Kemal H. Karpat

THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE OTTOMAN STATE, 1789-1908

I. INTRODUCTION

THE study of the Ottoman state in the latter part of the eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth demands a broader analytical framework than hitherto used if its transformation and the social and political history of the Middle East, the Balkans, and even North Africa, which were parts of the Ottoman State at one time or other, are to be properly evaluated and interpreted.

Most of the studies on the modernization of the Middle East deal with the nature and intensity of outside stimuli, that is to say, the European impact, and much less with the forces within the Middle Eastern society which conditioned the response to these stimuli. In addition, the history of the Middle East and the Balkans in the nineteenth century has been viewed and interpreted from rather dogmatic national viewpoints. Consequently, the changes in the social and political structures of the Ottoman empire, and the profound impact of these changes on the nature of the emerging national states in the area, have often been ignored or interpreted in line with the writers' ideological and national biases. Such interpretations have resulted not only from a certain unwillingness to shed one's cultural and religious outlook on history but also from insufficient knowledge of the social history of the Ottoman state. From the very start it is necessary to recognize the essential fact that the Balkan and Middle Eastern societies, and their socio-cultural-economic structure in the Ottoman era, were subject to transformation through the impact of internal forces long before massive European influence accelerated this transformation. Already by the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries – that is, almost during the height of its power – the Ottoman empire faced serious social dislocation as indicated by Hasan Kafi Bosnevi (Akhisari) (1544–1616) in his *Uṣûl al-ḥikem fî niẓâm al-alem*, and later, in 1630, by Koçi Bey in his *Risâle*.

The process of transformation in cultural systems different from that of the West must be viewed as operating at several levels in accordance with internal and external stimuli. In the Ottoman empire the process of change operated in the social-economic sphere within the context of the four social estates. Originally change revolved around the well-defined functions of these estates and was predictable since the forces of transformation remained constant. But beginning in the sixteenth century, after the addition of new forces of change, the third

and fourth estates of the merchants and craftsmen, and food producers (peasants and husbandsmen) broke out of the traditional social arrangement and of the predictable cycle of transformation. Eventually, this structural change under-mined the socio-economic foundations of the first and second estates; that is, the men of the sword and of the pen,[1] and reshaped their ancient political-cultural functions. It was in this social environment that a new group of communal leaders arose. Their history, hardly studied at all, epitomizes the transformation of the Ottoman empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. We have referred and still refer to this group as the *ayan*s in order to describe the Muslim sections of the middle class. We use this term in a rather symbolic fashion since the meaning, functions and power of the *ayan*s changed continuously in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[2] The often-used term 'notables' or *eşraf* with respect to this class refers actually to the groups which emerged late in the eighteenth century as a consequence of the transformation in the socio-economic order.[3] Usually the title *ayan* was conferred by government while *eşraf* were recognized as such by individual communities as a consequence of social strati-fication. The relations of the *ayan*s with the bureaucratic order and their con-flicting group ideologies formed, we believe, the central dynamics of the internal transformation which occurred in Ottoman society in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Both groups were in turn subjected to external influences in varying degrees of intensity, and at different levels of activity, and responded independently and often in conflict with each other to the multifaced stimuli from outside. Faced with this situation, the Ottoman political system, based on a series of balances, began to disintegrate while creating at the same time the need for a new system. Indeed, the system's inability to answer the challenge, coupled with the evolution of the social structure into political states along cultural-religious lines, stood as major causes accounting for the disintegration of the Ottoman state, but not before it made valiant efforts to cope with the situation. The government's ultimate answer to this situation began as an attempt at integration through centralization under Selim III, and eventually culminated in the establishment of a Turkish national state.

It is clear from the above that our treatment of the transformation in the

[1] For this ancient social arrangement see E. I. J. Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam* (Cambridge, 1962). Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, *The Nasirean Ethics*, tr. G. M. Wickens (London, 1964).

[2] For a more extensive treatment of the *ayan* and for bibliography see Kemal H. Karpat, 'The Land Regime, Social Structure, and Modernization in the Ottoman Empire', *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East*, William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (eds.), (Chicago, 1968), pp. 69–90. See also article 'Ayan' in *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (new edition) and Herbert L. Bodman, Jr., *Political Factions in Aleppo 1760–1826* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1963). I. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Meşhur Rumeli Ayanlarından Tirsinikli Ismail, Yıllıkoğlu Süleyman Ağalar ve Alemdar Mustafa Paşa* (İstanbul, 1942) and Avdo Suceska, *Ajani* (Sarajevo, 1965).

[3] For a view of *eşraf*s in Syria see Albert Hourani 'Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables', *op. cit.*, *Beginnings of Modernization...*, pp. 41–68.

Ottoman state is based on a historical-functional view of structural change. Consequently, we shall study, first, the different patterns of stratification among the Christian and Muslim inhabitants of the Empire, and especially among their respective leadership groups. Secondly, we shall view this stratification as conditioned in good measure by a new set of economic forces stemming in part from the industrial revolution and the free market economy of the West. Thirdly, we shall consider the transformation of the political system as a functional response to the economic stimuli, to the diversified social structure and to the resulting need for a new type of regulatory action. In other words, we shall proceed from the hypothesis that the differentiation of the political system and the rise of a new political cadre are related to the social differentiation and to its underlying causes: changes in occupations, in ownership patterns, income levels, and cultural-political values.

2. THE DICHOTOMY OF SOCIAL STRUCTURES AND POLITICAL TENSION IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The military reforms undertaken by sultans Mustafa III (1757–74) and Abdulhamit I (1774–89), despite the great importance attached to them by scholars as the formative bases of a new élite, as the first channels of communication with the West and as the foundations of new modes of thought, had in reality a more modest goal, namely to assure the survival of the state against external and internal challenges. Advanced technology, an economic system relying increasingly upon industry, new techniques of government and of study culminating in military power constituted the backbone of external, Western challenge. The search for autonomy in the provinces and a series of conflicting demands for order and security and regulatory action, couched often in moralistic and religious terminology, made up the internal challenge. Actually this latter challenge was a by-product of Western technological, economic and intellectual forces which reflected themselves upon everyday life in society in the form of expanded trade, change in land tenure, and intensified communication. The ensuing dichotomy between society and government, long in the making in the Ottoman state, was rooted in the following situation. Society developed and differentiated into new occupational groups with new thoughts and demands corresponding more or less to the technological and economic stimuli, and expected a change in government functions accordingly. But the government, consisting of the throne and the central bureaucracy and considering itself synonymous with the state and subject to its own traditions of authority, was unable to understand and cope functionally with the problems created by change. Nevertheless the bureaucracy attempted to educate itself in the rudiments of functional government, to acquire a blue print of modernization in its frequent but superficial contacts with the West, and to mould society according to its own image of modern statehood. The leadership groups, both Muslim and non-

Muslim, on the other hand rising to power in society at large, often on the basis of economic power and communal support, sought a government shaped in accordance with their interests, aspirations and respective culture. Thus the conflict between the ruler and the ruled, and the need for harmony between government and society at every level of activity constituted the fundamental problem facing the Ottoman state in its latter stage. The problem was aggravated by the fact that any attempt to reconcile society and government functionally and ideologically was bound to undermine the complex socio-ethnic and religious system of balances on which the traditional Ottoman state stood. The differences and conflicts inherent in this situation were maximized after the social organization and its supporting land system broke down, the commerce with the West in the Balkans and the coastal areas increased, and the authority of the throne collapsed.

Trade with Austria and west European countries expanded rapidly through-out the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The opening of the Black Sea to the Russian trade through the peace treaties of Küçük Kaynarca and Jassi in 1774 and 1792, coupled with the loss of territory along the north shores of the same Sea, deprived the Ottoman state of its major economic base. The Black Sea had been an exclusive Ottoman trade area, which compensated for the French and British domination of Mediterranean commerce. Moreover, the merchant class along the Black Sea littoral was related commercially to Istanbul and Anatolia, which served as the trans-shipping points for goods from east, west and beyond. This was in fact a rather complex and balanced trading system which was productive enough to compensate for the losses suffered in the military fields until the end of the eighteenth century. Meanwhile, the industrial revolution in the West, the resulting urbanization and change in consumptive habits, coupled with the technological and military advancement, changed drastically the pattern of trade. The Ottoman state, whose trade balance was favorable well into the nineteenth century, gradually became an importer. Its exports, which consisted in good measure of manufactured items, gradually shrank to agricultural commodities by the second half of the nineteenth century. It began to buy some new items, such as indigo, coffee, sugar, steel, metal pro-ducts, and also clothing apparel, which not only replaced the locally manufac-tured goods but eventually became symbols of wealth and social status. The empire became an exporter of foodstuffs and raw materials; it sold wool and imported woolen clothes. The total European trade with the Ottoman empire in 1783 was estimated to be 4·4 million. In 1829 it fell to 2·9 million (the Greek independence war accounts for it), but rose to 12·2 in 1845, to 54 in 1876, and to 69·4 million in 1911.[1] From about 1850 to 1914 imports greatly exceeded

[1] For background information on trade see Charles Issawi, *The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800–1914* (Chicago, 1966), p. 60. Nicolas G. Svoronos, *Le Commerce de Salonique au XVIIIᵉ siècle* (Paris, 1956). Paul Masson, *Histoire du commerce français dans le Levant au XVIIIᵉ siècle* (Paris, 1911). A. C. Wood, *A History of the Levant Company* (London, 1935). Leone Levi, *History of British Commerce 1763–1870* (London,

exports. Following the Anglo-Turkish Commercial Convention of 1838, which gave to Great Britain undisputed competitive superiority with regard to domestic manufactures, the Ottoman state economy almost collapsed.

David Urquhart, who had undertaken an exhaustive survey of Ottoman resources, proposed for the West in the early 1830s to supply the 'necessities as well as the luxuries of the whole of the eastern population, whose attention will thus be exclusively directed to agriculture, and the furnishing of raw produce... [and to] take from them their produce in return for our wares'. Two decades later M. A. Ubicini could lament that the

manufacturing industry has greatly declined from what it formerly was in the Ottoman Empire. At present the greater part of the exports of Turkey consist of raw materials which it hands over to Europe, and which the latter returns to Turkey in a manufactured form. The numerous and varied manufactures...no longer exist or have completely declined...At Scutari and Tirnova there were two thousand looms of muslin in operation in 1812, whereas there were only two hundred in 1841...the same decay is observable in the old manufacturing towns of Syria and of Arabian Iraq.

But Ubicini, despite this trenchant observation, found the fault in the Ottomans' failure to concentrate all efforts on agriculture, thus committing the 'error so common to young states or nations in the process of transformation of endeavoring to produce all things necessary for its own consumption'.[1]

These developments, coupled with the changes in the patterns of regional exchange, disrupted the internal trade whereby one region supplied the other with raw material or manufactured goods. Eventually these regions, due in part to the predominance of sea communications, became economically attached to France or England, while maintaining a formal but continuously weakening political tie to the Ottoman administration.

The social consequences of this expanding but one-sided trade relation – that is, of the economic liberalism advocated sincerely by Ubicini as the surest road to universal material welfare, and unwittingly to imperialism – were not felt everywhere in the empire at the same time and with the same intensity. Southeastern Europe had fallen under the impact of expanded trade with the West early, in the eighteenth century. It benefitted from some special economic safeguards and protectionist measures offered by the Ottoman state in its heydays. Consequently, the area developed itself economically and reached political independence before European industrial development necessitated economic and political dependence on the part of its markets and sources of agricultural commodities.

1872), p. 934, places the exports to the Ottoman empire in 1850 to £2,811,000. Turkey was in third place. Other statistics place the volume of British exports to Turkey well above this figure. See Bailey, *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement* (Cambridge, Mass., 1942), p. 74. Also William Page, *Commerce and Industry Tables of Statistics for the British Empire* (London, 1919).

[1] The quotations are from D. Urquhart, *Turkey* (London, 1933), pp. 141–4, and M. A. Ubicini, *Letters on Turkey*, tr. Lady Easthorpe (London, 1856), pp. 339–44, reproduced in Issawi, *op. cit.*, pp. 42–5 *passim*.

By the end of the eighteenth century the European sections of the empire inhabited by Christians had formed three groups of leaders, conspicuously absent among the Muslims. These groups became the torch-bearers of Balkan nationalism, and eventually the backbone of the Serbian, Greek, and Bulgarian national states (1804–78). The first group was formed by the leading merchants, manufacturers and other related occupations, whose origin can be traced to the intensive trade with Europe beginning in the early part of the century.[1] Suffice to mention that the Greek merchant colonies in Vienna, Venice, Trieste, and especially Odessa were the active revolutionary vanguards of their ethnic groups under Ottoman rule. The second group was formed by the non-Muslim intellectuals whose origin and status can be traced either to the merchant class mentioned above or to the schools established or supported by the same or by the local church. This group became the banner-bearer of the nationalist ideology, especially after some members acquainted themselves with the ideas of the French Revolution. To these one may add the lower Christian Orthodox clergy who often found themselves at odds with the bishops or Patriarchs who were associated with the ruling bureaucratic order.

The third group of leaders, related to the population at large, was formed by those romantic figures called *haiduk* or *klephte* – half highwaymen, half popular leaders – who often served in Western armies and navies and fought as guerrilla commanders and then as military leaders during their respective national revolutions. The most important characteristic of these groups was the fact that they grew up mostly in the eighteenth century from a peasant agricultural basis, that they maintained some sort of relations with the peasant masses, and that, at the beginning at least, they symbolized to a degree the ideological consensus emerging among the economic middle class groups and the intellectual-military élites.

The nationalist uprisings of the Balkan groups, beginning with the Serbian revolt of 1804 and culminating belatedly in the Bulgarian revolt of 1875 and several scattered ones afterwards, appear in retrospect as natural and expected. Bulgaria emerged as an independent state chiefly as a consequence of the Ottoman–Russian War of 1877. This is so not only because of the religious or cultural antagonism (which acquired ideological significance as a means of mass mobilization) but also, as a Bulgarian scholar put it, because of the profound antagonism between a *de facto* bourgeois land-ownership, a capitalist system of

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[1] See Traian Stoianovich, 'The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant', *Journal of Economic History* (June, 1960), pp. 234–313, also 'The Social Foundations of Balkan Politics 1750–1941', *Balkans in Transition*, Charles and Barbara Jelavich (eds.), (Berkeley, 1963), pp. 297–345, 'The Nature of Balkan Society under Ottoman Rule', *Slavic Review*, vol. XXI, 4 (1962), pp. 597–622. The above writings seldom use any Turkish sources (except those written in Western languages) and treat each contemporary Balkan state as though it was independent from the fifteenth through the nineteenth centuries. These writings conspicuously ignore the existence of Turkish traders and Turks in general in the Balkans or the impact of the Ottoman state on the economic system or upon the transformation of Balkan society.

production with capital investment and hired labor at the social level, and a feudal type of authority at the government level.[1]

The social stratification described above contained also the embryo of a peculiar type of antagonism shaped along ethnic–religious lines which sparked the revolutionaries' zeal. The dominating political group, which had become dysfunctional, was almost exclusively composed of the Ottoman bureaucracy, while the leaders in towns and villages engaged in manufacturing and trade as well as the community leaders in non-Muslim villages consisted of Christians. The latter regarded the administration as an alien exploiting group. They began calling the Ottoman bureaucracy 'Turkish' since their view of the ruling group was colored by their own nationalist political outlook. In their eye, the Ottoman state was already a national Turkish state, though such a state did not actually emerge until 1923.

The developments among the Muslim population during the preparatory stage of national statehood in the Balkans (paradoxically these occurred often in the same lands and town in which the Christian nationalists were active) was of a completely different nature. The Russian–Ottoman wars of 1768–74 and 1787–92, ending in defeat for the Ottomans, undermined considerably the authority of the central government. It facilitated at the top the emergence of the *ayans* as *de facto* rulers of various areas and enabled them to contend for power.

North Africa, Syria (Jezzar Ahmet Paşa), Egypt and Iraq acquired a *de facto*, though temporary, autonomy while in Arabia the Wahhabis swept the land. In Rumelia, the upheavals among the Kirjalis, and the inhabitants of Deliorman and Vidin led by Tartar princes, and especially by Pasvanoğlu (1797) and by Tepedelenli Ali Paşa in Janina, weakened further the government's authority by forcing the army to fight these rather than the Christian rebels. The Turkish–Muslim peasant, meanwhile not undergoing yet a revolutionizing social change, was isolated from the world as a relic of the past and pushed down the social scale by a relatively more prosperous Christian peasantry which was bolstered economically and ideologically by a middle class of its kin and religion. In towns, which were inhabited by Muslim–Turkish groups usually engaged in manufacturing and administration, the old rulers were gradually pushed into the background by the new middle class which rose from among the Christian groups.

This process began late in the eighteenth century and was almost completed in the first half of the nineteenth. The Turkish–Muslim segment of society did not have a middle class (merchants, intellectuals, clergy) which could compete politically with the Christian one. The only leader in the countryside was the *ayan*, in most cases a man who owed his power to wealth and inherited

[1] On the social groups and nationalism in the Balkans see Dimitrije Djordjevic, *Revolutions nationales des peuples balkaniques, 1804–1914* (Beograd, 1965); S. Fischer-Galati, 'The Peasantry as a Revolutionary Force in the Balkans', *Journal of Central European Affairs*, vol. XXIII, 1 (1963).

social position. He was not a trader or manufacturer, but often a landlord. The *ayan*'s organized military forces were recruited from the local Muslim groups or the dissatisfied rebellious elements of the imperial army, who entered his service in response to promises of booty and land. The *yamak*s (border-guarding janissaries), *dayı*s and local Muslim notables often tried to usurp the land of the Christian peasants, as rural ownership was the only means left to this group to maintain its economic and social status.[1]

The Muslim–Turkish craftsmen who had formed the backbone of the manu-facturing groups in Balkan towns well into the middle of the eighteenth century, as attested by the names of trades and guild organizations, were pushed to less important trades and eventually to ordinary menial jobs.[2] By the middle of the nineteenth century they had ceased to be a meaningful economic force. The rise of the *ayan*s (sometimes referred to also as *derebey*s, lords of the valley) and the attempts by the *dayı*s and local notables to acquire land may be considered to have been symptoms of the final breakdown of the old *timar* system. These developments also marked the beginning of a new stage of social evolution among the Muslim–Turkish elements in the western part of the empire. This evolution became politically meaningful towards the end of the nineteenth century because of the pressure of international events in the Balkans, and in part because of the policy of the government. Meanwhile, however, the Turkish peasant masses in the Balkans, deprived of effective leadership, were used by the ruling authorities to replenish the ranks of the army or were hired as unskilled laborers by Bulgarian and Greek farmers and traders, or, after independence was acquired, were simply forced to flee to the remaining areas of Ottoman state. Unable to grasp the social position into which he was pushed by these circumstances, the Turkish peasant used religion as a basis of group solidarity, and thus identified himself with the Ottoman political élite. The élite eventually used this identification for the nationalist mobilization of the lower strata and for achieving political solidarity in the national state.

[1] Christo Gandev, 'L'apparition des rapports capitalistes dans l'économie rurale de la Bulgarie du nord-ouest au cours du XVIIIᵉ siècle', *Etudes Historiques* (Sofia, 1960), pp. 208 ff. See also a series of court decisions published in Yugoslavia on the History of Macedonia, *Turski Documenti za Makedonskata Istorija 1800–1839*, 5 vols. (Skoplje, 1951–8). See, for instance, document number 53, vol. 1, ordering the *ayan* Mustafa ağa, not to bother the *raya*. (By this time the name *raya* came to be applied to Christians.) For similar occurrences in Anatolia see Kenan Akyüz, *Ziya Paşa'nın Amasya Mutassarıflığı Sırasındaki Olayar* (Ankara, 1964).

[2] One may in fact distinguish by name the early crafts and trades of Turkish origin from those which were introduced later in the Balkans. For instance, a Wallachian docu-ment of 18 July 1812 gives a list of all the craftsmen *isnafuri* (from the Turkish *esnaf*) and tradesmen in Bucharest. Of 61 professions on the list, 22 bear distinctly Turkish names and relate mostly to wearing-apparel, house items and foods, while the remainder of names are of German, Hungarian (usually describing metal works), Slavic, or French origin and relate mostly to trade and crafts which were introduced more recently. *Documente Privitoare la Economia Ţării Romîneşti, 1800–1850*, vol. 1 (Bucureşti, 1958), pp. 146–7.

The social-political situation of the Turkish and non-Turkish groups in the Balkans is well described by T. G. Vlaykov in his memoirs concerning the district of Pirdop in Bulgaria in the 1860s. After referring to the peaceful but clearly segregated coexistence of the Turkish and Bulgarian communities, the author, a Bulgarian, states:

Compared with the life of the Turks, our life was patently on a higher level. Take livelihoods. For the Bulgarians, these were so varied – there were indeed hardly any trades, hardly any manufacture or fields of commerce in which they did not deal. As for the Turks, their agriculture was all they knew. And our leading people, our merchants and *chorbajii* [heads of Bulgarian villages] – how much higher they stood in alertness of spirit, in national consciousness as well as in monetary wealth than the Turkish leading folk...Yet for all this, we Bulgarians felt a subconscious fear of the Turks...The fear of all our folk for the Turks arose from the fact that although we lived in the village unoppressed by them, we felt nevertheless that they were the masters; the governor in the *konak* [mansion] was a Turk...then the prefect and the judge in the citadel also were Turks. Turkish was the whole power. Turkish was the kingdom. And we Bulgarians were their subjects.[1]

Thus, the social-ideological ground for national independence was laid, and when the occasion arose the Bulgarian national state emerged much in the same fashion as had taken place in Serbia and Greece.

3. THE INTEGRATIVE PROCESS: CENTRALIZATION

The leadership cadres among the empire's Muslim population at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries consisted essentially of two major groups: the *ayan*s and *eşraf*s, or notables who had become a sort of landlords, and the bureaucratic-military elements associated with the government. The *ayan*s (the Christian counterparts for village leaders in some areas in the Balkans were the *chorbajï*s), despite their heterogeneous origins, were in fact precursors of a new type of middle class group whose fundamental importance for the social-political history of the Middle East has not yet been assessed. The *ayan*s, often with the support of the local *ulema* and the janissaries, helped strengthen local autonomy and thus weakened the hold of the central authority over provinces, including the Balkans. The conflict between the central authority and the provinces, which had brought down many of the Muslim empires in the past and which the Ottomans successfully avoided for centuries, dealt them ultimately a fatal blow. Thus it was the rise of the *ayan*s and especially their revolts during a most critical period of social transformation in the Balkans, which facilitated the rise of modern national states in the Balkans such as Ali Paşa of Janina's role in the Greek revolt. This is a critical factor which is only now receiving the attention it deserves. Consequently, the efforts of Sultan

[1] T. G. Vlaykov, *Prezhvyanoto* (Experiences), 3 vols. (Sofia, 1934–42). Fragments reproduced in Doreen Warriner, *Contrasts in Emerging Societies* (Bloomington, Ind., 1965), pp. 235–6.

Selim III (1789–1807) to create a new order – *Nizam-i Jedid* – and a modern army (1793) must be attributed not merely to his desire to strengthen Ottoman military power in order to fight outside enemies but chiefly to the unavoidable necessity of asserting the authority of the central government over the *ayans*.[1] The twenty-odd papers on the question of reforms submitted to the Sultan at his own request stressed the need for civil reform, for economic recovery and for a comprehensive plan for reform to be reached by deliberation and universal consent.[2] The basic aim of Selim's reforms was the revitalization of the old political order, as clearly indicated by his desire to reform the *timars*, the back-bone of the old Ottoman socio-political system. His efforts to force the members of each social estate to wear their traditional costumes, which marked their established social rankings, confirms this view. But revival of the old order was impossible.

First, the drastically altered social structure called for government to assume regulatory functions rather than being the equilibrium center of the balance system as had been the case in the past. Secondly, a policy of centralization pursued amid these conditions, if successful, could have led to a relatively integrated political system whose maintenance would have called for a series of new structures and a corresponding political culture. Thirdly, the creation of new political structures, and the performance of a variety of functions falling hitherto outside the sphere of government activity, would have called for new criteria for recruitment into government service and for the kind of specialized training necessary to discharge properly these new governmental functions. All this would have changed the very meaning of government as known until then in the Ottoman empire. The concept of a functional government which began to prevail during Selim's time is well illustrated in a report by Ebubekir Ratip, the Ottoman ambassador in Vienna. The characteristics of a contemporary state, according to Ratip, were a disciplined army, sound finances, good and enlightened officials, security and prosperity among the populace, all to result from government measures.

The embassies opened in Paris, London, Vienna, Berlin, and elsewhere in Europe,[3] the modern schools, and especially the teaching personnel brought from France in 1793–98 and 1806–7, while important in their limited ways as avenues of cultural diffusion, were not the major forces of change, but were supplementing accessories to changes in the social system and the new develop-

[1] A summary of the struggle with the *ayan* based on Turkish sources may be found in *Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. v (İstanbul, 1962), pp. 2724–6, 2859–63. The most comprehensive study of the period is Stanford J. Shaw, *Between Old and New; the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789–1807* (Cambridge, Mass. 1971).

[2] Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal, 1964), pp. 72 ff., and Enver Ziya Karal, *Tarih Vesikaları*, 1/6 (April, 1942), pp. 414–25.

[3] For the opening of the new embassies see Ercümend Kuran, *Avrupa'da Osmanlı İkamet Elçiliklerinin Kuruluşu* (Ankara, 1968). For the pact with the *ayan* see Halil İnalcık, 'Senedi Ittifak ve Gülhane Hattı Hümayunu', *Belleten*, vol. xxviii (October, 1964), pp. 603–90.

ing concepts of government embodied in the principle of centralization. Indeed, the policy of centralization more than any other single measure initiated during the reign of Selim III and Mahmud II (1808–1839), was instrumental in undermining the bases of the old arrangement and in paving the way for a new one.

The internal motive of centralization, as mentioned before, was the desire to end the threat of the *ayan*s and of other rebellious elements. To accomplish this, the government saw no other way but to undermine the *çiftlik*s, or large landholdings, of Rumelia and Anatolia on which the power of the upper Muslim groups rested. It thus indirectly supported the Christian masses against the *ayan*s and janissaries. The best example of this came when Ebubekir Paşa, governor of Bosnia, allied himself with the Serbian rebels against the Pasvano-ğlu's *yamak*s and *dayı*s, and in doing so supported, unwillingly to be sure, the Serbian drive for independence.

The administrative organization established to support the new army contained the embryo of a centralized, functionally oriented state. A fiscal organization intended to gather the revenue of a number of *timar*s left without administrators, the collection of new taxes, the contemplated conscription methods, all seem to point towards an emerging central integrated administration. During Selim's reign there began to emerge also a small group of men acquainted with western languages and the positive sciences. Selim's reforms were halted by the Janissary revolt in 1807. It was the most celebrated *ayan* of the period, Alemdar Mustafa Paşa of Rusçuk (Russe), who intervened with his army and was instrumental in bringing Mahmud II to the throne in 1808, and indirectly in helping to reconstitute the modern army disbanded in 1807. The new army, constituted first as a unit of the Janissary corps, was known as *Sekban*, and then in 1826 as *Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye* [Victorious Muhammadan Soldiers] after the janissaries had been abolished. Sultan Mahmud II began his reign with a most humiliating concession to the *ayan*s. These, headed by Alemdar Mustafa Paşa, demanded special rights. The sultan, aware that many *ayan*s were at the gates of İstanbul with their armies, some numbering as many as 5,000 soldiers, signed the agreement known as *Sened-i Ittifak* in 1808. The signatory *ayan*s, speaking also on behalf of those who did not attend the meeting, recognized the primacy of the throne and expressed their intention to obey its authority as exercised through the Grand Vizir. They agreed, for themselves and their sons, that the monarchy's survival guaranteed the life of the state and of themselves. Consequently, mutual trust was declared to be essential. The *ayan*s agreed to protect the central authority against military uprisings in return for its guarantee of their lands and right to pass them on to heirs (Art. 5). Other provisions dealt with taxes and the treatment of peasants and with the necessity of confining the authority of government officials to their offices and areas of assigned jurisdiction. This was an important step towards the differentiation and definition of administrative functions that is essential in political modernization. It also forecast the later struggle between the bureaucracy and the

economically oriented groups. The pact was, in fact, a negotiated agreement between the Grand Vizirate, representing the emerging 'modern' bureaucracy, and the *ayan*s, who had established *de facto* control over the lower social groups. It legitimized the status of the *ayan*s in relation to the throne and the people, not on the basis of Islam but of power. The pact, moreover, was a compromise between two administrative concepts best suited to the power interest of each group: centralization for the bureaucracy, decentralization for the latter. Each concept, though outwardly embodying some attitudes and philosophies inherited from the traditional era, was in fact a totally new idea born from changed economic and social conditions. The *ayan*s were not opposed to all centralized systems, but only to one that disregarded their own interests and violated their traditional local authority. The bureaucracy and the *ayan*s had a certain common interest in rationalizing the administrative and economic systems of the empire. The methods involved the expectations of each group, and the reconciliation of this system with the philosophy of each were to determine their respective ideological orientations.

The conflict between the central bureaucracy and the *ayan*s resulted in a speed-up of centralization, which led eventually to the annihilation of the latter beginning in 1815, thanks to the new army and the modern weapons secured for the war with Russia in 1812. Finally, in 1831, the sultan was able to abolish the remaining *timar*s with little opposition, and he placed the remaining *sipahi*s (former administrators of the *timar*s) into four cavalry squadrons. Finally, he destroyed the Janissary establishment in 1826. Without regard for property rights, the sultan seized the lands of the *ayan*s and distributed them to his own men in the new 'victorious Muhammadan soldiers' army.

It was also at this point that a new policy began to emerge at the government level. Paradoxical as it may appear, the throne sought to get the support of the 'masses' against the potential new upper classes in the countryside. After the suppression of the top *ayan*s, the new propertied groups expanded their power, established influence over their respective communities, and spoke on their behalf. The 'masses' were thus represented by these leaders from the upper ranks of the community, who formed a sort of middle class and set the tone of political developments in the century. Without checks on his power, that is without the Janissary corps, the *ayan*s and through them the *ulema*, the sultan himself became an absolute ruler. Foreign observers with democratic liberal views, such as Adophus Slade, saw the increase in the new bureaucracy's power as the cause of further regression, while Turkish students, usually representing the authoritarian bureaucratic outlook, regarded this as the beginning of a concerted drive for true modernization, 'a purposeful change for the improvement of society' as one put it.[1] But, interestingly enough, others such as Ziya

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[1] Berkes, *op. cit.* p. 93, Berkes's picture of Mahmud II as the 'people's' man is overly idealized, more in line with Berkes's own ideological bent rather than Mahmud's personality. Berkes makes Mahmud II appear like Ivan the Terrible as depicted by the

Gökalp, father of Turkish nationalist ideology, regarded the rise of the *ayan*s as the beginning of a struggle for freedom. Sultan Mahmud II also created in 1826 a Directorate of *Vakf*s, known as the *Evkaf*, in order to concentrate the administration of these basic social institutions of Islam, and incidentally to use their revenue for government expenditures. Actually, the creation of the *Evkaf* administration was a far-reaching measure, since the *vakf*s besides being a means for the individual Muslim to discharge social obligations stemming from religion, performed some public welfare functions. These functions were now to be assumed by the emerging bureaucratic order.

The sultan also reorganized his bureaucracy, which now supposedly served the state instead of being the 'slave' of the throne. It must be pointed out that the abolition of the *timar*s theoretically consolidated the state possession of lands, thus giving the bureaucracy a strong lever of power. A new bureaucratic structure began to emerge as a direct consequence of centralization, and eventually replaced the old one. The place of the *Ağa* of the Janissaries was taken by the *Serasker*, who was Commander in Chief, Minister of War, and a sort of garrison commander and police chief in the capital. Eventually, in 1845, the police functions were given to a special police department, the *Zaptiye Müşiriyeti*. The increase in foreign relations, and the replacement of Greek dragomans (interpreters) with Muslims culminated in the creation of the *Tercüme Odası* (Translation Bureau) in 1833. This bureau became the training ground for Ottoman diplomats, and also for the new intelligentsia who played a major role in ideological developments during the nineteenth century. Under Mahmud II the bureaucratization drive resulted also in the creation of the *Bab-ı Meşihat* (*Fetvahane*, which means literally the house of *Fetva*s) as the office of the *Şeyhülislam*, who was incorporated in the government bureaucracy formally as a kind of government official in charge of providing religious opinion rather than advice. The Grand Vizirate – the real seat of the Ottoman administration – was divided into ministries of Civil Affairs (which became the Ministry of Interior in 1837) and Foreign Affairs. The Grand Vizir became Prime Minister but later reverted to his old title. Thus, he was called *Başvekil*, then *Sadrazam*, and then in Republic once more *Başvekil*, and lately *Başbakan*. (Actually, all these words have the same meaning: Premier or Head Minister.) Other functions and institutions attached basically to the Grand Vizirate, namely the courts which had been under the *Kadıasker*, passed under the jurisdiction of the *Şeyhülislam*. The establishment of a Ministers' Council (*Meclis-i Vükelâ*), along with the creation of a Military Council and a Judiciary Council, was followed by the establishment of committees for public works (*nafia*), agriculture, trade and industry, some of which later became ministries.

Soviets – good to people but awful to the Boyars. See also F. E. Bailey, *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement* (Cambridge, 1962), which reproduces a letter by Reşit Pasha, very critical of Mahmud's tyranny, giving thus a different picture of the situation.

The school system established under Mahmud II aimed in essence at training personnel for government service. Thus it was an attempt neither towards secularization nor for instructing the population at large. The cultural dichotomy which is attributed to the educational system would not have resulted if the schools' basic purpose had been broader than that of training government officials. (The educational project of 1845–6, envisaging a school system to be topped by a university, under a permanent council of public instruction, was hardly implemented. A truly broad educational system was planned only after 1869.)[1]

4. THE RISE OF A MUSLIM–TURKISH MIDDLE CLASS GROUP AND BUREAUCRATIZATION

Mahmud II destroyed the *ayans* but did not liquidate their supporting subgroups or the economic and social process which was transforming the entire society. In fact, the *ayans* were being superseded by a Muslim middle class, composed of artisans, landowners and other groups engaged in a variety of economic occupations, whose history is barely known. Mahmud's liquidation of the *ayans* seems to have indirectly helped the development of this new class, which was to play important political roles towards the end of the century. It should be noted that this development took place at least sixty years behind its Christian counterpart in the Balkans, which had gained for the most part national independence. The economic foundation of this class was the ownership and cultivation of land, which the government had used in the past as a lever to control society. Now, in contrast, the cultivation of these lands and the crop prices were determined not by government regulation but by the interplay of supply and demand, the growing impact of the western industrial system and the laws of a cash economy and free market. But true economic power was still mostly in the hands of the urban merchant groups. These were mostly Greek, Armenian and, in places, Christian Arab. Socio-political changes after 1840 were conditioned by the struggles among these groups, but with considerably different results from the earlier changes in the Balkans, as will be indicated later. Moreover, the impact of the bureaucracy, both as a political force and as regulatory administrative apparatus, produced results quite different from those in the early part of the century. First, we shall deal with the relations between bureaucracy and the economic system.

The extreme emphasis placed by scholars on the modernizing role of the bureaucracy tends to obscure its position as a social group with a tradition and a philosophy of its own. The bureaucracy may be instrumental in creating a

[1] See Osman Ergin, *Türkiye Maarif Tarihi*, 5 vols. (İstanbul, 1939–43). Some scattered information is in I. Başgöz and H. E. Wilson, *Educational Problems in Turkey* (Bloomington, Ind. 1968), and Andreas M. Kazamias, *Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey* (London, 1966).

differentiated political system and in performing integrative, unifying functions. It may rise against propertied aristocrats or against any other group challenging the authority of the central government. Moreover, a socio-economic order based on private property and free trade would necessitate the formation of a rational (interest motivated) legal order in which the bureaucracy plays special roles. Max Weber has pointed out that the capitalist system had a major part in the development of a modern bureaucracy because of its 'urgent need for stable, strict, intensive, and calculable administration'. Capitalism, according to Weber, is also the most rational basis for the bureaucracy because it supplies the necessary money resources. But all this does not prevent the bureaucracy from becoming a dominant and exploiting class like any other social group if it is in full command of economic and political power.

The propertied agricultural and artisan groups in the Ottoman empire exerted a certain pressure on the bureaucracy for a stable economic life. The bureaucracy, in turn, hard pressed for revenue, did its best to bring a degree of order to existing socio-economic relations. For instance, the census of 1831 aimed at securing information on various forms of property and on the number of people in the empire in order to levy taxes and draft men into the army. This was in fact a prelude to general conscription.

The establishment of a modern capitalist order and of a rational bureaucratic system seemed to depend on the liquidation of the old social order, on the development of new, differentiated social and political structures, and on the assumption of power by new social groups through revolution, evolution, or war. The emergence of a new political order, either through internal social changes or international pressures as in the case of colonial countries, in which various social groups could coalesce and share common political beliefs, may facilitate the establishment of harmony between the economic and administrative structures. But in the Ottoman empire the basis of the old political system was preserved despite social changes. The state formally never losing sovereignty, tried to preserve its multi-national character, and remained opposed to Turkish nationalism almost to the end of the World War I. However, prior to the rise of Turkish nationalism, the intellectuals in the Ottoman bureaucracy developed their own statist ideology and tried unsuccessfully to impose it on society as a whole. The bureaucracy maintained the view that it was the foundation of the state, much in the spirit of the traditional Ottoman view of society. But if one considers the emerging modern Ottoman bureaucracy not from an ideological viewpoint but a functional one, then one may distinguish a certain orientation which developed towards functionalism and professionalization. Sadık Rifat Paşa, former ambassador in Vienna, who is supposed to have inspired some of the basic ideas of the *Tanzimat* decree of 1839, demanded financial security for government officials – that is a stable form of remuneration, and social ranking equal to the *ulema* and the military. It was the bureaucracy's responsibility to assure security so that subjects would benefit from the fruit of their labor and

strive to accumulate wealth through productive activities.[1] It was again during this period that the idea of facilitating the circulation of state lands and of expanding their use as a means for increasing state revenue began to gain popularity. This led to the Land Code of 1858. In other words, the ideas of Western economic liberalism, couched in familiar terms and concepts, began to penetrate bureaucratic thought.

The *Tanzimat* decree of 1839, though almost unanimously accepted as the turning-point in the transformation of the Ottoman state, was in reality instrumental chiefly in accelerating the centralization and bureaucratization of the Ottoman empire. Issued by one of the top men of the new order, Reşit Paşa, former ambassador to London, a few months after the accession of Sultan Abdülmecid (1839–61), the edict merely expanded upon and crystallized ideas and policies developed and implemented in the past.[2] The edict's promise of security for life and property was actually directed to the masses in order to rally them behind the throne and the bureaucracy in their struggle with the *ayans*.[3] The edict also mentioned the need for banks in order to protect the value of Ottoman currency and to increase wealth. The Ottoman Bank, owned by foreign interests, was established in response in 1840. Later, however, the introduction of some more basic measures, such as the commercial code (1850), administered by special trade courts, met with opposition, and Reşit Paşa – previously brought to power for a second time – had to resign in 1852. These and other symptoms indicated that the transformation of the Ottoman State had entered a new stage. Indeed, one may easily wonder at the developments which necessitated the introduction of a commercial code when other more pressing problems awaited solution.

The rescript of 1856 – *Islahat Fermanı* – represents another important stage in the transformation of the Ottoman State. It was issued to reaffirm the provisions of the rescript of 1839, much of whose implementation supposedly had been delayed. The year of the rescript coincided with the treaty of Paris whereby the Ottoman empire was admitted into the community of nations and became subject to the provisions of international law as applied to 'civilized nations'.

The changes in 1789–1856 resulted from a gradual and natural response of the Ottoman leaders to social and political pressures and followed to some extent the Ottoman traditions of change. The throne seemed to rally loyalties, while the bureaucracy, despite its slowness, gradually began to assume new responsibilities on behalf of the government. A series of measures, including the famous Land Code on which work began in the early 1840s, were part of the 'statist'

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[1] Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (Princeton, 1962). Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, 1961), pp. 129 ff.

[2] The best source on the subject is still the collective work, *Tanzimat* (İstanbul, 1940). See also Reşat Kaynar, *Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat* (Ankara, 1954).

[3] Halil Inalcık, 'Tanzimat Nedir', *Tarih Araştırmaları* (Ankara, 1941), pp. 237–63. Also *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi* (Ankara, 1943).

policy of 'voluntary modernization'. The rescript of 1856, however, changed this direction by imposing on the process of transformation the will of outside powers, and by giving priority to projects which could not be implemented. The Hatt-ı Humayun of 1856, which 'was in many ways the magnum opus of Lord Stratford'[1] was prepared in collaboration with the French ambassador and Austrian internuncio to the Porte and was accepted as a whole by the Ottoman government. Its main purpose was to grant equality to Christians, as promised in 1839. But 'equality' had limited grounds for implementation because of a lack of institutions and a legal framework whereby this concept could acquire tangible meaning. In fact, the 'democratic' processes it wanted to implement in the Ottoman empire were hardly known in Europe at the time. The rescript declared equality in military service (which nobody liked), justice, schools (already Christian schools were far more advanced), abolished the head tax, and provided for equality of employment in government, though the implementation of all these measures was very limited. The long range effect of this 'equality' was to increase the economic power of the remaining Christian groups in the Ottoman state, and to accord them indirect support in their nationalist struggle. The edict, on the other hand, placed new emphasis on basic social and economic measures which the earlier edict of 1839 had largely neglected. It called for the establishment of banks, the codification of penal and commercial laws, strict observance of annual budgets, and for the reform of prisons. In consequence, maritime and commercial codes of French origin were introduced in 1856–63.

The Ottoman government introduced these measures largely through the efforts of Ali and Fuad Paşas, disciples of Reşit Paşa, despite a growing opposition from some communal leaders who were influential among the population and looked upon some of the reforms as being imposed from outside. The coming of Abdülaziz to the throne (1861–76) brought the opposition to foreign-inspired reforms into the open, but it was soon overcome. Consequently a Law of Vilayets (1864) modeled on the French administrative system, a Council of Justice (*Divan-ı Ahkâm-ı Adliye*), and a Council of State were introduced. In 1868, at the insistence of the French, and after overcoming the sultan's initial opposition, the Galatasaray *lise* was opened. For many years this school graduated excellent men, but also many Francophile intellectuals whose alienation from their own culture and disdain of their own society was no different from the attitudes of the colonial intelligentsia towards their own societies.[2]

[1] Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856–1876* (Princeton, 1963), p. 43. For a British view of Lord Stratford see Allan Cunningham, *The Turkish Career of Stratford Canning* (forthcoming).

[2] The true impact of the educational system demands a clear detached analysis. There are many conflicting views on the subject today, as the early opinion that these intellectuals were true reformers is being challenged by a continuously growing number of students, especially in Turkey. See Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Türkiyenin Düzeni, Dün, Bugün, Yarın* (Ankara, 1968); Niyazi Berkes, *200 Yıldır Neden Borcalıyoruz* (İstanbul, 1964);

Thus, there is truth in the view of some writers that after the middle of the nineteenth century the Ottoman empire was gradually subjected to a policy of semi-colonialism. This situation is essential to understand in order to evaluate the economic and international dimensions acquired gradually by Ottoman and Turkish nationalism.

Yet, the growing commercial relations with Europe,[1] the liberalization of transfer of state lands to individuals through amendments to the Land Code of 1858, and the regulation of economic relations through a European system of codes and courts, coupled with a 'liberal' economic policy of *laissez-faire*, increased economic activity and consolidated further the emerging primitive Ottoman capitalist system. It is in the intricate web of these conditions that the economic foundations of a Turkish Muslim middle class may be found. Its beginnings may be traced to the breakdown of the Ottoman feudal system, to the *ayan*s, and to the government's readiness to try every measure likely to increase material wealth in the hope of augmenting state revenue. The rise of this middle class, whose power rested in land-ownership rather than commercial enterprises, had far-reaching effects. It provided the bases for new patterns of social stratification among the Muslim population, gave birth to a new group of communal leaders formed of *ulema* families, small merchants, landlords, and even settled tribal chieftains in the countryside, and eventually generated an intellectual stratum of its own. Though overwhelmed by the bureaucratic intelligentsia, these intellectuals originating in the middle class could at times express new views of the world and of reforms, as in the case of Namık Kemal, Ahmet Mithat, Halit Ziya, and others.

After the middle of the nineteenth century, this Ottoman middle class was composed of two groups; the agrarian wing consisted mainly of Muslims, while the commercial-entrepreneurial in the cities was made up mostly of non-Muslims. Their interaction played a part in the transformation of the Ottoman state. It is in this context that the revolts in Syria and Lebanon in 1845–60 acquire their true significance, coinciding as they did with the birth of a market economy in the predominantly Muslim areas of the empire. This is also the period in which the name of *ayan* was gradually discarded, and other terms, such as *ağniya* (rich) and *eşraf* (notables) were more frequently used. A new upper social group among Muslims had come into existence. Already in 1845 the sultan had established a special council of *ayan*s and notables, supposedly for promoting the reforms but actually for providing some sort of representation for this new group. The existence of this new and powerful social stratum affected also the

Niyazi Berkes, *Batıcılık, Ulusçuluk, ve Toplumsal Devrimler* (İstanbul, 1965). Unfortunately, Berkes's subjective and propagandistic views expressed in these books published in Turkish hardly measure up with his balanced scholarly work in English.

[1] For instance, in İzmir the total trade in 1850 was 67 million francs. Tens years later it went up to 105 million francs and by 1881 it reached 221 million francs (116 million imports, 105 million exports). Demetrius Georgiades, *La Turquie actuelle* (Paris, 1892), p. 224 ff.

political thinking of the period, as clearly seen in the proposal for a constitutional system, in which the *ulema* and the notables would have a special place, on the part of Hayruddin Paşa, who was made prime minister for a short while under Abdülhamid II.[1]

The impact of these changes was clearly felt in the political-ideological field. The process of integration, which began originally as a drive towards administrative centralization, was broadened to become concerned with the basic question of political loyalty. The idea of equal citizenship, known usually as Ottomanism, was a mere legal device through which the government wanted to supersede the ethnic and religious loyalties of the various minority groups. This attempt towards integration failed as far as most of the Christian subjects were concerned, for the idea lacked the emotional appeal held by their own brand of nationalism. But the Muslim–Turkish intellectuals, whose number began to increase rapidly after the middle of the nineteenth century, seized upon Ottomanism as a nationalist ideology of their own and defined its content according to their own cultural-social background and interpretation of history. Nationality began to transform itself into nationalism.

The correlation between the rise of the intelligentsia and of ideology, and their dependence on communication, both as a means of political socialization and of mass indoctrination, began to emerge as the new dimensions of Ottoman modernization after 1860. Indeed, communication came to play a crucial part in the process of transformation. It began with the introduction of the postal system (1834), telegraph (1855–64), and railways (1866), chiefly as the result of the government's efforts to communicate with its field representatives and rapidly transport its troops. With the establishment of a modern press, especially of *Ceride-i Havadis* and of *Tercüman-ı Ahval* (1860), the full impact of modern communications began to be felt.[2] The way for a new phase of transformation which could enlist large numbers of people in the process of modernization had thus begun.

[1] On the notables see Albert Hourani, 'Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables', in *Beginnings of Modernization*, pp. 41–68. See also William R. Polk, *The Opening of South Lebanon, 1788–1840* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963). For administrative reforms and their social basis in the early times see Stanford J. Shaw, 'The Central Legislative Councils in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Reform Movement', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 1 (January 1970), pp. 51–84. For Hayreddin Paşa's views see *Reformes necessaires aux états musulmans* (Paris, 1868) and *Mukaddime-i Akvam al-Masalik fi Marifetul Ahval al-Memalik* (İstanbul, 1878).

[2] See Kemal H. Karpat, 'Mass Media', in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, ed. R. Ward and D. A. Rustow (Princeton, 1964).

5. THE MUSLIM INTERPRETERS OF THE NEW ORDER:
   THE YOUNG OTTOMANS[1]

The Ottoman intellectual trio, İbrahim Şinasi (1826–71), Ziya Paşa (1825–80), and Namık Kemal (1840–88), usually referred to as Young Ottomans and described as the forerunners of the modern intelligentsia, were the first Muslims to attempt to develop a broad theoretical justification and an ideology for the emerging centralized modern institutions in terms of Islamic political tradition and Ottoman principles of government. Their ideas centered essentially on the restructuring of state institutions, while the latter-day Muslim reformists, such as Jamal ad-Din Afghani (1839–97), and especially Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), were concerned, on the philosophical level, primarily with the reform of Islam. Even the Pan-Islamism of Afghani, and Abduh's limited political activity among Egyptian nationalists directed against the expansionist policy of the West, differed from the endeavors of Namık Kemal and Ziya Paşa; for the latter aimed at institutional adaptation and political socialization rather than religious reform. İbrahim Şinasi, Ziya Paşa, and Namık Kemal were educated in government schools and occupied government positions most of their adult lives. They were essentially the agents of the emerging centralized bureaucratic structure, despite their disputes with the sultan arising primarily from the need to re-define the functions and powers of the throne. Their ideas may be divided into several categories.

The first category concerned the introduction of a constitutional order and of representative institutions designed largely to create a division of functions within the ruling institution. Representation was justified on the basis of the Islamic principles of *meşveret* and *Şura* (consultation and assembly), rather than on that of representation of groups and their interests. The intellectuals' aim was to correct the errors of the *Tanzimat* reforms, and put an end to the cultural dichotomy which supposedly had resulted from a misunderstanding of the philosophical, ethical and social foundations of the empire, and from the use of state power to impose an alien cultural system upon society. The Young Ottomans were considered also 'liberal' in the sense that they criticized the absolute powers acquired by the sultan and his bureaucracy through centralization and its use to destroy the existing system of culture. Criticism of the sultan also resulted from the incompatibility of autocracy with a rational, creative life.[2]

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[1] Mardin, *op. cit.* pp. 252 ff.; Berkes, *op. cit.* pp. 197 ff.; and Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp. 147 ff. The literature in Turkish on the Young Ottomans is cited in the bibliographies of Mardin, Lewis, and the author's *Turkey's Politics* (Princeton, 1959).

[2] The 'liberal' political thought used as a weapon by the bureaucracy-intelligentsia in its power struggle with the sultan was best expressed in Prince Mustafa Fazıl's letter to Sultan Abdülaziz, which was published in 1867. The letter points out that four centuries ago the Turks 'submitted to their leaders on the virture of a freely accepted principle' and had a 'moral virility'. But now there was a feeling that pride and honor were diminishing subject to the 'injustice, whims, exactions of subordinate officials who depend only nominally on your [sultan's] authority...Your subjects [sultan's] of all

The second category of the Young Ottomans' ideas embodied the view of the new bureaucracy-intelligentsia toward other social groups, notably the former *ayan*s and the wealthy communal leaders. Ziya Paşa and Ali Suavi, who understood the problems faced by the countryside population and voiced bitter criticism of the abuses of the propertied commercial and agrarian groups, both Muslim and non-Muslim. Ziya Paşa believed that the Tanzimat had abolished the 'old [administrative] system instead of reforming and preserving it' and consequently left immune to punishment the *derebey*s and *ayan*s. 'The [municipal] councils established after the Tanzimat in each town had as members the notables, that is to say, the old *derebey*s, who took the title of councilmen. While in the past it was possible to punish them [*derebeys*] severely...now the councilmen and clergy in each town have been oppressing the people several times worse than the old *derebeys*.'[1] The factual truth in this statement must be balanced with another truth, namely the fact that the population was oppressed even more by the bureaucracy. Consequently, the people found it more congenial to follow their own communal leaders, thus jeopardizing effectively the authority of the government officials and arousing their anger against the *eşraf* or notables, who were often held responsible for disorders in their community.

The country's future, according to Ziya Paşa, was threatened by the Capitulations, the economic and financial abuses of the foreigners, including the right to acquire property, and the interference of Europeans, corrupt officials, and local lords in the country's affairs. Ziya Paşa pointed out that the changes in traditional dress ruined local industries, for it reduced the demand for local cloth and compelled the idle men to seek employment in non-productive occupations or simply wander around. In his novel *Intibah-yahut-Sergüzeşt-i Ali Bey* ('Awakening or Ali Bey's Adventures'), written in 1876, Namık Kemal also criticized the sons of rich country squires (*ağniya evladından*), who came into the city and corrupted its morality.[2] Kemal's articles on the property rights

faiths are consequently divided into two classes: those who oppress without checks and those who are oppressed, without mercy.' The intellectual degeneration and loss of moral virility was accompanied by stagnation in agriculture and trade, and the disappearance of the desire and skill to produce. The cause of all these lay in the political system's lack of freedom and of a constitution that would guarantee the people 'their sacred religion, fortune, and property, as well as the security of home'. The system instituted after the Tanzimat had 'corrupted and made greedy our statesmen who in their own turn contributed more to corrupt and render it [the system] greedy'. The letter is a criticism of the sultan, but it does point out that the immediate grievance was the new bureaucratic order. See translation by M. Colombe in *Orient*, no. 5 (1958), pp. 29–38.

[1] *Hürriyet*, 5 April 1869, quoted by İhsan Sungu, *Tanzimat*, pp. 821–2. Bitter criticism was also voiced by Ali Suavi in his article in *Ulum*, no. 15 (1870), reproduced in İ. Sungu and Ziya Maden, *Ziraat Tarihimize Bir Bakış* (İstanbul, 1932), pp. 207–8, 228 ff.

[2] This topic was a major theme in Turkish literature well into the period of the Republic, and it remains one of the most promising sources for the study of social behavior. It is also interesting that Namık Kemal describes the topic of his novel as an 'event which, even if it did not actually take place, had the possibility of occurrence'. *Intibah* or *Sergüzeşt-i Ali Bey* (İstanbul, n.d.). A French translation appeared in *Mercure de France*, July–August 1921.

accorded to foreigners, on population, trade, and agriculture, and his insistence on immediate regulatory laws were, among other things, demands for a rational reorganization of economic life and for the protection of state property. These were expressed in the form of moral criticism of the existing situation. Namık Kemal was in favor of expanding and nationalizing national economic activity, but without undue favor to the Christian minorities. His economic views, alongside those of many other writers, still awaiting study, were expressed in newspapers such as *İbret* and *Basiret*, the latter becoming in fact the spokesman for the rising Muslim middle classes.

Hilmi Ziya Ülken, an authority on Turkish intellectual history, after describing these intellectual manifestations as being a kind of 'people's voice' writes:

The people's voice [actually] belonged to the *Hayriye* (Muslim) merchants who began to rise next to the tradesmen belonging to the minorities after the Ottoman empire's contact with the West, and [whose origin was] in the limited and yet unsuccessful movement of capital... Namık Kemal in his articles on economy spoke always about [the need for] Muslim Bank, Muslim Corporations, and about protecting and supporting the Muslim merchants. Thus, his purpose was to develop the *Hayriye* [Muslim] businessmen and the Ottoman–Muslim enterprises.[1]

The third category of ideas of the Young Ottomans, that which concerns us most here, constituted the political culture of the emerging 'modern' Ottoman state or of the administrative unit in which changes occurred. The basic goal was the creation of a new identity for Ottoman subjects and loyalty to its government. The new concept of the *Vatan* (fatherland) aimed at creating a new form of identity to supersede religious, ethnic, and local divisions. The recognition of Ottoman citizenship for all inhabitants regardless of religion, the abolition of the *millet*s, and the introduction of the general military service (which had been in practice limited to Turks) prepared the ground for the successful dissemination of the new political culture.[2] Yet, loyalty and identity were basically matters of inner commitment, which could not be achieved without an emotional experience capable of linking one's values to the new political entity, the modern state. This called for a knowledge, both intuitive and symbolic, of the society's psychology, a certain ability to portray the new ideas as maintaining somehow the old cherished values while seeking the best in the future, and to express them in commonly accepted forms.

Achievements in history were the first important means of bolstering confidence

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[1] Himli Ziya Ülken, 'Tanzimattan Sonra Fikir Hareketleri', *Tanzimat*, pp. 758, 761. Also *Türkiyede Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi* (İstanbul, 1966), vol. I, pp. 29–30.

[2] As early as 1838, a special board pointed out the need for a new kind of attachment to the state and fatherland to be achieved by science. 'Without science, the people cannot know the meaning of love for the state and fatherland. It is evident that the acquisition of science and skill comes above all other aims and aspirations of a state' (Berkes, *op. cit.* p. 105). This, in other words, meant new, rationally devised loyalties, in accordance with the needs of a centralized, integrated structure. Lewis quotes Cevdet Paşa, one of the great Ottoman statesmen of the nineteenth century, who called attention to the need for relating the new idea of fatherland to some commonly accepted values: *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp. 352 ff.

in the future. Namık Kemal's true ideology was evident in his writings on history: six historical plays glorifying the deeds of Muslim and Ottoman heroes, including Saladin, Emir Nevruz, and sultans Selim I and Mehmet II. Here he 'endowed heroes with political and social intentions inconceivable before the time he was writing'.[1] His cult of heroes may well be interpreted as a cry for a new charismatic leader to carry out the social transformation that he envisaged. Similar demands were formulated later by Ziya Gökalp in Turkey and Muhammad Abduh in Egypt.[2]

Namık Kemal's historical romanticism, though to some degree a defense against the biased Western view of Ottoman history, was in large measure an attempt to foster loyalty to the Ottoman state through the concept of fatherland, to which he anchored the society's symbols and attachments. This was, in fact, the first step towards nationalism.

Namık Kemal's poem *Hürriyet* ('Freedom') and the play *Vatan* ('fatherland'), still widely read in Turkey, provided some of the basic material for the new political culture. The poem stressed the permanency of the *millet*-nation (originally it meant Muslim community) and demanded sacrifice of individual goals for the sake of the greater community – the fatherland. All sixty-two lines of this ideological poem represent a unique attempt to use every psychological and social symbol in the native culture to foster loyalty to the nation and state and to the fatherland, that is, the 'land of our martyr ancestors'.[3] One would agree with the judgement that this poem 'is the first and most powerful model of a social poem, social mysticism, love for fatherland and freedom. This poem is one of the rare works that have gone beyond literary limits and imbued the future generation with love for the country.'[4] The hero in the play *Vatan* is

[1] Ercüment Kuran, 'Ottoman Historiography of the Tanzimat Period', in B. Lewis and P. M. Holt (eds.), *Historians of the Middle East* (London, 1962), p. 427. Namık Kemal planned to write a fourteen-volume history. The four volumes printed studied romantically events up to 1479.

[2] Abduh said: 'The Orient needs a despot to force those who are criticizing each other to recognize each other's mutual value. In order to bring the people to a stage which they cannot abandon, fifteen years [of despotism] suffice. Can't the entire Orient find a single autocrat among its own [people] who will be just with his people, and through whose intermediary justice would be achieved more in fifteen years than in fifteen centuries?' Article in Rashid Rida, *Tarik al-Ustadd al-Imam* (Cairo, n.d.), vol. II, pp. 390–1. See excerpts in French: Anouar Abdel Malek, *Anthologie de la litterature arabe contemporaine* (Paris, 1965, pp. 55–6).

[3] The arguments advanced today in African states on behalf of the concept of fatherland are not different from Namık Kemal's. Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal, in a report on the doctrine and program of the Party of African Federations defined the fatherland as the 'heritage handed down to us by our ancestors: a land, a blood, a language or at least a dialect. The nation groups such fatherlands together in order to transcend them... it is...a conscious will to construct and reconstruct. Objectively, it is a restructuration along the lines of an exemplary model or archetype.' (*On African Socialism*, trans. Mercer Cook, (New York, 1964), p. 11.)

[4] Mehmed Kaplan, *Şiir Tahlilleri* (İstanbul, 1958), p. 38. A psychological but conservative study by the same author is Namık Kemal: *Hayatı ve Eserleri* (İstanbul, 1948).

Islam Bey, who sees the fatherland as 'protecting everyone's rights, life...[as] a true mother nurturing many people'.[1] 'The state has declared war,' he shouts, 'the enemy is at the frontier trying to trample under feet the land and bones of our martyrs. Why was I born if not to die for the fatherland.'[2]

These speeches were rooted in a popular concept of history – in the *Gazi* philosophy of the religious warriors and the attachment to ancestral ways, all part of the traditional culture.[3] The ideology of Namık Kemal revolved almost exclusively around the emerging idea of fatherland, the territorial state to which many of the attachments felt towards the *umma* (community) were transferred. But this call to nationalism was devised in accordance with the Western approach, concept and usages of ideology, except that he substituted Islamic values for Christian ones. Ideology in the modern sense as a means of mass mobilization and identification found its way into the Muslim–Turkish political ethos. Namık Kemal's ideology, thus rooted in Islam, could hardly appeal to the Christian groups which were striving to establish their own national father-lands. Nor could the emerging political culture, centered on the bureaucracy-intelligentsia, fully satisfy the practical demands of the notables and propertied groups which demanded a controlled, responsible, and professionally competent administration, and continued to view with suspicion the élite's power motives.

Nevertheless, the Young Ottomans played a vital role in introducing some general notions of pre-modern political culture and in paving the way for the constitutional experiment of 1876–7. They could not, however, provide lasting solutions to the smoldering conflict between the rising propertied middle classes and their own statist, bureaucracy-intelligentsia. This conflict was born of economic and social differences that could not easily be superseded by a unity of culture. The propertied groups lacked the organization to articulate and ex-press their own viewpoints, but the conflict was there: it came into the open during the first constitutional parliamentary experiment in 1876–8.

The Constitution has been described as an attempt on the part of the bureaucracy to curb the sultan's powers.[4] If, however, one considers the bureaucracy's own need for a stable, productive economic basis and the central role to be played by a property system and a corresponding social

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[1] Mustafa N. Özön (ed.), *Vatan yahut Silistre* (İstanbul, 1957), p. 17. Mehmed Murad Mizancı, the true Islamist ideologue of the empire, hailed the play as 'the first national work written in the modern style and corresponding to the national temperament' (*Mizan*, December 1888; quoted in Özön, p. 93).

[2] *Ibid.* p. 14.

[3] The work of Mehmed Murad Mizancı, *Turfanda mı Yoksa Turfa mı* (İstanbul, 1890), praising the Muslim idealists, is one of the most noteworthy Islamic idealogical writing of the period.

[4] Robert Devereux, *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period* (Baltimore, 1963), p. 31; also B. S. Baykal, '93 Meşrutiyeti', *Belleten*, VI, 21–2 (1942), pp. 45–83. Berkes considers the Constitution an attempt to deprive Russia of her argument that the Ottomans did not have freedom. Berkes, *op. cit.* pp. 225–6.

organization to stabilize the dislocated population, the constitutional experiment appears in a different light.

Far more important in understanding the background of the Constitution of 1876 was the administrative experience and personality of Mithat Paşa (1822–84), its the leading spirit.[1] Mithat had been the only truly successful Ottoman governor in the modern age. He brought economic reform and relative prosperity and tranquility to the troubled provinces of Niş and the Danube (*Tuna*) and, temporarily, to Baghdad. His basic approach was to call on local notables and, promising to fulfill his administrative duties to everybody's advantage, ask for cooperation and good treatment of the local people. Thus he established a rudimentary form of collaboration between a *de facto* local government and the central authority, primarily on administrative matters. (Mithat was also involved in drafting the *Vilayet* Law of 1864, the first major attempt at Ottoman administrative reorganization. The Russian ambassador was so alarmed that he told the sultan that the provincial local councils to be created under it would undermine his rule.)[2] In Baghdad he used the same realistic, pragmatic, and collaborationist approach in introducing general conscription and an equitable tax system, and especially a new system of land registration based on the Land Code of 1858.[3] All these reforms degenerated under his successors, who were bent on a literal enforcement of the central government's authority. There is, consequently, enough ground to assume that Mithat Paşa viewed the Constitution and the Parliament of 1876, not only as devices to limit the sultan's authority, but also as methods of establishing a system of balances and co-operation between the major social groups – the propertied groups and the bureaucracy, represented politically by the local and central governments respectively.

The Constitution was designated, as far as its timing and foreign policy goals were concerned, to upset the Russian efforts to intervene with the Western approval in order to 'liberalize' the Ottoman regime. From a functional viewpoint, however, it appeared as a rational measure designed to achieve essentially the integrative political roles performed by parliaments in the West. The need and place for a parliament were determined not by culture but by the functional necessities stemming from a diversified social structure and a differentiated

[1] The orthodox Muslims found the Constitution of 1876 contradictory to religion, but eventually the commission drafting the Constitution included ten members of the *ulema*. A truly objective study of the *ulema* is needed: many of them were far more reform-minded and progressive than the statesmen. See the excellent study by Uriel Heyd, 'The Ottoman Ulema and Westernization in the time of Selim III and Mahmud II', *Studies in Islamic History and Civilization* (Jerusalem, 1961), pp. 63–96.

[2] Sir Henry Elliot, *Some Revolutions and Other Diplomatic Experiences* (London, 1922), pp. 228ff.; Ali Haydar, *Life of Mithat Pasha* (London, 1903); M. Z. Pakalın, *Mithat Paşa* (İstanbul, 1940).

[3] See an excellent article on the subject by Albertine Jwaideh, 'Mithat Pasha and the Land System of Lower Iraq', in Albert Hourani (ed.), *Middle Eastern Affairs*, St Antony's Papers, no. 16 (Carbondale, n.d.), pp. 106–36.

political system.[1] The search for a viable balance between central authority and local power was a pressing problem born not of political idealism but of recognition of middle-class power. Mithat Paşa was merely acknowledging the existence of a social fact and trying to cope with it.

The elections to, and especially the debates in, the Parliament of 1877 brought out once more the division of interest and of opinion between the countryside groups and the bureaucracy. The members of the House of Deputies were elected by the administrative councils and the election committees in the provincial capitals, *sanjaks* and districts. The election committees, in turn, though headed by government officials, consisted mainly of notables, *ulema*, and the communal representatives of the non-Muslims. In addition to required technical qualifications, the candidates had to enjoy public esteem *and to possess taxable properties*. Thus, the House of Deputies represented essentially two groups – the commercial, agrarian and other propertied groups; and the government functionaries – instead of being a 'truly representative body'.[2] The *Ayan* Council, or the upper house, was appointed by the sultan and was of limited consequence.

The deputies from the countryside repeated in the parliamentary debates, perfunctorily and euphemistically, all the known formulae of loyalty to the sultan, Islam, the nation, and the fatherland. But in stating their practical demands they were precise and factual, and openly revolutionary in criticizing the bureaucracy. Many deputies – Muslim and non-Muslim alike – seemed well versed in the terminology of Western liberalism, even though many had no direct contact with Europe and were antagonistic to its culture and policies. They demanded a just and efficient tax system, freedom of the press, legal safeguards for private property, proper currency regulations, and freedom of enterprise, the latter being a demand voiced chiefly by the non-Muslim commercial groups. On cultural matters, the Muslims remained committed to Islam. But freedom was considered an essential condition for progress and for preserving man's true nature. Abdurrahim Efendi (Syria) insisted that individual freedom could survive only in a society that included equality and the right to speak of inequalities therein – for example, in taxation and appointment to government office. The deputies bitterly criticized the

[1] One must disagree with Leonard Binder's hasty judgement that parliaments 'were simply transferred wholly grown to the Middle East. They were, and remain, artificial legalisms and a continuing temptation to go outside the law' (*The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East* (New York, 1964), p. 5).

[2] Devereux, *op. cit.* p. 148, and Appendix, p. 269. We have personally contacted the heirs of the late Hakki Tarık Us and discovered that he had been working on a third volume on the Parliament of 1876. This volume consisted of biographies of deputies. Among the elected were the Çamurdanzadeler, Mollazadeler, Alemdarzadeler, and Evrenoszadeler, all former *ayans*. Mihalaki Gümüşgerdan of Filibe or Plovidv (Devereux erroneously lists him as a functionary), son of Athanas, was the head of a modern clothing enterprise there. The titles *efendi*, *bey*, and *ağa* also help identify the officials, landlords, and artisans.

tax system, which favored the rich and permitted government officials to receive bribes.[1]

The real targets for attack, however, were the government officials. Some of the criticism directed at them was extremely significant in the broader context of the claims put forth by the emerging middle class. Corrupt officials and courts, one deputy declared, could undermine the existing laws and 'produce ill effects similar to a civil war and be the real cause for the country's destruction'.[2] 'Law is the [means] to lift humanity to the level of civilization. Gentlemen, the law should take care of these officials. We must seek the [proper] law and everything will take its correct course.'[3] The bureaucracy caused backwardness in 'agriculture, commerce, arts, science, all other matters of public interest. Our officials permit some *derebeys*, false dynasties, tax collectors without conscience, *çorbacis* [Christian landowners and communal leaders of the Balkans], informants, and men of intrigue to worsen the situation of the poor.'[4] Some deputies, one of whom was a Muslim clergyman, attacked the *ulema* as a heaven for title-hungry nobles, who ignored education, knowledge, and science, especially in the provinces where progress was most needed. Others even mentioned the need to abolish the *medrese*, the religious schools.[5]

The debates inevitably led to demands for subjecting the executive to the control of the elected representatives of the people, and to legitimize power according to the peoples' will, since the 'state's existence depended on the people's acceptance'.[6] This issue came into the open on the question of whether a law approved by the Parliament could be amended by the Council of Ministers. The House of Deputies eventually inserted in the reply to the sultan's speech a critical remark censuring the poor administrative performance of the ministers who supposedly contributed to the Ottoman defeat in the war with Russia in 1877.

The clash between the legislature and the executive culminated in a dramatic

[1] For the records of debates, see Hakkı Tarık Us, *Meclis-i Mebusan 1293–1877, Zabıt Ceredesi*, 2 vols (İstanbul, 1940, 1954); Kemal H. Karpat, 'The Ottoman Parliament of 1876 and Its Social Significance', *Proceedings of the International Association of South East European Studies* (Sofia, 1969), pp. 247–57. On the debate on the press law, see my 'Mass Media', in Ward and Rustow, *op. cit.*

[2] Hakkı Tarık Us, *op. cit.* II, p. 113.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 276. Though remindful of Islamic law, these utterances call for a different regulatory concept.

[4] *Ibid.* p. 241 (Kazanciyan of Erzurum).   [5] *Ibid.* pp. 207–8, 210, 381–2, 382–5.

[6] 'Devlet ahalinin muhabbeti ile kaim', *ibid.* p. 113. The House also provided a forum for airing resentment of arbitrary administrative actions, but also for defending group interests, as in the case of a Mahir Bey, a political *persona non grata*. Mahir Bey, exiled to Konya, discovered that in Seydişehir and Beyşehir the tax auction was fraudulently handled. He apparently was instrumental in bringing the matter to the attention of the *vali*, who nullified the deal. The affected parties plotted and sent Mahir to another town. Mahir, following the constitution, petitioned the Parliament to seek personal redress. Hacı Mehmed Efendi, the deputy from Konya, objected to the letter, since he was associated with the tax auctioneers. This is a typical case of lobbying for interest groups. (*Ibid.* pp. 183–6.)

confrontation between the sultan and Ahmet Efendi, the *Kethüda*, or superin-
tendent, of a guild, an *awam*, 'a man of low class', as the high officials described
him. In a meeting convened to discuss the passage of the British fleet through
Ottoman waters, Ahmet Efendi told the sultan that he, the ruler, was the cause
of the country's misfortune, and that the deputies would never accept responsi-
bility for a situation arising outside their knowledge. Moreover, he claimed that
none of the issues debated and voted on by the House of Deputies was effectively
considered by the Administration, and none of its decisions was enforced.[1]
In a rage, the sultan threatened to return to the autocratic rule of Mahmud II,
but 'Ahmet Efendi, being a turbaned, unassuming man from the artisan posse',
insisted on his views.[2] The sultan eventually dismissed the House of Deputies.
Many of the critical deputies who wanted to remain in Istanbul to carry on their
'popular' mandate were forcibly put on ships and sent home, but they were not
arrested, for fear of inciting their constituents to open revolt. Thus ended the
first Ottoman parliamentary experiment, but not before it stirred the country
out of political apathy. The mass political mobilization had thus begun.

6. TOWARDS NATIONAL STATEHOOD

The latter part of the nineteenth century, especially the reign of Abdül-
hamid II (1876–1909), represents the synthesis of previous structural develop-
ments.[3] It was a period of growth and differentiation in the economic and social
fields, and of ideological transformation. Ottoman nationalism was gradually
superseded by Turkish nationalism. Political events reached the turning-point
for the throne, the intelligentsia, and the military. These three major organized
forces conflicted or coalesced, as the case may be, with each other and with the
economic groups, and eventually put a virtual end to Abdülhamid II's rule in
1908, though his reign continued formally for another year. In fact, all these
events were the prelude to the establishment of the Republic and the formal
abolition of the monarchy and the Caliphate in 1922–4. We shall analyse first
the throne's position. The constitution of 1876 endeavored to institute a con-
stitutional monarchy in order to limit the sultan's powers and, thus, preserve
and consolidate the division of labor among the three classical branches of
government. The Constitution created the legislature and defined its functions
according to the Western models, though its relation to the executive was justi-
fied in terms of the *şura* (council) and *meşveret* (consultation), both of which

[1] *Ibid.* p. 401.

[2] Mahmud Celaleddin Paşa, *Mirat-ı Hakikat* (İstanbul, 1909), provides interesting
reading on the attitude of officials toward the deputies.

[3] Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi Birinci Meşrutiyet ve İstibdat Devirleri 1876–1907*
(Ankara, 1962); Mahmud Kemal İnal, *Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar*, vols. VI, VII,
VIII (İstanbul, 1946–9); Tahsin Paşa, *Abdulhamid Yıldız Hatıraları* (İstanbul, 1931).
Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*; Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern
Turkey*; Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*.

came from Islam. At the same time the Constitution recognized the sultan as the head of the Executive and gave him extensive powers in the appointment and dismissal of ministers. But the deputies, as mentioned previously, began soon to demand control over the Executive, since they were the 'people's representatives'. These demands, if fulfilled, would have assured the Executive's independence from the sultan, and possibly have permitted a rational and functional development of the bureaucracy in line with the country's felt needs. Abdülhamid's autocracy stopped, and in fact perverted, all these political trends. The early Ottoman reformers, relatively free of direct foreign interference, and not faced with complex problems, had followed the functionalist logic in making the Grand Vezir a *Başvekil*, prime minister, as mentioned earlier. The *Başvekil* in turn developed his own administrative apparatus. This trend emerged clearly after the destruction of the Janissaries in 1826; that is, after the major threat to the reforms had been removed. The great prime ministers, known also as reformers, despite their different philosophies, such as Reşit, Ali, Fuad and Mithat Paşas, emerged in 1839–76. But from 1876 onwards, almost to the end of the Ottoman empire, there were no prime ministers comparable in stature to them. Sultan Abülhamid II acquired effective control of the Executive and used the prime minister as a mere executive agent.

The effort to consolidate the power of the throne began actually under Abdülaziz in 1870. It was Abülhamid II who increased the throne's power and transformed the sultan from a supreme executive organ, as he was regarded throughout the Ottoman empire, into an autocratic semi-deity as Caliph, and who sought to legitimize his powers through a reinterpretation and perversion of Ottoman Islamic political theory. Abdülhamid II's autocracy was different from Mahmud II's strong rule. Indeed, Mahmud II followed the old Ottoman tradition of *hükum* and *örf*; that is, he relied upon the Executive' absolute prerogative to use whatever authority was necessary in order to enforce government functions. Mahmud II did not attempt to legitimize his power by reinterpreting the Islamic law, but relied on political practices. He referred to some old political traditions in an effort to show that he was acting in accordance with the traditional separation of powers that had been implemented by the Ottoman government. He claimed that this was in conformity with Islam. Abdülhamid II broke away from an essentially secular political tradition by generalizing the rule of Islam in government affairs.

Much of Abdülhamid's policy stemmed from his own personality, the dictates of outside events, from the alienation of the intelligentsia, and changes in the demographic cultural composition of the empire. He had a limited education, a narrow dogmatic spirit, but also a perceptive, intuitive nature. Aware that the fate of all sultans since Selim III had been decided first by the Janissaries and the *ulema* and then by the court officials, he developed a morbid fear of plots. Eventually, he won the *ulema* to his side and succeeded in controlling the bureaucracy. A series of internal and external developments also helped consolidate

the throne's position. The rapid change in native customs and way of life and the diversification and secularization of intellectual pursuits brought about a crisis of identity. Foreign interference, coupled with the religious motives which stood behind Stratford Canning's 'reformist' urges (which were denounced by Ottoman intellectuals who attacked the era of 'liberalism' under Abdülmecit and Abdülaziz), appeared as immediate threats to society's cultural survival. The throne therefore appeared not only as the repository of all ancient values, but also as the agency most capable of defending and preserving them. Abülhamid's pious nature, ascetic habits, frugal life and occasional resistance to outside demands seems to have enhanced his stature among the religious-minded, as well as the traditionalists. His efforts to reassert the identity of society, though more in religious rather than political secular terms, struck a nationalist cord, even among the most progressive thinkers.

Unlike the previous sultans, Abdülhamit II had a rather simple but ideological interpretation of reforms, civilization, and East and West. First, he seemed to believe that human nature rather than reason dictated man's attitudes, that the emotional life of Westerners was determined by national attachments, while the dominant force among Easterners was religious instinct, that much of the essence of contemporary civilization was rooted in the basic Islam, that this Islam was the product of Arab genius, which built a socio-political system around the religious instinct, and that materialism, naturalism and secularism (*maddiyyun, tabiyyun, dahriyyun*) were interrelated enemies of religion.

Actually, as may be noted, this chain of thought was not a defense of Islam or of the basic tenets of religion. It was a reassertion of the Islamic identity and of piety as strongholds of resistance to the onslaught of change. As happens in times of crises, this was also a response to the changed conditions in the Ottoman empire and in the Islamic world in general.

The war of 1877 with Russia, and the treaties of San Stefano and Berlin of 1878–9, resulted in the loss of vital territories south and southeast of the Danube and the Caucasus, which were populated by large numbers of Muslim–Turkish people.[1] The mass migration of over one million people which began in this period is still referred to by many Turks today, when asked about the time of their parents' migration, as '93 sökümü' or the disaster – or literally 'unweaving of 93' (1293/1877). In the following decades the empire lost additional European territories and witnessed the migration of additional thousands of Muslim Turks into Thrace and Anatolia. Consequently, the empire's Christian–Muslim balance disappeared, and the Muslim element acquired an overwhelming majority in the remaining areas. The idea of a multinational state based on common citizenship lost its practical importance since the Ottoman state became predominantly inhabited by Muslims, and aside from Iran, it was the only remaining

[1] Hilmi Ziya Ülken, 'Aperçu général de l'évolution des immigrations en Turquie', *Integration*, vol. V (October, 1959), pp. 220–40. Ahmet Cevat Eren, *Türkiyede Göç ve Göçmen Meseleleri* (İstanbul, 1966), pp. 69–72, *Türk Ansiklopedisi* under *Göç*.

major independent Muslim state in the world. The future seemed to lay in capitalizing on the Muslim features of the empire in order to rally all the faithful, first, in order to assure the empire's survival, and secondly, to start the movement of Muslim liberation from European rule as advocated by Jamal al-Din Afghani, who forced to leave the country in 1871, was invited back and greatly honored in 1894–7. Hence Abdülhamid's efforts to revitalize the Caliphate and use it as the rallying symbol of Pan-Islamism. At this stage it appeared as though the empire could preserve its integrity only by consolidating the unity of its Muslim subjects. The strong emphasis on the Arab character of Islam and on the sultans' position as Caliph, therefore, had the practical aim of preserving the Arab's loyalty and of neutralizing further the relatively feeble nationalist, separatist endeavors of the Christian Arabs. Indeed, the Arab–Muslim Middle East loomed as the major area of strength capable of assuring the empire's survival. On the other hand, the nationalist awakening among Muslims in India and their warm affection for the Caliphate (notably the *Khilafa* movement under Amir Ali) gave additional impetus to the metamorphosis of the throne into a symbolic religious institution. Thus, in the hour of its greatest weakness, the Ottoman state was called to undertake the liberation of Muslims on behalf of the universal ideas of Islam, while the very Muslims demanding liberation were actually seeking to materialize the tenets of their particular brand of nationalism.

The reign of Abdülhamid was also a period of intensive growth, which brought more clearly into focus the conflict between the differentiated Ottoman social structure and a ruling order whose ideology became increasingly dysfunctional. At the basis of this growth was increased economic activity, spurred by trade with the West. Tobacco cultivation spread in various areas as it became one of the major Ottoman export items. The silk industry received new attention, while coal mines were opened in various parts of Anatolia. The building of railways under Abdülhamid, as well as the introduction of other communication facilities and of modern utilities in cities, created new occupational groups. Even the peasant was now affected by economic change. The gradual liberalization of the Land Code of 1858, coupled with the emergence of commercial groups even in the remotest towns of the Middle East, drastically changed the traditional structure of rural and tribal societies. In some areas, such as lower Iraq, the tribal *sheikh*s became landowners and town residents, while in other areas landownership became a prime factor in gaining social status. Commercial activity in coastal towns was still in the hands of non-Muslims, but in the interior, and even in İstanbul and Salonica, Muslim entrepreneurial groups were on the rise. Some of these were former migrants from Balkan countries who had sold their land and small enterprises and migrated to Anatolia to start a new life.

A comprehensive study of the economic and social history of the Ottoman empire in the nineteenth century could throw light on the institutional and ideological developments throughout the years between 1856 and 1922. The

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role of the town notables in the Revolution of 1908, the sudden mushrooming of political parties in 1908–18, the speed with which the Union and Progress party established branches throughout the land at the initiative of the local gentry, and finally the ability of Mustafa Kemal to mobilize the masses in the war of liberation between 1919 and 1922, through the use of communal leaders, point to the existence of new leadership groups among the middle strata. All this indicates that the economic penetration of the West had changed drastically not only the modes of occupation in the Ottoman countryside but also the stratification patterns among Muslims.

A most reliable indicator of the social transformation in this period is urbanization. The urban population in the Western part probably tripled in size, if some statistics concerning Izmir, Salonica and several other towns can be considered to be indicators of a general trend.[1] Much of the inflow into urban areas was caused on the one hand by immigration from lost territories and on the other by the flight of peasants unable to endure the worsening conditions in agriculture. However, the towns offered limited opportunity for employment. The newcomers gave birth to large lower-class groups which generated in time a new group of nationalist intellectuals and a social philosophy of their own, which acquired in due time special political meaning.

The origin of many intellectuals who emerged after 1880 may be traced to these dislocated groups, forced to flee their ancestral lands either by misery or the exclusive nationalism of the Balkan states. It was this group which hailed Namık Kemal's play *Vatan* as an assertion of national character and a call for patriotic action, and was ready to demonstrate and call for war when Russian demands and Western intransigence went too far. In some subtle ways this lower urban stratum embodied the seeds of a modern mass society, not because of advanced technology but because of the drab uniformity of its living conditions and a sort of alienation resulting from social dislocation and the gradual loss of traditional values. In a matter of one generation, the men from Monastir in Macedonia and Elazığ in Anatolia had become alike in the slums of Kasımpaşa in İstanbul. The conditions for nationalism were here, only the leaders and the ideology were missing.

The professionalization of the bureaucracy during Abdülhamid's reign through expansion and improvement was another development. The ministries mentioned in the constitution of 1876 were maintained (with only one or two exceptions), such as foreign affairs, interior, justice, defence, navy, finance, education, construction and trade, *meşihat* (*sheihulislam*), *Vakf*s, and the Council of State. But the ministers headed by the *Sadrazam* were not an independent executive, but obedient agents of the Sultan.

The heterogeneous organization of the court system was also preserved: the *nizamiye* courts tried civil cases among Ottoman subjects; *şeriat* courts tried family cases among Muslims; *cemaat* courts tried commercial cases among

[1] Issawi, *op. cit.* pp. 17, 232.

non-Muslim Ottomans, the *muhtelit ticaret* courts tried commercial cases among foreigners established in the empire and Ottoman subjects; *konsolosluk* (Consulate) courts dealt with cases among Ottomans and the citizens of the countries represented by the consulates. But the courts under Abdülhamid won a degree of autonomy unknown in the past.[1] The legal cases concerning foreigners were taken from the Foreign Ministry and placed under the jurisdiction of the Justice Ministry. Finally, in 1880, the office of the Public Prosecutor was established.

The existing file system was expanded to cover all officials in 1877–83, a salary scale was introduced, and steps were taken to adopt the merit system in the appointment and promotion of officials. As a consequence of all this the number of government officials increased greatly due in part to the administrative reform in 1864–77 and the division of the territory into *vilayet, sancak, kaza,* and *nahiye*.[2] The *vilayets* (provinces) were attached to the Ministry of Interior. It is interesting to note that after 1878 the Arab provinces began to be placed at the head of the list of ceremonies in order to emphasize their importance, and the *valis* (governors) of these provinces received the highest pay. The bureaucratic-administrative reforms failed in the end, chiefly due to lack of public control and failure to define executive responsibility. Yet it was this bureaucratic basis which enabled the Young Turks in 1908–18, and then Mustafa Kemal, to establish a national state and initiate modernization reforms.

The rise of the intelligentsia as a politically significant group during Abdülhamid II's reign was one of the major developments related to the transformation of the Ottoman state. An educational system may be instrumental in bringing up intellectuals with a particular frame of mind. But the educational system itself is the outcome of more basic economic and social factors. For instance, the Christian minorities' schools, though supported mainly by local communities, were qualitatively superior to Turkish schools, thus reflecting in a way a higher economic status, professionalization and specialization among these groups. The Turks were, in fact, economically speaking, second-class citizens in their own country. But the changes in the social arrangement and the emergence of new middle-class groups among Muslim Turks after the 1850s showed its impact on the educational system too.

The so-called modern schools, established in 1839–60, were designated to train the personnel needed for government service. But the schools established after 1860–95 were predominantly professional and technical. In the first period there were only six major professional schools. In the second period there were established at least twenty-five professional schools, in law, finance, commerce, civil engineering, customs, veterinary science, and police training, while the

[1] Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, pp. 342–8.
[2] Karal, *op. cit.* p. 332; see also for background, A. du Velay, *Essai sur l'histoire financière de la Turquie* (Paris, 1903); Ubicini, *Letters on Turkey* (Paris, 1956); Bailey, *op. cit.*

older ones, such as the schools for civil servants (1859) and medicine were expanded.[1]

Much of this educational development actually rested upon the *Maarifi Umumiye Nizamnamesi* (Regulation of General Education) issued by Abdülaziz in 1869, which remained in use until the Republic. The Regulation, following a French model, called for the establishment of an educational system beginning with elementary education and culminating in the *Darulfünun* (University). Theoretically, it established thus a three-layer educational system. The program outlined in the regulation began to be enforced chiefly during Abdülhamid II's reign. By 1879–86 there was established 119 *rüşdiye* (junior) schools in the provinces, and 17 in İstanbul, and several *idadiyes* (lycées) in the provincial capitals. Both became preparatory steps for entrance into the professional schools as well as for occupying many government jobs. But the *sübyan* (elementary) schools were ignored and, thus, as Cevdet Paşa, the historian and the statesman, remarked, the 'work began in the middle,... the establishment of the *rüşdiye* was a forward step in the path of progress...[But], in fact, the elementary schools should have been improved [first] and [then] establish the *rüşdiye* schools to bring up the children graduating from there.'[2] The University (*darulfünun*, or house of sciences) was closed in 1871, but not before a number of lectures and courses were given. Thus, the Ottoman educational system, even after its improvements in 1869–86, consisted chiefly of middle-level schools concentrated in towns and cities. This school system with a very narrow social basis was the cradle of the new intelligentsia.

The rise of a new and sizable intelligentsia after 1870 reflected not only the increase in the number of schools but also the social and economic status and cultural outlook of the provincial urban strata from which it emerged. Indeed, the origin of the group of intellectuals raised in the new professional schools may throw some light upon their political attitudes and ideological orientation. Unlike the Young Ottomans, who belonged mostly (Ali Suavi was a notable exception) to the middle and upper ranks of the Ottoman bureaucracy or to the urban groups in the capital, the new intellectuals of the Hamidian period came from the provincial towns. These were often the sons of local notables, scions of agrarian families or even of the rising local Muslim–Turkish merchants. In a way they represented a new social group which rose, as explained earlier, due to the economic activity during and after the Crimean war and the Paris treaty of 1856. It is interesting to note in this context that none of the five founders of the first Young Turk secret organization in the Medical School (1889) came from İstanbul. Thus, the introduction of the mid-level and of a series of professional schools helped expand the size of the intelligentsia. Since the bulk of the government personnel was recruited from this new intelligentsia, the children

[1] The basis for this information is still Osman Ergin, *Türkiye Maarif Tarihi* (İstanbul, 1939–45), 5 vols.
[2] Cevdet Paşa, *Tezakir 1–12*, ed. Cavid Baysun (Ankara, 1953), p. 11.

of the new middle-class strata established a foothold in the imperial bureaucracy. Furthermore the professional schools which provided a degree of professional specialization created the conditions for selectivity and stratification among the intelligentsia, and produced eventually a political ideology and a leadership group; in fact, a new political élite.

The rise of the military officers and their political roles during the nineteenth century cannot be separated from those of the intelligentsia. The first modern schools were established in order to train the military, as were several other professional schools, such as the school of medicine. Civilian schools began to be established only after the government services expanded in a variety of new fields and the need for trained personnel became acute. The tensions between the civil and military bureaucracies failed to materialize during most of the nineteenth century. The powerful Ottoman military traditions embodied in society's culture, as well as a certain identity of view among the educated, preserved unity between the military officers and the civilian intellectuals.

There were, however, certain aspects of the military training which produced qualitative differences among officers. The training in military schools was relatively more advanced and technical in nature. Life was organized and disciplined. It was dominated by a strong *ésprit de corps* and especially by a sense of community and camaraderie lacking among the civilians. The officers were drawn from all over the country, not from the peasantry as is commonly assumed, but chiefly from the provincial towns.

The political roles played by the military in the transformation of the Ottoman state in 1889–1908 and thereafter were preceded by a process of differentiation and specialization which resulted in the emergence of an élite among the officers. The first truly modern and integrated military school, the War College (*Mekteb-i Ulümu Harbiye*), was established in 1834. It was a professional school intended to train a new type of officer. But the truly meaningful development in this school did not occur until 1861, when a special category, the *Erkân-ı Harb* (staff officer) class, was formally created for post-graduate officers.

By 1876 a series of new military *rüşdiye* (junior high schools) and *askeri idadi* (military high schools) were opened in İstanbul, Erzurum, Damascus, Bosnia, Baghdad and Monastir,[1] that is, in each city which was the center of a regional army. In consequence, the *Harbiye* (War College), and especially its staff-officer section, became the most coveted step of the ladder of the military hierarchy. The staff officer came to represent the peak of the military élite. Differing from the corrupt civil bureaucracy, where high positions were granted often according to *intisâb* (family bureaucratic succession) or to the whim of the sultan or the premier, the *erkân-ı harb* officer reached his position through stiff competition and

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[1] The information is derived from Muharrem Mazlum, *Erkâni Harbiye Tarihçesi* (İstanbul, 1930), and Ziya Şakir, *Tanzimat Devrinden Sonra Osmanlı Nizam Ordusu* (İstanbul, 1957). See also Dankwart A. Rustow, 'The Army', in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, ed. Robert Ward and D. A. Rustow (Princeton, 1964), pp. 352–69.

sustained work.[1] All officers spoke foreign languages, and many studied abroad.

The staff officers represented various regions of the empire. Available geographical data taken at random – for instance, regarding the 17 graduates in 1885 – shows that three of them came from the Balkan towns, six from Anatolia, two from the Arab provinces and only three from İstanbul, while the origin of the rest is unknown.[2] The next year, when, incidentally, the staff officers were separated into 'military' and 'technicians' according to their specialization, there were eleven graduates, but the geographical distribution remained proportionately similar to the previous year. A great number of *erkân-ı harb* officers in the Ottoman empire reached the highest offices of government. During the Young Turk period and the first three decades of the Republic it was the same *erkân-ı harb* which supplied the top political leaders. Enver Paşa (infantryman with number 1542 of the fifty-fifth class), Ahmet Muhtar, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), Kazım Karabekir, Kazım Orbay and scores of other leaders in between 1826 and 1924 were staff officers. It is interesting to note also that the junta which engineered the military revolution of 1960 in Turkey was composed mainly of staff officers.

The military establishment had a rather functional modern organizational framework topped by the *Bab-ı Seraskeri* (Military Porte), or Ministry of Defense. The name was changed to *Harbiye Nezareti* (War Ministry) in 1879, but it reverted to its old name in 1884, and later it took once more the title of Ministry of War, or simply *Harbiye*. The brains of the military establishment was the *Dar Şuray-i Askeri* (Military Council), which dealt with military matters and was composed of the following sections: War, Supply, Planning, Judiciary and Health. The most vital organizational development towards the end of Abdülhamid's reign occurred with the formal establishment of the *Erkân-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye*, or General Staff Council, which represented the six major branches of the military forces. It became, in fact, not only the planning office for the military but also the final step in the selection of the élites and of leadership.

The army proper, commanded by the *erkân*s, consisted of regular (*nizamiye*) troops assembled around seven army centers: İstanbul, Monastir, Shumen (Şumnu), Erzurum, Damascus, Baghdad and Sana (Yemen). The troops were conscripts serving four years, and consisted mostly of ethnic Turks. Usually the bulk of the army was supplied by only one-third of the population. In 1877 the total number of the regular army troops was 206,541 men, 38,197 horses, and 3,660 mobile cannons. The reserve (*redif*) troops amounted to about 500,000 men at this date.[3]

The disastrous war of 1877 with Russia showed that the troops were poorly trained, the equipment was obsolete and, more important, it lacked dynamic,

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[1] Mazlum, *op. cit.* pp. 11 ff., reproduces the graduation diplomas which describe the officers academic background and training.

[2] Mazlum, *op. cit.* pp. 214–16.   [3] Karal, *op. cit.* pp. 355–7.

ideologically motivated commanders. The fact that the Russian troops advanced to the outskirts of İstanbul was a profound shock to the sultan, the army, and the officers. The Ottoman leaders finally realized that the empire was no longer a powerful state but a shrinking conglomeration of territories and conflicting ethnic-religious groups. The war and the Treaty of Berlin (1878) were the catalysts which precipitated the reorganization of the military and civil bureaucrats, the expansion of professional schools and the ideological developments which occurred under Abdülhamid II, as mentioned earlier.

The rise of a large group of intellectuals and the professionalization and specialization among the civil and military bureaucracies, both of which formed the bulk of the intelligentsia, could not produce changes without a new system of political beliefs or ideology. Indeed, one of the distinctive marks of the leadership groups in changing societies is their commitment to a new set of political values. This system of political values or ideology in the Ottoman state appeared as nationalism.

The Young Ottomans, notably Namık Kemal, developed the concepts of fatherland (*vatan*), political identity, and loyalty to the state within the framework of the Ottoman–Muslim culture. These formed the psychological foundations of the nascent Turkish nationalism, and the political culture of the new generation of intellectuals. This nationalism moved from a defensive into a dynamic state through the addition both of the economic and social ingredients mentioned above, and also of the scientific thought and the secular view of man and society. The teaching of natural sciences in the schools, the rapid changes in the society, the advance in specialization, and the overall level of sophistication necessitated a secular, philosophical outlook on life and society. Yet, paradoxically enough, Abdülhamid, while encouraging specialization and the introduction of technology, muzzled free inquiry and forbade teaching of the social sciences, supposedly in order to protect the sanctity of Islam. The students with their positivist scientific logic acquired in the schools, and with fresh concepts of progress and civilization, could not accept the explanation that the hordes of religious men of dubious character, of beggars, occultists, who had filled the towns and enjoyed government support, symbolized the empire's true identity and purpose, and that the empire's salvation lay in even more identification with religion.[1] Moreover, the true causes of backwardness, when considered in the

[1] There was a contradiction between Abdülhamid's religious orientation and the establishment of this relatively modern professional school system. The purpose of education seemed to be only the imparting of skills necessary to meet the government's administrative needs. Moreover, the schools were deemed to be an excellent means for indoctrinating the pupils with loyalty to the sultan as symbolically expressed in the customary greeting: 'Padişahım çok yaşa' (Long live my ruler). The school system, however, avoided dealing with the more basic question of philosophy and outlook on the world.

Social sciences were never taught, the fear of identification with the Western values and modes of life was dominant despite the fact that the educational system the Ottomans were trying to introduce would soon lead there. Indeed, the learning of French and the

light of positivist rational thought, appeared to lie in the government's inability to establish a rational and efficient organization and thus move into the modern age.

Nationalism consequently appeared not only as a political solution to the survival of the state and of Turks as a cultural-political group, but also as a channel for the introduction of science and progress for the new political unit: the nation. As Yusuf Akçura pointed out in 1904 in his classic *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* ('Three Political Ways'), Pan-Islamism and Ottomanism had already failed. Nationalism was the logical choice, not only for survival but also for modernization. The process of modern communication which began with the newspaper and the telegraph created also a modern literature. Literary works became, in turn, not only a major channel for the diffusion of new ideas; they also gave a new impetus to the development of nationalism. The need for a language understood by a majority led to the vernacular Turkish, to the search for a national Turkish history, and for a national culture. Thus, by the time the new intellectuals formed their secret association known as the Young Turks in 1889, to protest against Abdülhamid's suppression of freedoms and ask for the reinstatement of the constitution of 1876, Turkish nationalism was already born.[1] The Young Turks who escaped abroad and organized a network of political organizations (*İttihad ve Terakki*, 'Unity and Progress') and published more than 100 newspapers and reviews in European countries often thought of and expressed themselves as Turks. To be a Turk meant not only an ethnic identity but also a political one.

The climax of the Young Turks (Union and Progress) activity was the revolution of 1908, the first of its kind in the Ottoman Empire.[2] The revolution itself, however, was not carried by the sophisticated Young Turks in the European capitals but by a hard core of military officers in the Salonica–Monastir area. Their upheaval was prompted by the European powers' plans to infringe further upon Ottoman sovereignty. The scanty scholarly works on the Young Turks ignore the vital fact that the rebellion of the officers in Salonica in 1908 was supported by widespread popular meetings in the area. These meetings were led mostly by the local Muslim notables of the Balkan towns as they proudly identi-

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desire to become identified with a form of life considered superior became commonplace among intellectuals at the end of the century. There is certainly a compulsory logic of thought covering eventually all aspects of life even if one were to study only the positive sciences. The above conditions provided the philosophical roots of the intelligentsia's aloofness and opposition to the government, and their orientation toward secularism and positivism as expressed in the *Meşveret*, the major publication of the Young Turks. Eventually secularism and positivism entered into the stream of nationalism.

[1] The factual discussion together with the relevant bibliography may be found in my article on modern Turkey in the *Cambridge History of Islam*. See also Ercüment Kuran, 'The Impact of Nationalism on the Turkish Elite', *Beginnings of Modernization*, pp. 109–17.

[2] Ernest Ramsaur, *The Young Turks: Prelude to Revolution* (Princeton, 1957), first for the formative years and Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks, The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908–1914* (London, 1969).

fied themselves in the cables (I was able to count 117 cables) sent to the sultan in İstanbul.

The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 resulted from the combined effort of the army officers, the town notables and their educated offspring. It was the prelude to the fundamental social, economic and political changes which, combined with the military defeat in 1918, brought the empire to an end. The Young Turk Era, 1908–18, was the last phase of the Ottoman state. It was also the final stage in which the last conditions necessary for the emergence of a national secular Turkish state were created. During this period Turkish nationalism acquired distinctive secularist features which forced the Arab intelligentsia to shed their final loyalties to the Ottoman state and strive to create their own national states. The Young Turks undertook also a series of educational, political and economic reforms – including the rejection of the capitulations. Political parties of all tendencies were established, several ideologies – islamism, westernism, nationalism – found countrywide response. The Ottoman state thus entered the age of political modernization. It could not survive the process of transformation, since empires by their nature can seldom withstand pressure and adapt to the complex conditions necessitated by structural and political changes. The culminating point in the transformation of the Ottoman state was the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. But the republic carried with it the Ottoman legacy. Its social structure, leadership, and patterns of transformation followed a certain sequence and regularity which can be fathomed only by understanding the socio-political history of the Ottoman state as attempted in this study.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN AT MADISON
MADISON, WISCONSIN