Authoritarian Populism and Liberal Democracy

Edited by
Ivor Crewe · David Sanders

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In honour and memory of Anthony King, 1935–2017, dedicated teacher, scholar and advocate of liberal democracy.

PREFACE

The essays in this book celebrate the life and work of Anthony King, Millennium Professor of Government at the University of Essex, who died in January 2017. Tony taught at Essex for over fifty years and several of the contributors to this volume were his former students and/or research collaborators. He had a passionate lifelong interest in the health of liberal democracy and the continuing challenges that it faces. In recognition of his contribution to the study of democracy, a conference was organised at Essex in May 2018, chaired by John Bercow, the Speaker of the House of Commons and another of Tony's former students. The theme of the conference was one close to Tony's heart—the tensions between authoritarian populism and liberal democracy. The essays here seek to explain how and why authoritarian populist opinion has developed and been mobilised in a variety of democratic countries in recent years. They also explore the implications of this growth in authoritarian sentiment for the operation of democratic politics in the future. We are grateful to all the participants in the conference and especially to Anthony Forster, Essex's Vice-Chancellor, who provided the necessary funding.

Oxford and Wivenhoe   Ivor Crewe
December 2018   David Sanders

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Introduction

Ivor Crewe and David Sanders

Authoritarian populism is on the rise in political systems across the world. In the Far East, popularly elected authoritarians rule in China, the Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore. In the Islamic world, popularly elected authoritarians have ruled Iran since 1979; and more recently, Turkey's Recep Erdogan has offered an object lesson in how to use democratic elections to subvert democracy by increasing political repression and central government control. In the US, Donald Trump's administration has initiated a series of 'populist' policies aimed at 'protecting American jobs' and keeping out undesirable (especially Muslim) immigrants whilst doing everything it can to undermine public confidence. In the UK, United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)'s success in provoking a referendum on the UK's membership of the EU, which produced precisely the result UKIP had aimed for, and the subsequent shift in the Conservative Party's centre of gravity towards a hard Brexit from the EU have fuelled support for policies that emphasise Britain's narrow national economic interests and seek to restrict immigration into the UK. In the wider European context, anti-immigrant/anti-EU parties have made

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successful populist appeals to substantial (though still minority) parts of the electorates, inter alia, in France, the Netherlands, Italy, Austria, Greece and Hungary.

Populism (invariably of the political right) was a term widely used to characterise much of Latin American and Iberian-peninsula politics in the middle years of the twentieth century. Populist leaders were held to make appeals over the heads of 'civil society organisations' directly to voters' basest concerns about the integrity of the nation and unwarranted intrusions in its internal affairs by outside agents, their fears about foreigners (later to be overtaken by fears about immigrants) and the threats posed by left-wing ideologies. The authoritarian component in the mix was derived from a preparedness by such leaders to use severe repression in support of their political ends. That repression in turn was both justified and sold to the public in terms of (1) the permanent risk that civil liberties would degenerate into civil licence and ungovernable anarchy and (2) the need for a punitive judicial system that would preserve civil order (Dix 1985).

It might be argued, of course, that authoritarian populism would be expected to thrive in political systems that are not based on liberal democratic principles and practices. After all, such regimes are already likely to be authoritarian in character, and leaders can often achieve (re)election by offering simplistic, nationalistic solutions to electorates already rendered manipulable, malleable or gullible by state control of the mass media. Yet support for authoritarian populist leaders and movements is now sufficiently extensive across the liberal democratic world that scholars and commentators are striving to understand both what underpins this support and what dangers it might imply for the health of democracy itself.

Empirical analyses of the bases of electoral support for populist parties in democratic countries suggest that this support is typically rooted in a rejection of contemporary liberal politics and discourse (Wodak et al. 2013). Populism thrives among those who feel that their opinions and interests have been overridden by a mainstream party system that is so concerned to protect minority rights (and often ethnic minority rights) that they feel both politically dispossessed and economically left behind (Jones 2007). Partly because of the consistent anti-immigrant discourse of populist movements, the use of the term *populism* almost invariably carries negative connotations—the idea that there is something morally disreputable or even repugnant about both its proponents and its supporters. *Authoritarian populism*, if anything, is even worse. Not only are unpleas-

ant views being articulated or supported, but they are infected with an authoritarian mind-set that is dismissive of counter-opinion and prepared to use all means possible to achieve the populists' (morally suspect) policy goals. Yet for the populists themselves, and for their electoral supporters, this characterisation is almost wholly false. For them, to be populist is simply to articulate or support popular views—perhaps politically incorrect ones—which liberals and socialists do not like.

This book seeks to use the term "authoritarian populism" in a politically neutral way focusing on its character, its sources and its likely consequences. We regard authoritarian populism as a two-pronged phenomenon. On the one hand, it consists of leaders who are elected on simplistic, nationalistic electoral platforms who pursue illiberal and authoritarian policies once they achieve office. On the other hand, it also involves a mind-set among mass publics that embraces resentment of immigrants and immigration, cynicism about human rights, support for robust foreign policies, ideological sympathy for the market and rolling back the state and, in Europe, opposition to the European Union. As several of the chapters in this book show, this mind-set is much more prevalent than current voting for right-wing extremist parties in most Western democracies. The views that the mind-set represents, however, constitute a potential reservoir of electoral support for far-right campaigns and movements that wish to use elections as a route to subverting democratic institutions and practices. This is why contemporary authoritarian populism represents such a serious challenge to liberal democracy.

Part I of this book (Chaps. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8) describes contemporary authoritarian populist movements and tendencies in a number of major liberal democratic countries. In Chap. 2, Ivor Crewe argues that populist politics has historically been weak in the UK and remains relatively weak compared with other democracies. He suggests that social conservatism and moral authoritarianism have waxed and waned in popularity but rarely turned into a political force of any significance. Resentment at immigration is the long-standing exception, the *only* issue since Irish Home Rule with the consistent capacity to disrupt the electoral basis of the party system. The impact of populist movements and politicians exploiting the immigration issue depends more on the existence of intermediary institutions that blunt the exposure of political elites to the 'people', and vice versa, than on the strength of public opinion. Crewe argues that these intermediary institutions have been eroded in recent years. He concludes that populism in the UK would shrivel if the issue of immigration

was resolved, but economic demographics make this unlikely for the fore-seeable future.

In Chap. 3, Joe Greenwood and Joe Twyman use a multi-wave panel survey of over 14,000 respondents to explore the structure of authoritar-ian populist attitudes in Britain. They demonstrate that the UK electorate can be divided into five ideological groupings, based around the notion of authoritarian populism, that are much more complex than simple notions of left and right. They characterise the five groups as 'Right Wing Populists', 'Mainstream Populists', 'Centrist Weaker Populists', 'Centrist Moderates with Populist Leanings' and 'Left-wing Progressives'. Their analysis shows these five groups differ systematically in terms of their atti-tudes towards immigrants, their support for (or rejection of) human rights, their positions on the left-right spectrum, their support (or other-wise) for a robust British foreign policy and their attitudes towards the EU. Greenwood and Twyman show that group membership has a very powerful impact on electoral preferences, over and above standard vote predictors, in both the 2015 and 2017 general elections.

In Chap. 4, John Bartle, David Sanders and Joe Twyman extend the empirical analysis of authoritarian populist opinion to 12 European coun-tries. The chapter reports the results of simultaneous surveys on authori-tarian populist attitudes conducted simultaneously in the UK, France, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Poland, Italy, Spain, Romania, Lithuania and Holland. Representative sample surveys with a common set of questions were conducted in each of these countries in November 2016. The chapter shows that authoritarian populist attitudes (anti-immigrant, anti-EU, anti-Human Rights and pro a robust foreign policy) form a single authoritarian populist factor or scale in ten of the twelve countries surveyed (the two exceptions are Romania and Lithuania). Across these ten countries, the *sources* of populist attitudes are also very similar, with particularly strong effects being observed for the perceived cultural consequences of immigration. The chapter uses cluster analysis to show that authoritarian populism is *not* an exclusively right-wing mind-set among European mass publics. Analysis of voting data shows that the res-ervoir of support for authoritarian populist parties is much larger than either the current electoral strength of such parties or the proportion of the population that intends to vote for them at the next general election would suggest.

In Chap. 5, David Marsh explores the relationship between populism and the 2016 Brexit vote that resulted in the UK's projected withdrawal

from the European Union. Marsh argues that the Brexit vote was the expression of an intense 'anti-politics' sentiment among significant parts of the UK electorate that itself reflects a rejection of the centralising tendencies of successive British governments. For Marsh, the irony of the Brexit decision is that, in response, the current UK government has sought to re-centralise power, rather than de-centralising it, as many Brexit supporters would have preferred.

In Chap. 6, Harold D. Clarke, Marianne C. Stewart and Paul Whiteley investigate how populist attitudes and other important factors affected voting for Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton in the 2016 US presidential election and the surprising outcome of that contest. The analyses employ national survey data gathered in a module included in the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) project. The survey includes questions on topics related to populism such as attitudes towards immigration and racial minorities, differences between national and personal economic evaluations and feelings of relative deprivation. Other relevant data include judgements about party performance on important issues such as the economy and health care, perceived traits of Trump and Clinton, attitudes towards women's roles and statuses, gays and lesbians, abortion and same-sex marriage as well as measures of partisanship, general liberal-conservative orientations and socio-demographic characteristics. Crucially, the analyses show that traditional predictors of US voting behaviour (most especially, party identification) came together with populist feelings about 'being left behind economically' among large swathes of the electorate to produce Trump's victory.

In Chap. 7, David McKay asks how a man so psychologically flawed as Donald Trump could be elected as President of the United States. Mckay notes that in the history of the Republic a man like Donald Trump had never before been elevated to the Presidency. Not only did he have no experience of the government at any level, he was also emotionally and intellectually totally unfit for high office. McKay explains this startling development in terms of three factors. The first was the transformation of the Republican Party from a centre-right party used to brokering policy solutions with the Democrats through bargaining and compromise to a far-right insurgent outlier dismissive of the legitimacy of the Democrats and intent on imposing its will through manipulation and confrontation. The second involved the two-pronged revolution in communications that has occurred in the US since the 1980s. With the abandonment of the 'Fairness Doctrine' in 1987 the way was left open both for the rise of

right-wing talk radio and of Fox News. For the first time, therefore, the far right was provided with a national platform for the dissemination of its particular brand of news. Soon after, the Internet provided further opportunities for self-reinforcing opinions through the expression of views that bypassed all the traditional means of political communication. Third, these developments occurred in the context of the quite startling demographic and cultural changes that have occurred in the US since the 1980s. In 2018 the share of foreign-born population was as high as it was in the 1890–1910 period. The non-white population was also at an all-time high and traditional mores in sexual and social relations were being challenged as never before. With the concomitant ascendancy of identity politics, the scene was set for the assertion of white, nativist nationalism by those who felt abandoned by the Democrats and their supporters among cosmopolitan urban elites. As an opportunistic political entrepreneur, Trump was able to exploit a transformed Republican Party and the revolution in communications to appeal to this rising nativist sentiment, capture the nomination and eventually the presidency.

In Chap. 8, Graham K. Wilson considers the implications of Trump and Trumpism for American liberals. Wilson notes that one of Anthony King's most insightful pieces on American politics concerned the reasons why public policy in the US seemed to be systematically different from public policy in other advanced democracies. This difference is often referred to as 'American exceptionalism'. Wilson argues that the exceptionalist argument is often overstated, though not by King. It argues that one aspect of declining exceptionalism has been the transformation of the Democratic Party into something much closer to the centre-left reformist parties found in other advanced democracies. However, this transformation has left the Democratic Party facing the dilemmas that these other parties have encountered particularly the challenge of trying not to lose working-class support while addressing pressing social problems such as gender and racial discrimination. Wilson concludes that the task for the Democrats is how to reconcile these competing demands.

Part II of the book (Chaps. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16) considers how liberals and Democrats could and should respond to the rise of authoritarian populism.

In Chap. 9, Geoffrey Hosking asks how liberal democracies can respond effectively to likes of Vladimir Putin without prejudicing liberalism and democracy. Hosking argues that liberal democracies can respond effectively to Russia's challenge *only* by reaffirming the values on which they

are based, that is pluralism, the rule of law and genuine electoral choice. At the moment, Putin's ideological and cyber-challenge is proving effective largely because Western political leaders have been betraying those values—to the benefit of right-wing populist movements which Russia supports. Hosking suggests that liberal democracy depends on a tacit compact between rulers and ruled: the ruled accept that the rulers have power and (often) wealth because everyone benefits by sharing to some degree in general prosperity, peace and stability. He argues that, since the 1980s, compact has been systematically violated in many Western countries by elites who allowed the costs of de-industrialisation to fall mainly on those displaced from regular jobs. The financial crisis of 2007–2008 intensified the effect: those who caused the crisis in the first place have continued to benefit from accumulated wealth while imposing the costs of the crisis on the poor and disadvantaged by cutting welfare benefits. Hosking argues that the much-hyped economic 'recovery' is not recognised by most people, who have lost confidence in their capacity to sustain their way of life and pass it on to their children. Generalised trust in banks, politicians, the media, the police and other key social institutions is seriously eroded. The most readily available scapegoats for the (correctly) perceived injustices are immigrants and international institutions. Populists see this clearly; they exploit the distrust in elites to evoke powerful symbols of mass national identity, and they use the simplifying and inflammatory effects of social media to gain followers. Their proposed solutions, however, are perverse. Until Western politicians rediscover and reaffirm our basic values, all our societies—and probably the EU and NATO—will lurch from one crisis to another. Governments will be tempted to respond by lapsing into authoritarianism. Liberal democracies are in danger because they have weakened themselves, not because of subversion from outside.

In Chap. 10, Natasha Ezrow asks how the liberal democratic cause can be advanced in the Middle East. Ezrow notes that when the Arab Spring first broke out in late 2010 and into 2011, there was tremendous optimism that democratisation would finally take hold in the Middle East. For decades, it had been a region ruled primarily by authoritarian governments. Unfortunately, these hopes from the Arab Spring were unfounded. The Arab Spring led to conflict, state failure and only modest reforms in Morocco and Jordan. The one exception to this was the case of Tunisia. Tunisia stands as the only country in the Middle East that has a strong chance of democratising fully, in spite of enduring years of authoritarian rule. Though Lebanon is nominally democratic, its leaders are still chosen

or vetted by foreign powers. And Turkey is now backsliding even further into authoritarianism. Ezrow suggests that much can be learned from the democratic transition in Tunisia about the ways in which liberal democracy can be advanced to the Middle East in general. Ezrow proposes that there may be a 'Tunisia model' that other Arab nations could follow. She argues that Tunisia's successful democratisation lay in prioritising improvements in women's rights, promoting secular education (while also allowing space for Islam to co-exist), and building political parties that were committed to the rule of law. Having support from NGOs was also critical in helping to curb corruption. Ezrow concludes that this model could prove a useful one for other Middle Eastern countries notwithstanding the different and difficult conditions that prevail in many of them.

In Chap. 11, Jean Blondel and Jean-Louis Thiebault explore the links between populism and presidential and parliamentary political systems. Presidential systems, of course, explicitly organise the executive around the idea of the (popular) *leadership* of a single elected leader, who has to obey a number of precise rules in order to satisfy the principles and rules of the presidential system. This is not to say that leadership is unimportant in parliamentary systems, merely that the potential for populist tendencies to emerge is higher in presidential systems. In both types of system, however, leaders increasingly tend to question public freedoms; they attempt to weaken constitutional courts; they question the independence of the judiciary; they limit the rights of public broadcasters; and they attempt to exercise greater control over public spending and administration. The key mediating role in this context is played by political parties. For Blondel and Thiebault, it is essential that strong, well-structured parties continue to play a major part in liberal democracies.

In Chap. 12, Ian Budge asks whether the recent rise of populism damages the case for Direct Democracy. Budge notes that the UK's vote for Brexit and Trump's victory in the US, along with the success of anti-immigration and anti-EU-parties in referendums and elections throughout Europe, have fuelled reactions against the idea of extending Direct Democracy—an idea that was widely supported in the 1990s and early 2000s. The preference for elites now is for external checks and balances on popular opinion—for a 'republican' rather than a 'direct democratic' set up in which referendums are deployed to resolve a wide range of major policy issues. Budge argues that—rather than discrediting Direct Democracy—recent events support the case for instituting it properly. Instead of being sporadically invoked as a political tactic when governments

want to avoid internal party splits or think they can win, popular consultations should be governed by constitutional rules for when they should be called; how they should be conducted; and (importantly) how votes should be interpreted in terms of reflecting settled popular preferences (with the kind of allowance for error any well-conducted survey has to make). Budge observes that nobody has ever accused the most advanced Direct Democracy, Switzerland, of being disordered in spite of its most important policies being constitutionally subject to popular initiatives and referendums. He concludes that a properly constituted form of direct democracy would do much to undercut the dangers of populism rather than to reinforce them.

In Chap. 13, Martin Kettle assesses how established parties should respond to the rise of identity politics in their electoral base. Kettle argues that identity politics has both a long history and new salience in distinctly modern forms and that it is important to clarify the differences. Kettle notes that identity politics centred around nationalism, and religion are long established in democracies. Often, he argues, established parties such as the UK Labour and Conservatives with contrasting distributional agendas have succeeded in accommodating themselves with such forms of identity politics, because established parties tend to be coalitions rather than tribes. Kettle then explores the post-industrial volatility of the electorate and analyses four main sources of modern identity politics: nationalism, gender, religion and race. Kettle then goes on to review the potentially transformative importance of social media as a reflection/generator of new forms of identity politics, particularly around sexual identity. He discusses Mark Lilla's thesis about the destructive impact of identity politics on US Democrats but argues that this is not yet easily transferable to the UK, though the potential is there. Kettle concludes that modern parties must respond to old and new forms of identity politics but not reduce their programmes and strategies to identity politics.

In Chap. 14, Michael Moran argues that authoritarianism, populism and the welfare state are historical bedfellows. He suggests that the impulse to populism is plain: some of the most important welfare state measures, notably those concerned with income maintenance, were designed to provide shelter for those dispossessed by market forces under industrial capitalism. Moran notes that the authoritarian impulse has taken various forms, but was present from the beginning: the most important prototypical welfare state was created in Bismarck's Germany by an authoritarian regime as a means of managing and controlling the challenge of leftist

radicalism. Welfare states in liberal democracies like the UK were marked by a different kind of authoritarianism: by hierarchies of power exercised by (usually male) expert professionals, a hierarchy typified by the power exercised by medical professionals over patients. Moran suggests that three forces undermined these authoritarian systems. First, the destruction of high-wage industrial employment for a (mostly male) working class turned comparatively simple income maintenance regimes into chaotic and widespread mechanisms for subsidising workers on low incomes and in precarious occupations. Second, mass migration of labour across national borders undermined a key link that had created popular support for the welfare state: that link tying citizenship, nationality and entitlement. Third, identities were reshaped not only by mass migration but also by the way changes in gender roles transformed welfare states that had been created for male professionals to govern male clients. The modern challenge of authoritarian populism is a response to these changes, notably to: the decay of the old authoritarian hierarchies; the decay of nationally bounded citizenship that once tied the welfare state to national identity; and the decay of income maintenance systems designed for a Fordist economy that assured high-wage male employment. Moran concludes that getting out of this fix depends crucially on reconstructing the labour market rather than reconstructing the welfare state itself.

In Chap. 15 Archie Brown argues that there has been a progressive fixation on the top leader in British politics that owed much to lessons drawn from the particular leadership style of Margaret Thatcher. Expectations of what a prime minister could and should do have altered over the past four decades. General elections are increasingly described as contests between two party leaders. The Conservative manifesto for the 2017 general election was presented by the prime minister as 'my manifesto' and the party became 'Theresa May's team'. While a personalisation of policy is not entirely new, this took a party leader's proprietorship a step further. There have been ups and downs in prime ministerial power both pre- and post-Thatcher, but the general tendency has been to expect the prime minister to do more than in the past and to project expectations on to him or her to an unrealistic extent. Brown contends that not only are the powers of prime ministers exaggerated in much political writing, but that the placing of more power in the hands of an individual leader is also, in principle, undesirable in a democracy and conducive to policy 'blunders'. Concentration of decision-making in the hands of a leader and a

coterie of close aides promotes groupthink and leads to policies not receiving the critical scrutiny they require.

Part III of the book (Chaps. 16, 17 and 18) reviews Anthony King's contribution to our understanding of the conditions for sustaining democracy and summarises the main conclusions about authoritarian populism and liberal democracy that emerge from the preceding chapters.

In Chap. 16, Peter Riddell notes that one of the main arguments for constitutional reform in the UK has always been that it will improve the working of democracy and satisfaction with the political system. His analysis examines the roots of the arguments for UK institutional/constitutional change from the late 1980s onwards; the nature of the changes, particularly as implemented under the Blair Government after 1997; and their impact, especially on attitudes towards politicians and the political process. Riddell pays particular attention to Anthony King's contributions to these debates. Riddell's main thesis is that the demand for broad constitutional changes grew after Margaret Thatcher's third electoral victory in 1987, leading to firm and sweeping commitments under John Smith's leadership of Labour from 1992 to 1994, However, implementation was, while substantial in aggregate, always piecemeal in particular. There was no attempt at a new settlement or a real shift in the balance between citizens and the state, despite ambitious rhetoric used by political leaders. Riddell notes the paradox that some measures such as Freedom of Information and the Human Rights Act, as well as strengthening of select committees, increased public dissatisfaction with government and the working of the political system. Moreover, the revelations about MPs' expenses in 2009, itself a product of greater openness, fuelled a reaction against the Westminster political class and demands for more sweeping political change. The chapter concludes that the UK's exit from the EU will trigger some of the most profound, and unpredictable, constitutional changes that the UK has experienced for many decades, particularly for relations between central government and the devolved administrations. Along with internal upheavals in the main parties, these changes will affect the functioning of UK democracy for some time in unforeseeable ways.

In Chap. 17, Albert Weale considers some of the issues that populism raises for political theorists. He notes that in *The Founding Fathers v. the People* Anthony King set out two contrasting visions of American democracy: the constitutionalist and the populist (King 2012). According to constitutionalism, political power should be exercised through balanced institutions that set limits on what governments can do. According to populism, the people are sovereign and there should be no intrinsic limits

on their power. King traced how these two contrasting images shaped the discussion about reforms to the American political system. Starting from King's contrast, Weale examines the terms of the theoretical tensions that exist between constitutionalism on the one hand and populism on the other. Weale argues that popular government, rightly understood, requires the rule of law and hence a sort of minimal constitutionalism. He concludes that such a constitutionalism can co-exist with a commitment to majoritarian government.

In Chap. 18, Nicholas Allen reviews Anthony King's analysis of the most important institutional prerequisites for sustaining liberal democracy (specifically: elections, elected institutions and elected officials) and the major democratic ideas and norms that underpinned them. Reflecting the cases he wrote about, King was not unduly concerned about the immediate future of liberal democracy, but he was increasingly concerned about its quality. Allen highlights three related themes that recurred throughout King's work: the importance of institutions in sustaining elite responsibility as well as responsiveness (including the dangers of hyper-responsiveness); the role of long-term changes in systemic norms that structure democratic practice (including the tension between deliberation and participation); and the limited and often concealed capacity of democratic government to respond effectively to popular preferences (including the diminished capacity of politicians to deliver what they promise). Allen concludes, like King before him, that politicians—and the wider political class—need to be more honest about the limits of what they can do for the people, particularly in the face of encroaching populism.

In Chap. 19, Ivor Crewe and David Sanders pull together the various themes explored in the individual chapters and summarise their implications for the health of contemporary liberal democracies.

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Populist Movements in Major Liberal Democracies

Authoritarian Populism and Brexit in the UK in Historical Perspective

Ivor Crewe

The Brexit Referendum vote in June 2016 coincided with sweeping electoral advances by radical right parties and leaders across a swathe of liberal democracies in the West. Later in the same year, Donald Trump was elected to the White House on a virulently nationalist, anti-immigrant and illiberal platform. Conservative nationalist parties formed governments in Hungary and Poland and proceeded to dismantle independent institutions and stifle liberal opposition; radical nationalist parties languishing on the political fringe only a decade ago entered coalition governments in Austria, Finland, Norway (Norway!) and latterly Italy, and shattered the traditional party systems of Germany and Sweden (Sweden!); in France's presidential election the candidates of the established parties were overtaken by insurgent outsiders of the Centre (Macron), and the radical Right (Marine Le Pen), who captured over a third of the vote.

Nationalist movements defined by their hostility to the organisation, economics and social impact of globalisation—to international institutions, notably the EU, and to international treaties, particularly free trade agreements, to immigrants and ethnic minorities, and to the elites who promoted and benefited from globalisation—mobilised popular support on a scale not seen since the rise of fascism in inter-war Europe. The

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changing party landscape in most of these countries is the outcrop of sub-terranean and enduring shifts in their economic and cultural formation, and as a result unlikely to go into reverse in the near future. Authoritarian populism has emerged across the West as a significant and lasting political force.

Where does the Brexit Referendum result fit into this picture? Does it signify that authoritarian populism is set to become a major fixture of British politics? The short answer is: probably not. This chapter will explain why.

Illiberalism and the Popular Political Culture in Britain

An illiberal and authoritarian mindset has been a recognisable part of the popular political culture in Britain (especially England), and in particular of working-class men, since at least the mass franchise of 1918 and almost certainly before. Countless opinion surveys have reported significant, usually majority, support for the cluster of positions that together amount to authoritarian populism—for capital and corporal punishment and tougher court sentences generally, for robust limits to immigration, for distrust of foreigners (other than those from the white Commonwealth) and for tougher action against welfare 'scroungers' and unofficial strikers. (The best source of data is the annual *British Social Attitudes* series.) It is combined with a 'them and us' cynicism about politicians and parties, and a distrust of established authority, including self-claimed experts, academics, science and the quality media. With the aid of the tabloids, this outlook is usually embellished by urban myths about the scale of crime, immigration and scrounging, and the undeserved privileges of culprits, in a lament of national decline. The embodiment of this culture was the fictional Alf Garnett, the ranting, right-wing Wapping dock worker in the 1960s BBC sit com, *Till Death Do Us Part*, instantly recognisable as the personification of voices in the pubs, clubs and canteens of the land who were rarely represented by the political classes.

Alf Garnett was untypical of his class for voting Conservative but not for holding the set of views he did. Nationalism, authoritarianism and, usually, social conservatism are the default instinct of the poorly educated and, consequently of the working class. This is quite compatible with holding radical views about the distribution of wealth and power within

the national community, supporting higher and more progressive taxation, welfare benefits, public services and state investment and trade union rights. The political sociologist, Seymour Lipset, saw the significance of this 60 years ago in his seminal article on 'Democracy and Working Class Authoritarianism' (Lipset 1959), which has stood the test of time ever since. He introduced the distinction between two value dimensions held by voters in liberal democracies: 'economic liberalism/conservatism' (in American terms) and authoritarianism/liberalism. The working class were generally economic 'liberals', in favour of economic redistribution by the state, but authoritarians on issues of civil and minority rights, immigration and internationalist foreign policy. Liberal intellectuals, he argued, had too facilely presented the working class as a liberating force in history because "the struggle for freedom is not a simple variant of the economic class struggle" (p.483). This two-dimensional structure of political values among the mass public has been consistently reported by electoral analysts, with more variation in the labelling of the dimensions than in their substance (e.g. Heath et al. 1991, 173–5).

The Limited Impact of Authoritarian Populism in British Political Life

Authoritarian populism has always had a place in British political life. But its impact on elections, parties and government action has been—at least until the Brexit Referendum—remarkably limited, a case study in the capacity of UK political institutions to impede the conversion of a significant and strongly held block of public opinion into public policy. The occasional eruptions of authoritarian populism on the national political scene have generally subsided and been deflected to the sidelines. The immigration of about 150,000 Jews from persecution and poverty in Russia and Eastern Europe in the 1890s triggered a popular backlash in the media and on the streets, including anti-Jewish riots in South Wales (Garrard 1971; Cesarini 1994). Its political expression was the British Brothers League, which marched and petitioned against Britain becoming "the dumping ground for the scum of Europe" (Ball 2017). In this case, the government did respond, by passing the 1905 Aliens Act, which for the first time introduced immigration controls and registration, after which political anti-Semitism and hostility to immigrants declined until Mosley's British Union of Fascists (BUF) emerged in the 1930s.

The BUF movement had some populist features. Oswald Mosley, its leader, was a powerful demagogue, who styled himself after Mussolini and enjoyed haranguing mass rallies. The BUF rose from the ashes of the New Party, formed by Mosley in 1930 in the aftermath of the 1929 Crash and the resulting Depression, but disbanded after its failure to elect any MPs in the 1931 election (Benewick 1972; Thurlow 2006). The BUF was anti-Establishment: the political class, and the parliamentary system, had failed the people in its complacent and helpless response to mass unemployment. The old order—parliament, trade unions, the banks—would be replaced by a corporatist state actively applying protectionist and Keynesian measures to revive the economy. By 1936 the BUF was open in its admiration for Nazi Germany and virulently anti-Semitic. It challenged normal parliamentary politics by adopting uniforms and salutes, Italian fascist style, by staging mass rallies and large demonstrations, and by instigating and provoking street violence. But it was less popular than these theatrics suggested. Its membership peaked at 50,000, soon after being formed (and after receiving the enthusiastic but short-lived backing of Lord Rothermere's *Daily Mail*) but was down to 8000 by 1935. It ignored the 1935 general election and, despite pockets of support in its East End stamping ground, failed to elect any councillors in the London County Council elections of 1937. The only substantive change it brought about was the 1936 Public Order Act, which banned political uniforms.

After his release from war-time internment, Mosley tried to revive the Union Movement in parliamentary by-elections, by exploiting local white prejudice and resentment in areas settled by Commonwealth immigrants from the Caribbean in the 1950s and 1960s. Although he failed, there was no mistaking the prevalent local hostility to black immigration, especially as it swelled in the 1960s and 1970s with larger inflows from India and Pakistan. Prejudice was commonplace, job and housing discrimination widespread, and resentment occasionally flared into violence, notably the Notting Hill race riots of 1958. But the popular backlash against Afro-Caribbean and South Asian immigrants did not disrupt national politics until Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' speech in Birmingham in April 1968.

Inflammatory in substance, tone and delivery—replayed 50 years on it remains deeply shocking—Powell inveighed against mass immigration from the black Commonwealth and the anti-discrimination proposals of the imminent Race Relations Bill, in lurid and incendiary terms. He began by relating a conversation with a middle-aged constituent who told him that he hoped his (successful) children would settle abroad because "In

this country in 15 or 20 years' time the black man will have the whip hand over the white man". There had been a transformation of some communities with "no parallel in a thousand years of English history". The nation was "busily engaged in heaping up its funeral pyre". The indigenous population "found themselves made strangers in their own country" and were discovering "that they were now the unwanted". The proposed anti-discrimination laws would "risk throwing a match onto gunpowder". He was "filled with foreboding". Like the Roman, he saw "the River Tiber foaming with much blood". He had to speak up for ordinary English men and women; not to speak "would be the great betrayal". The speech contained almost all the tropes of authoritarian populism that are familiar today—national decline and betrayal, the disintegration of local communities, minority cultural takeovers, the deafness of the political class to ordinary people's concerns and the government's lack of control.

The speech caused a political storm. Edward Heath immediately sacked Powell from the Shadow Cabinet, and most senior Conservatives (as well as the Labour Government) publicly condemned him. *The Times* leader called it an evil speech. But in the country, Powell was widely and vociferously supported. London dockers and Smithfield porters went on strike and marched on Parliament with placards proclaiming 'Don't Knock Enoch', 'Back Britain not Black Britain', and 'Enoch was Right', the last becoming a common and enduring catchphrase among opponents of immigration and race equality laws. A Gallup poll conducted ten days after the speech reported that 74% agreed with the speech (15% disagreed), 69% thought it is wrong to sack him (20% thought it right) and 83% felt immigration should be restricted (Heffer 1999, 467). Powell had touched a raw nerve.

But the storm soon died down and left national politics unscathed. The Race Relations Bill passed into legislation. Powell was not a populist and had no interest in leading an organised movement within or outside the Conservative party. A political outcast during Edward Heath's premiership, he left the Party in 1974, and became an Ulster Unionist MP in October of that year.

Thereafter, authoritarian populism was safely contained by the established party system and parliamentary politics until the late 2000s. Countless surveys consistently revealed an authoritarian and illiberal outlook among a large minority (and occasionally a majority) of the public, especially towards immigrants, some ethnic groups, sexual minorities, criminals and prisoners, the unemployed and the socially marginalised

generally, but it was not allied to a rejection—as distinct from healthy scepticism—of mainstream parliamentary party politics (National Centre for Social Research 1983–). Right-wing authoritarianism was quite popular—but it was not populist.

This was largely because the Conservative Party, under Thatcher's leadership, re-positioned itself as more hard line than the party of Heath (and the Labour party of the 1960s and 1970s) on many of the issues that most exercised instinctively authoritarian voters. The Employment Act of 1982 effectively outlawed closed shops, 'wildcat' strikes, secondary picketing and political or solidarity strikes not directly connected to a dispute between the employer and workers about their terms and conditions. These were abuses in the eyes of most voters, including ordinary trade union members, and their remedy won substantial support, according to polls conducted at the time. To accommodate authoritarian traditional moralists, Section 28 of the 1988 Local Government Act stipulated that local councils should not "intentionally promote homosexuality or publish material with the intention of promoting homosexuality" in schools and other areas. In response to tabloid media campaigns against welfare 'scroungers', which resonated with working-class voters, the regulation and administration of welfare benefits were continuously tightened in an effort to minimise fraudulent claims.

These and other measures satisfied right-wing authoritarians in active politics and among voters that Thatcher's Conservative Party was receptive to their concerns. On the critical issue of immigration, at the core of authoritarian populism (at least in Britain), Thatcher set out the Conservative position on Granada TV's *World in Action* in January 1978. Asked about speculation that the Conservatives would adopt a new get-tough policy to cut down immigration, she replied:

> *there was a committee which looked at it [immigrant numbers] and said that if we went on as we are, then by the end of the century there would be four million people of the new Commonwealth or Pakistan here. Now, that is an awful lot and I think it means that people are really rather afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with a different culture and … if there is any fear that it might be swamped people are going to react and be rather hostile to those coming in.*
>
> *So, if you want good race relations, you have got to allay peoples' fears on numbers. … we must hold out the clear prospect of an end to immigration because at the moment it is about between 45,000 and 50,000 people coming in*

a year. Now, I was brought up in a small town, 25,000. That would be two new towns a year and that is quite a lot. So, we do have to hold out the prospect of an end to immigration except, of course, for compassionate cases. (Margaret Thatcher Foundation)

Liberal commentators were outraged, especially by her double reference to fears of being 'swamped', but judging from the Conservative Party postbag, she had caught the public mood. Compared with Powell's combustible rivers-of-blood speech, her language was restrained and her position balanced by allusion to compassionate cases. It deflected an incipient challenge from the white supremacist National Front which had chalked up some respectable by-election performances[1] shortly after the immigration of Ugandan Asians expelled by Idi Amin in 1971–1972, and 5% of the vote in the 1977 Greater London Council (GLC) elections. At the 1979 general election, the National Front fielded a record number of candidates for an insurgent party, but flopped dismally with a vote of only 1.3%.

The Conservatives' commitment to limit immigration, and its decline to modest numbers, alongside the other measures outlined above, cut off the opportunities for right-wing populists to advance. The successor to the National Front, the British National Party (BNP), created in 1982 from a merger of various English nationalist, neo-Nazi and anti-immigrant mini-parties on the far margins, made no headway until 2009 when its 6% of the vote in the 2009 European elections rewarded it with two MEPs under a regional PR electoral system. It was probably helped by the parliamentary expenses scandal of the year before, which so damaged the reputation of the political establishment, and by voters' growing awareness of the swelling numbers of East European immigrants since the eastwards expansion of the European Union in 2003.

The 1980s might also have been fertile ground for left-wing populism. The de-industrialisation of the 1970s and 1980s visited economic devastation on some local communities in the North, Midlands and Scotland, and was exacerbated by cuts to public services, welfare payments and infrastructure investment under the austere macro-economic policies of the Thatcher governments. Yet it failed to flourish. It was limited to the Militant Tendency's infiltration of the Labour party, and to the militancy of some trade unions, notably the miners led by Arthur Scargill during the long miners' dispute of 1982–1984, and to defiance against central government cuts to local council spending, conspicuously in Liverpool. The Thatcher governments faced these local insurrections down, and out of

electoral caution the Labour Opposition expelled or sidelined their leaders; as a result, left-wing populist agitation was confined within the wider Labour movement and never gained a national platform.

The story of twentieth-century popular authoritarianism in Britain, unlike much of the European Continent, is therefore one of containment. Illiberal and authoritarian impulses were never far from the surface of public life but generally lay dormant. An entrenched parliamentary party system proved sufficiently responsive to the occasional populist outbreak, almost invariably caused by hostility to surges in immigration, for the eruption to subside.

UKIP: The First Successful Populist Authoritarian Party

The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) was founded in 1993 but remained in the shadows for a decade. Its emergence on the political scene in the 2000s marks the first occasion on which a nationalist and populist movement changed the political landscape and altered the course of public policy (Goodwin and Milazzo 2015). It has had a short life and little electoral success but a profound and enduring impact on the national future. Its progress pressured David Cameron into agreeing to the Brexit Referendum and arguably won it for Leave through the effective campaigning of its leader, Nigel Farage (Shipman, 2016). No unelected politician has delivered such a massive shock to the politics of Britain for at least a century. The shape and tenor of British politics have changed irreversibly.

UKIP bore many of the hallmarks of a populist party. Its leader, Nigel Farage portrayed himself as an ordinary bloke of common sense views; he liked to be photographed in blazer and flannels with a pint of beer in a country pub. UKIP's founding purpose was to extricate the UK from the European Union and restore absolute national sovereignty to Westminster. The enemy was a self-serving political class, supported by international business and a metropolitan cultural elite, who had sold out the interests of ordinary people to the bureaucrats of Brussels. UKIP hung other issues on the peg of EU membership, notably uncontrolled immigration from EU member states (in compliance with the Freedom of Movement principle), the enhanced threat of terrorism as a consequence, and 'welfare tourism'. In the 2000s the polls generally put its popular support at about

4%, but it came second, overtaking Labour, in the 2009 European elections, winning 16% of the vote and 13 seats.

Support for UKIP steadily rose in the polls during the Coalition Government of 2010–2015. An electoral breakthrough looked imminent. Two Conservative MPs who resigned on defecting to UKIP won the subsequent by-election as the UKIP candidate. The party made advances in local elections and enjoyed a spectacular victory in the 2014 European elections, when it topped the poll with 27% of the vote and 24 seats. It was the first time in a century that a party other than the Conservatives and Labour had won a national election. The Conservatives feared that UKIP would make inroads into its large base of Eurosceptic and anti-immigration supporters and that more of its backbenchers might defect. In the event UKIP took 13% of the vote in the 2015 general election but was crucified by the first-past-the-post electoral system and returned only a single MP. The demographic of the UKIP vote paralleled that of populist right-wing parties across Europe: it was concentrated in areas of economic decline or standstill, in towns and villages rather than metropolitan centres, among men more than women, the elderly more than the young, and those with minimal formal education and qualifications. Many had voted Labour until the 2000s, but felt neglected by the New Labour governments and drifted out of voting or to the Conservatives before switching to UKIP in 2015 (Evans and Tilley 2017, chapter 8).

The advance of UKIP after 2010 arose from a combination of unusual features of the politics of the time (Whiteley et al. 2018). The participation of a centrist liberal party in a peacetime government for the first time since 1931 meant that the Liberal Democrats no longer served as a respectable party for protest voters. And voters had much to protest against, including a severe recession following the 2008 global financial crisis, the deepest cuts in public spending since the 1930s and a sharp spike in immigration from Eastern Europe. UKIP gave voice to these grievances, which they laid at the door of the EU. Rundown public services? They could be funded properly if the British government didn't hand over billions to Brussels. Small businesses struggling to stay afloat? They were being strangled by EU red tape. Stagnant wages? The result of European migrants taking British jobs. Labour under Blair had foregone the opportunity under the Freedom of Movement rules to limit immigration from the accession states. David Cameron had pledged to cut net immigration to 'tens of thousands' in his 2010 election campaign, and lamentably failed. Neither was listening to the voters.

THE BREXIT REFERENDUM

UKIP's electoral advance between 2010 and 2015 led to the Brexit Referendum. The 2015 Conservative manifesto would not have included the promise of a referendum, nor would David Cameron have chosen to hold it as early as June 2016, had UKIP not been seen as a political threat which, while blocked at the general election, would return, and had the growing number of anti-EU Conservative MPs not clamoured for one (Shipman, 2016). Nonetheless, the referendum decision and outcome was an unforced blunder, born out of panic and complacency. An authoritarian populist party had been repulsed at the general election and could have been thwarted in other ways.

The most common interpretation of the referendum result was that it was a populist revolt against a Westminster and City Establishment. The 'left behind' voters of the dilapidated towns and villages of the economically stagnant North, Midlands and South West took the opportunity of a referendum to protest against a political class that was indifferent to their financial and cultural insecurities. The Leave campaign theme of 'taking back control' of the country's laws, borders and money brilliantly weaved together the linked resentments against immigrants, cuts in public services and bureaucratic regulation. In fact, the pattern of voting revealed that much more than populism was at play. There were decisive majorities for Leave in the prosperous shires of the South and decisive majorities for Remain in most of the big cities, including their areas of deprivation. Scotland and Northern Ireland—irrespective of their own economic geography—voted emphatically for Remain. A nostalgic English nationalism, mobilised by the promise of a return of parliamentary sovereignty, constituted the bedrock of the Leave vote, in prosperous and struggling areas alike. But working-class populism fuelled by concerns about immigration and austerity was the topsoil, and proved the tipping point in a close result. Turnout was higher in the referendum than the general election held a year earlier, and rose most in Leave-voting areas that were economically and educationally behind, and that had rallied to UKIP between 2010 and 2015 (Glynn and Menon 2018).

THE 2017 ELECTION: A POPULIST REALIGNMENT?

The resurgence of authoritarian populism in 2010–2015 resembled earlier short-lived spasms that had intermittently and briefly broken the mould of a stable system of parliamentary party politics. The combustible ingredi-

ents of the populist flare-ups were the same: a rapid swell of foreign immigration, concentrated locally rather than dispersed nationally, combined with the economic recession and the concomitant decline in wages, employment and social services.

UKIP was the most respectable of the right-wing populist movements that had erupted since the 1900s and proved to be the most successful. It steered clear of violence and illegality, taking advantage of new institutional opportunities that were unavailable to many of the earlier populist and nationalist groups. These included European elections, where the colour of the Westminster government was not at stake, combined with a system of regional proportional election, which emboldened people to register their discontent by voting for a minority party; the reach and mobilising potential of social media; the focus on party leaders in television debates and panels, and, of course, the referendum.

There was one other unusual institutional opportunity for authoritarian populism to establish itself in the mainstream of British politics: Teresa May's unnecessary calling of an election in 2017. This was the third national ballot in the space of two years in which conflict over Britain's relations with the EU formed the backdrop to people's vote.

The Brexit Referendum had exposed cultural divisions in the country which had hitherto been hidden and overridden by traditional class divisions. At elections voters are asked to choose between two established parties of government who appeal for support on the basis of party loyalty, governing competence and, broadly, the balance between state and market in the provision of economic opportunity and social security. Social class—income, wealth and occupation—is the key if diminishing demographic component of party choice. In the referendum, voters were asked to choose between two visions of Britain's future place in the world and were motivated as much by culture and values as by economic interest. Broadly speaking the referendum divided voters between internationalists and nationalists, between those who welcomed globalisation as an opportunity and those who feared it as a threat, between those who lived comfortably with open borders, free trade, diverse communities and supranational regulations and those who did not. This cultural divide was underpinned by generation and level of formal education, which replaced social class as the critical demographic components of the choice between Remain and Leave.

The voting patterns that led to the 2017 election result bore the imprint of the referendum (Curtice et al. 2018). For the first time since mass fran-

chise elections began in 1918, social class bore almost no relation to party choice, whereas age, massively, and education, decisively, did (National Centre for Social Research, 2018). Conservatives, promoting themselves as the party that would deliver Brexit (and 'Brexit meant Brexit'), advanced furthest in traditional Labour constituencies that had heavily voted for Leave a year earlier, mopping up UKIP support. The Labour party, while deliberately ambiguous about Brexit, targeted the young and educated with a traditional social democratic programme of spending on housing, health, schools and universities (by abolishing tuition fees), and advanced furthest in Remain areas, including traditionally Conservative seats. University towns, cathedral cities and multi-million-pound suburbs of London swung hard to Labour; the old coalfields of Yorkshire and the East Midlands swung hard to the Conservatives. No previous election had produced such disparate shifts in the vote across constituencies, both in direction and size. 'Uniform national swing' was a thing of the past.

The 2017 election may turn out to be that rare electoral event, a historically critical, 'realigning election', as distinct from a 'normal' election. In long-established democracies, election outcomes are typically the product of a stable social and geographic base of support for the main parties, competing on the issues that traditionally divide them, combined with short-term, election-specific, fluctuations in voters' judgement of the past record and future competence of the parties and their leaders. These are 'normal' elections in which the two leading parties take it in irregular turns to govern over a period of generations.

A realigning election is an earthquake that permanently changes the political landscape and the parties that pitch their electoral battles on it. There are usually warning tremors in preceding elections. A new big issue, or cluster of issues, divides the nation, but along different social, geographic and party lines than before. Fresh social cleavages in party support replace the old ones; the geographical base of the parties' strength shifts; the parties compete on a new set of national concerns and appeal to different constituencies of interests from before. Sometimes realigning elections decisively tip the balance of support in favour of one of the parties for a generation; sometimes the original party balance is maintained, but by new coalitions of voters mobilised by a different mix of issues and interests (Campbell et al. 1966).

The 1932 US presidential election is the classic realigning election. The big issue was the Depression: Roosevelt's Democrats mobilised a new coalition of white blue-collar workers and ethnic minorities to vote for the

New Deal social programmes, and the Democrats dominated the White House and Congress for a quarter century. The 1968 presidential election, won by Nixon, was another, notably in the American South. Fought on civil rights and the Vietnam War, the white and evangelical working class, who for two generations had been New Deal Democrats, switched permanently to the Republicans in a backlash against Lyndon Johnson's civil rights legislation and the socially liberal movements for women's and gay rights spearheaded by younger, university-educated whites in the North. It was the first battle in the 'culture wars' that have steadily overtaken party politics in the US. Nearer home, the 2015 election in Scotland, held eight months after the Independence Referendum, upended the nation's party system. Independence from Westminster control replaced traditional left-right social and economic issues as the defining political division. The Scottish National Party swept to victory in 53 of the 56 constituencies, and consolidated its replacement of Labour as the governing and dominant party of Scotland, a position it has maintained since.

Many of the characteristic features of a realigning election were present in 2017. A new big issue—Britain's future relations with Europe—competed with the customary tax, welfare and spending issues for the attention of voters. Interest-driven voting, rooted in social class, was replaced by values-driven voting, rooted in generation and education. The economic geography of Conservative and Labour support shifted, with each making significant incursions into the traditional territory of the other. This new pattern of voting was the culmination of a gradual trend that began with New Labour and was accelerated by the Brexit Referendum. Turnout rose, especially among the young, who typically vote in low numbers, just as it had risen among traditionally apathetic or disaffected groups in the referendum.

There is a case for speculating that the emergence of UKIP, the resulting referendum and the rapidly following 2017 election might mark a turning point in British electoral politics. The critical issues will be cultural, clustering around (English) national identity, immigration, ethnic minority rights, relations with Europe and, perhaps, military and political disengagement from the wider world. Authoritarian populism will be incorporated by a re-energised Conservative party, which will place it to the fore of its traditional marked-based, pro-business positions on tax, spending and social security. Labour will become the party of the better educated and younger generations, championing the rights of ethnic, gender and sexual minorities, the party of environmental protection, promot-

ing international engagement, closer relations with Europe but detachment from the US, alongside its traditional advocacy of government spending on welfare, public services and infrastructure.

But an equally plausible future is one marked by a steady subsiding of the populist authoritarian mood that fuelled UKIP's short-lived electoral breakthrough and led to Brexit. If an orderly Brexit is followed by a new settled trading relationship with the EU, and if the economic outcome falls short of a crisis that can plausibly be attributed to exiting the EU, Britain's relations with Europe are likely to change from a political issue to a technical matter. Immigration, too, could recede from public debate. Surveys report that popular concern about immigration has already fallen away, perhaps in the light of a drop in immigration rates, the knowledge that after Brexit the UK will not be obliged to admit automatically migrants from EU states and in a pendulum swing against anti-immigrant rhetoric at the Brexit Referendum (English 2018). Nor are other issues likely to fuel popular authoritarianism, with the possible exception of Islamic terrorism. There is no British parallel to the intensity of the culture wars in the United States between conservatives and liberals, and evangelicals and secularists, where the rights to abortion, gay marriage, gender self-identity and gun ownership are strongly contested and provide a permanent popular base of support for authoritarianism.

A Historical Perspective

The era of mass politics in Britain began a century ago. It has proved stony ground for authoritarian populist movements. They have occasionally burst upon the scene only to fizzle out after a few years. The single-member simple majority electoral system has blocked electoral breakthroughs into Parliament. The two main parties, particularly the Conservatives, being of necessity broad coalitions of interests and principles, have absorbed and diluted authoritarian impulses with the potential to command popular support. Authoritarian populist insurgencies have only threatened to disrupt established parliamentary party politics during surges of immigration, an occurrence with an almost unique capacity, at least in Britain, to mobilise popular opinion against the political class.[2] The Brexit Referendum, a one-off and unnecessary political initiative, provided an exceptional opportunity for the public to give political expression to their concerns about the scale, concentration and management of immigration.

Liberals are deeply worried about the rise of authoritarianism populism in democratic systems. The lesson to draw from British experience is not simply to desist from unnecessary referendums, or to design and time them more skilfully. It is to recognise that throughout Europe,[3] rapid and large waves of migration across national borders are followed by the electoral advance, sometimes into government, of radical-right parties that threaten liberal values and, usually, democratic institutions. This is most likely if the immigrants' culture, particularly their language and religion, is noticeably different from that of the host population, but not confined to such cases. It is as true for the historic and stable social democracies of northern Europe as for the more fragile Mediterranean democracies with an authoritarian past. And it is as true for the European countries that survived the global financial crisis unscathed with their national social contract intact (Sweden, Norway Finland, Netherlands, Germany) as for those that were plunged into a deep recession (Italy, Greece, France). The causal connection between surges of immigration and a flourishing radical right is an iron law of political sociology.

To protect their values and institutions in a world of massive migrations, liberals may need to abandon their internationalist instinct for open and unmanaged national borders and for tacit acceptance of illegal immigration. They should instead fashion a distinctively liberal position on immigration based on the socially progressive traditions of planning, public services, community cohesion and worker protection against exploitation. The policy components might include graduated, controlled and dispersed inflow, additional government spending in areas settled by recent immigrants to protect local public services, threshold language requirements for citizenship and leadership of international programmes to settle refugees near their country of origin. To do otherwise would be to provide the forces of illiberal authoritarianism with an opportunity to advance unparalleled since the 1930s.

Notes

1. In Uxbridge (8% of the vote) in December 1972 and West Bromwich (16%) in May 1973.
2. Nuclear weapons, the poll tax and the invasion of Iraq might be cited as other examples. But CND—the movement for unilateral nuclear disarmament—was engaged in converting the Labour party, and the poll tax riots were a popular revolt against a particular government policy. Only opposi-

tion to the invasion of Iraq included a sense of betrayal by the political class, for misleading the public about Iraq's capacity to deploy weapons of mass destruction.

3. Europe, because Canada and Australia are exceptions.

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Exploring Authoritarian Populism in Britain

Joe Greenwood and Joe Twyman

In recent years political commentary and discourse in Britain have become increasingly interested in 'populism'. Results such as those in the 2014 European Parliamentary elections or the 2016 EU Referendum point to the importance of populism to modern British politics. Newspaper headlines tell, for example, of a 'populist uprising',[1] 'the rise of populism'[2] and even the 'crazy populism'[3] of some of Britain's political leaders, with the former leader of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), Nigel Farage, held up as a figurehead for 'Europe's Populist Revolt'.[4] Despite all this interest and extensive discussion, relatively little time has been devoted to precisely who these 'populists' actually are. Often the analysis seeks to explain *why* and *how* this rise in populism has occurred while skirting around the issue of *what* it actually is.

The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines 'populism' as a 'political approach that strives to appeal to ordinary people who feel that their concerns are disregarded by established elite groups', but that is only the start of the story. Moving beyond this dictionary definition, populism has taken on a life of its own as it is co-opted by various individuals and groups to describe a wide range of political beliefs, ideologies and activities. At one end of the scale, the Washington Post declares that 'we're all populists

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now'. In contrast, Harry Cole, Westminster correspondent for *The Sun* newspaper, is perhaps most dismissive of the use of the term by academics and commentators alike, writing that it 'seems everyone has just given up and decided "populist" is just a blanket term for people who win elections that you personally are a bit sniffy about'.[5]

To help better understand the nature of populism in Britain, this chapter sets out to take a detailed look at different types of populists, using the definition of an *Authoritarian Populist* previously explored by Sanders (2017). Specifically, Authoritarian Populists share specific common beliefs and attitudes: disapproval of the European Union, its institutions and closer European integration; a belief in a strong military and a muscular approach to foreign policy; opposition to human rights legislation and anti-immigrant sentiment.

This chapter first looks in detail at the characteristics of different groups of the British electorate, as defined by this Authoritarian Populist taxonomy. We then go on to explore the explanatory power of these variables. The chapter adopts a data-led approach, using a large-sample survey of 14,923 British adult respondents conducted by the polling company YouGov. The survey was conducted online from 30 May 2017 to 2 March 2018, encapsulating a wide range of political and social events, including the 2017 General Election, during the fieldwork period.

Eight different variables were used to construct the taxonomy: support for patriotism, support for a 'strong and tough' foreign policy, disapproval of the EU, distrust in EU Institutions, scepticism regarding the need to protect human rights, a negative view of immigration, opposition to immigration from outside the EU and self-reported Left/Right political placement.

K-means Cluster analysis was used to identify distinct groupings within the data. As Table 3.1 shows, five groups, or clusters, were identified. An alpha-scale test for uni-dimensionality among this set of variables yields a score of $\alpha = 0.81$. The first of the groups are the 'Mainstream Populists'

Table 3.1   Main attitudinal groupings, based on cluster analysis, within the UK electorate

1	'Mainstream Populists'	17%
2	'Centrist Weaker Populists'	20%
3	'Moderates with Populist Leanings'	31%
4	'Left-Wing Progressives'	18%
5	'Right-Wing Populists'	14%

and account for nearly one in five (17%) of the British population. As Fig. 3.1 shows, this group tend to be slightly left of centre ideologically, though they are also relatively patriotic and display many of the characteristics of classic Authoritarian Populists. These include anti-EU sentiment, negative attitudes towards human rights and being against immigration.

The second of these groups are 'Centrist Weaker Populists', who make up one in five (20%) of the population. As Fig. 3.2 shows, these Centrists, as the names suggest, are generally drawn from the centre of the political

Fig. 3.1 Mainstream Populists' scores on component variables in the cluster analysis

Fig. 3.2 Centrist Weaker Populists' scores on component variables in the cluster analysis

spectrum. Like the Mainstream Populists, they show an animosity towards both the EU and human rights. In contrast, however, while the Mainstream Populists are strongly opposed to immigration, this 'weaker' variant is not emotionally against immigration to anything like the same degree, though they remain unconvinced that immigration from outside the EU is a good thing.

The third group are the 'Moderates with Populist Leanings'. They make up the largest single group in the British population, accounting for nearly one in three (31%). As indicated in Fig. 3.3, like the Centrists, Moderates are mainly centrists themselves, but with a slightly right-of-centre hue. While the first two groups are against the EU, the Moderates are pro-EU and, at the same time, not particularly patriotic. Nor are they against human rights. They are also pro-immigration, while still maintaining a scepticism towards immigration from outside the EU.

The fourth group are the 'Left Wing Progressives', who account for 18% of the population. As Fig. 3.4 shows, this group are on the left of the political spectrum and in many ways display typical attitudes and beliefs associated with the progressive realm of British politics. They are in favour of the EU, have a strong pro-human rights position and are in favour of immigration. Separating them from all other groups identified in this analysis is their support for immigration from outside the EU.

The final and smallest group emerging from this analysis are the 'Right Wing Populists', who make up just over one in seven of the population

Fig. 3.3 Moderates with Populist Leanings' scores on component variables in the cluster analysis

(14%). As Fig. 3.5 shows, they share many similarities with the 'Mainstream Populists', specifically being patriotic, anti-EU, anti-human rights and anti-immigration. The key distinction, however, is the right-wing nature of this group. It is that aspect that sets them apart from the other groups and defines them as a separate cluster within the analysis.

Figures 3.6–3.9 show the demographic composition of the different groups. Figure 3.6 shows that the Right-Wing Populists also set themselves apart by having a noticeably larger proportion of males within their

Fig. 3.4 Left-Wing Progressives' scores on component variables in the cluster analysis

Fig. 3.5 Right-Wing Populists' scores on component variables in the cluster analysis

ranks. While the other groups in this taxonomy are majority female and are broadly in line with the general population as a whole, nearly six out of ten (58%) Right-Wing Populists are male.

As Fig. 3.7 shows, Right-Wing Populists are also the oldest of the five groups. The average age of Right-Wing Populists is 56.1 years, three years higher than the next oldest, and four out of ten are over the age of 65. At the other end of the age range are the Left-Wing Populists, more than two-thirds whom (68%) are under 50, with an average age of 41.8. Figure 3.8 indicates that the Left-Wing Populists also stand out when it

Fig. 3.6   Percentage in each cluster grouping by gender

Fig. 3.7   Percentage in each cluster grouping by average age

comes to education levels. Nearly six out of ten (58%) went to (or are currently studying at) university. In contrast, the Mainstream Populists, The Centrists and the Right-Wing Populists all have more than two-thirds of their cohort having not attended. As Fig. 3.9 shows, Mainstream Populists, along with having the largest proportion who have not attended university, also have the largest proportion drawn from the C2, D and E social grades. At six out of ten, the proportion is notably higher than the other groups—all of whom have a majority from A, B and C1 social grades.

Fig. 3.8 Percentage in each cluster grouping by education

Fig. 3.9 Percentage in each cluster grouping by social grade

Turning now to voting, as Table 3.2 shows, in the 2015 General Election a noticeable minority of both the Mainstream Populists and Right-Wing Populists voted for UKIP, with the party representing the second most popular choice among the former. In both cases, however, it was the Conservatives who were in the ascendancy—accounting for more than two-thirds of the Right-Wing Populist vote. Of the five groups, the Left-Wing Progressives were alone in not having the Conservatives as the most popular vote choice. For that group, Labour was, perhaps unsurprisingly, the top choice, with nearly six out of ten choosing them.

As Table 3.3 shows, by the 2017 General Election the picture had become more polarised in terms of party choice. The collapse of UKIP across the board benefitted the Conservatives among each of the populist groups, rising as high as over nine out of ten (91%) of the Right-Wing

Table 3.2 Percentage in each cluster voting for parties in the 2015 General Election

Vote 2015	Mainstream Populists (%)	Centrist Weaker Populists (%)	Moderates with Populist Leanings (%)	Left-Wing Progressives (%)	Right-Wing Populists (%)
Conservative	36	46	43	5	67
Labour	25	24	31	58	6
Liberal democrat	5	8	12	12	3
UKIP	26	13	2	0	22
Other (All)	7	8	12	25	3

Table 3.3 Percentage in each cluster voting for parties in the 2017 General Election

Vote 2017	Mainstream Populists (%)	Centrist Weaker Populists (%)	Moderates with Populist Leanings (%)	Left-Wing Progressives (%)	Right-Wing Populists (%)
Conservative	58	58	39	2	91
Labour	29	32	39	76	3
Liberal democrat	4	5	15	11	1
UKIP	4	1	0	0	3
Other (All)	5	4	7	10	2

Table 3.4   Mean score (out of ten) for 'Big Five' personality traits

	Mainstream Populists	Centrist Weaker Populists	Moderates with Populist Leanings	Left-Wing Progressives	Right-Wing Populists
Neuroticism	4.0	3.6	3.7	4.0	3.4
Conscientiousness	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.4	7.1
Agreeableness	6.2	6.2	6.0	5.9	5.9
Extraversion	4.0	3.9	3.9	3.9	4.1
Openness	5.2	5.4	5.4	5.9	5.3

Populists. In 2017 Conservatives achieved a majority of support among the Mainstream Populists, Centrist Populists and Right-Wing Populists, but the Moderates remained equally divided between their support for Labour and Conservatives. Meanwhile, support for Labour among the Left-Wing Progressives soared by 18 points to rise to 76%. This increase mainly came from the decline in those choosing to vote for other parties, down by more than half, while support for the Lib Dems remained relatively constant.

In recent debates, a great deal of attention has been paid to psychological traits and their role in political strategy and targeting, particularly regarding the controversial work of Cambridge Analytica.[6] This so-called *psychographic targeting* is reported to make use of the 'Big Five' psychological traits: neuroticism, conscientiousness, agreeableness, extraversion and openness.[7] The five groups in the Authoritarian Populism taxonomy, however, showed very little in the way of meaningful differences when it came to these measures. As Table 3.4 shows, all five groups exhibited similar mean scores out of ten across the Big Five.

Authoritarian Populism and Electoral Choice

Now that we have a good idea about the profile of our five ideological groups, the logical question that arises is whether different authoritarian populist positions influence political choices. Fortunately, the richness of our data enables us to take a detailed look at how these ideological camps relate to the last UK-wide trip to the polls: the 2017 general election. It has been observed that the electorate's return to the two major parties in 2017 was driven in no small part by views on Brexit (Heath and Goodwin 2017). As such, we should expect the ideology that played a key role in

shaping positions on Britain leaving the EU to have influenced vote choice in 2017 as well (Inglehart and Norris 2016). This proposition is also supported by the idea that underlying ideology shapes views on specific political issues and also influences party preferences (Peffley and Hurwitz 1985). This fits within a broader view of ideology as a set of zero- or first-order beliefs that are defined early in life, remain relatively static, and underpin higher-order beliefs and attitudes that are more fluid (Bem 1970). Indeed, ideology has been cited as a factor that influences vote choice to the extent that election campaigns fulfil an informative function only, rather than altering preferences.

In order to test the proposition that authoritarian populist ideological position influences vote choice, we ran logistic regressions to examine the relationship between the ideological group and vote in 2017, whilst taking into account other factors that we know to be important. Given the major parties' cannibalisation of minor parties' votes in 2017, our focus in the regressions is on voting for the Conservatives and Labour. As such, we recorded 2017 vote, our five ideological groups from the taxonomy, and a range of other ordinal and nominal indicators into binary variables to include in the regressions. First amongst the variables that we need to account for when estimating the relationship between authoritarian populism and 2017 vote is past vote choice, which is the predictor par excellence. Thus, our models include both 2015 vote and 2016 EU referendum vote as independent variables, with the latter also included to test whether our authoritarian populist groups are related to 2017 vote independently of the act of having voted 'Remain' or 'Leave'. The models also include a variable that influences vote choice in general, in the shape of party identity, as well one that influences the likelihood of voting at all, in the form of attention paid to politics. Beyond these key political variables, the models account for the key demographic variables of age, gender, education, social grade, work status, income and housing tenure. This means that our models fall squarely within the sociological approach to accounting for political behaviour, though our focus on authoritarian populist ideology adds an important element of political psychology as well.

The inclusion of a range of variables in our models enabled us to test not only whether authoritarian populism is related to vote choice but also how strong its relationship is in comparison to other important

influences. In each of the models, we are concerned with the statistical significance of the relationships, the size of the increase or decrease in the likelihood of voting for a party and the strength of the relationships compared to others. Together, these indicators allow us to assess how important an influence authoritarian populism was on vote choice in the 2017 general election. Our first expectation before running the models, stemming from the view of ideology as an underlying influence on political choices, is that authoritarian populism will be strongly related to vote choice in 2017, even when accounting for other factors. Our second expectation is based on the Conservative Party's right-of-centre ideological position, its pro-Brexit stance following the EU referendum and its advocacy of firm limits on immigration. Given that those positions clearly distinguish the Conservatives from Labour, and are reflective of some of the key issues for authoritarian populism, we expect the ideology to promote voting for the Conservative Party in 2017. These expectations can be restated as follows:

Hypothesis 1 *After accounting for other influences, membership of authoritarian populist ideological group is strongly related to 2017 general election vote choice.*

Hypothesis 2 *Membership of authoritarian populist groups is positively related to the likelihood of voting Conservative in the 2017 general election.*

Hypothesis 3 *Concomitant with Hypothesis 2, membership of authoritarian populist groups is negatively related to the likelihood of voting Labour in the 2017 general election.*

The significant results of the first logistic regression, with Conservative vote as the dependent variable, are displayed in Chart G1.[8] Specifically, the chart presents the unlogged odds (indicated by the Exp(B) statistic) of voting Conservative in 2017 that is associated with each of the independent variables in the model. This can be interpreted as the likelihood of voting Conservative, with figures above one representing a higher likelihood and figures below one representing a lower likelihood. For information, the reference groups for each categorical variable in the models are presented in Table 3.5. Looking at the results, we can see that Right-Wing Populists are over 16 times more likely (Exp(B) = 16.352) than Left-Wing

Table 3.5 Reference categories for variables included in models

Variable	Reference category
Party identity	No party identity
Political attention	Not applicable: continuous variable
Age	Not applicable: continuous variable
Gender	Male
Education	No formal qualifications
Social grade	E
Work status	Full-time employment
Household income	Less than £15,000 per year
Housing status	Own outright

Progressives (the reference category) to have voted Conservative in 2017. This is the most dramatic relationship in the model and is followed in size by the impact of the other authoritarian populist positions. These are associated with a likelihood of voting Conservative that is between five and nine times greater than that associated with the Left-Wing Progressive group. At the lower end of this range, the likelihood of voting Conservative associated with Moderates (Exp(B) = 5.823) is approximately the same as that associated with having voted Conservative in 2015 (Exp(B) = 5.631, reference category = 2015 Labour vote) and identifying with the Conservative Party (Exp(B) = 5.416, reference category = no party identity). The size of these relationships is notably larger than that associated with having voted Leave in the 2016 EU referendum (Exp(B) = 1.750, reference category = Remain vote). On the opposite side, Labour Party and Scottish National Party (SNP) identification are associated with the lowest likelihood of voting Conservative. Those who identify with Labour are three and a half times less likely (Exp(B) = 0.283) than those with no party identity (the reference group) to vote Conservative, whilst SNP identifiers are seven times (Exp(B) = 0.144) less likely.

The size of the above relationships does not tell the whole story, so we must also consider their strength. For this, we turn to the Wald statistic, displayed on the right of Fig. 3.10, which gives an approximation of the relative strength of each relationship. Using this measure, identifying with the Conservative Party (Wald = 329.082) is by far the strongest factor in choosing to vote for the party 2017, followed by having done so in 2015 (Wald = 216.380). The status of those two variables as the pre-eminent predictors of 2017 Conservative vote is unsurprising, but we can also observe that Right-Wing Populism is the next strongest predictor

	Exp(B)	Wald
Right Wing Populism	16.352	
Centrist Weak Populism	9.102	
Mainstream Populism	8.695	
Moderatism with Populist Leanings	5.823	155.032
2015 Conservative Vote	5.631	107.504
Conservative Party Identity	5.416	98.994
Work Status: Student	2.410	75.601
EU Referendum Leave Vote	1.750	216.380
		329.082
2015 UKIP Vote	1.630	15.361
Political Attention	1.033	29.148
Age	1.022	12.453
Housing: Social Renting	0.621	4.944
2015 SNP Vote	0.494	35.591
Liberal Democrat Party Identity	0.487	14.875
Housing: Other	0.486	3.944
Other Party Identity	0.463	22.288
EU Referendum Did Not Vote	0.436	4.814
		15.571
Labour Party Identity	0.283	37.706
SNP Identity	0.144	124.323
		12.944

Fig. 3.10   Effects of influences on the likelihood of voting conservative in the 2017 General Election

(Wald = 155.032). Further, after Labour Party identification (Wald = 124.323), the other authoritarian populist groupings are the three next strongest predictors (with Wald figures ranging from 107.504 to 75.601). In light of these figures, and those relating to the size and directions of the relationships, the hypotheses outlined at the outset are supported. Indeed, given that the models set a high bar by including past vote and party identity, they provide strong evidence that authoritarian populist ideology was an important factor in vote choice in the 2017 general election. Further, it is clear that those with more strongly authoritarian populist views were much more likely to vote for the Conservative Party than for other parties.

Figure 3.11 shows the results of the second logistic regression, with 2017 Labour vote as the dependent variable, in which the effects of authoritarian populism are opposite to, and smaller than, those relating to Conservative vote. Specifically, those in the Right-Wing Populist group are approximately four times less likely than Left-Wing Progressives (Exp(B) = 0.233) to vote Labour whilst Mainstream Populists are less than half as likely (Exp(B) = 0.438). Centrists (Exp(B) = 0.543) and Moderates (Exp(B) = 0.562) continue this trend for authoritarian populist

	Exp(B)	Wald
Labour Party Identity	5.565	
2015 Labour Vote	4.434	
2015 Other Party Vote	2.433	431.693
Housing: Living with Family	1.431	180.791
2015 UKIP Vote	1.350	38.818
Gender: Female	1.232	6.278
Age	0.978	3.955
Social Grade: C2	0.775	10.105
EU Referendum Leave Vote	0.740	41.548
Liberal Democrat Party Identity	0.740	3.878
Social Grade: D	0.723	9.815
Social Grade: A	0.713	5.734
Work Status: Unemployed	0.653	5.059
Moderatism with Populist Leanings	0.562	4.646
Centrist Weak Populism	0.543	6.075
UKIP Identity	0.441	40.736
Mainstream Populism	0.438	27.112
EU Referendum Did Not Vote	0.250	12.842
Right Wing Populism	0.233	44.150
Conservative Party Identity	0.168	170.228
SNP Party Identity	0.150	72.186
		170.958
		27.234

Fig. 3.11 Effects of influences on the likelihood of voting labour in the 2017 General Election

inclinations to be positively associated with Conservative vote and, concomitantly, negatively associated with Labour vote. However, the relationships are not as strong for Labour vote as for Conservative vote, in part because of the particularly strong influence of Labour Party identity (Wald = 431.693). Nevertheless, with Wald statistics ranging from 72.186 to 40.736, authoritarian populism remains amongst the stronger factors in the decision to vote Labour in 2017 and the results support both hypotheses 1 and 3. Overall, the second model (Cox & Snell R^2 = 0.438) is not as good at accounting for Labour vote as the first model (Cox & Snell R^2 = 0.510) is at accounting for Conservative vote. Thus, authoritarian populism is a stronger predictor of Conservative vote than it is of Labour vote, and the model is better at explaining the former than the latter.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has provided new insight into who authoritarian populists in Britain are, addressing a relative paucity of such information until now. To provide this insight, we analysed data from an original survey of a representative sample of 14,923 British adults, conducted by YouGov. Using

the definition of authoritarian populism provided previously by Sanders, we identified five ideological groups in the British context: Mainstream Populists, Centrists, Moderates, Left-Wing Progressives and Right-Wing Populists. The Mainstream Populists, Centrists and Left-Wing Progressives each constitute roughly one-fifth of the population, whilst the Moderates constitute almost a third and the Right-Wing Populists make up less than a sixth. Demographically, the Right-Wing Populists are more likely than the other groups to be male, and are the oldest of the ideological groups. By contrast the Left-Wing Progressives are the youngest group, and are distinguished from all of the other groups by the prevalence of holding university-level education. Most of the ideological groups have a majority of members in higher social grades, with only the Mainstream Populists having a majority in lower social grades.

Politically speaking, the largely Labour-voting Left-Wing Progressives stand in opposition to the majority of Conservative voters in the Mainstream Populists, Centrists and Right-Wing Populists groups, whilst the Moderates are split down the middle in this regard. The link between authoritarian populist ideology and political choice is also supported by the results of the logistic regressions that we ran, which reveal that the ideological group is amongst the most important predictors of vote in 2017. This is the case even when we account for strong predictors of electoral choice such as past vote, as well as for demographic variables. The model that we tested is particularly good at accounting for Conservative vote, and it seems that authoritarian populist ideology is a particularly important factor in the decision to vote for that party. Authoritarian populism is a less important factor in the decision to vote Labour, and it is Left-Wing Progressives who are most apt to do so. Overall, this chapter has demonstrated that ideological groups defined by their authoritarian populist positions are demographically distinct and politically important. Thus, authoritarian populism has electoral consequences in its own right, and also represents an important factor that can help us understand why different demographic groups vote for different parties.

Notes

1. https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/954590/European-Union-Manfred-Weber-Brussels-Belgian-PM-meeting.
2. https://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/politics/new-centrist-party-wont-take-12352403.

3. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5713665/Labour-big-beast-condemns-Corbyns-crazy-populism.html.
4. http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-populism/?iid=toc.
5. https://twitter.com/mrharrycole/status/1001156966251671552?lang=en-gb.
6. https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/cambridge-analytica-and-the-perils-of-psychographics.
7. https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-03880-4.
8. Results are significant at the conventional 0.05 level, meaning we can be 95% certain of the rejecting the null hypothesis of no effect.

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Authoritarian Populist Opinion in Europe

John Bartle, David Sanders, and Joe Twyman

The election of Donald Trump in the US and the rise of support for populist parties across Europe have prompted widespread speculation about the character and strength of populist opinion (Goodhart 2017; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012; Kaltwasser et al. 2017; Műller 2017). Such opinion constitutes a reservoir of potential support for populist parties that seek to make electoral capital at the expense of established, 'mainstream' parties (Meguid 2010). Recent research in the UK has shown that a cluster of attitudes that can reasonably be described as authoritarian populist (AP)—centring on opposition to immigration, cynicism about human rights, disapproval of the EU, support for a robust defence and foreign policy, and a right-wing ideology—forms a single factor that underpins a range of other political preferences (Sanders et al. 2016). This chapter replicates these

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analyses for the UK and an additional 11 European countries: France, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Poland, Italy, Spain, Romania, Lithuania and Holland, using representative sample surveys with a common set of questions.

Part I presents a series of models that show that authoritarian populist attitudes form a single factor in ten of the twelve countries. Part II shows that across these ten countries the *sources* of AP attitudes are very similar, with particularly strong effects for the perceived *cultural* consequences of immigration. Part III relaxes the assumption that authoritarian populism is an exclusively right-wing phenomenon. It conducts a series of country-by-country cluster analyses of the component measures making up our AP scale. This enables us to identify the 'political tribes' in each country and differentiate between left- and right-wing authoritarian populists. It also enables us to estimate potential support for authoritarian populist parties. Part IV examines the relationship between 'tribe' membership and voting for right-wing authoritarian populist parties. This shows that the potential support *for* such parties is much larger than indicated by *either* past vote *or* current vote intentions.

MEASURING AUTHORITARIAN POPULIST OPINION IN TEN EU COUNTRIES

Populist movements claim to represent a silent majority who are ignored by the cosmopolitan political 'elites', especially the mainstream parties (Müller 2017). Populist leaders typically claim that the elite has flouted the will of the people by encouraging mass migration, introducing human rights laws to protect minorities, transferring power to supra-national organisations such as the European Union and weakening national defence (Mudde 2017). These leaders express impatience with those features of liberal constitutionalism (checks and balances, human rights laws and international treaty commitments) that place limits on majority rule and produce messy political compromises. They typically claim that popular sovereignty can be re-established either by using the mechanisms of direct democracy or by 'entrusting their interests to a personal leader who is directly chosen by the people and who continues to defer to, and consult, them' (Canovan 2002, 29).

The claim that there is a silent majority that is hostile to the elite consensus is clearly important and merits empirical analysis. A recent multiwave

panel survey conducted between 2011 and 2015 suggests that there is a distinct constellation of attitudes in the UK that forms a single scale that can be described as authoritarian populist (Sanders et al. 2016). In November 2016, representative sample internet surveys were conducted to establish whether similar constellations might be observed in the 12 EU countries (including the UK).

Our survey employed several measures to estimate authoritarian populist dispositions: two indicators of attitudes towards immigration (the number of negative emotions associated with immigration and the belief that immigration from outside the EU is a bad thing); two indicators of anti-EU attitudes (disapproval of the EU and distrust of EU institutions); two indicators of respondents' national orientations (whether the respondent's country should pursue a 'strong and tough foreign policy' and the belief that patriotism is important); a single indicator of cynicism about human rights (agreement with the proposition that 'People who talk about protecting human rights are mainly interested in protecting the rights of criminals, not those of their victims') and a single measure of ideological position (the respondent's self-placement on an 11-point left-right scale).[1]

Our results provide a fascinating snapshot of contemporary attitudes across a wide swathe of Europe. Across all 12 countries, for example, some 63% of respondents expressed at least one negative emotion about immigration. This varied from a low of 53% in Spain to a high of 75% in Poland. Similarly, some 36% of all respondents expressed cynicism about human rights. This varied from a low of 27% in Sweden to highs of 45% in Lithuania and Romania. Left-right self-placement was measured from 0 (most left-) to 10 (most right-wing). The mean across all 12 countries is slightly right of centre (5.2). The Spanish are were the most left-wing (4.4) and the French the most right-wing (5.5).

Table 4.1 presents the results of a series of exploratory factor analyses and alpha-scaling models that test the proposition that our eight indicators form a single factor or scale (Spector 1992). The results are reported for each country separately. In each of the models, we expect all the indicators to load relatively highly on the first factor (the only factor loadings reported). We also expect that the eigenvalues of the first factor will be substantially larger than the equivalent value for the second factor. In the alpha-scaling models, we expect alpha values either close to or greater than 0.7 since this is generally regarded as an indication that the items form a single scale (Heath et al. 1994).

Table 4.1 Summary of factor analyses and alpha-scaling analyses in 12 EU countries

	Factor 1 Loadings												
	UK	France	Germany	Sweden	Denmark	Finland	Poland	Italy	Spain	Roman	Lithuania	Holland	Ten[a]
Negative immigration emotions	0.71	0.67	0.64	0.77	0.69	0.62	0.48	0.61	0.51	0.46	0.38	0.59	0.65
Non-EU Immigration is a bad thing	0.67	0.73	0.70	0.81	0.75	0.70	0.53	0.64	0.52	0.43	0.36	0.62	0.67
Disapproval of EU	0.76	0.51	0.48	0.59	0.48	0.58	0.55	0.61	−0.24	0.43	0.45	0.64	0.54
Distrust of EU institutions	0.63	0.38	0.44	0.56	0.50	0.57	0.62	0.49	−0.24	0.50	0.50	0.55	0.48
Foreign policy strong and tough	0.52	0.45	0.26	0.43	0.39	0.25	0.47	0.36	0.31	0.22	0.07	0.40	0.40
Patriotism is important	0.68	0.50	0.51	0.70	0.61	0.39	0.27	0.35	0.59	0.14	0.09	0.47	0.52
Critical of human rights	0.73	0.61	0.51	0.64	0.60	0.63	0.39	0.49	0.42	0.24	0.39	0.47	0.57
Left-Right self-placement	0.60	0.52	0.50	0.48	0.47	0.18	0.44	−0.40	0.53	−0.12	−0.07	0.38	0.37
Factor 1 eigenvalue	3.55	2.47	2.18	3.22	2.64	2.17	1.83	2.03	1.55	0.97	0.89	2.19	2.29
Factor 2 eigenvalue	0.16	0.48	0.25	0.56	0.68	0.68	0.41	0.41	0.91	0.37	0.54	0.32	0.50
Alpha-scale coefficient	0.84	0.70	0.72	0.79	0.73	0.66	0.62	0.66	0.59	0.37	0.36	0.70	0.70
Mean Alpha-scale score (range 0–1)	0.45	0.70	0.31	0.49	0.50	0.49	0.41	0.60	0.24	–	–	0.33	0.45
No. of cases	1265	815	873	881	911	783	849	815	908	716	723	821	8921

[a]Pooled models across ten countries, excluding Romania and Lithuania; no Alpha-scale scores for Romania and Lithuania

In ten of the twelve countries, the results broadly conform to this expected pattern. In the UK, for example, all the component variables load above 0.5 on the first factor, and there is a very large difference between the eigenvalues of the first and second factors (3.55 compared with 0.16). The alpha-scale coefficient in the UK model (0.84) is well above the 0.7 threshold. The models are similarly supported in France, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Poland and the Netherlands. In Italy and Spain, the model fits are less good, though still reasonably close to expectations. Italy is complicated by the fact that ideological self-placement loads negatively on the first factor, suggesting that AP attitudes are associated with the left. In Spain, the negative coefficients on the two EU variables suggest that AP attitudes are associated with support rather than disapproval of the EU. Finally, the Lithuanian and Romanian models are weak. Both models produce a series of very low loadings on the first factor and the eigenvalues for the first factor are below unity. This indicates that the first factor explains little of the overall variance in the component indicators. The scaling models also produce alpha coefficients well below the 0.7 threshold in both cases (0.37 for Romania and 0.36 for Lithuania). The final column of Table 4.1 reports the factor and alpha-scaling models across the ten countries, excluding Lithuania and Romania. These results match expectations: averaged across the ten countries, all the component indicators load positively on the first factor; the first factor eigenvalue significantly exceeds that of the second factor and the alpha coefficient meets the 0.7 threshold.

The results reported in Table 4.1 support the notion that in most of the countries examined, there is a set of political attitudes that constitutes a distinctive authoritarian populist mindset. To be sure, there are a few anomalies that we return to in section 'The Sources of Authoritarian Populist Attitudes in Ten EU Countries' below. Nevertheless, anti-immigrant, anti-human rights, anti-EU, supportive of a strong nation-state, and (generally) ideologically right-wing attitudes clearly represent an important dimension of contemporary politics. In the next section, we explore the individual- and system-level sources of this mindset in order: (1) to validate our AP scale measure by showing that it correlates with other variables in theoretically plausible ways; and (2) to provide a preliminary causal account of the origins of authoritarian populist attitudes.

THE SOURCES OF AUTHORITARIAN POPULIST ATTITUDES IN TEN EU COUNTRIES

There are innumerable explanations of why AP attitudes vary across individuals (see Altemeyer 1981; Barnett 1982; Dix 1985; Ford and Goodwin 2014; Hall and Jacques 1983; Jessop et al. 1984; Jessop 2016; Jones 2007; Mudde 2007; Stenner 2005; Wodak et al. 2013). Here, we concentrate on a limited set of propositions that our data enable us to test across those ten countries where AP attitudes form a single scale.[2]

We explore seven sets of hypotheses. The first relates to why so many people across Europe appear to be concerned about immigration: the belief that immigration either has had or will have an adverse effect on the community in which they live, making it feel less like the 'home'. This belief does not necessarily reflect the objective size of the local or national immigrant community but can have important consequences for the development of an authoritarian populist mindset (Rydgren 2018). We operationalise this notion by assessing the extent to which individuals agree with the statement that 'There are so many foreigners round here that it doesn't feel like home any more'. We hypothesise that agreement with this proposition will strengthen AP attitudes.[3] A second hypothesis is that AP attitudes strengthen among those who believe that economic conditions have worsened in the recent past (Clarke et al. 2017). We measure this belief, somewhat imperfectly, by asking them whether they think their country's economic circumstances have worsened or improved over the past year. Our third proposition relates to the effects of national *versus* European identity. We hypothesise that individuals who have an exclusively national identity are more likely to believe in the need to preserve the integrity and character of the nation-state and have stronger AP attitudes (Mudde 2007; Haidt 2016).

A fourth hypothesis concerns 'negative valence'. This is the idea that those who believe that the incumbent governing party or parties have failed to deliver are more likely to develop AP attitudes (Clarke et al. 2017). We sum valence assessments across seven policy domains (housing, education, immigration, the economy in general, defence, crime and unemployment). We expect scores on this composite index to have a negative relationship with our AP scale. Our fifth hypothesis relates to 'traditional social values'. Authoritarian populism is often seen as a regressive mindset that favours the re-establishment of a (sometimes mythical) past political order. It follows that those who favour traditional social values

will tend to hold authoritarian populist views (Ignazi 1992; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). We measure these values by agreement with the propositions that (a) children should be obedient and respectful towards authority and (b) men and women should pursue very different gender roles. We expect those who agree to have stronger AP attitudes. A sixth set of explanatory variables relates to issue salience (Hobolt and de Vries 2012). We hypothesise that AP attitudes are stronger among those who regard immigration or terrorism as the most important issue facing the country and weaker among those who believe that the most important issue is the gap between rich and poor. Finally, we include controls for age, gender and education. We expect AP attitudes to be associated positively with age and being male and negatively associated with education (Arzheimer 2018).

Our dependent variable (AP scale) is constructed separately for each of the ten countries. Our country-by-country model specification is:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{APscale} = a &+ b_1 \text{Not Home} + b_2 \text{Economic Retrospections} \\
&+ b_3 \text{National Identity} + b_4 \text{Valence} + b_5 \text{Obedient} \\
&+ b_6 \text{Different Roles} + b_7 \text{MIP} - \text{Immigration} + b_8 \text{MIP} \\
&- \text{Terror} + b_9 \text{MIP} - \text{Gap} + \sum \varepsilon_I.
\end{aligned} \tag{4.1}
$$

MIP signifies Most Important Problem, and $\sum \varepsilon_I$ is a random error term.[4] We also estimate a pooled 10-country model. This adds two objective country-level control variables: the percentage of the population who were born outside the country as of January 2015 (% Foreign) (Golder 2003) and average percentage change in GDP 2005–2015 (GDP change).[5] Our pooled model specification is:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{APscale} = a &+ b_1 \text{Not Home} + b_2 \text{Economic Retrospections} \\
&+ b_3 \text{National Identity} + b_4 \text{Valence} + b_5 \text{Obedient} \\
&+ b_6 \text{Different Roles} + b_7 \text{MIP} - \text{Immigration} + b_8 \text{MIP} \\
&- \text{Terror} + b_9 \text{MIP} - \text{Gap} + b_{10} \%\text{Foreign} + b_{11} \text{GDPchange} + \sum \varepsilon_I.
\end{aligned} \tag{4.2}
$$

Since the AP scale is a normally distributed interval-level measure, estimation is by Ordinary Least Squares regression (Achen 1982). Table 4.2 summarises our findings for model [1] for each of the ten countries where

AP attitudes form a single scale. The penultimate row of Table 4.2 estimates model [2], using (country-) clustered regression with robust standard errors (Greene 2012). A positive sign (+) denotes a significant positive estimated effect; a negative sign (−) a significant negative effect; and a zero no statistically significant effect.[6] The corrected R^2s show that the models are all reasonably well-determined. The R^2 is a modest 0.30 for Poland, although this is not unusual with individual-level data. For the remaining countries, the R^2 is always well above 0.40 and in the UK, France and Sweden, it exceeds 0.60. The strongest support for hypotheses in terms of coefficient signs and significance levels is in the UK. In this case all but three of the independent variables are significant and correctly signed. The only exceptions are education (which is non-significant) and Economic Retrospections and Valence assessments (which both have significant *positive* rather than *negative* effects).[7] For most of the remaining countries in Table 4.2, the results are broadly similar, with most predictors significant and correctly signed—although inevitably, as in the UK model, there are a small number of coefficients that do not match expectations. The 10-country pooled model is reported in the penultimate row of the table. The R^2 of 0.48 indicates that the model is well-determined. Most of the individual-level coefficients are significant and correctly signed though *non-significant* effects are observed for Economic Retrospections, Valence assessments and the prioritisation of the rich/poor gap. Both of the country-level variables also fail to achieve significance, suggesting that neither the objective economic performance nor the objective size of the immigrant population has direct effects on authoritarian populist attitudes.

Looking across the rows in Table 4.2 enables us to assess the number and types of effect that operate in the different countries examined. Thus, for example, the *most* correctly predicted effects were evident in France and Sweden (in both cases 10 out of 12 effects are correctly predicted) and the least in Poland (6/10 correctly predicted) and in Spain (only 4/10 correctly predicted). Looking down the columns tells us which predictor variables most consistently had effects in different countries. Here, the consistent, correctly signed effects we observe (in nine out of our ten countries) are those for gender (men are more likely to hold AP views), for the sense that 'it doesn't feel like home round here any more', for an exclusively national identity, and for the prioritising of immigration as the most important problem facing the country. Slightly less pervasive but still widespread effects are observed for traditional social values (particularly in relation to the need for children to be obedient and to respect authority)

Table 4.2 Summary of findings from regression models of AP attitudes

	Independent variable												Coeffs correct	Corrected R²
	Age	Male	Educ	No home	Econ retro	Natid	Valence	Obedience	Diff role	MIP-Immig	MIP-Terror	MIP-Gap		
Predicted effect	+	+	−	+	−	+	−	+	+	+	+	−		
Observed effect														
UK	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	−	9/12	0.63
France	+	+	0	+	−	+	−	+	0	+	+	−	10/12	0.62
Germany	+	+	0	+	0	+	−	+	+	+	0	0	8/12	0.55
Sweden	+	+	0	+	−	+	−	+	+	+	0	−	10/12	0.69
Denmark	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	0	+	0	−	7/12	0.54
Finland	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	0	8/12	0.49
Poland	0	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	6/12	0.30
Italy	−	0	−	+	−	−	−	0	+	+	0	−	8/12	0.52
Spain	0	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	0	0	+	−	4/12	0.44
Holland	0	+	0	+	0	+	−	+	0	+	0	−	7/12	0.47
Ten countries	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	0	7/12	0.46
Coeffs correct	6/10	9/10	1/10	9/10	3/10	9/10	5/10	7/10	6/10	9/10	5/10	7/10		

and for the prioritising of the gap between rich and poor as the MIP. These may seem 'obvious' findings—and indeed they are—but the fact that the models consistently show these effects across different countries supports our claim that the AP scale is measuring something real and important (McIver and Carmines 1981; Heath et al. 1994).

Europe's Emerging Political Tribes: Evidence from Cluster Analyses

The analysis we have conducted so far treats authoritarian populism as a single, continuous scale on which any individual can be located. The evidence presented in Table 4.2 shows that individuals' positions on this scale can be plausibly explained by a number of different individual-level factors that operate across our ten EU countries. Yet there are also country-by-country variations in the effect coefficients. In addition, as we saw when we discussed factor models earlier, in some countries left-right ideological self-placement has a somewhat ambiguous relation with the other components of the authoritarian populist mindset. This prompts the question as to whether we should perhaps be looking for the possible existence of distinct left-leaning and right-leaning populist sentiment in different countries. One obvious vehicle for such an exploration is cluster analysis (Alenderfer and Blashfield 1984; Scarbrough 1984). This technique identifies distinct groupings of individuals (i.e. who register similar scores) on a given set of characteristics. In this case, the characteristics are the eight component indicators of authoritarian populism. Given that we know (a) from Table 4.1 that the intercorrelations among the eight components vary across countries and (b) from Table 4.2 that the sources of AP attitudes vary across countries, we use separate country-specific cluster analyses to identify the different clusterings or 'political tribes' that characterise each of our ten countries.

Table 4.3 provides an illustrative cluster analysis for the UK. We estimate two-, three-, four- and five-cluster models. It is possible to estimate more clusters or groupings of individual respondents and we do so for some countries as reported below. We limit our search to five clusters for the UK because with this solution one of the clusters contains only 3% of respondents. Our operating rule is that if a cluster contains 5% or less of the sample, it is unrealistic to describe that grouping as a 'political tribe'. We realise this is an arbitrary figure and that we could have estimated an

Table 4.3 Cluster analyses of the eight component authoritarian populism indicators, UK as an illustration

	Component indicator								
	Negative immigration emotions	Non-EU immigration bad thing	Disapproval of EU	Distrust EU institutions	Foreign policy strong and tough	Patriotism important	Critical of human rights	Left-right self-placement	Percentage in cluster
2-Cluster solution									
Cluster 1	0.84	2.72	2.51	2.14	0.16	3.10	2.39	3.02	36
Cluster 2	1.10	3.19	3.23	2.61	0.38	4.01	3.27	6.13	64
3-Cluster solution									
Cluster 1	0.13	2.07	1.61	1.77	0.03	2.58	1.67	2.55	23
Cluster 2	2.20	3.99	4.25	2.86	0.43	4.10	3.78	3.93	14
Cluster 3	1.10	3.19	3.23	2.61	0.38	4.01	3.27	6.13	64
4-Cluster solution									
Cluster 1	0.13	2.07	1.61	1.77	0.03	2.58	1.67	2.55	23
Cluster 2	2.20	3.99	4.25	2.86	0.43	4.10	3.78	3.93	14
Cluster 3	0.43	2.61	2.08	2.29	0.19	3.58	2.65	5.39	30
Cluster 4	1.72	3.73	4.30	2.91	0.55	4.41	3.84	6.81	34
5-Cluster solution									
Cluster 1	0.13	2.07	1.61	1.77	0.03	2.58	1.67	2.55	23
Cluster 2	2.41	3.99	4.20	2.86	0.43	4.20	3.94	4.41	11
Cluster 3	1.21	3.96	4.46	2.86	0.43	3.61	3.04	1.61	3
Cluster 4	0.43	2.61	2.08	2.29	0.19	3.58	2.65	5.39	30
Cluster 5	1.72	3.73	4.30	2.91	0.55	4.41	3.84	6.81	34
Overall UK average	1.00	3.02	2.96	2.43	0.30	3.67	2.94	4.96	
Range	0–4	1–5	1–5	1–3	0–1	1–5	1–5	0–10	

ever-more differentiated set of groupings. These estimates would be increasingly unstable since our sample size for most countries is under 1000. Such analyses would have revealed very little about the 'actual' tribes in each country.

The first, two-cluster, solution shown in Table 4.3 shows that Cluster 2 respondents score higher on each of the eight AP indicators than do Cluster 1 respondents. However, the numerical differences between the two groups, although statistically significant, are not particularly large— for example, the Cluster 1 mean for negative immigration emotions is 0.84, compared with a figure of 1.10 for Cluster 2. Moreover, if we were to describe all Cluster 2 respondents as authoritarian populists, we would not only be inferring that fully 64% of the UK electorate were AP or AP-incliners but doing so on the basis of relatively small differences in mean scores across the eight component items.

The three-cluster solution differentiates between two groupings previously within Cluster 1 of the two-cluster solution. In the three-cluster model, Cluster 2 respondents are clearly left wing (mean score 3.93) but they are also strongly anti-immigrant (Negative Emotions mean score = 2.20; Opposed to non-EU Immigration score of 3.99), anti-EU (disapproval 4.25; anti-EU Institutions 2.86), supportive of the strong nation-state (Strong Foreign Policy 0.43; Patriotism Important 4.10) and critical of human rights (mean 3.78). In short, these Cluster 2 respondents, who represent 14% of the electorate, exhibit most of the key characteristics of authoritarian populists but are left wing. Bizarrely, they look more authoritarian populist than the 64% of respondents now in Cluster 3 (exactly the same group who were in Cluster 2 in the two-cluster model) who also classify themselves, on average, as more right wing.

This is where the four-cluster solution proves instructive. This solution distinguishes between two groups inside Cluster 3 of the three-cluster solution. In Cluster 3 of the four-cluster model, there is a clear centre-right group (mean ideology score = 5.39) that is broadly sympathetic to immigration (mean Negative Emotions = 0.43), pro-EU (mean EU disapproval = 2.08), moderate on foreign policy (mean score = 0.19) and relatively uncritical on human rights (mean score = 2.65). This group is very different from the more distinctly right-wing authoritarian populists indicated in Cluster 4—who on average score noticeably higher on all eight of the component measures than the 'social liberals' in Cluster 3.

The final segment of Table 4.3, for completeness, reports the results of a five-cluster solution. The key difference from the four-cluster solution is

that the 14% of left-wing APs in that model are now divided into two groups that look very similar across most of the eight components, although they do differ a little in terms of immigration emotions and antipathy towards human rights. However, the Cluster 3 respondents in the five-cluster solution constitute under 3% of our sample and thus fall below our self-imposed threshold for the definition of a distinct tribe. We conclude that the four-cluster solution shown in Table 4.3 makes the most sense in terms of identifying the UK's most important political tribes. As we indicate in the table, on the basis of the four-cluster solution, we would characterise members of Cluster 1 as left liberals (23% of the electorate), Cluster 2 as left authoritarian populists (14%), Cluster 3 as centre-right liberals (30%), and Cluster 4 as right-wing authoritarian populists (34%). In short, in the UK at least, AP attitudes cut across left and right. A substantial proportion of the population (around 48% on our estimate) holds broadly AP attitudes, drawn from both right (34%) and left (14%).

We repeated the analysis shown in Table 4.4 for each of the remaining nine countries in our reduced 10-country sample. The detailed results are reported in the Online Supplementary Materials but Table 4.4 displays the headline results.[8] The clusters reported represent our best estimates of the political tribes in each of our ten countries in November 2016. They also represent our conclusions about the character and size of the different authoritarian populist groupings in each country. In France, for example, we estimate the size of the total AP electorate at 66%, divided into 25% who place themselves clearly on the ideological right and 41% who place themselves on the centre-right. In Holland, in contrast, we observe only 30%, divided equally between right APs (15%) and centre-left APs (15%). Figure 4.1 summarises the overall pattern across all ten countries. The various AP groupings represent reservoirs of potential support for authoritarian populist parties in future elections.

Political Tribe Membership and Voting Intentions

It has been suggested that the authoritarian populist mindset is more prevalent among European mass publics than current levels of voting for right-wing populist parties would imply (Mudde 2007). Figure 4.2 reports the observed levels of populist party *voting* in the most recent general elections in our ten countries. A simple comparison between Figs. 4.1 and 4.2 shows that the size of the AP reservoir in each country is clearly greater than the actual proportion of the population that voted right-wing popu-

Table 4.4   Estimated political tribes in ten European countries, based on cluster analyses

Country and number of clusters	Political tribe	Percentage of electorate	Country and number of clusters	Political tribe	Percentage of electorate
UK: 4-cluster solution	Left liberals	23	Finland: 6-cluster solution	Left liberals	8
	Left AP	14		Left AP	14
	Centre-right liberals	30		Centre-left liberals	20
	Right AP	34		Centre-right liberals	22
France: 3-cluster solution	Left liberals	34		Centre-right AP	25
	Centre-right AP	41		Right AP	11
	Right AP	25	Poland	Left liberals	22
Germany: 4-cluster solution	Left liberals	19		Centre-left AP	23
	Centre-left liberals	50		Centre-right liberals	35
	Centre-right AP	24		Right AP	20
	Right AP	7	Italy	Left liberals	13
Sweden: 3-cluster solution	Left liberals	41		Left AP	16
	Right liberals	16		Centre-right AP	47
	Centre-right AP	43		Right liberals	25
Denmark: 4-cluster solution	Left liberals	26	Spain	Left liberals	23

(*continued*)

Table 4.4 (continued)

Country and number of clusters	Political tribe	Percentage of electorate	Country and number of clusters	Political tribe	Percentage of electorate
	Centre-left liberals	24		Centre-left liberals	46
	Centre-right AP	37		Right AP	36
	Right AP	12	Holland	Left liberals	10
				Centre-left liberals	26
				Centre-left AP	15
				Centre-right liberals	33
				Right AP	15

AP signifies Authoritarian Populist; data weighted by in-country weights

list. Given that there are many other reasons why people vote the way they do—among them party identifications, leader affect, issue salience assessments and economic evaluations—this is not surprising (Arzheimer 2018). Significantly, the same pattern is also evident if we compare the size of the AP 'tribe(s)' in each country with the *intention* to vote for a right-wing populist party in the *next* general election, as in Fig. 4.3. The extent of AP sentiment is consistently greater than the proportion of voters intending to vote for a populist party.

The relationship between authoritarian populist attitudes and party preferences is obviously more complicated than the simple observation that there are more authoritarian populists than right-wing populist voters. In order to make cross-national comparisons feasible, we characterise the parties in each of our ten countries according to the classification provided by Wolfram Nordsieck.[9] We condense the party groupings summarised by Nordsieck into five 'party family' categories:

(1) Far-left, including communist and radical left parties.
(2) Centre-left, including social democracy, left green and left nationalist parties.

Fig. 4.1 Levels of right-wing and left-wing authoritarian populism in ten European countries. Cluster-analysis-derived estimates of the percentages of the total electorate with an Authoritarian Populist (AP) mindset

(3) Centre, including liberal and social liberal parties.
(4) Centre-right, including Christian Democrat, conservative and centre-right liberal parties.
(5) Right-wing populist, including Eurosceptic and national conservative parties.

Thus, in the UK for example, the far-left category (1) is empty—though this may change in the future as the Labour left under Jeremy Corbyn consolidates its position in the party; category (2) contains Labour, the Scottish Nationalists, Plaid Cymru and the Greens; category (3) contains the Liberal Democrats; category (4) the Conservatives; and category (5) UKIP and the British National Party. The allocations of parties to categories in the other nine countries are outlined in Online Supplementary Materials.

Table 4.5 reports the simple relationship across our ten countries between party family vote intention and membership of an authoritarian populist 'tribe'.[10] This shows that the strong bivariate relationship between vote intention and AP tribe persists when multivariate controls are imposed. Table 4.5 differentiates between right-wing and left-wing AP

Fig. 4.2 Right-wing populist voting in the recent general election in ten European countries. Percentage of votes cast for parties described by Wolfram Nordsieck party as right-wing populist, right-wing nationalist or Eurosceptic/National Conservative. Source: http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/countries.html. Figures for Italy 2018 are for Lega Nord. Berlusconi's Forza Italia, which some regard as right-wing populist, received 14% of the vote. Cinque Stelle, a populist party that garners support from both left and right, received 32.8%

tribes, the latter (8% of respondents) being much smaller than the former (37%). It is clear from the table that there is a fairly strong, although by no means invariant, relationship between vote intention and tribe. Among the non-APs, support is distributed predominantly among the four non-populist party groupings, with the centre-left, centre and centre-right together attracting some 81% of the non-AP vote. Among the left-APs, the votes are distributed across the five party groupings, though there is a clear tendency for them, *despite their leftist ideological orientations*, to vote for either centre-right (28%) or right-wing populist parties (25%). Right-wing APs do not uniformly support right-wing parties. Roughly one-third of them (34%) support either left, centre-left or centre parties, though the other two-thirds clearly intend to vote either centre-right or populist right.[11]

The key figures in the Right AP column, however, are the 31% who support centre-right parties and the 35% who intend to vote for right-

Fig. 4.3 Right-wing populist vote intention and the size of the authoritarian 'tribe' in ten European countries

Table 4.5 Bivariate relationship between party family vote intention and membership of a Populist tribe, across ten pooled European countries

	AP tribe status			
	Not in an AP tribe (55%)	Member of left AP tribe (8%)	Member of right AP tribe (37%)	Percentage of all those with vote intention
Party family				
Far-left	13	12	6	11
Centre-left	40	19	15	27
Centre	16	16	13	15
Centre-right	27	28	31	29
Right-wing populist	6	25	35	19

Column percentages reported; data weighted to equal *N*s across countries

wing populist parties. At present, centre-right parties are just as successful at attracting the support of right-wing populist voters as are the right-wing populist parties themselves. If this pattern continues, then right-wing populism in Europe may not progress much further beyond its current

levels in the coming years. But there is a real risk here. On the one hand, centre-right parties may feel that in order to meet voter concerns about immigration and the negative economic consequences of globalisation they need to transmute themselves in anti-immigrant, protectionist right-wing populist parties in order to survive electorally (Pardos-Prado 2015). On the other hand, if centre-right parties fail properly to respond to wide-spread voter concerns about these issues, they will find themselves under-cut by the growing attraction of right-wing populist parties that will undoubtedly seek to mobilise as much of their potential authoritarian tribal support base as they possibly can. If the centre-left parties decide to attack a niche authoritarian populist party, this may increase the salience of the immigration issue and allow the niche party to take votes from the centre-right (Meguid 2010). The only real protection against the rising tide of authoritarian populist sentiment among European voters is for the entire liberal political establishment (from the centre-left to the centre-right) to start to talk openly and honestly about the long-term *social* costs of immigration and economic globalisation. It is simply not good enough for liberals to emphasise the economic benefits of immigration and to cas-tigate voters who are seduced by populist solutions with labels such as 'ignorant', 'neo-fascist' or 'gullible'. The cultural concerns articulated by the members of the authoritarian populist tribe that we have outlined here are real. They need to be heard and addressed rather than condemned. We are convinced that if they are ignored, the extensive authoritarian populist sentiment we have described risks being mobilised increasingly by right-wing populist parties whose simplistic solutions to complex problems risk serious social, economic and political damage (Müller 2017).

Summary and Conclusions

'Populism' is often used imprecisely to describe anti-establishment politi-cal movements that propose simple solutions to complicated problems and that advocate popular policies that liberals find uncomfortable. We have tried to avoid any such usage here. Rather, we have described what we characterise as authoritarian populist sentiment among European mass publics as a mindset that combines a preference for strong national foreign policies with opposition to immigration, anti-Europeanism, an antipathy to the liberal human rights agenda and a right-wing political orientation. We found evidence of this mindset in ten of the twelve countries that we surveyed in November 2016. In those ten countries, factor-analytic and

alpha-scale models indicated the existence of a statistically coherent constellation of authoritarian attitudes. We showed in simple regression models that across all ten countries, individuals' positions on an authoritarian populism scale could be predicted reasonably satisfactorily by a series of theoretically informed predictor variables. In particular, we found that the perceived community consequences of immigration, strong national identity and the prioritisation of immigration as an issue all had strong effects on AP orientations.

Cluster analysis enabled us to explore the potential size of the AP population in each of our ten countries where we observed a clear AP scale. Significantly, this analysis allowed us to differentiate between the right- and left-wing AP 'tribes' which exist in some countries. In our sample, there are sizeable left-AP groups in the UK, Finland, Poland, Italy and the Netherlands. There is also a large centre-right AP group in France. Our analysis of the relationship between AP attitudes and vote intention shows that at the moment, centre-right parties across Europe can expect to garner as much support from authoritarian populist voters as can right-wing populist parties. Our supposition, which we hope to have justified in the analysis here, is that members of the authoritarian populist tribes in different countries represent a potential support reservoir that may be attracted to populist parties in the future. Donald Trump's success in the US appears to show the power of an intelligently targeted social media campaign to mobilise support among those who adhere to an authoritarian populist mindset. It is likely that right-wing populist parties in Europe will be seeking to emulate these efforts in the years ahead. Those who would resist the rising tide of populism in Europe should start taking action now, aimed at persuading those members of the AP tribe who have not yet succumbed to the electoral attractions of right-wing populism *not* to switch their votes from their current, centre-right intentions.

NOTES

1. The full question wording and country-by-country responses are laid out in Table A1 of the Online Supplementary Materials, available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17997-7_4.
2. In particular, we are not able to examine the impact of personality traits (Altemeyer 1981), partisanship (Arzheimer and Carter 2009) or post-materialist sentiments (Inglehart 2015). Nor can we impose controls for social context (Pettigrew and Tropp 2008).

3. To be clear, we expect this to be the case even after controlling for national levels of immigration.
4. All predictor variable terms are as defined in Table A2 of the Online Supplementary Materials.
5. The distributions of these variables are reported in Annex 1 of the Online Supplementary Materials.
6. Table A3, parts 1 and 2 of the Online Supplementary Materials contain the precise estimates for the coefficients.
7. The impact of education is likely to be mediated by other variables, such as attitudes to immigration. The coefficients in Table A3, parts 1 and 2 of the online materials represent the direct impact of education.
8. See Annex 2 of the Online Supplementary Materials.
9. This is available at http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/countries.html. See Annex 3 of the Online Supplementary Materials which shows how parties are allocated to party families in each country.
10. See Annex 4 of the Online Supplementary Materials for the detailed country-specific distributions.
11. Annex 5 of the Online Supplementary Materials presents a simple ordered logistic model of the Party-Family variable. This shows that the strong bivariate relationship between vote intention and AP tribe persists when multivariate controls are imposed.

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Populism and Brexit

David Marsh

Discussing the relationship between populism and Brexit raises two immediate issues: firstly, populism is a highly contested concept, while, secondly, it is impossible to be sure what Brexit will entail at the time of writing (August 2018). This chapter addresses two particular questions: how did populism affect voting upon Brexit, and what are the possible implications of Brexit for British politics, and indeed more broadly for the UK democratic system? In addressing these two questions, the chapter is divided into four substantive sections: first, I briefly examine the contested concept of populism; second, I discuss how populism affected voting on Brexit; third, I consider how the Brexit vote influenced voting in the 2017 Election and subsequent British politics and, finally, I raise questions about how the outcome of Brexit may affect the trajectory of British democracy.

Populism

Populism is a heavily contested topic, and this is not the place to address that complexity. While I acknowledge this contestation, in my view, there are four major, and clearly related, features of populism (Bang and Marsh 2018): a conflictual relationship between 'the elite' and 'the people', with the elite seen as betraying the people; a rejection of the pluralism associ-

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ated with liberal democracy; an emphasis on strong leadership; and a rejection of cosmopolitanism, while embracing 'nativism'. It is not difficult to see how these features played a role in the Brexit vote.

Tormey (2018) argues that a conflictual relationship between 'the elite' and 'the people' is the defining characteristic of populism. As Canovan (1999, 3) puts it, populism is: 'an appeal to "the people" against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society.' As such, populist movements do not share a common ideology, nor a clearly delimited constituency. Rather, there is a focus on a 'territory' and an 'identity' shared by the people, but neglected by the elite. In this vein, Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) see the contemporary successes of populism, even in the heartlands of liberal democracy, as primarily due to its rhetoric about how 'the people' have been made invisible and robbed of their nation and sovereignty by a corrupt, reifying and self-centred, globalist establishment.

While it could be argued that pluralism is the defining feature of liberal democracy, in contrast, populism emphasise monism; there is one people and one answer. Consequently, in populism, 'the people' are seen as a largely undifferentiated whole, which the populist 'leader', rather than the existing elite, can represent, or indeed embody. As such, populism does not recognise difference. At the same time, as Kerr et al. (2018) argue, many, perhaps most, populist politicians promote 'the preservation of the status quo ante—as it was before mass migration, Europeanisation and globalisation started to challenge the nation state'. This emphasis on monism and the reification of a 'glorious past' is clearly reflected in populism's strong opposition to immigration.

Bang's (2018) treatment of populism is among the most interesting. He argues that the core cleavage in contemporary liberal democracies is no longer a left/right one, but, rather, one between global cosmopolitanism, which is joined by the hip to neoliberalism, and 'nativism', which is at the core of populism. In Bang's view, neoliberalism is rooted in the global, rather than the national, reason, rather than emotion, competing, rather than shared, interests and the quest for personal, rather than collective, identity. In contrast, populism looks to the other 'side' of each of these binaries.

I have no space to discuss all of these issues here, but a number of these features of populism featured strongly in the Referendum debates and, as we shall see, help explain the Brexit vote. Consequently, while the next section begins with a consideration of the demographic factors that influ-

enced the voting, I also consider the extent to which antipathy towards the political elite, attitudes to sovereignty and immigration and political leadership affected that vote.

Explaining the Brexit Vote

Unsurprisingly, a great deal of work has been done on the Brexit vote (Godwin and Heath 2016; Crescenzi et al. 2018; Clarke et al. 2017a), with the focus on demographic and attitudinal factors, the role of politicians and parties and the effect of the campaign.

The Role of Demographic Factors

The broad demographic picture of Leave supporters is well-established, and easily summarised (see Goodwin and Heath 2016, for a succinct summary):

- Education was perhaps the most important predictor of vote. Among those with GCSE qualifications or below, support for Leave was 30% points higher than among people with a degree.
- Age was another important predictor, with Leave voting 20 points higher among those aged 65 or more than those aged 25 or below.
- Households with incomes below £20,000 per year were 10% more likely to vote Leave than households with incomes above £60,000 per year.
- Geographic location was crucial. No matter what their personal characteristics and qualifications, people were more likely to vote Leave in low-skill, compared with high-skill, areas.
- The globalisation process, which benefited many, left others behind, because they lacked qualifications and live in low-skilled communities. This left-behind group overwhelmingly supported Brexit. As Crescenzi et al. (2018, 126) put it: 'The degree of internationalisation of the local society (…) is associated with a statistically significant reduction in the share of voters supporting the UK departure from the European Union.'

  The last two points here clearly reflect the role of populism in the outcome. It was those who did not 'benefit' from globalisation, who felt threatened by the changes associated with the process, and the associated growth of cosmopolitanism promoted by the 'London' elite, who provided the core of the Leave vote.

The Role of Attitudes

Of course, while age, education and so on might be key correlates of voting, to *explain* how they affect voting we need to understand how the relationship is mediated by attitudes on various issues. An IPSOS-Mori study provides the most detailed analysis of the role of attitudes in shaping the vote (Kaur-Ballagan et al. 2017). Their focus is upon how their respondents' attitudes to a series of issues helped explain their votes.

When they asked respondents which issues affected their voting decision in the Referendum, political-economic and socio-cultural factors both played a key role. However, there were crucial differences between the factors which affected the votes of 'Remainers' and 'Leavers'. So, 71% of Remainers, but only 30% of Leavers, were concerned about the putative impact of Brexit on Britain's economy. In contrast, the voting of 44% of Remainers, but only 3% of Leavers, was impacted by concerns about the ability of British citizens to live and work in other EU countries. At the same time, 68% of Leavers, but only for 14% of Remainers, reported that their vote was influenced by the number of immigrants coming to Britain.

When the IPSOS-Mori researchers (2017) examined how different attitudinal factors were associated with a Leave vote, they found that what they term the anti-immigration and nativist factor was the most important for 34% of Leave voters. As such, they argue that sovereignty and anti-immigrant feeling drove the EU Referendum vote, although they see this as tied to a broader sense of distrust of the system, a related distrust in experts and nostalgia. They contend, in turn, that these nativist and anti-immigration sentiments are shaped by views that reject liberal pluralist values such as a diversity and the importance of listening to other peoples' views. Other contemporary studies also emphasised the importance of attitudes and values for Leave voters, who exhibited a strong sense of nostalgia, in particular a view that things in Britain were better in the past. Overall, the literature suggests that these cultural and value-related factors were more important in explaining Leave voting than any direct sense of being 'left behind' economically. These findings clearly suggest that populism, and especially populist rhetoric, influenced the Leave vote, and thus the Referendum outcome.

Clarke et al. (2017a) similarly emphasise the importance of sovereignty, and relatedly immigration, in explaining the Leave vote, but they also stress that support for exiting the EU and curbs on immigration had been building over time (see also Swales 2016). Their longitudinal data shows

that there was wide support for these attitudes even at the start of their data series. They argue that this support owed a great deal to their respondents' lack of confidence in the way in which the mainstream parties had coped with the economy and immigration. This argument is supported by Swales' (2016) finding that those who agreed that 'politicians don't listen to people like me' were much more likely to vote Leave (58%) than those who did not (37%).

Swales (2016) also emphasises that, while 94% of those who voted in the 2015 General Election also voted in the EU Referendum, a majority (54%) of those who did not vote in that election did subsequently vote in the Referendum. So the Referendum attracted a new set of voters resulting in a higher turnout (72%) than in the 2015 Election (66%). More significantly, however, these 'new voters' were much more likely to vote Leave than those of her respondents who had voted in 2015.

The Role of Parties

There was also a strong link between party identification and vote in the Referendum (see Swales 2016). Unsurprisingly, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) supporters were the most likely to vote Leave (98%), followed by those that identified with no party (70%) or with the Conservatives (58%). Conversely, Liberal Democrats, Greens and Labour identifiers were least likely to do so.

In this context, Clarke et al. (2017b) highlight the role played by UKIP and its then leader Nigel Farage, both in building opposition to the EU and immigration and in putting pressure on David Cameron to agree to a Referendum. As such, they identify UKIP's role, particularly in the context of its rise in electoral support, as among the most important background factors explaining the Brexit vote: a factor which they suggest most of those in UK politics are loathe to acknowledge.

The Role of the Campaign

Clarke et al. (2017b) also point to the role of the Referendum campaigns. They focus more on the Leave campaign, suggesting it won the battle to frame the issue, particularly because of its ability to make voters believe that migration and Europe were the same, thus relating sovereignty and immigration. They also emphasise the importance of the fact that the

Leave campaign had two strands of leadership, with Nigel Farage appealing to UKIP voters and those with strong nationalist views, while Boris Johnson, and to a lesser extent Michael Gove, the leading Tory Brexiteers, appealed to voters who were more globally minded. Other observers have emphasised the importance of the Leave campaign's efforts to portrait itself as defenders of ordinary people, and their common sense, against the political elite and 'experts' who were out of touch with them.

The failures of the Remain campaign also deserve attention. One of its major mistakes was to think it was going to win fairly comfortably: a view reinforced by the fact that opinion polls suggested that this would be the case. However, in my view, its main error was to use 'experts', on economics, social policy, finance, health, education and so on to 'explain' to voters the inevitable consequences of a Leave vote. In doing so, the Remainers were merely reproducing the response which had been a, perhaps the, major cause of the problem in the first place, and which, as we saw, the Leave side had strongly attacked. The growth of anti-politics, or more precisely of a belief that politicians, and the political and economic elite more generally, paid too little attention to the concerns/wishes of 'the people', that is of people like them. In that context, to use experts to tell voters what to think merely exacerbated the problem. As such, the Remain campaign totally ignored the rise of populist rhetoric.

Even this brief examination of the factors that shaped the Brexit vote clearly indicates the importance of populist ideas and rhetoric. The vote very significantly divided the country, and, not only was the vote close, but there were clear demographic and geographic divisions between Leavers and Remainers. I turn next to the question of how these divisions have affected British politics since the Referendum, but, here, the key point to emphasise is that each of the key features of populism, which I briefly discussed above, clearly played out in the Leave campaign and had an effect on Leave voting. Leave voting was in part a response to dissatisfaction with politics as it had been practised, and to the uncoupling of the elite from 'ordinary people'. It also reflected a rejection of cosmopolitanism, which was seen as undermining British sovereignty, promoting globalisation and relatedly immigration, rather than being concerned about the economic interests of those ordinary people. Instead, Leave supporters embraced 'nativism' and a leadership which would put British interests first.

British Politics After the Referendum

In many ways, contemporary British politics has been shaped by the Referendum result. The electorates' position on Brexit, and on the issues strongly related to Brexit, immigration, sovereignty and trust in politics and politicians, remain much the same. At the same time, research has shown that voting on Brexit was the best predictor of voting in the 2017 General Election. Here, I discuss both those developments before considering likely developments in the party system in the era of Brexit. In the next section, I then turn to the broader question of how Brexit might affect the future of the British democratic system and British democracy.

Little Change in Attitudes to Brexit and Related Issues

In the two years since the EU Referendum, there have been a number of significant developments: a new Prime Minister; a surprise General Election, with a surprise result; and more or less constant coverage in the media of the UK-EU negotiations, much of which has been very negative. Nevertheless, the opinion polls indicate little change in the electorates' views. The electorate remained evenly split on whether people voting to Leave was 'right' or 'wrong', and answers to this question, unsurprisingly, reflected the individual's Referendum vote. At the same time, few voters have changed their mind about how they voted. So, Curtice (2018a) reports that, although Leave voters were a little less likely (87%) than those who voted Remain (91%) to say they would vote the same, the difference was small (4%). Interestingly, of those who did not vote, the majority (51%) said they would now vote Remain, with a minority (21%) saying they would vote Leave. Consequently, even a year after the Referendum, the British Election Study found no sign of a decline in the electorate's 'very strong' sense of identification with Leave and Remain camps, which are substantially more important to voters than their party identities (see Hobolt et al. 2017).

The electorates' views on those attitudes which, as we saw in the previous section, helped explain the Referendum vote also remained largely unchanged. As an example, when the NatCen Panel post-Referendum survey (REF) asked people what they thought should be the current priority for government, they found that those who voted Remain thought the main focus should be on education, poverty and the economy, while Leavers wanted the focus to be on immigration. As in the Referendum

debate, the main issue which divided the two 'sides' was immigration, as it continued to be the main priority of government for 47% of Leave voters, but only 16% of Remain voters.

In the same vein, the IPSOS-Mori survey referenced earlier analysed the extent to which the electorate's attitudes towards immigration changed after the Referendum. The results show that in 2017 some 60% of respondents still wanted a reduction in the number of UK immigrants, and that Brexit has had very little impact on those views. After the Referendum, there was only a 2% reduction in that number.

Brexit and the 2017 Election

The immediate consequence of the Leave vote was the resignation of David Cameron and his replacement by Theresa May. Her tenure has been consistently troubled, with the tensions in her party reflecting continuing splits over Brexit: an issue we return to below. Having initially ruled out an election, May called a snap one for 8 June 2017, arguing that her aim was to secure a larger majority (her majority was 17 at the time of the election) to strengthen her hand in the Brexit negotiations.

In April 2017, the Conservatives had a lead of over 20% in the opinion polls, but this declined throughout the campaign. Nevertheless, the result was a surprise to most observers. Although the Conservative Party polled 42.4% of the vote, which was its highest share since 1983, it suffered a net loss of 13 seats, whilst Labour made a net gain of 30 seats on 40.0% of the vote, its highest share since 2001. As such, support for Labour increased by 15% from around 25% at the start of the campaign to 40%.

However, in some ways, the most interesting outcome of the election was the apparent return to two-party politics. Eighty-two per cent of the electorate voted for the two main parties, at a time when many observers, including myself, were emphasising the growth of antipathy to politics as it was practised, and an associated decline in voting for, and membership of, mainstream political parties: an apparent contradiction that I return to below. As a necessary corollary, support for all the minor parties fell, but, in particular, the UKIP vote fell dramatically: a development I also discuss below.

The 2017 British Election Study (Fieldhouse and Prosser 2017) emphasises the importance of Brexit in the election in two ways. First, they show that, for their respondents, Brexit was the dominant issue in the campaign. In addition, three of four other issues that featured strongly,

immigration, the economy and the NHS (the fourth was terrorism), were also issues which featured heavily in the Referendum campaign. In fact, the British Election Study (BES) study shows that over a third of their respondents identified Brexit, or the EU, when asked about what, in their view, was the most important issue in the campaign, compared to less than 10% who identified the NHS and 5% who suggested the economy.

Second, among their respondents, it was the respondent's vote in the Referendum which was the factor that most affected their vote in the election. Indeed, the BES researchers emphasise that Brexit continued to influence views on politics and party preference after the Referendum and throughout the campaign. In this vein, an ICM poll conducted immediately prior to the election being called, showed 53% of Leave voters intending to vote Conservative, compared with 38% of Remain supporters, but this gap widened during the campaign to 58% and 33%, respectively. ICM found a similar pattern, although reversed, for Labour, with a 15% difference between Remain and Leave voters at the start of the campaign had grown to 22% by the end. Certainly, the link between having voted for Brexit and supporting the Conservatives rather than Labour intensified in the post-Referendum period, and this was reflected in the election (Evans 2018).

The IPSOS-Mori study also argues that these Brexit-driven shifts have reshaped the traditional social divisions that have underlain British politics. So, the Conservatives' greatest gains were in working-class constituencies. They had 12% more support than in the 2015 Election amongst working-class (DE) voters, but only 4% more amongst professional and managerial (AB) voters. At the same time, they achieved a 9% increase in votes in the most working-class seats in England and Wales, but only 1% increase in the most middle-class seats [IPSOS-Mori 2017].

The Conservative's hard line position on Brexit, together with the absence of Nigel Farage, saw the UKIP vote collapse, most of it going to the Conservatives. Of the UKIP's 2015 voters who voted again in 2017, more than half voted Conservative, with 18% voting Labour and only 18% remaining loyal. Overall, there is no doubt that the Conservatives were the Leave party, attracting some 60% of the Leave vote [IPSOS-Mori 2017].

Although the Liberal Democrats had the clearest pro-EU position and promised a second Referendum, they barely picked up more Remain voters than they lost. Rather, Labour were the most popular party amongst Remain voters in 2016, and a large number of Remainers switched to them from the Conservatives, and other from the Greens and Lib Dems.

Indeed, almost two-thirds of those who voted Green in 2015, and a quarter of those who voted Liberal Democrat, moved to Labour in 2017. Overall, over 50% of Remain voters supported Labour in 2017, with a quarter voting Conservative and 15% Lib Dem.

Of course, the 2017 Election result, and particularly the resurgence of Labour, cannot be explained purely by reference to Brexit. As the BES emphasises, the election campaign mattered probably more than in any other recent election. In particular, they emphasise the strong performance of Jeremy Corbyn, especially relative to Theresa May. At the start of the campaign, Corbyn lagged significantly behind May in his leadership scores, but by the end of the campaign, he had almost caught up. Interestingly, Corbyn's much improved performance was also reflected in Labour improved image, as the gap between Labour and the Conservatives in terms of who the respondents saw as the best party to handle key issues significantly reduced.

Brexit and the Future of British Political Parties

For a few decades, we have seen increasing partisan dealignment, with declining voting, identity with, and membership of UK Political Parties. Of course, this has not been a feature restricted to the UK. Indeed, Peter Mair (2013), the doyen of researchers on parties, in his last book, predicted the death of political parties as we know them: he saw them as being replaced as channels of representation by social movements. Certainly, we have seen the rise of new and different parties in Europe, many of which, like the Five Star Movement in Italy and Podemos in Spain, are seen as being, in some senses at least, populist parties.

In the UK, this of populism was ridden by UKIP, which polled 12.7% of the vote in the 2015 Election, attracting both previous Conservative and Labour voters. Subsequently, UKIP and particularly its leader Farage played a major role in the Referendum campaign. However, in helping achieve a Leave vote, it seemed to have served its purpose, polling only 1.9% of the vote in the 2017 Election: a result mirrored in subsequent local elections.

The significantly increased support for the two major parties in the 2017 Election, together with the decline in UKIP support, might be seen as marking the end of partisan dealignment, and a reassertion of party politics as we have known it. However, that seems to me to be a mistaken

conclusion. Both major British parties are in disarray, although not for all the same reasons.

The Conservatives attracted much of the UKIP vote and, as we saw, polled their highest share of the vote since 1983, but the good news for them ends there. They failed to gain an overall majority and their membership was 124,000 in March 2018 (less than half the number in 2002), and many suggest that this involves very significant over-counting. However, it is Brexit, within the broader context of declining support for politics as it is practised, that is the most imminent threat to the Conservative. The Parliamentary Party is almost irretrievably split over how 'hard' or 'soft' Brexit should be. Consequently, it has forgotten what made the Conservative Party successful historically, a party 'statecraft', directed to winning elections and preserving an image of government competence in order to retain power. At the same time, as Curtice (2018b) argues, the Party is now supported by a pro-Leave electorate, many of whom would prefer a hard Brexit. He sees this as a development which is likely to have important consequences for the Government's Brexit negotiations, as it puts the Government under significant pressure 'to deliver a Brexit that meets the aspirations of Leave voters' (Curtice 2018b). Of course, these two pressures point in different direction, but it is hard to see how the outcome can be positive for the Conservatives.

Indeed, the only positive for the Conservatives appears to be the disarray within the Labour Party. Labour has bucked the trend by increasing its membership, which stood as 552,000 in January 2018. However, this resulted, in large part, from the Ed Miliband's decision to allow 'registered supporters' to join at a low cost. At the same time, Labour increased its share of the vote in 2017. However, the Parliamentary Party is clearly split, in large part over the question of Jeremy Corbyn's leadership. At the same time, there is an ongoing problem over the issue of anti-Semitism. All this means that Labour remains behind the Conservatives in the opinion polls in 2018. At the same time, Labour have a problem because their support is broadly in favour of, at least, a soft Brexit, so they may lose votes if they do not take a position which Remain voters can support.

All this means that the future of the UK Party system is uncertain and will depend a great deal on the outcome of the Brexit negotiations and on whether the disaffection from politics as it is practised, often termed anti-politics, increases.

Brexit and the Future of the UK's Democratic System

At present (August 2018), the outcome of the Brexit negotiations is far from clear. However, I want to explore two, related, putative, consequences of Brexit, the extent to, and ways in, which it represents a challenge to the UK democratic system.

I and others (see Hall et al. 2018 for references) have argued that there is a British Political Tradition which has underpinned the institutions and processes of British government. It involves a limited liberal idea of representation, in which the emphasis is upon government being freely and fairly elected, and a conservative notion of responsibility, emphasising the idea that government knows best, rather than that it should be responsive to citizens. In an important sense, the growth of populism and anti-politics, and the Brexit vote, represent a rejection of that view of democracy (see Hall et al. 2018).

As I argued, the Remain Campaign failed to recognise the importance of this development, with the political elite telling citizens what was best for them. The Leave Campaign avoided that problem, but, subsequently, the Government's response has, in large part, reflected their continued commitment to the British Political Tradition. In essence, it has argued 'leave the negotiations to us and the experts we appoint.' It has rejected another Referendum on the terms of any settlement and, until the Law Lords' intervention, tried to limit Parliament's role in the process. As such, the Government is still saying 'we, and other experts, know best', exactly the approach that the Brexit vote challenged. As Richards and Smith (2018, 15) put it:

> the Government's strategy towards a post-Brexit settlement which emphasises a re-centring rather than de-centring approach to power in Westminster, is unlikely to resolve the longer-term anti-politics pathologies revealed by the Brexit vote. The net effect will be to exacerbate the very anti-politics discontents that those voting for Brexit sought to break from.

This will become a major problem if the negotiated outcomes fail to meet the aspirations of those who voted for Leave. If that happens, then the Government's response is likely to be seen as an arrogant failure, thus further reducing trust, deepening the anti-politics mood and undermining democracy.

Conclusion

Brexit is probably the most significant event in British politics since 1945. It owed a great deal to the growth of populist rhetoric, and particularly the growing antipathy to politics as it has been practised and the failure of the political elite to be responsive to the concerns of 'ordinary people'. The factors which led to the Brexit vote have continued to shape UK politics subsequently. It is almost impossible to predict what the outcome will be, but, if Brexit is seen as a failure, this is likely to deepen distrust in politicians, the political system and even democracy as it is currently practised.

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Populism Plus: Voting for Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton in the 2016 US Presidential Election

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The 2016 US presidential election surprised everybody, not least the winner Donald Trump's principal adversary, Hillary Clinton and aghast media commentators. Trump was one of the most improbable candidates for the presidency, a man who flouted established conventions in political campaigning by ridiculing his rivals for the Republican nomination and calling

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for his presidential opponent to be jailed. Loudly chanted slogans such as 'Little Marco', 'Lyin' Ted', 'Crooked Hillary' and 'Lock Her Up' were staples of Trump rallies across the country. Trump had no real background in politics either at the state or national levels, let alone in the Republican Party. In a leaked video, he openly admitted to being a sexual predator and had a very colourful private life to support this perception. Throughout the entire nomination and election process, his chances of winning were heavily discounted by almost everyone.

Despite these negatives and against all the odds, he not only won the Republican nomination, but in the end narrowly won the contest for the presidency. This was in the teeth of overwhelming predictions by pundits that Hillary Clinton would easily prevail (e.g., Edwards-Levy et al. 2017). The forecasting guru, Nate Silver, who up to that point had an impressive track record in calling US elections correctly was heavily criticised in the media for predicting that Hilary Clinton had 'only' a 71 per cent chance of winning. The criticism was that this forecast was far too pessimistic since the 'groupthink' was that the contest was a shoo-in for the Democratic candidate. In the event, Silver, like virtually all of his fellow forecasters, called it wrong, and Donald Trump, not Hillary Clinton, became the president-elect.

This chapter examines why America elected such an unlikely outsider as the 45th President. The story appears less remarkable set against the rise in support for populist politics which has been sweeping the democratic world since the Great Recession and the international migration crises that accompanied it. Indeed, the contest had much in common with the 2016 vote in the UK to leave the European Union, and with the electoral successes of parties like the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the Five Star Movement in Italy (see, e.g., Clarke et al. 2017).

We first examine the sources of support for populist parties in contemporary democracies, before going on to investigate their relevance for understanding the 2016 US presidential election. Some of the factors at work apply across many countries, such as the perception that many 'ordinary people' have been 'left behind' by globalisation, growing inequality and mass immigration. Other issues such as gun control, health care provision and restrictions on abortion are largely, although not entirely, unique to the US. We begin by considering what happened in the presidential election.

The 2016 Results Reviewed

To set the scene we begin by examining the details of voting in the 2016 presidential election. Democratic candidate, Hillary Clinton, gained 48.2 per cent of the popular vote, while Republican Donald Trump took 46.1 per cent, nearly three million votes less than his rival. However, she won only 232 delegates in the Electoral College compared with Trump's 306, largely as a result of losing by very narrow margins in typically 'blue' states like Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. These states had supported Obama in 2012 and, indeed, had not opted for a Republican for president since the 1980s. A look at the geography of the vote in that election highlights just how much the Clinton vote came from heavily populated coastal states like New York, Massachusetts and California, whereas the Trump vote came from Midwest, Mountain and Southern states—areas of the country sometimes derisively called 'fly-over' country by the cultural and media elites Trump targeted for heavy criticism in the populist rhetoric that animated his campaign.

Surprisingly, given that he was the winner, Donald Trump fared worse in 25 states than his predecessor Mitt Romney, the unsuccessful Republican candidate in the 2012 election. Not to be outdone, Hilary Clinton also put in a worse performance than her predecessor, Barack Obama, in fully 47 states. So *both* of the 2016 candidates were relatively unpopular in comparison with their immediate predecessors. To understand who supported Trump and Clinton and who did not, we begin by examining the sources of populist discontent in the US and other contemporary Western democracies.

Sources of Populism

Observers have offered two broad explanations for the growth in support for populist parties and candidates in contemporary democracies. The first focuses on a syndrome of grievances based on the economic marginalisation of individuals, perceived threats from immigrants, refugees and ethnic-minority groups, and identity politics (Mudde 2007; Oesch 2008; Posner 2010; Reich 2016; Ford and Goodwin 2014; Clarke et al. 2017).

Changes in contemporary capitalism engendered by globalisation, international migration and stagnating wages, particularly among low-skilled workers, have created a situation in which large sections of the electorate have not shared in the fruits of economic growth. The enormous

US trade deficit with China, accompanied by the outsourcing of skilled manufacturing jobs and the movement of industries to low-cost countries like Mexico are cited as important causes of the growing inequality. These economic trends, coupled with the trauma of the Great Recession which began in 2008 and growing levels of inequality, have created serious political problems for the mainstream parties in the US (Galbraith 2012; Stiglitz 2012).

The second type of explanation emphasises voters' growing disillusionment with the performance and effectiveness of governing administrations and political parties, declining trust in politicians and the media, and a loss of confidence in democratic institutions more generally (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Tilly 2005; Whiteley et al. 2016). This erosion of support for how democracy works in practice is largely driven by perceptions that institutions such as the federal government in the US no longer deliver for ordinary voters, in part because it has been captured by a plethora of special interests (Bartels 2008). American politics has become increasingly polarised, and public approval of Congress in particular has fallen to a very low level (Gelman 2008; Fiorina 2017).

There is a history in the US of candidates running for office by 'running against Washington', a prominent example being Texas billionaire Ross Perot, who ran disruptive third-party candidacies in the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections. One of Donald Trump's catchphrases during the 2016 campaign 'Drain the Swamp!'—referring to the need to oust the denizens of a corrupt Washington establishment—exemplifies this type of campaigning. This is a typical populist slogan and variants of the 'people versus politics' theme have been repeated in different elections in other political systems. Taken together, the failure of governments to protect electorates from the negative consequences of globalisation combined with widespread distrust of elites has produced growing support for insurgent outsiders like Trump in the US and populist movements in other democratic countries.

If we focus on the psychological mechanisms which translate this discontent and distrust into support for populism, a key driver is feelings of relative deprivation on the part of many voters. Such emotions mobilise voters who feel 'left behind' in comparison with their fellow citizens to take political action. Relative deprivation arises from the fact that individuals develop expectations as to how society should treat them in relation to their economic position and social status. At the same time, these individuals also make judgements about how they are actually treated in

practice, and the more negative the comparisons between expectations and performance, the more likely individuals are to experience frustration and anger (Walker and Smith 2002). These emotional responses are a 'potent, volatile, instigator of action' (Marcus et al. 2000, 26) and a stimulus to protest behaviour and other forms of political action (Conover and Feldman 1986; Markus 1988).

Populism and Candidate Support in the 2016 Election

Since US presidential elections are decided not by winning an overall plurality or majority of the popular vote but rather by amassing a majority (270 or more) of Electoral College votes at the state level, we begin by examining evidence for populism in the 2016 election by linking data on the socio-economic characteristics of states to voting patterns in that contest. We then drill down to the level of individual voter to see how socio-economic characteristics and political attitudes influenced support for Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. The aggregate analysis is based on state-level voting statistics together with data from the US Census. The individual-level analysis uses data from 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), an internet-based panel survey of the US electorate with more than 64,000 respondents. The two-wave survey was conducted by YouGov during and immediately after the presidential election campaign (Ansolabehere et al. 2017).

The State-Level Story

To investigate the drivers of the vote at the state level we require indicators of the socio-economic and political characteristics of US states. One of the broadest measures relevant to socio-economic status and life chances more generally is the Human Development Index.[1] Originally created by the United Nations Development Program, the purpose of the index is to define a broader measure of development than gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. It combines data on standards of living, life expectancy and educational attainment. Here, we use the 2016 Human Development Index (HDI) scores for the 50 states plus the District of Columbia. The state with the lowest HDI score was Arkansas and the one with the highest was Massachusetts.

The HDI is a very broad measure but it does not take into account levels of inequality within states, which are arguably key drivers of populist discontent. The latter are captured in our analysis by the Gini coefficient, a standard measure of inequality which varies from 0 to 1 with a higher score meaning greater inequality.[2] There are a variety of measures of inequality but the Gini coefficient is one of the best known and frequently used. The average Gini coefficient is 0.47 and varies from 0.41 for Alaska to 0.54 for Washington, DC, thereby indicating that the capital region is more unequal than any of the 50 states.

A third measure which is highly relevant to populist politics is the rate of economic growth, that is, the change in GDP per capita over time. Again, this differs from other measures, and we use the average growth of GDP per capita in each state over the period from 2013 to 2016 to better identify trends. Clearly, one way in which Americans can be left behind is to live in states where the economy is stagnating. These growth rates varied from a negative 1.9 per cent in Alaska to a healthy 3.6 per cent in California, so there were sizable differences in state-level economic performance in the years leading up to the 2016 election.

A fourth measure which relates to a contentious issue in the election is the rate of international immigration at the state level. Links between populism and immigration have been widely discussed (e.g., Clarke et al. 2017; DeVries 2018). In the year before the election immigration varied from 0.5 per cent of the population of Montana to 6.1 per cent for Washington, DC. The expectation is that an upsurge in immigration in a state should have boosted support for Donald Trump. During the campaign, he called repeatedly for restrictions on immigration and promised that, if elected, he would build a wall at the Mexican border to halt the flow of illegal migrants entering the US across its southern border. During the campaign Trump stoked public resentment by arguing that undocumented immigrants were taking the jobs from hard-working people who 'played by the rules'. He also repeatedly claimed that many of the new arrivals were 'bad dudes'—drug dealers, gang members and rapists—bent on doing great harm to the fabric of American society.

A key politically charged demographic in the US is the population balance between Whites, Hispanics and African Americans in various states, in light of historic differences in electoral support among these groups. The percentage of electors in the three groups varies considerably across the states. Hawaii has the fewest Whites with only 19 per cent of the population in this category. At the other end of the spectrum, some 94 per cent

of the population of Vermont is White. Equally, the number of Hispanics varies from 1 per cent in West Virginia to 46 per cent in New Mexico. Regarding African Americans, the state with the smallest population in this group is Utah with 1 per cent. This compares with the District of Columbia which has an African American population of 46 per cent. Accordingly, we include the percentages of the population of each state which are Hispanic or African American in the analysis with the reference category being the percentage of Whites.

Three state-level dummy variables are used in the model to control for unusual political circumstances in particular states which make them outliers. Firstly, a Utah dummy variable is included since this was the home state of Mitt Romney, and this temporarily inflated the Republican vote in that state in 2012. Secondly, a Vermont dummy variable is included since this state is the home of Bernie Sanders, the left-wing populist candidate for the Democratic nomination in 2016. Finally, we include a dummy variable for Washington, DC, since it is traditionally rather different from the rest of the US in that it consistently and heavily supports Democrats while having an unusual socio-demographic profile resulting from the presence of a large African American population combined with thousands of federal bureaucrats with well-paying white-collar jobs.

Table 6.1 contains the results of a multiple regression analysis of the state vote shares for Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton in 2016. Standardised regression coefficients in the table show that the state-level vote share for Republican candidate Romney in 2012 was easily the strongest predictor of support for Trump in 2016. This indicates that voters who supported an establishment Republican candidate in the previous presidential election also turned out in large numbers for Trump four years later. Indeed, the bivariate correlation (r) between Romney's support in 2012 and Trumps in 2016 was fully +0.92 (on a 0–1 scale). Trump was running as a self-styled anti-establishment renegade, but he also was running on the Republican ticket. Although doubts were expressed throughout the campaign about his support from traditional Republican voters, in the event a large majority of them did support him. The Republican electoral base did not desert Trump.

Regarding the 'left behind' thesis, the Human Development Index, economic growth and inequality all have statistically significant effects on Trump's support, with the strongest being the Human Development Index. States with lower levels of human development and slower economic growth tended to have higher percentages of Trump voters, whereas

Table 6.1   State-level models of voting for Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton in 2016

Predictors	Trump vote share	Clinton vote share
Romney % vote in 2012	0.802***	–
Obama % vote in 2012	–	0.809***
Human Development Index	−0.117***	0.103***
Gini Inequality Index	−0.073*	0.000
Economic growth 2013–2016	−0.072**	0.074***
Immigration 2015–2016	−0.011	0.031
Percentage Hispanics	−0.167***	0.130***
Percentage African American	−0.068*	0.154***
Utah outlier dummy	−0.244***	0.241***
Washington, DC, outlier dummy	−0.127***	0.059**
Vermont outlier dummy	−0.074***	0.016
Adjusted R^2	0.97	0.98

Note: Standardised regression coefficients

– variable not included in model

*** ≤ 0.001; ** ≤ 0.01; * ≤ 0.05; one-tailed test

states with higher levels of development and faster economic growth had fewer Trump voters. In contrast, high levels of inequality served to reduce the Trump vote rather than increase it. This finding is consistent with the argument that voters in traditional Democratic supporting states such as New York and California which have relatively high levels of inequality are reluctant to vote for Republican candidates.

These 'left behind' effects did not extend to immigration since this had no influence on the Trump vote at the state level. Trump also did well in states with a high proportion of White voters and low proportions of Hispanics and African Americans, something which is apparent in Table 6.1, where the White vote is the residual category. These ethnic effects were particularly evident in the District of Columbia which has the highest percentage of African Americans, a point made earlier. In addition, Trump lost ground in Utah, the home base of the 2012 Republican 'establishment' candidate Mitt Romney, and also in Vermont, the home of left-wing populism in the US. Overall, the Trump regression model fits the data very well—the adjusted R^2 is fully 0.97.

Turning next to support for Hillary Clinton, not surprisingly Obama's vote share in 2012 was very strongly related to Clinton's vote in 2016—the bivariate correlation (r) is +0.93. Again, this implies a lot of continuity in support for Democratic presidential candidates over time. Clinton ran

as a Democrat and a large majority of Democratic partisans in the electorate rallied to her candidacy. Also, although levels of immigration and inequality did not matter as direct influences on Democratic support, Clinton did well in states with high scores on the HDI index and strong records of economic growth. In addition, unlike Donald Trump, she did relatively poorly in states with a high percentage of White voters, but significantly better in states with a high percentage of African Americans and Hispanics. Finally, she ran very well in Washington, DC, and (relatively) well in Utah. At the same time, there was no Vermont effect, even though that state's junior senator, Bernie Sanders, had endorsed her after she defeated him for the Democratic nomination. Overall, the adjusted R^2 of 0.98 for the Clinton model shows that it provides a very accurate predictor of her state-level vote.

Populism and the Individual Voter

We next consider presidential voting at the individual level in 2016 since, as is well known, aggregate-level results do not necessarily translate to the individual level, a phenomenon known as the 'ecological fallacy'.[3] The 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES)[4] has a rich variety of indicators which make it possible to examine the impact of people's perceptions of feeling left behind as well as measures of trust in government, an indicator which is not available at the state level.

The CCES survey also included a variety of issue indicators which have the potential to be important influences on electoral choice, such as the state of the economy and perceptions of immigration. As we will see, while immigration at the state level did not significantly affect the vote for either candidate, this is not true for subjective judgements of immigration at the level of the individual voter. In addition, there are a number of issues which tend to be more important in the US than in other contemporary democracies such as gun control, abortion and health care. And, recognising the importance of partisanship in the set of forces affecting electoral choice (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960; Clarke et al. 2009), we control for how voters' party identifications influenced their ballot behaviour in 2016. Using the CCES data, we examine how all of these factors affected voting for Trump and for Clinton.

There are two indicators in the CCES survey which capture voters' perceptions of being left behind. First, there is a measure of evaluations of the performance of the national economy—a variable which plays an

important role in voting behaviour in the US and elsewhere (e.g., Duch and Stevenson 2008; Lewis-Beck 1988). When voters make positive judgements about the economy, they tend to support the incumbent party's candidate in presidential elections, and when they make negative judgements, they tend to support the opposition party's candidate. A second question asked about the respondents' satisfaction with their own household incomes, and this is the basis of measuring relative deprivation. We compare levels of optimism about the national economy with feelings of optimism about one's own finances. Respondents who are sanguine about the national economy but unhappy with their own financial circumstances are likely to feel a sense of relative deprivation, and so the difference is used to capture this idea in the modelling.[5]

The second aspect of populist thinking discussed earlier, distrust of government, is assessed by a set of questions asking respondents if they are satisfied with the performance of the President, Congress and the Supreme Court. As the earlier discussion indicates, compared to voters in general, populists tend to dislike 'establishment' politicians and institutions. A third and related benchmark of populist thinking involves negative feelings about immigration, and this is tapped by a battery of four items. A principal components analysis of these indicates that they form a single underlying scale in which a high score indicates positive attitudes towards immigration and a low score the opposite.

We mentioned earlier that there are a number of issues which are distinctive to American politics and these are included in the analysis. Support for gun control is measured using a principal components analysis of five items which probe attitudes to the issue with a high score on the scale meaning that the respondent favours gun control. Similarly, attitudes towards abortion are measured with a principal component analysis of five items associated with this issue—a high score indicates opposition to abortion. A third issue relates to taxation and in this case, individuals are asked if the US budget deficit should be reduced by cuts in government spending or increases in taxation. For this variable, a high score indicates a preference for cuts in spending rather than higher taxation.

Attitudes towards spending on health care are measured with a question about the Affordable Care Act introduced during the Obama administration which extended health care coverage to millions of Americans. This was a very contentious issue during the 2016 election campaign, and these controversies have continued during the early part of the Trump administration. Respondents were asked if they thought Congress should

repeal or retain the act, with a high score indicating a preference for repeal-
ing it. Attitudes about crime and punishment are captured by a battery of
three items which form a single principal component with a high score
indicating that a respondent favours longer prison sentences and more
police officers as solutions to the problems of crime. Finally, attitudes
about US military interventions overseas are measured using four items
which produced a principal component for which a high score denotes
that the respondent favours the use of US military forces in trouble spots
around the world.

A variable measuring a respondent's general ideological position is also
included in the modelling. This variable is a scale varying from 1 ('very
liberal') to 7 ('very conservative'). Also, to measure the extent of ideologi-
cal proximity between voters and the presidential candidates, respondents
were asked about their perceptions of the positions of Clinton and Trump
on this liberal-conservative scale. Finally, partisanship is measured using
the traditional American National Election Study (ANES) seven-point
party identification scale which varies from 1 ('very strong Democrat') to
7 ('very strong Republican').

One the themes referred to earlier was that populists tend to 'run
against Washington'. An interesting topic relates to whether or not these
anti-establishment feelings extend to local politicians and local commu-
nities. The question is whether populists in the US are against govern-
ment in general, or if their focus of attention is on federal (i.e., national)
institutions. This issue is investigated with a battery of items which
examine perceptions of local politicians and the delivery of local services
such as transport and education. Two principal components emerge
from analysing these items, the first relating to policy delivery and the
second to politicians. In both cases, high scores denote positive
evaluations.

A final topic examined in the individual-level analysis concerns media
consumption. One question relates to the use of traditional media such as
newspapers and television to obtain information about politics and the
election. A second question asks about the use of the internet and social
media for this purpose. These questions enable us to determine if Trump
supporters differed from Clinton supporters in their media consumption
patterns during the campaign. Overall, the CCES survey data make it
possible to investigate the impact of a large variety of issues and other
important variables on voting for Trump and Clinton in the 2016 presi-
dential election.

The Individual-Level Story

The results of the individual-level modelling appear in Table 6.2. The models first explore the impact of socio-demographics on voting, and then include all the other measures in logistic regression analyses (see, e.g.,

Table 6.2   Logistic regression models of voting for Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton

Predictor	Trump vote	Trump vote	Clinton vote	Clinton vote
National economic evaluations		−0.241***		0.163***
Perceptions of being left behind		0.074***		0.015
Attitudes to immigration		−0.342***		0.013
Evaluations of President Obama		−0.527***		0.529***
Evaluations of Congress		0.143***		−0.155***
Evaluations of the Supreme Court		−0.051***		0.081***
Support for gun control		−0.223***		0.149***
Opposition to abortion		0.199***		−0.182***
Punitive attitudes to crime		0.084***		0.048
Opposition to taxation		0.009***		−0.006***
Respondent left-right score		0.064***		−0.007
Trump left-right score		0.038***		0.030*
Clinton left-right score		−0.100***		0.067***
Party identification		0.283***		−0.450***
Opposition to affordable health		0.666***		−0.367***
Perceptions of racism in the US		−0.110***		0.979***
Evaluations of local communities		0.176***		0.017
Evaluations of local council		0.129***		0.004
Views on US military intervention		0.676***		0.548***
Use of media for politics		0.098***		0.033
Use of social media for politics		0.024		−0.026
Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual	−0.811***	0.128	1.098***	0.140
Religiosity	0.537***	0.107***	−0.409***	0.004
Male	0.354***	−0.149***	−0.498***	−0.217***
Age	0.032***	0.031***	0.021***	0.021***
Family income	0.065***	0.065***	0.046***	0.045***
Educational attainment	−0.002	0.090***	0.305***	0.184***
African American	−2.832***	−0.416***	1.541***	0.079
Hispanic	−1.187***	−0.188	0.760***	0.231**
Constant term	−4.267***	−4.463***	−1.997***	−3.497***
AIC	65,680.56	34,938.07	72,058.00	34,478.43
Pseudo R^2	0.18	0.57	0.12	0.58

*** ≤ 0.001; ** ≤ 0.01; * ≤ 0.05; one-tailed test

Long and Freese 2014). In each case, the dependent variable is the vote for Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton compared with all other options, which includes voting for their main rival, a minor party candidate, or not voting at all. In this way, we get a broad picture of the sources of support for Trump and Clinton compared with all other electoral options. This approach has the advantage of including individuals who were not motivated to vote for either of these candidates, something which would not be examined in an analysis confined to voters who chose either Trump or Clinton.

Considering the socio-demographic models first, it is apparent that Donald Trump received positive support from religious groups, men, older Americans and Whites. In contrast, but predictably, he lost support in the LGBT community and among African Americans and Hispanics relative to Whites. Interestingly, levels of educational attainment made no difference to his support, and it is also evident that his vote did not come differentially from poor people. The positive relationship between household income and the Trump vote has a typically 'Republican flavour', and it indicates that his support was not simply due to a revolt of the poor and dispossessed.

In comparison, Hillary Clinton was supported by gays and lesbians, older voters, women, African Americans and Hispanics. Like Trump, she also received support from more affluent voters, something made possible by the well-documented tendency of poorer people not to participate in elections. In Clinton's case, unlike Trump's, educational attainment also had a strong effect, with well-educated people being more likely to cast their ballots for her. Clinton's support among religious individuals and men was significantly lower than Trump's.

Turning next to the full models, there are some predictable findings such as lower levels of support for Trump among voters who judged that the national economy was doing well. This is the familiar phenomenon of voters rewarding the candidate of an incumbent party (in this case the Democratic Party) for a good economic performance and punishing them for a bad one. This pattern of behaviour also extended to those who felt left behind in relation to their own finances compared with the national picture. If they judged that they were doing worse than their fellow citizens, this increased the likelihood of opting for Trump.

Regarding attitudes towards the incumbent president and federal political institutions, Trump voters were unlikely to admire President Obama, which is no great surprise, and they also disliked the Supreme Court

despite the fact that it is a more conservative institution than a generation ago. However, this pattern did not extend to Congress which they liked (in relative terms), despite the fact that approval ratings for the institution in the general population are very low.[6] The obvious explanation for these findings is that partisanship influenced voters' judgements about the President and various institutions. Republicans control Congress and so they tended to like that institution more than the White House under Obama or the Supreme Court. Although the Court was not markedly liberal, it had drawn Republican ire by thwarting efforts to overturn Obama's signature piece of legislation, the Affordable Care Act.

Turning to issue perceptions, support for Trump was greater among opponents of immigration, and persons who had a 'law and order' attitude to crime and opposed gun control. Similarly, if respondents disliked higher taxation as a solution to the deficit problem, opposed the Affordable Health Care Act and opposed abortion rights for women, in each case they were more likely to vote for Trump. Equally, respondents who supported US military interventions overseas or believed that the US does not have a racism problem also were more likely to support Trump than were those who held the contrary opinions on these issues.

With respect to more general ideological orientations, Trump supporters tended to locate themselves and their candidate on the right of the 'liberal-conservative' ideology scale. In contrast, they placed Hillary Clinton well to the left of this scale. These broader ideological considerations influenced voting for both of these individuals. Not surprisingly, the seven-point partisanship scale also played a big role in explaining the vote with Republican identifiers flocking to support Trump, particularly if they were strong identifiers. This reinforces a point made in the state-level analysis that although Trump was far from being a mainstream or traditional Republican candidate, he nonetheless attracted Republican identifiers in the election. Finally, the analysis suggests that Trump voters sought political information in traditional media outlets but using social media did not have a direct influence on their vote.

The profile of support for Clinton is very different from that of Trump. As the candidate of the incumbent party, she was rewarded by voters who perceived that the national economy was doing well, but her support was not affected by perceptions of relative deprivation. If voters admired Obama and the Supreme Court but disapproved of Congress, they were more likely to vote for Clinton. In this regard, it is evident that perceptions of partisan control clearly played a role in explaining this result. In

addition, voters who supported gun control, favoured abortion rights, supported higher taxation and the Affordable Health Care Act all tended to vote for Clinton. Interestingly, Clinton and Trump supporters both shared a willingness to see the US intervene militarily overseas, but unlike Trump's adherents, Clinton voters felt very strongly that the US has a racism problem. Perceptions of the performance of local government and local politicians and media usage did not affect support for Clinton.

Regarding ideology, although self-placement on the liberal-conservative scale was not associated with the likelihood of voting for Clinton, she was more popular among those who saw her as being on the right of the ideological spectrum. This finding may have been related to the fact that many Bernie Sanders supporters in the nomination contest ending up voting for Clinton even though they saw her as a quintessential establishment-oriented Democrat rather than a progressive. Partisanship again had a very strong influence, with Democrats much more likely to vote for Clinton than independents or Republicans.

A few changes occurred in the relationship between demographics and the vote for both candidates in the full models compared with the restricted models. Thus, the LGBT effect disappeared among both Trump and Clinton voters suggesting these were driven by issue perceptions and related variables, which were taken into account in the full models, rather than by demographic characteristics. Similarly, religiosity and African American identity no longer influenced the Clinton vote, again because these worked via the other variables in the full models.

Overall, the models had excellent fits by the standards of individual-level voting analyses, with McFadden R^2's of 0.57 and 0.58 for the Trump and Clinton analyses, respectively. The Akaike Information Criterion statistics which appear in the table also indicate that the full models did a much better job in explaining the vote than the restricted demographic models.

Conclusion: Populism Plus Equals Trump

Populism was an influential factor driving voting for Donald Trump in 2016. Analyses testify that both the reality of being left behind as measured by state-level indicators and perceptions of being left behind as captured by survey questions had influential effects on Trump's support. In this regard, the US exemplifies the growth in support for populist politics that has occurred in many democracies since the Great Recession nearly a

decade ago. At the same time, there is a disjunction between the reality of immigration in the US as captured by state-level data and individual-level perceptions of immigration when it came to voting in 2016. There is no evidence to suggest that actual rates of immigration at the state level influenced the vote, whereas there is strong evidence to suggest that perceptions of immigration were important. Equally, a number of distinctively American issues in relation to health care reform, abortion and gun control all played a part in explaining voting patterns in 2016, as they had in earlier elections.

Donald Trump was an insurgent candidate who relished his role as an outsider challenging the political establishment. The analyses presented above indicate that the anti-government sentiments that boosted support for Trump were focused on Washington, not the local level. In fact, Trump supporters were more likely to be influenced by their appreciation of local politics than were Clinton supporters. The now famous political-economic establishment 'swamp' Trump repeatedly decried on the campaign trail was very much a national, not a local, problem in the minds of his supporters.

Finally, and important, it bears emphasis that Trump benefited from being the Republican standard-bearer. Unlike Ross Perot in an earlier era, Trump was the candidate of a major political party with millions of partisan supporters across the country and campaign organisations in every state. Many prominent Republicans initially expressed strong reservations about Trump during the Republican primaries and some of them vociferously reiterated these sentiments when it became evident that he would be their party's nominee for president. However, as the election approached, faced with the prospect of a Clinton presidency most of these erstwhile, 'Never Trumpers' gave him their support, if only grudgingly. A large majority of rank-and-file Republican identifiers across the country did the same. Populism and partisanship came together to propel Trump's successful race for the White House.

In 2020 Donald Trump will have been at the centre of American politics for four years and so an outsider strategy is going to be harder for him to pursue in next election cycle. In addition, the Democrats may well seek to nominate an outsider themselves who carries none of the heavy political baggage that burdened consummate insider, Hillary Clinton, throughout the campaign. That said, at the time of writing the US economy is doing very well and if this continues for the next two years, Trump's bid for a second term likely will be boosted by this fact. A booming economy will

be exhibit #1 for his claim that he has fulfilled his now famous campaign promise to 'make America great again'. On the other hand, this could be a double-edged sword if 'good times' erode voters' perceptions of being left behind, particularly in the pivotal 'rust belt' states that proved decisive for Trump's victory in 2016. Rising prosperity may dissipate populist anger. If so, Trump could be a political casualty of his economic success.

The mid-term elections in November 2018 will be a harbinger of what is likely to occur in the next presidential election, but in view of the dismal track record of pundits in forecasting the results in 2016, it would be foolish to make predictions about what might happen. At this stage, all one can say is that the election of Donald Trump as the 45th President was a remarkable and disruptive event in US political history. Invigorated populist sentiments and a traditional mix of partisan-related attitudes paved his path to the White House. What happens next in a very uncertain political environment remains to be seen.

Notes

1. See http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi.
2. A score of 0 means that everyone in a state would have the same income and a score of 1 means that one person would have all the income and everybody else would have nothing.
3. This is the well-known finding that aggregate-level correlations do not necessarily imply individual-level correlations, a fact explained in a classic article by Robinson (1950).
4. The 2016 CCES data and accompanying codebook and technical documentation are available at: https://cces.gov.harvard.edu.
5. Details regarding the construction of variables used in the individual-level model may be downloaded from: www.utdallas.edu/epps/hclarke/.
6. The Real Clear Politics average of congressional job approval between March and May 2018 was 15 per cent approve and 73 per cent disapprove. See https://www.realclearpolitics.com (accessed 28 May 2018).

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Facilitating Donald Trump: Populism, the Republican Party and Media Manipulation

David McKay

At least the members of the Know Nothing Party knew they knew nothing.

– P. J. O'Rourke

In 1981 Anthony King asked: 'How on earth had a great country like the United States, filled with talented men and women, managed to land itself with two such second- (or was it third-?) rate presidential candidates as Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan?' (King 1981, 56). However, the 2016 contest produced a winning candidate that makes the 1980 contenders look like political geniuses. For not only did Donald Trump have no experience of public office—let alone high office—he was also pathologically mendacious, cruelly vindictive and emotionally erratic. Many informed commentators saw his election as another example of a rising tide of populism and a shift to an incipient authoritarianism supported by a newly

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How the Hell Did This Happen? London, Grove Press, 2017, 2

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assertive white working class. Many pointed to what they saw as parallel developments in France, Britain, Hungary, Poland and elsewhere that represented increasing anger at uncontrolled immigration fuelled at least in part by 'globalism' and the 'liberal international political order' (see, e.g., Cox 2018). This combination had led to growing inequality, stagnating real incomes and a rift between educated metropolitan elites together with their service classes and the forgotten masses of rural and older industrial areas. While there is some truth to these concerns, this chapter argues that in the case of the United States—which arguably represents the most egregious example of this phenomenon—the source of the problem lies as much in institutional as cultural and socio-economic factors. The two institutional developments are the capture of the Republican Party by the far right and the emergence of right-wing media outlets that for the first time have simultaneously acquired national platforms on television, radio and the Internet. In sum, an ever more extremist Republican Party has built a base of support and then used its newly acquired institutional power to advance its agenda and exclude moderate opinion. And in the process they have been ably abetted by right-wing media organizations that eschew reasoned argument and debate but instead peddle a monochromatic party line that claims a monopoly of the 'truth.'

A Populist Surge?

There are three strands to the claims that we are witnessing a populist surge in the United States. The first is that it is primarily an economic phenomenon and a rebellion by a white working class beaten down by decades of economic decline. The second is that it relates primarily to cultural changes and in particular to the rise of identity politics engendered by white voters' resentment at 'preferential' treatment for ethnic and racial minorities and newly arrived (often illegal) immigrants. Special treatment for minorities is sometimes conflated with the status of other groups, notably women and sexual minorities, whose assertiveness is seen as a further threat. Third and related are claims that we are witnessing a rejection of long-established democratic values and a preference for simpler, authoritarian rule by strong leaders. Let us look at each of these in turn.

Populism and Economic Status

The conventional wisdom about the current state of American politics (and indeed politics elsewhere) is that we are in the midst of a cultural and

economic crisis engendered by the failure of parties and political institutions to respond adequately to rapid economic change. At the heart of this claim is the assumed link between the economic and educational status of the population and their opinions about the state of the country and its political institutions. So while real household incomes have increased in the last few years, the most dramatic change has been the vastly improved lot of the top 5% of households while the lowest echelons have seen little or no improvement in their incomes (see Mislinski 2017). As significant has been a shift in the sources of income. Increasingly families depend on two or more incomes—and especially so on women's earnings and on government programmes such as social security and unemployment compensation (Da Costa 2018). Added to this are concerns about the growing unaffordability of health care and higher education. So, in comparison with the situation 30 or 40 years ago, many working Americans feel poorer and less secure than did the earlier generations. There is little in the way of upward income and wealth progression, and this problem is most acute in those parts of the country—notably rural and older industrial areas—allegedly left behind by technological change.

Partly as a result of these developments public regard for political institutions—and in particular the Congress and the federal government—is low as is perception that the country is 'moving in the wrong direction.' (See the regular updates on these indicators in *Real Clear Politics.*) While all of these changes ring true, recent survey findings show that they only have a very loose connection to the election of Donald Trump. After all, deindustrialization and rural depopulation have been occurring for many decades and there is little evidence that things in 2016 were any worse than in 2008 or 2012 when Barack Obama was elected. Indeed, by most measures the economic situation actually improved in this 8-year period and especially so after 2012. Unemployment fell, real incomes increased and some small amelioration in income and wealth inequality occurred (See *The New York Times 2017* and sources cited). As telling are the data on Trump voters. While it is well established that Trump's base is made up disproportionately of white voters without a college education, a number of studies have shown that poorer less well-educated white voters were much less likely to support Trump than better off voters with the same level of education. Indeed the 70% of Trump voters without a college education is exactly the same figure for all Republican voters in recent elections and very close to the figure for all voters over 50. So the typical Trump voter—and also those who approved of his performance through late 2018—is older, white and above average income. This cohort also

tends to live in rural and semi-rural areas away from metropolitan centres (Carnes and Lupu 2017; Abramowitz 2018). But here again, this was true of 2008 and 2012. Indeed the voting pattern in 2016 was remarkably similar to that in 2012. As Morris Fiorina has convincingly shown, it takes only very small changes in the vote for president and Congress to trigger quite dramatic changes in institutional control and the consequent public policies (Fiorina 2017, 216).

Populism and Race and Identity Politics

While it now is well established that Republican voters are united on issues of cultural conservatism (antipathy towards Muslims, immigrants, atheists, sexual minorities and support for indicators of 'Americanism' including the Flag, the English language and the military) (Bartels 2018), what is less well known is that (a) there has been little change in these figures since around 2005 and (b) on other issues, including the role of government, Republican voters are far from being united (Bartels 2018). On the first point, the evidence in support of Republican cultural conservatism is overwhelming. Surveys have repeatedly shown the unity of Republicans' sentiments in this area. Remarkably, Republicans actually believe that there is as much discrimination against whites and Christians as there is against Muslims and Immigrants (see Bacon in FiveThirtyEight, 2017). And what applies to Republican voters applies even more to Trump voters. Again there is a large volume of survey evidence to support this claim—many Trump supporters were mobilized by his racist, anti-immigrant and sexist innuendos. Most of these voters were Republican identifiers but some were refugee Democratic or Independent identifiers (Bartels 2018; Malone 2016). What the Trump candidacy seemed to do, therefore, was to mobilize cultural conservatism among Republican voters and to attract a minority of Democratic and Independent voters who previously had voted for Obama. Interestingly, neither negative views of Trump among what has been called the Rising American Electorate (RAE) consisting of minorities, women and millennials, nor positive views of Hillary Clinton's candidacy were sufficient to overcome this emerging Trump coalition (Bartels 2018)—at least in the Electoral College Vote. In terms of the other dimensions that traditionally divide the parties, Bartels and others have shown that Republicans have mixed views on the role of government in society including taxation and a range of entitlement programmes (Bartels 2018 and preliminary analysis of the American

National Election Studs (ANES), reported in *The Washington Post*, 2017). We are of course, talking about relatively small shifts in voter sentiments here; there was no wave of populist support for the Republicans. Rather, Hillary Clinton failed to inspire many traditional Democratic voters while Trump consolidated his support among cultural conservatives—mainly Republicans but including voters who previously voted Democratic. If this is the case, the interesting question is not why did Trump win, so much as how did a man like that actually win the nomination? We will return to this question later, but first what evidence is there that Trump voters were motivated by anti-Democratic, authoritarian values?

Populism and Authoritarian Values

A common assumption among political commentators is that the election of Donald Trump represented a rejection of democratic values and a shift towards authoritarianism. Some of these concerns do, of course, relate to Trump's behaviour in office and especially his cavalier disregard for the rule of law (see, e.g., Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; Frum 2018). More relevant to our argument are claims that among voters there has been a general move away from democratic values irrespective of particular candidates. However, no such evidence exists. Studies by the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group (Drutman et al. 2018) and the Pew Research Center (2017) demonstrate that a substantial majority of voters support democracy and those who are doubtful about democratic processes are lukewarm about an authoritarian alternative. Of the three indicators used by Drutman, Diamond and Goldman—support for a strong leader, army rule and an anti-democratic system—only support for army rule rose between 2011 and 2017. Pew research comes to the same conclusions (Pew Research Center 2017, Figure 1). As might be expected the group that has the most negative views of democracy closely overlaps those who support Donald Trump. Hence,

> The Highest levels of support for authoritarian leadership come from those who are disaffected, disengaged from politics, deeply distrustful of experts, culturally conservative, and have negative attitudes toward racial minorities. (Drutman et al. 2018, 4)

This study reveals two further interesting trends: the highest levels of support for authoritarianism came from Trump Primary voters and from

Democratic voters who switched from Obama in 2012 to Trump in 2016 (Drutman et al. 2018, 30). Indeed the latter group had the highest anti-democratic score of all at 45%. So we can conclude that while there has been no increase in anti-democratic beliefs, those that hold them are more numerous among Trump supporters than among any other voting group.

To summarize 1 to 3 above—while there has been no populist surge in the United States, a substantial minority of voters have been mobilized not so much by economic hardship as by cultural conservatism and a preference for authoritarian rather than democratic values. All the evidence suggests not that these voters have grown in number or that their views have become more extreme over time. Rather, their visibility has been greatly increased through their support for one candidate, Donald Trump. All of this has happened in a country where views about politics and society have not been moving to the right. On the contrary, on almost every economic and cultural indicator that define individuals' position on a left-right dimension, the country has been moving to the left with the median voter commonly described as slightly left of centre (Fiorina 2017, chapter 11).[1] As earlier suggested, then, the important question to be answered is how did a man like Donald Trump win the nomination and the subsequent election? Over the last several decades, two developments have all but transformed the landscape of American politics and together they go some way to explaining the Trump phenomenon—the transformation of the Republican Party and the rise of the New Media.

The Transformation of the Republican Party

In 1993 Eric Uslaner said this about the Congress of the 1980s:

> In the 1950s and 1960s, the Congress was a civil, if not very open, institution….By the 1980s the House and the Senate came to resemble day-care centers in which colicky babies got their way by screaming at the top of their lungs… While the majority of members still spoke in civil tongues, sanctions did not deter legislators who flouted the rules. In some instances the panoply of shrill voices in the Congress led to stalemate. In other cases it lead to 'bad' policy. (Uslaner 1993, 3)

Thirty years later this description seems almost tame, for by then the party polarization in Congress had reached such a level that the institution was widely regarded as dysfunctional (Mann and Ornstein 2008, 2016).

This transformation was in large part due to changes in the Republican Party and in particular its steady drift to the right. These developments have been extensively catalogued elsewhere (see the summary of the work by Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal in NPR 2012) and general agreement exists that polarization is asymmetric—the Republicans have moved significantly further to the right than have the Democrats to the left (Poole and Rosenthal 2012; Mann and Ornstein 2016). However, until 2016 the presidential nomination system did not produce Republican candidates that remotely resembled the median Republican in Congress. George H.W. Bush, Bob Dole, George W. Bush, John McCain and Mitt Romney were all candidates whose views were more representative of the median Republican voter rather than the growing right wing of the party that, by later in this period, had effectively taken over the Congressional Party. So the Republicans changed from being a right of centre coalition of moderates and conservatives to an unambiguously right-wing party that was hostile not only to liberal views but also to any perspective that clashed with the core views of an ideologically cohesive conservative cadre of party faithfuls (for data on the transformation of the Congressional party, see Hare et al. 2014). The Republicans have also enjoyed advantages relating to geography and electoral rules—their support is more dispersed across much larger constituencies. In contrast, the Democratic vote is concentrated in smaller, more populous constituencies. Many Democratic votes are thus, 'wasted.' As David Hopkins has effectively shown, the larger, more demographically and culturally homogenous Republican constituencies lend themselves to 'capture' by ideological purists who exploit local and state party rules in ways that greatly advantage their preferred candidates in the nomination process (Hopkins 2017).

A further puzzle relates to the gap between what has been called 'party sorting' and the ideological preferences of voters. Fiorina's work in this area is particularly instructive for he shows (a) the increasing divide between the parties is elite led; (b) those most involved in politics are the most sorted into ideological camps; and (c) among this involved group the level of ideological commitment is far below that of the political class (candidates, elected and party officials) (Fiorina 2017, 49–50). What this means, of course, is that the choices being offered to the public in the nomination processes are increasingly in line with the ideological commitments of the political classes, for it is the activist party faithful who tend to drive nominations (Rauch and La Raja 2017). Moreover, this trend is more pronounced in the Republican than in the Democratic Party. This is

partly a consequence of the realignment of the South from Democratic to Republican—Southerners have always been more conservative whatever their party label—and, more importantly because the Republican party's appeal to many voters is based more on ideology than on appeals to group interest. Grossman and Hopkins stress that this is not a new phenomenon, although the ability of party leaders to martial the faithful has increased in recent years. As they put it:

> A party primarily defined by ideology will always remain particularly vulnerable to the charge that its leadership, faced as always with the real-world limitations of governing and the need to maintain electoral appeal beyond the party base, has strayed from its principles and must be forced back into line. Though the ability of conservative activists to enforce this purity has increased in recent years, the relative power of ideology as a definitional attribute of the right is, as our analysis reveals, quite long-lived. The American left has its own share of problems in governing, especially the task of holding a diverse coalition together, but overwhelming pressure from constituencies to maintain ideological fidelity is not nearly as great a challenge for Democrats as it is for today's Republican leaders. (Grossman and Hopkins 2014, 20)

Unquestionably these developments help explain the problems faced by moderate candidates in primary elections at all levels. In Congressional elections, an ideologically committed cadre of activists work hard to ensure the selection of candidates who are ideologically suitable (Rauch and La Raja 2017). This also goes some way to explaining the success of Donald Trump in the 2016 nomination process. For although there was much speculation at the time that he was an unknown ideological quantity, during the primary season Trump assiduously stuck to messaging the Republican base on the one issue that is now accepted as the core of their world view—cultural conservatism. As Nate Silver wrote at the time:

> But whereas Cruz offered a mix of anti-establishment-ism and movement conservatism—and whereas Marco Rubio offered movement conservatism plus a strong claim to electability—Trump's main differentiator was doubling down on cultural grievance: grievances against immigrants, against Muslims, against political correctness, against the media, and sometimes against black people and women. And the strategy worked. It's a point in favor of those who see politics as being governed by cultural identity—a matter of seeking out one's "tribe" and fitting in with it—as opposed to carefully calibrating one's position on a left-right spectrum. (Silver 2016, 4)

Once it was clear that Trump was on the road to the nomination, Republican leaders proved remarkably reluctant to disavow him. Paul Ryan, Mitch McConnell and even his primary opponents including Mitt Romney and Marco Rubio were, in the final analysis, ready to swallow their pride and stop short of unambiguously condemning his often-outrageous behaviour. In sum, disavowing Trump would almost certainly have helped Hillary Clinton—something that was anathema both to the Republican base and to almost all Congressional Republicans. None of this explains the hugely effective way in which Trump managed to get his message across to primary voters. To understand this we have to look at his use not only of the New Media but also of what might be called the New Old Media.

Trump, The New Media and New Old Media

One of the most remarkable developments over the last 30 years has been the growth of the right-wing media. As recently as 1992 only two major newspapers with more than local readerships—the *New York Post* and the *The Washington Times* followed an unambiguously right-wing line. On the radio Rush Limbaugh and Sean Hannity were also establishing national followings. Today, however, there is a myriad of outlets including *Fox News* (since 1996), Sinclair broadcasting that controls 193 local affiliate stations, *Breitbart News*, *The Daily Caller*, *Washington Examiner*, *American Greatness*, *Truthfeed*, *Townhall* and many others.[2] Some (*Fox News*, *Washington Examiner*) are what I have called New Old Media but most are Internet based and are thus part of the New Media. Part of the reason for this dramatic change was the abandonment of the 'Fairness Doctrine,' imposed by the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) in 1949 that required broadcasters to be 'fair, honest and balanced.' In 1987 the doctrine was abolished by the Reagan Administration—a decision that was later effectively upheld by the Supreme Court (for a discussion see Ruane 2011). Paradoxically Trump has called for its return to counter what he sees as liberal bias. Of course the doctrine only covered broadcast news and opinion, whereas much of recent controversy centres on other media.

Four features of these changes in media content and style and worthy of note:

First, there are few 'moderately conservative' news outlets; the vast majority are on the hard right and their core message usually relates to

cultural conservatism rather than the role of government or foreign policy (Calmes 2015). In most cases they portray political differences in absolutist or Manichean terms. Thus the presidency of Barack Obama was a 'disaster' for the United States and the election of Hillary Clinton would have spelled the end of the United States as a functioning democracy.

Second, it is their disdain for evidence or fact-based analysis; they claim a monopoly of the truth and show contempt for alternative views. Any Republican candidate or elected politician who strays from the hard right line is exposed as a traitor to the cause. And although they do not directly select candidates, they tend to limit the pool of candidates from which nominations are made (Calmes 2015). In other words, in order to avoid drawing the right-wing media's ire Republicans seeking election or re-election increasingly adjust to the right—often further than they need to (Congressman David Price in Calmes 2015, 6).

Third, the traditional media tend to be moderately liberal (or are perceived to be by the public). They are, famously, referred to as the 'mainstream media' that use evidence-based analysis and strive to provide balanced accounts of events, if from a liberal perspective. The outlets further to the left such as *Mother Jones*, *Slate* or the *Huffington Post* tend to be policy or issue based. They advance a liberal position by providing evidence in support of liberal policies or pointing to the destructive effects of the right-wing alternatives. What is fascinating about the Trump candidacy is how he stuck almost religiously to the core of the right-wing script. When he talked about policy reform (health care, taxes, trade and foreign policy) he did so in broad generalizations promising that everything would be 'just fine.' Take his comments on health care such as: 'We have to come up, and we can come up with many different plans. In fact, plans you don't even know about will be devised because we're going to come up with plans—health care plans—that will be so good. And so much less expensive both for the country and for the people. And so much better' (Interview with Dr. Mehmet Oz, on the *Dr. Oz Show*, September 13, 2016). However, when it came to immigration and those issues most associated with cultural conservatism he was demagogic and often quite specific. Hence his very clear statements on building a wall and banning Muslims and 'rapist' Mexican illegals, his contempt for female broadcasters, his pro-NRA gun control stance, his acceptance that women who have abortions should be 'punished' and his contempt for black voters: 'You're living in poverty, your schools are no good, you have no jobs, 58 per cent of your youth is unemployed. What the hell do you have to lose?' (On the

Dr. Oz Show (Trump Speech in Dimondale, Michigan, August 20, 2016). The fact that he was inconsistent in the past on many of these issues was irrelevant to his base. The point is that for the first time in recent history a leading candidate for president was speaking their language on their issues—and doing so with a brutal clarity.

Fourth, Trump is, of course, famous for his use of social media and in particular Twitter to express his thoughts. However, notwithstanding the possible role of Russian and other hackers using Facebook and Twitter to undermine the Clinton candidacy, it is difficult to make the case that the direct use of social media was the main vehicle for the advancement of the Trump candidacy. For one thing the demographic profile of his base—older, white voters with limited education—is precisely the group that uses social media least. More convincing is the argument that Trump used social media in ways that made it easier for right-wing sites such as *Breitbart* as well as the New Old Media and in particular *Fox News* to project his message. Indeed a statistical analysis of his Tweets and re-Tweets in *The Columbia Journalism Review* shows just how effective this strategy was (Faris et al. 2017). Crucially it obliged the mainstream media to cover his Tweets—and the more outrageous the Tweet the more publicity it generated. After all, controversies, disasters and drama are the lifeblood of all media, whatever their status. Trump also spoke the language of his supporters. He was the very antithesis of the dry, logical policy-wonkish image that Hillary Clinton projected. As one media observer noted:

> Clinton had a social media presence but it was dry and boring, and certainly handled by a staffer, and not herself. Trump was in control of his social media at all times. He had advisors and consultants of course, but if he wanted to post something on social media he was going to do it from the phone in his pocket. He wasn't passing a message onto a staffer and having them take his words to create a politically correct version. Look at his Tweets. They are full of grammatical errors and misspellings. He is always real. There is no political correctness BS with him, and the public ate it up, constantly wanting more. (McDonald 2017)

Trump therefore did not need the 94.5 million Twitter followers that Barack Obama had accumulated by the end of his presidency (but less than Katy Perry and Justin Bieber both of whom broke the 100 million mark by late 2016). At around 24 million, Trump's following was relatively modest. But the impact of his Tweets both through re-Tweets and through other media coverage was certainly much greater (Faris et al. 2017).

TRUMP, THE REPUBLICANS AND GOVERNANCE

Historically, the numerous veto points in the US system were overcome by political parties representing broad coalitions of interests. Thus the stuff of American politics was bargaining, logrolling, negotiation and compromise. Today, however, the parties find it increasingly difficult to perform this function largely because of the essentially closed ideology characteristic of the Republican Party. To many Republicans compromise is viewed as betrayal and moderation as a sign of weakness. Compounding this problem has been the tendency for the party to change institutional and electoral rules, procedures and norms in ways that make compromise more problematical. Hence the existence of institutionalized gerrymandering, their support for the (originally Democratic initiative) to abandon the minimum 60% threshold necessary to confirm some executive and judicial appointments and the shift of decision making from legislative committees to the party leadership in the House and Senate. And, perhaps most outrageously, the refusal of the Republican Senate to consider a replacement for Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia who died in February 2016 until after the election of the following November. Add to this the ways in which the interaction of geography and electoral rules benefits the Republican Party and thus increases polarization, and the potential for policy paralysis is obvious (Hopkins 2017; Mann and Ornstein 2016; Dionne et al. 2017).

While these problems were ever more apparent during the Obama presidencies, they have been brought into much sharper relief by the incumbency of Donald Trump who revels in confrontation and provocation. Rather than acting as an ameliorating influence on polarized institutions he has, at least in his first two years in office, seriously aggravated the governance problem. This shows in a number of ways—his support for far-right Republican candidates; his failure to provide any semblance of policy coherence to Congress; his regular attacks on any member of Congress who disagrees with him; and perhaps above all, giving his highest priority to the worst instincts of his electoral base rather than defending any semblance of what might be called the public interest. His sins are both those of omission—allowing Congress to steamroller through a tax bill in the complete absence of the deliberative processes that complex legislation requires, and commission—using executive power to create an immigration policy that violates basic standards of fairness and consistency.

In sum, Trump has made a dysfunctional governing context much worse, not because he is riding on the back of a national populist surge, but rather because he knows how to exploit the grievances of a substantial minority of disaffected voters and create his own news agenda. By so doing he has managed to maintain the loyalty of his 35–40% base among voters.

Writing during the incumbency of someone as erratic and unpredictable as Donald Trump is to invite becoming a serious hostage to fortune, so any thoughts on the implications of his presidency for American democracy must be tentative. In this context, the most discussed issue is whether the checks and balances of the American system will be robust enough to counter his onslaught on the rule of law. While some commentators agree that they probably are (see Dionne et al. 2017), the Trump presidency has aroused emotions among a substantial section of the American electorate that may be difficult to contain. Prime among these is the growing cultural divide between liberals and conservatives. Whether this continues in size and intensity is anyone's guess. However few would dispute the need for ameliorating leadership of the highest quality to provide a bridge across the ideological extremes. Ultimately this means the return of more traditional leaders in Congress and, above all, Presidents and presidential candidates who see their role as representing all, rather than just a minority of Americans. In sum this requires presidents to see their main asset as the power to persuade rather than the power to bully, intimidate and lie in order to stifle opposition and please what is a minority of voters.

Notes

1. This applies to almost all the indicators that make up the left-right dimension including views on the general the role of government, entitlements, taxation, healthcare, abortion, gun control, capital punishment, the status of women, immigrants and ethnic and sexual minorities.
2. Presumably in their efforts to remain balanced, *Real Clear Politics* gives equal coverage to articles in right-wing sites such as *Townhall*, *American Greatness* and the *The Washington Times* as it does to liberal sites like the *Daily Beast*, the *Huffington Post* and the *Guardian*. Yet these are not true equivalents given that the former are much further to the right than the latter are to the left. This is a good illustration of the ideological asymmetry characteristic of media opinion in the United States.

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Exceptionalism, Contending Liberalisms and the Future of the Democratic Party

Graham K. Wilson

A fundamental question about American politics is the degree to which it is "exceptional" compared to other advanced democracies.

Exceptionalism is a term that has had both a celebratory and a more analytical usage. The celebratory form is the most common, used by politicians to reassure Americans that they live in the greatest of all countries that have ever existed. It is the more analytical usage, however, that concerns us here. It has several dimensions set out by Hartz (1955) and most clearly by Lipset (1977). Analytical exceptionalism has several components. First the role of the state in the USA is more restricted. Government is smaller than in most advanced democracies. Second, it accepts responsibility for a smaller range of issues and problems so that the welfare state is less developed. Third, the smaller state is a consequence of the absence of a class-based political party with links to the socialist tradition exemplified by the social democratic parties of Europe and the Labour Party in the UK. Finally, American citizens support this more limited view of the role

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of the state. Hartz (1955) had argued for the dominance of political tradition is the USA that combined respect for individual freedoms with support for free markets and the responsibility of individuals, not the state to guarantee the wellbeing of themselves and their families. King's (1973) contribution was to show that the exceptionalism of American public policy resulted from the preferences of citizens and not from a distortion of the popular will by institutions.

Scholars such as Lipset (1977, 1996) and Hartz (1955) have explored many explanations for the persistence of what Hartz had termed the liberal tradition in America. These have included the distinctive historical experience of the USA such as not having a feudal past. Lipset (1977) provided a useful catalogue of additional explanations for the strength of the liberal tradition and American exceptionalism including ethnic divisions, racial divisions and higher living standards than in other countries. The German sociologist, Sombart, had long ago memorably argued that socialism in the USA had been buried by an avalanche of roast beef and apple pie (Sombart 1906 trans. 1976).

The exceptionalist and consensus views of American political development and thought espoused by Hartz and Lipset would find little support in the American academy today. The apparent indifference of earlier scholars to the belief and traditions in the USA that legitimized gender and racial discrimination now seems striking. After all, Hartz's magnum opus, *The Liberal Tradition in America* was published at a time when racial segregation was still the law of the land in about one third of the nation. The USA had just experienced McCarthyism, a denial of freedom of thought and belief practiced by many in addition to beyond the infamous Senator from Wisconsin. Most recently, Spencer Piston has shown that the common claim in the exceptionalist literature that Americans do not envy the rich or wish to tax them more heavily is false (Piston 2018). Americans have a good measure of antipathy to the rich. The old saw that Americans want to be rich themselves and therefore do not wish to redistribute income is empirically false.

Our thinking about public policy and state capacity is also deeper than when the exceptionalist thesis was more popular. In particular, scholars and practitioners became much more attuned to the both the potential of regulation to bring about economic and social change and the costs that regulations generate. The impact of government is not limited or defined by the percentage of GDP it spends alone but by its additional capacity to mandate behavioral change. As is well known, government in the USA (federal state and local) spends a lower percentage of GDP (38 percent) than government in the UK (42 percent) or the average for OECD

members (OECD 2018). To a significant degree, the American state is a regulatory state; as is also the case in assessing the impact of the European Union on member states, spending is not the full measure of impact. Government in the USA is a much larger presence than spending figures alone would suggest (Wilson 1998).

Even by the crude measure of government spending as a percentage of GDP, the American state has expanded significantly. Total government spending in the early twentieth century was less than 10 percent of GDP; in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, it reached 41 percent subsequently falling back to the high 30s. Few areas of American life today are not touched by the federal government. Federal loans programs are central to the plans of young Americans to attend college; programs such as Social Security and Medicare are the bedrock on which older Americans build their retirements. Admittedly in a somewhat convoluted manner, programs such as Food Stamps, the earned income tax credit and CHIPS (Children's Health Insurance Program) have brought a measure of support to lower income Americans. The large American defense budget has had a substantial impact on numerous industries with spinoffs ranging from airliners to the web. For all the comments that used to be made about the USA having a "weak" state it has been strong enough to marshal the resources to be by far the world's greatest power and to remake American society in relation to race and gender relations.

How have Americans felt about the move away from the limited role of government to the modern American state? King had noted the ambiguities that survey research had found. It is easy to generate large majorities in opinion polls in favor of free markets and limited government. On the other hand, as King had noted citing Free and Cantril (Free and Cantril 1967) opinion polling also pointed to substantial, majority support for an expansive view of the responsibilities of government, for example in insuring that everyone has access to health care and insurance. Grossmann and Hopkins (2016) make a similar point including more recent data. Americans have appeared to be ready to support government action to address problems even when pollsters have tried to make clear the costs involved, for example by stipulating that government action on a problem would result in higher taxes.

The exceptionalist thesis was to its credit necessarily a comparative interpretation of American politics. Its plausibility is therefore dependent on developments not only within the USA but also in the countries with which it is compared. Developments in other democracies also weakened the exceptionalist thesis. King had noted the contrast between the USA

and other democracies in the extent of government ownership of industry (King 1973). Since the publication of King's article over four decades ago, the UK has taken privatization to a level that exceeds American practice. Americans are startled to learn that when they land at Heathrow, they are at an airport owned by non-British investors (the Spanish corporation Ferrovial, the Qatar sovereign wealth fund and the Quebec pension fund) rather than by a British government agency. The air traffic control system that brought their plane into a safe landing is privately owned. Their first glass of water they may drink or use in bathrooms on the way to customs and immigration is supplied by private company. In the USA, all of these activities would be government owned. Although the UK pursued privatization more aggressively than most countries, most other countries, including, for example France, pursued some type of privatization policy. The exceptionalism of the USA was therefore eroded by the growth of government in the USA and the retreat of the state in other advanced democracies.

Exceptionalism and the Democratic Party

One area where the exceptionalist thesis seemed to endure, however, was in the American party system. A pivotal part of the exceptionalist thesis had been the absence in the USA of a class-based center-left reform party analogous to the social democratic parties of western Europe. Although by the time King wrote his article the Democrats were commonly identified as the center-left reform party, the American party system was still incoherent. The Democrats still contained a significant conservative Southern wing and the Republican Congressional party still contained liberals such as Senator Jacob Javits. The ideologically confused party system made American politics fun to teach but confusing to voters.

King had noted that the American political system was undergoing profound change in his contributions to the influential book he edited, *The New American Political System* (King 1978). Several aspects of the changes that King described made the US party system more similar to the stereotype of "European" party systems in which parties are ideologically coherent and can be placed on a left-right scale (It would perhaps be too much a digression to explore how far European party systems in reality fitted the "European" party model).

First, they became ideologically distinct (Poole and Rosenthal 1997; McCarty et al. 2013). In contrast to development in many advanced

democracies in the 1990s and 2000s where competition focused increasingly on competence in addressing valence issues (Clarke et al. 2009), American political parties became much ideologically distinguishable. The critical issues of health care (Obamacare) and of responding to the 2008 financial crisis revealed major difference between the parties on the role of government in society. In contrast to earlier periods in American politics, the parties became distinct on a wide range of issues that are not necessarily logically linked ranging from reproductive rights to the environment to racial equality. It became common in the USA as in parliamentary systems for key pieces of legislation (the Affordable Care Act in 2010, the 2017 tax cuts) to pass without a single vote in support from the "opposition" party.

Second the gap between the parties widened. As in 1950s Britain, parties can be ideologically distinct but relatively close together on a left-right continuum. This is not the case in the USA. Democrats became somewhat more liberal but Republicans moved sharply to the right as is clearly demonstrated by shifts in the DW-NOMINATE scores (Mann and Ornstein 2016).

It could of course be argued that the Democrats were still significantly different from European social democrats in that they had no formalized linkage to labor unions or class-based politics. This difference had been central to the exceptionalist thesis; much of the writing on the topic is by political scientists such as Lipset (1996) or theorists such as Hartz (1955).

The reality of the links between organized labor, the working class and the Democratic Party is messier than might be supposed, however. Although they have not enjoyed a formalized role in the Democratic Party, labor unions have played a critical role in supporting it both financially and organizationally. As Greenstone (1969) described, the United Auto Workers (UAW) long played a major role in Democratic Party politics. With the decline of the Midwestern auto industry, the UAW today is perhaps less important in the party than teachers' unions or the Service Employees International Union. In all presidential elections except in 1972, the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), which aspires to being the umbrella organization for unions, has been an important source of support for the Democratic nominee. Union members have consistently been more Democratic in their voting behavior than non-members (Maniam 2017).

THE TRAVAILS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

As we shall see, the irony today is not that the Democrats are fundamentally different from social democrats but that they confront some of the same dilemmas. Admittedly, Democrats have had more than their share of bad luck and failure in recent decades. The bad luck consists of losing in the Electoral College in two Presidential elections (2000 and 2016) whilst winning the popular vote, in the case of 2016 by a substantial margin of over three million votes.

However, the likelihood that the Democrats have real problems and not just bad luck is suggested by their performance outside the Presidential arena losing what had once seemed an invincible dominance of institutions other than the Presidency. Democrats controlled both chambers of Congress with only a brief interruption in the fifty years after the 1932 election. Thereafter, the Republicans enjoyed much greater success controlling the Senate from 1981 to 1987, from 1997 to 2007 and from 2015 to the present. Similarly, the Republicans held the House from 1995 to 2007 and then recaptured control after only four years.

The Democrats' decay went down to the local level suffering major losses in state legislatures around the country so that in 2017 in a majority of states Republicans controlled both chambers of the state legislature and the governorship. The proportion of state legislators who are Democrats declined to 42% in 2016 whilst the Republicans held more state legislative seats than even before in the party's history (Wilson 2016). Although of course the justices would resist a partisan characterization, it is also the case that there had been a Republican majority on the Supreme Court for some decades.

This change in the state of the parties was striking for those of us who had cut our teeth on American politics during the long period of Democratic dominance at all levels except the Presidential. The most obvious negative change in Democratic support has been the loss of the white working class, a problem that confronts social democratic parties in Europe.

There are important arguments about how to define and measure the size of the working class; in the USA, one common operationalization is to define the working class as people who did not go to college. There is, however, substantial agreement on the following points.

First, the traditional working class has shrunk. There are many fewer jobs than in the past in what were the almost emblematic blue collar jobs such as coal mining or steel production. As many have pointed out in the

context of Trump's promise to bring back coal mining jobs in the USA, there are many more people employed in the solar power industry than in coal mining in the USA.

Second, the working class is less effectively organized. The strength of unions, particularly in the private sector, has plummeted. The vast majority of American workers, the overwhelming majority of American workers in the private sector do not belong to a union. The rate of unionization in the private sector is now less than 7 percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2018). Even in those sectors where the level of union membership remains significant, union power has been severely constrained by management threats to outsource, to relocate to nonunion parts of the USA or to shift production overseas.

Third, class differences have become ever more apparent in the USA in terms of inequality, declining social mobility, life expectancy, health issues such as weight and smoking (Luce 2017). The American working class, including the white working class, has been in trouble.

Fourth, progressives have struggled to combine appropriate concern for addressing disadvantage and discrimination afflicting minorities and women with maintenance of traditional working-class support. Concerns about class inequality have had to compete with concerns about racial and gender inequity. Such concerns had been conspicuously lacking from the original New Deal agenda (Katznelson 2005). Scholars such as Gest (2016), Hochschild (2016) and Cramer (2016) and have demonstrated the deep resentment that many white working-class people over progressives' focus on the race, feminism and the environment. White working feelings of resentment and marginality have only increased since the 2008 financial crisis. Whether or not these feelings of resentment about welfare policies are expressions of veiled racism is a hotly debated, controversial issue turning on whether reactions against welfare are due to the (erroneous) belief that they benefit largely African Americans or reflect a race neutral antipathy toward welfare and the alleged dependency it induces (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sniderman and Piazza 1993).

The problem for the Democrats has been therefore that the alliance with constituencies favoring policies such as those promoting race and gender equity has been accompanied by a dramatic fall in support from the working class. Studies of voting behavior in the USA generally emphasize stability; individuals acquire a party identification and stick with it, consistently voting in accordance with their party identification. However, true this might be of individuals psychologically, one of the most striking

changes in American politics sociologically has been the change over the last fifty years through which the white working class has become solidly Republican. This trend began long before the prospect of a Trump Presidency. The proportion of the lowest third of white Americans in Socio Economic Scale (SES) who identified as Democrats fell from about 67 percent in 1962–1970 to about 50 percent in 2002–2004 (Teixeira and Abramowitz 2008). White working-class support for the Republican candidate at about 67 percent was, however, at its highest in 2016. In contrast, Democrats have fared well amongst the more educated; white college graduates supported Hillary Clinton by a 9 percent margin.

This trend again has its counterparts in other advanced democracies, for example the UK, where age was a better indicator of voting than social class in the 2017 General Election (YouGov 2017). There has been a radical change in the composition of Socialdemokratische Partei Deutschland (SPD) support in Germany that sounds very familiar to American ears; working-class voters now comprise only 17% of its support (Chazan 2017). The demise of the Communist Parties of France and Italy similarly demonstrated the waning of the political power of social class as a predictor of political allegiance. Lipset's famed description of elections as the democratic form of class struggle in *Political Man* (Lipset 1981) was no longer (if it had been ever) true.

Trump and the Future for the Center Left in the USA: Contending Liberalisms?

All political parties are to some degree coalitions; American political parties have always been coalitions of diverse interests. The challenge for the Democrats is often said to be that their coalition is composed of antagonistic elements. On the one side are causes and groups that appeal to higher income progressives such as the environment, government reform and achieving equality for women and minorities; on the other side are labor unions working politically to both protect organized labor and advance the New Deal agenda of advancing the American version of the welfare state. These interests and causes are not necessarily in conflict. However, it often contended that the Democrats' loss of the white working class has resulted from giving priority to progressive, professional class causes and insufficient attention to unions.

An important test of how great are the strains within a coalition is how much or little leaders of different sections evaluate politicians. If the leaders of different interests or viewpoints differ substantially in their

evaluations of politicians, the coalition is under great strain; if the leaders have a common evaluation of politicians, the coalition is more secure.

How different are these tendencies at the level of political elites? In order to address this question we explored how similarly a variety of interest groups associated with the center left evaluated the same objects, namely the members of the House and Senate. Interest groups in the USA issue score cards grading legislators their voting records on what the groups regard as key legislation. The score cards examined here come from the activist liberal organization, Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), the League of Conservation Voters (LCV), the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and the UAW (United Auto Workers). The ADA and LCV have been seen as representing a new liberalism focused on issues such as race, rights and the environment; the AFL-CIO might be expected to embody more the New Deal tradition of emphasizing economic issues. How similarly did they evaluate the voting records of legislators?

At first glance, liberal groups and unions seem united. Their evaluations of *Congress as whole* show the groups close together and evaluating the Democrats more positively over time as the party became more consistently liberal (Fig. 8.1). ADA and LCV scores correlate almost perfectly with those of the AFL-CIO (Table 8.1). However, this very large effect is driven to a considerable degree by the groups' antipathy to Republicans. If we focus on how the groups evaluate only *Democratic* Representatives and Senators the scores are noticeably less closely correlated. The correlation between AFL-CIO and LCV scores drops to 0.5 (Table 8.2).

Moreover, as expected, the ADA and LCV scores show much more stability over time than do the (admittedly incomplete) AFL-CIO and ADA or LCV scores. The ADA and LCV evaluate Democrats in both the House (Fig. 8.2) and Senate (Fig. 8.3) with considerable similarity and stability over time.

In contrast, the AFL-CIO is sometimes close to the ADA or LCV in its evaluations of Democrats, sometimes quite far apart. Thus, at the "inside the Beltway" level of interest group politics, liberal groups share an overarching view of which party is better while showing significant differences on how they evaluate politicians within them.

These differences are reflected in divisions about the future of the party electorally; is the way forward to rely on a progressive coalition of professional class liberals, women and racial minorities or should the party attempt to rebuild strength amongst the white working class? The election

Fig. 8.1   Interest group scores over time. Source: As provided by the groups

Table 8.1   Correlations of union/liberal group scores, both parties, both chambers 1997–2014

	AFL-CIO	LCV	ADA	UAW
AFL-CIO	1.00	0.81	0.90	0.94
LCV	0.81	1.00	0.88	0.98
ADA	0.91	0.88	1.00	0.98

Table 8.2   Correlations of union/liberal groups, Democrats only both chambers, 1997–2014

	AFL-CIO	LCV	ADA	UAW
AFL-CIO	1.00	0.63	0.78	0.50
LCV	0.63	1.00	0.7	0.74
ADA	0.78	0.78	1.00	0.66

Fig. 8.2 Fluctuations in interest group scores, 1970–2017. Source: As supplied by organizations and from published sources. AFL-CIO data is incomplete

Fig. 8.3 Correlations in voting scores, Senate Democrats, 1970–2017. Source: Scores provided by organizations

of Trump in 2016, admittedly on a minority of the vote, focused attention on the white working class in the USA just as the Brexit vote did so in the UK. In line with discussions of Brexit, early emphases on the economic factors such as job losses due to globalization have given way to a greater emphasis on culture. Areas that swung to Trump were not necessarily hit harder economically than others or have suffered lower rates of economic growth, but have felt isolated or at odds with cultural trends in the USA as they become more secular and less committed to traditional family structures (Wilson 2017). There has also been increased recognition of a crisis in the white working class that has been in part economic (stagnant incomes in real terms for several decades) but is also sociological in terms drug addiction (the opioid crisis), declining life expectancy, family instability and rising suicide rates (Luce 2017).

Others have suggested that the Democrats abandon attempts to win back the white working class, a group seen as both irredeemably racist and reactionary and inessential to victory electorally. Instead Democrats should place even greater emphasis on the support of racial and ethnic minorities. Philips, for example, attacks the Democrats' 'obsessive focus on wooing voters who supported Donald Trump'. These are, of course, the 'wavering whites', the 'conservative white working class voters susceptible to racially charge appeals' (Philips 2017). Elsewhere, Philips has argued, to use the title of his book, that *Brown is the New White*, that demographic forces have ended the dominance of white Americans. Democrats should focus on an alliance of minorities and progressives rather than attempting to win back working-class votes.

Whites remain the largest group demographically in the United States however and are not projected to be a minority of the population until 2055. Even that projection is highly questionable. It rests on assumptions that future generations of children and grandchildren of minorities will continue to identify with that group. In the case of mixed marriages, the assumption is that the identification will be with the race/ethnicity of the minority parent. Studies have found that in the case of Hispanics, by the third generation, 18 percent had ceased to identify as Hispanic an in the case of Asian Americans, 42 percent of whom had ceased to identify as Asian (Duncan and Trejo 2016; see also Alba 2016). It would be strange in any case for a political party to rely base its plans on demographic changes that will not come to fruition until after another nine Presidential and ten Congressional elections.

Democrats will continue to need to maximize support (or minimize Republican support) from white working-class voters for a long time to come. The most obvious strategy—working for reforms such as health care whose benefits cross racial divides has not succeeded politically perhaps because white voters assume that in practice "they" will get the benefits while "we" pay the taxes.

A further possibility for the Democrats would be to embrace the economic nationalism that Steve Bannon briefly linked to the Republicans. Eschewing trade agreements and disparaging globalization, Democrats could emulate Trump in promising to return jobs to the USA. To some degree, the Democrats have already moved in this direction backing away from trade liberalization. It was Republican support, not a majority of Democrats that enabled Clinton to ratify North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This strategy also has its problems including alienating key sources of financial support for Democrats such as Hollywood and a surprisingly large section of Wall Street. It would alienate much of the party's intellectual base while engaging with Trump on a battle field that he has already occupied.

In the short term the Trump Administration will unite the Democratic Party. President Trump has acted vigorously to weaken environmental protection, consumer protection, labor unions, programs to protect minorities and the rights of women. In short, he has done much to bring the Democrats together. Whether they can remain united in the longer term is a different matter.

Conclusion

Scholars have long been fascinated by the topic of American exceptionalism, and Anthony King made a notable contribution to this debate. The expansion of government in the USA and the shrinkage of government elsewhere as neoliberal policies spread internationally in the late twentieth century have eroded this exceptionalism. Similarly, the Democratic Party has become a clearly left of center party in unified opposition to the Republicans. Ironically, however, as it has become in effect more like the center left parties of Europe, like them it has struggled to combine working-class support with contemporary understandings of liberalism.

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The Liberal Democratic Response to Authoritarian Populism

How Can Liberal Democracies Respond Effectively to Putin Without Prejudicing Liberalism and Democracy?

Geoffrey Hosking

Recently there has been a tendency for those concerned about the crisis in our political system to place some of the blame on Russian cyber-warfare. This is to confuse cause and effect. At the moment Russia's ideological challenge and cyber-threat are proving effective largely because for many years Western political leaders have already been betraying liberal democratic values—to the benefit of right-wing populist movements which Russia supports (Shekhovtsov 2018; Laruelle 2015). As the Greek ex-Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis recently remarked, 'Vladimir Putin must be rubbing his eyes in disbelief at the way the West has been undermining itself so fabulously' (Varoufakis 2017, 2).

Liberal democracies can respond effectively to Russia's challenge *only* by reaffirming and staunchly defending the values which they have inherited and on which they are based, that is constitutional government, the rule of law, defence of human freedoms, an active civil society and genuine electoral choice. It would be reassuring if they showed some signs of understanding the seriousness of the crisis and of how to reassert those

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values—not necessarily in the form in which they inherited them, but in a form which answers the needs of the modern world.

Perhaps liberalism itself has let us down. In his recent book, *Why Liberalism Failed*, Patrick Deneen argues that liberalism has failed because it has succeeded too well. 'As liberalism has become more fully itself, its inner logic has become more evident and its self-contradictions manifest' (Deneen 2018, 3). The book is in many ways an interesting one, and makes a number of good points. But I do not accept Deneen's basic premise. To my mind what has failed is not liberalism itself, only one form of liberalism—one might call it a perversion of liberalism, that is, neo-liberalism. For as Deneen admits, liberalism arose from fundamental and universal human values: freedom, self-realisation, the rights of free speech, association, religious belief and so on (values which Tony King cherished). Neo-liberalism has failed us by actually limiting these rights in the name of economic growth within balanced budgets. It is certainly an ideology, one which begins to remind me of Soviet communism in its rigidity and in the way governments pursue it to its logical end, regardless of its effect on human suffering.

A lurid symptom of the consequences was the Grenfell Tower fire of the night of 14–15 June 2017, in which 72 people died and a further 70 were injured. Only five years earlier, during a refit, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, practising financial rectitude, had deliberately rejected fireproof external cladding in favour of a somewhat cheaper non-fireproof version, something they were enabled to do by recent relaxations in building regulations. The risks of this decision were exacerbated by the fact that the tower's only evacuation route was down a single central staircase. The tenants of the tower, mostly poorer and minority-ethnic people, had reacted by raising concerns about the fire dangers. They had considered taking legal action against the council, but reportedly were prevented from doing so by recent cuts in legal aid. It later transpired that some 600 high-rise blocks in the UK had similar cladding, 57 in Glasgow alone. In some of them, *residents*, rather than the government, the local council or the construction firms, were subsequently asked to pay the considerable cost of refurbishment.

After the fire, the government promised that funds would be provided for those who had lost their homes in it, and that all would be rehoused as close as possible to Grenfell Tower within three weeks. In actual fact, nearly a year later only 74 out of 210 households had been permanently rehoused. The rest were still living in temporary accommodation or in

hotel rooms, mostly whole families to one room. Kensington and Chelsea, the richest borough in the UK, had not even taken the step of compulsorily purchasing premises which were unoccupied in order to rehouse families.[1] The whole episode suggested that the government and the local authority had mentally assigned Grenfell tenants to the category of second-class citizens, with inferior financial and legal status to the more affluent property owners living in some cases only a few yards away from them. Kensington as a location dramatised the inequality: some of London's poorest people lived in high-rise blocks of flats, almost round the corner from fabulously wealthy Russian oligarchs and the sumptuous embassies around Kensington Palace.

This disgraceful episode was *not* the direct result of liberalism. There *was* another modern form of liberalism—in Britain that of Lloyd George, Keynes and Beveridge, all of them Liberals both with a capital and a small letter—but represented in most European countries by Social Democrats or Christian Democrats. In their version of liberalism personal economic freedom was reconciled with social justice and strong government through a tacit or explicit socio-economic contract guaranteeing all citizens against absolute indigence by means of what I call the 'fiscal covenant': the tacit agreement that, if you pay your taxes, the state will look after you, or at least prevent you slipping into utter destitution if you suffer unemployment or a serious accident or illness, and when you reach old age. The fiscal covenant created a way of making social solidarity real: the sharing of national wealth through progressive taxation proved a powerful factor in consolidating the sense of nationhood engendered by war. The national treasury became the clearing house through which the whole nation shared the cost of providing mutual security and well-being for all: defence, communications, education, health services, pensions, welfare benefits and other forms of social good. The fiscal covenant became a major component of national identity.[2]

The national fiscal covenant provided the underpinning for generalised social trust, and this is precisely what has been seriously weakened since the 1980s by deliberate political decisions (as Mike Moran points out in his paper) against the background of the globalised economy, and then by the financial crisis of 2008, after which many governments adopted 'austerity' as an economic policy, again by deliberate political decision, with the aim of rebalancing budgets. In the UK, for example, the costs of 'austerity' have included funding cuts to hospitals and schools; the closure of numerous public libraries; extreme strain on the facilities of the National

Health Service; repeated crises in the prison service caused at least partly by a shortage of prison officers; families forced out of their homes and communities because they are deemed to have too many bedrooms, because their housing benefit has been cut, or because the local council or housing association has sold their home to a developer; reductions in tax credits and disability benefits, which have imposed on many claimants anxiety-creating forms to fill in and intimidating tests to undergo; the withdrawal of many youth services and careers advice centres; reductions in legal aid which exclude many people from access to the law, especially women, prisoners, recent immigrants and the disadvantaged generally—those who most need such access. One could go on. Cumulatively, these cuts impaired the fiscal covenant and undermined the rule of law. They deprived many people, especially the poor and disadvantaged, both of their confidence in the future and of their feeling of belonging to a community. That is what has made them willing prey to populist parties which have pledged to restore welfare benefits and recreate the sense of community.

The disruption to stable routines and to household budgets, the restriction of access to the law, the impoverishment of collectively provided facilities—all these deprivations loosened the bonds of attachment and routine confidence in the future which most of us take for granted most of the time and which are the underpinning of democracy and civil society. Not many families follow politics closely, but most have become aware of the gradually increasing disentitlements imposed on them by a national government yielding to the demands of global finance. They also notice that the already wealthy are actually augmenting their wealth at the same time, apparently at everyone else's expense. By 2017, figures showed that Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) chief executive officers were earning 386 times the national living wage, or more specifically 132 times more than the average police officer, 140 times more than a schoolteacher, 165 times more than a nurse and 312 times more than a care worker (Equality Trust 2017). Moreover, inherited wealth had become a far better determinant of social and economic status than either exceptional talent or hard work.[3] Those with inherited wealth could expect to have it protected and enhanced by dedicated, discreet and extremely confidential wealth managers, handpicked for their trustworthy qualities (Harrington 2016). Much of it would be placed in minimally regulated private equity funds, hedge funds or tax havens (many of them in Switzerland or in British dependencies), where it would be concealed from the tax authorities (Coggan 2009, 82–90, 2012, 153–4, 189–91).

An especially insidious form of economic polarisation is that generated by these tax havens. The economist Gabriel Zucman, who has made a special study of what can be inferred from national statistical records, has estimated that some 8% of international wealth—about $7.6 trillion—is hidden in this way. If the French state could tax its citizens' hidden wealth at 100% (actually no democratic state is going to go that far), it would immediately raise about 350 billion euros, or 15% of GDP (Zucman 2015, 52–5). The loss is not merely quantitative. Tax havens not only deprive societies of much-needed resources; they also undermine trust in the taxation system, and thereby the fiscal covenant which is a linchpin of Western democracy. As Zucman comments, 'When tax evasion is possible for the wealthy, there can be no consent for taxes' (Zucman 2015, 56). Potential taxpayers feel they are being taken for a ride, become reluctant to contribute to an unjust system and try to find their own small-scale ways of avoiding tax. Martin Daunton, in his major history of British taxation, asserts that during the nineteenth century 'the creation of a high degree of trust in the state and public action permitted a shift in attitudes, away from criticism of the state as prodigal to acceptance of the state as efficient' (Daunton 2001, 178).[4] Today tax havens encourage the reverse process, towards distrust of the state.

The publication of the Panama Papers in 2016 opened the eyes of many to the clandestine procedures by which 1% of the world's population was able to hold half of the world's wealth and avoid being taxed on much of it. The confidential documents, summaries of which were published in several European newspapers, derived from Mossack Fonseca, a law firm based in Panama, which provided legal services to clients wishing to set up 'offshore' companies in tax havens. The papers disclosed an intricate web of ownership structures by which firms and individuals made their identity, and that of beneficiaries, almost impossible to trace. Tax inspectors who came looking for information were fobbed off with claims of confidentiality or with confusing and unhelpful information. Among the beneficiaries of such offshore manoeuvres were the prime ministers of Pakistan and Iceland, the president of Ukraine, a close friend of the president of Russia and the late father of British Prime Minister David Cameron (*The Guardian*, 5 and 8 April 2017).

The effect of these publications was deepened by the later publication of the so-called Paradise Papers. These were obtained by the German newspaper *Süddeutsche Zeitung* from the company registers of 19 tax havens and two offshore service providers, and were shared with the

International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, which conducted a thorough examination of them. In many ways the most shocking aspect of these materials was the practices that they disclosed (unlike the Panama Papers) were all legal and accepted as legitimate by those involved. They showed that a large number of respected individuals and companies had knowingly or unknowingly hidden a considerable proportion of their wealth in tax havens, where they were taxed at a minimal rate or not at all. The investors included several well-known actors, a prominent motor-racing driver, the footwear company Nike, advisers of President Putin, members of President Trump's cabinet, the governor of the Nigerian Central Bank, subsidiary companies of Apple, colleges of Oxford and Cambridge Universities, the estate of the British Queen and many more (*The Guardian*, 7–11 November).

While the general public in the UK and other European countries did not know many details—and would probably not have been able to understand them if they had—they were aware in general that the wealthy and influential were protecting and increasing their own fortunes at everyone else's expense, at the very time when national governments were pursuing a policy of 'austerity'. As the economist Thomas Piketty commented, 'Austerity is what led to the rise of national selfishness and tensions around national identity' (Piketty 2016, 174).

The victims of this process feel that the government has violated the tacit social contract which holds democracies together. The resulting inequalities severely undermined confidence in the political and economic system as a whole. That is a perfect setting for the rise of populist parties. Many British citizens—Europeans too—were left with the feeling that they were no longer respected, no longer full citizens, and also, owing to recent high levels of immigration, that they had become surrounded by alien inhabitants whom they did not know and could not trust, and that they could no longer have confidence in the safety nets supplied by the state in case of disaster. Islamist terrorism then added extra impetus to their fears. The result was widespread exaggerated distrust of all immigrants and of international institutions generally, and also loss of trust in governments and in established experts generally (including most of the contributors to this book!).

There are two vectors of generalised social trust at work here: trust in the nation-state and trust in finance. Up to 60 or 70 years ago, most of us in case of unexpected disaster would have looked to family, friends, trade unions, friendly societies, local communities or religious congregations to

help us out. Nowadays, however, we place our reliance in finance: insurance policies, pension funds and the purchase of real estate, which has provided both a stable place to live and a hedge against inflation. We have financialised social trust and thereby given international financial institutions huge resources to play with and to misuse. They have taken full advantage of this situation.

The clash between the two vectors of social trust is summarised by a former staunch supporter of neo-liberal globalisation, the *Financial Times* columnist Martin Wolf (2014). In recent years he has modified his views and now diagnoses a serious mismatch between the current mode of free market capitalism and democracy:

> In democratic societies, a tacit bargain exists between elites and the rest of society. The latter say to the former: we will accept your power, prestige and prosperity, but only if we prosper too. A huge crisis dissolves that bargain. The elites come to be seen as incompetent, rapacious or, in this case, both.

He adds that globalised elites have

> become ever more detached from the countries that produced them. In the process, the glue that binds democracy—the notion of citizenship—has weakened…. The loss of confidence in the competence and probity of elites inevitably reduces trust in democratic legitimacy. People feel even more than before that the country is not being governed for them, but for a narrow segment of well-connected insiders who reap most of the gains and, when things go wrong, are not just shielded from loss but impose massive costs on everybody else. (Wolf 2014, 351–2)

This is a pretty good description of what has been happening to Western societies for several decades, and of what has propelled populist parties into the foreground of politics. The financial crash of 2007–2008 naturally intensified the resultant resentments. At the roots of the crash was the massively untrustworthy behaviour of banks, financial institutions and building societies.

The German political economist Wolfgang Streeck (2017) goes further than Wolf. He believes the free market economy and liberal democracy are altogether incompatible. He has labelled those who depend on the national fiscal covenant as *Staatsvolk* and those who depend on international financial institutions as *Marktvolk*. The former are the democratic electorate who choose between the main parties' manifestoes and leaders and who depend on the safety nets provided by the state. The latter include anyone

who takes out insurance, contributes to a pension scheme or buys real estate by means of a mortgage: to a greater or lesser extent, they become investors in the financial markets, which guarantee their security by demanding from governments that they prove their reliability as borrowers. Streeck lays out the main features, demands and expectations of the two categories as follows:

Staatsvolk	Marktvolk
National	International
Citizens	Investors
Civil rights	Contractual claims
Voters	Creditors
Elections (periodic)	Auctions (continual)
Loyalty	'Confidence'
Public opinion	Interest rates
Public services	Debt service

Streeck (2017, 124)

There is an underlying disequilibrium here: the globalised economy offers no fiscal covenant; only the nation-state can do that. Consequently, even in a globalised economy, and even for the *Marktvolk*, the nation-state remains our public risk manager and the trustee of the fiscal covenant. It can sustain that covenant only through taxation or by offering secure returns on the bonds it sells to finance its own debts. It can do the latter, in turn, only if it sustains budgetary balance: that is the rationale behind 'austerity'. The global economy makes its demands on nation-state treasuries, but does not compensate states unable to balance their budgets. In the absence of any international pooled financial security, nation-states remain our public risk managers, and populations are therefore very loath to surrender control of that management to outside institutions. This has applied even, perhaps especially, within the EU's eurozone, where the creation of a single currency was not supplemented by the establishing of supra-national risk-bearing collective provisions. The result is that the populations of Europe have increasingly looked to their own nation-states as public risk managers and as guarantors of the fiscal covenant. Populist parties accordingly take a traditional right-wing stance on patriotism, but a left-wing one on social security benefits.

Those are the *economic* motives for clinging to the nation-state. There are other, no less important, *symbolic* reasons why the *Staatsvolk* are

attached first of all to their own nation-states. The symbols of national identity have the potential to exercise a much more powerful emotional appeal than self-interest.

It is the nation which evokes the trust-generating symbolic motifs which augment social solidarity. The nation is the largest collective—usually many millions of people—with which the individual can feel a sense of community solidarity. A nation is a huge aggregation, each of whose members can know personally only a tiny proportion of its other members. Imagining the unknown members as people to whom one can extend at least a preliminary presumption of trust and with whom one can engage more readily than with those outside the nation's borders requires a symbolic repertoire capable of summing up the nation's identity and projecting it to all its members. A shared language greatly eases mutual understanding and can facilitate the settling of conflicts. A nation can be symbolically evoked through its various emblems: the national flag, the national anthem, a portrait of the head of state. Its ceremonies—connected with anniversaries or occasions of rejoicing or mourning—give people an opportunity to mingle with each other in a heightened emotional setting, in some cases enhanced by the liturgy of a distinctive religion. A shared history or folklore provides points of reference for conversation or public discourse. A common culture in literature, music or the visual arts, communicates feelings connected with the shared experience of homeland (Anderson 1991; Smith 1991).

Streeck's Marktvolk/Staatsvolk dichotomy roughly corresponds to the dichotomy expounded by another thinker concerned with the condition of our contemporary democracies: in a recent book David Goodhart (2017) distinguishes between 'somewhere' people and 'anywhere' people.

The people Goodhart classifies as Anywheres are animated by what he calls 'progressive individualism', that is, they value individual freedom very highly and are prepared to accept its social corollaries. Their worldview places a high value on social liberalism, 'on autonomy, mobility and novelty, and a much lower value on group identity, tradition and national social contracts (faith, flag and family)'. They 'are comfortable with immigration, European integration and the spread of human rights legislation, all of which tend to dilute the claims of national citizenship'. By contrast, the Somewheres hold a worldview which Goodhart calls 'decent populism' (though he notes that a small minority of 'hard authoritarians' among them do not qualify as 'decent'). They 'are more socially conservative and communitarian by instinct…. They feel uncomfortable about many aspects

of cultural and economic change—such as mass immigration, an achievement society in which they struggle to achieve, the reduced status of non-graduate employment and more fluid gender roles' (Goodhart 2017, 5–6). They react against both the social and the economic forms of liberalism.

In their study *How Democracies Die*, Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt quote a classic article of Richard Hofstadter describing the phenomenon of 'status anxiety', when a sector of the population feels that their standing, their identity and their sense of belonging to a community are under existential threat. They adopt a style of politics which is 'overheated, over-suspicious, overaggressive, grandiose and apocalyptic' (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 172–3). This seems like an apt portrayal of populist politicians, and of the convinced Brexiteers in the British government.

Symbols are more powerful and more motivating than self-interest. That is one reason why many people in the Brexit referendum voted against their own economic interest (although of course it is also true that calculating one's own long-term economic interest is difficult). Symbols are moreover especially suited to dissemination through social media, which as a result have provided further impetus to populist politics in recent years. Their prevalence has greatly reduced the incidence of public meetings as well as of membership of collective organisations such as political parties. Although it is possible to organise collective activities such as strikes and demonstrations through Twitter and Facebook, the prior communication of the individuals involved is minimal. This effect has been intensified by the weakening of trade unions which resulted from the deindustrialisation of the 1980s and after; nowadays many people work as individuals in the 'gig economy'. For these reasons class identity has totally lost its connection with political party voting (Sanders 2017).

Social media also tend to act as an 'echo chamber'. That is, individuals receive the kind of news they want to hear, usually amplified for good measure, and the kind of political comment whose lines of argument they already find congenial. Extremist content, chauvinist, racist or misogynist, is disseminated with minimal restriction, while moderate, nuanced or complex comments are drowned out. In a parody of Habermas's 'public sphere', public discussion tends to proceed in closed boxes of strongly held and often exaggerated opinions without differentiated mutual debate. This is the milieu in which 'fake news' and 'post-truth' assertions become apparently valid currency. These are all symptoms of fragmented social trust (*The Economist*, 4 November 2017).

Conclusions

The decline of trust in governments and in the established parties of both government and opposition arises from processes in which economic resentments and symbolic identity politics are intertwined. In both Britain and the EU a substantial minority, in some countries a majority, of the population feels that the economy no longer works for them. They connect this perception with the intrusive operation of remote international firms and institutions and with recently increased immigration which results partly from the domination of international financial institutions and partly from the enlargement of the EU. They can no longer have confidence in their economic future, nor can they trust the human solidarity embodied in the symbolism of national identity and in the fiscal covenant guaranteed by the nation-state.

In this sense, there is a serious tension between democracy and the global free market. Does that tension amount to total incompatibility? We do not know yet, because governments and established political parties have not even acknowledged the problem. The populist parties have recognised it, but they have merely manipulated the resultant tensions and grievances to gain votes. Their proposed solutions seem likely actually to make the problem worse.

Where do we go from here? That is the question all democratic societies face. There is one possible comfort: democracies tend to be better at solving serious problems than authoritarian states—*provided they retain the basic principles of democracy* (Runciman 2013). They certainly need to demonstrate that superiority now. So far there is precious little sign that they know how to do so. In Britain in particular the Brexit referendum has disrupted the constitution, whose proudly sustained 'unwrittenness' now seems a serious drawback. As Runciman points out (2018, 46–8) if relations between government and parliament go on as they are now (early July 2018), we may well in the next year or two become a plebiscitary authoritarian state, in which parliament plays only a subsidiary role in decisive matters. In this respect we are now potentially imitating Russia.

It may be worse than that. There is one especially insidious way in which Putin's Russia subverts British democracy, and it is possible only because of the complicity of some of Britain's financial elites. Britain has become the accomplice of Russian oligarchs in the laundering of corrupt or criminal money through the City of London and the Overseas

Dependencies. As the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee reported in May 2018, 'the assets stored and laundered in London both directly and indirectly support President Putin's campaign to subvert the international rules-based system, undermine our allies and erode the mutually reinforcing international networks that support UK foreign policy' (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 2018). Such practices also exacerbate the inequalities in British society and obstruct the government's declared policy of registering the ownership of overseas assets held in Britain in order to tax them properly. Glaring inequalities and a tax regime which is irresolute in enforcing its own rules both weaken liberal democracy. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, we in the West dreamed of a 'convergence' in which Russia would become more like us. It now seems possible that the convergence is taking place the other way round: with the help of financial malpractice, Britain is becoming more like Russia!

If the term 'liberal democracy' is to have any continued real meaning, then it must reside in the nexus of features I enumerated in the first paragraph: guarantees of human freedoms, constitutional government, the rule of law, an active civil society and genuine electoral choice. This entails restricting the lopsided financialisation of our economy, the feature which makes us most vulnerable to Russian subversion. Those values will not be embodied precisely as they were in the 1940s and 1950s, but the general tenets which held good then must be re-established now or society will fragment into lower-level trust networks which will put their own interests before everyone else's and may even descend to using violence against one another. This is what happened in the 1930s, for example, in the street battles between Communist and Nazi para-military groups in Germany, and in the Spanish civil war. And in the end of course the conflicts thus generated eventually became far more serious even than that. In Britain most political commentators are obsessed, understandably, with Brexit; they should be at least equally concerned about creeping authoritarianism. The danger to liberal democracy comes mainly from inside our own country, not from Russia.

Notes

1. See summary in *The Guardian*, 22 May 2018.
2. The passing of this system was lamented by Anthony Judt (2010).

3. With a few specialised exceptions such as pop singers and international footballers. For a detailed presentation of the thesis that inherited wealth offers better returns than exceptional talent or hard work, see Thomas Piketty (2014).

4. See also the conversation between Bo Rothstein and a Russian tax-inspector in Rothstein (2005, 2–4).

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How Can the Liberal Democratic Cause Be Advanced in the Middle East?

Natasha Ezrow

When the Arab Spring first broke out in late 2010 and into 2011, there was tremendous optimism that democratization would finally take hold in the Middle East. For decades, it had been a region ruled primarily by authoritarian governments. Unfortunately, these hopes have been unfounded. The Arab Spring led to conflict, state failure and only modest reforms in Morocco and Jordan. The one exception to this was the case of Tunisia. Tunisia stands as the only country in the Middle East that has a strong chance of democratizing fully, in spite of enduring years of authoritarian rule. Though Lebanon is nominally democratic, its leaders are still chosen or vetted by foreign powers. And Turkey is now backsliding even further into authoritarianism.[1] What lessons can be learned about the democratic transition in Tunisia? What are the ways in which liberal democracy can be advanced to the Middle East in general?

This chapter looks at the role of political parties, secular education and women's rights in order to better advance our understanding of how democracy can take hold in the region. It begins by looking at why the

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Arab Spring failed, by highlighting the twin institutional issues for Arab political systems: weak political parties and legislatures. The weaknesses in these two institutions in the Middle East help partially to explain why the Arab Spring was not able to bring about democratization. The second half of the chapter then turns to look at the one exception, the case of Tunisia. It explores Tunisia's history with parliamentary politics under the Socialist Destourian Party, and the leadership of Habib Bourguiba (1957–1987) and Zine El Abidine Bin Ali (1987–2011). The analysis then examines two other important factors that explain Tunisian exceptionalism: Tunisia's experiment with implementing secularism in the educational system and the implementation of women's rights *before* democracy. What is the impact of years of secular education? What is the impact of the promotion of women's rights? For the moment it appears that the parties in the Tunisian parliament (both secular and religious) are mostly interested in finding compromises, negotiating and moderating their views and maintaining progressive rights for women. Thus, the chapter proposes that there may be a "Tunisia model". It concludes by providing a brief outline of what is needed for the future.

INSTITUTIONAL GAPS IN THE ARAB WORLD

The Arab world has had little exposure to democratic practices and democratic institutions. Because of this, the transition to democracy after decades of authoritarian rule was very challenging. Most notably political parties in Arab states are inherently weak. The dominant parties (such as in Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Algeria) during past and current authoritarian rule continue to be patron-clientelistic.[2] Parties that have formed in some countries since the Arab Spring mostly foment sub-national and religious identities (such as in Yemen and Libya). Furthermore, opposition parties have shown a shaky commitment to democratic processes. After Hosni Mubarak was toppled in Egypt in 2011, there were high hopes for democracy in Egypt. Many young protesters had taken to the streets to fight against decades of repression and corruption. However, the protests were not driven by any organized political group. In fact, for decades political parties that could pose any threat to authoritarian rule in Egypt were undermined, by either having their leaders jailed or being forced to run as independents. Though repressed for decades the most organized political group in Egypt was the Muslim Brotherhood. But as was demonstrated once they took power, the Muslim Brotherhood was hardly committed to democracy.

The reason for this dearth of organized parties is that authoritarian regimes in the Middle East have stifled the formation of viable *political parties.* Historically, opposition movements have also been either co-opted or completely repressed. Moreover, political parties that are allowed to run for office in the Middle East are usually not autonomous from either the military or the executive. Political parties in Yemen are run by powerful personalities, such as the now deceased Ali Abdullah Saleh's General People's Congress. Political parties in Algeria have not been autonomous from the military. Most parties in the Arab world are heavily monitored by the regime and their platforms must be considered suitable. In Egypt under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, any party that antagonizes the social order is banned, which enabled Sisi to run for president in Egypt in 2018 largely unopposed.

In the place of strong parties, the economically challenging post-independence era in the 1950s and 1960s led to the creation of an authoritarian populist movement in states like Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952–1970) and Iraq and Syria under the Ba'ath Party. Authoritarian populism manifested itself as Arab nationalism—it was a convergence with the demands of those in power with the public to solve the crises that emerged after new states were created in the region (Jessop et al. 1984). The ideology of Arab nationalism was decidedly vague and aimed at articulating support for popular views and quick fixes to complex problems.

Thus it comes as no surprise that today, in most Middle Eastern countries, parties are not ideological and programmatic, and therefore are not well linked with voters (Herb 2003). Political parties in the Middle East have often served as tools of powerful leaders to help them dole out patronage. The Ba'ath parties in Syria and Iraq eventually became tools of the Assad family and Saddam Hussein, respectively, to buy off support (Owen 2013). The same can be said of Lebanon, where parties' only connection to society is through the distribution of patronage before elections.

The rise of independent candidates also reinforces patron-clientelism. Libya currently has no law to regulate political parties. One third of the seats in the constituent assembly go to independent candidates. Though political parties are legal in Morocco and Jordan, the system is designed to encourage independent candidates, not strong political parties.

Even more problematic than the rise of independent candidates is the emergence of parties formed around sub-national identities. Parties that have formed in Libya have formed around identities that are tribal, ethnic and geographic, even though a law was passed that attempted to ban the formation of parties based on religious, tribal or regional affiliations.

Smaller tribal groups have complained that they were not selected for key posts. Groups based in Misrata further west feel that they suffered the most during the battles against Qaddafi and are hoping for both recognition and the right to maintain their weapons. Some groups in Cyrenaica have pushed for more autonomy in the Eastern province of Libya. Tribes in Libya have little reason to cooperate with one another since rifts were encouraged for decades.

Another issue is the role of dogmatic religious parties. In Libya's case, there are no secular parties. Libya has always been a pious society that is much more socially conservative than Egypt or especially Tunisia. All of the parties refer to Islam as a source of inspiration. Even the so-called secular or liberal parties feature the virtues of sharia (Sawani 2018). Islamic Parties have emerged in Libya, which offer little room for negotiation and compromise. For example, a new party made up of Muslim scholars called the Party of Reform and Development, has announced that it outright refuses to deal with any group which contradicts sharia. Refusing to deal with more liberal and secular factions in Libya makes it more difficult for any compromises to be ironed out about the future of the country.

Islamic parties per se are not a problem, but Islamic parties that refuse to compromise and collaborate with secular parties do pose a challenge for democracy. Parties that are willing to make concessions and negotiate are important to fostering stable democracy. Party elites need to not only be committed to democracy but to ruling for everyone, including secularists.

But building viable parties, both secular and Islamic is critical to building democracy for many reasons. Parties help coordinate politicians, organize mass involvement and can help recruit and socialize democratic elites. Parties frame policy alternatives and structure electoral choice in ways that promote peaceful political competition and compromise. Parties mediate conflict when public policy has become too politicized and when demands have become irreconcilable (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Parties can help shape political debate in ways that pacify highly charged issues (Randall and Svåsand 2002). Parties can also neutralize ethnic tensions by forcing compromise and conciliation. Parties with strong roots provide more regular electoral competition and help diminish electoral volatility (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006).

Though Tunisia in the past had a dominant party system, Tunisia has also had experience with a well-institutionalized political party, initially

called the Socialist Destourian Party (1964–1987), and that later became the Democratic Constitutional Rally (1988–2011). The party was not under the thumb of the leader or the military. The party had a strong ideological agenda of secularism, modernization and social justice. Debate and conflicts existed inside the dominant party as competing elites have fought within the party structure for voice and influence (Angrist 1999). Though these political conflicts never led to the creation of multiple parties, for the most part the main party was able to serve as an arena to deal with discontent and conflict over policies. The differences have meant that for unhappy Tunisian elites, the standard method of expressing dissent has been informal, within the single-party framework (Angrist 1999). The experience has also meant that Tunisian politicians have experience with resolving conflict and negotiation. For the most part, the main actors in Tunisian politics have never been overly dogmatic and instead have been flexible and willing to compromise.

The Tunisia Model?

In spite of years of parliamentary practice, Tunisia under its second leader, Ben Ali, was experiencing political decay and high levels of corruption. The regime became overly repressive and dissatisfaction with the economy was high. Protests were first reported in the interior town of Sidi Bouzid, after a 26-year-old street vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire. The protests quickly spread to nearby towns, and eventually reached the capital and wealthy coastal communities associated with the ruling elite. As a result, on January 14, 2011, long-time leader Ben Ali, fled the country for Saudi Arabia. With the fall of Ben Ali, Tunisia rapidly pursued the process of transitioning into a democracy. Unlike Syria, Libya and Yemen which have been mired in civil war and instability and Egypt which has made a return to full authoritarianism, Tunisia is slowly making the democratic transition. This is a transition that is not free of bumps along the way; however, as the economy has suffered, corruption has remained, the country appeared to be suffering from terrorist attacks and dissatisfaction is high. In spite of this, the Tunisian outlook looks much brighter than any of the other countries in the Middle East. What are the key lessons that can be learned from its tentative success? We now look at the role of the secular education system and the importance of women's rights.

Secular Education

In the Middle East tensions exist between traditional and modern, secular and Islamic. When these views are polarized into zero sum games, at the elite level it becomes more difficult to form parties that are willing to compromise. At the citizen level, the political culture is less acceptant of finding compromises as well. Indeed studies have argued that secular countries are more likely to be democratic. Though it is true that there are secular autocracies, with the single exception of the Maldives there are few cases of religious democracies (Norris 2013). Secularism may be important to promoting tolerance and democratic values. Surveys of Muslim countries revealed that the populations that are the most religious are less supportive of secular democratic values and principles than those of other faiths and who are less religious (Norris and Inglehart 2011). But as many scholars of democracy have commented, individuals must have the freedom to believe what they want (meaning freedom of religion) as long as their actions do not infringe on the liberties of other citizens (Stepan 2000).

Tunisia achieved its goal of fostering a tolerant and moderate population through secularizing the educational system. Both Bourguiba and Ben Ali were committed to this (DeGorge 2002). For Bourguiba, this was part of a modern project to respect individual liberties and social justice. Bourguiba viewed religion as an obstacle to modernization and he aggressively pursued pushing for secularization of Tunisian life. To an extreme, Islam was more or less eliminated from public life. To do so, the Neo-Destour party put a big emphasis on public education and ensuring that it was free to all Tunisians. Schools were expanded and modernized. More recent studies have cross nationally offered support for the case for secular education and democracy. Those who are educated are more likely to support a secular democracy and thus are more likely to endorse democratic values (Norris 2013). Tunisia's educational system not only educated its population but it also played a role in promoting acceptance and conciliation. As a result, a notable feature of Tunisia is the pragmatic nature of the regime's political discourse and practice.

Ben Ali continued this type of secular modernization and reformed the way that Islam was taught within the educational system (Somer 2017). Most notable was the appointment of Education Minister Mohammed Charfli in 1989. Charfli did not eliminate Islam, but he utilized interpretations of Islam that are more consonant with democracy and tolerance. Every school textbook was revamped to rid itself of traditional conceptions

of Islam. At the same time, Koranic studies were reduced so that other non-Islamic thinkers could be brought in, such as Freud, Spinoza and Voltaire. Classical Muslim poets were studied that portrayed a version of Islam that was not dour and unforgiving (Faour and Muasher 2011). As a result, Tunisian textbooks championed freedom, cooperation, equality, social justice, respect and tolerance (Faour 2013). In fact, tolerance is one of the most important themes in Tunisian textbooks. Most importantly, Charfli implemented reforms that eliminated intolerance toward different religions, while keeping the liberal aspect of Islam intact. The curriculum highlights the unity of mankind and the peaceful co-existence between different races and religious. There is an emphasis on dialogue, flexibility, moderation and an openness to universal values in the curriculum (Faour 2013).

Charfli also removed material that used the Koran to justify violence, holy wars and discrimination of women, such as wife beating and demanding subservience from females. Other lessons from the Koran which may have looked down upon the rights to abortion and protection from arbitrary divorce were also eliminated. Civic courses were introduced to learn more about government. The science curriculum incorporated Darwin and the Big Bang Theory (Faour 2012). According to Charfli, the schools were the best places to fight extremism and many young Tunisians who attended schools who had been brought up by illiterate formerly rural family members were now pursuing scientific studies (Jonathan 1995). Charfli's reforms may have contributed to the more democratic and pluralistic worldview of Tunisian protesters. Tunisia's educational system remains one of the most secular in the Middle East.

Historically in the Middle East, education was undertaken in places of worship. The clergy served as both teachers and administrators. In almost all Arab countries, Islamic religious education in the public school system is integrated into the Arabic language and social studies programs. In the Gulf countries, Islamic norms and codes of behavior are completely ingrained into the school systems. Many Arab countries students spend several hours a day studying religion in primary school. The curriculum does not try to foster analysis and critical thinking, but rather focuses on the memorization of facts. There are not separate civics courses offered. The texts themselves imply that non-Muslims should not hold important political and administrative positions. There is no promotion of universal rights and the rights of women are discussed with a religious dimension.

In the case of Tunisia, the promotion of universal rights has not been attacked by the dominant Islamic party, the Ennahda Party. Instead, Ennahda is mostly moderate and pragmatic. Before the authoritarian regime broke down, the Ennahda Party never directly confronted the state, but invested in building grassroots support. The demands of the party were softened in order to be open to cooperation with the secular opposition. In 2005, it agreed to form a coalition with other secular leftist and liberal opposition groups committed to rights and freedoms and made a call for popular sovereignty.

After the fall of Ben Ali on January 14, 2011, the coalition that formed in 2005 remained partly intact. The party was willing to form a coalition with secular parties. The Ennahda party focused more on how to build a fair and democratic constitution than on the role of religion. Religion was not their guiding principle in policy making. Ennahda leader, Rached Ghannouchi is mostly a moderate that is committed to democratic practices and institutions. Ghannouchi ensured that imposing sharia law would not be the foundation of the Constitution. The party also agreed to mediation by the National Dialogue Quartet (a group of civil society organizations) (Somer 2017). The party also did not amend the progressive Personal Status Code of 1957 which guarantees women's rights.

Women's Rights

Women's rights in Tunisia have always been very progressive compared to rest of the Arab world. Women's rights were given precedence over cultural norms and were implemented before democracy was in place. The personal status code, which was established in 1956, was a landmark piece of legislation that distinguished Tunisia as a progressive country in the area of women's rights. This code banned polygamy and gave women the right to file for divorce. The minimum age for marriage of both sexes was 18. Divorce can take place due to irreconcilable differences. The penal code prohibited rape. Abortion was legal. It was also required that women were paid equally for equal work. Other articles of the proposed constitution have made clear that women's rights will be protected. Article 20 sets forth equality between both sexes in duties and rights and article 45 guarantees the protection of women's rights and supports their gains. The state also guarantees equal opportunities between men and women and eliminates all forms of violence against women.

In April of 2014, Tunisia has also lifted previous reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).[3] Since August of 2011 Tunisia has also allowed individuals or groups to submit complaints on women's rights violations to the CEDAW Committee.[4] In addition to this, the national citizenship code was amended in November of 2014 to grant women married to noncitizens the right to transmit their citizenship to their children without official consent from the fathers.[5] The move will further cement Tunisia's position at the forefront of the debate on women's rights among Islamic countries. More recently in 2017, Tunisia passed a law ending violence against women,[6] which included the removal of a loophole in the penal code that allowed rapists to escape punishment if they married their victims.[7] There are aims to allow women to marry non-Muslims. Tunisia aims to achieve full equality for men and women and ensure equal opportunities and responsibilities.

One of the reasons why women's rights have been so progressive is that the main Islamic party, Ennahda has given prominence to women in its own party structures, with a woman heading its list in one of the Tunis electoral constituencies in October of 2011 elections. Moreover, almost half of Ennahda's parliamentary contingency is female. Though the Tunisian electoral legislation forced women onto party lists, Ennahda took it upon itself to run a lot of professional women to ensure that they would be elected. Ennahda has also ensured all that the personal status legislation that provides rights for women is not going to be altered. The party instead claims that social ills lead to Western influenced amoral behavior and that this deserves more attention than debating about the veil. Ennahda supporters are also at ease with Western modernity as long as it is not imposed on them and they are given the freedom to voice and display their religious views (Dalmasso and Cavatorta 2013).

This stands in stark contrast to the way women are treated in other Middle Eastern countries, with many countries forcing women to have a guardian. Women's rights in the Middle East have been one of the worst in the world. Women in the Middle East often must have a male guardian to travel, or in the case of Saudi Arabia, just to interact with others. Marriage and family laws are also archaic with men being allowed to have multiple wives in Saudi Arabia and have an easy process to divorce a wife. In Syria, women must get the consent of their husbands or must prove that her husband abused her or neglected his duties. Only recently (2014)

have laws been updated in Morocco, which prevent women from having to marry their rapists. In court, the testimony of one male is equal to the testimony of one female.

There are other causes for concern as well. Libya's current penal code classifies sexual violence as a crime against a women's honor. A ban on polygamy was lifted in February 2013, as husbands no longer had to obtain the consent of his first wife before marrying a second. Marriage licenses are no longer issued out to women marrying foreigners. In April the government called for a ban on men and women mixing in educational institutions and workplaces. Women's rights in the Middle East have a long way to go to achieving parity with countries in other parts of the world.

Why does all of this matter? Of course women's rights are important intrinsically, but women's rights are also important to fostering a democracy (Moghadam 2008). Studies have shown the importance of women's rights and democratization (Wang et al. 2017). A dataset that examined the state of democracy in 177 countries from 1900 to 2012 revealed that countries do not become fully democratic without political and social rights for women. Societies transitioning from authoritarian rule need women in order to develop a functioning democratic government. Women's rights increase the costs of authoritarian repression and enable women to organize. Without women's rights, no country has managed to fully democratize (Wang et al. 2017). Democracy needs women to be treated as equals if it is to be inclusive, representative and enduring.

Women's groups in Tunisia who have had much more experience to advocate on their behalf also played a role in keeping Ennahda in check. Ennahda's conciliatory efforts toward gender equality came *after* substantial pressure from women's groups who initially protested the arrival of Ghannouchi from exile in January 2011. When Islamic groups sought to replace the term "equality" for "partnership", women's rights activists and their male supporters in secular and left-wing parties demonstrated, forcing the assembly to keep the term "equality" in place (Moghadam 2014).

Conclusion

Much attention focused on the Middle East after the Arab Spring with hopes that countries would be able to overcome decades of authoritarian rule. Various reasons have been given for why the Middle East never democratized, including scholarly work that blamed Islam and Arab cul-

ture as being incompatible with democracy (Fish 2002). The weakness of the opposition and the robust strength of the coercive apparatus were also considered to be a major obstacle (Bellin 2004; Lust-Okar 2005). Civil society was also too weak to push for democratization. Meanwhile, others pointed to the rentier effects of having massive amounts of oil and low levels of taxation (Ross 2015). But this chapter looks to why democracy did not come to fruition for Arab countries after the Arab Spring. A pivotal opportunity emerged for democratization to take place, but yet only Tunisia democratized. Less attention has focused on the interplay between the weak institutions present, the educational system previously in place and the extent of women's rights.

For countries in the Middle East, the goal of achieving liberal democracy will only be realized with a focus on building well-institutionalized political parties that are ideologically cohesive, rooted with society, and have nation-wide appeal. Parties based on religion, tribe or patron-client ties will not be able to appeal to a mass audience or be equipped to cooperate and negotiate. In addition to building strong political parties, the educational system needs to be reformed to emphasize secularism, or at least offer interpretations of Islam that promote tolerance and compromise. Finally, democracy will never take hold in the Middle East until the rights of women are advanced more fully.

Notes

1. The chapter looks only at Arab countries, excluding Turkey, Iran and Israel.
2. Libya did not have a dominant political party under Qaddafi.
3. This was an international treaty instituted on September 3, 1981.
4. This was passed on August 16, 2011.
5. This was amended on November 23, 2014.
6. This was passed on August 11, 2017.
7. This was passed on July 26, 2017.

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Parliamentary and Presidential Systems: The Role of Parties and the Danger of Authoritarian Populism

Jean Blondel and Jean-Louis Thiebault

Parliamentary government was arguably 'invented' by and for Britain in the mid-eighteenth century, with Walpole being widely recognized as the first 'prime minister'. At the same time, however, another form of 'regular rule', that of presidential government, was also 'invented' (the expression is not too strong either) as a result of the American constitution of 1787–1789. Yet its status was slow to be accepted. Major criticisms were made of its constitutional arrangements and there came to be a widespread view that it was wholly inadequate as a 'general' model of government. By the second half of the twentieth century, however, that 'inadequate' model had come to be the most widespread governmental formula around the world, particularly in 'new countries'. Thus, the eighteenth century turned out to be the period when the two prevailing models of governmental

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systems were devised and put into practice. The only major exception is the fully decentralized and consensual model that has existed for generations in Switzerland—but only in Switzerland.

While parliamentary and presidential systems of government have each diversified over the years, the new forms have generally been recognized as *sub-sets of one or the other of the two 'general models'*. This is the case not just for presidential government, which exists, as we shall see, in both 'pure' and 'semi-presidential' forms. It is also the case with parliamentary government, which, having started on the basis of British practices in a monarchical context, has come to be adopted by some republics and operated in widely diverse modes.

These two government models have been crucial for studies of the way in which the problems posed both by and to government can best be answered in an essentially liberal-democratic context. The models suggest two markedly different approaches for studying these problems, however. The more 'classical' parliamentary government approach starts from the problems themselves and emphasizes the mechanisms which can best be adopted to look for a solution: broadly speaking, emphasis is placed on the way in which the various fields of government come to be examined and a solution found. Thus the idea is to look at the problems as they are presented in parliament (e.g. how to maximize economic growth or how to achieve social justice) and to consider the way in which parliament and government resolve any difficulties and indeed conflicts they may encounter in the process. It is in this context that parties come to play a major part, since, in a liberal-democratic context, parties are the mechanisms by which solutions can be expected to be found.

The approach of the presidential model is rather different, as the emphasis here is on the search for the best—and possibly most rapid—solution to the problems that need to be tackled. Emphasis is thus placed on the role of the key person in charge of decision-making, namely the elected president, who can be expected to have a particular interest in seeing that the best solutions are assessed and sought. The presidential system may also be regarded as stressing democratic decision-making, given the part played by the president in the process, although, of course, the president's view may not always be the electorally winning one. Before going in greater detail into the consequences of these two key models on governmental decision-making, however, a short presentation of the characteristics of both of them needs to be given.

The Nature of Parliamentary Government

Parliamentary government was established somewhat earlier than presidential government. It originated when British government had reached a total impasse in the middle of the seventeenth century, when King Charles I was unwilling (and unable) to find a constitutional solution to the conflict he faced with parliament. This major conflict resulted in the king being tried for high treason, found guilty, and beheaded in 1649. This tragic development was followed by a short republican interlude which was equally unable to bring about any form of political consensus between rival royalist and republican factions. However, the eldest son of Charles I, who became king as Charles II in 1660, started the process towards such a consensus, which was first achieved by William and Mary from 1688 and completed by the Georges of the House of Hanover from 1714.

What followed was a genuinely British type of compromise, based on the 'invention' of the position of 'prime minister', an individual who would be the de facto political leader of the country as long as s/he could command the support of a majority of members of the House of Commons. This development became known, eponymously, as the 'parliamentary' system, a political system that was to be subsequently adopted by most Western European countries, especially after the debacle of the Napoleonic dictatorship in 1814–1815. In being adopted outside Britain, the parliamentary system was appreciably modified (including by becoming republican in some cases), although it did retain its major characteristic, namely that it was based on a fundamental link, typically of a personal character, between government and parliament.

The Nature of Presidential Government

Presidential government, in its pure or 'semi-' form, has one fundamental characteristic: it is the first 'regular' system of government which gives 'the people' the key power to choose the top citizen of the state, namely the president, by universal suffrage, in the great majority of systems at least. The president is elected for a term of several years (four or five, in general) and can typically be re-elected (but in many cases for one further term only). Presidential government thus relates essentially to the character and mode of appointment of the chief executive, as well as of the powers of that chief executive vis-à-vis other powers of the state. It is generally argued that presidential government, at any rate in its 'pure' form, entails

a 'separation' between the executive—that is the government, which the president organizes and leads—and the legislature, which is elected independently of the president and acts as a check on her/his ability to pass new laws. The United States provides the most obvious and prominent example of this form of government.

The independence of the legislature under presidential systems is radically different from what occurs in a parliamentary system. In the parliamentary case, the national executive proceeds from parliament, without whose formal support the government could not remain in office. Even in those parliamentary systems that are republics, the president is typically elected by parliament and the powers of that president (like those of monarchs in monarchical parliamentary systems) are typically formal and ceremonial rather than substantial.

It is because the powers of the president are very large in presidential systems that these systems are rightly called presidential or, at least, semi-presidential, if and when the parliament does exercise, indirectly at least, some power over the composition of the government. In general, the composition and action of the national executive (i.e. the government) depends formally and in practice on the chief executive (i.e. the president), although there may be variations in the case of semi-presidential governments.

As noted above, presidential government was entirely an 'invention' originating in the United States in the late eighteenth century. There had never been such a system previously, although there had been republics, as in Ancient Rome. However, there had never been a regular arrangement in which a president ruled a country for a substantial period above all the other members of the national executive. 'Semi-presidential' governments differ from 'pure' presidential ones in that the 'executive' of a 'semi-presidential' system tends to resemble that of a parliamentary government, where a member of the legislature is in 'overall charge' of the executive and even may be referred to as 'prime minister'. Yet, even in such cases, too, the president is the 'boss'.

THE LONG LACK OF DEVELOPMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT

The 'invention' of presidential government in the United States at the end of the eighteenth century was far from being quickly followed elsewhere. This was despite the fact that the system was a 'new' democratic form of rule that appeared to be particularly well-suited to 'new countries', of

which there came to be, from the early nineteenth century, a number in central and south America. However, presidentialism did eventually prevail in the countries of these areas—though only after political difficulties of all kinds occurred, including many military coups. There were also difficulties in France when, after the last monarch left the country in 1848, a presidential regime was adopted in a new constitution. Ironically, that new constitution was abolished only four years later, as the nephew of Napoleon, having been first regularly elected president, made himself emperor! Thus, while the American presidential system flourished throughout the nineteenth century, its presidentialist progeny did not thrive, even in most new countries in Latin America or elsewhere for many decades. This lead to a widespread view that presidential government was rarely applicable and specifically was unfit for 'liberal-democratic government'; a line that was still adopted in a major comparative politics text towards the end of the twentieth century (Linz and Valenzuela 1994).

This said, things had begun to change appreciably already by then, as after World War Two and during the 1950s and 1960s presidential government expanded markedly across the world, in the context of the large number of new countries having emerged as independent states from colonial rule in other continents besides America. Thus presidential government, in its various forms, pure or semi-presidential, came to prevail in the majority of the countries of the world in the twenty-first century. Beyond Latin America, presidentialism became adopted in the large majority of African countries and by a substantial minority of Asian countries. Only Europe maintained its well-established belief in parliamentary government, mostly monarchical. In the West, France was an exception, as it moved to (semi) presidential republican rule from the 1960s, but in Eastern Europe several countries also adopted forms of presidential rule. Thus, while only one country, the United States, was presidential early in the nineteenth century, 95 of the 181 countries of more than 100,000 inhabitants in existence at the beginning of the twenty-first century were presidential or at least semi-presidential (Elgie 2011).

The Part Played by Leadership in the Success of Presidential Regimes

Presidentialism has traditionally been associated with the concept of leadership, a quality that presidents are regarded as being endowed with—though this may be regarded as either a positive or a negative characteristic,

depending essentially on the sentiments of the holders of these views. In contrast, the notion of leadership has been associated to only a limited extent with parliamentary government. This is because parliamentary government (perhaps more in theory than in practice) emphasizes a degree of 'comradeship' or collective responsibility, resulting from the fact that the national executive is regarded as being the product of a joint undertaking among the decision-makers concerned. While such a conclusion can even be viewed as arguable in relation to cases of single-party government, it is a most doubtful proposition with respect to multiparty government, of which there are very many examples. The notion that a *parliamentary government* is composed of a group of men and women aiming at achieving a common goal is almost certainly only true in a minority of cases.

What is suggested, on the other hand, is that in presidential government the president plays the major part in deciding who belongs to the executive. With the 'boss' being known in advance (perhaps often well in advance) of the formation of the executive, one of the president's key roles is to bring together, at the top of the 'administration', persons who are known to be able to run their departments efficiently. It is up to the president to ensure that the executive acts in a coordinated manner (or at least in a manner which does not result in serious and prolonged opposition among its members). Such a state of affairs means that the president is expected to be more than just concerned with ensuring that the whole administration is viewed as positively as possible. The president is also expected to exercise leadership with respect both to the members of the executive itself and to those who, outside the executive (including the electorate), will pass judgement upon it.

Obviously, whatever leadership the president exercises will result to some extent in confrontations (and in some cases in serious conflict) depending on the support the head of the executive receives from other members of the executive. While a cabinet without a prime minister is unthinkable in a parliamentary system, it may be that the president will prefer not even to appoint a 'head' of the executive at all. Different presidents will be likely to behave differently in relation to the problem that the existence of the executive poses. One can understand easily why the matter of presidential leadership can be regarded as a rather 'problematic' subject—most obviously when there is tension when a (non-presidential) head of the executive holds views opposed by the president herself or himself. Thus, on this point in particular, the leadership of the president is viewed as a 'perilous' subject and, consequently, leadership can justifiably

be regarded by observers as having potentially negative as well as positive aspects.

More generally, the question arises as to whether 'leadership' should be regarded favourably in terms of the relationships it helps to foster. Conflictual relationships between leaders and members of governments inevitably exist. And the existence of such situations makes it difficult to assert that there 'should be' strong leadership. Nonetheless, there is much support for the general idea of leadership and there is, at any rate in principle, an unquestionable case in favour of leadership. However, several writers, such as Anthony King, have expressed scepticism about the value of 'strong' leadership, though King also acknowledges that strong leaders are at least occasionally desirable (King 1985). This is a delicate matter, as it does seem, in view of what was pointed out earlier, that leadership is more likely to develop 'naturally' in presidential than in parliamentary government—and indeed to be more obviously necessary in presidential than in parliamentary government. It seems therefore difficult to argue strongly in favour of presidential systems without being to an extent also obliged to recognize that leadership is 'a good thing', at any rate overall and if practical circumstances are taken into account. Yet it is understandable that some commentators should go as far as rejecting presidential systems entirely as these depend markedly on leadership and to an extent on forms of 'charisma' which are associated with leadership. A more realistic position may consist in adopting a less strongly positive line, however, namely that leadership is associated with presidentialism and that presidentialism was the only realistic solution in the context of the large numbers of the 'new' countries which became independent in the nineteenth (Latin America) and twentieth centuries (Asia and Africa).

The Need for Strong Parties in Parliamentary Systems

Such a realistic position is particularly justified in view of the fact that what is required of a regime in order to adopt and flourish under liberal-democratic rule is not so much the strong presence or near-absence of leadership, but the presence of strong political parties. The continuous existence of such parties, not the presence of a strong leader, is the truly relevant factor, as it is through the parties that some influence can be exercised on the decisions which are taken by the government. This is where, of course, the historical origin and the early subsequent development of

the two basic forms of governments are both particularly relevant. It therefore follows that we need to return, on the one hand, to parliamentary arrangements in Britain and to presidential arrangements, perhaps not so much in the United States, where the situation tends to be rather well-known, but *elsewhere* in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

In such a general context, one must remember that there have been vast economic and social changes linked to the development of globalization. These changes strongly shook contemporary societies, favouring in particular an increasingly 'populist' approach to government and, in the process, calling in question of the ability of the parliamentary and presidential models of government to cope with the increasingly complex economic and political problems they face.

THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES EXPERIENCED BY PARTIES IN PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS, IN PARTICULAR IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM

In a parliamentary system, the core task of the prime minister is to determine the broad policy direction the government takes and to persuade its supporters to follow it. Unfortunately, this picture does not correspond closely or even at all to the way most prime ministers behave most of the time. This is so for two reasons. First, most prime ministers are not in a position to pursue closely their own specific goals: their policies have to be related to those of their party. Second, prime ministers cannot take many decisions entirely on their own: as a matter of fact, most British prime ministers take few political initiatives (King 1985). The question is therefore whether parties help successfully to meet the tasks required.

The British government is typically a single-party government. The Conservative and Labour parties have dominated British electoral politics since the 1920s, though the Liberal Democratic Party has had some limited successes, including that of belonging to a coalition government under Cameron in the early part of the twenty-first century. Except in a few cases, the constituency-based majoritarian electoral system discourages voters from casting their votes for the candidates of smaller parties. Prime ministers have obviously influenced their respective parties' development—though some have done so more than others. Recent changes in the internal leadership rules of British political parties have increased the influence of party activists. Labour members now directly elect the party

leader, and local constituency selectorates are increasingly important in the choice of both Labour and Conservative parliamentary candidates. This in turn means that local parties play an important role in selecting the group of parliamentarians from which the prime minister selects most of his or her ministers (King 2015).

In the face of the increased influence of party activists, party leaders also have to contend with pressures from the electorate. Both public opinion and the ruling Conservative party are deeply divided over Britain's decision to leave the EU—the most significant issue the country has faced since 1945. After David Cameron's defeat in the 2016 referendum (he had campaigned for a Remain vote) he was replaced as prime minister by Teresa May. To strengthen her parliamentary majority, Teresa May called an election in 2017 but succeeded only in losing her majority and as a result has had to rely on the support of Northern Ireland Unionists for her government's wafer-thin majority. With hardline Eurosceptics to her right and anti-Brexit Tory MPs to her left, the future of the May government is highly uncertain. In such a context, the question of prime ministerial leadership assumes considerable prominence. It remains to be seen whether or not Mrs May is up to the task of providing it.

The Political Difficulties Experienced by Parties in Presidential Systems

The Founding Fathers of the American constitution decided to create a political system in which there would be a single leader of the executive: the election of the president by an electoral college composed of delegates from the various States was a means of consolidating the presidential office. The role of the first president in asserting the preponderance of the presidency was of profound importance. Such an arrangement was totally and absolutely new and was indeed a major institutional invention. Recently, however, the US presidency has suffered from a number of political difficulties, not least when several recent presidents have found themselves confronted by a Congress dominated by the opposing party, a situation which has led to some weakening of the office.

The North American presidential model was adopted in those Latin American countries that became independent early in the nineteenth century. The way Latin American presidencies functioned differed widely from the principle on which the North American presidency had been

established. Latin America adopted presidential systems in which, in fact or in law, the power of the president was significantly extended. The countries of the subcontinent became aware of two contradictory political conditions prevailing in these countries. One was the need to establish a strong executive while the other was the need to offset the temptation of presidents to use their powers in order to become dictators.

The most important difference between the North American and Latin American presidential systems lies in the opportunity for the president to intervene actively in the drafting of laws, often without parliament being involved. Latin American constitutions gave presidents a presidential veto, but the truly large part played by the president in the Latin American legislative context mainly comes from the use of 'decree-laws'. Moreover, emergency legislation is the most widespread and the most effective mechanism by which the president becomes involved in the legislative area. These exceptional powers of the president are often used to speed up the legislative process without there being any emergency. 'Crisis legislation' has made possible all types of abuses and violations of freedoms, under the guise of 'national security' or of 'defence of the revolution'.

Latin American presidential systems have experienced serious difficulties in particular with respect to parties. Political instability and military coups led many Latin American countries to adopt and systematically widely expand the notion of exceptional rule. Latin American countries were among the first to adopt provisions leading under certain circumstances to the restriction of the regular operation of the institutions. These provisions have been widely used and often abused. Crisis situations have been generalized and become frequent, with detrimental consequences on the functioning of the institutions.

Juan Linz argues that the presidential system was dangerous for young democracies (Linz 1990). He bases this conclusion on the experience of presidential systems in Latin America, where, when he wrote, democracy was weak and dictatorship predominated. On the basis of that experience, he argued that the difficulties involved in building coalitions in multiparty presidential systems could threaten the survival of these systems. Presidents often come to power without the support of a parliamentary majority: thus, although Latin American parties are always loyal to 'their' president, they are therefore minority presidents. On the other hand, as a matter of fact, some minority presidents did perform rather well: for example, in Brazil, both Cardoso and Lula were able to see many of their reforms

being approved by congress, even if their party did not enjoy a majority. Moreover, work on Brazilian 'coalition presidentialism' showed that, in these presidential systems, it is not an authoritarian temptation that prevails, but the democratic process which threatens blockages (Amorim Neto 2006; Raile et al. 2011; Pereira et al. 2005).

However, the relationship between presidential rule and the failure of democracy is not straightforward. While many authors have suggested that democracy has failed in presidential countries, other writers have identified examples in which presidential rule did survive without engendering the demise of democracy. Indeed, Kapstein and Converse (2008) find that parliamentarism is more dangerous for democracy than presidentialism. Their comparison between presidential systems and parliamentary systems shows that the former are more durable than the latter, especially in the context of economic crises. The two authors also show, on the other hand, that parliamentary regimes have not done particularly well, as presumably the institutional arrangements characteristic of parliamentarism are not always robust enough in practice. As a result, parliamentary democracies with divided party systems and frequent cabinet instability have more difficulty maintaining democracy than their presidential counterparts (Kapstein and Converse 2008).

The reasoning of these authors is reinforced by the French case. So far, the presidential system has survived well in that country. It succeeded primarily because the election of the president by direct universal suffrage gives that head of state a much stronger legitimacy than that which results from a mere parliamentary majority. The French presidential system also seems to provide a better protection than European parliamentary democracies. It concentrates power in the president, but it has also proved to have great flexibility, adapting without difficulty to alternation, to 'cohabitation' or to merely relative majorities. French executive power thus ultimately turns out to be more pragmatic and stronger than the conventional parliamentary system. Moreover, the presidential system has produced its own 'counter-powers' which protect democracy. The Constitutional Council has gained weight and authority over time. The Council of State and the Court of Auditors enjoy a prestige and an influence which have grown continuously. Justice has become truly independent. The press and the audiovisual media exercise their role of critical assessment.

The Rise of Authoritarian Populism

Yet parliamentary and presidential regimes are in crisis, and are overwhelmed by anti-system movements. In Europe, electoral democracy and political liberalism used to go hand in hand, but such a tradition seems to have ceased to prevail. Leaders do accept full competition in elections, but, at the same time, they question public freedoms. They attempt to weaken the constitutional courts; they question the independence of the judiciary; they limit the right of public broadcasting; and they exercise control over public administration. Two contradictory principles are in effect combined in these regimes. Their leaders are elected, but they deprive the citizens of their fundamental rights. They claim to act in the name of democratic action but they limit public freedoms in the name of a certain conception of democracy, while also insisting on the importance of elections. In these hybrid regimes, the primary source of all political legitimacy is the vote. Once elected, leaders hold the monopoly of popular representation. They embody the general will. Such a cult of popular sovereignty gives these regimes a definitely 'populist' tone. In Russia, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 'illiberal' governments have come to power.

The reasons for such a change are to be found in the profound economic and social transformations affecting these societies. Economic policies based on free trade and the flexibility of labour rules are under attack. Cultural norms emphasizing diversity and supporting immigrants are being challenged. International institutions and treaties are denounced. There are even deeper changes at work. Technological changes have altered production patterns and weakened the centres of manufacturing industry. They have also led to the emergence of a meritocracy that dominates the government, the administration, the media and the largest cities. The emergence of this new elite has resulted in less-well educated citizens in small towns and rural areas feeling worthless and valueless, a state of affairs which has sown the seeds of 'populist' resentment.

These trends have deepened social divisions between the more educated and the less educated citizens, between those who benefit from technological change and those who feel threatened by such a change, between the cities and the rural areas. A climate of fear, of anger and of resentment has developed, which the immigration crisis in Europe has strengthened. The immediate repercussions of the migrant crisis are profound, but the potential long-term challenge is deeper.

Some parties of the Left and of the Right question the norms and institutions of liberal democracy itself, especially the freedom of the press, the rule of law and the rights of minorities. There is growing impatience with governments that seem unable to act in the face of escalating problems. Growing insecurity has led to demands for strong leaders and to forms of authoritarianism. The rise in populism undermines and ultimately threatens the positions of traditional parties, not only in Britain but in many other countries as well. Political parties become strongly polarized. Partisan polarization makes compromises more difficult to achieve (Galston 2018; Mounk 2018, 98–112; Müller 2018).

The involvement of the 'people' is apparently leading to a mixture of electoral enthusiasm and of greater discontent. So far, what has been typically referred to as 'authoritarian populism' has not led as yet to any major change in the *structure* of the classical democratic political system, possibly because the institutional arrangements which could replace that classical democratic political system have not as yet been discovered.

Yet there is little doubt that what is at stake, albeit in a somewhat uncertain manner, is a crisis—or at least a substantial worry—about the capacity of parties, as we have known them so far, to manage the problems which the widespread emergence of populist sentiments appears to have unleashed. As these populist sentiments emerged primarily in the more affluent countries, the problem they pose is all the more irritating precisely because it is in the more affluent countries that it has emerged. Had it emerged elsewhere, it might have been possible to suggest that, with greater affluence, the problem in question could be expected to be controlled, at a minimum, and perhaps even overcome.

Since it is in the more affluent countries that the question of the capacity of parties to provide a solution to the future of democracy is posed, the worry is naturally widespread that liberal democracy as we know it may not be able, first, to reduce and, second, to solve, the problem which liberal democracy is facing. Thus the conclusion here cannot be other than very tentative; it has also to be as open as possible to all kinds of experiments and approaches. It is much too early to conclude that parties will be able to provide better solutions; but it is also much too rash to conclude from current experience that populism can only flourish in the context of authoritarianism. It remains, above all, much too early to be sure that a model cannot be found that accommodates populist aspirations to a liberal vision.

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Does Populism Discredit Direct Democracy?

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This chapter is organized around the two leading concepts of (authoritarian) populism and (direct) democracy. The first two sections examine each in turn, locating populism in a long line of temporarily dominant but transitory paradigms used to describe and explain striking political developments from the late 1950s onwards (Table 12.1).

Direct democracy is first defined and then examined in terms of its two main forms—mediated and unmediated. The essential question is whether it can really function without proper regulation of discussion and voting, or dispense with intermediary institutions, above all political parties.

Section 'Democracy as Usual?' then considers whether current political developments (like their predecessors) constitute any more than a blip in the normal functioning of democracies which they can well cope with. Section 'Combining Direct and Representative (Programmatic) Democracy: A Possible Synthesis?' discusses how representative processes and direct policy voting could complement each other in the future, with political parties as the key link—particularly in terms of framing and firming up inchoate popular preferences.

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Table 12.1 Dominating descriptive paradigms in political science 1950–2020

Paradigm name	Period	Overt thesis	Subliminal message	Emotional impact	Political effects
'Social Democratic Consensus'	1950–1970	Politics is only about managing the welfare state, not challenging it	Main social problems are solved	Personal security from cradle to grave	Marginal policy adjustments, don't rock the boat
Power elite	1960s	Everything is run by the 'Establishment' which subverts meaningful political reforms	Radical action frustrated	Hidden control	Protest movements
'End of Ideology'	1960–1980	Political parties all now 'pragmatic' rather than ideological	The left have given up	Common sense rules	Rely on technocratic solutions to manage growing crises
Neo-corporatism	1970s	Government negotiates policy with unions and business	Big special interests have policy veto	Nothing much can be done to change things politically	'Winter of discontent'; inertia in face of crises
Government overload	1975–1985	Governments try to do too much	Cut government down	Private good, public bad	Thatcher and Reagan privatizations
'Neo Liberal Consensus'	1985–2015	Free markets rule	No such thing as society	Get on your bike	EU single market: privatizations; get taxes down
'End of History'	1985–1995	(Neo-liberal) democracy triumphs everywhere	US is the world model	Feel good and free!	Peace dividend: economic prosperity
Societal breakdown	Late 1990s, 2000s	'Lonely individualism' as social bonds weaken	Riches aren't everything	Nobody cares	'Broken Society'—multiplying social problems
Participatory democracy	1990–2010	Help the people speak!	Open up politics	Act to make a difference!	Growing use of referendums and consultations
Globalization	2000 onwards	'World Village'; socioeconomic disruption	Try to get back to way things were: build bulwarks against change	Insecurity	Crises and austerity
Authoritarian populism	2016 onwards	Parallels with 1930s; 'lonely crowd' which turns to strong leaders	Power to the people	Fascism! Bolshevism! Revolution!	Stop immigration: Revive 'good times' of past

Authoritarian Populism: A Passing Paradigm?

Most uses of the term 'populism' are little more than an expression of annoyance by academics, politicians and journalists at a vote that upsets normal political routines. It acquires more substance when applied to those political parties which, whatever their ideology or the issues they base themselves on, indiscriminately attack the whole range of established parties and institutions. Such parties are often transitory (UK Independence Party (UKIP)) or are assimilated once they get into the legislature. More long-lasting, and not generally described as populist, are regional parties like Sinn Fein or the Scottish National Party (SNP) (or Lega del Nord) which aim at kicking out the establishment from their own territory.

These examples underline the point that parties which erupt on to the political scene from outside, often under a commanding leader, are not new and have in some shape or form been around from the foundation of most democracies, sometimes transitory, sometimes more enduring. It is also worth noticing that discussions of populism usually focus on parties rather than the populace as such. The people rarely organize themselves. They have to have an alternative to vote for and that has to be provided by a party, flash or otherwise. With much more voter volatility under the impact of globalization there is less to anchor voters in long-standing allegiances. Voters for the populist Obama in 2008 transferred to the populist Trump in 2016 (although of course Hillary won the election in terms of the popular vote—it was the very rules designed to mediate and deflect popular voting that brought Trump to power). Trump himself might be regarded as following a recognizably Republican policy line with idiosyncratic wobbles around it.

These examples are drawn from general elections under representative democracy rather than referendums or popular initiatives. Eighty per cent of referendums around the world result in supporting the status quo and/or government proposals (LeDuc 2003, 21–4, 152–84). Thus Aboriginals were enfranchised in Australia (1986) and the Monarchy retained (1998). Two referendums kept Quebec in Canada at the end of the twentieth century as Scotland was in the UK (2014) and ratified the Good Friday agreement in Northern Ireland (1998). Various national popular votes against EU proposals in the early millennium have been reversed after reflection on the consequences (and some government manipulation). Only in Britain in 2016 has an EU referendum resulted in the rejection of the elite consensus. This, however, was due less to UKIP than to a factional takeover of the Conservative Party.

Viewed in comparative perspective, therefore, the vote for Brexit is exceptional. Combined with Trump's election in 2016 however it constitutes such a striking development that it diverts attention from 'politics as normal' elsewhere. Like the striking developments of earlier decades it seems to usher in a whole new political era, which cries out for new concepts and paradigms to describe it. Social scientists are never backward in providing these, as Table 12.1 shows.

Authoritarian populism joins a long list of diagnoses provided for the political class by their 'public intellectuals' to explain what seemed at the time mould-breaking developments in contemporary politics' They were all accepted in their time as almost universal truths, propelling their originators to fame and fortune. What they have in common is that they are never very clearly defined and remain ambiguous enough at the edges to bring together a wide range of contemporary developments. For a time they seem to explain everything—until a new development generates a new paradigm and the old one fades away. Where's your neo-corporatism, decline of ideologies, or 'end of history' now? It's authoritarian populism, stupid.

Direct Democracy

Direct democracy itself was propelled to the fore in the 1990s by one of the paradigmatic diagnoses of social-political ills listed in Table 12.1—participatory democracy. This stemmed in part from a reaction to the new technological developments which increasingly made mass debate and participation possible (surveys, polls, computers, internet, emails, television and other media). No longer had citizens to all get together at one place and time to discuss issues and legislation—which had been the killer argument against it.

What additionally spurred on the cause in the 1990s was the perception of 'democratic deficits' in existing institutions everywhere, not just in the technocratic EU. Democracy was in the air as it spread over Eastern Europe and Latin America with the 'end of history'. So academics and activists alike were receptive to deepening democracy where it already existed, by extending opportunities for deliberation and participation by the general public. The two were joined together in the concept of 'deliberative polling' pioneered by James Fishkin (2018), an American academic who is busily trying to implement it around the world.

Britain in the mid-1990s was in fact one of the earliest places where deliberative polling was actually tried out. BBC2 carried three programmes over the course of one weekend showing a representative sample of electors coming together and voting on penal sentencing policy (more, or less, severe?) The initial sample poll had a vote with a strong majority favouring more severe sentencing. Over the ensuing weekend participants attended lectures and seminars with sociologists, police, prison governors and other experts (overwhelmingly for emptying prisons) and a debate between the actual and shadow home secretaries—with the latter, Tony Blair, 'tough on crime, and on the causes of crime' (including prisons in this). On the last day the sample reversed its stance and voted by a strong majority for softer sentencing.

Fishkin has continued to be involved in such deliberative polling around the world. This addresses the main argument against direct democracy, that citizens are not well enough informed to vote directly on policy and should leave it to experts and trusted political representatives to decide. One could not expose the whole population to such intensive discussion of course. But the way a deliberative poll addresses and answers a referendum question, if shown on TV before the actual vote, could usefully inform and guide the reactions of the national electorate. More generally, as it is a representative sample, one can infer from its reactions what the populace would decide if it were well informed (for qualifications about this argument see Sanders 2012).

This serves to underline the point that direct democracy does not come in only one form. Most of the arguments opposed to it are in fact aimed against a totally unmediated form of popular voting, where it takes place in a kind of free for all of conflicting opinions and groups with no regulation of discussion and no reality checks on what is being said. This might sound like the Brexit referendum! However, there is no need to do things this way. Many national referendums are in fact hedged in by rules and procedures laid down in advance, as we shall see below. We can only imagine what parliaments would look like if there were no clear procedures: no Speaker or Moderator to regulate discussion: no repeated readings and debates on procedures: and with governments empowered to call a vote at any point in the discussion at will. The same surely applies to debate in any forum, and we would expect disorderly procedures to produce dubious results anywhere, not just in popular referendums.

Table 12.2 summarizes some of the arguments commonly used against direct democracy. Often they could be applied to voting in general elections too when they emphasize the instability of opinions and voting outcomes (6). Most are aimed against the convenient but unrealistic 'straw man' of unmediated discussion. Where they use other arguments these often cast doubt on ordinary citizens' capacity to make wise political discussions. This comes dangerously close to criticizing democracy as such rather than just direct democracy.

The close connection between the two is demonstrated when we consider how democracy itself can be defined, and then compare it with direct democracy. Democracy is differentiated from other types of political regimes by sustaining a 'necessary correspondence between acts of governance and the equally weighted felt interests of citizens with respect to these acts' (Saward 1998, 53: following A.D. May 1978). The most direct way to provide this democratic guarantee of correspondence is surely to have citizens voting directly on all important policy themselves. There may well of course be arguments against this (some of them rehearsed in Table 12.2). But this belief is what drives proponents of direct democracy on and gives them their moral passion.

Far from encouraging populist upsurges, popular policy elections can go any way and there is no record of them consistently favouring one kind of substantive proposal over another. The only consistent outcome is that popular votes generally favour the status quo or government proposals.

This all argues for direct democracy not being inherently radical or revolutionary in its nature, despite traditional fears of an oppressive majority crushing minorities or tyrannizing over immigrants, Gypsies, Muslims or Jews. In all this there seems little difference between states which have some measure of direct democracy and those which have not.

DEMOCRACY AS USUAL?

Against this background we can go on to examine the actual incidence of what might be called authoritarian populism at the present time and ask if it really constitutes a threat to democracy or is actually one aspect of its normal functioning, which has been experienced in similar forms without lasting damage in the past.

Of course the image the term itself calls up is of the Fascist March on Rome in the early 1920s and the Nazi takeover of Germany ten years later. Although they took advantage of constitutional forms to seize power,

Table 12.2   Criticisms of direct democracy with responses to them

Criticisms	Responses
1. General elections already let citizens choose between alternative governments and programmes, hence there is no need for direct policy voting	Many issues are not discussed at general elections so if the people are to decide they need to vote on them directly. Moreover such elections primarily choose governments, which voters may do without taking policy into account
2. Ordinary citizens do not have the education, interest, time, expertise and other qualities required to make good political decisions	Politicians do not necessarily show expertise and interest either. Participation expands citizen capacities. Deliberative-polls reveal what the people would decide 'if they are thinking'
3. Good decisions are most likely to be produced where popular participation is balanced by expert judgement. This is representative democracy where citizens can indicate the general direction policy should take, but leave it to be carried out by professionals	Expertise is important but not infallible. In any case it can inform popular decisions, as in deliberative polls. Modern representative democracies are heavily imbalanced against popular participation
4. Those who vote against a particular decision do not give their consent to it, particularly if the same people are always in the minority	The problem is general and not confined to direct democracy. Voting on issues one by one gives minorities more voice on issues important to them
5. No procedure for collective decision making can be guaranteed not to produce arbitrary outcomes. What seems like a strong majority may be de-stabilized by setting out the alternatives another way.	Such problems are generic to democratic voting procedures. Voting on dichotomous questions one by one (the usual procedure in popular policy consultations) does, however, eliminate cyclical voting and produces a clear majority for one side or the other
6. Deliberative poll and referendum outcomes are unstable and would be different if the poll was held at another time	This is also true of general election outcomes. If one vote is not regarded as authoritative rules can allow for two or three votes to get at 'real' settled preferences
7. Without intermediary institutions (parties, legislatures, governments) to 'frame' discussion no coherent stable or informed policies will be made. Direct democracy undermines intermediary institutions including parties	Direct democracy does not have to be unmediated. Parties and governments can and do play the same role as in representative (party) democracies today.

these semi-coups were carried out with elite connivance in dubiously democratic countries. Mass plebiscites were only held under intimidating conditions either to facilitate a takeover that was already happening or to get retrospective approval for it.

Nothing happening today is remotely comparable to these events. What occurred recently is:

1. The surprise victory of an extremely unorthodox presidential candidate in the US. It is worth noting that this was a regular representative election, that he was the candidate of a mainstream party, he was brought to power more by the rules for aggregating votes than as a reflection of the voting itself; and that Roosevelt was regarded in much the same way by commentators and the political establishment in the early and mid-1930s (not to mention Reagan before he won everybody over in the 1980s.)

2. Momentum and Corbynism in Britain (perhaps preceded by the SNP). However, Momentum has done nothing to threaten the rules. It is really something quite normal, a Leftist faction which aims at taking over a mainstream party, with many parallels in the past.

3. Mediterranean and Central Europe. The Le Pens (Jean and Marine) contested two presidential elections in France but lost the run-off spectacularly both times. The situation hardly compares with the near civil war in the years around 1960 and the takeover of power by the Gaullists. The current political chaos in Italy is not unfamiliar but again the authoritarian populism of the Cinque Stelle and Lega (and Forza Italia?) hardly matches the neo-fascism, communism and the Brigate Rosse of earlier decades. The same can be said of Germany and the student movements and terrorism of the late 1960s and 1970s—and the Greens and Die Linke of the 1980s and 1990s. In Austria the Freedom Party was in a government coalition in the 1990s.

4. North-West Europe. Anti-establishment parties won surprising levels of support forty years ago (remember Mogens Glistrop?) and are hardly stronger today.

5. Poland and its Visegrad partners are certainly under the rule of authoritarian right-wing parties who are tampering with the rule of law. They are irrevocably embedded in the EU however and are being countered by the European Court of Justice.

6. The Americas. In Canada the parties which briefly mushroomed in the 1990s and which were, broadly, anti-Establishment, have been re-absorbed by Progressive Conservatives and Liberals. In the United States, Trump, as pointed out above, is pursuing a very right-wing but recognizably Republican policy line; however, much he wobbles around it in his tweets. Mexico has progressed from what might be described as an authoritarian regime which tried to present itself as populist while becoming decreasingly so, to genuine party competition which has brought a democratic leftist party to power. Despite enormous problems the rest of Central America and the Caribbean are perceptibly more stable and democratic than they were 25 years ago. The same can be said of most of South America and most importantly of its three largest countries where regular elections and peaceful transfers of power between reasonably stable and established parties have recurred regularly over the last 30 to 40 years.

Turning to the rest of the world, its largest democracy, India, has functioned well ever since its foundation. All one can say of Africa is that democracy is recognizably spreading within the general chaos. Elsewhere in the Middle East, populist movements of all types have arisen but then been crushed by military takeovers, reverting to the earlier post-war and post-independence situation.

Taking a broad view then there seems little indication of a general growth in either populism or authoritarianism in the last decade. There have always been parties throughout the post-war period which wanted to overturn the existing order. They have been backed by surges of popular feeling which however have rarely propelled them to power—and where they have been (as in Poland and Italy) their hold on it proved transitory.

The non-existence or weakness of authoritarian populism at the present time renders it largely irrelevant to any debate about the merits or otherwise of direct democracy. One abiding criticism of the latter, however, has been that it opens the way to plebiscitary interventions by groups (like the military) which have seized power and want to justify their rule, though we should note that this role can also be played by rigged representative elections like the one in Egypt in 2018.

The ability to call a popular vote at will is indeed a procedural weakness. As pointed out above, however. It is not one inherent in direct democracy as such. Rather it stems from not having proper procedures to regulate it.

The people cannot give voice to their true opinions unaided, any more than parliaments could if debate and votes were not regulated.

One central aspect of procedures is when and how votes should be called. Having referendums only when a government wishes to have them rather than when a significant part of the electorate want them has the obvious effect of biasing decisions in favour of government proposals (although it can go wrong for the government as with Brexit). Regularizing the rules for calling referendums—or more expansively, allowing for initiatives called on a sufficient show of popular support— removes the bias and levels the playing field for government and opposition groups. Of course no rules can stand against an authoritarian government. But at least they make it more difficult to claim legitimacy if it sweeps them away.

Figure 12.1 sketches out the varying degrees of autonomy which citizens could have in initiating votes. These stretch from some kind of body in continuing session, like the regular assemblies of Greek city states and some small Swiss cantons to votes called by governments with complete freedom to do so when they want (the British situation?):

There are further procedural nuances to those in Fig. 12.1, such as whether proposals to be voted on are subject to revision by courts or governments: what kind of majority is required (of those voting or of the whole electorate) and whether the outcome is decided by a simple majority (50 per cent+) or a reinforced one of, for example, two-thirds. Clearly procedures are crucial to letting the people speak. They are not just impediments to their expression as more simplistic advocates of direct democracy would maintain. This provides some basis for the rapprochement between representative democracy and direct democracy which is considered in the next section.

Fig. 12.1   Degrees of autonomy in calling popular policy votes

COMBINING DIRECT AND REPRESENTATIVE (PROGRAMMATIC) DEMOCRACY: A POSSIBLE SYNTHESIS?

Most evaluations of representative democracy as opposed to direct democracy are done without much reference to political parties (other than to sweep them away in the case of some enthusiasts). But in fact the nineteenth-century mass parties—a social invention comparable to the steam engine in technology—have transformed democracy in the modern world, to the extent that it is better described as 'party democracy' than as either representative democracy or direct democracy.

The emergence of political parties in fact brought representative democracy closer to direct popular policy voting although in a new form. Parties now competed at general elections by offering alternative policy programmes (packages of policies) to the electorate. Voters could choose the programmes they preferred overall and express their choice by voting for the party that supported it. Party discipline then ensured that its representatives in parliament would support the package and try to carry it through in government.

This transformation of representative democracy into party democracy gave the initiative to parties in formulating the policy alternatives for which electors voted. Often these were regarded as too narrow or even indistinguishable from each other, either because parties had been corrupted and bought by sectional interests (as asserted by the American Progressives in the early twentieth century) or because they were embedded in the capitalist system to an extent that precluded them from offering truly radical alternatives to it (according to neo-Marxist and Green critics of the late twentieth century). Certainly the rise of new and local issues often made the broad packages offered by parties seem inadequate or insensitive to concerns felt by particular groups of citizens. Ecological issues, in particular, remained off the main agenda. Under these circumstances, an obvious solution to the stultifying effects of party control and elite dominance seemed again to be direct popular voting on policy, with increasing emphasis on the power to initiate such a vote if a sufficient body of opinion wanted it (an 'initiative').

Contrary to many preconceptions, however, direct popular policy voting does not necessarily involve the sweeping away of parties and parliaments, although the desire to do so is often a powerful motivating force for advocates of 'people power'. The general conclusion of this chapter, supported by the guidance provided to popular voting in

Switzerland by parties and other institutions (Kreisi 2005, 2012) is that many of the critical arguments against direct democracy are valid against its unmediated forms, but not against its mediated forms. The latter provide a more direct and unhampered expression of the popular will than representative democracy, while still providing procedural safeguards for minorities. The contrast between modern forms of direct and representative democracy is overdrawn. The latter usually involves voting on party policy packages as well as on candidates and government competence. This could pave the way for a new democratic synthesis that combines direct 'policy elections' (initiatives and referendums) with general elections in the areas appropriate for them—not unlike modern Swiss practice.

In the modern world in fact direct and representative democracy have come together through the pervasiveness of policy voting and the political parties' role in organizing it. Of the two, representative democracy has travelled further, no longer based on individual representation, but rather on programmatic voting with the winning party as guarantor of the programme. Direct democracy has continued to differentiate itself as direct voting on individual policies, most often policies not central to ongoing party politics, or else exceptional decisions that transcend normal party divisions.

We can see this better by examining actual practice in contemporary democracies. Popular policy votes tend to be held disproportionately in five areas: (1) changes to the constitution, (2) territorial questions covering secessions or extensions of the national territory, devolution and autonomy (Scotland and EU), (3) foreign policy, (4) moral matters such as divorce, abortion and homosexuality and (5) ecology and the environment (including local campaigns for protection of particular features, or in opposition to the siting of a power plant). In Swiss cantons and American states, fiscal matters are increasingly voted on, usually involving tax limitation and restrictions on the size of government (for surveys of content across countries, see LeDuc 2003).

'Policy voting' thus takes place either on issues of a certain level of generality—constitutions or foreign policy measures like trade liberalization that will have a long-term effect—or in areas that fit uneasily into the general left-right division of party politics and that might indeed provoke internal party splits, such as moral and ecological matters. The closest that policy votes come to influencing the current political agenda is on fiscal

matters. Even tax limitation has a long-term rather than an immediate effect. Almost never is a vote held, for example, to 'prioritize unemployment now', 'stop inflation', 'end the war', 'reduce prison population' and so on.

Several factors contribute to this pattern of policy consultation. First and perhaps most importantly, governments do not want to put their central policies to a referendum. So, where they have control over their timing and initiation, voting will not cover issues central to left-right conflicts— only off-issues that might split the party. New and opposition parties have generally also mobilized to put such issues on the agenda and not to refight continuing party battles.

A party-based explanation is only one part of the answer, however, since the same pattern also occurs in fairly unregulated popular initiatives where parties have less control. It is probable that voters themselves, and even interest groups, see no point in taking up matters that have already been part of the general election debate, and have already put into office parties that are pursuing them as part of a mandate. The so-called representative elections are heavily focussed around medium-term policy plans, so it is natural that parties should be left to get on with them at least in their first years in office (and it often takes time to organize a referendum or initiative).

In this way, a certain division of labour seems to be emerging between general, programmatic, elections and direct policy voting on individual issues. Where issues are linked together and form an integral part of the activity of governments, usually within the traditional left-right framework, the parties in power are left to get on with them. Where individual issues have long-term implications and do not fit so easily into a unifying framework, they tend disproportionately to be the subject of special popular votes. The overall mix does not seem a bad way of trying to translate popular preferences into public policy (Budge 1996, 181–8). By mandating timely government action to alleviate popular grievances it strengthens democracies against any danger of authoritarians stirring them up for a political takeover. This is indeed the conclusion we should draw about its general effects—it strengthens the democratic system against any threats rather than undermining it—and for that reason if no other should be adopted more widely.

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How Should Established Parties Respond to the Rise of Identity Politics in Their Electoral Base?

Martin Kettle

What do we actually mean by identity politics? Here is one way to attempt an answer. On 10 April 2018, the former US President Bill Clinton joined a panel discussion at Queen's University, Belfast. He had come to Northern Ireland to reflect, along with many others, on the 20th anniversary of the 1998 Good Friday agreement. The agreement had produced an end to IRA violence in return for a power-sharing agreement between Northern Ireland's Protestant unionists and its Roman Catholic nationalists. After 30 years of conflict, and more than 3500 deaths, the agreement had held for the next 20 years, although not without many periods of sectarian difficulty, which still continue.

Now aged 71, and weakened by two bouts of heart surgery, Clinton's voice had for some years lost some of the light tenor ring it commanded in his pomp. But in Belfast he still spoke with customary cogency. "Here's what I want to say," he announced after some introductory anecdotes.

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> In the wake of all this tribalism going on all over the world today, all this identity politics … the Good Friday agreement is a work of genius that is applicable if you care at all about preserving democracy… Because it calls for real democracy—majority rule, minority rights, individual rights, the rule of law, the end of violence, shared political decision making, shared economic benefits [and] shared special relationships.[1]

As a succinct statement of why Northern Ireland's 1998 agreement was a qualitative break with the zero-sum sectarian politics that had marked the preceding decades, this summation by Clinton is very impressive. As so often before, one is struck by the intellectual focus and political seriousness of the former president. All of the key elements of the European model of consensual democratic politics—what Clinton called 'real democracy'—are set out within what appeared to be entirely unscripted remarks. The agreement may have applied only to Northern Ireland, a place with a population of less than two million people. But the way Clinton managed to tell it, the agreement was a model of much wider democratic significance, whose principles are applicable elsewhere.

Yet there is an unmistakable note of sadness in Clinton's words too. Perhaps that tone of regret can be explained by the ongoing suspension of the Northern Ireland power-sharing institutions since early 2017. Perhaps it is down to the fact that Northern Ireland's politicians have not made as much fresh progress into non-sectarian politics as optimists might have hoped in 1998. Yet the minor key framing of Clinton's otherwise major key comments also speaks more widely. It's not just Northern Ireland where there is political 'tribalism' today, he is saying, but "all over the world". The threat to consensual democracy is equally widespread and very contemporary. That threat, as he names it, is something called 'identity politics'.

Identity Politics Before Identity Politics

On one level, there has always been something called identity politics. Every nationalist movement in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe was a form of identity politics. Political parties routinely privilege some further aspect of identity—whether of class, work, ethnicity, religion and more. Yet, until recently politics got on well without the phrase. Today, on the other hand, it is hard to read what used to be called a newspaper without coming across references to identity politics. These references are not neutral. They are invariably about something that is seen as a menace to

moderate politics, consensual politics or even to democratic politics. This drumbeat seems to be steadily increasing.

Yet when people talk about identity politics a confusion reigns. The term is used in very different contexts to describe very different political movements. As a result it is not straightforward to say what it actually means, or to generalise about it. Like a number of other much used phrases in modern politics—neoliberalism and populism spring to mind—identity politics can sometimes mean what the user wants it to mean rather than something objective. The upshot is that identity politics has become a label that is stuck on a rather wide and eclectic mix of phenomena in different political cultures.

Bill Clinton's remarks in Belfast were an example of this. What exactly did he mean by identity politics? He isn't entirely clear, but it seems reasonable to argue he was thinking about two rather divergent meanings at the same time. The first of these, explicitly, is the issue of tribal nationalism as a form of identity politics. This was perhaps triggered in Clinton's mind not just by Irish history and politics—the subject he had come to Belfast to discuss—but also by the recent rise of nationalist identity politics in several parts of Europe. The most recent of these, the re-election of Victor Orban's nationalist Fidesz government for a third term in Hungary, had occurred two days before Clinton spoke in Belfast. So the contrast between the triumph of the tribal nationalist form of identity politics in Hungary on the one hand and Northern Ireland's hard-won consensual accommodation with it on the other was hard to avoid.

However, Clinton surely had in mind another sort of identity politics as well. He will, we can say with some confidence, have been thinking about the disruptive effects on the Democratic Party's electoral coalition of the personal identity politics—and the language—pursued by many educated American liberals on race, gender and sexual orientation. I know for a fact that Bill Clinton believes in private that the mishandling of these very issues was what lost Hillary Clinton the presidency in 2016. He believes they opened the way for Donald Trump to attack liberal 'political correctness' and liberal 'elite' disconnectedness—embodied in Hillary Clinton's scorn for the voters whom she infamously labelled a 'basket of deplorables'. Like many US Democrats, Bill Clinton will have had that version of identity politics on his mind too.

But it isn't just Bill Clinton who uses the term 'identity politics' in different ways and in more than one context. While I was writing this essay,

and without looking very hard, I came across many commentaries and analyses that blamed the rise of identity politics for one thing or another. Here, in short summary, are four randomly selected examples from the same period in which Clinton made his own remarks. I don't offer them as definitive usages, but they underscore why this is such a slippery subject.

The first is a Huffington Post report (March 28) on the valedictory address given by London's departing Australian High Commissioner Alexander Downer. This quoted Downer as saying, in the course of reflections about Brexit, that modern identity politics is the creation of the UK political elites. Modern British politics had "a near obsession with identity politics" Downer said. "Instead of building on an existing national identity by working to integrate migrants into the mainstream of society, the elite have salami sliced society with an ideology of identity politics." In this example, therefore, the argument is that there is a right identity for a country and a series of wrong ones. Britain, in Downer's view had an identity politics problem because it mixed them all up.

A few days later, the commentator Gideon Rachman wrote a column in the *Financial Times* (April 3) which said the embrace of identity politics was not the work of the elites, as Downer had argued, but the work of their opposite, the extremes. Reflecting in the wake of Jeremy Corbyn's equivocations on antisemitism, Rachman told readers that the far left and far right in Britain are now united by "their fondness for identity politics", and that this was a form of politics that is "fundamentally illiberal because it imposes a group identity on individuals". People have composite identities, argued Rachman. He considered himself to be Jewish, British, a Londoner, a journalist and a history graduate. So, where Downer was arguing that the identity politics problem is about allowing people to have too many identities, Rachman was arguing the opposite, that the problem is about trying to impose only one on them, at the expense of complexity.

A week after that, the commentator Anne McElvoy wrote a piece in the *Evening Standard* (April 10) that broadened out some of Rachman's observations, while also alluding to some of the things that Clinton was talking about in Belfast that very afternoon. In the wake of the Hungarian election, McElvoy wrote, it was more than ever clear in Europe that political moderates in the Western democracies were struggling. They must, she said, learn to balance "a dizzying array of identity politics and intersectionalities, many of which have claims on attention but not all of which can or should be fulfilled at once or in equal degree". Here, therefore, the problem lay in a direct challenge to moderate politics.

A couple of days later, David Brooks in *The New York Times* (April 12) also echoed things that Rachman had written about, while digging much deeper into the more self-focused American version of identity politics. In particular, Brookes bemoaned the rise in the United States of an "identity politics which is [a] reactionary reversion to the pre-modern world. Identity politics takes individual merit out of the moral centre of our system and asserts that group is … an immutable category, a permanent tribe." In this example, the issue is what Brooks sees as the growth of an antisocial individualism.

There are many more such examples. They are not hard to find. But they show why the question with which I began—what do we mean by identity politics?—is both important and difficult. Different people in different cultures, and even different people within the same cultures, mean different things by the phrase. We need to get a bit of order in the discussion.

DEFINING THE INDEFINABLE

So let's try a definition. Let's say that identity politics means a form of political engagement that is centred on who we consider ourselves to be. The identity could be many things: it could be national or regional, racial or ethnic, linguistic or religious, gendered or sexual, or age-related—and more. All these forms of identity politics have something in common, however. They seek as a priority to defend, to advance, to celebrate and to reward that sense of identity.

As such, therefore, they are potentially disruptive of other forms of political engagement that focus on different ways of mobilising. The most historically important of these are the forms of engagement that are primarily concerned with the allocation of the resources and opportunities of the social and economic order—the politics of distribution, inequality or public goods. These forms of distributional politics are vulnerable to identity-driven disruption, whether the focus is on maintaining, reforming or overthrowing that order. In other words, identity politics is a potential threat both to the left and the right.

In part, that disruptive effect exists because identity politics has a tendency to be more absolutist. It is difficult to be half-Muslim, half-transgender, half-Catalan, half in favour of free speech. As Robert Ford puts it, in many forms of identity politics there is simply no cake that can be divided up. By contrast, most political engagement with the economic

and social order is *not* absolutist (though there are exceptions). Here there is a cake. It can be divided up in various ways—you can even have your cake and eat it. Distributional politics covers a range: from the preservation of the status quo to the promotion of radical change. In distributional politics it is not so difficult to be in favour of some nationalisation, or some immigration, or somewhat higher wages, or to trade off aspects of these issues. Identity politics does not present itself like that. It is difficult to reason with or to compromise with. You either have the identity or you don't.

In reality, though, these lines are not so tidy. In the first place, distributional politics can itself be a form of identity politics. 'The workers, united, will never be defeated' is a slogan which clearly embodies a form of identity politics, except that here the identity is socio-economically defined. Labour's current Corbynism is a form of political engagement that is both identity-based—its supporters venerate Corbyn—and also based on a view of resource distribution questions.

Secondly, while identity politics can be disruptive to socio-economic politics, there is a long history of pragmatic and practical accommodations between them. The Labour and Conservative parties each have deep histories of that kind. Labour has always been—and in spite of the arguments surrounding Corbyn and antisemitism, still is—an accommodation between class-based agendas and a variety of socialist agendas, not to mention religious, nationalist and environmentalist agendas too. The Conservative party has had many different identity interests and different approaches to the resources agenda over many years—from the era of Disraeli to that of Nikki Morgan—but they have mostly been managed so that the party can hold together. Whether Brexit marks the end of that remains to be seen.

There is at least one further twist. Even in modern politics, it is more than possible for elements of both broad classifications of identity politics—tribal and self-focused—to coexist within the same society. No society has just one form of identity politics and not the other. All have both, in different degrees and combinations and with differing consequences. Britain is a very good example of this. It is a country in which there are long established national, religious and racial identities. But these forms of identity politics coexist, alongside more contemporary ideas of identity based on the self, especially in places like universities and the media. So, in addition to there being definitional questions about identity politics, there are also geo-cultural questions about its impact. Not all countries have the

same experience. The political parties of the right, centre and left reflect these differences in contrasting ways.

More importantly, perhaps, many versions of identity politics are not inherently as absolutist as they can sometimes become or than polemics can imply. Most people in fact have multiple different identities. Most of the time, most people are comfortable with this. It's only when they are compelled to choose that the trouble starts. Gideon Rachman, quoted above, objected to having to do this. But he is absolutely not alone in considering himself to be a mix of identities. The late Charles Kennedy, for example, often used to say in speeches that he was proud to be a Highlander, proud to be a Scot, proud to be a British and proud to be a European. They were all, he said, part of him and he had no trouble honouring them or reconciling them all within himself. Interestingly, he tended not to add in this declaration of multiple identities that he was a Roman Catholic. But he might easily have done.

Wallowing in the Warm Bath of Identity

We may, indeed, all have these multiple identities. But how do we grade the different identities in relation to one another—or even at all? Which are most important when the chips are down? It is very hard to answer this authoritatively. To say someone 'is Labour' tells you part of their identity. But it doesn't tell you how important it is in comparison with other things in their lives. Millions of voters define themselves by other things entirely. And attempts to be more specific can be ridiculous too. This effort was mocked by a New Yorker cartoon a few years ago depicting supposedly undecided political blocs holding banners like 'Pro-war gay oil men for separation of church and state' or 'Trust-funded organic farming Enron-stock holding gun enthusiasts'.

But it is time to climb out of the warm bath of complexity and return to the question of the real impact of identity in modern politics. Historically, most established democratic political systems are still dominated by parties that are coalitions, not tribes. There are some exceptions, especially where a country's politics have been dominated by traumatic internal upheavals, as is to some extent still the case in the Irish Republic to this day. The nature of the electoral system clearly impacts on party formation and sustainability too, as Emmanuel Macron's success in France shows.

British political parties have evolved in their own way too. The Labour Party remains in recognisable ways what it was from 1900, a party of

labour, not a socialist or social democratic party. Meanwhile the Conservatives also remain equally recognisably what they were from the early twentieth century onwards, a party of the land, the middle-class and the established order. In these parties, a multiplicity of identities manages most of the time to subsume their differences in support of the party's ideological purposes. The most striking of these, historically, is perhaps the almost complete subsuming of once irreconcilable branches of Christian identities. Occasionally, as in the case of the Labour Party's arguments over antisemitism, this can break down. But a party of this kind remains a coalition nevertheless, although in Labour's case less convincingly than before.

It should also be added that British parties that have wholly different aims—nationalist parties like the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Plaid Cymru, for instance, or an anti-EU party like Ukip or an environmentalist one like the Greens—are also coalitions of various kinds. The SNP, for example, is a coalition of social classes, predominantly working-class in some parts of Scotland, predominantly middle-class in others. It is also a coalition of left wing and right wing, of pro-Europeans and anti-Europeans. What unites it is its nationalism, but you can be black or white, male or female, gay or straight, liberal or conservative, fond of England or loathe England, providing you are a nationalist.

The self-focused form of identity politics that has arisen in recent years, spurred by social media, is very different indeed. It has emerged out of the simultaneous cultural fragmentation of early twentieth-century Western industrial society and the rise, in these increasingly post-industrial nations, of liberal sexual and ethnic diversity and a culture based on rights. All of this has been turbo-charged out of recognition—as other forms of politics have—by the internet and social media, which help people to choose identities more easily. David Runciman has argued that social media are a powerful driver in enabling people to reinforce the identities they want to have and the communities they want to belong to, and to put the users increasingly beyond the reach of traditional sources of political mobilisation.[2] The outcome is a burgeoning focus on the self and on individual identity which is beginning to replace earlier collective forms. The most notable example of this is in the United States. But the social media's cultural revolution means it is likely to become much more significant elsewhere too.

Much of what has been written about modern identity politics has been written in the United States. Most of that concentrates upon American examples and on the US Democratic Party in particular. A lot of it centres

around analysis of Hillary Clinton's failed 2016 presidential bid and the election of Donald Trump. It focuses on the rise of ethnic, gender and sexual identities and, above all, on the elevation of the 'self' at the expense of the collective. To critics, this form of identity politics has cut itself off from voters who do not embrace its goals, principles and language, allowing Trump and others to frame its advocates as politically correct elitists who have abandoned the economic concerns, cultural values and patriotism of ordinary voters and who have taken over parties in which those voters once trusted. This phenomenon is not restricted to America. The Brexit experience should be a warning that other countries, including Britain, face forms of it of their own.

The Politics of Me, Not the Politics of We

Nevertheless, if you look up 'identity politics' on Wikipedia—as I shamefacedly confess that I have done—you will find that the subject is treated in this exclusively American context. There is literally no mention of identity politics in any country other than the United States. It is also the case that the two best-known recent books for the general reader about identity politics are also both American. These are Mark Lilla's *The Once and Future Liberal* (2017) and Amy Chua's *Political Tribes* (2018), both published in the past year. Judging by what I have read about it, a forthcoming book by the conservative commentator Jonah Goldberg, with the Spenglerian title *Suicide of the West* (2018), may soon be a third. It is worth adding that all three of these authors occupy very different places on the American left-right political spectrum.

The concentration of American writing and American debate about identity politics does not mean that what it describes is exceptional to America. But it is important to be careful in extrapolating from it to other cultures. This is certainly true for Britain. The British political class, practitioners as well as academics and journalists, centre left as well as centre right, has a shared cultural weakness. We assume much too easily that British politics take place down river from American politics, so that what happens in America will generally flow on to Britain, either in the flood or in a more leisurely but still irresistible current. The belief that British politics is fated to shadow American politics is widespread in a lot of postimperial Conservative thinking. But it was also one of the insufficiently recognised axioms of New Labour too; Blair once told me that New Labour would not be elected if Bill Clinton was not re-elected in 1996.

There is a very real danger that the assumption that British politics follows American politics may make it more likely that American identity politics will take root here. Either way, the belief is simply not true.

Lilla's book is a central text on identity politics. It is a polemical essay against this particular conception of identity politics, not an exposition of it. It is an assault on a form of democratic left politics which, as he puts it, has mutated from a politics of 'we' to a politics of 'me'. In Lilla's view, identity politics is characterised by what he calls a "turn towards the self" in democratic left politics, which he says is matched by a turn away from "an imaginative hopeful vision". This turn to the self covers, in no particular chronological order or hierarchy of significance, women, Hispanics, 'ethnic Americans', the LGBT community, Native Americans, African Americans, Asian Americans and many others, sometimes in combination. The upshot is something that Lilla describes as post-vision politics.

Lilla dates the origins of the identity movement to the counter-cultural social movements of the 1960s and notes its growing importance in the Democratic Party from the Reagan era onwards. He particularly concentrates on the spread of identity politics in universities. He thinks universities are important, not just because he himself teaches in one, but because they reproduced a generation of political thinkers and activists who extolled the politics of the self and the importance of movement politics. This in turn fostered the disproportionate academic study of identity groups, which helped in its turn to foster in due course what Lilla calls "the Facebook model of identity—the self as homepage" and, over time, to an indifference towards those who were unlike themselves. Liberals stopped knowing much about working-class life and stopped talking to blue-collar voters. The eventual upshot of this was Trump's defeat of Hillary Clinton. Amy Chua makes the same distinction in her book, when she says "On the left, 'inclusivity' has long been a progressive watchword, but today's anti-oppression movement are often proudly exclusionary."

As I read Lilla's book, however, I increasingly began to annotate it with comments like "not true in UK", "only in America" and "is this so in Britain". At one point, indeed, Lilla says this himself:

> As interest slowly shifted from issue-based movements to identity-based ones, the focus of American liberalism also shifted from commonality to difference. And what replaced a broad political vision was a pseudo-political and distinctly American rhetoric of the feeling self and its struggle for recognition.

Much of Lilla's polemic and much of what he describes can also be dubbed 'distinctly American'. With very few exceptions, all his points of reference are American: American liberal culture, American universities, American political junctures and American political teleology. It is a book that has been triggered by the catastrophic election of Trump. It is a plea to the Democratic Party to rebuild the politics of vision and inclusivity. But the corollary is that Lilla's book is only relevant to British or any other country's democratic left politics if the same or similar phenomena are established there and if they have unfolded in similar ways to produce equivalent crises to the one that, in his view, has taken place in America.

Europe Is Not Yet America

The truth is that this has not happened yet, or at least it has not happened in any European country, including Britain, to anything like the same degree that Lilla describes in America. What these European countries, including Britain, mainly display is still much more congruent with what Amy Chua discusses in her book—group-based political tribal identities. Nevertheless, it is possible that something akin to the identity politics attacked by Lilla may develop elsewhere too. The Brexit vote was in part about identities. And two issues in particular—radical Islam and transgender activism—have each created significant arguments on the left and, to a lesser extent, on the right. I have become very conscious that this form of identity politics is increasingly represented in my own newspaper, *The Guardian*. Not, in my personal view, to its benefit as a free intellectual space.

Two examples, one on the left, one on the right, illustrate how this could develop further. Both relate to the ethnic minority vote in Britain, a group of voters which now constitutes around 15% of the total, a significant section of the electorate. Labour is in general a socially liberal party. Labour's support among Muslim voters is very strong. But many Muslims are socially conservative. Labour is generally careful not to confront this issue. It is therefore vulnerable to liberal campaigns which call on it to confront socially conservative Muslims on issues such as gay rights, and to illiberal campaigns that accuse it of giving socially conservative Muslims a free pass which it would not give to socially conservative white voters.

But the Conservative party has a problem too. Conservatives have long tried to cultivate ethnic minority voters, in part because they believe such voters are pro-business, pro-family and socially conservative. Yet, as the

recent handling of the concerns of the 'Windrush generation' of now elderly Afro-Caribbean voters has shown, Conservative policies on immigration are hard line and, in the government's own words, 'hostile'. This disrupts Conservative strategy, perhaps fatally. In both examples, therefore, an identity political question has, or may have, a decisive effect on party and electoral politics more generally.

There are no simple solutions to these and other identity politics issues. It ought, however, to be some reassurance that political parties have long records of making accommodations with identity issues over time, without suffering for it. But there are no guarantees this will continue. Parties exist to provide competing programmes and narratives which can command and then sustain coalitions of support. They stand or fall on their values, their programmes and the credibility of their leaders. Parties must respond to identity politics—as must news organisations—but neither of them should reduce their strategies to identity politics alone. Parties and the media must tell the truth about identity issues, just as they must do so over bread-and-butter political issues. The logic of this is to build bridges to different communities in their programmes, not to pull bridges down. That is the classic coalitionist approach which I described earlier. Yet it would be naive to ignore the new dangers.

Montaigne Got There First, of Course

Modern societies are complex. Earlier societies were complex too. Multiple identity was not invented in 1968. Yet modern politics is too often ill at ease with complexity. However unless politicians and parties—and, I add once again, media organisations—can continue to adapt to complexity they will continue to struggle to speak for people who lead complicated, stressed and often conflicted lives.

This need to understand the inevitability of complexity and the necessity of compromise is not new. Four centuries ago, Michel de Montaigne got to the heart of the matter in an essay entitled On the Inconstancy of Our Actions. Even the best writers, Montaigne observed, "are wrong in stubbornly trying to weave us into one invariable and solid fabric".

> "Anyone who turns his prime attention on to himself will hardly ever find himself in the same state twice," Montaigne went on. "I give my soul this face or that, depending upon which side I lay it down. I speak about myself in diverse ways: that is because I look at myself in diverse ways. Every sort of

contradiction can be found in me, depending upon some twist or attribute: timid, insolent; chaste, lecherous; talkative, taciturn; tough, sickly; clever, dull; brooding, affable; lying, truthful; learned, ignorant; generous, miserly and then prodigal. I can see something of all that in myself, depending on how I gyrate; and anyone who studies himself attentively finds in himself and in this very judgment this whirring about and this discordancy. There is nothing I can say about myself as a whole, simply and completely, without intermingling and admixture."[3]

Not even Clinton or Macron, two great masters of the bold inclusive politics that is ultimately the only response to identity politics, could have put it better than this sixteenth-century Frenchman who spent much of his life in a library. There is hope for all of us in that.

NOTES

1. http://www.qub.ac.uk/Research/GRI/mitchell-institute/good-friday-agreement-20-years-on/live-stream/?utm_source=Social&utm_medium=Twitter&utm_campaign=LiveStream&utm_term=&utm_content=GFA20.
2. http://www.cbc.ca/radio/spark/336-bad-driving-social-media-influence-and-more-1.3863844/are-digital-technologies-making-politics-impossible-1.3863855.
3. de Montaigne, Michel. 1993. On the Inconstancy of Our Actions. In *The Essays: A Selection*, 128. Penguin Books. Translation copyright © M.A.Screech 1987, 1991, 2003.

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Populism and Social Citizenship: An Anglo-American Comparison

Michael Moran

The foundations of the Anglo-American welfare state were laid during the New Deal era in the early 1930s. The cause was taken up with vigour by the Labour government in Britain after 1945. Since the Great Financial Crisis which erupted in 2008, both the US and the UK have experienced a new age of welfare austerity. The crisis, however, was only the occasion of the austerity, not the cause. The rise and fall of this welfare regime is what I examine here. I sketch the conditions that brought it into existence, and I show how the passing away of those conditions produced the atmosphere that led to important recent events in the Anglo-American world—notably the election of President Trump and the 'Brexit' vote.

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Since these events are commonly discussed in the language of populism, I begin by discussing that idea.

Populism and Elite Anxiety

Populism is an idea with two obvious features: its meaning is unclear, and hardly anyone has a good word to say for it. When Donald Trump, Bernie Sanders, Marine le Pen, Jeremy Corbyn, Ralph Nader, Gerry Adams and the Five Star Movement can all be described as populist, then we are plainly dealing with a 'stretched' concept—one stretched to snapping point and of limited use for social inquiry, though very useful for criticism or abuse.[1] Of the septet above, only Nader has embraced the designation: the Populist Party of Maryland was his vehicle in the 2004 Presidential campaign. Parties are perfectly happy to put stretched concepts into their titles: consider Democrat, Republican, Socialist, Nationalist, Christian. But the only major party in Western Europe or North America that I can find with populism in its name is the *Partido Popular* in Spain, and even that depends on a contestable translation from the Spanish. In the age of the populist hardly anyone owns up to being one. Populism is mostly a source of elite anxiety.

Where does this anxiety originate? The answer surely lies in the root of the word: a root that creates anxiety among elites about the disruptive consequences of popular intervention in politics. Aristotle's fear that 'democracy' was a form of tyranny, allowing the propertyless to expropriate the propertied; Madison's fear of faction and mob rule, which so influenced the restraints on popular influence in the original American constitution; Matthew Arnold's fears of impending social anarchy, voiced in the shadow of the first significant popular extension of the franchise in Britain; the 'new populism' and the 'collapse of deference' identified over thirty-five years ago by the most distinguished twentieth-century American student of British politics: all are in the tradition of elite anxiety about popular disruption (Beer 1982, 107ff).

The immediate source of elite anxiety now, and the resort to populism to make sense of it, is obvious: the Brexit result and the Trump victory spectacularly kicked over elite applecarts. Elites are anxious because they have lost control over popular politics. Party elites in Anglo-America were able to mobilise and control popular forces for decades after the Great Depression because the solution to that Depression created a social contract between the population and ruling elites—in particular a contract

between elites and the working class, or rather between elites and male manual workers and their families. That contract is now destroyed.

We usually think of this contract as embodied in the postwar settlement, or in the welfare state, because it involved the development of systems of social citizenship—universal entitlements mandated by state power. That is what I examine here, and I do it in two main parts. First, I describe this settlement, but I emphasise that it rested not only on state-enforced entitlements but also on a 'shadow' welfare state—a network of provision in the labour market and in wider civil society that enriched the bare entitlements of social citizenship. Second, I show how both the welfare state and its shadow were diminished by economic change and policy change. The result left large numbers of citizens stranded—and provided the conditions for elite loss of control. 'Populism' is the resulting crisis of elite control over popular politics.

Social Settlement, Social Citizenship and Social Contract

The welfare state that was created, notably but not exclusively in the postwar world, had three components. The first two are well-documented; the third is not.

The first consisted of *Les Trente Glorieuses*, to use Fourastié's image in his study of the 'invisible' transformation of France in the thirty years after 1945 (Fourastié 1979). The image was seductive but inaccurate. The transformation spanned more than three decades, was anything but invisible, and was not confined to France. Across Western Europe and North America the living conditions of workers were transformed. 'The glorious thirty' created an infrastructure which transformed the quality of everyday life by integrating most households into grids that delivered energy, safe sanitation, clean water and broadcast news and entertainment (Gordon 2017, 1–6). But it also did something more profound. By transforming productivity it laid the foundations for consumerism: access to goods that lessened the drudgery of domestic labour; an enriched diet; transformed personal hygiene; and increased geographical and social mobility. After the glorious thirty, access to a networked infrastructure delivering all these things was a de facto entitlement of citizenship—something symbolised by the national energy grids that were at the heart of Fourastié's 'invisible' revolution. As Fourastié (1979, 205, my translation) succinctly put it:

'production is a condition of consumption.' *Les Trente Glorieuses* might more accurately be called the 'glorious thirty plus.' Long before 1945 it had been born on both sides of the Atlantic: in the 1930s new industries like vehicle production created a working class employed in high-wage, high-productivity and high-security jobs.

That observation introduces the second feature of the citizenship contract that bound elites and the working class. Full employment, high wages and high productivity were closely connected to social innovations that in turn laid the fiscal foundations for social citizenship. The new economy, variously described as Fordist or Keynesian, aimed at stable full employment and fostering national economies—hence the centrality of active regional policy during the 'glorious thirty plus.' It created universal entitlements to free education, at the minimum up to adolescence, to income maintenance in old age and unemployment and to universal health care, free or nearly free at the point of treatment. New administrative technologies such as *Pay as You Earn* (developed in the UK in the World War II) meant that a stream of tax revenue could be extracted from the wages of the prosperous workforce to pay for these entitlements. All this was anatomised as early as 1950 in Marshall's classic essay (Marshall 1950).

Plainly these generalisations about the rise of social citizenship simplify, and in simplifying overlook the great variations in the character of the 'contract' between elites and workers during the 'glorious thirty plus.' The most important exception in the rise of social citizenship was the US, and it lay in particular in the failure of the US to create anything like citizenship entitlements to free health care on the West European model. But here the third, less well-documented feature of the contract is important. The US did provide health care free at the point of treatment—but it was occupationally based, and remains so: by 1980, 77 per cent of those in employment were enrolled in an employer-sponsored health insurance plan (Pew Research Centre 2016, 24). True, this part of the shadow welfare state did not provide mandated universal entitlements, but filled gaps and enriched the often-parsimonious benefits offered by the 'residual,' 'liberal' welfare systems of Anglo-America (to borrow Esping-Andersen's language). Beyond employment-based health insurance the most important part of the shadow welfare state was the system of occupationally based pensions: by 1980, 50 per cent of US workers were enrolled in some kind of retirement plan (Pew Research Centre 2016, 35).

The shadow welfare state was also important beyond the US. It was especially significant in the UK for a reason identified in Esping-Andersen's

study (Esping-Andersen 1990): the UK resembled more the US than either Bismarckian or Nordic systems because it offered only a residual, bare and often bleak system of welfare. That residual character was exemplified by the service often trumpeted as the quintessence of universal social citizenship: the National Health Service (NHS). 'Universal health care free at the point of treatment' in practice amounted to an entitlement to turn up in the surgery of a powerful gatekeeper (the General Practitioner) and to take whatever the gatekeeper offered—which might be anything from expensive hospital care to a placebo. The contract between elites and workers in the British system of social citizenship also perpetuated class inequality. It was signalled in both the title and substance of Marshall's essay: 'Citizenship *and social class*.' The institutions of citizenship enforced class stratification, notably in the way credentialism in education sorted the young into a hierarchy of institutions and regulated access to the most lucrative parts of the labour market (Marshall 1950, 9–10; my italics).

This bleak social citizenship contract was softened by the shadow welfare state. Marshall neglected it. The other great British theorist of welfare, Titmuss, did notice it, but he principally worried about the way it allowed the better off to manipulate the taxation system to part-fund things like private pensions (Titmuss 1963, 45–6, 217). Strictly, the shadow welfare state could not confer entitlements that amounted to social citizenship. But, as in the US, for large numbers of workers and their families it softened the hard edges of the contract between elites and workers. In the manufacturing and extractive sectors it provided materially significant benefits. Private sector provision of open defined benefit pension schemes (the most valuable) peaked at 8 million workers in the UK in 1967 (Pensions Policy Institute 2016, 1). Titmuss was right: many of the benefits distributed by the shadow welfare state reinforced the inequalities of the market economy. They created occupational pensions that reflected wage inequalities and allowed the better paid to manipulate the tax system to pay for shadow benefits like occupational pensions and private health insurance. But they were nevertheless an important underpinning of the postwar settlement. They also created, around the social world of the enterprise, a communal life that linked employees and their families with the workplace.[2] In the Anglo-American world the settlement was a good bargain for governing elites. At the cost of a residual welfare state delivering cheap and not very cheerful services, it brought social peace and, especially via the parties, elite control over popular politics.

It also had obvious weaknesses. Funding even the residual welfare state depended on the high wage, high productivity and high employment achievements of the 'glorious thirty plus.' On that conjunction depended the fiscal foundations of social citizenship. The shadow welfare state flourished under 'Fordism': an economy where big industrial concerns provided for male breadwinners not only stable work but also an array of social benefits that supplemented social citizenship and softened its hard edges.

Breaking the Contract

The above is a lost world. In this section, I describe how the contract in the postwar settlement was broken by elites, and analyse some of the consequences. The changes coincide with something well-known: the ascendancy of neo-liberalism in political thought and policy practice. The way this broke the contract can be summarised under four headings.

The Industrial Economy Was Hollowed Out

'Deindustrialisation' summarises a key change in the economy that had underpinned the social contract. The big industrial concerns that provided high-productivity, high-wage and secure jobs for working-class families shrank drastically. In the US, employment in manufacturing fell by 30 per cent between 1990 and 2015; in the UK, manufacturing jobs fell from just over 7.8 million in 1981 to 2.68 million in 2016 (Pew 2016, 25; Berry 2016 for the UK). Service jobs replaced those that in manufacturing and extractive industries had provided the economic base for working-class communities. The rise of female participation in the workforce, especially in the service sector, signalled the decline of a key family formation in the 'glorious thirty plus'—one with a single male breadwinner. Key benefits of the shadow welfare state declined to insignificance. In the UK, those eight million workers in open defined benefit pension schemes in 1967 had shrunk to 750,000 by 2016.[3] In the US, likewise, the coverage and generosity of retirement plans fell: 26 per cent of American workers were in a defined benefit plan in 1979; by 2014 it was 2 per cent (Employment Benefit Research Institute 2016). This was part of a wider pattern: as the old manufacturing and extractive industries shrank, not only did the shadow welfare state shrink, but there was also increased job insecurity and a rise in part-time working and zero-hour contracts. Employers used

the change in the balance of power in the workplace to practise a new authoritarianism, exercising increasing control over employees.

One of the most important consequences these changes had for the social contract in the postwar settlement is summarised in Fig. 14.1 for the UK. High productivity and high-wage jobs became restricted to those successful in the competition governed by educational credentialism. Thus one of the key conditions of the postwar settlement—a stream of tax-extracted revenue to pay for welfare—became more uncertain. In addition to this squeeze on revenue, there developed new demands from a greatly enlarged group, the working poor. This forced the state to create benefits that subsidised low pay. That is the story behind Fig. 14.1, showing a rise in the percentage of those drawing more out of the benefits system than they paid in taxes. The result has been a benefit system which is simultaneously increasingly complex and increasingly authoritarian. Elite thinking about welfare retains a historical assumption about income maintenance dating from the 'less eligibility' clause of the New Poor Law: that life on benefits should not be better rewarded than life in work. The assumption reflects elite belief that the population, especially its poorest part, suffers from an Original Sin, a preference for a life of subsidised idleness. It

Fig. 14.1 UK non-retired households receiving more in benefits than in taxes paid. Source and details of calculations: Foundational Economy Collective (2018, 37)

explains some of the horrors of the modern system, such as the persecution of sick and disabled welfare claimants. And, when combined with complexity, it explains why so much income maintenance is dominated by the search (as in Universal Credit) for an automatic calibrator that can regulate the flow of benefits to the poor according to the flow of income.

Citizenship Entitlements Were Displaced by 'Privatised Keynesianism'

As real income stagnated, and the benefits of the shadow welfare state like occupational pensions shrank in value, families resorted to a variety of strategies to maintain living standards. One was to transform the 'single male breadwinner' family into a two-income household. Another was what Crouch calls 'privatised Keynesianism': the resort to sale, mortgaging or remortgaging of assets by individual citizens to do the job of supporting consumption that in classic Keynesianism was the job of a deficit running state (Crouch 2009).

That is the key lesson of Fig. 14.2: the booms of the age of neo-liberalism (those of the Thatcher and the Blair years) were powered by equity withdrawal, mostly against the single most valuable asset that many people owned, the family home. In the US, it lay at the heart of the

Fig. 14.2 UK equity withdrawal 1970–2016. Source and details of calculations: Foundational Economy Collective (2018, 34)

sub-prime mortgage boom before the Great Financial Crisis (Aalbers 2012). An obvious limit to this is that, once remortgaged, the asset cannot be borrowed against again. Unless, that is, as is the case in the UK, housing market finance is manipulated to ensure (fairly) uninterrupted asset appreciation. For those excluded from home ownership—especially the young who disproportionately form 'generation rent'—privatised Keynesianism takes the form of running up card debt, an important feature of the US boom up to 2007. The limits to that are set by the moment when the credit cards are all maxed out, and the resort to payday lenders and criminal loan sharks is exhausted. That helps explain why the young have been among the most numerous 'populists' that elites fear: they either disproportionately decline to participate in the electoral contests organised by party elites or, as in France, they vote the wrong way. Another limit—shown in Fig. 14.2 by the shape of things since 2008—is set by what happened when privatised Keynesianism hit the wall of the Great Financial Crisis.

A New Plutocracy and a New World of Income Inequality Was Created

The age of the populist has also been the age of the plutocrat—or, rather, of the new plutocracy created by the world of share options, the pursuit of shareholder value and a plutocrat-friendly taxation system. These new plutocrats can make the robber barons of the gilded age seem restrained, but they are not at the heart of the transformation of the contract between elites and the people. True, the postwar settlement often involved punitive tax rates on high income, but they were not central to social citizenship—which concerned popular entitlements. More important than plutocracy has been the way labour markets have redistributed resources up the income hierarchy, especially to the top 5 per cent. This group is not seriously rich in the plutocratic sense, but it has appropriated most of the increase in productivity over the last thirty years. This is not just the effect of plutocracy. It is about the creation of new elites, privileged by their success in the contest of academic credentialism, who have used that early success to ascend to the apex of occupational hierarchies in both public and private sectors. It can be thought of as the consummation of the inequalities built into Marshall's regime of 'social citizenship and social class.'

The income inequalities produced in the age of neo-liberalism have not only widened the gap between occupational groups; they have also created new worlds of territorial deprivation. The human cost is the disappearance in the unsuccessful communities of the high-wage enterprises that lay at the heart of the postwar settlement and the shrinkage of the shadow welfare state that humanised work and enriched the contract between workers and elites. Blackpool in the UK is a striking case. It was a stronghold of Brexit, and is a concentration of almost every imaginable social ill (O'Connor 2017). Many of these declining communities have been deserted by elite institutions like banks and by public institutions like police and libraries. (Just about the only official figures who continue to live in them are religious ministers.)[4] They also signify the fourth feature of the broken contract: they are centres of ill-health, depression, alcohol-induced disease and declining life span.

Working Class Mortality and Morbidity Increased

For American workers displaced from secure and well-paid jobs in manufacturing and extractive industries the loss of employment has been a double catastrophe: to the loss of jobs must be added the loss of the health insurance coverage that was the most important benefit of the shadow welfare state in the US. Despite the passage of the Affordable Care Act, the number of Americans without insurance coverage was still over 27 million in 2016. This group is disproportionately young, has poor formal education and when working is disproportionately in the service sector (Berchick 2017). The growth of deductibles in private insurance cover means that the number of *underinsured* Americans—those who cannot cover the most important medical needs—has also grown. The underinsured, unsurprisingly, are disproportionately among the low paid (Commonwealth Fund 2016).

In short, this part of the shadow welfare state in the US is in decay. The results are documented in the work of Case and Deaton (2015), on rising morbidity and mortality among white non-Hispanic Americans since 1990. They show a growing health crisis among the key social group—white workers—in the postwar social settlement. These figures are unsurprising: a demoralised and dispossessed social group robbed of decent health care resorts to cheap over-the-counter drugs, tranquilisers, alcohol and pain killers, to try to deal with the emotional and physical consequences of dispossession. In the northern hemisphere I can think of only

one other instance where economic dispossession has caused such a national health disaster—Russia in the 1990s after the collapse of the old Soviet economy.

The NHS has helped the UK avert the worst of the American catastrophe, but as the example of Blackpool shows there are plenty of signs that a more limited disaster is happening. And there is now some early evidence that the long improvement in mortality and morbidity among the poorest classes and communities in the UK is being reversed (D. Campbell 2017).

Conclusion: Reaping the Whirlwind

'What ransom will property pay for the security which it enjoys?'[5] In relation to the postwar settlement, the answer to Joseph Chamberlain's question, sixty years after it was posed, was a surprisingly modest one. The regime of social citizenship which emerged from the postwar settlement in the Anglo-American world was less generous than the Bismarckian or Nordic settlements. But niggardly though it was, it stabilised an unequal social order and created a golden age of polyarchy where a few elitist parties monopolised political debate, political activism and political office.

It is a truism to say that what is loosely called populism is the result of the passing away of the postwar settlement. It is less of a truism to say that the contract that so benefitted elites was also broken by those elites. That is more contentious because the dominant interpretations of what happened from the early 1980s onwards picture it as the result of compelling, mostly structural change. The two most distinguished French observers of the change—Fourastié, the Catholic technocrat, and Piketty, the quasi-Marxist—both think of the 'glorious thirty' as an unrepeatable episode (Fourastié 1979, 260ff; Piketty 2014, 97). But the contract was broken, and the new world of neo-liberalism born, by choice, not impersonal structure. The deregulation of financial markets was a choice, made because economic and governing elites sensed advantage. That choice set free the forces of financialisation, led to the world of maximised shareholder value, enriched beyond the dreams of avarice those corporate managers who could deliver that maximised value and thus brought to birth income inequality and the new plutocracy. Choice created deregulated labour markets and often—as in the case of the miners in the UK—led the state to destroy whole working-class occupations. Choice fashioned taxation systems to enrich plutocrats. Choice positioned the UK as a post-industrial service economy in the international division of labour, where

the most important enterprises were branch subsidiaries of foreign enterprises. Choice sold over one and a half million social housing units, creating the conditions for 'generation rent.' Choice opted for the light touch deregulation of financial markets that led to the catastrophe of the Great Financial Crisis and the decade of austerity.

In his discussion of one group that would indeed embrace the label 'populist'—those idealistic young radical Russian intellectuals who went in search of the spirit of the people in the closing decades of the nineteenth century—Slezkine (2006, 141) describes populism as 'a poor man's socialism, a violent response to a modernity that had not yet arrived.' Over a century later that modernity has arrived, and it has left a large section of the population high and dry. To be more exact, a particular version of modernity was successfully promoted from the beginning of the 1980s. In business it promoted the maximisation of shareholder value and the organisation of production into global (or at least multinational) supply chains. In labour markets it promoted flexibility—which on the ground meant increased managerial authority over employees, an end to job security, the dissolution of the benefits of the shadow welfare state and the appropriation of productivity gains by the very best paid. In government it promoted high modernism: synoptic legibility, measurement and the subjection of civil society to a regime of performance measurement. In the UK and Europe, it promoted Madisonian government designed to insulate elites from popular influence. It made no such attempt in the US because the US already had a Madisonian constitution. In political culture it promoted an extreme form of metropolitanism and Europhilia in the UK, and identity politics at the expense of class politics in the US.

The proverb says: 'You can turn an aquarium into fish soup, but you cannot turn fish soup back into an aquarium.' In the decades after 1980 elites made fish soup of the postwar settlement. Now they are living with the consequences. They are right to be anxious; they have a lot to lose. In many discussions of populism the 'problem' is assumed to lie in the attitudes and behaviour of 'ordinary' (read 'normal') citizens. In the most recent anxious despatch from an elite institution (Harvard) the solution offered is to subject the population to civic education—an echo of Matthew Arnold's conviction that only education could cope with the 'Populace,' the word he used to describe a working class that liked 'bawling, hustling, and smashing [and] beer.'[6] But the betrayal in the broken contract suggests that the problem lies not with 'ordinary' people but with abnormal elites—the reckless opportunists examined in Davis's recent

dissection of elite life (Davis 2018). It is elites, not 'ordinary' people, who need re-education. But the scale of the problem suggests that re-education alone will not do the job.

Notes

1. On the general problem see Gerring (1999).
2. My wife grew up in the two decades after the end of the World War II in a mining family on the Lancashire coalfield. Her memories of the shadow welfare state show how central it was to family life. Some benefits were substantial: miners' occupational pensions and compensation for death or injury through industrial accident above and beyond official provision. Some were significant 'fringe benefits': free coal for the households; a system of occupational succession that gave preference to the sons of miners (to go down the pit) and daughters to go into the offices or work in canteen. Some were important in humanising family contact with the world of work: subsidised beer in the Miners' Welfare Club; Christmas parties and annual children's outings to the seaside. In 1960 there were 600,000 miners in the UK; multiply by at least two to estimate the numbers covered by this bit of the shadow welfare state. And there is an added twist in the Lancashire example. My wife grew up in a household of Lithuanian migrants, in a mining community with Lithuanians, Poles, Ukrainians, Irish and a few Italians: the shadow welfare state thus contributed to migrant integration into citizenship. In the EU referendum the constituency which includes this community (St Helens) voted leave by 58/42.
3. Calculated from Pensions Policy Institute (2016, 1).
4. Churches and mosques are the backbone of the Foodbank Movement in the UK. Thus in a generation the shadow welfare state has gone from organising seaside outings for children to supplying food to families.
5. Joseph Chamberlain, speech in Birmingham, 5 January 1885.
6. Arnold (1869/1993, 109). For the anxious despatch from Harvard, Mounck (2018).

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The Top Leader Fixation in British Politics

Archie Brown

During her third term as prime minister, Margaret Thatcher informed the political editor of *The Times* (and, later, of the BBC), Robin Oakley: 'I am not an "I" person. I am not an "I did this in my government," "I did that". I have never been an "I" person so I talk about "we"—the government … I cannot do things alone so it has to be "we". It is a Cabinet "we"…. Yes, you can lead very firmly but in the end the point of leadership is that you get a lot of other people with you, so is that clear?' (Oakley 2002, 133)

Oakley observed, 'Frankly, it wasn't; but there was something about the gleam in the Prime Minister's eye which made me feel that "We" had better be encouraged to talk about something else if the interview was to last the course' (Oakley 2002, 133). Oakley's offence had been to ask Mrs Thatcher why she had used the royal 'we' in announcing a birth in the family with the words, 'We are a grandmother'. In reality, Thatcher had to be urged—by the few people who were not afraid to risk her wrath—to use the first-person singular less and embrace a more collegial leadership. Occasionally, as in the 'grandmother' instance, she would overcompensate with an inappropriate 'we', but her personalistic style of

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rule remained very different from the gloss she put on it when interviewed by Oakley.

Several years earlier, Mrs Thatcher had received a 'blockbuster' memorandum, scathingly critical of the way she led the government, written mainly by the Head of the 10 Downing Street Policy Unit, John Hoskyns, with another prime ministerial adviser David Wolfson and speechwriter Ronnie Miller as co-signatories. The trio told her that she 'broke every rule of good man-management'. They added: 'You bully your weaker colleagues. You criticise colleagues in front of each other and in front of their officials. … You give little praise or credit, and you are too ready to blame others when things go wrong'. She had, they told her, 'an absolute duty to change the way you operate'. It was time she started saying 'we' and not 'I' (Hoskyns 2000, 323–8; Moore 2013, 641–3). Hoskyns believed that Thatcher's survival as prime minister was at stake and that he was trying to be helpful. He had hoped that the document, written in August 1981, would be a prelude to a constructive conversation with the three signatories about how she might usefully mend her ways, and he was surprised by the lack of response until two or three weeks later, 'she hissed at me, out of the corner of her mouth as we sat down to start a meeting in her study: "I got your letter. No one has ever written a letter like that to a prime minister before"' (Hoskyns 2000, 327).

Hoskyns had his own explanation for why Thatcher survived for so long (although her leadership style was, ultimately, to be her undoing), and even prospered, while continuing to treat cabinet colleagues in the way he deplored: 'Her good luck, her achievements, the Falklands victory, the Brighton bomb, the Reagan factor, Michael Foot's leadership of the Labour Party, Kinnock's succession, the growing evidence of economic success, Gorbachev and the gradual collapse of the Soviet Union—all these things combined to make … her position become unassailable' (Hoskyns 2000, 328). Notably, the list omits a particularly important factor in the success of the Conservative Party in the 1983 general election—the creation of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the effect of the Liberal/SDP Alliance vote on Labour's chances of returning to power.

The reason for beginning this chapter with Margaret Thatcher and her style of rule is that she is central to its main arguments. The Thatcher government gave a huge impetus to the idea that political power in Britain belongs, above all, to the prime minister rather than to the government or cabinet. Her leadership style also influenced expectations of British party leaders more generally, including leaders of the Labour Party. The political

commentariat has, moreover, largely bought into the Thatcher and post-Thatcher assumptions about the powers that belong to the prime minister individually and have, in turn, influenced assumptions within the political class about what prime ministers are *entitled* to do. Such has been the change in the terms of political discourse that even senior cabinet ministers will treat, and speak of, the prime minister as their 'boss' in a way barely conceivable for their counterparts in the governments headed by Clement Attlee, Harold Macmillan, Harold Wilson or James Callaghan.

Britain is not, of course, the worst example of the dangers of misplaced faith in a strong leader, the idea of a 'strongman' as saviour of the country. There are numerous contemporary examples of intolerant 'strong leaders' with populist appeal who are doing long-term damage to democracy in their countries, whether Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt, Racep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey or, in milder variants, Vladimir Putin in Russia and Viktor Orbán in Hungary. That the false allure of the strong leader may threaten even long-established democracies is disturbingly clear from the impulsive and narcissistic presidency of Donald J. Trump in the US. Survey research has shown that not only in the US but internationally, too, Trump is perceived as a strong leader. But 'strong' is not a synonym for 'wise'. A majority of respondents in thirty-seven countries perceived him to be also 'arrogant, intolerant and dangerous' (Pew 2017). The extent to which one person has been empowered to take decisions that have damaging consequences throughout the world (for climate change, international trade and respect for treaty obligations, to name but three), and in a country famed for its constitutional 'checks and balances', should be a warning for the UK, which has less separation of powers than exists in the US (although even in America the supposed independence of the Congress and the Supreme Court is now being severely tested).

With all that in mind, I argue that in a democracy we should not put up with great concentration of power in the hands of one person (Brown 2014, 2016). It is not enough to note the change from a 'we' to an 'I' style of leadership. It is lamentable that this trend has been accepted so unquestioningly, with party leaders admired as 'strong leaders' the more they dominate their colleagues, and praised when they hog the limelight for appearing to be in tune with an age of celebrity. My contention is that a more collective leadership is not only normatively preferable in a democracy to placing ever more decisions in the top leader's hands, but also less prone to policy 'blunders' of the kind eloquently analysed by Anthony King and Ivor Crewe (King and Crewe 2013).

The old debate which began in the 1960s about whether Britain has prime ministerial or cabinet government has given way in the political science literature to a focus on 'the core executive' (although the latter term has no resonance beyond academia). The literature on the core executive moves beyond the prime ministerial government versus cabinet government dichotomy, an either-or which, in some (but by no means all) of the earlier literature, greatly oversimplified the complex reality. Underlining the obvious point that there are only twenty-four hours in a prime minister's day, and that many institutions and individuals contribute to the making of major policy, is helpful up to a point. Yet it leaves open the question of the ways in which the top leader's power may have increased and, to the extent it has, the normative issue of whether a greater concentration of power in one person's hands should be meekly accepted or vigorously challenged.

What is clear is that there has *not* been a steady upward curve in a prime minister's powers, for even if the secular trend should be upwards, there have been many ups and downs over the decades. Writing in the 1960s, I noted that 'no Prime Ministers in the twentieth century have exercised greater power than Lloyd George and Chamberlain' (Brown 1968, 44). That was, of course, before the governments headed by Edward Heath and by Margaret Thatcher came into being. As King observed, Heath's style was 'certainly more collegial than Chamberlain's but 'he dominated his government—and dominated it across the board—to an extent that few of his predecessors had', while 'Margaret Thatcher was 'an even stronger leader than Heath and an infinitely more successful one' (King 2016, 133–4). Although John Major made a virtue of leading the Conservative government in a very different manner from the Iron Lady, the length of time Thatcher spent in 10 Downing Street, the extent to which she stamped her personality and policy preferences on the government and the fact that she led her party for fifteen years and was prime minister for eleven and a half has had a significant impact on perceptions of leadership and on understandings of the prime minister's role in the UK.

There was a direct link between the governments headed by Thatcher and by the second longest-serving post-war British Prime Minister, Tony Blair. Margaret Thatcher's closest aide was her private secretary, Charles Powell, of whom her foreign policy adviser, Sir Percy Cradock, said it was sometimes 'difficult to establish where Mrs Thatcher ended and Charles Powell began' and that Powell 'frequently overstepped the line between the official and the political domains' (Cradock 1997, 14–15). His younger

brother, Jonathan Powell, was Tony Blair's chief of staff and, though a political appointee, he was (along with Alastair Campbell) accorded the right to give instructions to civil servants in a break with traditional (and subsequent) constitutional procedure. Jonathan Powell's capacious interpretation of the powers a prime minister was entitled to wield undoubtedly owed a good deal to the example of the Thatcher administration and to his knowledge of the role played by his elder sibling. Before Blair entered 10 Downing Street, Powell voiced his preference for a 'Napoleonic system' of government, one in which 10 Downing Street would not put up with ministers 'who pay fealty to their liege but really get on with whatever they want to do' (Powell 2010, 78).

In practice, Blair was not as dominating as he wished to be (or as ruthless as Powell thought he should have been) because of the countervailing power wielded by Gordon Brown at the Treasury. In any government the Treasury is hugely important and its political head an especially influential member of the government. Even by normal Treasury standards, however, Brown's dominance of economic policy-making was exceptional and Blair had much less of an impact on that central area of policy than had, for example, Harold Macmillan. The importance of the office of chancellor and the seniority of its incumbents are such that they normally serve for a lengthy period, although Brown's ten years were very much at the upper end of the spectrum. In contrast, Macmillan (whose experience as an MP in the north-east of England during the 1930s depression left an indelible imprint on him) had four different chancellors and somewhat uneasy relations with all of them during his premiership of less than seven years. The first two resigned and the third, Selwyn Lloyd, was dismissed as the most prominent casualty of Macmillan's 1962 'night of the long knives' when he sacked a third of his cabinet and in the process did himself much more political harm than good. Blair, although sometimes tempted, never dared to sack Brown, since it was predictable that this would merely hasten his own political ousting.

Thatcher and Blair, however, both pushed further prime ministerial dominance of foreign policy-making. This has been an area of growth in power of heads of executive ever since the Second World War. The increase in the speed of travel and communications has led to heads of government meeting their counterparts more frequently. Thus, diplomacy at the highest level has meant meetings between a prime minister and foreign premier or presidential counterpart. In Britain the trend began not so much with Winston Churchill during the Second World War as with Neville

Chamberlain on the eve of that conflict. Chamberlain illustrated the dangers of prime ministers who come to believe that they alone know best and that they are entitled to take the big foreign policy decisions. There was nothing surprising or reprehensible about Chamberlain's determination to avoid war a mere two decades after the carnage of 'the Great War' and given that British public opinion was very much in line with the prime minister's pacific stance. The problems were Chamberlain's excessive belief in the superiority of his own judgement; his treatment of Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden who, notwithstanding his own later catastrophic decisions over Suez, knew much more about foreign policy and other countries than Chamberlain did; his presentation of a sordid compromise agreement with Hitler as a great triumph; and the trust he bestowed in the German dictator to keep his word (a gullibility that in that last respect he shared with an unlikely counterpart, Josif Stalin).

Even though prime ministers have come to play a larger role in foreign policy in the post-war period than they generally did in the previous half-century (with Lloyd George and Chamberlain the big exceptions to that generalisation), they have usually done so in close collaboration with the foreign secretary. Indeed, in the immediate post-war Labour government, Ernest Bevin was the principal foreign policy-maker and Attlee was content with this, even though he took a strong interest in this area of policy himself. That reflected both his style of leadership in which ministers were allowed to get on with the job (unless Attlee came to the conclusion they were not up to it, though he never dismissed any major member of the cabinet) and his particular trust in the judgement and character of Bevin. When Harold Laski, who just happened by rotation to be chairman of the national executive committee of the Labour Party in 1945, used that position to speak in the name of the recently elected Labour government and to give interviews to foreign newspapers, Attlee wrote to him that 'Foreign affairs are in the capable hands of Ernest Bevin' and that the Foreign Secretary's task was 'quite sufficiently difficult' without Laski adding to it with irresponsible statements. Accordingly, 'a period of silence on your part would be welcome' (Martin 1969, 153). Attlee naturally felt free to offer his opinion on certain issues to Bevin. He urged him to consider the entire British withdrawal from the Middle East (a policy that was pursued only after the Suez debacle twenty years later) and he may well have been right. The point in the present context, however, is that Bevin felt free to reject that advice and did so.

It is inconceivable that Margaret Thatcher would have written of British foreign policy being in the capable hands of anyone other than herself, and least of all Geoffrey Howe whom she treated with particular disdain. When Thatcher made her longest visit to the Soviet Union in late March and the beginning of April 1987—a highly successful venture, for she had earned the respect of Gorbachev by the knowledge she displayed of Soviet domestic reforms and was regarded as an especially useful interlocutor because of her closeness to and influence over Reagan—she even attempted to prevent the foreign secretary accompanying her, but had to give way on that point following vigorous protests from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) (Moore 2015, 623). Prior to that Moscow visit, Howe had accepted an invitation to write an article for the Soviet magazine, *New Times*. The prime minister was shown the FCO draft and demanded 'Massive deletions', as its tone was too conciliatory for her taste. She was especially outraged with Howe's use of phraseology that seemed to put him on an equal footing with the prime minister in the making of foreign policy when he wrote, 'Mrs Thatcher and I', a phrase she circled and wrote 'No no no' (Moore 2015, 619).

While Tony Blair was less overbearing than Thatcher, it is hard also to imagine him following Attlee's example and writing that British foreign policy was in 'the capable hands' of either Robin Cook or Jack Straw. Blair was even more of an 'I' person than Thatcher and more so than any previous post-war Labour leader.[1] He constantly attributed Labour's election victories to himself, although John Major accepted that Labour would surely win handsomely even without 'Black Wednesday' when the UK crashed out of the European ERM (Exchange Rate Mechanism). Of 'Black Wednesday' (16 September 1992), Major wrote: 'On that day, a fifth consecutive Conservative election victory, which always looked unlikely unless the opposition were to self-destruct, became remote, if not impossible' (Major 2000, 312; see also Bartle and Crewe 2002, 84–8). The Labour Party was heading for a landslide victory in 1997 under any half-way competent leader, and John Smith, who died suddenly in May 1994, was highly competent, an outstanding House of Commons performer who had already been a successful cabinet minister. Blair was fortunate to acquire the leadership at an optimal moment for his party, given that their victory in the next election was all but certain. When Labour won again in 2001, Blair was still a plus rather than a minus, but not of decisive importance for the Labour victory. It was the economy (Gordon Brown's domain) that 'was crucial as a determinant of voting choice' (Butler and Kavanagh 2002, 241).

By 2005, two years after the launch of the Iraq war—with Blair's role in ensuring British participation increasingly seen to be a disastrous mistake—the party leader was becoming a liability and even further from being the reason for Labour's holding on to government. In countless interviews and on one of the earliest pages of his memoirs, Blair has repeated, 'I won three general elections' (Blair 2010, xvi). It is remarkable that so many others (including Labour MPs, almost traumatised by four successive electoral defeats) have taken this personalisation of the victories at face value and have succumbed to its post hoc, ergo propter hoc illogic.

Blair shared Margaret Thatcher's view that a decision to commit British lives and limbs to a war should be essentially the prime minister's. 'If', he wrote, 'you had told me on that bright [1997] May morning as I first went blinking into Downing Street that during my time in office I would commit Britain to fight four wars, I would have been bewildered and horrified' (Blair 2010, 522). On Iraq specifically, Blair claimed a personal right to take the decision to enter the war, writing that 'most people felt Iraq was a difficult decision' and they 'sympathised with the fact *the leader* had to take the decision' [italics, AB] (Blair 2010, 522). Although he did not always get the last word on every policy decision even of international significance—he was, for example, determined to take Britain into the common European currency, but was thwarted by Gordon Brown—Blair took the view that this was his entitlement. As he put it, 'ultimately I'm the prime minister and have to decide' (Blair 2010, 28).

The trend towards setting prime ministers far above every other member of the government was briefly carried a stage further by Theresa May in 2017, although it did not turn out well for the premier. Her aspiration to dominate party and government was a central feature of her ill-judged election campaign in that year. Personalising the campaign still more than any of her predecessors had done, she aimed to enhance her power over her cabinet colleagues and parliamentary party by gaining the credit for what she, and most of the mass media, assumed would be a greatly enhanced parliamentary majority. By contrasting 'her' government with one led by Jeremy Corbyn she believed that she was focusing on Labour's weakest link. While it is true that Corbyn, even as voters went to the polls, still ran behind his party in opinion surveys, his popularity surged greatly during the election period and the wide gap between the party leaders' ratings at the start of the campaign narrowed dramatically. A Labour Party manifesto which was more radical than that presented to the country by Ed Miliband two years earlier reflected the change in the balance of power

in the Labour Party. It turned out to be more popular than the cautious approach, especially on the economy, adopted two years earlier. Corbyn benefited also from looking at home on the campaign trail, whereas May appeared anything but comfortable even in carefully choreographed meetings with Conservative supporters.

What is most relevant in the present context is the extent to which the Conservative Party became no more than 'Theresa May's team' and the party manifesto became '*my* manifesto', a claim to ownership of it that turned out to be especially embarrassing when an unpopular policy on social care had to be abandoned only four days after the manifesto's launch. This was emblematic of a non-collegial style of leadership in which May relied on her unelected aides, Nick Timothy and Fiona Hill, but kept ministerial colleagues at a distance. Ministers responsible for particular policy areas covered by the manifesto were presented with a fait accompli. Thus, the unpopular policy on residential and domiciliary care—or the 'dementia tax', as it was promptly dubbed—had major implications for the then Communities Secretary Sajid Javid and Health Secretary Jeremy Hunt, but they were merely informed of its inclusion in the manifesto less than twenty-four hours before the document's launch (Watt 2017). A senior minister told the political editor of the *Sunday Times*, 'We are all complicit. We were spineless' (Shipman 2017, 285). People in marginal constituencies were bombarded with letters and leaflets, in which Theresa May asked them 'to back me'. The literature was in tone and content more evocative of a presidential than a parliamentary election. In the briefest of passing mentions to the 2017 general election campaign in her speech to the Conservative Party annual conference in October of that year, the prime minister acknowledged that it had been 'too scripted' and 'too presidential' (May 2017, 2).

Media commentary on the prime minister's performance frequently contrasted the 'strong and stable' government promised by the prime minister with the new reality of an administration propped up by the votes of Northern Ireland Unionists. May's repetitive, almost robotic, campaign style likewise attracted a good deal of adverse attention. Characteristically, however, there was little focus on the more fundamental issue of whether a prime minister *should* dominate a government in the way May's rhetoric and campaign literature suggested. The more problems that are referred to the prime minister, the more decisions she is expected to make personally, the less time she has to weigh the pros and cons in every case and the more de facto power thereby devolves to the premier's principal aides.

Unsurprisingly, they are the people most eager to concentrate ever more power in 10 Downing Street and the most enthusiastic advocates of dominating prime ministers. Thus, Jonathan Powell writes: 'The little secret of the British constitution is that the centre of government is not too powerful but too weak', and he sees as a problem something that should, rather, be welcomed: the fact that a prime minister needs to use persuasion to get her or his way and can only lead a government 'by building coalitions of support and by carrying his colleagues with him' (Powell 2010, 29).

If a prime minister can issue orders to cabinet colleagues, as distinct from trying to persuade them to adopt a particular course of action, that is very convenient for the prime minister's aides who may—and often will—be the progenitors of the proposal. Decision-making by a prime minister and a coterie of aides has, however, serious disadvantages. It leads to groupthink and to policies not receiving the critical scrutiny they require. When a domineering prime minister acts as if she or he is indeed the 'boss', rather than captain of a team, a likely outcome is self-censorship on the part of senior colleagues who should not feel the need to be hesitant about contradicting the leader in any country deserving the name of democracy.

Prime ministers and party leaders, unless they are as well-grounded as a Stanley Baldwin or a Clement Attlee, are too ready to augment their powers at the expense of their colleagues. It is time to ask what is so admirable about one-person rule that we wish to encourage an individual leader to accumulate ever more power. There is, perhaps, an unacknowledged assumption that the only way to effect great change is through having one person driving it through rather in the way in which Margaret Thatcher led the 1979–1990 government. Yet the government headed by Attlee during 1945–1951 changed at least as much as did the Thatcher government—in a different direction—although Attlee's style was utterly different. He neither hogged the limelight nor tried to dominate his ministerial colleagues. If there was one area in which he had greater influence than any other, it was defence. But he did not try to usurp the authority of departmental ministers or claim a special prerogative for the leader. During his premiership, Attlee told the Labour Party conference in 1948: 'Whilst every Minister is responsible for his own departmental decisions the collective responsibility both in home and foreign policy is with the Cabinet. We share the blame or the credit for every action of the Government' (Attlee 1948).

Attlee's criticisms of Winston Churchill's chairmanship of the cabinet (notwithstanding his great admiration for Churchill) are consistent with the way he exercised his own leadership. He wrote a private letter to Churchill, during the last phase of the wartime coalition government, to complain that the prime minister was paying too much attention to two ministers who were not in the cabinet. They happened to be Churchill's personal cronies—Lord Beaverbrook and Brendan Bracken—but Attlee did not dwell on that. He focused on what he said was 'a serious constitutional issue', namely that 'in the eyes of the country and under our constitution the eight members of the War Cabinet take responsibility for decisions' (Jenkins 2001, 776). In the same letter Attlee complained that Churchill had become too lax about reading cabinet committee minutes and, moreover, that he spoke at excessive length, and frequently not to the point, in cabinet meetings. The aptness of the rebuke was noted even by Churchill's loyal private secretary (Colville 1985, 554–5). Yet Churchill himself was, as he put it, 'a great believer in bringing things before the Cabinet' and as peacetime prime minister in the first half of the 1950s, he took pride in the fact that 'we had 110 Cabinet meetings in the past year; while the Socialists had only 85 in a year—and that a time of great political activity' (Moran 1966, 404). In those years R.A. Butler, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, dominated the economic policy-making process. Churchill, he said, 'did not interfere at all'. Even where the budget was concerned, the prime minister expressed only the most general of sentiments, such as 'I hope you're not going to forget the poor' or 'I hope it's not just going to be more dividends for the rich' (Brown 2014, 90).

The more widely it is taken for granted that prime ministers and leaders of the opposition will take all the big decisions within their respective parties, the more these leaders will be emboldened to act on that assumption. It should not be too much to expect politicians who aspire to occupy positions of power or influence within the country to insist that better decisions will be reached through a more collective and collegial leadership exercised by people of some standing within their party and the country, as distinct from a coterie of the leader's placemen and placewomen. Following the UK general election of 2017, a British prime minister is more constrained, and cabinet ministers more emboldened, than they generally have been in recent decades. The circumstances are peculiar because the prime minister bears responsibility for holding an unnecessary general election which weakened both her and her party. There is nothing

wrong—indeed, a great deal that is right—with strong and stable government, a government that can get things done. The mistake is to conflate this, as May so persistently tried to do, with the more complete domination within cabinet, parliament, party and country of one person at the top of the political hierarchy. Even the greatest of prime ministers were not chosen because they were believed to possess a monopoly of wisdom. So why should we admire the prime minister or party leader who rules by pulling rank instead of seeking through persuasion and reasoned argument to influence colleagues? Rather than meekly accept the dominance of one person, we should abandon deference and challenge the presumptuousness of power-maximising leaders.

Note

1. More of an 'I' person, almost certainly, than *any* earlier Labour leader, but I can write with some certainty only of the post-war leaders, since I read every speech to the Labour Party conference of leaders from 1945 onwards I could lay my hands on (which was almost all of them). No previous leader used the first-person singular anything like as often as did Blair. It was 'we', 'this party', 'this great movement', 'a Labour government' and so on. Even Hugh Gaitskell, in his famous speech to the 1960 party conference, defying the impending conference vote in favour of unilateral nuclear disarmament, did not say 'I will fight and fight again' but, rather: 'There are some of us, Mr Chairman, who will fight, and fight, and fight again, to save the party we love'.

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Anthony King's Contribution to the Study of Liberal Democracy

Constitutional Reform and the Functioning of UK Democracy

Peter Riddell

The past two decades have seen far-reaching constitutional changes in the name of improving democracy, yet, at the same time, a marked decline in trust in, and respect for, democratic political institutions—and, most recently, a fracturing of the political system itself.

Anthony King was not only an astute commentator on these trends, notably in his classic study of 2007 *The British Constitution*, but also a participant in many of the debates about changing the British institutional system, particularly as an inaugural member of the Committee on Standards in Public Life from 1994 until 1998, and then as a member of the Wakeham Commission on reform of the House of Lords. He was both a believer in the potential for improving the workings of government— and the executive's relations with voters—and a realist about the results.

From the current perspective, 'The British Constitution' appears as a mid-term report, after the legislative changes of the early Blair period had been implemented but before the populist uprising of the current decade, let alone the post-Brexit/post-Trump election agonising about whether liberal democracy can survive. Anthony King contrasted the old and new constitutions and the incoherence of the process of change with no overall

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plan, leading him to conclude that the 'British constitution is a complete mess'. His perspective of 2007 underlined not only the piecemeal nature of constitutional change up to that date but also the unforeseen consequences which have only later become apparent.

Anthony King identified a series of distinct changes, some pre-dating the election of the Blair Government in May 1997:

1. Membership of the European Community, then Union, involving a huge transfer of competence and responsibilities to European institutions. Revealingly, in 2007, there was no serious thought that the UK might leave the EU.
2. The growth of judicial activism from the early 1980s onwards, linked to, but not dependent upon, the Human Right Act of 1998 and the creation of the Supreme Court.
3. Devolution with the legislative transfer of powers in an asymmetrical way to elected bodies in Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast, as well as the creation of directly elected mayors in London and some other English local authorities.
4. A proliferation of new elections and the adoption of various proportional and quasi-proportional electoral systems (in addition to the previously dominant, but not exclusive, first-past-the-post system, still used for the House of Commons).
5. A shift in the traditional relationships of ministers and civil servants with the growth in the role of politically appointed special advisers, together with a greater emphasis on management and implementation in the civil service.
6. The increased use of referendums for major constitutional changes, such as devolution, and promised for European developments.
7. Freedom of Information legislation, epitomising a broader trend towards increased accountability and transparency of the way government works.
8. House of Lords reform. While the proposals of the Wakeham Commission were not implemented, the 1999 act removing the majority of hereditary peers, and the creation of more life peers, made the second chamber more assertive.

Anthony King rightly stressed how these changes were incoherent and 'particularistic'. I have written (in McDonald, editor, 2007) about the separate and distinct origins of many of the legislative reforms introduced after 1997: for instance, the long-standing debate amongst centre-left

lawyers leading to the Human Rights Act; and the Scottish Constitutional Convention of 1992–1995 producing the proposals for legislative devolution for Scotland in 1997–1998. The campaign for freedom of information legislation was always developed separately. In practice, the long period of Conservative rule and Thatcherism, or rather the distinctive style of Margaret Thatcher herself, was the inspiration for the revival of the constitutional debate in Britain from the late 1980s onwards. Circumstance and opportunity played a large part both in framing the changes and in determining which succeeded and which did not. It proved less hard to establish new elected bodies and new electoral systems where none had previously existed—such as creating the new arrangements for Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and London—than in changing long-established existing systems. The proposals of the Jenkins Commission in December 1998 for a mixed electoral system for the House of Commons—electing members by the alternative vote in single member constituencies, topped up by others to provide a slightly more proportional outcome—were quickly sidelined by Tony Blair. This was because of opposition from Labour ministers and MPs, and the absence of any pressing electoral or political reason to make a change. A referendum during the coalition government in May 2011 saw an alternative vote system rejected by a more than two to one margin. Similarly, once most of the hereditary peers were removed from the House of Lords in 1999, there has never been sufficient political energy to overcome the forces of the status quo to move away from a largely appointed second chamber to a system of partial or complete election.

No government has attempted to fit all these changes together into a comprehensive plan. Indeed, there was a very British aversion to any idea of Founding Fathers and a Constitutional Convention as in Philadelphia in 1787. Calls for a constitutional convention and wholesale reform made little or no progress during the premierships of either Tony Blair or Gordon Brown. This was despite Gordon Brown's proclaimed greater interest in constitutional reform, and in citizens' assemblies as a means of producing greater direct popular participation, notably in the wake of the comprehensive plans for changing the constitution proposed by the Power Inquiry and its *Power to the People* report of February 2006.

Anthony King was sceptic about such a sweeping, permanent revolution in Britain's constitutional structure. In the conclusion to *The British Constitution*, finished at the end of 2006 but published the following autumn, he argued that demands for a written constitution with a capital

C were likely to fall on deaf ears, and deserved to because: there was no need for a written constitution; there was no popular demand for either a constitutional convention or a written constitution; a broadly agreed draft constitution would probably not emerge from the proposed convention; there was a high probability that an agreed constitution would be a bad one, possibly a very bad one; even if men and women of comparable stature could be attracted to such a convention, it is not at all clear that attending would be the most profitable use of their time; and the UK had already undergone—since the late 1960s—a period of intense and unremitting constitutional change. 'Enough is enough', he concluded, 'if not forever, then at least for the time being. There does not appear on the face of it to be a good case for instituting a Maoist permanent revolution in Britain's constitutional structure. Rather the contrary'. He did, however, argue that there was a strong case for addressing some of the problems and instabilities identified earlier in his book such as the long-term financing of the devolved parliaments, the issue of Scottish and Welsh representation at Westminster, the constitutional status of the House of Lords, whether a distinction should now be drawn between constitutional and non-constitutional acts of parliament and whether there should be an agreed convention concerning the occasions when national referendums ought to be held. Only the first two have been partially addressed with Scotland, and to a lesser extent, Wales granted greater fiscal powers and some limitations on rights of Scottish (and where relevant Welsh) members of the House of Commons to vote on legislation and measures affecting only England and/or Wales. But nothing has happened on the other items on Anthony King's wish list.

Anthony King's analysis has been vindicated in that there has been no codified or written constitution, nor any serious government attempt to create one (although there have been private and academic attempts to hold citizens' assemblies). The implicit assumption that a piecemeal approach would continue was challenged in the following decade in ways which he did not anticipate. The arrival of Gordon Brown as Prime Minister in mid-2007 proved to be a false dawn, promising a second wave of reform in the hurriedly written Green Paper 'The Governance of Britain'. In the words of Vernon Bogdanor, a critic of Anthony King's constitutional work, writing in February 2008: 'the first phase, from 1997, transferred power from one group of professional politicians to another—from politicians at Westminster to politicians in Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast—and from politicians to judges. It was concerned, crudely, with

how the officer class were to divide the spoils. The next phase promises to be more fundamental, opening up new avenues of participation and so helping to transfer power from politicians to the people'. These hopes were not fulfilled as the diffuse, hurriedly drafted and often ill-thought out ideas in the July 2007 Green Paper generally made little headway and were overshadowed by the Brown Government's understandable priority of handling the banking crisis of 2008 and the subsequent recession.

Nonetheless, the changes since 1997—as well as the earlier ones such as entry into the European Community and the growth of judicial activism— have had a big cumulative impact. Anthony King argued that the UK had shifted from having a power concentration constitution to a power sharing/diffusion constitution. Politicians outside London mattered in a way they had not for decades. The devolved administrations and assemblies in Edinburgh, Cardiff, Belfast (with important, and ever longer, interruptions) and London have proved to be important alternative power bases challenging the previous dominance of central government in London and the Westminster Parliament. If the process was incomplete, and patchy, it still represented what Anthony King described as a move towards, if not to, a new constitution.

Moreover, the creation of the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition in May 2010 saw a renewed debate on some unresolved areas of constitutional reform, but little fundamental change with the overwhelming rejection in May 2011 of the Alternative Vote system of electing members of the House of Commons and recriminations between the coalition partners over the failure of a fresh initiative on House of Lords reform. Attempts to reduce the size of the Commons, from 650 to 600 MPs, on the basis of equal-sized constituencies also stalled. Proposals to strengthen the independence of select committees in the Commons, which had been proposed by Tony Wright's committee in 2009 in the wake of the expenses scandal, were implemented after the 2010 election—notably the election of their chairs by all MPs. The changes have had an impact on the standing and influence of committees. Perhaps the most significant change, at least for the governing parties and politicians if not for voters, was the Fixed Term Parliaments Act providing for general elections on a fixed date every five years. This happened in 2015, but two years later the May Government used one of the two over-ride provisions (a two-thirds majority of all MPs voting for an earlier dissolution, the other being a vote of no confidence) to seek an early general election. In addition, and largely associated with the Scottish independence referendum in 2014, there were further

transfers of powers to Scotland and Wales, notably greater control over tax-raising for the Scottish Government and Parliament.

The post-1997 changes were all justified in the name of improving accountability, bringing power nearer to the people and opening up the workings of government—united under the convenient, and often vague, umbrella of strengthening democracy. An increasing range of legislative and administrative powers was moved away from central government to the devolved executives on the one hand and to EU institutions on the other. But there were contradictions. As Anthony King often pointed out, there was a growing weakening of the role and financial independence of local authorities, under administrations of both main parties. Many reforms of public services, notably in education and health, strengthened the role of the centre, often by establishing direct relations with new local providers such as academies and other schools, or foundation trusts running hospitals. So there was often less democracy in the running of such services, and democratically elected local councils had less power, and financial freedom, than previously.

To look at the issue in a contrarian way, as Anthony King much enjoyed, what might have happened if the institutional changes—especially the creation of the devolved bodies—had not happened? The claim by Labour leaders in the late 1990s that the creation of the Scottish Parliament would undermine the Scottish National Party (SNP) and its demands for independence appeared at one level to have been contradicted by the latter party's success in ending Labour dominance in Scotland and taking office in 2007, and retaining it since then. Yet the outcome of the referendum on independence in September 2014, and the setbacks suffered by the SNP in the June 2017 general election in reaction to its calls for a second referendum, suggests that the legislative devolution of 1999, and its subsequent enhancement, was sufficient for many Scottish voters who did not want full independence. So in that sense constitutional change succeeded in addressing the pre-1997 grievances about remote rule from London and headed off full independence. If these changes had not happened, the political situation in Scotland could have been more unstable and demands for independence could not have been avoided. And Brexit has introduced further uncertainty.

Moreover, there have been unintended consequences. Referendums have become an accepted part of the constitutional landscape, yet there has been no real discussion, let along agreement, on the circumstances when they should be called, their status and how binding they should

be—all points of contention after the vote to leave the EU in the June 2016 referendum. The referendum has moved from being legally advisory to, in effect, being binding, and being seen as trumping parliamentary sovereignty. Supporters of leaving the EU have seen any attempt in Parliament to modify or qualify withdrawal as flouting the will of the people. A parallel example is the negative political and media response to rulings by the senior judiciary, most recently over the judgements by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court in December 2016 and January 2017 over the need for parliamentary approval for triggering withdrawal from the EU—summed up in the *Daily Mail* headline 'Enemies of the People' about the former ruling.

The chain of causation is hard to establish but the process of constitutional change has been linked with increased public frustration with government and certainly not with satisfaction that past grievances have been addressed. Anthony King was involved in this process as a member of the Committee on Standards in Public Life which produced a series of reports in the mid-and-late 1990s which led to the creation of a set of new codes and regulators overseeing the outside interests of MPs (especially their lobbying activities), standards of local councillors, the public appointments system and a whole new framework for spending by political parties and the conduct of elections under the Electoral Commission.

Yet the tighter regulation, new codes and greater transparency did not produce greater trust in the political system—rather the reverse. Indeed, as Tony Wright, the political academic turned MP, who chaired the old Public Administration Select Committee up to 2010, pointed out, publishing codes and, for example, highlighting the details of MPs' outside financial interests had had the effect of increasing public discontent with politicians and current institutional arrangements. So these reform proposals, desirable in themselves, have tended to lead to lower, rather than increased, public confidence, as had been intended and hoped. The political philosopher Onora O'Neill was prescient in her 2002 Reith lectures in warning that some of the regimes of accountability and transparency developed over the previous 15 years may have damaged rather than reinforced trustworthiness. She noted the paradox that we still depend on the very people whom we claim not to trust. In particular, she maintained that new mechanisms of accountability and targets can undermine the professionals on whom the public sector depends and can create a culture of suspicion and low morale which may increase public distrust. Yet it would be perverse to argue that the institutional changes—the various codes and

attempts to regulate standards in public life—should not have been introduced because they have not improved trust and confidence in the workings of the political system.

The Committee on Standards in Public Life has wrestled with this conundrum. A survey of public attitudes towards conduct in public life published by the Committee in March 2015 (based on data collected in 2014 by GFK NOP as part of the Hansard Society's Audit of Political Engagement) showed that nearly twice as many people (36 per cent) rated the standards of conduct of people in public life as low than rated them high (18 per cent). Some 41 per cent thought standards were neither high nor low. This was the first time in a survey commissioned by the committee that those who said they thought standards were low outnumbered those who thought they were high. Back in 2004, nearly a half (46 per cent) thought standards were quite, or very, high, against just 11 per cent quite or very low. Moreover, in roughly similar proportions, people thought that standards had got worse rather than improved (36 to 16 per cent). However, while confidence about improvement was low, fewer people thought things were getting worse. Well over half the respondents (56 per cent) were not confident that the authorities in the UK are committed to upholding standards in public—against 38 per cent who were very or fairly confident. This again reflects a declining trend over the previous decade. Similarly, three-fifths (61 per cent) were not confident that the authorities would generally uncover wrongdoing by people in public office—although, by contrast, only a slightly smaller proportion (58 per cent) were confident that the media would generally uncover such wrongdoing.

The research has also shown a consistent pattern that those who have a negative opinion about the way that Britain is governed have also been more likely to make a negative assessment of standards of conduct in public life, and vice versa. Moreover, both trends between 2004 and 2014 have moved downwards. These findings also tie in with the responses to questions on how well the current democratic system addresses respondents' concerns. The later research was undertaken after the MPs' expenses scandal of spring and summer 2009, which rocked Westminster, ending the careers of a number of MPs, while also having a big negative impact on public opinion. The survey was also conducted after the furious backlash against Nick Clegg and the Liberal Democrats over their abandonment of their 2010 election pledge to phase out student fees and, instead, their acceptance of a sharp increase as part of the coalition agreement with

David Cameron's Conservatives. That was seen as epitomising politicians' betrayal of voters.

The survey authors concluded that the 2014 results showed that public office holders had not been able to restore public confidence in those who hold office. They suggested that, although it is not possible to disentangle causal relationships, the public view that standards of conduct of public office holders are low may be at least in part an expression of general dissatisfaction with politics, rather than reflecting any actual decline in standards of conduct.

In its 15th Audit of Political Engagement, published at the end of April 2018, and based on interviews conducted in December 2017, the Hansard Society showed that satisfaction with the system of governing Britain remains 'stubbornly low'. Two-thirds of those questioned think the system needs significant improvement—and the further someone lives from Westminster, the more likely they are to take this view. A mere 14 per cent are satisfied in Scotland compared with 41 per cent in London. The public thinks the system is not good at encouraging governments to take long-term decisions (just 17 per cent), but does a better job of protecting minority rights. Just 29 per cent report being broadly satisfied with the system of governing Britain, with 67 per cent thinking the system either needs 'a lot of' or 'quite a lot of' improvement. This compares with a 36 to 60 per cent ratio in the first year of the survey in 2004. One revealing factor in the latest survey is that for the first time in the period after a general election, satisfaction has fallen rather than risen. The size of the change should not be overdone, but the trend is clear. Only just over a fifth (22 per cent) think the system is providing Britain with a stable government; a similarly small percentage think that the system is good at ensuring the views of most British people are represented.

A year after the publication of his book *The British Constitution* in late 2007, but, crucially before the disclosures on MPs' expenses in 2009, Anthony King presciently wrote in the *Daily Telegraph* in December 2008 that the deepest divide in British politics was not between the main parties but 'between Britain's whole political class and the great majority of the British people. On the far side of a chasm stand politicians of all parties and their hangers-on. On the near side is almost everyone else'. He pointed to the decline in turnout at general elections—which fell sharply in the 2001 general election and barely recovered in 2005; the decline in the memberships of political parties; as well as the responses to various surveys—and the long-term declines noted in the preceding paragraphs

were already clear by then. Anthony King rightly noted that the British have always been sceptical about politics and politicians, but now scepticism had morphed into cynicism, even contempt. It is, however, right to be suspicious of golden ageism. In my 2011 book, *In Defence of Politicians—In Spite of Themselves*, I pointed to the historic unpopularity of politicians. Shakespeare referred to 'scurvy politicians' in King Lear and the National Anthem refers to 'Confound their politics, frustrate their knavish tricks'. You just have to look at the early nineteenth-century cartoons of Gillray and Rowlandson up to the puppets of Spitting Image in the 1980s to appreciate the point. Yet it is possible there has been a shift from the perennial lack of trust, and ridicule, to a deeper contempt about a lack of effectiveness and influence.

Anthony King argued—looking forward to his joint book with Ivor Crewe *The Blunders of Our Governments*—that part of the answer lay in the fact that the British system of government was failing to perform adequately. Government of both major parties, he claimed, blunder and fail more often than they used to do. He gave the examples of the poll tax, the Child Support Agency, the 1992 expulsion from the European exchange rate mechanism, big cost over-runs and failures of IT projects across the public sector, the failure to control immigration, the bungled introduction of home information packs, the handling of the collapse of Northern Rock and failures of government regulation of financial services and so on. He also, perhaps unwisely, said we had the London Olympics to look forward to.

'Blunders' attracted a lot of, mainly favourable, attention on its publication in 2013, but it had a number of flaws. First, there was an assumption that making a wrong choice, or one with which they disagreed, was the same as a blunder. Secondly, mistaken policy choices were seen as the same as flaws in implementation. The two are distinct, both in causes and effects, even if he authors' list of blunders rightly highlighted the all too frequent failure by central government to consider implementation or delivery in its policy making. Thirdly, the authors ignored successes, as the London Olympics proved to be a well-run project. And there is an often-ignored list of other successes which the Institute for Government (2012) has highlighted in its policy making work: the ban on smoking in public places; much of the privatisation programme; Scottish devolution; the improvement in school performance of pupils in London; the introduction of the national minimum wage; and, more recently, automatic enrolment in pension schemes. These were introduced by the same ministers and same civil

servants as are blamed for the policy failures. The public disillusion noted by Anthony King in December 2008 cannot simply just be linked to the blunders of government he noted in specific policy areas.

Anthony King was on stronger ground in stressing the gap between rhetoric and reality—the difference between what politicians say and what voters experience, political language has been debased, not just by the proliferation of social media but before that by the permanent campaign. Words, he argued, were seldom to educate, often to obfuscate, and, not least, to score points off the other side—an exercise which voters find tedious and pointless. This alienation from politicians has increased when politicians are seen, fairly or otherwise, as stretching the truth—as over the Iraq war in 2003 or tuition fees in 2010—or of misbehaving, as some were in the revelations over expenses in 2009. Anthony King was, perhaps, over-optimistic in his analysis. Ivor Crewe and he outlined various ways in which blunders could be avoided and the performance of government improved. He did not believe democracy was under threat. Democracy, in his view, was secure; most people want more of it, not less; misgovernment is certainly bad in itself and cynicism corrodes respect for politicians.

The experience of the past few years suggests that the malaise is deeper and is not just about blunders by governments in mishandling various specific policy initiatives. Nor is it linked, or susceptible to cure by institutional reforms. The fracturing of the political system seen in most western democracies since 2012–2013 reflects a more serious disillusionment, particularly amongst skilled and unskilled workers and their families who had been the bulwarks of social democratic and centre-left parties in the postwar era. Just as the end of the Cold War in 1989–1990 produced a large number of books highlighting the triumph of liberal democracy, so now a new generation of political scientists and commentators is busy worrying about whether the threats to democracy and representative institutions are not just cyclical but are structural and more permanent. They point to the lasting effect of the banking crisis of 2008–2013 and the associated austerity programmes, as well as to the long-term effects of the globalisation of production and technological change in exacerbating inequalities and reducing opportunities particularly for the unskilled.

In political and electoral terms, this reaction led to a fragmenting of established party systems and the rise of populist, self-consciously anti-establishment parties of the left and right—in France, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Greece, Austria, Italy and briefly in the UK, in the form of UK Independence Party (UKIP). Authoritarian leaders have used the

democratic process to undermine traditional democratic norms and constitutional constraints and build up electoral support for authoritarianism. That has been seen most starkly in Poland, Hungary and Turkey with attempts to undermine the independence of the courts and the media, while, in the USA, President Donald Trump has brushed aside the long-established conventions of respecting your opponents, of accepting the rulings of judges and constitutional constraints, of recognising civil liberties and freedom of speech and of accepting the responsibilities of holding office—not least in separating personal financial interests from the interests of government and state.

In the UK, the success of UKIP in the 2014 elections to the European Parliament, and, at least in terms of share of the vote, in the 2015 general election, mobilised many of these frustrations. The high point came in the June 2016 referendum on membership of the EU which was as significant for a higher turnout (over 72 per cent) than in the general elections a year earlier (66.1 per cent) or a year later (68.7 per cent) as for the narrow margin of 52/48 per cent in favour of leaving. Following the achievement of its objective in the referendum, support for UKIP rapidly subsided amid internal infighting, and with the Liberal Democrats still suffering from the reaction to their participation in the 2010–2015 coalition government, the share of the total vote of the two main parties jumped sharply at the 2017 general election. Yet both the Conservatives and Labour were very different from what they had been over the preceding three decades. Under Jeremy Corbyn and his allies, Labour had rejected the strategy of the Blair/Brown years to become a party of the socialist left, while the Conservatives remained riven by disagreements over the handling of the Brexit vote. There are huge gulfs between, and within, the main parties about what type of welfare state and market economy the UK should be, let alone what Britain's international relations should be outside the EU. The fracturing of previous assumptions about public life was seen in challenges to rulings by the courts, to the impartiality of the civil service and to the role of the House of Lords in passing amendments to the withdrawal legislation.

Withdrawal from the EU represents by far the most fundamental constitutional change of the current era—larger than entry in 1973 in its direct implications because of the gradual extension of EU competences and the interlinking of UK society, business and government with the EU over the intervening 45 plus years. It will affect most of the other constitutional changes—notably the balance between the central government

and the devolved administrations, and the role of the courts. Anthony King was both right in 2007 in arguing there was no appetite or will for sweeping constitutional change and a formal written constitution, but wrong in, understandably, not anticipating the upheaval in UK politics and its constitutional arrangements to come.

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CHAPTER 17

The Founding Fathers v. The People?

Albert Weale

TECTONIC PLATES

In *The Founding Fathers v. the People* Anthony King set out to describe and analyse a tension in democratic thought and practice exemplified in the US. That tension was well captured in the title of the book. On the one hand, there is a vision of government and politics advanced by the founding fathers, which is constitutionalist and republican rather than populist and participatory. On the other hand, there is a vision of government and politics advanced by radical democrats, which is populist and participatory rather than constitutionalist and republican. These are the two 'tectonic plates' of US government and politics, plates which as they meet throw up distinctive and puzzling features of US democracy. For King, these puzzling features included the restrictions on who can stand for presidential office, term-limits on the presidency, the absence of national referendums, the role of the courts in deciding policies like abortion or the result of the 2000 presidential election, the longevity of the Electoral College, primary elections, the practice of electing judges and the Senate filibuster.

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In King's analysis, constitutionalists favour government arrangements that protect individual rights, impose constraints supposedly derived from higher constitutional laws on any administration of the day, prescribe the disaggregation of the institutions of government through a separation of powers and exhibit a preference for experienced representatives acting independently to temper the direct influence of the people in government. King (2012, 142–3) expressed their motto as 'good government, not people power'. By contrast, radical democrats favour the principle that the people should rule. In consequence, there should be a straight line of authority from the people to government with no separation of powers and no constitutional checks on what the people can decide. Radical democrats favour simple numerical majorities over concurrent majorities, and, although they have differing views on representation, they look with favour on such practices as New England town meetings, popular initiatives and referendums, as well as e-democracy, all of them practices that institutionalize widespread popular participation.

Anthony King identified these different visions as the two American political nostalgias. Each vision had a place in the political history of the US—hence their nostalgic quality. However, as the tectonic plates defining US political culture, they created a fault line in democratic theory and practice. The purpose of King's analysis was not to uncover some latent contradiction, leading to the ultimate collapse of democracy. Instead it was to highlight and understand otherwise uninterpretable features of US politics and policy, features like the restrictions on who can stand for presidential office, the role of the Supreme Court in policy making or the absence of national referendums. Living on the fault line of two tectonic plates did not presage a destructive earthquake. It merely explained some otherwise odd features of the landscape.

From various hints dropped in *The Founding Fathers v. the People*, as well as from his writings more generally, you might think that Anthony King was not just describing or analysing the two nostalgias, but also evaluating their relative merits in a way that favoured the constitutionalist over the radical democratic vision. For example, in the light of the research by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) on what American citizens want from government, King concluded that most Americans have no real interest in expanding the orbit of direct democracy, favouring instead disinterested but empathetic government guided by expertise (King 2012, 193). In *Running Scared* King (1997) argued that US politicians campaigned too much and governed too little. He repeatedly asserted that the blunders of

government came from lack of deliberation over alternative policies and the instruments that might be used to implement those policies (King and Crewe 2013: chapter 27; King 2015, 296–301). A whole stream of his research was given over to the study of leadership, on the assumption that good leadership mattered and it was important to create the conditions within which it could be exercised. Forced to choose between radical democracy and constitutionalism, it is not hard to guess where Anthony King's vote would have gone.

Yet, in *The Founding Fathers v. the People* King never expressed an evaluative preference for one vision of democracy over the other. One possible reason is that he was realist enough to know that any political reformer begins from where we are and not where some theory tells us that we ought to be. If ideals of popular participation hold some in their grip, those ideals cannot simply be ignored or wished away, even if the nostalgia on which those ideals are based is incoherent and less supported by experience than their proponents claim. Conversely, even ardent proponents of direct democracy typically accept the place of constitutionalist values in the US political system. Indeed Anthony King (2012, 178) quoted proponents of direct democracy as saying that the two principles of US government—government by the people and government by constitutional rule—will co-exist in any functioning polity.

However, the recent rise of authoritarian populism suggests that more attention needs to be given to this conflict of visions. All populists see the system of representative government as something that has been taken over by an elite (Canovan 2005; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017; Taggart 2000). In the US authoritarian version of populism this idea is formulated in terms of the 'deep state', the view that the existing institutions of government are pervaded by those wishing to frustrate radical populist reform, exemplified in the way that the Trump administration has sought to eliminate independent and informed people in the US administration (for some telling examples, see Osnos 2018). So, for authoritarian populists, constitutional government is an emanation of the deep state. It must be trumped (pun intended) by arbitrary government.

The fact that there are two great traditions in US political thought and culture pushing in opposition to one another does much to explain some otherwise anomalous features of US government and politics. However, it prompts the question as to whether these two sets of principles must be understood as being necessarily opposed in the way authoritarian populists claim, as co-existing in the way that King claimed or, when rightly

understood, as complementary. After all, traditions of thought are not pieces of inert matter acting on one another through physical forces but ideas that can be reflected upon and developed and which can be brought into various logical relationships with one another.

In this chapter I follow the line of thought that seeks to make the constitutionalist and democratic visions complementary to one another. In particular, I shall advance the following claims:

1. We can have no idea of a democratic system independently of some constitutionalist principles. This is the thesis of minimal constitutionalism.
2. Constitutional rules and principles incorporate democratic values when applied to the relationship between executive and the legislature.
3. Liberal rights are not inherently counter-majoritarian.

If these arguments are correct, any seemingly problematic relationship between constitutional principles and democratic principles arises from misinterpretations, misinterpretations associated with the myths that surround the two nostalgias.

Minimal Constitutionalism

Any meaningful conception of democracy requires a minimal conception of a constitution. This is the first step in the reconciliation of constitutionalism and democracy. For the purposes of this argument, a constitution can be understood as the set of second-order rules, the rules that define the way in which first-order rules—laws and policies—can be validly made (for the idea of second-order rules, see Hart 2012, 26–49). A constitution thus contains the ground-rules that define the freedoms, rights, powers and immunities of actors involved in political choice. Although different from Anthony King's definition, this concept of a political constitution is consistent with the one that he himself stated: 'the set of the most important rules and common understandings in any given country that regulate the relations of that country's governing institutions and also the relations between that country's governing institutions and the people of that country' (King 2007, 3).

Note the two parts of King's definition: the rules regulate *both* the relations of a country's governing institutions to one another *and* the

relations between a country's governing institutions and the people of that country. It is the second component that defines a country's constitution as democratic or not. In particular, to define a democratic constitution, those rules need to specify ways by which the country's government can be made representative of those who are being governed. Suppose we say in such a system that choices of the people are politically decisive. If so, a democracy always needs a constitution. My argument for this claim is wholly unoriginal, and is to be found in H.L.A. Hart's *The Concept of Law* (Hart 2012). Here is how it goes. If the choices of the people are decisive in a democracy, what does that mean? To answer that question, consider a non-democratic monarchical regime in which there is a supreme individual ruler who is sovereign. In this case sovereignty may be defined as John Austin (1995) suggested in terms of habits of obedience. The sovereign is a person who receives habitual obedience from the bulk of the population but who does not habitually obey any other (earthly) person or institution. In the days before democracy, the monarch was treated as the sovereign. The king or queen's will determined what should be done.

With democratization, it is tempting to see it as a process in which the will of the monarch as sovereign passes to the people who now possess their own sovereign will. Tempting, but wrong. It makes no sense to think of modern democracy as a matter of transferring ultimate authority from the absolute monarch to the people who now occupy the position of that monarch. We cannot meaningfully say that where once stood the will of the monarch, there now stands the will of the people. To be able to say this would require us to say that the people govern themselves. Yet, citizens, as members of a people, cannot give orders to themselves in any literal sense.

Here is the way that Hart himself puts the point:

> If we attempt to treat the electorate in such cases as the sovereign and apply to it the simple definition of the original theory [the theory that law is the will of the sovereign], we shall find ourselves saying that here the "bulk" of the society habitually obey themselves. Thus the original clear image of a society divided into two clear segments: the sovereign free from legal limitation who gives orders, and the subjects who habitually obey, has given place to a blurred image of a society in which the majority obey orders given by the majority or by all. Surely we have here neither 'orders' in the original sense (expression of intention that *others* shall behave in a certain way) or obedience. (Hart 2012, 75)

Hart goes on to consider the view that one way to rescue the simple idea of popular sovereignty is to distinguish between persons in their private capacity and persons in their public capacity. If we make this distinction, popular sovereignty means that persons in their private capacity follow the laws and policies that those same persons have decided upon in their public capacity. Yet, though we can make such a distinction, we cannot make it unless we say that people in their public or official capacity act by virtue of some rules that define what it is for a collection of people to make law or policy. As Hart puts it, 'It is only by reference to such rules that we can identify something as an election or a law made by a body of persons' (Hart 2012, 76). Those rules are the rules of a minimal constitution.

Some will say that the argument that democracy presupposes some minimal constitutionalism is valid for countries with written (strictly speaking documentary) constitutions, but it would not apply to a country like the UK, which lacks a single document stating the ground-rules by which the liberties, rights, powers and immunities of political actors are defined. However, this is to confuse the question of the form of a constitution with its existence and meaning. As Anthony King's definition of a constitution put it, a constitution is 'the set of the most important rules and *common understandings* in any given country'. In other words, constitutional norms can exist by convention as well as by explicit documentary formulation. In any case, as the High Court reminded us all in its *Miller* judgement, there clearly are legal texts that have the status of constitutional rules in the UK, even if they are not gathered together in one single place (*R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union*, particularly paragraphs 18 to 36).

At this point someone might complain that I have stacked the deck. Confronted with the need to show that the principles of radical democracy are compatible with constitutionalism, all I have done, it might be said, is to show that constitutionalism is compatible with the principles of a representative democracy, not a radical democracy. What of the radical democrat's claim that the people should govern directly through the more extensive use of referendums, popular initiatives and the like? Yet, if what radical democrats want is an intensifying of public participation in the making of policy, say through the use of referendums or popular initiatives, such participatory devices require constitutional provision in order to give them authority. Such rules will define how referendums or popular initiatives are to be conducted, who is entitled to vote and the like. Whether we are talking about representative government or direct

democracy, there is still the need to specify the second-order rules that determine the legitimacy of the process.

Legislative-Executive Relations

Remember the two parts of Anthony King's definition of a constitution. One part of the constitutional rules regulates the relations between a country's governing institutions and the people of that country. Another part regulates the relations of a country's governing institutions to one another. By contrast with the previous argument about popular self-government, a constitutional specification of the relationship between the various institutions of government might seem to have no especially close association with the principles of democracy. Indeed, it might be thought that this is just the point where democratic and constitutional principles come apart. Is this really so?

Constitutionalists often distinguish between the higher laws of the constitution and the ordinary laws of everyday legislation. Anthony King cited the example of John Locke, who not only made the distinction between the higher constitutional law and ordinary legislation, but also incorporated that distinction in the constitution that he drafted for Carolina, paragraph 120 of which declared that every part of the constitution 'shall be and remain the sacred and unalterable form and rule of government for Carolina forever' (cited in King 2012, 135). Since over time majorities in a political community will evolve in their thinking and orientation, it would seem that any 'fundamental' constitution of a Lockean sort will constrain the political expression of that evolution. A fundamental constitution becomes a fundamentalist document. If anything supports the tectonic-plates account of democracy and constitutionalism, then it would appear to be this account of the dualism of constitutional and ordinary law.

However, as Anthony King (2012: chapter 2) himself pointed out, exactly what the founding fathers had in mind when they prefaced the Constitution with the ringing phrase 'We the People' is hard to define, but it is unlikely to coincide with what we would nowadays understand by the term 'the people' (Walter Lippmann 1955, 32–3, made a similar point). It is simply false to hold that there was one particular historical moment at which the people constituted themselves through a higher law, despite attempts by modern theorists to make sense of that idea (see Rawls 2005, 231–40).

However, there is a less grandiose way of linking the distinction between a higher constitutional law and ordinary law with democratic values, which involves democratic accountability and the relation of executive to legislature. Problems of legislative control are exemplified most clearly in those extreme cases of policy where governments have to respond quickly to emergency situations: foreign policy crises, the threat of war or terrorism or the conduct of high-level international diplomacy. Emergency action takes place either outside the scope of legislative control or under emergency powers granted by the legislature.

As Atanassow and Katznelson (2017) have pointed out, the challenges to the principles of liberal democratic regimes posed by the need for emergency powers have been extensively examined within the liberal tradition, including by Locke and Hamilton, as well as by Carl Friedrich and his pupils. Within this tradition the key requirements are that the powers granted or allowed to executives be as limited as possible and that they be temporary rather than open-ended or permanent. The ideal to be approximated as far as possible was well expressed by Ed Murrow, the CBS reporter in London, when speaking about his experience of the Second World War:

> I am persuaded that the most important thing that happened in Britain was that this nation chose to win or lose this war under the established rules of parliamentary procedure. It feared Nazism, but it did not choose to imitate it… Representative government, equality before the law, survived. Future generations who bother to read the official record of proceedings in the House of Commons will discover that British armies retreated from many places, but that there was no retreat from the principles for which your ancestors fought. (Cited in Hennessy 1992, 19)

The insight here is that constitutional principles can regulate the relations of different institutions of government, and these principles express a democratic imperative. To say that there is a higher (or more fundamental—the spatial metaphor seems eminently reversible) principle is not to restrict the powers of legislatures, but to ensure that the powers exercised by executives under legislative sanction and approval are used for the legitimate purposes for which they were intended and not usurped by executive authority. Constitutionalism and democratic control are complementary. In terms of the relation between executive action and legislative authorization, the relationship between constitutional and democratic principles is complementary rather than antagonistic.

Liberal Rights and Majority Rule

Consider again those constitutional provisions that regulate the relationship between government and the people, but this time with the people as the subject of laws and policies, not their author. In such cases, the principles of constitutional democracy often intersect substantially with liberal political values. Liberal values make the design of government institutions turn on the protection of individual rights, rights which are regarded as moral rights antecedent to the establishment of government. On this view, governments do wrong when they seek to abridge or curtail these rights, even by the legitimate means available to them within a democracy. So, for example, in a particularly clear statement of this thesis, Ronald Dworkin wrote: 'If citizens have a moral right to free speech, then governments would do wrong to repeal the First Amendment that guarantees it, even if they were persuaded that the majority would be better off if such speech were curtailed' (Dworkin 1977, 191). As Richard Bellamy (2007: chapter 1) notes, this position has been developed by rights theorists into two theses. The first is that the constitutional protection of rights is the precondition for citizens to be treated with equal concern and respect. The second is that courts are counter-majoritarian institutions, and are best placed to secure substantive rights protection.

Anthony King (2012, 80, 136) noted that the founding fathers believed that natural rights were inalienable, but they did not think it necessary to incorporate an explicit declaration of rights into the original draft of the Constitution, perhaps because they took the belief to be self-evident. However, pressure from the anti-federalists, who were primarily concerned about local interests, led quickly to the first ten amendments, commonly known as the Bill of Rights. It is these amendments that guarantee among other things that there will be no law establishing a religion or abridging freedom of speech, that people will be protected against unreasonable searches, that no person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself or herself in a criminal trial, that there shall be a right to an impartial jury and that the people have the right to bear arms. These provisions, as well as the later Fourteenth Amendment, have played a large role in the developing jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, as well as underwriting its actions when declaring otherwise constitutionally agreed legislation invalid.

If counter-majoritarian rights protection was definitive of constitutionalism, then the tectonic-plates view of US political culture and government

would be right. There really would be a built-in opposition between rights protection through the use of counter-majoritarian courts and the practice of majoritarian government, even when operating in an explicitly constitutional way. However, we can understand explicit bills of rights in constitutional documents, without the need to invoke the idea that they are essentially counter-majoritarian devices. Many of the rights that are invoked in bills of rights either explicitly protect rights of political organization or, where they protect the integrity of persons, prevent threats to that integrity that could be used to restrict political opposition. Thus, it is easy to see how protecting freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom from arbitrary policy searches and the right to a fair trial are ways in which the rights of political opposition can be protected, which is why circumscription of these rights is one of the instruments of authoritarian governments. The protection of these rights is not counter-majoritarian, but instead prevents temporary majorities usurping powers in ways that cannot later be reversed, so maintaining effective political competition over time. As Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018: chapter 5) put it, such constitutional provisions are the 'guardrails of democracy'.

A similar case against temporary factional mischief can be developed for rights other than those that have a direct relationship with the conditions for political competition. To say that public policy ought to be aligned with majority opinion in a society is compatible with saying that the alignment ought to be in relation to settled opinion. Freedom of religion and conscience may well be threatened with temporary surges of public opinion that do not reflect opinion over the longer term. In such cases, democracy requires a legal constitution that blocks or stalls illiberal legislation. Conversely, with some types of rights, it is important that constitutional interpretation comes into line with majority opinion as expressed through the political process. The US Supreme Court's well-known pro-business decisions, as in *Lochner*, between the end of the Civil War and the New Deal seem to be unassociated with popular political feeling, except negatively.

The Two Nostalgias

The argument so far seems to have produced a paradox. There is no doubt that Anthony King was right empirically. There are seemingly odd and distinctive elements in US government and politics, when viewed comparatively, and the political culture of the US is marked by the contrast

between a liberal constitutionalist way of thinking and a radical democratic way of thinking. On the other hand, if the arguments set out earlier are correct, there is no inherent conflict between constitutionalism and democracy. In fact, democracy presupposes some form of constitutional regulation and the system of representative government requires just those constitutional provisions that enable the legislature to constrain the executive. How are we to resolve this paradox?

To answer this question, consider Anthony King's idea that what we are discussing a conflict of nostalgias. Nostalgia always involves myth-making. When we refer to the founding fathers versus the people, what we are really referring to are the myths built upon the two nostalgias that have so influenced US political culture. As King (2012, 66) himself noted, the US Constitution has for some years attracted the sort of reverence that in other cultures is associated with religious relics. As early as the 1830s it has been spoken of as 'our Ark of Covenant', and Ronald Reagan in 1987 described Americans' feelings about it as ones of reverence. The National Constitution Center in Philadelphia and the National Archives in Washington, DC, are places of pilgrimage. Originalist constitutional theory is a paradigmatic example of such political reverence. But so in its own way is Dworkin's jurisprudence, which contrasts the outputs of democratic decision-making with the moral truths of constitutional principles and sees the Supreme Court as having an independent form of political authority, founded in its own tradition of reasoning akin to the writing of a chain novel (Dworkin 1986, 228–32).

The doctrines of radical democracy are also built on myths, however, particularly when they are premised on populist styles of reasoning (Canovan 2005). Not only do populists see the system of representative government as something that has been taken over by an elite, they all represent the remedy as securing the direct involvement of ordinary people whose will should prevail in the making of policy. The will of the people—at least as populists represent it—should be the basis of government policy (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). Among populists, there is often a nostalgia for what they imagine was a purer past. They look back to agricultural societies in which upright people governed themselves as the farmers of New England, Virginia, or the Midwest were once supposed to do as the heartland of the people (Taggart 2000). From this perspective the democratic ideal is to replicate in modern large-scale democracies the practice of direct self-government.

Populism diagnoses the ills of modern-day democracy as the lack of the direct voice of the people running government. But there are no examples of government by popular assembly that could serve as models for such a form of government in the modern state. Government by popular assembly does survive at the town level in Switzerland, some New England communities and elsewhere, but it is limited to local affairs. It comes nowhere near the major areas of government policy that are so central to the well-being of the citizens of a modern state: economic policy, national education, health care, transport, protecting the environment, international trade, defence and foreign policy (Weale 2018: chapter 2).

Nostalgia is never about what it is about. The two nostalgias are the mythical forms of the present polarized discontents brought about by economic dislocation and social change. Nostalgia resists the cool and dispassionate appraisal of the functioning of democracy. Along with his other works, Anthony King's *The Founding Fathers v. the People* provides us the sober analysis that is needed. Reading it closely should strengthen commitment to the complementary values of constitutionalism and democracy.

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CHAPTER 18

Ideas, Institutions and the Politicians of Our Governments: Anthony King as a Student of Liberal Democracy

Nicholas Allen

Anthony King was very much associated with the study and broadcast coverage of elections. Yet, his professional interest in liberal democracy ranged far more widely than ballots and voting. As a teacher, he convened a long-running module at the University of Essex that explored the foundations, forms, failures and futures of democratic political systems. Over the course of two-dozen lectures, he surveyed democracy's association with capitalism, the nation state, civil society, civilian control of the military, enlightenment values and economic prosperity, before introducing students to several established democracies, notably the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the United States, as well as a number of newer, occasional and pseudo democracies, including India, Brazil, Nigeria and Russia. Throughout, King encouraged his students to reflect on the factors that appeared conducive to the emergence of liberal democracy (see Dahl 2000). He also encouraged them to reflect on the relationship between democracy and good government.

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In his lectures, King defined democracy in minimalist terms: as a set of arrangements through which the vast majority of people were given the chance to decide, from time to time, who their rulers would be. Good government, by contrast, was a set of desirable outcomes, such as administrative efficiency, political stability and the absence of corruption. Listening to King was the first time that many of his students had been confronted with the idea that democracy and good government, though often co-occurring, were not the same thing. It was also the first time that many of them had been confronted with the idea that liberal democracy, much like good government, was not inevitable.

As a writer, King was a student of liberal democracy in the sense that he wrote a great deal about how it worked, especially in Britain and the United States. He wrote about elections and electoral politics, party leadership elections and leader effects on voting behaviour, parliaments and executives, policy making and patterns of public policy, and politicians and their foibles. Although his writings never dealt at length with the question of when and why democracy emerged, or failed, they frequently touched upon the quality of British and American democracy, in some cases at length. His professional interest in these two established democratic systems spanned five decades, more than long enough for him to observe a number of significant developments in the structure and style of politics in both places. An incisive commentator, King had a knack for synthesising others' insights, for seeing the bigger picture, and for making his points in a clear, accessible and sometimes provocative manner. To be sure, he was not generally concerned about the immediate future of democracy in either country, but nor was he always optimistic about what he observed.

This chapter reflects on King's work as a student of liberal democracy. It does so by identifying and engaging with three general themes that characterised his writings: his interest in democratic diversity, his scepticism towards too much democracy and his concern with the quality of government and democratic outputs. Ultimately, as we shall see, King was a realist when it came to democracy: it was what it was and it could be successful in different ways. Largely for that reason, democratic government was something that deserved to be described and understood on its own terms and in its different incarnations.

A STUDENT OF DEMOCRATIC DIVERSITY

Although King was best known as a British politics specialist, he regarded himself as a student of comparative politics. He was always interested in diversity and was acutely conscious that there were, in practice, multiple democratic forms and multiple ways in which people could be given the chance to decide who their rulers would be. In one sense, his interest in diversity was reflected in his in-depth work on two very different cases, the British and American political systems. In another sense, it was reflected in his efforts to locate his immediate focus in a wider context. Whether writing about predominant-party politics in Britain after the 1992 general election or the experiences of American congressmen, King strove to make sure his readers were aware of appropriate comparators.[1]

Democratic diversity has, of course, been conceptualised in multiple ways (see Held 2006; Weale 2007). Perhaps the most influential typology in contemporary comparative political science is Arend Lijphart's (1999) distinction between 'majoritarian' and 'consensus' models of democracy. Majoritarian political systems are essentially those that centralise and concentrate political power in the government of the day and thereby enable a majority (or plurality) of voters to choose who will govern them until the next election. This logic historically applied to the United Kingdom, hence the model's alternative name: the 'Westminster model'. Consensus systems, in contrast, tend to decentralise and disperse power, creating multiple opportunities for minority voices to participate in decision making. It is a model that can be found in many European countries, such as the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark and Switzerland.

King always drew on others' conceptualisations in his work, including Lijphart's, yet he was never a slave to the 'literature'. When writing about democracy, as with other topics, he usually preferred to frame his analysis on his terms. Thus in *Running Scared*, his 1997 book on American politicians' electoral vulnerability, he proposed his own typology of democratic systems. Drawing on the classic distinctions between 'representative' and 'direct' forms of democracy and between 'trustee' and 'delegate' models of representation, King (1997, 52–6) suggested that modern liberal democracies fell into one of two categories. Most, including Britain, were essentially 'division of labour' democracies, in which arrangements were geared towards promoting the principle that it was the elected rulers' job to govern and act on what they thought was in the country's best interest.

The people's role was to choose periodically who should excise such discretion in regular but occasional elections. A very small number of political systems, by contrast, were 'agency' democracies, of which the United States was the most significant example. In such systems, the people were positively sovereign, and those who governed were meant to function as delegates rather than as trustees. Elected officials' main job was to reflect faithfully the wishes of the people; it was not to act independently and take decisions that they thought best served the national interest. Institutional arrangements moreover were oriented towards that end. In particular, frequent elections and primary elections, augmented by initiatives and referendums, existed to keep officials responsive and individually accountable.

King's work often raised more questions than it answered. In this case, his distinction between division-of-labour and agency models of democracy almost cries out for the development of some 'agency-democracy index', along the lines of Lijphart's framework, for mapping national variation over space and time. In Britain, for example, the growing importance of constituency service for MPs and the spread of referendums would suggest that there has been some chipping away at the old division-of-labour model. It would also be fascinating to relate countries' scores on such an index to other characteristics, such as political trust. In an almost throw-away comment, King (1997, 55) suggested that: 'an agency political culture is almost certain to be an anti-politician political culture.' But is this true?

The distinction between division-of-labour and agency democracy also brings into focus two big questions that can be asked of any democratic system: are individual citizens more or less actively involved in political decision making, and is popular sovereignty in the form of majority rule more or less constrained in practice? In many ways, King's later work on British and American democracy can be read as detailed answers to both questions.

In *The British Constitution*, for instance, and again in *Who Governs Britain?*, King (2007, 2015a) explored not only long-term institutional changes and the erosion of the United Kingdom's traditional 'Westminster model', but also changes in the ideas that underpinned them. Political attitudes in Britain, as in many other places, had changed almost beyond recognition since the Second World War. Political deference had once ruled the roost, epitomised in the old adage that 'the man in Whitehall knows best'. But a new-found willingness to 'exalt' the people had grown up and

challenged the old deferential mindset. Describing this shift, King (2007, 65) observed how, during the years after 1945,

> Millions of ordinary Britons, and not just radical student leaders, decided that they wanted their voice to be heard and to be heard all the time, not just once in every four or five years. They wanted to be asked their views, to be consulted. They wanted, or said they wanted, to participate more actively in public affairs, including local affairs. They demanded that government at all levels be more responsive to their concerns.

Crucially, such ideas had resonated among elites. They would provide the ideational bedrock on which many subsequent constitutional developments, including the introduction of devolution, freedom of information legislation, local and national referendums and directly elected mayors, were built.

Meanwhile, King's 2012 book on American democracy, *The Founding Fathers v. The People*, addressed more directly the second question and the constraints or otherwise on popular sovereignty. American political development, observed King, had been built on two fundamentally opposed sets of ideas. One of these, the 'constitutionalist' position, was very much in favour of constraining the people. It was associated with the Founding Fathers and their commitment to individuals' rights, the separation of powers, checks and balances and deliberative decision making. It informed much of the original Constitution. The other set of ideas, the 'radical democracy' position, was very much in favour of giving as much practical effect as possible to the people's nominal sovereignty. It was associated with the Jacksonian and later progressive eras, and influenced much subsequent political development, especially at the state level, in the form of primary elections and the proliferation of initiatives and referendums. The result was a political system riddled with contradictions, although one that still managed to retain the support of both constitutionalists and radical democrats.

Looking to the present, the tensions between constitutionalism and radical democracy remain central to many of the concerns expressed about the apparent authoritarian turn in many electoral democracies. The possibility that democracy can threaten the *liberal* element of liberal democracy is, of course, familiar to many. But as Yascha Mounk (2018) has recently observed, it is not so much the tyranny of the majority that liberal democrats need to fear in the twenty-first century as authoritarian leaders

who claim to represent the voice of the majority. In some places, such as Hungary and Turkey, the 'democratic' threat to liberal democracy has come in the form of elected governments eroding constitutional safeguards that curb their power and protect individual rights. In Britain, it can be seen in some of the more ardent Eurosceptics' attacks against anyone who questions the government's handling of Brexit. When the British high court ruled that primary legislation was needed to give effect to the June 2016 referendum result, the right-wing *Daily Mail*'s front page damned the three judges as 'enemies of the people'. Whenever MPs or peers have voted to assert parliamentary scrutiny of the Brexit negotiations, ardent Brexiteers have attacked them for thwarting 'the will of the people'.

To complicate matters, the idea that the sovereign people should be actively involved in decision making is something that often unites both champions of liberal democracy, especially proponents of the 'agency' kind, and many of the populists who supposedly threaten it. The crucial difference, of course, is that the former, including in Britain, have often simultaneously championed the virtues of constitutionalism (see, e.g., the Power Report 2006). The tension between this ideal and that of popular sovereignty may or may not have been lost on them, but it has certainly distinguished them, and continues to distinguish them, from those who champion the people with little regard for liberal values.

Less Democracy Can Be More

Just as King's work reflected his interest in democratic diversity, it also recognised that different systems could be more or less democratic in different ways. In *The British Constitution*, for instance, he suggested three criteria for judging the purely democratic features of any system: 'accountability', 'responsiveness' and 'citizen participation' (King 2007, 55–61). Accountability reflected the notion that citizens should be able to identify who was responsible for decision making and 'throw the rascals out' if need be. Responsiveness, meanwhile, reflected the premise that elected officials should act in accordance with popular preferences. Lastly, participation was based on the idea that a more politically active citizenry and popular decision making were intrinsically good. Needless to say, some systems were more democratic in one sense than another; and arrangements that promoted one value could simultaneously undermine another.

King never championed a particular model of democracy, but a degree of scepticism towards maximising individual accountability, responsiveness

and citizen participation—the hallmarks of agency democracy—permeated much of his writing. It was certainly apparent in *The British Constitution*. As King observed, Britain's traditional governing arrangements, as they existed in the mid-twentieth century, had been organised around a remarkably straightforward democratic logic. Political power had been hoarded in London, specifically in the hands of the government of the day, and voters had periodically chosen which group of politicians—in practice, those from the Conservative or Labour parties—would pull the levers of power. The system did not promote citizen participation, but it did promote stable and effective government, and above all it promoted collective accountability at the systemic level. Power was concentrated in the hands of the governing party, and it was very easy for voters as a whole to attribute blame for government failures and thus kick the rascals out. Moreover, the would-be rascals knew this, creating yet another virtuous outcome:

> Precisely because British governments knew that they could be, and ultimately would be, held to account, they tended on the whole to behave responsibly. The buck in the system stopped with them, they well knew it, and most of the time they responded accordingly. British politics was freer than the politics of many other countries from gesture politics, symbolic politics and a disposition to make promises that could not possibly be fulfilled. (King 2007, 60)

Since then, as King observed, the constitution had been transformed. On the one hand, more opportunities had been created for people to participate in politics via elections and referendums, and there were also more actors that voters could hold to account. In one sense, then, British democracy had been enhanced. On the other hand, changes within the political system had created new centres of power and new concentrations of authority. The government of the day now shared its responsibilities with the devolved institutions and other elected officials, an empowered and increasingly assertive judiciary, increasingly assertive parliamentarians and all manner of regulatory institutions (King 2007, 362). The clear line of accountability that had previously run from governments to citizens was thus greatly diminished, a situation greatly exacerbated by Britain's membership of the European Union and the effects of globalisation.

A key insight of King's analysis was that the implications of these changes had yet to permeate fully British politics, especially as practised in

London. Voters still looked to the government of the day to take the big decisions and to deal with all the problems that governments used to deal with. For their part, politicians in London still acted as if the government could decisively resolve all problems (King 2007, 355–6). The upshot was a growing divide between voters' expectations of government and the government's inability to fulfil them. It was no surprise, suggested King (2007, 356), 'that so many voters, puzzled and disoriented, opt out of the political process. It is no longer a process that they understand or can easily relate to.'

If *The British Constitution* can be read as a lament for the lost simplicity of the past, *Running Scared*, King's 1997 analysis of American democracy, was a clear critique of agency democracy and the problems of 'hyper responsiveness'. It described and critically assessed the number of national-level elections in the United States and Americans' determination that 'democratic norms and practices should pervade every aspect of national life' (King 1997, 52). Compared with their counterparts elsewhere, American politicians tended to enjoy short terms of office, especially members of the House of Representatives who faced re-election every two years. At the same time, the United States was peculiar in requiring almost all would-be candidates for elective office to compete in primary elections in order to secure their party's nomination. In turn, American politicians were almost unique in the extent to which they cultivated their personal profiles and campaigned as individuals rather than as standard-bearers for their political party. Finally, and again almost uniquely, they were obliged to raise enormous sums of money in order to fund their own campaigns.

As a result, American politicians had to contend with an extraordinarily high degree of electoral vulnerability. Even if re-election rates were actually high and turnover low—a product in part of the various advantages enjoyed by incumbents—elected politicians remained potentially vulnerable, and they were certainly aware of their potential vulnerability. Because of their predicament, politicians were obliged to think constantly about how their actions might play out back home in their districts. The consequences were not always benign:

> The politics of high electoral exposure is expensive in terms not only of campaign costs but of congressional buildings and staff. It takes up inordinate amounts of legislators' time and energy. It distorts the organization of and internal processes of Congress, bending them toward credit-claiming and constituency service and away from deliberation and debate. Not least,

it drives considerable numbers of able people out of politics and undoubtedly deters even more from coming in in the first place. (King 1997, 157)

More worrying, the electoral vulnerability that underpinned American democracy affected the way politicians made policy. Indeed, the book's central thesis was set out in its subtitle: *Why America's Politicians Campaign Too Much and Govern Too Little*. Too much democracy promoted short-term thinking, the deferral of difficult decisions, symbolic politics and high-blown rhetoric. It led to bad decisions and policies as most representatives, most of the time, had every incentive to extract concessions that directly benefited their immediate electoral needs. And since this incentive was shared by most politicians, they acted in concert to produce policies that benefited them personally but failed to address wider societal and economic problems.

Paradoxically, Americans' predilection for democracy meant that the solution for failing democracy was often to demand more of it. The problem, however, was that many of the solutions offered to making democracy work better entailed 'making politicians more responsive to the public' (King 1997, 162). The result was likely to be a cycle of disaffection:

> when large numbers of Americans become dissatisfied with the workings of their government they call for more democracy. The more they call for more democracy, the more they get of it. And the more of it they get the more dissatisfied they become with the workings of their government. (King 1997, 172)

An alternative solution, suggested King, was to embrace other ideals in the American political tradition, including those associated with the indigenous 'constitutionalist' position previously discussed that might promote a clearer division of labour between citizens and rulers.

Overloaded and Blundering Governments

King's concern with the quality of government was very much to the fore in *Running Scared*. Indeed, his concern with the outputs and outcomes of democratic politics was an enduring theme across all his work. The arrangements by which the vast majority of people decided who their rulers would be were always important, but so too were the actions of those who were elected to rule.

King's most influential analysis of the links between democratic processes and government performance came in his 1975 paper, 'Overload: Problems of Governing in the 1970s'. Written as part of a collection of essays to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of Britain's Political Studies Association, 'Overload' was King's response to prevailing concerns that democratic government in the United Kingdom, as in many places elsewhere, was no longer functioning as well as it once had (see Birch 1984). This was a time when the link between parties' manifesto commitments and subsequent government policy, a cornerstone of democratic accountability, had seemingly broken down. This was also a time when instances of policy failure had multiplied. Governments of all ideological persuasions were struggling to achieve many of their own goals and to meet citizens' expectations.

For King, the challenges facing Britain's democratic system of government were essentially twofold. The first of these was the expanding role of the state: 'the range of matters for which British Governments hold themselves responsible—and for which they believe that the electorate may hold them responsible—has increased greatly over the past ten or twenty years, as well as over the past fifty' (King 1975, 164). Governments were failing to meet citizens' expectations in part because they were now expected to deal with so many more problems. As King (1975, 166) memorably observed, 'Once upon a time, then, man looked to God to order the world. Then he looked to the market. Now he looks to government.'

Meanwhile, a second challenge reinforced the first: the state's ability to fulfil its responsibilities had diminished just as its responsibilities had grown. In order to deliver public services, manage the economy and so on, all governments needed to work with other economic and social actors. The particular problem in the 1970s, argued King, was that governments had become involved in a growing number of dependency relationships, and that incidents of non-compliance by others in these relationships, most notably trade unions, had grown markedly. Governments were consequently finding it ever harder to achieve the levels of compliance necessary to achieve their goals.

From these two challenges stemmed a third: the combination of inflated expectations and diminished state capacity risked creating mass dissatisfaction with existing democratic arrangements. Overloaded governments threatened to weaken 'diffuse' support for the regime (Easton 1975). Or, as King (1975, 172) put it,

> A system of government, especially a liberal system, is like a bank in that, to a considerable extent, it relies on confidence. If confidence is lost, there may be a 'run on government' comparable to a run on a bank. The customers may look for new places to lodge their trust.

Although he did not spell it out, citizens could become increasingly open to suggestions of alternative, even non-democratic arrangements.

King's pessimism reflected the tone of contemporary debate. In the same year that 'Overload' was published, for instance, three academics penned *The Crisis of Democracy*, a report on the long-term viability of democratic government in Europe, Japan and the United States (Crozier et al. 1975). As with King's account, the problems of unmet expectations were very much to the fore, as were the risks of resulting mass dissatisfaction with democratic arrangements.

Some of King's pessimism surrounding overloaded government was confounded by subsequent developments. As Michael Moran (2018) has written, widespread privatisation, the state's withdrawal from certain areas of public policy, the rise of independent or 'depoliticised' regulation and the creation of bodies like Britain's Office for Students, and the marked diminution in trade-union power have all reduced both the number of matters for which governments are responsible and the number of dependency relationships in which they are involved.

Nevertheless, several elements of King's analysis in 'Overload' remain as relevant as ever for understanding democratic government today. One of these relates to the importance of citizens' expectations. Expectations have featured prominently in some recent accounts of democratic dissatisfaction (Flinders 2012). If citizens' expectations of what their governments can provide are hopelessly unrealistic, then disappointment is inevitable. Despite its widespread 'rolling back', many voters across the advanced industrial world still look to the liberal democratic state as a universal problem-solver. Governments have divested themselves of many responsibilities, but the state still resembles, at least in newspaper and television reporting, the 'sort of unlimited-liability insurance company' that King identified in the 1970s.

Another ever-relevant aspect of King's analysis in 'Overload' relates to the fundamental importance of government performance. Democratic arrangements matter because they influence the quality of government. The quality of government matters in turn because it affects support for democratic arrangements. A political system that provides consistently

high levels of prosperity, peace and moderation is likely to be more secure than one that does not. It is perhaps hardly surprising that more authoritarian ideas have flourished recently in contexts where liberal democracy has seemingly failed to deliver, or at least to deliver to substantial sections of society (Ford and Goodwin 2014).

Towards the end of his career, King returned to the topic of good government in *The Blunders of Our Governments*, a widely read analysis of major British policy failures co-written with Ivor Crewe (2013). Part of his motivation was undoubtedly a concern with the effect of policy failure on public opinion. In an earlier article written for *The Daily Telegraph*, King (2008) had suggested that one of the factors behind contemporary levels of political alienation was 'that our system of government is failing to perform adequately. Governments of both major parties blunder and fail far more often than they used to.' *Blunders* sought to explain why this was the case. Ever concerned with the 'so what?' question, King and Crewe also suggested a number of possible remedies, not least a greater dose of deliberation in the policy process.

Being Honest About Democracy

Readers by now should have detected a common thread to the work surveyed in this chapter. When it came to liberal democracy, King was a realist, someone defined by the *Oxford English Dictionary* as 'A person who tends to regard things are they really are, rather than how they are imagined, or desired to be'. He recognised democracy for what it was, and he sought to describe, explain and understand it on its own terms. He recognised that democracy came in many forms, that some forms were arguably more desirable than others, that it needed to be understood as part of a broader system of government and that too much democracy, or at least too much democracy as understood by proponents of what he termed the 'agency' or 'radical' traditions, could undermine good government and other democratic values.

Beyond that, what broader lessons might we draw about liberal democracy from King's work? At least three answers can be offered in response. The first relates to the importance of ideas, in particular how they shape political practice. King's essays on the United States showed how an agency model of democracy had developed over time because many if not most Americans at key moments had wanted it that way, or at least had wanted to lessen the division of labour between people and their rulers.

Similarly, his work on Britain showed how changing ideas about democracy had fuelled demands for, and led to, constitutional change. In both cases, relevant ideas permeated the respective political elites. Looking to the future, and at risk of expressing a truism, liberal democracy will continue to survive and prosper in those places where most people want it to survive and prosper. It will also generally evolve in ways that are consistent with the prevailing climate of ideas.

The second answer relates to the importance of institutions. On the one hand, the quality of any democracy obviously rests in large part on the precise nature of the rules that determine when and how people are able to choose their governments. Institutional design matters enormously. On the other hand, liberal democracies are systems, and any judgements about the quality of democracy in a particular place need to reflect the workings of the system as a whole. A certain configuration of relatively undemocratic institutions, such as existed in Britain after the Second World War, can nonetheless enable voters to exercise considerable power over their governments. A multitude of democratic institutions, such as can be found in the United States, can nonetheless make it difficult for voters to exercise concerted influence over their governments.

The final answer relates to the importance of politicians. Their responses to recent social, economic and political developments will have an enormous impact on the future shape and health of liberal democracy. Contributing to an edited volume on the 800th anniversary of *Magna Carta*, King (2015b, 55) was particularly clear about the challenge that greater global interdependence and complexity posed for meaningful democratic government:

> Who is held to be accountable for what? There is now no omnibus answer to that crucial question, whether in Britain or elsewhere. The government of the day, whichever country it is in, is sometimes the answer, but not nearly as often as it once was. That is why the practice of democracy within the bounds of existing nation-states seems so unsatisfactory and leads so often to frustration and disappointment. The world of King John and his barons has exploded. The fallout from that explosion has still not come to earth.

Politicians—and the wider political class—arguably need to be more honest about the limits of what government can do for people and who can be held responsible for what. Such honesty might help to educate

citizens. It might discourage politicians from acting as if they were omnipotent and from cultivating unrealistic expectations. It might even help to focus politicians' minds on creating mechanisms that could promote basic accountability in an increasingly confusing world.

Note

1. In the case of the former, the comparators were Sweden and Japan (King 1993). In the case of the latter, they were Britain and Germany (King 1997).

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Conclusion

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Ivor Crewe and David Sanders

For over 60 years after World War II, authoritarian populist movements were confined to the political fringe of the advanced democracies of Europe, North America and Australasia. The Communist parties of France and Italy were the one notable exception in the early decades, after which their electoral support steadily fell. But authoritarian populist parties of the right made almost no headway, rarely achieving a parliamentary breakthrough, although occasionally making their presence felt on the streets. The emphatic defeat and discrediting of European fascism in 1945 had, it was assumed, flushed the toxin of far-right ideas out of the democratic body politic.

In fact, an authoritarian mindset has always been relatively widespread among the citizenry of the West. Its characteristic features are a suspicion of minorities, especially ethnic and religious minorities; distrust of political, financial and cultural elites, including mainstream politicians of the established parties; a disposition to believe in conspiracies; and a faith in simple solutions to stubborn and complicated problems, notably

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solutions involving the breach of individual rights and due process. The unifying thread is a low tolerance of difference, dissent and complexity. In his eponymous classic study of 1950, the German sociologist and psychologist, Theodor Adorno, delineated a personality type, the 'authoritarian personality', a bundle of deep-seated traits that shaped people's moral and political outlook (Adorno et al. 1950). There is little reason to believe that authoritarian personalities have diminished in number, let alone disappeared.

We should therefore recognise that a sizeable pool of potential support for authoritarian movements is a permanent feature of mass democratic politics, even if parties and political leaders failed to fully mobilise it for over half a century. Volcanoes can lie dormant for decades before shifts in the tectonic plates trigger an eruption. They stayed quiescent until the late 2000s for two reasons. In some democracies the barrier to entry into the party system was set too high by the electoral system, notably in the single member, simple plurality systems of the UK, US and France. But this was true too of the effective or formal thresholds set in proportional systems such as those of Germany and the Scandinavian democracies, which were lower but sufficient to keep the authoritarian populists out. There was another constraint: in almost all the democracies the principal political differences between the parties were defined by the left-right social-economic spectrum (state-directed versus market-directed economy, low tax/small government versus high tax/big government, workers' rights versus business freedom). These divisions cut across and as a result suppressed political cleavages defined by 'liberal and internationalist' versus 'authoritarian and nationalist' values on public policies including immigration, minority rights, foreign aid, international alliances, crime and punishment and the environment.

The principal and critical cause of the surge in support for authoritarian populist parties and leaders is the growth of mass immigration in the past two decades. The failed states and economic privation of the Horn of Africa, the unremitting sectarian wars across tracts of the Middle East and the working out of the Freedom of Movement principle after the eastern expansion of the European Union produced unprecedented flows of population across national borders. Every successful AP party and leader depicts the influx of immigrants as a threat to the jobs, wages, social entitlements, everyday way of life, security and identity of the home population and as a betrayal of the people by an out-of-touch elite.

Mass immigration or, more accurately, the perception and fear of it is not the complete explanation; two other concurrent changes in the global political landscape have propelled AP parties to national prominence. The economic recession that followed the 2008 global financial crisis in most advanced democracies turbo-charged authoritarian populism. It reinforced popular distrust of the established parties and financial institutions that had not only presided and in some cases precipitated the financial crisis, but had chosen to respond to it by fiscal retrenchment. Governments of both the centre-right and centre-left chose austerity—cuts in social and public services—rather than public investment as a response. The result was rising unemployment, cuts in living standards and the impoverishment of local communities in economically stagnant areas. Since 1945 and until 2008 authoritarian populism of the right did not flourish during economic downturns; the difference since then is the larger presence, and in some cases growth, of immigrant communities who have easily been depicted, usually misleadingly, as threats to wage levels, job security and the capacity of local hospitals, schools and public housing to cope with the spike in demand for their services at a time of cuts in public expenditure.

Fuel was added to the combustible mix of economic recession and mass immigration by repeated outbreaks of terrorism by Islamic fundamentalists in the major cities of the West. Few cities escaped, irrespective of whether the country in question had participated in military interventions in the Middle East. Most perpetrators were immigrants from Muslim countries, or their radicalised sons and occasionally daughters. Authoritarian populist leaders—Donald Trump and Marine Le Pen particularly come to mind—have been relentless in associating immigration, terrorism and personal insecurity in the public mind.

Economic recession and terrorism boosted incipient support for AP movements, but the arrival or prospect of immigrants on a large scale was critical. Every movement or leader on the authoritarian populist right (with the partial exception of Latin America) places control of national borders at the heart of their appeal. AP parties have broken through in democracies with high levels of immigration despite their surviving the global recession relatively unscathed, and keeping their social contract with the public intact, such as Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Austria and Switzerland. And they have failed to make an impact in those democracies which suffered a major recession after 2008 but have relatively low levels of immigration, such as Portugal, Spain and Ireland.

Authoritarian populism of the right flourishes by mobilising hostility to immigration and replacing the politics of class by the politics of ethnic and national identity. AP movements are not, however, single-issue, policy-reform parties. They pose a threat to the principles and institutions of liberal democracy in four ways. They breach principles of equal rights by defining the 'people' whom they claim to represent in national and ethnic terms, and on that basis according to them a privileged and exclusionary citizen status. They seek to subvert the political independence of the judiciary, media, universities and other institutions of civil society. They work to undermine the integrity of the electoral process in their own favour. And they try to replace an impartial rules-based public administration with one that trades in political favours and personal connections.

Right-wing authoritarian populism has already scaled the heights of power in some democracies. It has captured the Presidency in the United States and Turkey and it is entrenched in government in Hungary and Poland. There have been concerted attacks on the institutions and values of liberal democracy in all four countries, most successfully in Turkey and Hungary, less effectively (so far) in Poland and the United States. The executive in each case has sought to suppress opposition by undermining the free media, judicial procedure and the integrity of electoral process and in two cases, Turkey and Hungary, the independence of the universities. Elsewhere AP parties have cleared the electoral hurdle to gain representation in a multi-party parliament, typically with 10 to 20 per cent of the seats. This has been sufficient in some cases to enable them to join a coalition government as a junior partner (in Finland, Norway and Austria). In other countries the mainstream parties have collaborated to exclude them from government. But irrespective of whether they are in or outside government, their entry into the established party system as serious competitors for votes almost invariably induces the mainstream parties, particularly those dependent on a working class or traditional conservative base, to tack to the right. For fear of haemorrhaging their habitual support, the establishment parties edge into the discourse and priorities of the authoritarian populist agenda, normalising it in the process.

The return of authoritarian populist movements in much of the West, some of them close to fascism, poses a serious threat to liberal democracy. How should advanced liberal democracies respond to the challenge? In separate chapters in this volume, Geoffrey Hosking and Mick Moran make an eloquent case for the restoration of the implicit social contract between state and citizens that has been dismantled by the adoption of 'neo-liberal'

economic and social policies that give primacy to global markets and companies over state protection of local communities, even at times of deep recession. There is some strong electoral corroboration for this position. Neglected areas of economic decline, marked by deindustrialisation, job insecurity, stagnant living standards and demoralised communities proved to be fertile ground for Brexit and Donald Trump in 2016 and for Marine Le Pen in the French presidential election of 2017. But Brexit and Trump also attracted significant support in economically dynamic communities and from traditional conservatives, not least because the Conservative and Republican parties, particularly among activists on the ground, came down on their side. And, as we have noted, authoritarian populism has prospered in the affluent social democracies of Scandinavia and the social Christian democracies of Germany and Austria, campaigning on a xenophobic anti-immigrant platform. Restoring social protection against the depredations of international market forces should be part of the counter-strategy against authoritarian populism, but is not enough by itself.

Another approach might focus on institutional reform. Authoritarian populism is more likely to succeed in systems where the institutions that mediate between the governing elite and mass public have been weakened or bypassed. It can exploit direct plebiscitary democracy but it is constrained by indirect representative democracy. Presidential elections and referendums offer opportunities to authoritarian populists whereas parliamentary elections present obstacles: compare the success of UK Independence Party's (UKIP) leader Nigel Farage in the 2016 Brexit Referendum with UKIP's failure to win any seats in the general election less than a year later.

Authoritarian populist movements have skilfully exploited two relatively recent changes in the institutional structure of advanced liberal democracies: the democratisation of political parties and the democratisation of political communications. In Britain and the United States, most notably, the balance of power has shifted from the legislative elite of the party to its grassroots membership in selecting leaders, making policy and holding elected members of the legislature to account. Moreover, the parties are more open to infiltration by those on their authoritarian fringe than in the past, whether by design or accident. David McKay's chapter on Trump's nomination as the Republican presidential candidate gives a central place to the role of primaries and the power of wealthy backers in a de-regulated system of campaign finance. As for communications, Twitter, YouTube and Facebook short-circuit the mediation of print and

broadcasting. They directly connect political leaders to voters, marshalling and bonding those of a political like mind into a movement of electoral power, as Trump's triumph in 2016 and the rapid entry of new authoritarian populist parties such as the AfD and the Swedish Democrats demonstrated.

Although the regulation of referendums, the social media and parties' rules about membership, leadership selection and policy-making might be reformed, it is difficult to envisage any reversal of the trend towards more direct forms of democracy. A more realistic approach is to recognise that throughout Europe,[1] rapid and large waves of migration across national borders are almost invariably followed by the electoral advance, sometimes into government, of radical-right parties that threaten liberal values and, usually, democratic institutions. This is most likely if the immigrants' culture, particularly their language and religion, is noticeably different from that of the host population, but not confined to such cases. And it is to recognise too that the economic, political and demographic forces that propel the movement of impoverished and devastated peoples towards the prosperous and secure countries of the West are unlikely to abate in the foreseeable future.

To protect their values and institutions in a world of massive migrations, liberals need to acknowledge that the causal connection between surges of immigration and a flourishing radical right is the closest there is to an iron law of political sociology. They may have to accept that the majority whose interests they seek to serve are, in David Goodhart's insightful terms, people of 'somewhere' rather than 'anywhere' (Goodhart 2017) for whom a settled daily way of life and a common local culture are part of the social contract. Liberals may need to abandon their big-hearted internationalist instinct for open and unmanaged national borders and tacit indifference to illegal immigration. They should instead fashion a distinctively liberal position on immigration based on the socially progressive traditions of planning, public services, community cohesion and worker protection against exploitation. The policy components might include graduated, controlled and dispersed inflow, additional government spending in areas settled by recent immigrants to protect local public services, threshold language requirements for citizenship and leadership of international programmes to settle refugees near their country of origin. To do otherwise would be to provide the forces of illiberal authoritarianism with an opportunity to advance unparalleled since the 1930s and to

destroy the extraordinary post-war achievements of the liberal demo-cratic order.

NOTE

1. Europe, because Canada and Australia are exceptions.

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[1] Note: Page numbers followed by 'n' refer to notes.