parsimonious solution. Since the aim is to confront the results with or without the introduction of the levels of stigma of the fascist past, the assumptions made are the same, and the results are easier to interpret. Moreover, Appendix 9 shows the parsimonious solution for the analysis performed without the condition measuring the ideological convergence of the political spectrum (with similar results).

According to the principle of causal asymmetry, necessity and sufficiency are also tested for the absence of the three outcomes, and the absence of conditions is tested both for the outcomes and their absence. Deviant and typical cases are analyzed in Chapter 8 in order to assess whether the introduction of the levels of stigma is a difference-maker in explaining the social acceptability of populism.[16]

To interpret each solution, three indicators are reported: inclusion, coverage, and PRI. The coefficient for inclusion (other authors use the term *consistency*) shows how 'precise' the solution formula is in explaining the occurrence of the outcome, while coverage coefficients describe how many cases are covered by that solution formula. Although they are not strictly necessary (and for this reason they are not discussed), the PRI values are reported as well. PRI stands for *proportional reduction in inconsistency* and is an alternate measure of inclusion. It is more exacting than the usual raw consistency, and it expresses how much a given solution is not only a subset of the outcome but also of the absence of the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012; Thiem and Duşa 2013).

Explaining the social acceptability of populism

This section examines the presence of necessary and sufficient conditions for the social acceptability of populism (it includes all manifestos analyzed, both right- and left-wing). The conditions tested are low levels of accountability and responsiveness (D), poor economic performance (E), high levels of corruption (C), and high levels of ideological convergence (CNVG). The levels of stigma associated to the fascist past will be introduced in Chapter 8.

The analysis for necessity evaluates whether the outcome is a subset of any of the analyzed conditions, meaning that the condition appears every time the outcome is present. I checked whether each condition has an inclusion coefficient possibly close to 1 and never below 0.9. This is not the case, and the same applies to the absence of the outcome. The analysis for the absence of the conditions, in line with the theoretical expectations, does not produce any significant result. This means that none of the four conditions (or their absence) is a necessary condition for the presence or absence of the outcome.

The next step consists in assessing sufficiency – in other words, determining which (combination of) conditions are sufficient for the presence (or absence) of the outcome. If a condition (or configuration of conditions) is sufficient, it means that it is a subset of the outcome, and this implies that when the configuration is present, the outcome must also be present. Each case, a certain country in a certain time point, can be a member of only one configuration of conditions

(following the crisp approach that for each condition a case can only be in or out, below or above the 0.5 threshold).

This is visualized in the truth table (Table 7.2), which displays 16 rows because there are 4 tested conditions (k), which means that there are 16 possible configurations (2^k). The column "Populism" indicates whether a certain configuration leads to the outcome (1: high social acceptability of populism) or to its absence (0: low social acceptability of populism).

The logical reminders, configurations which are not covered by any empirically observed case, are represented by the last four rows. They represent configurations of conditions which are not covered by any empirical case analyzed here. In the most parsimonious solution, assumptions are made about the outcome attributed to these configurations. The level of inclusion shows to what extent each configuration is sufficient for the outcome, and the last column indicates which cases cover that configuration.

This analysis considers only configurations with an inclusion coefficient higher than 0.88. This means that the first 9 rows indicate the configurations that are considered as sufficient for the outcome; 17 out of 23 cases are therefore covered. All the other rows are not considered as sufficient configurations for the outcome. The inclusion threshold is rather high (.88) because of the distribution of the cases concerning the outcome.

Since a majority of cases is more in than out for the presence of the outcome, only those rows with a higher explanatory power are included. Normally a clear jump in the coefficients would be used, but in this case, there is no clear jump.[17] For these reasons, .88 seems to provide a reasonable cut-off point. Importantly,

Table 7.2 Truth Table: Total Populism

Conditions				*Outcome*			
C	*D*	*E*	*CNVG*	*Populism*	*n*	*Inclusion*	*Cases*
1	1	0	0	1	1	0.9859	AT_94
1	1	1	1	1	4	0.9763	FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
1	1	1	0	1	1	0.9627	FR_12
0	1	1	0	1	2	0.9613	DE_13,UK_95
0	1	1	1	1	1	0.9375	AT_13
0	0	1	1	1	2	0.9246	CH_95,CH_11
1	1	0	1	1	2	0.9070	DE_02,FR_02
0	1	0	0	1	2	0.8992	AT_02,DE_94
0	0	1	0	1	2	0.8874	NL_12,SE_94
0	0	0	0	0	1	0.8709	CH_03
0	1	0	1	0	1	0.8703	UK_03
0	0	0	1	0	4	0.7548	NL_94,NL_02,SE_02,SE_14
1	0	0	0	?	0	-	
1	0	0	1	?	0	-	
1	0	1	0	?	0	-	
1	0	1	1	?	0	-	

the same criteria will be applied when explaining the two outcomes: populism in right- and left-wing party manifestos. Moreover, the choice of the cut-off point is relatively important for the type of analysis performed in this study; since the crucial point is the difference between the two models, with and without the levels of stigma of the fascist past, what ultimately matters is to observe in which model more cases can be explained.

The truth table is then logically minimized through a Boolean process (performed via software) that identifies irrelevant conditions in a particular configuration. The first solution is called complex or conservative, and it makes no assumptions about the configurations for which there are no observed cases (logical reminders). The intermediate solution, on the other hand, includes directional expectation; in this case, each condition is supposed to trigger high levels of social acceptability of populism. Finally, for the most parsimonious solution, a hypothetical outcome is allocated to the configurations without observed cases as long as this leads to a simpler (more parsimonious) solution. For this type of solution, it is important that there are no simplifying assumptions (certain configurations without an observed outcome might be assumed to explain both the outcome and its absence, which would be a contradiction).[18]

All the sufficient rows with inclusion higher than .88 were included after checking also for contradictory rows (configurations with observed cases leading both to the outcome and to its absence). For reasons of space, I will avoid presenting here the conservative and intermediate solutions (see Appendix 6, Table A6.1). The formula obtained for the most parsimonious solution is:

C + E + D * cnvg => POP

The solution has acceptable coefficients and is quite in line with the hypothesis, apart from the condition CNVG; it is the polarization of the ideological space, rather than its convergence, that, combined with D, C, or E, explains the social acceptability of populism. This means that high levels of corruption (C), (+) a low economic performance (E), or a combination of low accountability and responsiveness with (*) a low ideological convergence of the political space (D*cnvg) are sufficient to explain the social acceptability of populism. Figure 7.1 represents the plot between the solution formula and the social acceptability of populism.[19]

This solution has an inclusion coefficient of .814, indicating that cases fall close to the line (the effect of the configuration is predicted precisely). The coverage coefficient is .772 (acceptable but meaning that more that 20% of the cases are not explained by this solution formula). This indicates that some deviant cases coverage have a higher score in the solution rather than in the outcome (upper-left quadrant): Switzerland and the United Kingdom in 2003 and the Netherlands in 2002. They are therefore truly logically contradictory cases because they show a high acceptability of populism while not being members of the solution (C + E + D*cnvg). This implies that there is another condition, not included in this model, that explains the presence social acceptability of populism. Moreover, there are several deviant cases for consistency. They should be members of the



Figure 7.1 Plot with Solution for Total Levels of Populism

outcome (meaning that they were supposed to show high social acceptability of populism) but for some reason they are not: Sweden in 1994, Austria and Germany in 2002, and France in 2012.

Explaining the social acceptability of right-wing populism

This section repeats the analysis but this time trying to explain the social acceptability of *right-wing* populism only. The analysis does not indicate any necessary condition for the presence (or the absence) of the outcome. Similarly, the absence of conditions does not give any result. All the coefficients are far from the threshold typically assumed to indicate necessity (.9). This means that none of the four conditions (or their absence) is a necessary condition for the presence (or absence) of the outcome.

The next step consists of assessing sufficiency – in other words, the aim is to determine which (combination of) conditions are sufficient for the presence (or absence) of the outcome. The analysis reveals that no configuration is sufficient for the absence of the outcome. The truth table (Table 7.3) presents the results for the presence of the outcome, and it is composed of 16 rows displaying all the possible configurations. For the subsequent minimization, only configurations with an inclusion coefficient of at least 0.83 are included.[20] This means that only the first 5 rows indicate the configurations that are considered as sufficient for the outcome: 9 out of 23 cases are therefore covered. The other rows are not considered as sufficient configurations for the outcome. The truth table is then logically minimized through a Boolean process that identifies irrelevant conditions in a particular configuration. The conservative and the intermediate solutions are reported in Appendix 6 (Table A6.2). A high social acceptability of right-wing populism is explained by the following parsimonious formula:

C * cnvg + E * CNVG => POP _ R

Although it can be considered a sufficient path to explain the outcome because the empirical information barely deviates from a perfect subset relation (the coefficient for inclusion is .896), it also covers a quite small part of the outcome. In fact, the solution plotted in Figure 7.2 has a very low coefficient for coverage (.600). This indicates that this solution formula explains just 60% of the cases.

Table 7.3 Truth Table: Right-Wing Populism

Conditions				*Outcome*			
C	*D*	*E*	*CNVG*	*Right-Wing Populism*	*n*	*Inclusion*	*Cases*
1	1	0	0	1	1	0.9327	AT_94
1	1	1	0	1	1	0.9266	FR_12
1	1	1	1	1	4	0.9121	FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
0	1	1	1	1	1	0.8399	AT_13
0	0	1	1	1	2	0.8356	CH_95,CH_11
1	1	0	1	0	2	0.8257	DE_02,FR_02
0	0	0	0	0	1	0.8233	CH_03
0	0	1	0	0	2	0.8184	NL_12,SE_94
0	1	0	0	0	2	0.7887	AT_02,DE_94
0	1	1	0	0	2	0.7829	DE_13,UK_95
0	1	0	1	0	1	0.7740	UK_03
0	0	0	1	0	4	0.6914	NL_94,NL_02,SE_02,SE_14
1	0	0	0	?	0	-	
1	0	0	1	?	0	-	
1	0	1	0	?	0	-	
1	0	1	1	?	0	-	



Figure 7.2 Plot with Solution for Right-Wing Populism

High corruption and low convergence (C*cnvg), or poor economic performance and high convergence (E*CNVG), almost perfectly explain the social acceptability of right-wing populism but only for a small portion of the cases included in the analysis. As the plot shows, many cases are in the upper-left quadrant, thus being deviant in kind because their high social acceptability of populism remains unexplained by the solution formula. The deviant cases with a higher score in the solution rather than in the outcome represent around a third of the cases, and this indicates the necessity to include another condition in the model.

Explaining the social acceptability of left-wing populism

This section repeats the analysis but this time to explain the social acceptability of *left-wing* populism only. The analysis does not indicate any necessary condition

for the presence (or the absence) of the outcome. Similarly, the absence of conditions does not give any result. This means that none of the four conditions (or their absence) is a necessary condition for the presence (or absence) of the outcome. The coefficients are always way below the conventional threshold for necessity.

The next step consists in assessing sufficiency – in other words, determining which (combination of) conditions are sufficient for the presence (or absence) of the outcome. The truth table is composed of 16 rows displaying all the possible configurations, and for the subsequent minimization, only configurations with an inclusion coefficient higher than .84 are included.[21] This means that only the first 8 rows indicate the configurations that are sufficient for the outcome; 14 out of 23 cases are therefore covered, and the other rows are not considered as sufficient configuration for the outcome.

The truth table is then logically minimized through a Boolean process (performed through the software) that identifies irrelevant conditions in a particular configuration. Both the conservative and the intermediate solutions are identical, and they are reported together with the details concerning the parsimonious solutions in Appendix 6 (Table A6.3). There are two different most parsimonious solutions, none of which reaches a satisfactory coefficient for coverage, and therefore none of them can be accepted:

$$\mathbf{S1: c * D + E * CNVG + C * cnvg \;=>\; POP_L}$$
$$\mathbf{S2: c * D + E * CNVG + D * cnvg \;=>\; POP_L}$$

Table 7.4 Truth Table: Left-Wing Populism

Conditions				*Outcome*			
C	*D*	*E*	*CNVG*	*Left-Wing Populism*	*n*	*Inclusion*	*Cases*
0	1	1	0	1	2	0,9125	DE_13,UK_95
0	1	1	1	1	1	0,9117	AT_13
1	1	0	0	1	1	0,8864	AT_94
0	0	1	1	1	2	0,8643	CH_95,CH_11
1	1	1	0	1	1	0,8505	FR_12
1	1	1	1	1	4	0,8494	FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
0	1	0	1	1	1	0,8442	UK_03
0	1	0	0	1	2	0,8416	AT_02,DE_94
0	0	1	0	0	2	0,8122	NL_12,SE_94
1	1	0	1	0	2	0,7987	DE_02,FR_02
0	0	0	0	0	1	0,7549	CH_03
0	0	0	1	0	4	0,7018	NL_94,NL_02,SE_02,SE_14
1	0	0	0	?	0	-	
1	0	0	1	?	0	-	
1	0	1	0	?	0	-	
1	0	1	1	?	0	-	



Figure 7.3 Plot with Solution for Left-Wing Populism

None of the solutions can be used given the low coefficients for inclusion (the first solution has a coefficient of .743, the second of .732). Moreover, even if the coefficient for inclusion would have been acceptable (above .750), these solutions are extremely difficult to interpret. They are almost identical, apart from the presence of C or D in the last term of the solution (the second solution is identical to the intermediate one, see Table A6.3). The first term, c*D, represents a combination of low corruption and low accountability and responsiveness. The second term of the solution, E*CNVG, represents a combination of poor economic performance and high political convergence. The last term presents a combination of high corruption and low convergence in the first solution, and low democratic quality and high convergence in the second solution. Figure 7.3 presents the plot between the outcome and the first solution, which has an inclusion coefficient of .743 and a coefficient for coverage of .756 (the second solution has an inclusion coefficient of .732 and a coefficient for coverage of .770).

Conclusions

The first step of analysis, consisting in assessing necessary and sufficient conditions for the outcome to occur, produced mixed results. The model tested in this chapter focuses on short-term supply- and demand-side factors derived from the relevant literature and seems to explain fairly well the overall levels of social acceptability of populism but not the two ideological declinations of populism.

Concerning the overall levels of populism's social acceptability, none of the single conditions is necessary for the outcome to be present (or absent). However, a solution can explain the social acceptability of populism in more than 75% of the cases (.772) while having an acceptable coefficient for inclusion (.814). In Boolean algebra, the solution is expressed as C + E + D*cnvg => POP. It means that high levels of corruption, a poor economic performance, or a combination of low accountability and responsiveness with a low convergence of the ideological space are sufficient for the presence of high levels of acceptability of populism.

Three cases do not display high levels of populism's social acceptability although they are member of the solution: the Netherlands in 2002 and Switzerland and the United Kingdom in 2003. The goal is to explain these cases by introducing the levels of stigma in the model because the idea is that short-term supply- and demand-side factors interact with cultural opportunity structures in determining the social acceptability of populism. In general, these findings confirm the hypothesis formulated in Chapter 2: the more unfavourable the socio-economic and political-institutional conditions, the higher the social acceptability of populism. Moreover, in line with what the relevant literature pointed out, it is not a single condition but rather a *combination* of factors than can explain the social acceptability of populism.

Concerning right-wing populism, none of the single conditions is necessary for the outcome to be present (or absent). Moreover, it was impossible to find a sufficient path to explain the social acceptability of right-wing populism. In fact, the parsimonious solution is problematic since despite an excellent inclusion coefficient (.896), only a very small part of the cases is explained (coverage .600). Populism in left-wing manifestos is not explained by any solution formula since no conditions are necessary for the outcome (or its absence) and the inclusion of the two, quite complex, final solution formulas is lower than the conventional .75 threshold.

From this first step of analysis, one can conclude that the short-term conditions typically linked to the presence of high levels of populism have indeed a strong resonance with the *overall social acceptability of populism*. However, when trying to disentangle the different types of populism, this model seems to fail in explaining the social acceptability of both left- and right-wing populism. This might reflect the choice of the conditions, which were selected to explain the overall social acceptability of populism. Moreover, different operationalisations and calibrations, as well as the introduction of additional countries, might produce different results.

The aim of the next chapter is to combine the four conditions already tested with a long-term, cultural element: the levels of stigma attached to the fascist

past. The model is tested a second time with the addition of the stigma levels in order to find a configuration of conditions which can better explain (inclusion) a broader range of cases (coverage) for the social acceptability of populism as well as for its right-wing and left-wing manifestations.

Notes

1 In social sciences, the tendency in studies using QCA is to discard solutions showing coefficients below .750 for inclusion and coverage. Here these thresholds are not considered as particularly relevant because the most important aspect concerns the comparison of the two models before and after introducing the levels of stigma. However, it is possible to say that in this study solutions with coefficients for inclusion below .750 will be treated as inconclusive (because the solution is not precise enough), while coefficients for coverage below .800 will be considered as sub-optimal (because this means that the solution leaves unexplained more than 20% of the cases). Finally, when the coefficients for inclusion are below .750 it is irrelevant to observe the coefficients for coverage.
2 The next chapter relies on the same operationalization and calibration; therefore, this section will not be repeated.
3 The point at which a country has full non-membership in the outcome is 0 for all the examined types of populism (total, right- and left-wing).
4 For Switzerland, the data on radicalism are derived from the Party Manifesto Project since the Chapel Hill survey does not include the country.
5 Normalization and Standardization are operated by the Democracy Barometer in the indicator "Absence of Corruption." It is considered as part of the features determining governmental capabilities and, in particular, its transparency.
6 For details about the indicators of the Democracy Barometer, see Merkel et al. (2016).
7 The DB codebook provides all the information concerning the sources of the data, and their scaling and standardization. Moreover, it offers detailed definitions of the concepts employed and notes about the measurements. The dataset of the DB does not directly refer to concepts such as *responsiveness* and *accountability*; therefore, I use their dataset by interpreting the type of information it contains in order to adapt it to the scope of this analysis.
8 OECD (2017), Unemployment rate (indicator). Doi: 10.1787/997c8750-en (Accessed in April 2017).
9 International Financial Statistics (World Economic Outlook), June 2015, available online (accessed in April 2019): www.imf.org/external/datamapper/LUR@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD?year=2015.
10 Solt (2016) SWIID version 5.1.
11 World Development Indicators, GDP growth (annual %), December 2015, available online (accessed in April 2019): https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG.
12 Dalton measures the Polarization Index (PI) as follows. PI = SQRT{Σ(party vote $share_i$)*([party L/R $score_i$ – party systemaverage L/R score]/5)^2}. In particular, "$_i$" represents individual parties. Here the formula is slightly adjusted. First, the left–right score is calculated according to the Chapel Hill survey or, since the survey does not cover the 1990s, the Party Manifesto Project is used (see notes to Table A3.1). Second, the effective number of parties is here intended as the number of parties which obtained at least 5% of the vote share, in order to include only those parties whose electoral manifestos are included in the analysis. The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) provides all the information needed to measure the polarization index: www.cses.org (consulted in October 2017).

13 The results remain consistent, both with the normal operationalization (Appendix 9, Table A9.1 and A9.2) and with the alternative one based on the co-occurrence principle (Appendix 11, Table A11.7 and Table A11.8).
14 Appendix 11 reports all the solution formulas for the alternative operationalization (Table A11.1 to A11.3).
15 About the different types of solutions in QCA, see Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 165–77).
16 All analyses are performed using the free software R, in particular the packages: 'QCA: Qualitative Comparative Analysis' (Dusa 2019) and 'Set methods: Functions for Set-Theoretic Multi-Method Research and Advanced QCA' (Medzihorsky et al. 2016).
17 Other credible inclusion cut-offs have been tested but they are not reported for reasons of space. The results remain consistent with those obtained with the cut-off point at .88.
18 See Ragin (1987) on different ways to treat logical reminders.
19 All the cases are displayed in Figure 7.1. However, typical cases and deviant cases consistency (in relation to sufficient terms or single terms) are not interpretable through this plot. When relevant, this is done separately (see Appendix 8). What is interpretable and relevant for process tracing and causality mechanisms when plotting the whole solution, like in this case, is the comparison between deviant cases coverage and individually irrelevant cases (Rohlfing and Schneider 2013).
20 An inclusion cut of .81 (closer to the jump in the values) gives extremely similar results. The results of this study (also in comparison with the findings that are presented in Chapter 8) would remain consistent also with cut-off points set at .82 or .84. This means that with any reasonable cut-off level by introducing the level of stigma the results show that right-wing populism becomes explainable.
21 Again, there is no clear jump to be used for the inclusion cut-off. Given the membership of the cases in the outcome, a rather high threshold is used. Higher thresholds have been tried as well, but they give even less interpretable solutions.

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8 The effect of fascist legacies on populism

This chapter repeats the analysis of the conditions for the social acceptability of populism, this time introducing into the model a fifth variable: *the levels of stigma attached to the fascist past*. The results show that by introducing the role of fascist legacies, it is possible to explain with greater precision the social acceptability of populism. However, while the new model works particularly well for overall populism and right-wing populism, left-wing populism's social acceptability remains unexplained. The results produced make it possible to conclude that the fascist legacy, especially in combination with other political opportunity structures, plays a key role in opening up or closing down the cultural opportunity structure for right-wing populism to thrive.

The chapter follows a structure identical to the one used for the previous step of analysis. The results of the fsQCA are presented first for the overall social acceptability of populism and then for the two ideological variants (right- and left-wing populism). In addition, it is discussed whether the new solutions are able to explain some of the cases that in the previous step of analysis deviated for coverage or inclusion. When the coefficients of inclusion and coverage improve after introducing the new condition, this is a good indicator that the new model works better, but it is not automatically a sign that the causal mechanism works as hypothesized. In fact, it is necessary to examine which deviant cases can be explained with the new model compared to the previous one without levels of stigma as a condition.

The relevant row lines of the truth tables are presented, as well as the plots illustrating where the cases fall when considering the relationship between the most parsimonious solution and the outcome. The inclusion cut-off for the process of minimization is always maintained exactly as in Chapter 7 in order to grant perfect comparability of the results. Appendix 8 (Figure A8.1) shows the distribution of cases in the newly introduced condition "low levels of stigma." The levels of stigma are assigned to each country in Chapter 6, where the choices made are explained in detail and justified according to the existing literature (Table 6.1 summarizes the findings). Since the relationship hypothesized is between the presence of *low* levels of stigma and high levels of social acceptability of populism, the values assigned in Chapter 6 are reversed; in this way, a level of stigma equal to 1 becomes 0 in the condition "low levels of stigma" (S), and vice versa.

A country is a full member of the condition (S) if its levels of stigma are extremely low, which in turn is supposed to trigger a high social acceptability of populism.

Compared to the distribution of cases in the other four conditions (Figure A5.1), the levels for stigma of the fascist past cluster around very low and very high levels. This means that three countries display values such as 0.1 (Germany), 0.2 (Sweden), and 0.3 (UK) in the condition "low levels of stigma" because their stigma levels are very high; therefore, they are supposed to close down the opportunity structure for populism. The other five countries (Austria, France, Italy, Switzerland, and the Netherlands) display levels between 0.7 and 0.9 because they have low levels of stigma, which in turn are supposed to open up the opportunity structure for populism. This element further confirms that the memories assigned to each country in Chapter 6 are not too fine-grained since it is possible to distinguish in a very clear (although nuanced) way between countries that developed a strong stigma of the fascist past and countries that generated low levels of stigma.

The next three sections examine the presence of necessary and sufficient conditions for the social acceptability of overall populism as well as its two ideological declinations. The conditions tested are low levels of accountability and responsiveness (D), poor economic performance (E), high levels of corruption (C), and high levels of ideological convergence (CNVG). Moreover, compared to the analysis presented in Chapter 7, low levels of stigma (S) are included in the model. Appendix 8 shows the plot between each of the three outcomes with stigma alone (Figure A8.2 to A8.4). Intuitively, it is possible to understand the impact of low levels of stigma on high levels of populism's social acceptability. This is true, in particular, for the social acceptability of right-wing populism (Figure A8.3). The coefficients for inclusion (.885) and coverage (.773) show that stigma *alone* can very well explain the social acceptability of right-wing populism in almost 80% of the cases. The most obvious exception is the UK (in 2003 and 2010): the country shows high levels of *Salonfähigkeit* of populism despite the presence of a strong stigma. On the contrary, the Netherlands in 1994 show levels of right-wing populism's social acceptability much lower than expected, considering that the country has a low stigma for the fascist past. These and all the other problematic cases will be discussed in detail in the remainder of the chapter.

Explaining the social acceptability of populism

Compared to the analysis performed in Chapter 7, the outcomes and conditions remain the same, as well as their calibration. The analysis for necessity does not produce any results. Low levels of stigma are not, in isolation, a necessary condition for the presence of high levels of social acceptability of populism. This is a first, important result. The simple presence of low levels of stigma cannot explain the social acceptability of populism. If they do so, this can only be the case when there is an interaction with other conditions.

This time, since there are 5 conditions included in the model, there are 32 possible configurations. For reasons of space, only the rows above the inclusion

cut (.88) are displayed (Table 8.1).[1] Similarly, configurations that are considered as insufficient for the outcome (below the inclusion cut-off) as well as logical reminders (which will be considerably more since the number of cases is stable while the number of possible configurations doubled) will not be displayed. The logical reminders are now 15, and all the solutions are reported in Appendix 7 (Table A7.1), including their coefficients for inclusion and coverage. Concerning the assessment of sufficiency, by including the levels of stigma, the most parsimonious solution is now more elegant, interpretable, with a much higher coefficient for coverage, and composed of two terms:

S + D => POP

The solution S+D has an inclusion coverage with a coefficient of .802, which is slightly lower than before (.814), but also a coverage coefficient of .862, which is considerably higher than before (.772).[2] Now, testing the model with the inclusion of stigma, *a low level of accountability and responsiveness (D) or a low stigmatization of the fascist past (S) are both relevant paths for the presence of the outcome* (plotted in Figure 8.1). Interestingly, the presence of S alone has a coefficient for inclusion of .826, one for raw coverage of .690 (indicating which share of the outcome is explained by S) and one for unique coverage of .177 (indicating which share of the outcome is *exclusively* explained by a certain term).[3]

Germany and the UK, for each of the election points included, display high levels of social acceptability of populism. Since the two countries have collective memories that are supposed to close down the opportunity structure for populism, it is unsurprising to observe that their presence is explained through the

Table 8.1 Truth Table: Total Populism

Conditions					*Outcome*			
C	*D*	*E*	*CNVG*	*S*	*Populism*	*n*	*Inclusion*	*Cases*
1	1	1	1	1	1	3	0,9999	FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0,9975	FR_02
1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0,9851	AT_94
1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0,9656	UK_10
1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0,9608	FR_12
0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0,9573	NL_12
0	0	1	1	1	1	2	0,9569	CH_95,CH_11
0	1	1	0	0	1	2	0,9561	DE_13,UK_95
0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0,9525	AT_13
0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0,9349	DE_94
0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0,9216	CH_03
0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0,9050	UK_03
1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0,8911	DE_02
0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0,8883	AT_02
0	0	0	1	1	1	2	0,8815	NL_94,NL_02



Figure 8.1 Plot with Solution for Total Populism

other term of the parsimonious solution (D). As hypothesized, the social acceptability of populism is linked to an interaction between stigma and other short-term conditions. In the UK and Germany, the presence of low accountability and responsiveness explains the high social acceptability of populism. Other countries, such as Italy, France, and Austria, have high levels of populism's social acceptability, and this is explained by both D and S. Indeed, these countries display both low levels of stigma and low levels of accountability and responsiveness.[4]

At this stage of the analysis, there is a crucial element to consider: the variation of the deviant cases between the first model without the levels of stigma and the deviant cases in the model after the introduction of the levels of stigma (Bennett and Elman 2006; Schneider and Rohlfing 2016). In other words, it is important to observe *which cases that were not explained by testing the four conditions extrapolated from the literature can now be explained by taking into consideration*

the levels of stigma. This aspect is paramount because it makes it possible to assess whether the new condition improves the explanatory power of the model. There are two categories of deviant cases: consistency (or inclusion) and coverage. The former constitutes a puzzle because it points to cases that should be members of the outcome but, in fact, are not. The latter is a puzzle because it includes cases that, conversely, are members of the outcome for reasons not disclosed by the QCA solution.

The previous model produced three deviant cases coverage: the United Kingdom and Switzerland in 2003 and the Netherlands in 2002. They displayed high levels of populism's social acceptability for reasons not explained by the solution C + E + D*cnvg => POP. After the introduction of the role of stigma, with the new solution formula D + S => POP, they are not deviant cases coverage anymore. Low levels of accountability and responsiveness, or a low stigma, can now explain why these three cases show high (the Netherlands 2002 and United Kingdom 2003) or very high (Switzerland 2003) levels of social acceptability of populism. By looking at the truth table and at the details of the solution presented in Table A7.1, it is clear that for Switzerland and the Netherlands the change is due to the role of fascist legacies (low values of S). In the case of the United Kingdom, the presence of the outcome is explained by the low quality of the democratic process (D).[5]

Finally, the model with four conditions did show several deviant case consistency (or inclusion). Unfortunately, the new solution does not constitute an improvement. In Figure 7.1, five cases that were members of the solution were not members of the outcome, and the model with the levels of stigma of the fascist past produces very similar results. As Figure 8.1 shows, the Netherlands in 2012 remains a very ambiguous case, while Germany and Austria in 2002 and France in 2012 remain deviant cases consistency. Finally, while the Netherlands in 1994 was an irrelevant case, now it is a deviant case consistency, while the opposite is true for Sweden in 1994. Germany might show low levels of populism's acceptability because of its very high stigma for the fascist past; therefore, it is not particularly surprising. France is quite close to the crossover point, and it might be that the manifestos in 2012 were coded as not very populist while the parties developed highly populist discourses outside the manifestos. Austria and the Netherlands, however, remain unexplained and problematic cases that find no explanation in the solution D + S => POP.[6]

Explaining the social acceptability of right-wing populism

This section examines the presence of necessary and sufficient conditions for the social acceptability of *right-wing* populism. The analysis for necessity does not produce any results. Low levels of stigma are not, in isolation, a necessary condition for the presence of the outcome. However, S can be considered as a *sufficient* condition for the presence of high levels of social acceptability of right-wing populism (POP_R). As mentioned above, Figure A8.3 shows the relation of

sufficiency between the levels of stigma and the social acceptability of right-wing populism. The coefficients for inclusion (.885) and coverage (.773) show that stigma *alone* can very well explain the social acceptability of right-wing populism in almost 80% of the cases.[7] The analysis will establish whether S works even better in explaining POP_R when combined with short-term socio-economic and political-institutional conditions.

Once again, since there are 5 conditions included in the model, there are 32 possible configurations. Hence, only the rows above the inclusion cut-off (.83) will be displayed (Table 8.2). It is worth mentioning that in this case, the cut-off threshold is even more accurate than in the model without the levels of stigma (Table 7.2). Indeed, the last case reported in the truth table is UK_10 with a level of .873, while the next case (UK_03) comes only after a very clear jump (.802). Configurations which are considered as not sufficient for the outcome (below the inclusion cut-off), as well as logical reminders, are not displayed for reasons of space. The logical reminders (configurations with no observed cases) are now 15, and all the solutions are reported in Appendix 7 (Table A7.2).[8] The cases assigned to the 11 sufficient configurations are now 15. Concerning the assessment of sufficiency, by including the levels of stigma, the two most parsimonious solutions are:

$$\mathbf{S1: S + (C * E) => POP_R}$$
$$\mathbf{S2: S + (E * CNVG) => POP_R}$$

The two solutions have, respectively, an inclusion coefficient of .856 and .846 and a coverage coefficient of .804 and .819. *Both solutions constitute a remarkable improvement compared to the solution obtained without stigma levels*, which had a

Table 8.2 Truth Table: Right-Wing Populism

Conditions					*Outcome*			
C	*D*	*E*	*CNVG*	*S*	*Right-Wing Populism*	*n*	*Inclusion*	*Cases*
1	1	1	1	1	1	3	0.9895	FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0.9875	AT_94
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0.9857	FR_02
1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.9742	FR_12
0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0.9531	NL_12
0	0	1	1	1	1	2	0.9461	CH_95,CH_11
0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.9405	AT_13
0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.9346	CH_03
0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0.9192	AT_02
0	0	0	1	1	1	2	0.8811	NL_94,NL_02
1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0.8725	UK_10

coverage coefficient much lower than .750.[9] The first term of the two solutions indicates that a low level of stigma (S) is in both cases part the solution formula that can explain the social acceptability of right-wing populism (POP_R). Moreover, a combination of bad economic performance with either high levels of corruption (C*E) or with a high ideological convergence (E*CNVG) constitutes the second term of the two solutions. *Even more importantly, it is possible to argue that a low level of stigma is per se a sufficient condition for the presence of the outcome* since it has an inclusion coefficient of .885 and a raw coverage of .773 (with a unique coverage of .241, meaning that *stigma alone can explain almost a quarter of the cases*).

It is difficult to establish which one of the two solutions is preferable and better explains the social acceptability of right-wing populism. For this purpose, it is necessary to look at several aspects linked to the concept of coverage. The solution coverage indicates how much of the outcome is covered by the solution term; raw coverage indicates which share of the outcome is explained by a certain alternative path; and unique coverage indicates which share of the outcome is exclusively explained by a certain alternative path (Ragin 2006). The term C*E has a coefficient for inclusion of .910, while E*CNVG has a coefficient for inclusion of .883. Both terms can explain the outcome with a very high precision. Concerning their coefficients for raw coverage, the two alternative paths have similar values: C*E has .472 while E*CNVG has .492. Finally, their coefficients for unique coverage are negligible: C*E in isolation cannot explain any single case, while E*CNVG has a coefficient of 0.015. To make a comparison, the levels of stigma (S) alone can explain almost a quarter of the cases (its coefficient for unique coverage is .241).

It is impossible to choose a solution path rather than the other by observing their coefficients for inclusion and coverage because they are very similar in this regard. Another important parameter to consider consists in observing the variations that occur in the presence of deviant cases coverage and deviant cases consistency (or inclusion). It is crucial to observe which cases that were not explained by testing the four conditions extrapolated from the literature can now be explained by taking into consideration the idea of stigma. This makes it possible to assess whether and possibly how the new condition improves the explanatory power of the model and which particular solution path is the most appropriate.

By observing the variation of the deviant cases, however, it makes once again no difference which of the two parsimonious solutions is selected. Figure 8.2 plots the second solution, which has a slightly higher coverage, while Figure 8.3 plots the first solution. They are almost identical since the levels of stigma alone constitute the first term of the solution, and the second term is very similar as well; a bad economic performance appears in both cases, once in combination with high corruption and once in combination with high convergence.

The previous model (with only four conditions) produced six deviant cases coverage: Switzerland in 2003, the Netherlands in 2002 and 2012, Austria and France in 2002, and the United Kingdom in 2003. These cases were perplexing



Figure 8.2 Plot with Solution for Right-Wing Populism

because they were members of the outcome for reasons not disclosed by the QCA solution. Now, after having introduced a new condition (S), five of these six cases can be explained. Tellingly, only the United Kingdom in 2003 is still a deviant case coverage (no matter which solution is selected), while all the other five cases can now be explained. *The reason why these five cases can now be explained is the low level of stigma*, which produces a high social acceptability of right-wing populism. This remains true for both solution formulas.

For example, by observing the truth table in Chapter 7 (Table 7.3) of the four initial conditions, Austria in 2002 only had low levels of responsiveness and accountability; now, by introducing the levels of stigma, it can be explained why it shows high levels of right-wing populism's social acceptability. The same is true for the Netherlands in 2002; it displayed high convergence, like Sweden in 1994 and 2002, but the Scandinavian country did not show high levels of populism's



Figure 8.3 Plot with Alternative Solution for Right-Wing Populism

acceptability. Similarly, the Netherlands in 2012 displayed a bad economic performance, like Sweden in 1994, but while Sweden shows no acceptability of populism, the Netherlands do. Switzerland in 2003 had no visible reasons to belong to the outcome (it was not a member of any condition that were supposed to explain right-wing populism's social acceptability), but with the introduction of stigma this case can be explained. Finally, France and Germany in 2002 showed the same combination of conditions: high corruption, low accountability and responsiveness, and high convergence. Once the levels of stigma are included, the high levels of right-wing populism's acceptability in France can be explained, and the country is no longer a deviant case coverage.

Whereas previously these six cases were in the upper-left quadrant (see Figure 7.2), leaving the presence of the outcome unexplained by the solution, now only one case remains. At this stage, none of the conditions analyzed explains the high social acceptability of right-wing populism in the United Kingdom in 2003. However, the case is also rather close to the crossover point (especially

in Figure 8.2); this indicates that a different operationalization or cut-off point might have produced different results. On the other hand, given the fact that the United Kingdom in the 2010s also shows rather high levels of right-wing populism's social acceptability, *one might consider the possibility that the type of collective memory assigned to the country, heroization, actually does not produce the high level of stigmatization of the fascist past that was expected*. Future studies should focus on the levels of stigma produces by a narrative based on heroization. Other countries that might be considered are the United States and Australia.

Apart from the United Kingdom in 2003, however, *high levels of right-wing populism's social acceptability are now explained much better*, and this is clearly linked to the inclusion of long-lasting fascist legacies in the model. Austria, France, Switzerland, and the Netherlands have low or very low levels of stigma of the fascist past because their collective memories are based on either cancellation or victimization, and this makes it possible to explain why right-wing populism is socially acceptable although the other conditions that were supposed to trigger it were not present. After the inclusion of stigma in the model, these cases moved from the upper-left quadrant and now the outcome is explained.

Concerning deviant cases consistency (or inclusion), the previous model did not show any because all the cases which were not members of the outcome were also not members of the solution. The new model, in contrast, produces a deviant case coverage: the Netherlands in 1994 (bottom-right quadrant). Although it is a member of the solution, it is not member of the outcome, meaning that both solutions fail to explain why the acceptability of right-wing populism in this case is not high. Moreover, the Netherlands in 1994 is not a borderline case because the case clearly belongs to the solution but displays a very low social acceptability of right-wing populism. One might argue that the measurement was biased by the fact that the party D66 has been coded as left-wing according to the degree of radicalism of its party manifesto and not as centre or right-wing as it is often described by experts. Had it been coded as right-wing, however, the social acceptability of right-wing populism would have still been lower compared to expectations (the level would have been around 230, with the crossover point still very distant at 419). The fact that the country in 1994 belongs to both solution formulas but show low levels of right-wing populism's social acceptability might be linked the volatility of right-wing populist parties in the Netherlands, often related to the presence of some charismatic leader.

Finally, Germany and Sweden are considered as irrelevant cases; they belong neither to the solution nor to the outcome. In other words, the fact that they have very low levels of right-wing populism's social acceptability cannot be explained by the short- and long-term conditions that were supposed to explain the social acceptability right-wing populism. It is not possible to establish whether Sweden and Germany show low levels of populism because there are no favourable conditions or because other conditions (not included in this study) close down the cultural and political opportunity structures for populism. However, by confronting these cases with other cases that show identical configurations of conditions (e.g. France and the Netherlands), it is possible to observe that countries with

similar socio-economic and political-institutional conditions, but also high levels of stigma of the fascist past, show a high acceptability of right-wing populism.

Explaining the social acceptability of left-wing populism

This section examines the presence of necessary and sufficient conditions for the social acceptability of *left-wing* populism. The analysis for necessity does not produce any results. Low levels of stigma are not, in isolation, a necessary condition for the social acceptability of populism. The social acceptability of left-wing populism, even after the introduction of levels of stigma of the fascist past, remains unexplainable.

Once again, since there are 5 conditions included in the model, there are 32 possible configurations. Hence, only the rows above the inclusion cut-off (.84) are displayed in Table 8.3. Configurations that are considered as not sufficient for the outcome, as well as logical reminders, will not be displayed for reasons of space. The logical reminders (configurations with no observed cases) are now 15. The conservative and intermediate solutions are reported in Appendix 7 (Table A7.3). The cases assigned to the 12 sufficient configurations are now 16. Concerning the assessment of sufficiency, by including the levels of stigma, the most parsimonious solution path is now:

C + D * s + E * S => POP _ L

The solution (plotted in Figure 8.4) has an inclusion coefficient of .690 and a coverage coefficient of .784. Given the fact that the inclusion coefficient is extremely low (significantly below the minimum required value of .750), this

Table 8.3 Truth Table: Left-Wing Populism

Conditions					*Outcome*			
C	*D*	*E*	*CNVG*	*S*	*Left-Wing Populism*	*n*	*Inclusion*	*Cases*
1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0.9443	UK_10
0	1	1	0	0	1	2	0.9253	DE_13,UK_95
0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.9053	AT_13
1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0.8813	DE_02
1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0.8782	AT_94
0	0	1	1	1	1	2	0.8779	CH_95,CH_11
0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0.8772	UK_03
0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0.8769	DE_94
0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0.8689	NL_12
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0.8430	FR_02
1	1	1	1	1	1	3	0.8440	FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.8428	FR_12



Figure 8.4 Plot with Solution for Left-Wing Populism

solution cannot be accepted as sufficient for the presence of the outcome. Three solution terms appear in the most parsimonious solution: high corruption (C); bad accountability and responsiveness but high stigma (D*s); and bad economic performance with low stigma (E*S).

Compared to the solutions obtained before the introduction of stigma, the coefficient for inclusion is even lower (it was .744). The coefficient for coverage is higher, but this is irrelevant since the levels of inclusion are unsatisfactory. The most interesting aspect of this solution formula is the presence of both S (low levels of stigma) and s (the absence of S, therefore high levels if stigma).[10] In other words, the role of stigma seems to be conflicting; both high and low levels of stigma are present in the solution that is supposed to explain the acceptability of left-wing populism.

This was predictable because a quick glance at the truth table (Table 8.3) shows that the three cases with the highest inclusion in the outcome involve

countries with very high levels of stigma: Germany and the United Kingdom. Afterwards, two countries with very low levels of stigma are present: Switzerland and Austria. Left-wing populism is acceptable in countries with opposite levels of stigma, and this is reflected in the solution formula. Moreover, this relationship between stigma and left-wing populism is displayed in Appendix 8 (Figure A8.4): Germany and the UK are in the upper-left quadrant because they show high levels of left-wing populism's acceptability but also high levels of stigma of the fascist past.

In particular, the solution term D*s (low levels of responsiveness and accountability combined with high levels of stigma) has a unique coverage of .137, meaning that alone it explains around 14% of the cases. To be precise, this configuration explains Germany (in 1994 and 2013) and the UK (1995 and 2003).[11] The other solution term E*S explains all the cases with low levels of stigma (the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, France, and Italy), but it has a unique coverage of .069. Overall, the solution formula provides a very weak path for the explanation of left-wing populism's social acceptability (inclusion coefficient of .690). Moreover, the introduction of the levels of stigma of the fascist past does not produce any improvement; in fact, the solution seems to bring us even further away from the explanation of left-wing populism's social acceptability.

It is clear that this new solution formula does not constitute an improvement compared to the model without stigma. This is true also considering deviant cases. While the previous model produced four deviant cases coverage, there are now five. Moreover, while before there were three deviant case consistency (or inclusion), now there are five cases which were supposed to display high levels of social acceptability of left-wing populism but do not: France (2002 and 2012), Germany (2002), the Netherlands (2012), and Italy (1994). In general, the new model works even worse than the old one, and the introduction of fascist legacies did not help explain more cases than before.

In fact, the contrary happened, and many cases remain problematic. The UK was already a problematic case concerning right-wing populism because its social acceptability remained unexplained. This might confirm that the type of collective memory present in the UK (heroization) does not block populism. Germany, on the other hand, follows a completely different trajectory. Right-wing populism in the country is socially not acceptable, while left-wing populism is very acceptable. This might be interpreted as follows: fascist legacies block the social acceptability of right-wing populism but not of left-wing populism.

However, it is not even possible to establish that for left-wing populism fascist legacies work in the *opposite* direction compared with what happened with right-wing populism: low levels of stigma can explain right-wing populism, but the simple fact of highly stigmatizing the fascist past cannot explain the social acceptability of left-wing populism. This leaves only one possible conclusion: in order to explain the social acceptability of left-wing populism, one must look beyond the levels of stigma of the fascist past, as well as beyond the short-term factors included in this analysis.

Conclusions

The second step of analysis tested the same conditions and outcomes but also introduced a fifth condition: the levels of stigmatization of the fascist past. The results can be considered as more or less satisfactory according to the three different outcomes that are included in the model. *Results are satisfactory to explain the overall social acceptability of populism, very satisfactory for right-wing populism, and unsatisfactory for left-wing populism.* Moreover, none of the models produced any necessary condition for any of the outcomes. This might signal the importance of considering new conditions in future research, while it testifies to the extreme variance when dealing with empirical manifestations of populism and its social acceptability across countries.

Concerning the *overall* social acceptability of populism, by introducing the levels of stigma, the rather complex but precise solution (C + E + D*cnvg => POP) is replaced by a more elegant and precise one: S + D => POP. The levels of stigma now help in explaining three additional cases, thus making the new solution not only more precise but also with a higher explanatory power: the Netherlands in 2002, and the United Kingdom and Switzerland in 2003, can now be explained thanks to the introduction of the levels of stigma. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that stigma alone has a coefficient for inclusion of .826 and one for unique coverage of .177 (indicating that almost 20% of the outcome is *exclusively* explained by levels of stigma).

Concerning the social acceptability of left-wing populism, after introducing the levels of stigma the solution still fails to reach an acceptable coefficient for coverage while the coefficient for inclusion is even lower than before, thus making the solution itself not strong enough to denote sufficiency. This aspect will be further investigated in the Conclusions, but it seems safe to assume that left-wing populism answers to different logics and thrives under different conditions compared to right-wing populism, and future research should try to understand which specific conditions trigger left-wing populism. Without any doubt, the levels of stigma of the fascist past do not contribute to shed light on left-wing populism's social acceptability. Including countries such as Spain, Greece, and Portugal, as well as Eastern European countries, might help in explaining the *Salonfähigkeit* of left-wing populism.

The most outstanding results concern the social acceptability of right-wing populism. After introducing the role of fascist legacies in closing down the cultural opportunity structures for right-wing populism to thrive, the old solution (C*cnvg + E*CNVG => POP_R) is replaced by two alternative solutions S + (C*E) => POP_R and S + (E*CNVG) => POP_R. They both bear a much more convincing explanatory power and contribute to explain several cases that before where a puzzle.

Low levels of stigma are in both cases sufficient in isolation to explain the social acceptability of right-wing populism (indeed, the coefficient for raw coverage is .773). Both solutions, moreover, can explain five deviant cases coverage: Switzerland in 2003, the Netherlands in 2002 and 2012, and Austria and France

in 2002. The United Kingdom in 2003, however, remains unexplained, and it would be helpful to develop a case study about the country in future research.

From this second step of the analysis, one can conclude that when considering the levels of stigma of the fascist past, the social acceptability of populism can be better explained. In more detail, while the previous model produced a particularly unsatisfactory coefficient for the coverage of the solution which was supposed to explain the social acceptability of right-wing populism, it is precisely this aspect that the new model contributes to grasp. It seems that fascist legacies mainly interact with the acceptability of right-wing populism. The fact that the new model provides a better explanation of the overall levels of populism's social acceptability might be linked to the fact that right-wing populism is better explained, while the acceptability of left-wing populism is poorly explained before as well as after the introduction of stigma.

Looking at the typology of collective memory previously elaborated, some remarks can be made at this stage. Countries characterized by a narrative based on *victimization* display a high social acceptability of populism and, more particularly, of right-wing populism. This is true also when other conditions seem not to constitute the perfect thriving ground for populism. In Austria and France, both characterized by collective memories based on victimization, the social acceptability of right-wing populism can be explained only after the introduction of the levels of stigma in the model. Italy seems to follow the same trend, but the social acceptability of right-wing populism is lower than expected. This can be linked to two possible explanations: either to the presence of additional conditions which were not considered or to the fact that Italian political parties are more populist in their daily communications than in their manifestos.

Countries characterized by a narrative based on *cancellation* also display a high social acceptability of populism. This remains true when other conditions seem not to constitute the perfect thriving ground for populism. In Switzerland and the Netherlands, both characterized by collective memories based on cancellation, the social acceptability of right-wing populism can be explained only after the introduction of the levels of stigma in the model.

Sweden, characterized by a narrative based both on culpabilization and on cancellation, never shows a high degree of social acceptability of (any kind of) populism, and this might be rooted in deeper features of the country's political culture or in the fact that the favourable opportunity structures for populism to thrive never materialized in the country. Germany, characterized by a narrative based on culpabilization, is a very interesting case. While the social acceptability of right-wing populism is always very low, things are very different when it comes to left-wing populism, which is socially accepted. This might be linked to the country's collective memory and the process of *Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit* that took place since the end of the 1950s, and it confirms that fascist legacies work only for right-wing populism.

Finally, the United Kingdom is consistently more populist than expected. This might be linked to the different institutional setting: indeed, the final values of populism's *Salonfähigkeit* might be high because the party manifestos are

written by parties that together receive around 90% of the vote share. However, there might be other reasons: for example, a comparative study that includes the United States and Australia might shed a light on the levels of stigma generated by a collective memory based on heroization.

Notes

1 The inclusion cut-off is identical to the one used in Chapter 7 for maximum comparability. The same is true for the sections about right- and left-wing populism.
2 This observation is not surprising since the coefficients for inclusion and coverage often are a trade-off between the two measures (Schneider and Wagemann 2012).
3 About unique and raw coverage, see Ragin (2006).
4 Interestingly, by observing the results obtained with the alternative operationalization, it emerges a different parsimonious solution: E + S + D*CNVG. This solution, despite being slightly more complex, is able to explain the social acceptability of populism with even higher precision (see Table A11.4). In particular, it has an inclusion coefficient of .849 and a coverage coefficient of .870. Moreover, the levels of stigma alone have an inclusion coefficient of .880 and a coverage coefficient of .703. Finally, it is important to notice that no matter the operationalization used for the measurement of populism in party manifestos, the results remain consistent and in line with the hypotheses.
5 Going into further detail, the United Kingdom shows alarmingly low levels of government capability (pertaining to responsiveness) and competition (pertaining to accountability), and this is true not only for the 2003 elections but also for the other two decades considered.
6 Concerning Austria in 2002, it is possible to observe that the levels of right-wing populism's social acceptability are exceptionally low (as already explained in Chapter 5). This might be because the FPÖ produced a party manifesto that shows unusually low levels of populism. For example, in the 1990s, their manifesto contained high levels of populism (more than 10%) and in the 2010s extremely high levels of populism (more than 21%). However, in 2002, their manifesto contained only 0.7% of populist statements. Interestingly, in 2002, the party was deeply divided and unable to organize an effective political strategy, a situation that decreased its share of the vote to 10.2%, almost two-thirds less than its previous share.
7 The alternative operationalization produces very similar results. The relation of sufficiency between levels of stigma and acceptability of right-wing populism has a coefficient of .823 for inclusion and .764 for coverage. See Appendix 11 (Table A11.5).
8 It is important to notice that the intermediate solution is S + C*D*E*CNVG => POP_R (see Table A7.2). This solution is particularly in line with the expectations because it shows that low levels of stigma (S) or a combination of *all the other four conditions* (C*D*E*CNVG) explain the social acceptability of right-wing populism. Moreover, the coefficients for inclusion and coverage are almost identical to those expressed in the parsimonious solution (.859 and .804 respectively). The difference between intermediate and parsimonious solution consists in the assumptions made. The intermediate solution is built on easy counterfactuals, and it discards difficult ones. Counterfactuals are called easy when the assumptions about the outcome of logical remainders are simplifying and in line with the theoretical expectations (in this case, C, D, E, and CNVG are supposed to produce POP_R). A counterfactual is difficult when it is simplifying the solution but runs counter to the theoretical expectations. Because the intermediate solution might

not allow all simplifying assumptions to be made, it contains some conditions that are redundant in the sense that they do not make a difference to the outcome (Schneider and Rohlfing 2016).

9 Before the introduction of levels of stigma, the solution was C*cnvg + E*CNVG => POP_R, with a coefficient for inclusion of .896 and a coefficient for coverage of .600.

10 About the fact that both high and low levels of stigma are present in the solution, it is interesting to notice that the PRI value for the solution is very low: .542. This means that the solution is sufficient for the outcome only slightly more than it is sufficient for the negation of the outcome.

11 With the alternative operationalization, the solution formula is similar: D*s + c*CNVG*S (see Appendix 6, Table A11.6). Once again, it is possible to notice that both S and s are present, and in particular the solution term D*s is consistently present, this time with a coefficient of unique coverage of .260. This solution term, once again, explains the social acceptability of left-wing populism in Germany and the UK. Importantly, the parsimonious solution would have an acceptable coefficient for inclusion (.838). However, it explains only two-thirds of the cases (coefficient of coverage .660).

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Conclusions

American historian Robert Kagan wrote: "This is how fascism comes to America, not with jackboots and salutes . . . but with a television huckster, a phony billionaire, a textbook egomaniac tapping into popular resentments and insecurities." Kagan is describing Donald Trump, but the portrait fits many populist actors across the globe.[1] After a decade spent debating about the emergence of a *populist Zeitgeist*, many commentators now evoke a certain *fascist Zeitgeist*. While fascism in its historical form is unlikely to come back, other forms of power that formally observe democratic rules might take its place. The political situation in Hungary has alarming echoes with Europe's past, but it could also foreshadow a disturbing future: the government led by Viktor Orbán shows that – rather than from classic fascism – new challenges might come from democratic illiberalism and populist democracy.

Fascism *tout court* might no longer be an acceptable ideology, and political parties describing themselves as neo-fascist usually remain at the margins of the political debate, but populism can reintroduce crypto-fascist ideas of power by formally adopting democratic elements. Indeed, the new far right is nationalist and xenophobic like the old one, but it has changed its language and style, and it tends to adopt a democratic and republican rhetoric. Post-fascism, rather than returning to a classic 'jackboots and salutes' style of fascism, might therefore turn into a new form of authoritarian, populist democracy by breaching a moral and political dividing line that separates it from liberal democracy.

Across the world, many are concerned with the illiberal turn of the democratic process. Refusing the 'old politics' has become a euphemism used to contest liberal democracy: its pluralism, minority protection, freedom of the media, and division of powers. Importantly, the most common way for authoritarian regimes to emerge is by challenging democracy *from within*, participating in (more or less regular) elections. A populist rhetoric often goes hand in glove with authoritarian tendencies since it allows to create a collective identity opposed to a common enemy, eliminate intermediate bodies, and claim to do it 'in the name of the people.'

The fact that a party like Vox could recently emerge in Spain, or that the Sweden Democrats and the AfD are increasingly successful in Sweden and Germany, indicates that even countries where certain ideas of power have remained taboo

for decades are now legitimizing the discourses of right-wing populist parties. In Croatia, revisionist views of the wartime Ustaša movement and the Nazi-allied Independent State of Croatia have entered Croatia's political mainstream: "Such views used to be seen as the lunatic fringe; now they are part of the mainstream," claims historian Rory Yeomans.[2]

In Europe, the very idea of democracy developed after 1945 as a reaction to fascism, Nazism, and World War II is at stake. It is important to celebrate the *vox populi* and to denounce the intrigues and corruption of the elite; actually, this is an essential part of democracy itself. Even Louis XVI allowed the population (including the Third Estate) to list their hopes and grievances in the *Cahiers de doléances*, thus recording criticisms of government waste and corruption. Emmanuel Macron recently asked for a compilation of *Cahiers de doléances* in response to the yellow vests movement. Doubtfully, however, we should welcome the return in contemporary Germany of the Nazi slogan *Lügenpresse* ('lying press') as a sign of a healthy liberal democracy.[3] As historian Enzo Traverso claims, in Western Europe democracy was born from the Resistance and from antifascism; therefore, an *anti-antifascist* democracy would be *amnesic* and *unfaithful* to its own history.[4]

The past, by definition, cannot come back, but history tends to repeat itself, and right-wing populism thrives when the memory of authoritarian regimes is not stigmatized. Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro defended the military dictatorship that governed the country from 1964 to 1985. In Serbia, President Aleksandar Vučić – a former disciple of the Greater Serbia ideology – has repeatedly celebrated and called for the protection of Ratko Mladić, a military leader convicted for committing crimes against humanity and genocide. It is not easy to establish to what extent Bolsonaro and Vučić gained consensus by expressing revisionist positions. However, there is no doubt that in countries where the stigma of the authoritarian past is strong enough, their words would have been unacceptable.

This study points to an element too often neglected when trying to make sense of populism. The most important lesson coming out of these pages is that *memory matters*. The process of memory-building is based on a conflict between different ideas of national identity and culture. History and memory studies consider this very delicate and conflictual process, while political scientists struggle to incorporate it. This is, however, of crucial importance to understand the formation and persistence of different political cultures and the social acceptability of certain ideologies. In fact, the way in which a country collectively remembers its past defines its new identity and national political culture by tracing *a red line between acceptable and taboo ideas of power*.

For this reason, compared to previous waves of populism that characterized Russia, Europe, and the Americas in the nineteenth century, when trying to make sense of contemporary populist discourses we should consider not only socio-economic turbulence and political disenchantment. The collective re-elaboration of the past, and the levels of stigma associated with the fascist past, are crucial elements as well. After World War II, *right-wing* populist discourses have become

socially unacceptable in certain countries but not in others. While Germany and Sweden have restricted illiberal political ideas to a *no-go area of the public debate*, other countries such as Italy, Austria, and France did not stigmatize the fascist past; therefore, right-wing populism maintained a certain *Salonfähigkeit*.

What a country decides to remember is definitely intentional: the solidification of history into collective memories follows a very clear strategy that aims at forming a certain image of the country. The conflictual process of memory-building takes place at the intersection of education, rituals of remembrance, and public debates. What emerges remains in the country's collective memory, while the rest is intentionally removed, cancelled, forgotten. Collective amnesia is the other side of the same coin: every official narrative of the past relies on both memory and forgetfulness. *There is nothing more political than our collective memory.*

Given its relevance, the formation of collective memories is often confrontational. Not only parliamentary debates, laws, disputes among historians, and official celebrations have a remarkable impact but also school manuals, movies, TV shows, and street names. The transmission of memory relies on civic education and, in equal measure, on the cluster of ideas conveyed by popular culture. *All of this matter* and can generate the collective antibodies to resist the fascist idea of power – or it can leave a country again vulnerable to the same, tragic mistakes that led to World War II.

This topic is more relevant than ever because the volatile, short-term, socio-economic conditions for the success of populism are all lined up, while the memory of the past is fading rapidly even in countries where traditionally certain ideas of power have been taboo. The Great Recession, or rather the usual cycle of financial capitalism that produces speculative bubbles, made inequalities grow while feeding citizens with insecurities based on feelings such as *relative deprivation* and loss of *social status*. The constant flow of migrants has been labelled as an 'invasion' or as a 'crisis', and many political entrepreneurs took advantage of the fears thus generated. After Brexit, the process of European integration seems to be less a political project and more an economic marriage that can be broken as soon as it is seen as disadvantageous, thus rewarding Eurosceptic actors.

The collective re-elaboration of the fascist past can provide a valuable tool to defuse dangerous political discourses when the memory of those events is based on a process of *Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit*. On the other hand, if a country prefers to cancel those memories through *selective amnesia or even self-victimization*, right-wing populism finds no obstacles and becomes socially acceptable. In other words, different political cultures shape the boundaries of the legitimate discursive space. For this reason, ideas previously associated with the fascist past now seem *acceptable* in certain countries but not in others.

By insisting on the erosion of democracy and the possible comeback of fascism, we risk to miss another crucial lesson that the results presented in these pages offer: the memory and therefore the stigma associated with the fascist past are effective in explaining the social acceptability of right-wing populism but not of *left-wing* populism. In Germany, for example, left-wing populism is highly

acceptable, while right-wing populism remained completely taboo until the 2017 elections (and is now present mainly in the East, which did not go through a process of culpabilization).

In Western Europe, left-wing populism will avoid social stigma and constitute a credible alternative as long as it will protect the rule of law and all the informal norms that keep democracy alive. In other words, left-wing populism must confront its Communist past and adopt a type of discourse that is inclusive, respectful of minority rights, checks and balances, and media freedom. In Latin America, left-wing populism used demagogy and often took on authoritarian features, but its goal was to include the lower classes into the social and political system. In the US and Spain, Bernie Sanders and Podemos symbolize two examples of how it is possible to propose a new model that combines a critical interpretation of the capitalist system and a project for its transformation without sacrificing the basic principles of liberal democracy.

An elitist contempt for the choices of the people leads to a stigmatization of populism, *every* type of populism, but this attitude inevitably reinforces populism itself, including its authoritarian and xenophobic declinations. Populism is a thin ideology, and what ultimately matters is to observe in combination with which type of full ideology it appears. Refusing to understand this, thus collapsing different phenomena, makes populism a useless or even dangerous concept. For these reasons, blaming populism for the decay of democracy would be utterly misleading.

Upholding crucial aspects of liberal democracy is a precondition for any credible left-wing populist movement, but it is not the only element to consider. In particular, remembering and celebrating the heroic efforts of the resistance movements that defeated fascism and Nazism should not become an empty ritual. The values that animated the resistance are not granted forever but have to be reaffirmed and protected. A narrative based on heroization, as we have seen, does not seem to be enough to produce sufficient levels of stigma of the fascist past. Left-wing populism must force the political elites to confront the fascist past in a critical way.

A collective memory of heroization has been attributed here to the United Kingdom, and it is supposed to be present in Eastern Europe as well (it would not be surprising to find out that also the United States rely on a similar narrative). It is important to investigate this type of memory because it seems to entail rather low levels of stigma of the fascist past. The United Kingdom displays high levels of social acceptability for both left- and right-wing populism, and this has become even clearer after the public debate about Brexit. In the absence of a clear stigmatization of the fascist past (sometimes due to an objective lack of responsibilities and guilt), *pre-existent elements of the national political culture might play a crucial role in determining the degree of stigmatization of populism.*

The most obvious application of the theory developed in this work is Eastern Europe. C*ommunist legacies*, combined with pre- and post-communist ones (including fascist legacies), seem to open up the cultural opportunity structures for the social acceptability of right-wing populist discourses, but at the same time,

they block the social acceptability of left-wing populist discourses. As already mentioned with regard to Eastern Germany, the collective memory developed in the East has elements of heroization because the *Soviet Union represented the opposition to fascism*, thus being able to avoid taking responsibility for the crimes of the regime it replaced. This could explain why, given the absence of a strong stigma of the fascist past, countries such as Hungary, Poland, and Czech Republic show alarming authoritarian and nativist tendencies in the context of an institutionalized form of populist democracy. Moreover, it might be the case that strong anti-communist memories made left-wing populist discourses socially *unacceptable*.

In Eastern Europe, the success of right-wing populist parties does not constitute a 'silent counter-revolution' like the populist radical right parties of the West but rather tap into a post-communist syndrome. These parties share clericalism and opposition to ethnic minorities, as well as secondary elements such as irredentism, anti-corruption, and Euroscepticism. When the Iron Curtain fell, all the conflicting social identities that communist rule had not destroyed but temporarily set aside exploded, and the pre-existing religious and ethnic cleavages re-emerged.

The link between the legacies of authoritarian regimes and populist discourses can be investigated also in relation to other countries and regions: fascism in Europe is only one example of the many authoritarian regimes that characterized the twentieth century. The *Communist* past and the collective memories of it, for example, can be analyzed not only in Europe but also in Asia. In Latin America, on the other hand, it is possible to study the presence of right- and left-wing populism in relationship to different authoritarian regimes such as *Chavismo* in Venezuela and *Peronismo* in Argentina, or the *Pinochet* regime in Chile, just to mention a few examples.[5]

Southern Europe offers interesting possibilities for studying the impact of collective memories on the social acceptability of populism. For example, it is necessary to include in future research cases such as Spain, Portugal, and Greece, which experienced extremely long-lasting authoritarian regimes. While for other West European countries the time for critical debates matured between the 1970s and the 1990s, now that more than 30 years have passed since the end of those regimes it will be possible to assign a type of mainstream narrative and potential secondary narratives to these three countries.

Another element for future research consists in determining the social acceptability of populist discourses by analyzing not only party manifestos but also *additional components of the public debate*. Political discourses circulate on a variety of platforms, such as TV shows, radio programmes, newspapers, websites, and social media. Indeed, political actors still communicate their ideas and programmes to voters through their party manifestos, but the role of other channels is increasingly important. Moreover, it would be possible to test whether different *media cultures* (and not only political cultures) are linked to different levels of populism's social acceptability.

In conclusion, democracy can be considered as a theoretical utopia and each achievement on the path towards a more inclusive, just, and representative form of power should be defended rather than taken for granted. Even in Western Europe, democratic quality can still spread and better incorporate minorities and women into politics, protect the rights of the LGBTQI community, guarantee better income equality, and strengthen the chains of accountability and responsiveness that link the people to their representatives.

The tension between populism and liberal democracy is a crucial element that might determine the types and shapes of future political systems. Citizens can have many good reasons to desire a collective *catharsis*, and relying on political entrepreneurs that offer redemptive politics can feel liberating. However, history teaches that a political carnival often turns into a grotesque, violent farce and that forging enemies through a poisonous language can be the antechamber of political violence. This is why the future of democracy depends on our memory of the past.

Notes

1 *Washington Post*, "This is how fascism comes to America", May 18, 2016, available online (consulted in October 2017): www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/this-is-how-fascism-comes-to-america/2016/05/17/c4e32c58-1c47-11e6-8c7b-6931e66333e7_story.html?utm_term=.7d82807b9279.

2 *Balkan Transitional Justice*, "Croatia's WWII Revisionism 'Terrifying', Says Historian", September 28, 2016, available online (consulted in April 2019): https://balkaninsight.com/2016/09/28/croatia-s-wwii-revisionism-terrifying-says-historian-09-26-2016/.

3 The Pegida movement (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West) re-popularised the term *Lügenpresse* in rallies across German cities since 2014.

4 *Jacobin*, "Fascism Old and New", April 2, 2019, available online (consulted in April 2019): https://jacobinmag.com/2019/02/enzo-traverso-post-fascism-ideology-conservatism.

5 In studying the legacies of different authoritarian pasts in other regions of the world, it might be necessary to expand or reformulate the typology of collective memory proposed in this study. Moreover, it is possible to imagine that the social acceptability of different ideas of power is linked not only to the legacies of authoritarian regimes but also to other critical junctures, such as colonialism, revolutions, civil wars, and regime changes.

Appendix 1

Populism in manifestos: overview

Table A1.1 Descriptive Data About Manifestos

	Number Manifestos	*Number Statements*	*Number Populist Statements*	*Percentage Populism*	*Average Populism by Manifesto*
1970s	27	1,304	84	6.44	4.87
1980s	30	3,061	112	3.65	4.27
1990s	39	2,718	139	5.11	4.82
2000s	35	3,297	148	0.85	4.48
2010s	42	3,684	229	6.21	6.51
Total	173	14,064	712	1.06	1.21

Table A1.2 Average Percentage of Populism in Manifestos

	Total Populism	*Right-Wing Populism*	*Left-Wing Populism*
1970s	4.30	2.09	6.52
1980s	4.28	3.08	5.47
1990s	5.10	4.55	5.65
2000s	3.80	3.98	3.63
2010s	6.62	5.68	7.57

Table A1.3 Average Populism in Manifestos (Weighted)

	Right-Wing Populism	*Left-Wing Populism*	*Total Populism*
1970s	72.69	517.73	295.21
1980s	172.38	439.09	305.74
1990s	263.76	318.94	291.35
2000s	268.47	123.10	195.78
2010s	281.17	307.73	294.45

Table A1.4 Average Populism per Country

	Right-Wing Populism	*Left-Wing Populism*	*Total Populism*
1970s	2.61	13.53	16.46
1980s	5.77	10.26	16.04
1990s	13.65	9.89	23.53
2000s	10.23	8.81	19.05
2010s	17.03	17.97	34.01

Table A1.5 Average Populism per Country (Weighted)

	Right-Wing Populism	*Left-Wing Populism*	*Total Populism*
1970s	99.95	630.40	730.34
1980s	323.21	823.70	1145.47
1990s	791.28	595.79	1387.07
2000s	690.34	316.55	1006.89
2010s	843.50	673.24	1516.74

Appendix 2

Populism in manifestos: statistical significance

Table A2.1 Statistical Significance Unweighted Populism

Dependent Variable: Percentage of Populist Statements in Manifestos				
	All Parties		*Mainstream Parties*	
	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
Intercept	8.35***	11.35***	9.41***	9.36***
	(2.33)	(2.32)	(2.09)	(2.09)
1970s	–0.08	–3.07	–0.65	–0.60
	(1.90)	(1.86)	(1.87)	(1.87)
1980s	–1.13	–4.12*	–1.03	–0.99
	(1.78)	(1.74)	(1.81)	(1.81)
1990s		–2.99		0.05
		(1.60)		(1.73)
2000s	0.79	–2.20	0.13	0.18
	(1.72)	(1.67)	(1.82)	(1.81)
2010s	2.99		–0.05	
	(1.60)		(1.73)	
Length (cent)	0.56	0.56	–0.18	–0.18
	(1.40)	(1.40)	(1.49)	(1.49)
AIC	1,168.50	1,168.50	746.16	746.16
BIC	1,215.89	1,215.89	787.72	787.72
Log Likelihood	–569.25	–569.25	–358.08	–358.08
Num. Obs.	174	174	118	118
Num. Groups: Parties	65	65	41	41
Var: Parties (Intercept)	1.83	1.83	0.80	0.80
Var: Residual	52.17	52.17	37.75	37.75

***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$. Results of two-level regression models with party manifestos nested in parties. All models contain country-dummies (not shown). The observations are 174 because the 5 Star Movement's manifesto is coded both as left- and right-wing.

Table A2.2 Statistical Significance Weighted Populism

Dependent Variable: Percentage of Populist Statements in Manifestos (Weighted)				
	All Parties		*Mainstream Parties*	
	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
Intercept	742.43***	753.96***	822.59***	741.12***
	(175.09)	(174.07)	(181.34)	(182.34)
1970s	–63.12	–74.65	–148.52	–67.05
	(139.67)	(136.70)	(133.17)	(134.69)
1980s	–5.77	–17.30	–37.35	44.12
	–63.12	–74.65	–148.52	–67.05
1990s		–11.53		81.47
		(117.99)		(123.83)
2000s	59.94	48.41	–92.72	–11.25
	(126.43)	(122.94)	(127.41)	(128.34)
2010s	11.53		–81.47	
	(117.99)		(123.83)	
Length (cent)	–25.19	–25.19	–110.49	–110.49
	(103.08)	(103.08)	(108.21)	(108.21)
AIC	2,553.89	2,553.89	1,650.13	1,650.13
BIC	2,601.28	2,601.28	1,691.69	1,691.69
Log Likelihood	–1,261.95	–1,261.95	–810.07	–810.07
Num. Obs.	174	174	118	118
Num. Groups: Parties	65	65	41	41
Var: Parties (Intercept)	14,444.77	14,444.77	4,3751.16	43,751.16
Var: Residual	28,1201.45	28,1201.45	18,2489.18	182,489.18

***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$. Results of two-level regression models with party manifestos nested in parties. All models contain country-dummies (not shown).

Appendix 3

Measurement of populism in manifestos: complete data

Table A3.1 Measurement of Populism in Manifestos

Country	*Decade*	*Party-Decade*	*Statements*	*Populist Statements*	*Vote Share*	*Ideology*	*Radicalism*	*Populism (%)*	*Populism (weighted)*
AT	1970	SPÖ_70	37	2	50.4	L	2.9	5.405405	790.0541
AT	1970	ÖVP_70	27	1	42.9	R	1.3	3.703704	206.5556
AT	1970	FPÖ_70	15	0	5.4	L	2.2	0	0
AT	1980	SPÖ_80	97	15	47.6	L	3.1	15.46392	2281.856
AT	1980	ÖVP_80	35	2	43.2	R	1.1	5.714286	271.5429
AT	1980	FPÖ_80	46	3	5	R	2.5	6.521739	81.52174
AT	1990	SPÖ_90	98	7	34.9	L	2.1	7.142857	523.5
AT	1990	ÖVP_90	110	10	27.7	R	3.5	9.090909	881.3636
AT	1990	FPÖ_90	104	11	22.5	R	5.8	10.57692	1380.288
AT	1990	Grüne_90	31	2	7.3	R	1.7	6.451613	80.06452
AT	1990	LIF_90	22	0	6	R	4.4	0	0
AT	2000	SPÖ_00	105	1	42.3	L	2.2	0.952381	88.62857
AT	2000	ÖVP_00	170	6	36.5	R	3	3.529412	386.4706
AT	2000	FPÖ_00	139	1	10	R	4.6	0.719424	33.09353
AT	2000	Grüne_00	52	2	9.5	L	3.2	3.846154	116.9231
AT	2010	SPÖ_10	60	2	26.8	L	2.1	3.333333	187.6
AT	2010	ÖVP_10	92	11	24	R	2.1	11.95652	602.6087
AT	2010	FPÖ_10	19	4	20.5	R	4.7	21.05263	2028.421
AT	2010	Grüne_10	241	17	12.42	L	3	7.053942	262.8299
AT	2010	NEOS_10	79	4	4.96	R	2	5.063291	50.22785

AT	2010	TS_10	144	20	5.73	R	3.6	13.88889	286.5
CH	1970	CVP_70	106	0	20.1	R	1.4	0	0
CH	1970	FDP_70	19	0	22.1	R	2.4	0	0
CH	1970	SVP_70	14	0	9.9	R	4.3	0	0
CH	1970	SP_70	18	1	24.7	L	3.9	5.555556	535.1667
CH	1970	LdU_70	16	1	6	L	1.5	6.25	56.25
CH	1980	CVP_80	25	0	20.2	R	1.2	0	0
CH	1980	FDP_80	30	0	6.9	R	5.6	0	0
CH	1980	SVP_80	42	0	11.1	R	1.3	0	0
CH	1980	SP_80	17	0	22.8	L	4.4	0	0
CH	1990	CVP_90	33	4	16.8	R	1.3	12.12121	264.7273
CH	1990	FDP_90	26	2	20.2	R	4.3	7.692308	668.1538
CH	1990	GPS_90	53	2	5	L	2.1	3.773585	39.62264
CH	1990	SVP_90	73	5	14.9	R	3.3	6.849315	336.7808
CH	1990	SP_90	43	5	21.8	L	3	11.62791	760.4651
CH	2000	CVP_00	23	0	14.3	R	4.9	0	0
CH	2000	FDP_00	47	6	17.3	R	2.6	12.76596	574.2128
CH	2000	GPS_00	32	1	7.4	L	2.9	3.125	67.0625
CH	2000	SVP_00	169	14	26.7	R	5.2	8.284024	1150.154
CH	2000	SP_00	121	4	23.3	L	4.8	3.305785	369.719
CH	2010	BDP_10	3	0	5.4	R	2.3	0	0
CH	2010	CVP_10	42	0	12.3	R	1.3	0	0
CH	2010	FDP_10	49	2	15.1	R	3.2	4.081633	197.2245
CH	2010	GPS_10	91	2	8.4	L	3.1	2.197802	57.23077
CH	2010	GLP_10	14	0	5.4	L	3.1	0	0
CH	2010	SVP_10	48	9	26.6	R	1.1	18.75	548.625
CH	2010	SP_10	31	3	18.7	L	6	9.677419	1085.806
DE	1970	CDU/CSU_70	31	0	35.2	R	1.5	0	0
DE	1970	FDP_70	2	0	8.4	R	3.7	0	0
DE	1970	SPD_70	56	1	45.8	L	2.4	1.785714	196.2857
DE	1980	CDU/CSU_80	36	3	38.1	R	4	8.333333	1270
DE	1980	FDP_80	45	2	6.9	R	1.4	4.444444	42.93333

(*Continued*)

Table A3.1 (Continued)

Country	*Decade*	*Party-Decade*	*Statements*	*Populist Statements*	*Vote Share*	*Ideology*	*Radicalism*	*Populism (%)*	*Populism (weighted)*
DE	1980	GrÙnen_80	25	2	5.6	L	3.4	8	152.32
DE	1980	SPD_80	65	19	38.2	L	1.7	29.23077	1898.246
DE	1990	CDU/CSU_90	42	1	34.2	R	3.7	2.380952	301.2857
DE	1990	FDP_90	191	7	6.9	R	1.2	3.664921	30.34555
DE	1990	GrÙnen_90	149	9	7.3	L	3	6.040268	132.2819
DE	1990	SPD_90	54	6	36.4	L	2.8	11.11111	1132.444
DE	2000	CDU/CSU_00	91	2	29.5	R	1.9	2.197802	123.1868
DE	2000	FDP_00	115	4	7.4	R	2.1	3.478261	54.05217
DE	2000	GrÙnen_00	129	2	8.6	L	2.6	1.550388	34.66667
DE	2000	SPD_00	112	4	38.5	L	2	3.571429	275
DE	2010	CDU/CSU_10	37	0	34.1	R	1.9	0	0
DE	2010	GrÙnen_10	54	16	8.4	L	2.4	29.62963	597.3333
DE	2010	Linke_10	120	25	8.6	L	4.8	20.83333	860
DE	2010	SPD_10	135	26	25.7	L	2.2	19.25926	1088.919
FR	1970	PS_70	228	35	43.2	L	4.1	15.35088	2718.947
FR	1970	UDR_70	95	12	15.1	R	2	12.63158	381.4737
FR	1980	PCF_80	69	4	15.3	L	4.2	5.797101	372.5217
FR	1980	PS_80	43	1	25.8	L	3.8	2.325581	228
FR	1980	RPR_80	74	9	18	R	2.1	12.16216	459.7297
FR	1990	LO_90	28	2	5.3	L	5	7.142857	189.2857
FR	1990	PCF_90	71	3	8.6	L	4.3	4.225352	156.2535
FR	1990	PS_90	72	10	23.3	L	2.3	13.88889	744.3056
FR	1990	RPR_90	130	8	20.9	R	1.3	6.153846	167.2
FR	1990	FN_90	17	1	15	R	6	5.882353	529.4118
FR	1990	UDF_90	23	1	18.6	R	1.3	4.347826	105.1304
FR	2000	LO_00	33	0	5.3	L	5	0	0
FR	2000	PS_00	76	6	16.2	L	2.1	7.894737	268.5789
FR	2000	EELV_00	60	1	5.2	L	3.2	1.666667	27.73333
FR	2000	UMP_00	35	1	19.9	R	3	2.857143	170.5714
FR	2000	FN_00	164	17	16.9	R	5.9	10.36585	1033.579

FR	2000	UDF_00	117	14	6.8	R	1.9	11.96581	154.5983
FR	2010	PS_10	94	2	28.6	L	3.2	2.12766	194.7234
FR	2010	FdG_10	149	11	5.25	L	2.6	7.38255	100.7718
FR	2010	Modem_10	78	3	9.1	R	1.1	3.846154	38.5
FR	2010	UMP_10	40	1	27.1	R	3.2	2.5	216.8
FR	2010	FN_10	116	2	17.9	R	5.9	1.724138	182.0862
ITA	1970	PCI_70	20	1	27.1	L	2.9	5	392.95
ITA	1970	PSI_70	5	2	9.6	L	5	40	1920
ITA	1980	PCI_80	515	9	29.9	L	1.7	1.747573	88.82913
ITA	1980	PRI_80	486	3	5.1	R	1	0.617284	3.148148
ITA	1980	PSI_80	274	3	11.4	L	1.7	1.094891	21.21898
ITA	1980	DC_80	102	4	32.9	L	1.3	3.921569	167.7255
ITA	1980	MSI_80	364	9	6.8	R	1.1	2.472527	18.49451
ITA	1990	LN_90	112	6	8.4	R	1.9	5.357143	85.5
ITA	1990	RC_90	85	1	6.1	L	3.4	1.176471	24.4
ITA	1990	FI_90	118	2	21	R	4.8	1.694915	170.8475
ITA	1990	AN_90	121	9	13.4	R	1.7	7.438017	169.438
ITA	1990	PDS_90	53	4	20.4	R	1.7	7.54717	261.7358
ITA	1990	PPI_90	26	2	11.1	R	5.7	7.692308	486.6923
ITA	2010	PD_10	45	3	25.4	L	2.4	6.666667	406.4
ITA	2010	PdL_10	68	4	21.6	R	2.7	5.882353	343.0588
ITA	2010	M5S_10	38	3	25.6	R	0.7	7.894737	141.4737
ITA	2010	M5S_10	38	3	25.6	L	0.7	7.894737	141.4737
ITA	2010	SC_10	38	5	8.3	R	1.4	13.15789	152.8947
NL	1970	VVD_70	98	0	14.4	R	3.1	0	0
NL	1970	PvdA_70	61	1	27.3	L	5.5	1.639344	246.1475
NL	1970	ARP_70	104	11	8.84	L	2.4	10.57692	224.4
NL	1970	KVP_70	40	0	17.65	L	2.4	0	0
NL	1980	VVD_80	63	0	23.1	R	3.1	0	0
NL	1980	PvdA_80	87	8	30.4	L	3.1	9.195402	866.5747
NL	1980	CDA_80	8	0	29.4	L	2.2	0	0
NL	1990	VVD_90	83	2	20	R	2.5	2.409639	120.4819
NL	1990	PvdA_90	7	0	24	R	1.4	0	0

(*Continued*)

Table A3.1 (Continued)

Country	*Decade*	*Party-Decade*	*Statements*	*Populist Statements*	*Vote Share*	*Ideology*	*Radicalism*	*Populism (%)*	*Populism (weighted)*
NL	1990	D66_90	128	5	15.5	L	1.8	3.90625	108.9844
NL	1990	CDA_90	9	0	22.2	L	1.3	0	0
NL	2000	VVD_00	84	1	15.4	R	3.4	1.190476	62.33333
NL	2000	PvdA_00	110	7	15.1	L	2	6.363636	192.1818
NL	2000	D66_00	137	7	5.1	L	1.4	5.109489	36.48175
NL	2000	SP_00	91	4	5.9	L	4.4	4.395604	114.1099
NL	2000	CDA_00	87	3	27.8	R	2.1	3.448276	201.3103
NL	2000	GL_00	156	11	6.9	L	3.5	7.051282	170.2885
NL	2000	LPF_00	25	1	17	R	4.4	4	299.2
NL	2010	VVD_10	162	4	26.6	R	3.9	2.469136	256.1481
NL	2010	PvdA_10	308	8	24.8	L	2.3	2.597403	148.1558
NL	2010	D66_10	222	2	8	R	1.6	0.900901	11.53153
NL	2010	PVV_10	116	6	10.1	R	5.3	5.172414	276.8793
NL	2010	SP_10	134	1	9.6	L	5	0.746269	35.8209
NL	2010	CDA_10	109	4	8.5	R	2.8	3.669725	87.33945
SE	1970	C_70	33	1	25.1	L	3.4	3.030303	258.6061
SE	1970	FP_70	32	0	9.4	L	2.2	0	0
SE	1970	M_70	5	0	14.3	R	3	0	0
SE	1970	S_70	5	0	43.6	L	1.8	0	0
SE	1970	V_70	12	0	5.3	L	5.3	0	0
SE	1980	C_80	53	0	15.5	L	2.4	0	0
SE	1980	FP_80	15	0	5.9	R	1.5	0	0
SE	1980	M_80	17	0	23.6	R	3.5	0	0
SE	1980	S_80	16	0	45.6	L	2.9	0	0
SE	1980	V_80	33	0	5.6	L	5	0	0
SE	1990	C_90	23	0	7.6	R	5.2	0	0
SE	1990	FP_90	38	0	7.2	R	4.9	0	0
SE	1990	MP_90	32	0	5	L	3.4	0	0
SE	1990	M_90	32	0	22.4	R	6	0	0

SE	1990	S_90	34	0	45.2	R	4.2	0	0
SE	1990	V_90	28	0	6.2	L	5.7	0	0
SE	2000	C_00	25	0	6.2	R	1.6	0	0
SE	2000	FP_00	37	0	13.4	R	2.3	0	0
SE	2000	KD_00	82	2	9.1	R	3.3	2.439024	73.2439
SE	2000	M_00	61	0	15.3	R	3.8	0	0
SE	2000	S_00	37	0	39.8	L	2.5	0	0
SE	2000	V_00	75	0	8.4	L	4.3	0	0
SE	2010	C_10	7	0	6.1	R	3.2	0	0
SE	2010	FP_10	11	0	5.4	R	3	0	0
SE	2010	MP_10	9	1	6.9	L	2.7	11.11111	207
SE	2010	S_10	58	0	12.9	L	2.2	0	0
SE	2010	V_10	76	0	5.7	L	4.3	0	0
SE	2010	SD_10	52	2	12.9	R	3.8	3.846154	188.5385
SE	2010	M_10	175	1	23.3	R	3.4	0.571429	45.26857
UK	1970	LIB_70	58	5	18.3	L	2.1	8.62069	331.2931
UK	1970	LAB_70	79	6	39.2	L	3.8	7.594937	1131.342
UK	1970	CON_70	88	4	35.8	R	1.3	4.545455	211.5455
UK	1980	LAB_80	169	9	27.6	L	4.9	5.325444	720.213
UK	1980	CON_80	83	1	42.4	R	3.9	1.204819	199.2289
UK	1980	SDP_80	127	6	25.3	R	2	4.724409	239.0551
UK	1990	LD_90	147	5	17.8	L	3.2	3.401361	193.7415
UK	1990	LAB_90	53	3	34.4	L	4	5.660377	778.8679
UK	1990	CON_90	219	4	41.9	R	3.8	1.826484	290.8128
UK	2000	LD_00	255	12	18.3	L	2.2	4.705882	189.4588
UK	2000	LAB_00	86	7	40.7	L	0.8	8.139535	265.0233
UK	2000	CON_00	159	7	31.7	R	3.7	4.402516	516.3711
UK	2010	LD_10	83	7	23	L	1	8.433735	193.9759
UK	2010	LAB_10	104	5	29	L	2	4.807692	278.8462
UK	2010	CON_10	133	13	36.1	R	3.1	9.774436	1093.857

Note: Six manifestos are missing. The missing cases are the following: in the 1970s Républicains Indépendant (France), PSDI, DC, MSI (Italy); for the 1980s UDF (France); for the 2000s MDC (France).

Appendix 4

Conditions: raw and fuzzy values

Table A4.1 Values for Conditions (Raw and Fuzzy)

Country	*Decade*	*Corruption*		*Economy*		*Convergence*		*Account-Resp.*	
		Raw	*Fuzzy*	*Raw*	*Fuzzy*	*Raw*	*Fuzzy*	*Raw*	*Fuzzy*
AT	1990s	67.03	0.51	8.25	0.26	0.55	0.20	61.80	0.64
AT	2000s	71.81	0.39	6.62	0.12	0.60	0.12	63.40	0.57
AT	2010s	71.71	0.39	11.16	0.64	0.39	0.67	63.50	0.56
CH	1990s	91.16	0.06	12.30	0.76	0.44	0.53	65.50	0.46
CH	2000s	72.69	0.36	8.33	0.27	0.67	0.05	68.40	0.27
CH	2010s	72.70	0.36	10.25	0.53	0.38	0.71	75.20	0.05
DE	1990s	86.73	0.09	8.35	0.27	0.63	0.08	56.50	0.81
DE	2000s	55.74	0.66	9.08	0.37	0.26	0.91	59.60	0.72
DE	2010s	73.56	0.34	10.30	0.54	0.47	0.44	63.50	0.56
FR	1990s	53.60	0.68	12.22	0.75	0.44	0.52	59.40	0.73
FR	2000s	36.11	0.84	9.30	0.40	0.39	0.67	59.30	0.73
FR	2010s	59.89	0.61	12.54	0.78	0.58	0.16	54.60	0.86
ITA	1990s	12.50	0.95	12.55	0.78	0.41	0.64	60.70	0.68
ITA	2010s	12.79	0.95	16.20	0.95	0.38	0.71	50.50	0.92
NL	1990s	90.66	0.06	8.46	0.29	0.22	0.95	65.10	0.49
NL	2000s	80.37	0.18	5.33	0.06	0.34	0.81	68.00	0.29
NL	2010s	79.61	0.19	10.26	0.53	0.46	0.46	68.00	0.29
SE	1990s	91.94	0.05	10.72	0.59	0.66	0.06	68.60	0.26
SE	2000s	88.76	0.07	5.23	0.06	0.40	0.67	70.40	0.17
SE	2010s	82.50	0.14	8.95	0.35	0.35	0.79	73.70	0.07
UK	1990s	77.30	0.24	13.41	0.84	0.61	0.11	48.60	0.94
UK	2000s	71.98	0.38	9.56	0.44	0.34	0.80	56.60	0.81
UK	2010s	59.13	0.61	14.56	0.90	0.36	0.75	57.60	0.78

Table A4.2 Values for Outcomes (Raw and Fuzzy)

Country	*Decade*	*Right-Wing Populism*		*Left-Wing Populism*		*Total Populism*	
		Raw	*Fuzzy*	*Raw*	*Fuzzy*	*Raw*	*Fuzzy*
AT	1990s	2,341.72	1	523.50	0.67	2,865.22	1.00
AT	2000s	419.56	0.5	205.55	0.17	625.12	0.33

Country	Decade	Right-Wing Populism		Left-Wing Populism		Total Populism	
		Raw	Fuzzy	Raw	Fuzzy	Raw	Fuzzy
AT	2010s	2,967.76	1	450.43	0.53	3,418.19	1.00
CH	1990s	1,269.66	1	800.09	0.95	2,069.75	0.97
CH	2000s	1,724.37	1	436.78	0.50	2,161.15	0.98
CH	2010s	745.85	0.93	1,143.04	1.00	1,888.89	0.95
DE	1990s	331.63	0.35	1,264.73	1.00	1,596.36	0.89
DE	2000s	177.24	0.15	309.67	0.30	486.91	0.23
DE	2010s	0.00	0.05	2546.25	1.00	2,546.25	0.99
FR	1990s	801.74	0.95	1,089.85	0.99	1,891.59	0.95
FR	2000s	1,358.75	1	296.31	0.28	1,655.06	0.91
FR	2010s	437.39	0.54	295.50	0.28	732.88	0.43
IT	1990s	1,174.21	1	6.57	0.05	1,180.78	0.73
IT	2010s	637.43	0.84	86.92	0.09	724.35	0.42
NL	1990s	120.48	0.11	108.98	0.1	229.47	0.11
NL	2000s	562.84	0.75	513.06	0.65	1,075.91	0.67
NL	2010s	631.90	0.84	183.98	0.15	815.88	0.5
SE	1990s	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.05
SE	2000s	73.24	0.08	0.00	0.05	73.24	0.06
SE	2010s	233.81	0.21	207.00	0.18	440.81	0.21
UK	1990s	290.81	0.29	972.61	0.99	1,263.42	0.77
UK	2000s	516.37	0.68	454.48	0.54	970.85	0.6
UK	2010s	1,093.86	0.99	472.82	0.58	1,566.68	0.89

Table A4.3 Calculation of Accountability and Responsiveness

Country	Decade	Responsiveness		Accountability		Total
		GOVCAP	REPRES	TR_PTPP	COMPET	
AT	1990s	71.1	58.2	58.1	59.7	61.8
AT	2000s	66.8	64.4	59.7	62.7	63.4
AT	2010s	66.5	70.5	50.7	66.3	63.5
CH	1990s	75.7	65.6	45.7	75.0	65.5
CH	2000s	76.4	68.7	55.9	72.4	68.4
CH	2010s	78.5	73.0	80.1	69.1	75.2
DE	1990s	66.0	53.3	44.7	62.1	56.5
DE	2000s	67.9	61.6	44.8	64.0	59.6
DE	2010s	65.7	60.9	62.1	65.2	63.5
FR	1990s	67.8	50.5	60.2	59.0	59.4
FR	2000s	62.0	57.2	60.2	57.8	59.3
FR	2010s	51.0	60.2	55.4	51.7	54.6
IT	1990s	64.7	50.4	55.1	72.6	60.7
IT	2010s	50.0	48.6	39.7	63.8	50.5
NL	1990s	77.2	50.5	64.2	68.4	65.1
NL	2000s	70.8	56.0	70.7	74.7	68.0
NL	2010s	64.8	59.2	69.4	78.5	68.0
SE	1990s	74.1	63.7	71.9	64.9	68.6

(*Continued*)

Table A4.3 (Continued)

Country	*Decade*	*Responsiveness*		*Accountability*		*Total*
		GOVCAP	*REPRES*	*TR_PTPP*	*COMPET*	
SE	2000s	69.6	70.1	75.2	66.8	70.4
SE	2010s	73.0	68.5	81.5	71.9	73.7
UK	1990s	45.7	76.4	34.3	37.9	48.6
UK	2000s	45.3	77.1	53.6	50.2	56.6
UK	2010s	51.8	74.8	56.8	47.0	57.6

Table A4.4 Calculation of Economic Performance

Country	*Decade*	*Unemployment*	*Gini*	*GDP*	*Total*
AT	1990s	3.3	28.11	6.6	8.25
AT	2000s	4.2	26.58	10.9	6.62
AT	2010s	4.9	29.31	0.7	11.16
CH	1990s	3.2	29.82	–3.9	12.30
CH	2000s	2.2	27.52	4.7	8.33
CH	2010s	3.4	30.09	2.7	10.25
DE	1990s	6.5	26.79	8.2	8.35
DE	2000s	8.5	27.00	8.2	9.08
DE	2010s	6.5	28.95	4.5	10.30
FR	1990s	11.1	28.54	3.0	12.22
FR	2000s	10.4	27.91	10.4	9.30
FR	2010s	8.7	28.13	–0.8	12.54
IT	1990s	9.0	31.91	3.2	12.55
IT	2010s	8.8	32.71	–7.1	16.20
NL	1990s	6.0	25.99	6.6	8.46
NL	2000s	4.0	24.03	12.1	5.33
NL	2010s	4.5	25.91	–0.4	10.26
SE	1990s	4.9	21.10	–6.2	10.72
SE	2000s	6.6	23.58	14.5	5.23
SE	2010s	8.1	25.17	6.4	8.95
UK	1990s	6.1	33.01	–1.1	13.41
UK	2000s	6.1	34.32	11.7	9.56
UK	2010s	6.6	33.85	–3.3	14.56

Appendix 5

Distribution cases in outcomes



Figure A5.1 Distribution Acceptability of Total Populism



Figure A5.2 Distribution Acceptability of Left-Wing Populism



Figure A5.3 Distribution Acceptability of Right-Wing Populism



Figure A5.4 Distribution Cases in Conditions

Appendix 6

All solutions without stigma

Table A6.1 Solutions Total Populism

Conservative Solution for Total Populism

```
M1: c*E + C*D + D*cnvg => POP

         inclS  PRI   covS  covU  cases
-----------------------------------------------------------
1 c*E    0.876  0.807 0.477 0.097 NL_12,SE_94; CH_95,CH_11;
                                  DE_13,UK_95; AT_13
2 C*D    0.896  0.830 0.492 0.107 AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12;
                                  FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
3 D*cnvg 0.872  0.801 0.491 0.047 AT_02,DE_94; DE_13,UK_95;
                                  AT_94; FR_12
-----------------------------------------------------------
  M1     0.821  0.751 0.730
```

Intermediate Solution for Total Populism

```
M1: E + C*D + D*cnvg => POP

         inclS  PRI   covS  covU  cases
-----------------------------------------------------------
1 E      0.850  0.787 0.651 0.125 NL_12,SE_94; CH_95,CH_11;
                                  DE_13,UK_95; AT_13; FR_12;
                                  FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
2 C*D    0.896  0.830 0.492 0.022 AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12;
                                  FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
3 D*cnvg 0.872  0.801 0.491 0.046 AT_02,DE_94; DE_13,UK_95;
                                  AT_94; FR_12
-----------------------------------------------------------
  M1     0.822  0.755 0.759
```

(*Continued*)

Table A6.1 (Continued)

Most Parsimonious Solution for Total Populism

M1: C + E + D*cnvg => POP

	inclS	PRI	covS	covU	cases
1 C	0.881	0.814	0.536	0.036	AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
2 E	0.850	0.787	0.651	0.095	NL_12,SE_94; CH_95, CH_11; DE_13,UK_95; AT_13; FR_12; FR_95, IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
3 D*cnvg	0.872	0.801	0.491	0.046	AT_02,DE_94; DE_13, UK_95; AT_94; FR_12
M1	0.814	0.748	0.772		

Table A6.2 Solutions Right-Wing Populism

Conservative Solution for Right-Wing Populism

M1: C*D*cnvg + c*E*CNVG + (C*D*E) => POP
M2: C*D*cnvg + c*E*CNVG + (D*E*CNVG) => POP

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	(M1)	(M2)	cases
1 C*D*cnvg	0.935	0.886	0.357	0.045	0.045	0.101	AT_94; FR_12
2 c*E*CNVG	0.845	0.775	0.346	0.064	0.119	0.064	CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
3 C*D*E	0.907	0.865	0.440	0.023	0.096		FR_12; FR_95, IT_94, IT_13, UK_10
4 D*E*CNVG	0.885	0.845	0.426	0.010		0.083	AT_13; FR_95, IT_94, IT_13, UK_10
M1	0.889	0.845	0.605				
M2	0.895	0.851	0.591				

Intermediate Solution for Right-Wing Populism

```
M1: E*CNVG + C*D*cnvg => POP

           incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u cases
-------------------------------------------------------------
1 E*CNVG   0.883 0.846 0.492 0.236 CH_95,CH_11; AT_13;
                                   FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
2 C*D*cnvg 0.935 0.886 0.357 0.101 AT_94; FR_12
-------------------------------------------------------------
  M1       0.895 0.851 0.593
```

Parsimonious Solution for Right-Wing Populism

```
M1: C*cnvg + E*CNVG => POP

         incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u cases
-------------------------------------------------------------
1 C*cnvg 0.940 0.896 0.386 0.108 AT_94; FR_12
2 E*CNVG 0.883 0.846 0.492 0.214 CH_95,CH_11; AT_13;
                                 FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
-------------------------------------------------------------
  M1     0.896 0.853 0.600
```

Table A6.3 Solutions Left-Wing Populism

Conservative Solution for Left-Wing Populism

```
M1: c*D + D*E + D*cnvg + c*E*CNVG => POP

           inclS PRI   covS  covU  cases
-------------------------------------------------------------
1 c*D      0.818 0.675 0.589 0.018 AT_02,DE_94; UK_03;
                                   DE_13,UK_95; AT_13
2 D*E      0.758 0.600 0.614 0.073 DE_13,UK_95; AT_13; FR_12;
                                   FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
3 D*cnvg   0.790 0.663 0.568 0.017 AT_02,DE_94; DE_13,
                                   UK_95; AT_94; FR_12
4 c*E*CNVG 0.860 0.710 0.430 0.056 CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
-------------------------------------------------------------
  M1       0.722 0.584 0.787
```

Intermediate Solution for Left-Wing Populism

```
M1: c*D + D*cnvg + E*CNVG => POP

         inclS PRI   covS  covU  cases
-------------------------------------------------------------
1 c*D    0.818 0.675 0.589 0.018 AT_02,DE_94; UK_03;
                                 DE_13,UK_95; AT_13
2 D*cnvg 0.790 0.663 0.568 0.024 AT_02,DE_94; DE_13,UK_95;
                                 AT_94; FR_12
3 E*CNVG 0.781 0.614 0.531 0.112 CH_95,CH_11; AT_13;
                                 FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
-------------------------------------------------------------
  M1     0.732 0.592 0.770
```

(*Continued*)

Table A6.3 (Continued)

Most Parsimonious Solution for Left-Wing Populism

M1: c*D + E*CNVG + (C*cnvg) => POP
M2: c*D + E*CNVG + (D*cnvg) => POP

		inclS	PRI	covS	covU	(M1)	(M2)	cases
1	c*D	0.818	0.675	0.589	0.018	0.134	0.018	AT_02,DE_94; UK_03; DE_13, UK_95; AT_13
2	E*CNVG	0.781	0.614	0.531	0.085	0.085	0.112	CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; FR_95, IT_94,IT_13, UK_10
3	C*cnvg	0.839	0.628	0.420	0.008	0.010		AT_94; FR_12
4	D*cnvg	0.790	0.663	0.568	0.022		0.024	AT_02,DE_94; DE_13,UK_95; AT_94; FR_12
	M1	0.743	0.597	0.756				
	M2	0.732	0.592	0.770				

Appendix 7

All solutions with stigma

Table A7.1 Solutions Total Populism

Conservative Solutions for Total Populism (With Stigma)

```
M01: c*d*S + C*D*CNVG + C*D*S + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*D*e*cnvg + c*D*e*s + c*E*CNVG*S) => POP
M02: c*d*S + C*D*CNVG + C*D*S + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*D*e*cnvg + c*D*e*s + D*E*CNVG*S) => POP
M03: c*d*S + C*D*CNVG + C*D*S + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*D*e*cnvg + c*E*CNVG*S + D*e*CNVG*s) => POP
M04: c*d*S + C*D*CNVG + C*D*S + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*D*e*cnvg + D*e*CNVG*s + D*E*CNVG*S) => POP
M05: c*d*S + C*D*CNVG + C*D*S + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*D*e*s + c*e*cnvg*S + c*E*CNVG*S) => POP
M06: c*d*S + C*D*CNVG + C*D*S + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*D*e*s + c*e*cnvg*S + D*E*CNVG*S) => POP
M07: c*d*S + C*D*CNVG + C*D*S + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*D*e*s + c*E*CNVG*S + D*e*cnvg*S) => POP
M08: c*d*S + C*D*CNVG + C*D*S + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*D*e*s + D*e*cnvg*S + D*E*CNVG*S) => POP
M09: c*d*S + C*D*CNVG + C*D*S + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*e*cnvg*S + c*E*CNVG*S + D*e*CNVG*s) => POP
M10: c*d*S + C*D*CNVG + C*D*S + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*e*cnvg*S + D*e*CNVG*s + D*E*CNVG*S) => POP
M11: c*d*S + C*D*CNVG + C*D*S + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*E*CNVG*S + D*e*cnvg*S + D*e*CNVG*s) => POP
M12: c*d*S + C*D*CNVG + C*D*S + c*D*cnvg*s + (D*e*cnvg*S + D*e*CNVG*s + D*E*CNVG*S) => POP
```

	inclS	PRI	covS	covU	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)	(M5)	(M6)	(M7)	(M8)	(M9)	(M10)	(M11)	(M12)
1 c*d*S	0.855	0.767	0.400	0.035	0.060	0.117	0.060	0.117	0.035	0.056	0.060	0.117	0.035	0.056	0.060	0.117
2 C*D*CNVG	0.932	0.886	0.397	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021
3 C*D*S	0.942	0.899	0.441	0.032	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.032	0.032	0.033	0.033	0.032	0.032
4 c*D*cnvg*s	0.946	0.909	0.362	0.043	0.043	0.043	0.043	0.043	0.043	0.043	0.043	0.043	0.086	0.086	0.086	0.086
5 c*D*e*cnvg	0.899	0.827	0.326	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000								
6 c*D*e*s	0.894	0.799	0.345	0.000	0.012	0.012			0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012				

(*Continued*)

Table A7.1 (Continued)

```
 7 c*e*cnvg*S 0.895 0.798 0.321 0.000                         0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 8 c*E*CNVG*S 0.961 0.927 0.315 0.003 0.012       0.012       0.012       0.012       0.012       0.012
 9 D*e*cnvg*S 0.899 0.799 0.293 0.008                                     0.008 0.008             0.008 0.008
10 D*e*CNVG*s 0.852 0.694 0.272 0.000             0.012 0.012             0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
11 D*E*CNVG*S 0.967 0.942 0.368 0.000       0.009       0.009       0.009       0.009       0.009       0.009
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   M1         0.854 0.796 0.775
   M2         0.854 0.795 0.772
   M3         0.854 0.796 0.775
   M4         0.854 0.795 0.772
   M5         0.852 0.793 0.775
   M6         0.851 0.792 0.772
   M7         0.856 0.799 0.783
   M8         0.855 0.798 0.780
   M9         0.852 0.793 0.775
   M10        0.851 0.792 0.772
   M11        0.856 0.799 0.783
   M12        0.855 0.798 0.780

              cases
-----------------------------------------------------
 1 c*d*S      CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11
 2 C*D*CNVG   DE_02; FR_02; UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
 3 C*D*S      AT_94; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
 4 c*D*cnvg*s DE_94; DE_13,UK_95
-----------------------------------------------------
 5 c*D*e*cnvg DE_94; AT_02
 6 c*D*e*s    DE_94; UK_03
 7 c*e*cnvg*S CH_03; AT_02
 8 c*E*CNVG*S CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
 9 D*e*cnvg*S AT_02; AT_94
10 D*e*CNVG*s UK_03; DE_02
11 D*E*CNVG*S AT_13; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
-----------------------------------------------------
```

Intermediate Solution for Total Populism (With Stigma)

```
M1: D + S => POP

     inclS PRI   covS  covU  cases
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 D  0.809 0.736 0.685 0.172 DE_94; UK_03; AT_02; DE_13,UK_95; AT_13; DE_02; AT_94; FR_02; UK_10; FR_12;
                             FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
2 S  0.826 0.755 0.690 0.177 CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; AT_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; AT_94; FR_02; FR_12;
                             FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  M1 0.802 0.740 0.862
```

Parsimonious Solution for Total Populism (With Stigma)

```
  M1: D + S => POP

     inclS PRI   covS  covU  cases
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 D  0.809 0.736 0.685 0.172 DE_94; AT_02; UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; AT_13; AT_94; DE_02; FR_02; FR_12; UK_10;
                             FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
2 S  0.826 0.755 0.690 0.177 CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; AT_02; AT_13; AT_94; FR_02; FR_12;
                             FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  M1 0.802 0.740 0.862
```

Table A7.2 Solutions Right-Wing Populism

Conservative Solutions for Right-Wing Populism (With Stigma)

```
M1: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*E*CNVG + (c*e*S*cnvg + c*E*S*CNVG) => POP
M2: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*E*CNVG + (c*e*S*cnvg + D*E*S*CNVG) => POP
M3: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*E*CNVG + (c*E*S*CNVG + D*e*S*cnvg) => POP
M4: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*E*CNVG + (D*e*S*cnvg + D*E*S*CNVG) => POP

                                -----------------------------
              incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u (M1)  (M2)  (M3)  (M4)  cases
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 c*d*S       0.898 0.853 0.438 0.060 0.060 0.082 0.086 0.146 CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11
2 C*D*S       0.975 0.961 0.477 0.074 0.076 0.076 0.074 0.074 AT_94; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
3 C*D*E*CNVG  0.912 0.874 0.361 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 c*e*S*cnvg  0.920 0.863 0.345 0.000 0.005 0.005 CH_03; AT_02
5 c*E*S*CNVG  0.951 0.925 0.326 0.003 0.012 0.012 CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
6 D*e*S*cnvg  0.927 0.874 0.315 0.009 0.014 0.014 AT_02; AT_94
7 D*E*S*CNVG  0.958 0.940 0.381 0.000 0.009 0.009 AT_13; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  M1          0.880 0.839 0.719
  M2          0.880 0.838 0.716
  M3          0.885 0.846 0.727
  M4          0.884 0.845 0.724
```

Intermediate Solution for Right-Wing Populism (With Stigma)

```
M1: S + C*D*E*CNVG => POP

              incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u cases
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 S           0.885 0.850 0.773 0.443 CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; AT_02; AT_13; AT_94;
                                      FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
2 C*D*E*CNVG  0.912 0.874 0.361 0.031 UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  M1          0.859 0.818 0.804
```

Parsimonious Solutions for Right-Wing Populism (With Stigma)

```
M1: S + (C*E) => POP
M2: S + (E*CNVG) => POP

                                 -----------------
             incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u (M1)  (M2)  cases
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 S          0.885 0.850 0.773 0.241 0.330 0.327 CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; AT_02;
                                                 AT_13; AT_94; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 C*E        0.910 0.871 0.474 0.000 0.031       UK_10; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
3 E*CNVG     0.883 0.846 0.492 0.015       0.046 CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  M1         0.856 0.815 0.804
  M2         0.846 0.803 0.819
```

Table A7.3 Solutions Left-Wing Populism

Conservative Solutions for Left-Wing Populism (With Stigma)

```
M1: C*D*CNVG + C*D*S + c*d*E*S + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*D*e*s + c*E*CNVG*S) => POP
M2: C*D*CNVG + C*D*S + c*d*E*S + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*D*e*s + D*E*CNVG*S) => POP
M3: C*D*CNVG + C*D*S + c*d*E*S + c*D*cnvg*s + (c*E*CNVG*S + D*e*CNVG*s) => POP
M4: C*D*CNVG + C*D*S + c*d*E*S + c*D*cnvg*s + (D*e*CNVG*s + D*E*CNVG*S) => POP

                               -----------------------------
             inclS PRI   covS  covU  (M1)  (M2)  (M3)  (M4)
-------------------------------------------------------------
1 C*D*CNVG   0.775 0.535 0.421 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023
2 C*D*S      0.735 0.485 0.440 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038
3 c*d*E*S    0.848 0.671 0.357 0.001 0.001 0.057 0.001 0.057
4 c*D*cnvg*s 0.897 0.812 0.439 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.110 0.110
-------------------------------------------------------------
```

(*Continued*)

Table A7.3 (Continued)

```
5 c*D*e*s    0.851 0.681 0.419 0.000 0.022 0.022
6 c*E*CNVG*S 0.873 0.727 0.365 0.000 0.008       0.008
7 D*e*CNVG*s 0.818 0.565 0.334 0.000             0.022 0.022
8 D*E*CNVG*S 0.811 0.617 0.394 0.000       0.008       0.008
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  M1         0.733 0.589 0.757
  M2         0.736 0.593 0.757
  M3         0.733 0.589 0.757
  M4         0.736 0.593 0.757

             cases
----------------------------------------------------
1 C*D*CNVG   DE_02; FR_02; UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
2 C*D*S      AT_94; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
3 c*d*E*S    NL_12; CH_95,CH_11
4 c*D*cnvg*s DE_94; DE_13,UK_95
----------------------------------------------------
5 c*D*e*s    DE_94; UK_03
6 c*E*CNVG*S CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
7 D*e*CNVG*s UK_03; DE_02
8 D*E*CNVG*S AT_13; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
----------------------------------------------------
```

Intermediate Solution for Left-Wing Populism (With Stigma)

```
M1: C*D + D*s + E*S => POP

      inclS PRI   covS  covU  cases
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 C*D 0.723 0.484 0.507 0.018 AT_94; DE_02; FR_02; FR_12; UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
2 D*s 0.803 0.643 0.536 0.138 DE_94; UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; DE_02; UK_10
3 E*S 0.725 0.548 0.536 0.102 NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  M1  0.704 0.559 0.777
```

Most Parsimonious Solution for Left-Wing Populism (With Stigma)

```
M1: C + D*s + E*S => POP

      inclS PRI   covS  covU  cases
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 C   0.706 0.478 0.547 0.026 AT_94; DE_02; FR_02; FR_12; UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
2 D*s 0.804 0.644 0.536 0.137 DE_94; UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; DE_02; UK_10
3 E*S 0.726 0.549 0.536 0.069 NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  M1  0.690 0.542 0.784
```

Appendix 8

Outcomes and stigma



Figure A8.1 Distribution of Cases in Stigma



Figure A8.2 Total Populism and Stigma



Figure A8.3 Right-Wing Populism and Stigma



Figure A8.4 Left-Wing Populism and Stigma

Appendix 9
Robustness test without convergence

Table A9.1 Robustness Test Without Convergence (Without Stigma)

```
Parsimonious Solution for Total Populism
M1: C + D*E => POP
        inclS PRI   covS  covU  cases
-------------------------------------------------------------
1 C     0.881 0.814 0.536 0.105 AT_94,DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,
                                FR_12,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
2 D*E   0.881 0.824 0.559 0.128 AT_13,DE_13,UK_95; FR_95,
                                FR_12,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
-------------------------------------------------------------
  M1    0.853 0.791 0.664

Parsimonious Solution for Right-Wing Populism

M1: C => POP
        incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u cases
-------------------------------------------------------------
1 C     0.895 0.851 0.569 -     AT_94,DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,
                                FR_12,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
-------------------------------------------------------------
  M1    0.895 0.851 0.569

Parsimonious Solution for Left-Wing Populism

M1: c*D*E => POP

        incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u cases
-------------------------------------------------------------
1 c*D*E 0.886 0.764 0.488 -     AT_13,DE_13,UK_95
-------------------------------------------------------------
  M1    0.886 0.764 0.488
```

Table A9.2 Robustness Test Without Convergence (with Stigma)

```
Parsimonious Solution for Total Populism

M1: C + D*s + E*S => POP_CAL5
        inclS PRI   covS  covU  cases
-------------------------------------------------------------
1 C     0.881 0.814 0.536 0.052 DE_02; AT_94,FR_02; UK_10;
                                FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13
2 D*s   0.861 0.779 0.451 0.118 DE_94,UK_03; DE_13,UK_95;
                                DE_02; UK_10
3 E*S   0.894 0.834 0.518 0.077 CH_95,CH_11,NL_12; AT_13;
                                FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13
-------------------------------------------------------------
  M1    0.854 0.796 0.762

Parsimonious Solution for Right-Wing Populism

M1: S + C*E => POP

        incl   PRI  cov.r cov.u cases
-------------------------------------------------------------
1 S     0.885 0.850 0.773 0.330 CH_03,NL_94,NL_02;
                                CH_95,CH_11,NL_12; AT_02;
                                AT_13; AT_94,FR_02;
                                FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13
2 C*E   0.910 0.871 0.474 0.031 UK_10;
                                FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13
-------------------------------------------------------------
  M1    0.856 0.815 0.804

Parsimonious Solution for Left-Wing Populism

M1: D*s + c*E*S => POP

        inclS PRI   covS  covU  cases
-------------------------------------------------------------
1 D*s   0.804 0.644 0.536 0.231 DE_94,UK_03; DE_13,UK_95;
                                DE_02; UK_10
2 c*E*S 0.843 0.684 0.432 0.127 CH_95,CH_11,NL_12; AT_13
-------------------------------------------------------------
  M1    0.796 0.658 0.663
```

Appendix 10

Alternative operationalization (A.O.)

Table A10.1 Variables Used for the Alternative Operationalization (A.O.)

Dimensions of Populism	*Aspects*	*Questions in the Codebook*
People-centrism	Closeness to the people	Does the speaker claim to belong/be close to/know/speak for/care for/agree with/perform everyday actions like/represent/embody the people?
	Stating a monolithic people	Does the speaker describe the people as homogeneous, sharing common feelings, desires, or opinions?
	Stressing the virtues of the people	Does the speaker describe the people in a positive way (moral, credible, competent, no lack of understanding, etc.)?
	Praising the people's achievements	Does the speaker stress positive actions and positive past and future impacts of the people (responsible for a positive development/situation, not being responsible for a mistake, etc.)?
	Claiming power for the people	Does the speaker argue that the people should have/gain/not lose power? Does the speaker give the people the competence to act or decide on a specific political issue? Does the speaker demand institutional reforms for more participation of the people in politics?
Anti-elitism	Exclusion of the elites from the people	Does the speaker describe the elites as not belonging to/not being close to/not knowing the needs of/not caring about/not speaking on behalf of/not empowering/deceiving the people?
	Blaming the elites	Does the speaker argue that the elites are a burden/threat? Does the speaker argue that the elites are accountable for negative developments/situations?
	Denouncing the elites	Does the speaker argue that the elites are responsible for wrong/stupid actions or immoral/criminal/ behaviour? Does the speaker argue that the elites are planning/scheming something?

Dimensions of Populism	Aspects	Questions in the Codebook
	Denying power to the elites	Does the speaker argue that the elites should have/lose/not have more power? Does the speaker deny to the elites the competence to act or decide on a specific political issue?

Note: three additional aspects have been included in the measurement compared to the other operationalization. Notably, the three variables: 'blaming the elites,' 'denouncing the elites,' and 'claiming less power to the elites.' Since this operationalization is based on the co-occurrence of the pillars, there were no reasons to exclude them from the measurement of populism.

Table A10.2 Measurement Populism in Manifestos (A.O.)

Country	*Decade*	*Party-Year*	*Total Statements*	*Populist Statements*	*Percentage*	*Weighted Populism*
AT	1970	SPÖ_1975	37	2	0	0
AT	1970	ÖVP_1975	27	1	0	0
AT	1970	FPÖ_1975	15	0	0	0
AT	1980	ÖVP_1983	35	4	11.42857	543.0857
AT	1980	SPÖ_1983	97	15	0	0
AT	1980	FPÖ_1983	46	3	0	0
AT	1990	FPÖ_1994	104	17	16.34615	2,133.173
AT	1990	GRÜNE_1994	31	4	12.90323	160.129
AT	1990	SPÖ_1994	98	7	0	0
AT	1990	ÖVP_1994	110	10	0	0
AT	1990	LIF_1994	22	1	0	0
AT	2000	SPÖ_2002	105	13	12.38095	1,152.171
AT	2000	GRÜNE_2002	52	4	7.692308	233.8462
AT	2000	FPÖ_2002	139	7	5.035971	231.6547
AT	2000	ÖVP_2002	170	6	0	0
AT	2010	TS_2013	144	39	27.08333	558.675
AT	2010	GRÜNE_2013	241	27	11.20332	417.4357
AT	2010	NEOS_2013	79	6	7.594937	75.34177
AT	2010	SPÖ_2013	60	2	0	0
AT	2010	ÖVP_2013	92	11	0	0
AT	2010	FPÖ_2013	19	4	0	0
CH	1970	LdU_1975	16	3	18.75	168.75
CH	1970	CVP_1975	106	0	0	0
CH	1970	FDP_1975	19	0	0	0
CH	1970	SVP_1975	14	0	0	0
CH	1970	SP_1975	18	1	0	0
CH	1980	CVP_1983	25	0	0	0
CH	1980	FDP_1983	30	0	0	0
CH	1980	SVP_1983	42	0	0	0
CH	1980	SP_1983	17	0	0	0
CH	1990	FDP_1995	26	3	11.53846	1,002.231
CH	1990	GPS_1995	53	4	7.54717	79.24528
CH	1990	CVP_1995	33	4	0	0
CH	1990	SVP_1995	73	5	0	0
CH	1990	SP_1995	43	5	0	0
CH	2000	SVP_2003	169	47	27.81065	3,861.231

(*Continued*)

Table A10.2 (Continued)

Country	*Decade*	*Party-Year*	*Total Statements*	*Populist Statements*	*Percentage*	*Weighted Populism*
CH	2000	FDP_2003	47	9	19.14894	861.3191
CH	2000	SP_2003	121	5	4.132231	462.1488
CH	2000	CVP_2003	23	0	0	0
CH	2000	GPS_2003	32	2	0	0
CH	2010	SVP_2011	48	15	31.25	914.375
CH	2010	SP_2011	31	5	16.12903	1,809.677
CH	2010	GPS_2011	91	5	5.494505	143.0769
CH	2010	BDP_2011	3	0	0	0
CH	2010	CVP_2011	42	2	0	0
CH	2010	FDP_2011	49	2	0	0
CH	2010	GLP_2011	14	0	0	0
DE	1970	CDU_1972	31	3	0	0
DE	1970	FDP_1972	2	0	0	0
DE	1970	SPD_1972	56	3	0	0
DE	1980	SPD_1983	65	20	30.76923	1,998.154
DE	1980	CDU_1983	36	3	0	0
DE	1980	FDP_1983	45	2	0	0
DE	1980	Grüne_1983	25	2	0	0
DE	1990	Grüne_1994	149	26	17.44966	382.1477
DE	1990	CDU_1994	42	1	0	0
DE	1990	FDP_1994	191	7	0	0
DE	1990	SPD_1994	54	6	0	0
DE	2000	SPD_2002	112	6	5.357143	412.5
DE	2000	FDP_2002	115	5	4.347826	67.56522
DE	2000	CDU_2002	91	3	3.296703	184.7802
DE	2000	Grüne_2002	129	2	0	0
DE	2010	Grüne_2013	54	22	40.74074	821.3333
DE	2010	Linke_2013	120	34	28.33333	1,169.6
DE	2010	SPD_2013	135	33	24.44444	1,382.089
DE	2010	CDU_2013	37	0	0	0
FR	1970	PS_1973	228	35	15.35088	2,718.948
FR	1970	UMP_1973	95	15	15.78947	476.8421
FR	1980	PCF_1981	69	13	18.84058	1,210.696
FR	1980	UMP_1981	74	11	14.86486	561.8919
FR	1980	PS_1981	43	1	0	0
FR	1990	PCF_1997	71	5	7.042254	261.6338
FR	1990	LO_1995	28	0	0	0
FR	1990	PS_1997	72	10	0	0
FR	1990	UMP_1993	130	8	0	0
FR	1990	FN_1997	17	0	0	0
FR	1990	UDF_1997	23	1	0	0
FR	2000	UDF_2002	117	17	14.52991	187.7265
FR	2000	FN_2002	164	22	13.41463	1,337.573
FR	2000	LO_2002	33	0	0	0
FR	2000	PS_2002	76	6	0	0
FR	2000	EELV_2002	60	1	0	0
FR	2000	UMP_2002	35	1	0	0
FR	2010	EELV_2012	149	20	13.42282	183.2215
FR	2010	MoDem_2012	78	8	10.25641	102.6667
FR	2010	FN_2012	116	3	2.586207	273.1293

Country	*Decade*	*Party-Year*	*Total Statements*	*Populist Statements*	*Percentage*	*Weighted Populism*
FR	2010	PS_2012	94	2	0	0
FR	2010	UMP_2012	40	1	0	0
ITA	1970	PCI_1972	20	3	15	1,178.85
ITA	1970	PSI_1972	5	2	0	0
ITA	1970	MSI-DN_1983	364	51	14.01099	104.8022
ITA	1980	PCI_1983	515	24	4.660194	236.8777
ITA	1980	PSI_1983	274	7	2.554745	49.51095
ITA	1980	PRI_1983	486	11	2.263374	11.54321
ITA	1980	DC_1983	102	4	0	0
ITA	1980	MSI-DN_1994	121	18	14.87603	340.6463
ITA	1990	MSI-DN_1994	53	7	13.20755	458.0377
ITA	1990	FI_1994	118	13	11.01695	1,110.508
ITA	1990	LN_1994	112	10	8.928571	142.5
ITA	1990	PRC_1994	85	3	3.529412	72.6
ITA	1990	PPI_1994	26	2	0	0
ITA	1990	M5S_2013	38	7	18.42105	330.1053
ITA	2010	M5S_2013	38	7	18.42105	330.1053
ITA	2010	PD_2013	45	5	11.11111	677.3333
ITA	2010	PDL_2013	68	5	7.352941	428.8235
ITA	2010	SC_2013	38	5	0	0
NL	1970	ARP_1971	104	15	14.42308	306
NL	1970	PvdA_1971	61	2	3.278689	492.2951
NL	1970	VVD_1971	98	0	0	0
NL	1970	KVP_1971	40	0	0	0
NL	1980	PvdA_1982	87	11	12.64368	1,191.54
NL	1980	VVD_1982	63	2	0	0
NL	1980	CDA_1982	8	0	0	0
NL	1990	VVD_1994	83	12	14.45783	722.8916
NL	1990	D66_1994	128	17	13.28125	370.5469
NL	1990	PvdA_1994	7	0	0	0
NL	1990	CDA_1994	9	0	0	0
NL	2000	GL_2002	156	44	28.20513	681.1538
NL	2000	LPF_2002	25	5	20	1,496
NL	2000	CDA_2002	87	9	10.34483	603.931
NL	2000	SP_2002	91	9	9.89011	256.7473
NL	2000	D66_2002	137	11	8.029197	57.32847
NL	2000	PvdA_2002	110	8	7.272727	219.6364
NL	2000	VVD_2002	84	3	3.571429	187
NL	2010	PVV_2012	116	20	17.24138	922.931
NL	2010	PvdA_2012	308	23	7.467532	425.9481
NL	2010	SP_2012	134	9	6.716418	322.3881
NL	2010	CDA_2012	109	5	4.587156	109.1743
NL	2010	VVD_2012	162	7	4.320988	448.2593
NL	2010	D66_2012	222	5	2.252252	28.82883
SE	1970	C_1973	33	1	0	0
SE	1970	FP_1973	32	0	0	0
SE	1970	M_1973	5	0	0	0
SE	1970	S_1973	5	0	0	0
SE	1970	V_1973	12	1	0	0
SE	1980	C_1982	53	0	0	0
SE	1980	FP_1982	15	0	0	0

(*Continued*)

Table A10.2 (Continued)

Country	*Decade*	*Party-Year*	*Total Statements*	*Populist Statements*	*Percentage*	*Weighted Populism*
SE	1980	M_1982	17	0	0	0
SE	1980	S_1982	16	0	0	0
SE	1980	V_1982	33	1	0	0
SE	1990	C_1994	23	0	0	0
SE	1990	FP_1994	38	0	0	0
SE	1990	MP_1994	32	2	0	0
SE	1990	M_1994	32	2	0	0
SE	1990	S_1994	34	0	0	0
SE	1990	V_1994	28	2	0	0
SE	2000	C_2002	25	0	0	0
SE	2000	FP_2002	37	0	0	0
SE	2000	KD_2002	82	2	0	0
SE	2000	M_2002	61	1	0	0
SE	2000	S_2002	37	0	0	0
SE	2000	V_2002	75	2	0	0
SE	2010	SD_2014	52	3	5.769231	282.8077
SE	2010	C_2014	7	0	0	0
SE	2010	FP_2014	11	0	0	0
SE	2010	MP_2014	9	1	0	0
SE	2010	S_2014	58	3	0	0
SE	2010	V_2014	76	5	0	0
SE	2010	M_2014	175	1	0	0
UK	1970	Liberal Democrats_ 1974	58	6	10.34483	397.5517
UK	1970	Con_1974	88	9	10.22727	475.9773
UK	1970	Labour_1974	79	7	8.860759	1,319.899
UK	1980	SDP/Alliance_ 1983	127	12	9.448819	478.1102
UK	1980	Labour_1983	169	15	8.87574	1,200.355
UK	1980	Con_1983	83	4	4.819277	796.9157
UK	1990	Labour_1992	53	4	7.54717	1,038.491
UK	1990	Liberal Democrats_ 1992	147	10	6.802721	387.483
UK	1990	Con_1992	219	7	3.196347	508.9224
UK	2000	Con_2001	159	23	14.46541	1,696.648
UK	2000	Liberal Democrats_ 2001	255	23	9.019608	363.1294
UK	2000	Labour_2001	86	7	0	0
UK	2010	Liberal Democrats_ 2010	83	12	14.45783	332.5301
UK	2010	Con_2010	133	19	14.28571	1,598.714
UK	2010	Labour_2010	104	5	0	0

Table A10.3 Populism by Country-Decade Raw and Weighted (A.O.)

Country	*Decade*	*Right-Wing Populism*		*Left-Wing Populism*		*Total Populism*	
		Raw	*Fuzzy*	*Raw*	*Fuzzy*	*Raw*	*Fuzzy*
AT	1990s	2293.30	1.0	0.00	0.1	2293.30	0.9
AT	2000s	231.65	0.2	1,386.02	1.0	1,617.67	0.8
AT	2010s	634.02	0.6	417.44	0.7	1,051.45	0.7
CH	1990s	1,002.23	0.8	79.25	0.1	1,081.48	0.7
CH	2000s	4,722.55	1.0	462.15	0.8	5184.70	1.0
CH	2010s	914.38	0.7	1,952.75	1.0	2867.13	1.0
DE	1990s	0.00	0.1	382.15	0.7	382.15	0.2
DE	2000s	252.35	0.2	412.50	0.7	664.85	0.5
DE	2010s	0.00	0.1	3,373.02	1.0	3,373.02	1.0
FR	1990s	0.00	0.1	261.63	0.5	261.63	0.1
FR	2000s	1,525.30	0.9	0.00	0.1	1,525.30	0.8
FR	2010s	375.80	0.3	183.22	0.3	559.02	0.4
IT	1990s	2,051.69	1.0	72.60	0.1	2,124.29	0.9
IT	2010s	758.93	0.7	NA	1.0	1,766.37	0.9
NL	1990s	722.89	0.6	1,007.44	0.7	1,093.44	0.7
NL	2000s	2,286.93	1.0	370.55	1.0	3,501.80	1.0
NL	2010s	1,509.19	0.9	1,214.87	0.9	2,257.53	0.9
SE	1990s	0.00	0.1	748.34	0.1	0.00	0.1
SE	2000s	0.00	0.1	0.00	0.1	0.00	0.1
SE	2010s	282.81	0.2	0.00	0.1	282.81	0.2
UK	1990s	508.92	0.5	0.00	1.0	1,934.90	0.9
UK	2000s	1,696.65	0.9	1,425.97	0.6	2,059.78	0.9
UK	2010s	1,598.71	0.9	363.13	0.6	1,931.24	0.9



Figure A10.1 Populism in Manifestos (A.O.)



Figure A10.2 Populism in Manifestos Weighted (A.O.)



Figure A10.3 Populism in Countries (A.O.)



Figure A10.4 Populism in Countries Weighted (A.O.)

Appendix 11

Solutions, robustness tests, and statistical significance (A.O.)

Table A11.1 Solutions Total Populism Without Stigma (A.O.)

Conservative Solutions for Total Populism

M1: C*D + c*E + D*CNVG + c*d*cnvg => POP

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1 C*D	0.881	0.824	0.463	0.026	AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13, UK_10
2 c*E	0.871	0.792	0.453	0.073	NL_12,SE_94; CH_95, CH_11; DE_13,UK_95; AT_13
3 D*CNVG	0.914	0.869	0.493	0.052	UK_03; AT_13; DE_02, FR_02; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13, UK_10
4 c*d*cnvg	0.820	0.720	0.337	0.027	CH_03; NL_12,SE_94
M1	0.831	0.775	0.727		

Intermediate Solution for Total Populism

M1: E + C*D + d*cnvg + D*CNVG => POP

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1 E	0.831	0.766	0.610	0.097	NL_12,SE_94; CH_95,CH_11; DE_13,UK_95; AT_13; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94, IT_13,UK_10
2 C*D	0.881	0.824	0.463	0.013	AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94, IT_13,UK_10
3 d*cnvg	0.833	0.747	0.369	0.033	CH_03; NL_12,SE_94
4 D*CNVG	0.914	0.869	0.493	0.043	UK_03; AT_13; DE_02, FR_02; FR_95,IT_94, IT_13,UK_10
M1	0.820	0.765	0.756		

Parsimonious Solution for Total Populism

```
M1: C + E + d*cnvg + D*CNVG => POP

           incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 C        0.886 0.838 0.516 0.029 AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12;
                                   FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
2 E        0.831 0.766 0.610 0.086 NL_12,SE_94; CH_95,
                                   CH_11; DE_13,UK_95;
                                   AT_13; FR_12; FR_95,
                                   IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
3 d*cnvg   0.833 0.747 0.369 0.027 CH_03; NL_12,SE_94
4 D*CNVG   0.914 0.869 0.493 0.043 UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,
                                   FR_02; FR_95,IT_94,
                                   IT_13,UK_10
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1       0.822 0.769 0.773
```

Source: Thresholds to determine the membership of the cases in the outcome (full non-membership, crossover point, and full membership): 0–665–2294. To determine the configurations of the truth table considered as sufficient for the outcome, the inclusion cut is .85. The same holds true for both analyses, without and with stigma.

Table A11.2 Solutions Right-Wing Populism Without Stigma (A.O)

Conservative Solution for Right-Wing Populism

```
M1: C*D + D*CNVG + c*E*CNVG => POP

           inclS PRI   covS  covU  cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 C*D      0.778 0.669 0.475 0.091 AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12;
                                   FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
2 D*CNVG   0.825 0.750 0.517 0.061 UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,FR_02;
                                   FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
3 c*E*CNVG 0.863 0.748 0.376 0.076 CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1       0.813 0.727 0.684
```

Intermediate Solution for Right-Wing Populism

```
M1: C*D + D*CNVG + E*CNVG => POP

           inclS PRI   covS  covU  cases
------------------------------------------------------------
1 C*D      0.778 0.669 0.475 0.091 AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12;
                                   FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
2 D*CNVG   0.825 0.750 0.517 0.051 UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,FR_02;
                                   FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
3 E*CNVG   0.870 0.794 0.515 0.078 CH_95,CH_11; AT_13;
                                   FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
------------------------------------------------------------
  M1       0.813 0.728 0.686
```

(*Continued*)

Table A11.2 (Continued)

Parsimonious Solution for Right-Wing Populism

```
M1: C + D*CNVG + E*CNVG => POP_CAL5

         inclS PRI   covS  covU  cases
-----------------------------------------------------------
1 C      0.797 0.699 0.539 0.126 AT_94; DE_02,FR_02; FR_12;
                                 FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
2 D*CNVG 0.825 0.750 0.517 0.051 UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,FR_02;
                                 FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
3 E*CNVG 0.870 0.794 0.515 0.050 CH_95,CH_11; AT_13;
                                 FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
-----------------------------------------------------------
  M1     0.819 0.742 0.721
```

Source: Thresholds to determine the membership of the cases in the outcome (full non-membership, crossover point, and full membership): 0–374–1697. To determine the configurations of the truth table that are considered as sufficient for the outcome, the inclusion cut is .78. The same holds true for both analyses, without and with stigma.

Table A11.3 Solutions Left-Wing Populism Without Stigma (A.O.)

Conservative Solution for Left-Wing Populism

```
M1: c*D + D*CNVG + c*E*CNVG => POP

           incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u cases
-----------------------------------------------------------
1 c*D      0.824 0.711 0.535 0.167 AT_02,DE_94; UK_03;
                                   DE_13,UK_95; AT_13
2 D*CNVG   0.746 0.608 0.485 0.116 UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,
                                   FR_02; FR_95,IT_94,
                                   IT_13,UK_10
3 c*E*CNVG 0.830 0.687 0.375 0.054 CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
-----------------------------------------------------------
  M1       0.740 0.636 0.706
```

Intermediate Solution for Left-Wing Populism

```
M1: c*D + D*CNVG + E*CNVG => POP

           incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u cases
-----------------------------------------------------------
1 c*D      0.824 0.711 0.535 0.167 AT_02,DE_94; UK_03;
                                   DE_13,UK_95; AT_13
2 D*CNVG   0.746 0.608 0.485 0.029 UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,
                                   FR_02; FR_95,IT_94,
                                   IT_13,UK_10
3 E*CNVG   0.757 0.616 0.465 0.056 CH_95,CH_11; AT_13;
                                   FR_95,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
-----------------------------------------------------------
  M1       0.741 0.637 0.708
```

Parsimonious Solutions for Left-Wing Populism

M1: c*D + E*CNVG + (C*CNVG) => POP
M2: c*D + E*CNVG + (D*CNVG) => POP

		incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	(M1)	(M2)	cases
1	c*D	0.824	0.711	0.535	0.167	0.205	0.167	AT_02,DE_94; UK_03; DE_13, UK_95; AT_13
2	E*CNVG	0.757	0.616	0.465	0.032	0.032	0.056	CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; FR_95, IT_94,IT_13, UK_10
3	C*CNVG	0.784	0.645	0.408	0.000	0.022		DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,IT_94, IT_13,UK_10
4	D*CNVG	0.746	0.608	0.485	0.007		0.029	UK_03; AT_13; DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,IT_94, IT_13,UK_10
	M1	0.749	0.646	0.701				
	M2	0.741	0.637	0.708				

Source: Thresholds to determine the membership of the cases in the outcome (full non-membership, crossover point, and full membership): 0–262–749. To determine the configurations of the truth table that are considered as sufficient for the outcome, the inclusion cut is .8. The same holds true for both analyses, without and with stigma.

Table A11.4 Solutions Total Populism with Stigma (A.O.)

Conservative Solutions for Total Populism

```
M1: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*E*cnvg*s + D*e*CNVG*s + (c*e*cnvg*S + c*E*CNVG*S) => POP
M2: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*E*cnvg*s + D*e*CNVG*s + (c*e*cnvg*S + D*E*CNVG*S) => POP
M3: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*E*cnvg*s + D*e*CNVG*s + (c*E*CNVG*S + D*e*cnvg*S) => POP
M4: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*CNVG + c*E*cnvg*s + D*e*CNVG*s + (D*e*cnvg*S + D*E*CNVG*S) => POP

                                 -----------------------------
              incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u (M1)  (M2)  (M3)  (M4)  cases
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 C*D*CNVG    0.912 0.860 0.372 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 DE_02; FR_02; UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
2 c*d*S       0.932 0.895 0.417 0.062 0.062 0.081 0.086 0.122 CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11
3 C*D*S       0.886 0.832 0.397 0.027 0.029 0.029 0.027 0.027 AT_94; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
4 c*E*cnvg*s  0.868 0.766 0.297 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043 SE_94; DE_13,UK_95
5 D*e*CNVG*s  0.933 0.847 0.285 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 UK_03; DE_02
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6 c*e*cnvg*S  0.916 0.856 0.315 0.003 0.012 0.012             CH_03; AT_02
7 c*E*CNVG*S  0.952 0.903 0.299 0.003 0.011       0.011       CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
8 D*e*cnvg*S  0.922 0.860 0.287 0.008             0.017 0.017 AT_02; AT_94
9 D*E*CNVG*S  0.930 0.877 0.339 0.000       0.008       0.008 AT_13; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  M1          0.871 0.828 0.747
  M2          0.871 0.827 0.744
  M3          0.872 0.829 0.752
  M4          0.871 0.828 0.749
```

Intermediate Solution for Total Populism

```
M1: E + S + D*CNVG => POP

              incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u cases
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 E           0.831 0.766 0.610 0.058 SE_94; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; DE_13,UK_95; AT_13; UK_10; FR_12;
                                      FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
2 S           0.880 0.844 0.703 0.183 CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; AT_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; AT_94;
                                      FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
3 D*CNVG      0.914 0.869 0.493 0.032 UK_03; AT_13; DE_02; FR_02; UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  M1          0.849 0.808 0.870
```

Parsimonious Solution for Total Populism

```
M1: E + S + D*CNVG => POP

              incl  PRI   cov.r cov.u cases
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 E           0.831 0.766 0.610 0.058 SE_94; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; DE_13,UK_95; AT_13; FR_12; UK_10;
                                      FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
2 S           0.880 0.844 0.703 0.183 CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; AT_02; AT_13; AT_94;
                                      FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
3 D*CNVG      0.914 0.869 0.493 0.032 UK_03; AT_13; DE_02; FR_02; UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  M1          0.849 0.808 0.870
```

Table A11.5 Solutions Right-Wing Populism with Stigma (A.O.)

Conservative Solutions for Right-Wing Populism

M1: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*E*CNVG + c*D*e*s*CNVG + (c*e*S*cnvg + c*E*S*CNVG) => POP
M2: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*E*CNVG + c*D*e*s*CNVG + (c*e*S*cnvg + D*E*S*CNVG) => POP
M3: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*E*CNVG + c*D*e*s*CNVG + (c*E*S*CNVG + D*e*S*cnvg) => POP
M4: c*d*S + C*D*S + C*D*E*CNVG + c*D*e*s*CNVG + (D*e*S*cnvg + D*E*S*CNVG) => POP

	inclS	PRI	covS	covU	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)	cases
1 c*d*S	0.884	0.821	0.459	0.071	0.071	0.094	0.099	0.163	CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11
2 C*D*S	0.831	0.735	0.432	0.054	0.056	0.056	0.054	0.054	AT_94; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
3 C*D*E*CNVG	0.841	0.747	0.354	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
4 c*D*e*s*CNVG	0.825	0.652	0.270	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.014	UK_03
5 c*e*S*cnvg	0.819	0.682	0.327	0.000	0.000	0.000			CH_03; AT_02
6 c*E*S*CNVG	0.925	0.854	0.337	0.004	0.013		0.013		CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
7 D*e*S*cnvg	0.816	0.687	0.295	0.009			0.009	0.009	AT_02; AT_94
8 D*E*S*CNVG	0.898	0.828	0.380	0.000		0.010		0.010	AT_13; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
M1	0.822	0.751	0.732						
M2	0.821	0.749	0.728						
M3	0.827	0.758	0.741						
M4	0.826	0.757	0.737						

Intermediate Solution for Right-Wing Populism

M1: S + c*D*CNVG + D*E*CNVG => POP

	inclS	PRI	covS	covU
1 S	0.823	0.760	0.764	0.352
2 c*D*CNVG	0.839	0.728	0.346	0.014
3 D*E*CNVG	0.853	0.769	0.437	0.027
M1	0.810	0.746	0.835	

```
                   cases
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 S                CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; AT_02; AT_13; AT_94; FR_02; FR_12;
                   FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
2 c*D*CNVG         UK_03; AT_13
3 D*E*CNVG         AT_13; UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Parsimonious Solutions for Right-Wing Populism

```
M1: S + c*D*CNVG + (C*E) => POP
M2: S + c*D*CNVG + (E*CNVG) => POP

                                            -----------------
                   inclS PRI   covS  covU  (M1)  (M2)
---------------------------------------------------
1 S                0.823 0.760 0.764 0.217 0.257 0.283
2 c*D*CNVG         0.839 0.728 0.346 0.014 0.018 0.014
---------------------------------------------------
3 C*E              0.812 0.696 0.450 0.000 0.017
4 E*CNVG           0.870 0.794 0.515 0.020       0.037
---------------------------------------------------
  M1               0.805 0.739 0.825
  M2               0.810 0.745 0.844

                   cases
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 S                CH_03; NL_94,NL_02; NL_12; CH_95,CH_11; AT_02; AT_13; AT_94; FR_02; FR_12; FR_95,
                   IT_94,IT_13
2 c*D*CNVG         UK_03; AT_13
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 C*E              UK_10; FR_12; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
4 E*CNVG           CH_95,CH_11; AT_13; UK_10; FR_95,IT_94,IT_13
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Table A11.6 Solutions Left-Wing Populism with Stigma (A.O.)

Conservative Solutions for Left-Wing Populism

M1: c*d*CNVG*S + c*D*cnvg*s + C*D*CNVG*s + c*E*CNVG*S + (c*D*e*s) => POP
M2: c*d*CNVG*S + c*D*cnvg*s + C*D*CNVG*s + c*E*CNVG*S + (D*e*CNVG*s) => POP

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	(M1)	(M2)	cases
1 c*d*CNVG*S	0.822	0.707	0.350	0.056	0.056	0.056	NL_94,NL_02; CH_95,CH_11
2 c*D*cnvg*s	0.820	0.703	0.362	0.049	0.049	0.128	DE_94; DE_13, UK_95
3 C*D*CNVG*s	0.918	0.822	0.307	0.029	0.055	0.029	DE_02; UK_10
4 c*E*CNVG*S	0.828	0.668	0.313	0.017	0.017	0.017	CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
5 c*D*e*s	0.846	0.709	0.377	0.000	0.014		DE_94; UK_03
6 D*e*CNVG*s	0.878	0.761	0.323	0.000		0.014	UK_03; DE_02
M1	0.849	0.773	0.636				
M2	0.849	0.773	0.636				

Intermediate Solution for Left-Wing Populism

M1: D*s + c*CNVG*S => POP

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1 D*s	0.843	0.742	0.508	0.260	DE_94; UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; DE_02; UK_10
2 c*CNVG*S	0.834	0.729	0.399	0.151	NL_94,NL_02; CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
M1	0.838	0.763	0.660		

Parsimonious Solution for Left-Wing Populism

M1: D*s + c*CNVG*S => POP

	incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1 D*s	0.843	0.742	0.508	0.260	DE_94; UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; DE_02; UK_10
2 c*CNVG*S	0.834	0.729	0.399	0.151	NL_94,NL_02; CH_95,CH_11; AT_13
M1	0.838	0.763	0.660		

Table A11.7 Robustness Test Without "Convergence" (A.O.) Without Stigma

Parsimonious Solutions for Total Populism

M1: D + E => POP

	inclS	PRI	covS	covU
1 D	0.821	0.758	0.665	0.140
2 E	0.831	0.766	0.610	0.085
M1	0.800	0.740	0.750	

	cases
1 D	AT_02,DE_94,UK_03; AT_13,DE_13,UK_95; AT_94,DE_02,FR_02; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
2 E	CH_95,CH_11,NL_12,SE_94; AT_13,DE_13,UK_95; FR_95, FR_12,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10

Parsimonious Solutions for Right-Wing Populism

M1: C + d*E => POP

	inclS	PRI	covS	covU	cases
1 C	0.797	0.699	0.539	0.263	AT_94,DE_02,FR_02; FR_95, FR_12,IT_94,IT_13,UK_10
2 d*E	0.797	0.658	0.384	0.108	CH_95,CH_11,NL_12,SE_94
M1	0.770	0.666	0.647		

Parsimonious Solutions for Left-Wing Populism

M1: c*D + (C*s + c*e*S) => POP
M2: c*D + (C*s + d*e*S) => POP
M3: c*D + (D*s + c*e*S) => POP
M4: c*D + (D*s + d*e*S) => POP

	inclS	PRI	covS	covU	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)	cases
1 c*D	0.824	0.711	0.535	0.031	0.146	0.159	0.031	0.043	DE_94,UK_03; AT_02; DE_13, UK_95; AT_13
2 C*s	0.898	0.800	0.358	0.000	0.048	0.045			DE_02; UK_10
3 D*s	0.843	0.742	0.508	0.007			0.055	0.051	DE_94,UK_03; DE_13,UK_95; DE_02; UK_10
4 c*e*S	0.830	0.738	0.439	0.015	0.111		0.122		CH_03,NL_94, NL_02; AT_02
5 d*e*S	0.809	0.705	0.402	0.007		0.103		0.114	CH_03,NL_94, NL_02
M1	0.841	0.770	0.706						
M2	0.828	0.752	0.698						
M3	0.831	0.758	0.713						
M4	0.819	0.741	0.705						

Table A11.8 Robustness Test Without "Convergence" (A.O.) with Stigma

Parsimonious Solutions for Total Populism

```
M1: C + S + D*E => POP

      inclS PRI   covS  covU
------------------------------
1 C   0.886 0.838 0.516 0.012
2 S   0.880 0.844 0.703 0.194
3 D*E 0.865 0.799 0.525 0.070
------------------------------
 M1   0.877 0.841 0.843

      cases
-------------------------------------------------------------
1 C   DE_02; AT_94,FR_02; UK_10; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13
2 S   CH_03,NL_94,NL_02; CH_95,CH_11,NL_12; AT_02; AT_13;
      AT_94,FR_02; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13
3 D*E DE_13,UK_95; AT_13; UK_10; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13
-------------------------------------------------------------
```

Parsimonious Solutions for Right-Wing Populism

```
M1: C + S => POP

      inclS PRI   covS  covU
------------------------------
1 C   0.797 0.699 0.539 0.049
2 S   0.823 0.760 0.764 0.275
------------------------------
 M1   0.793 0.723 0.814

      cases
-------------------------------------------------------------
1 C   DE_02; AT_94,FR_02; UK_10; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13
2 S   CH_03,NL_94,NL_02; CH_95,CH_11,NL_12; AT_02; AT_13;
      AT_94,FR_02; FR_95,FR_12,IT_94,IT_13
-------------------------------------------------------------
```

Parsimonious Solutions for Left-Wing Populism

```
M1: c*D => POP

      inclS PRI   covS  covU cases
-------------------------------------------------------------
1 c*D 0.824 0.711 0.535 -     AT_02,DE_94,UK_03;
                              AT_13,DE_13,UK_95
-------------------------------------------------------------
  M1 0.824 0.711 0.535
```

Table A11.9 Statistical Significance Unweighted Populism (A.O.)

Dependent Variable: Percentage of Populist Statements in Manifestos				
	All Parties		*Mainstream Parties*	
	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
Intercept	6.28*	9.84***	6.84***	8.26***
	(2.57)	(2.56)	(2.07)	(2.08)
1970s	0.15	–3.41	0.13	–1.29
	(1.91)	(1.87)	(1.75)	(1.76)
1980s	0.46	–3.10	1.52	0.10
	(1.78)	(1.76)	(1.70)	(1.70)
1990s		–3.56*		–1.42
		(1.62)		(1.62)
2000s	2.08	–1.48	2.15	0.74
	(1.72)	(1.68)	(1.69)	(1.69)
2010s	3.56*		1.42	
	(1.62)		(1.62)	
Length (cent)	2.35	2.35	1.04	1.04
	(1.42)	(1.42)	(1.40)	(1.40)
AIC	1,175.98	1,175.98	734.37	734.37
BIC	1,223.36	1,223.36	775.93	775.93
Log Likelihood	–572.99	–572.99	–352.19	–352.19
Num. Obs.	174	174	118	118
Num. Groups: Parties	65	65	41	41
Var: Parties (Intercept)	6.01	6.01	2.53	2.53
Var: Residual	51.59	51.59	32.44	32.44

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Results of two-level regression models with party manifestos nested in parties. All models contain country-dummies (not shown). The observations are 174 because the 5 Star Movement's manifesto is coded both as left- and right-wing.

Table A11.10 Statistical Significance Weighted Populism (A.O.)

Dependent Variable: Percentage of Populist Statements in Manifestos (weighted)				
	All Parties		*Mainstream Parties*	
	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
Intercept	627.56***	709.90***	684.51***	754.66***
	(155.77)	(154.49)	(147.45)	(147.92)
1970s	–48.84	–131.17	–89.52	–159.66
	(131.76)	(128.56)	(122.85)	(123.39)
1980s	42.76	–39.57	56.13	–14.01
	(123.50)	(120.78)	(119.11)	(119.17)
1990s		–82.33		–70.14
		(111.17)		(113.83)
2000s	169.58	87.25	80.53	10.39

(*Continued*)

Table A11.10 (Continued)

Dependent Variable: Percentage of Populist Statements in Manifestos (weighted)				
	All Parties		*Mainstream Parties*	
	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
	(119.66)	(116.13)	(118.57)	(118.70)
2010s	82.33		70.14	
	(111.17)		(113.83)	
Length (cent)	91.46	91.46	–41.70	–41.70
	(96.57)	(96.57)	(98.63)	(98.63)
AIC	2,531.65	2,531.65	1,627.78	1,627.78
BIC	2,579.04	2,579.04	1,669.34	1,669.34
Log Likelihood	–1,250.83	–1,250.83	–798.89	–798.89
Num. Obs.	174	174	118	118
Num. Groups: Parties	65	65	41	41
Var: Parties (Intercept)	1,851.03	1,851.02	14,320.56	14,320.56
Var: Residual	253,744.57	253,744.58	159,640.72	159,640.72

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Results of two-level regression models with party manifestos nested in parties. All models contain country-dummies (not shown).

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