The Young Turk era deepened, accelerated, and polarized the major views that had been gathering momentum in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century: Ottomanism and nationalism, liberalism and conservatism, Islamism and Turkism, democracy and autocracy, centralization and decentralization—all to the point where the empire might well have blown up had this not been accomplished by the events of World War I. This era, almost more than any other, has attracted scholars of modern Ottoman history, and it has been studied in such detail that it is difficult to believe that it was so short. Yet the politics, wars, and personalities of the period have so diverted its scholars that, to the present time, almost nothing has been done to study the modernization that it brought in even the darkest days of war. During this tragic period, four major wars decimated the population of the empire, raised its internal tensions to the breaking point, and threatened to destroy all the efforts of the sultans and reformers who had sought valiantly to save it during the previous century. Nevertheless, it was a time of regeneration during which the accomplishments of the Tanzimat and of Abdulhamit II were synthesized in a manner that laid the foundations of the modern Turkish Republic.

**Reaction to the Revolution**

The Young Turk Revolution had involved a cooperative effort of the CUP and various nationalist groups in Europe, so that the immediate internal reaction to the sultan's restoration of the Constitution was a wave of mass demonstrations, without equal in the empire's long history, in Istanbul and other major cities. Happy mobs of Turks, Arabs, Jews, Greeks, Serbs, Bulgars, Armenians, and Europeans embraced in the streets and made eternal vows of brotherhood for the common good. "Men and women in a common wave of enthusiasm moved on, radiating something extraordinary, laughing, weeping in such intense emotion that human deficiency and ugliness were for the time completely obliterated..." But what were they shouting for? "Tell us what constitution means," shouted the crowd. "Constitution is such a great thing that those who do not know it are donkeys," answered a speaker. Constitution had been advertised as such a general panacea that everyone assumed the recall of the Parliament would immediately solve all the problems that had crept in during the era of autocracy, including the terrorism of the minority national groups and their demands for autonomy or separation from the empire. The Armenian and Greek nationalist groups, on the other hand, tended to think that because they had cooperated with the Young Turks in Paris, the new regime would grant all their demands. To all, thus, it seemed that the millennium had come, the tension was over, and the empire would in fact be preserved.
The Constitutional Monarchy of Abdulhamit II

The joy was premature. In subordinating their desires to the immediate objective of restoring the constitutional regime, the different nationalist groups had ignored the many inherent contradictions in their programs. Achievement of the immediate goal ended the loose coalition of divergent interests, and the old differences and hostilities were revived.

The "revolution" had been made by the CUP, whose active members in the empire were mostly in the army. But it also suffered from internal divisions. While some of its members had advocated the Constitution in support of their brothers in Paris, most simply hoped that it would gain them promotions and higher pay as well as sufficient support from the Istanbul government to enable them to wipe out the provincial rebels. The CUP itself, therefore, never had drawn up a real political program beyond the restoration of Parliament. Nor was there any unity on the question of what to do with the sultan. Few of the liberals had gone as far as to advocate his overthrow, let alone the destruction of the dynasty. And whatever sentiment there had been to replace him was largely overwhelmed by the mass gratitude to him for restoring the Constitution. Abdulhamit remained on the throne, therefore, apparently determined to make his Constitution work. The CUP, whose members were not yet known to the public, remained in the background, mostly in Salonica, acting only as a pressure group to ensure the success of the new regime.

It did, however, dispatch to Istanbul a Committee of Seven, including three figures who later were to become most important—Staff Major Cemal Bey (later Minister of Nury Cemal Paşa), Talat Bey (later Minister of the Interior Talat Paşa), and Cavit Bey (later Minister of Finance and Public Works Cavit Paşa)—to represent it as steps were taken to establish a new government and to hold elections for the Parliament. But government itself remained in the hands of the old politicians, with the grand vezirate being held first by Sait Paşa (July 22–August 4, 1908), now a hero because of his criticism of the sultan's autocracy in its latter days, and then Mehmet Kamil Paşa (August 5, 1908–February 14, 1909), who had held the office twice before, in 1885–1891 and again for a short time in 1895.

The CUP's decision not to take over the government but to influence it through the Committee of Seven, thus in a sense to keep power without taking responsibility for its exercise, created a difficult political situation. No one knew exactly where power and authority lay. Did they still belong to the sultan? Were they to be exercised by the grand vezir? Or would the Parliament assume the leading role once it was convened? Inevitably, the result was confusion and conflict. In the provinces, political activists used the situation for their own purposes, getting the government to dismiss governors and other administrators whom they accused of corruption and misrule, sometimes with justice but more often simply to settle old scores. The government in Istanbul, unsure of its powers and the will of the CUP, usually complied, administering without having a policy of its own.

All these disputes came to a focus following the imperial decrees of August 1 and 3, 1908, modifying article 113 of the 1876 Constitution, which had allowed and even encouraged Abdulhamit's autocracy. The secret police now was abolished. The remaining police forces could act only in accordance with the Constitution. Other statements reasserted what already was in the Constitution. All Ottomans would have the same legal rights regardless of religion. No one could be arrested or imprisoned without cause. The courts were to be free entirely from outside interference. Subjects were guaranteed complete inviolability of their domiciles except...
with the authority of the courts and according to law. They could travel to foreign countries for any purpose whatsoever without any longer having to secure special permission. The government no longer would examine and censor publications before they were issued (publishers, however, were still subject to subsequent action if they violated the press or publication laws). More specific promises went beyond the provisions of the 1876 Constitution. The government could not thereafter examine and seize private letters and publications in the mails. Teaching and studying were to be free, without any kind of control. Bureaucrats no longer could be assigned to positions that they did not want (military officers excepted), and they were free to refuse to obey orders that they felt violated the law or the Constitution. All ministers, governors, and members of the Council of State were to be chosen by the grand vezir with the assent of the sultan, and all lower bureaucrats were to be appointed by the responsible ministers and governors in a similar way, with promotions and dismissals still subject to confirmation at the higher levels. Only the feyhulislam and the ministers of war and the navy were exempted from this procedure and instead were to be chosen directly by the sultan with only the advice of the grand vezir and the Council of Ministers. The budget was to be published annually, and separate regulations were to be drawn up to reorganize the ministries and the provincial administration. Immediately there were disputes over the question of appointing the ministers of war and the navy. To resist the efforts of the Committee of Seven to control the two ministries, the sultan and Sait Paşa introduced special regulations aimed at preserving civilian control over the armed forces, but the CUP finally prevailed, and Sait was soon replaced by the more compliant Kâmil Paşa. The Committee of Seven then retired behind the scenes, with the CUP declaring that it would do no more than attempt to guard the Constitution while leaving actual administration to the government.

It was the government of Kâmil Paşa, then, that cared for administration during most of the remaining months of Abdulhamit's reign, apparently with the full cooperation of the sultan. On August 16, 1908, it issued a detailed program promising financial reforms, reorganization of the administration and armed forces, and an effort to balance the budget. Treaties also would be renegotiated and measures taken to develop the economy. Education and science would be encouraged, and to secure the full equality of races promised in the Constitution, non-Muslims as well as Muslims would be conscripted and the military substitution tax ended as rapidly as possible. The special privileges enjoyed in the empire by foreigners by virtue of the Capitulations would be ended by agreement with the powers and by reforming the government so that foreigners would be willing to accept its authority. The separate privileges of the millets would gradually be brought to an end as all subjects, of all religions, would be given the same rights and legal status.

A whole series of laws and regulations followed to fulfill these promises. Political prisoners were pardoned and released, while prisoners held for nonpolitical crimes were released if they had served at least two-thirds of their sentences or longer than 15 years. The special martial law courts established in Macedonia to deal with rebels were abolished. A new advisory council was established in the Ministry of Forests, Mines, and Agriculture to recommend what measures the Parliament should take to improve the economy. Measures were taken to reorganize the bureaucracy and reduce the number of bureaucrats to meet the immediate budgetary crisis, but this was met with such strong protest that it was never fully carried out. The government was left with an extremely difficult budgetary problem, often lacking money to meet its daily expenses. Kâmil Paşa did what he could,
however, abolishing many of the smaller ministries that Abdulhamit had created for special purposes, like those for Health and Military Supplies, and turning their functions over to the regular ministries. General salary reductions were imposed (except for the army), and new commissions were established to unify government purchases, saving considerable amounts in a relatively short time. Quotas were set up to limit promotions in the administration and the Religious Institution, and the army was warned to limit its expenditures as much as possible. A special committee was set up to recommend means to reduce the annual interest payments made to the bondholders, and the extraordinary budget was abolished along with the special taxes imposed on the wages of civil servants and military officers to finance it. The Council of State was reorganized into four departments, Legislation (Tanzimat), Civil Affairs (Mülkiye), Finance (Maliye), and Education (Maarif), so that it could better prepare legislation for consideration by the Parliament, and the Ministries of Trade and Public Works were united, again eliminating the jobs of many civil servants. Finally, election laws were promulgated, and preparations were made for the convening of Parliament.

In the meantime, with a freedom of press and political association hitherto unknown in the Ottoman Empire, newspapers and political parties blossomed and the empire experienced a real political campaign. Two major political groups emerged to fight for power. First there was the CUP itself, which, while it did not actually form a party, issued a general manifesto of its policies and supported those candidates who promised to follow it, thus forming them into a group that came to be known as the Unionists (İttihatçular). Included in their number were Ahmet Riza, now returned from Paris and soon to be named president of the Chamber of Deputies, Talat, and Enver, among the few CUP members to reveal themselves, Abdullah Cevdet, Ahmet Muhtar, and others who campaigned in general support of modernization and westernization, though with some differences as to detail. The basic CUP program at this time included political reforms, popular freedom, strengthened national sovereignty and unity, agricultural and industrial development, and just taxation. The main opposition came from the Ottoman Liberal Union Party (Osmanlı Ahrar Fırkası), formed by Prince Sabaheddin as soon as he returned from Paris. The Istanbul newspaper İkdam was the principal organ of this group, which included the grand vezir and others who supported the prince’s call for decentralization and full equality for the minorities, thus gaining the support of the latter as well. The Liberal Union, however, was organized only on September 14, 1908, and therefore had very little time to participate in the campaign. The more conservative elements, representing the Islamic views previously favored by the sultan, did not actually form a group because they feared the CUP, but they did speak quietly about the need to retain Islam as the basis of state and empire. Debate in the campaign proceeded mainly on the questions of westernization and modernization versus decentralization, with Islamism and Turkism as well as the minority aspirations being de-emphasized under the assumption that the new freedom and equality would satisfy all.

The prospects of democracy in the empire were, however, destroyed by the greed of the powers and the empire’s neighbors, who proved to be as hungry for democratic, constitutional, Young Turk territory as they had been for that of the despotic Abdulhamit. Even as the campaign went forward, they took advantage of the temporary vacuum of power in Istanbul to strike while there seemed little chance of an immediate Ottoman response. On October 5, 1908, Austria annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina outright and Bulgaria proclaimed its independence, both renouncing
the sultan's suzerainty and stopping the payment of tribute to his treasury. The next day Greece took advantage of the powers' evacuation of Crete (completed on July 27) to annex it. In all these cases Ottoman protests to the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin, supposedly bound to guarantee its provisions, were met with no response. The Porte finally was compelled to solve the crisis on its own. It adopted measures to prevent internal uprisings against the minorities and made direct settlements with those who had violated their obligations. By the terms of the agreement signed on February 26, 1909, Austria would evacuate the sancak of Novipazar in return for Ottoman recognition of its rule over Bosnia and Herzegovina, pay monetary compensation of 200.5 million kurush, and help the Porte secure the agreement of the other powers to the abolition of the foreign post offices and all the Capitulatory privileges in the empire. A settlement with Bulgaria followed (April 19, 1909). Russia secured an agreement by promising to cancel 40 of the last 74 payments owed by the Ottomans for the war indemnity, and the Bulgars were to pay their compensation owed the sultan to Russia instead. In both cases the sultan, as caliph, would continue to control the lost provinces' Muslim religious life, appointing the kados and religious teachers as well as the chief muftis, who would represent him in religious matters and care for the interests of Muslims in the provinces. Austria and Bulgaria promised to finance the maintenance of Muslim schools and mosques and to facilitate the free exercise of the Islamic religion. Thus the matter was settled. The real losers were Serbia and Montenegro, whose ambition to reach the Adriatic had been thwarted by the Austrian acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nor was Russia very pleased, since Austria had fulfilled its ambitions without compensation to keep the balance of power in Central Europe. The czar therefore finally withdrew from the old League of the Three Emperors and moved toward the Triple Entente with Britain and France, finally completing the diplomatic alignments that were to lead directly to World War I.

The diplomatic settlement hardly assuaged Ottoman public feeling. In a very short time the new regime had lost more territory than Abdulhamit had been forced to give up since 1882. The new era of cooperation and hope was suddenly gone. The Muslims who had assumed that the Constitution would end the European efforts to break up the empire now began to turn toward the old sultan once again. The minority nationalists saw in the government's anguish at the loss of these territories a denial of their own hopes for autonomy or even independence. The mass of subjects saw in the latter's reaction the ephemeral nature of the hope that they might finally work together for the preservation of the empire. All the old divisions and hatreds returned despite the efforts of the government to keep everyone together. And the palace, which earlier had sat back in the hope that the Constitution would be able to solve the problems it could not solve, now itself began to encourage and support those elements that sought to use the situation to restore the sultan's power.

The time between the territorial losses and the elections was, however, too short for any major political shift to take place, particularly since the CUP and the army, in league with the government, were in real control of the country. The elections went ahead in November and early December 1908 under an electoral law issued by the government. Elections still were indirect, with the people choosing electors and the latter naming the actual deputies. The campaigns went ahead smoothly except in Macedonia, where the Greek government and the patriarch intervened to secure candidates favorable to their views. Mizanci Murat, now out of prison, strongly supported the Liberal Union, though it was accused of receiving funds
from the Greek government, the Dashnaks, and even the patriarch in return for its support of minority aspirations. The Greek ambassador declared that there were 6.5 million Greeks in the empire and demanded that they be given one quarter of all the seats in the new assembly and that Greek be made an official language. The Dashnaks made similar demands for the Armenians. In reaction the Muslims turned more and more to Islamic and Turkish views, though since the latter had no candidates the CUP prevailed, winning all the 288 deputy seats but one, which went to the Liberal Union. The Turks gained a bare majority, with 147 seats, while 60 seats went to the Arabs, 27 to Albanians, 26 to Greeks, 14 to Armenians, 10 to Slavs, and 4 to Jews. The voting had been honest, all the millets were represented in proportion to their actual population, and it seemed possible at least that democracy in the empire might well be given a second chance. The upper house, or Chamber of Notables (Meclis-i Ayan), was soon appointed by the Council of Ministers, and the Parliament and government seemed fully prepared for the new Ottoman constitutional regime.

On December 17, 1908, the old city of Istanbul witnessed one of the most remarkable scenes in its long history. Sultan Abdulhamit drove through the narrow streets in an open carriage, waving to the crowds assembled as he went to open the new Parliament, assembled in the Ministry of Justice building behind the Aya Sofya mosque. With his first secretary reading his speech, the sultan explained why he had not recalled the Parliament since 1878, stating that his advisers had recommended postponing this part of the Constitution until the empire was ready for it, the people better educated, and the basic reforms well established. “Being satisfied that the fulfillment of this wish would promote the present and future happiness of my Empire and Country, I proclaimed the Constitution anew without hesitation in spite of those who hold views and opinions opposed to this,” he explained. In response, both councils praised the sultan for restoring the Constitution and criticized those of his advisers who had misguided him in the past. Then they went on record to support the government’s efforts to regain the recently lost territories.

But the new regime had little chance of success. The Parliament simply helped focus attention on the divisions and rivalries that had been momentarily extinguished. The minority delegates did what they could to paralyze action until their demands were granted. The Muslim delegates and ministers were divided on whether to follow the CUP or the sultan or to develop an independent policy. Endless debates soon stalled most of the laws prepared by the Council of State. After he saw how unsuccessful the Porte had been in countering foreign aggression and how ineffective the Parliament was in facilitating the passage of legislation, Abdulhamit did not hesitate to intervene. The supporters of Islamism began to agitate openly, possibly but not definitely with the support of the sultan. Reacting to the secularism of the Constitution, the appearance of unveiled women on the streets, and the new equality recognized for non-Muslims, the Muslim religious conservatives began to campaign openly against the Constitution, declaring that the empire’s decline had been caused by its departure from basic Islamic foundations and that Islam could be adapted to meet the demands of a modern age; Islam could provide the laws to regulate every aspect of the empire’s social and political life, while only the technology of the West need be borrowed. Sympathizers were found everywhere, not only among the ulema, but also in the bureaucracy and the army, the dervish orders, and among the masses. The attempts of the new government to make provincial government more efficient and to conscript everyone also irritated the tribes of eastern Anatolia, which had always insisted on autonomy. Leading the
movement in Istanbul was Kâmil Paşa, joined by all those who were unhappy with the new order, including officials and army officers who had been dismissed and former palace spies. Soon joining them were the mass of Istanbul's Muslim population—artisans and merchants, proprietors of coffeehouses and public baths, porters, fishermen, peasants in the capital to sell their crops, recent refugees—all easily susceptible to a religious appeal.\(^{12}\)

Opposed to the conservatives were the modernists, holding views similar to those of Ahmet Rıza, but now led by men such as Abdullah Cevdet, Ahmet Muhtar, and Celal Nuri. Some of them advocated full imitation of the West to secure its support and respect. Most, however, felt that Ottoman modernization had to be more selective, taking what was best in the West and modifying it to meet the special needs of Islam and the Ottoman community. Enlightenment through education had to accompany the reforms so that the general population would support them and benefit from them. The modernists, however, were divided. Those who were unwilling to accept the CUP's direction in the Unionist Party or the decentralist policies of the Liberal Union joined the General Welfare Club (Selamet-i Umumiyet Kulübü) in 1908 and later the Ottoman Democratic Party (Osmanlı Demokrat Fırkası). Led by such old Young Turks as Ibrahim Temo, Abdullah Cevdet, and Ibrahim Naci, the new group did not actually participate in the 1908 elections, but it was able to get several CUP assembly members to represent its views while publicizing them in the newspaper Türkiye as well as in papers in İzmir, Monastir, and Aleppo, indicating the wide extent of support and organization.\(^{13}\) In addition, the Greek and Armenian delegates to the Assembly formed their own political groups dedicated to the autonomy or independence of Macedonia and the provinces of eastern Anatolia, seeking to accomplish their aims mainly by disrupting the Parliament in the hope that political anarchy would lead to fulfillment of their desires.

In the midst of these conflicts and resentments Kâmil Paşa tried to play off the different groups to build his own power at the expense of palace and Parliament as well as the CUP. At first the CUP refrained from opposing him, feeling he was the best alternative for the moment, but he assumed that this was the result of CUP weakness and thus attempted to use the situation to appoint his own men as ministers of war and the navy (February 10, 1909). The CUP then did show its real power. It secured an Assembly vote of no confidence against him, leading him to resign in favor of a CUP man, Hüseyin Hilmi, who became the new grand vezir. The CUP tried to conciliate the opposition, but the sultan and conservatives were alarmed at its demonstration of power, and events were set in motion that presaged major political changes.

**The Counterrevolution of April 13, 1909**

The modernists were too divided to take serious action against the CUP. But for the conservatives it was quite different. It seemed to them that the replacement of Kâmil Paşa, if not protested, would end the sultan's power to control the government and, thus, their own ability to curb its "irreligious" actions. Tension mounted in the capital. Students of religion massed here and there demanding an end to the Constitution. The army soldiers grumbled openly in the barracks with support from their officers. Many artisans and laborers, themselves under the influence of orthodox and mystic religious leaders, talked with increased fervor about the threat to the Şeriat and the danger of Christian domination.
It was one Hafiz Derviş Vahdeti who focused this discontent into an attempt at counterrevolution. Apparently a member of the Bektashi order, he began to publish a newspaper called *Volkan* (Volcano) on November 10, 1908, presenting a mixed message of mystic and popular Islam and strong opposition to the secularism of the government as well as the influence of the minorities and foreign representatives. Within a short time he formed the Society of Islamic Unity (*Ittihad-i Muhammedi Cemiyeti*), intended to replace the Constitution with the Şeriat and use Islam to modernize and rescue the empire. The secular schools and courts would be replaced with their Islamic counterparts and the authority of the sultan restored as the best means of rescuing the empire. While Abdulhamit apparently refused to provide financial support for the new organization and newspaper, it appears that it was helped by other elements in the palace, with one of the sultan’s sons, Burhaneddin Efendi, actually becoming a member. Volkan now began an active campaign against the government. The Society of Islamic Unity declared its intention to establish a regime that would fulfill the basic duties of Islamic government—to protect and promote the Şeriat and the basic practices of Islam, spread the light (nur) of Divine Unity throughout the empire, and free Muslims all over the world from the tyranny of non-Muslim oppression. Its immediate aims were to promote the interests of Muslims, support the Islamic principle of consultation (mesveret) as the basis of government, secure wider application of the Şeriat in the Meccelle code used in the secular courts, and to encourage the development of Muslim morals and traditions in the daily lives of all Muslims in the empire.

On April 3, 1909, the society held its first mass meeting at the Aya Sofya mosque, using the celebrations of the birthday of the Prophet to gain further popular support. Vahdeti harangued the crowd with appeals for struggle against secularism, stating that the Muslims had the same right as non-Muslims to organize to defend their ideals and rights. Chapters were organized in other cities, and these in turn began to send popular petitions to the government demanding that the Şeriat be restored. The society soon had members in the First Army of Istanbul, key to gaining control of the city. It cooperated with the Liberal Union group and campaigned against the government. A groundswell of mass support soon pushed the conservatives to open action. During the night of April 12/13, the soldiers of the First Army joined the students of religion before the Sultan Ahmet mosque, marched to the nearby Parliament building, and surrounded it. The grand vezir had been aware of the rising tension but had not expected such a sudden explosion; thus when he heard of the affair, he sent only his chief of police to see what was happening. The demonstrators presented him with a series of demands: the government would have to resign and send many deputies into exile; the Şeriat would be obeyed in full; all military officers removed by the government would be recalled, and the CUP influence in the army brought to an end. Ahmet Riza would be removed as president of the Chamber of Deputies and a “true Muslim” appointed in his place. Word of the demands was sent to the deputies gathered in the building, but since they had no authority to comply, the tension mounted. The mob began flooding into the Parliament buildings, and as the deputies fled in terror two were killed, apparently under the mistaken impression that they were Ahmet Riza and Hüseyin Cahit Bey, editor of the pro-CUP paper *Tanin*. The government faced a crisis. The minister of war refused to order the army to disperse the rebels. Grand Vezir Hüseyin Hilmi was powerless; he rushed to the Yıldız Palace and presented his entire cabinet’s resignation to the sultan. Abdulhamit not only accepted the resignations but also sent his first secretary to Aya Sofya with an order
accepting all the rebel demands. The CUP in any case had never been strong in Istanbul; its authority was based mainly on the threat of action on the part of the Macedonian army, and now it seemed completely defeated. CUP members who were in Istanbul fled, and its party and newspaper headquarters were sacked. Whether or not the sultan actually had participated in the planning of the counter-revolution, he now used it to restore his old powers, appointing his own men as ministers of war and the navy and thus reestablishing control over the armed forces. Ahmet Tevfik Paşa was appointed grand vezir with a new cabinet, though he was able to get the sultan to accept his own men in the key ministries as a price for his cooperation. Those deputies still in Istanbul were called to meet once again. Ismail Kemal was elected new president of the Chamber, while Mızancı Murat, long an Islamicist at heart, provided full support to the new regime, thus giving it the backing of the Liberal Union as well. 10

The sultan was back in power again, and the CUP in Istanbul was shattered. Senior army officers in Macedonia, not necessarily CUP members, took the lead to restore order under the leadership of the Third Army commander, Mahmut Şevket Paşa, his chief of staff, young Mustafa Kemal, and several officers who later were to make their mark both militarily and politically, including İsmet (Inönü) and Enver Bey. The CUP tried to rally its supporters around the empire, appealing also to the minority national groups with which it had cooperated in 1909. The only result of this was an Armenian uprising in Adana that stimulated a severe repression on the part of the local garrison, with massacre and countermassacre following until as many as 30,000 people of all religions were killed (April 14, 1909). Mahmut Şevket interpreted this to mean that the political solutions offered by the CUP would not work and that open military intervention alone could resolve the situation. In this he was supported in particular by Mustafa Kemal, who, since his rejection by the CUP leaders after his initial organizing successes, had abandoned it and opposed military participation in politics. Mustafa Kemal now organized the Macedonian army for the move on the capital, loading its men on trains and organizing what he called the “Operation Army” (Hareket Ordusu), which now moved toward Istanbul under the command of Hüseyin Hüsnü. Since this was not a CUP operation, though some of the officers involved had been CUP members, and since the Operation Army was operating in the name of the army to restore order, Abdulhamit at first accepted and welcomed the move. But the Operation Army soon took a turn quite different from what he expected. Most deputies and members of the Chamber of Notables joined members of the former and current cabinet to go to meet the advancing military train outside Istanbul at Yeşilköy (San Stefano) in the hope of gaining an agreement to restore the Parliament and defend the Constitution without any conflict. On April 22, 1909, they met together secretly as the National Public Assembly (Meclis-i Umumi-i Milli) under the chairmanship of former Grand Vezir Sait Paşa, now president of the Chamber of Notables. In order to assure the army that they had not participated in the counterrevolution and did not support the new government, they decided to depose Abdulhamit, though to lessen the danger of resistance in Istanbul they kept this part of their decisions secret. On the morning of April 24 the Operation Army reached the Istanbul railroad station and occupied the capital. The sultan ordered that there be no resistance, but some of his supporters set up barricades and fought vigorously near the Porte and at their barracks at Taksim and Üsküdar. By the end of the day, however, they were crushed. Mahmut Şevket declared martial law and summary courts tried, executed, or exiled those found responsible for the counterrevolution or the resis-
The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975

The final step came three days later. On April 27 Parliament again met as the National Public Assembly, this time at the Aya Sofya mosque and under Sait Paşa's chairmanship. Obtaining a fetva that justified the sultan's deposition on the grounds of complicity in the counterrevolution and the deaths that resulted, as well as of the theft of state funds, the National Assembly declared him deposed in favor of his brother, Mehmet V Reşat. The sultan and his family were immediately placed on a special train and sent to Salonica the same night so that the next morning the public and the sultan's supporters were presented with a fait accompli against which there could be no real opposition. After 33 years on the throne, then, still now only in his 66th year, Abdulhamit accepted the events as the will of God and lived on quietly in Salonica until he was recalled to Istanbul in 1912 due to the fear that he might fall to the enemy in the Balkan Wars. He then resided in the Beylerbeyi Palace, on the Anatolian side of the Bosporus, until his death six years later, on February 10, 1918. Thus ended in obscurity and disgrace the life of one of the most eminent of all Ottoman sultans.

The Ottoman Constitutional Democracy, 1909-1911

It long has been assumed that the revolutions of 1908 and 1909 ushered in a period of direct rule by the CUP. However mistaken this assumption was for Abdulhamit's last year of power, it was even less true in the period of constitutional democracy that followed until the disastrous war with Italy in Tripolitania. As we have seen, the counterrevolution of April 1909 disrupted and scattered the CUP and its supporters, and it was the senior officers of the Macedonian army who restored the Parliament and deposed Abdulhamit to preserve order. This in turn inaugurated not a new period of CUP dominance but, rather, a mainly constitutional and democratic regime influenced from behind the scenes by Mahmut Şevket Paşa, who became martial-law commander of Istanbul as well as inspector of the First, Second, and Third armies, thus inaugurating a limited kind of army participation in politics that has been exercised from time to time ever since.

In response, the CUP itself emerged mainly as a civilian political party. It worked to restore its previous authority by developing an empire-wide membership and political organization as well as a program that could appeal to the masses. So it was that while its first congress, held in Salonica in 1908, was secret, with its public statement still limited to support of the as yet unstated aims of the Macedonian CUP, the one held on November, 13, 1909, and all subsequent party congresses were quite public. The secret "patriotic clubs" previously established in the provincial centers now openly emerged as its party centers, all, however, still under the strong control of its leaders in Istanbul and Salonica. Its military members did not participate actively in politics, but their influence still was felt from behind the scenes. The CUP program was strongly secularist and reflective of the modernist policies of the intellectuals. It favored the existing organization of Parliament, with a Chamber of Notables partly appointed by the sultan and partly by the Chamber of Deputies. The vote was to be given to Ottoman male subjects over the age of 20 who possessed some property. Elections still would be indirect, but article 113 would be abolished altogether. All Ottomans would be equal before the law, free to assemble publicly and discuss political issues as long as the public order was not
disturbed. Censorship would be abolished, but the press still would be subject to regulations. Public primary education would be compulsory and free, with instruction being given in the language of the majority of the students in each school. But in the intermediate and higher levels, education would be voluntary and instruction only in Turkish. New laws would regulate the relations between workers and their employers. The tax system would be reformed to reflect economic and social needs. Efforts would be made to develop the economy of the empire and to encourage ownership of the land by the cultivators. All these were programs that could very easily have been accepted by Abdulhamit and the Men of the Tanzimat. The strong Turkish nationalism, which was to develop later, was as yet absent; there was a continuation of the practice that Ottoman Turkish was the official language of state. 23

With both the Liberal Union and the Islamic Unity parties wiped out by the events of 1909, only the small Ottoman Democratic Party remained to provide the CUP with some opposition in the elections and Parliament. For the most part, then, the main struggle for power in the government was between Mahmut Şevket, representing the military, and the CUP. Mahmut Şevket generally prevailed, though the CUP exercised some influence through the appointment of two members, Cavit Bey (deputy from Salonica) and Talat Bey, to the key positions of minister of finance and minister of the interior respectively. Şevket worked to keep army members out of politics and out of the CUP. But he also resisted the efforts of the government to supervise the army budget and, thus, to control the army. With such pulls from both sides, the members of the CUP's parliamentary group found it impossible to stay together. In February 1910 some of them formed their own parliamentary group, the People's Party (Ahali Firkası), thus bringing the divisions into the open. 24 There soon followed the Ottoman Committee of Alliance (Heyet-i Müttefka-i Osmaniye), which included members of the minority national groups as well as those members of the banned political parties who were still active in politics and advocating a decentralized empire. 25 There also were the Liberal Moderates (Mütedil Liberaller), led by Ismail Kemal and including deputies from Albania as well as the Arab provinces. 26 But none of these could participate too openly in politics due to the continued martial law; thus they acted merely as parliamentary groups, cooperating in opposition to the CUP and to the government when it supported CUP policies and representing a more conservative approach to public policy combined with a desire to meet the nationalist demands by a decentralized type of government. In November 1911 all the opposition groups joined in the Freedom and Accord Party (Hürriyet ve İstilâf Firkası), led by Ismail Hakkı Paşa, deputy from Amasya, Damat Ferit Paşa, member of the Chamber of Notables, and Riza Nur, deputy from Gümülcine. 27 There also were two radical underground groups. The Ottoman Radical Reform Party (İslahat-ı Esasiye-i Osmaniye Firkası), formed in Paris at the end of 1909 by the Ottoman ambassador to Sweden, Şerif Paşa, advocated revolutionary action to topple the regime by assassinating the government leaders, ending the martial law, and forming a new Parliament through elections. 28 There also was an Ottoman Socialist Party (Osmanlı Sosyalist Firkası) formed in Istanbul in 1910 under the leadership of Hüseyin Hilmi, publisher of the newspaper İştirak, which gained its main support from the Armenian and Bulgarian groups in the Parliament. But both right and left were suppressed by the army and forced to transfer their activities to Europe, after which they had little influence on politics within the empire. 29

The amendments to the Constitution of 1876 constituted the most important legis-
The rise of modern Turkey, 1808–1975

lation passed in the years before the Italian War. After a long series of debates in the Chamber of Deputies, a new law (August 21, 1909) fundamentally altered the balance of power in the government. The powers of the sultan and palace were severely reduced. The sovereignty vested in the House of Osman in the Constitution now was made contingent on the sultan's fulfillment of his accession oath made to the National Assembly promising to respect both the Şeriat and the Constitution and to be loyal to the fatherland (vatan) and nation (millet), thus giving the Parliament the right to depose him if it wished to do so (article 3). He still was allowed to retain his private treasury, wealth, and estates (article 6). But the ministers and the grand vezir were made responsible to the Parliament rather than to the sultan, and he was bound to call it into session within a certain number of days after each election and to allow it to meet at least for a certain amount of time, thus greatly limiting his actual authority to control the affairs of government. Even these limited rights were further restricted in subsequent articles. His right to conclude treaties was made subject to the ultimate approval of the Parliament. He could choose only the şeyhülislam and the grand vezir, whereas the latter alone could choose the rest of his cabinet subject only to the sultan's sanction (article 27). The presidents and vice presidents of the two chambers now were elected by their own members instead of being appointed by the sultan, and he could do no more than sanction them (article 77). Article 113 was altered to allow the government to proclaim martial law when needed and to suspend the normal laws and protections, but without any participation on the part of the sultan. Finally, the sultan's secretary and chief mabeyinci and their staffs were to be appointed by and responsible to the cabinet rather than the sultan, making it very clear that he could no longer build a government within the palace as Abdulhamit had done.

The Constitution also was modified to limit the power of the Porte in relation to the Parliament. Ministers were made responsible to the Chamber of Deputies rather than the grand vezir (article 29). If the cabinet disagreed with the Chamber on any matters, including finance, it was the latter that prevailed, and the former had to resign if it did not accept the situation (article 30). If it did resign and the same grand vezir or a new one formed another cabinet that failed to accord with the will of the deputies, the sultan had to dissolve the latter and hold new elections. But if the new Chamber upheld the will of its predecessor, then the cabinet in the end simply had to conform (article 35). The Chamber of Deputies had the right to interpellate the grand vezir or any minister, and if it disapproved of his conduct, the minister had to resign. If it was the grand vezir who was thus rejected, the entire cabinet fell and a new one had to be appointed (article 38).

When the Parliament was not in session, the cabinet could have its decisions promulgated directly by order of the sultan, but only for grave emergencies threatening the state or public order, and subject always to the ultimate approval or disapproval of the Parliament as soon as it could gather in regular or special session (article 36). The right to initiate legislation was extended to both chambers of the Parliament, whose decisions went directly to the sultan for promulgation without the sanction or intervention of the cabinet. The sultan had to promulgate the law within two months or return it. It then could be passed only by a two-thirds vote of the deputies, in which case the sultan had to promulgate it (articles 53–54). Thus the sultan's veto had only a delaying power. Both houses had to meet from November 1 to May 1 each year and to assemble without the call or sanction of the government or the sultan. Their terms also could be extended
through the normal process of legislation and promulgation (article 43). The deputi-
eties retained their right to approve the annual expenditure budget and to interpel-
late the ministers on its contents, but only the cabinet could determine how the
revenues would be assessed and collected (article 80).

Finally, rights previously in the Constitution were made more specific. Subjects
were now to be free from search, seizure, or imprisonment except in conformity
with the law (article 10). Publications were to be free, and there was to be no
censorship before publication (article 12). The post could not be opened or
searched except with the authorization of the courts (article 119). But while Otto-
mans were to be free to organize themselves into societies, all secret societies or-
ganized to destroy Ottoman territorial integrity, disturb public order, divide the
races of the empire, or violate the Constitution were prohibited (article 120).

But with the political leaders in Parliament spending most of their time in
political maneuvering, there was little opportunity to develop a concentrated pro-
gram of legislation to put any of the different groups' ideas into effect. Far fewer
laws were passed during the three years preceding the Italian War than in the
later years of the autocracy, and the bulk of these was concerned with fulfilling
the Parliament's constitutional responsibility of authorizing the annual budget and
providing supplementary funds when necessary. Further efforts were made to
balance the budget by reducing the bureaucracy, salaries, and promotions. A
new system of financial inspectors was created to go around the empire to ensure
that taxes were collected on time and in full and that government resources were
not squandered. The tax collection service and its methods were again revised.

A Financial Reforms Commission (Islahat-4 Maliye Komisyonu) was established
in the Ministry of Finance to recommend changes in organization and collection
methods to maximize revenues and reduce expenditures. State tax collectors as-
sumed the job of collecting and distributing the surtax shares intended for public
works and education, and the treasury received its own share to help meet its
financial obligations. A new central accounting system was organized to pro-
vide more efficient control over the handling of public funds by officials, ministries,
and departments. Individual taxes also were reorganized and generally increased.
Under the constant prodding of the legislature and the Accounting Office, revenue
collections increased dramatically to almost 100 percent of assessed taxes, but
expenditures increased even more rapidly, particularly for the army (which in-
creased from 596.7 to 849.8 million kuru§ between 1901 and 1910), the navy,
(from 50.06 to 115.2 million kuru§), the gendarmes and police (from 120.4 to
166.1 million kuru§) and the Parliament itself, which now cost some 100 million
curus for salaries and other administrative costs. As a result, the deficit increased
steadily through the Young Turk period, as shown in Table 4.1.

Most other legislative actions were devoted to meeting the terroristic attacks
that arose in Macedonia and eastern Anatolia following the counterrevolution. The
"Law on Vagabonds and Suspected Criminals" (May 8, 1909) was passed to
enable the government to deal with anyone suspected of acting against the interests
of the empire. Persons apprehended without any visible means of support could be
turned over to the public prosecutor and sentenced from two to four months to
work of public utility. Suspected criminals could be held up to 48 hours by the
police, and if proof of illegal acts or plans was discovered, they then could be
turned over to the public prosecutors for punishment according to the law. Anyone
found carrying arms could be imprisoned for six months. Those who actively par-
cipated in armed bands were to be imprisoned for ten years, and their leaders
Table 4.1. Ottoman revenues and expenditures, 1908–1911

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year (kurus.)</th>
<th>Total collections</th>
<th>Percent of assessment</th>
<th>Expenditures (kurus.)</th>
<th>Balance (kurus.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1324/1908–9</td>
<td>2,519,791,592</td>
<td>92.16</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1325/1909–10</td>
<td>2,692,693,836</td>
<td>96.44</td>
<td>2,775,263,363</td>
<td>−82,569,527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1326/1910–11</td>
<td>2,878,303,078</td>
<td>98.14</td>
<td>3,374,511,319</td>
<td>−496,208,241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


and organizers were to be executed. The families of those participating in such bands also were subject to punishment, and their property could be confiscated by the state. The army was ordered to establish “pursuit battalions” to capture and disarm the terrorist bands, and all subjects were required to report the presence of such groups and to cooperate with the army’s efforts against them.\(^{38}\)

A Law on Public Gatherings required that permits be obtained to hold any public gathering, indicating the time and place, the subjects to be discussed, and the names of its sponsors, so that they would be available for punishment if the law was violated. No public gatherings could be held within 3 kilometers of the Porte or Parliament while they were in session. Gatherings could not disturb the regular flow of traffic in the public thoroughfares or sidewalks. Government officials had to be admitted to all gatherings so that they could ascertain that the law was being observed.\(^{39}\) The Societies Law provided for the registration of all associations and also prohibited the formation of groups based on nationality or race or which advocated action to violate the law or public morality, disturb public order, or attack the empire’s unity.\(^{40}\) A new Press Law more or less confirmed those of Abdulhamit, making each newspaper legally and financially responsible for publishing information that might disturb public order, harm individuals, or incite violations of the Constitution.\(^{41}\) Printing presses and publishers were restricted in the same way.\(^{42}\) Istanbul and its environs were organized into a new province, side by side with the municipality, with a police organization (Emniyet-i Umumi Müdârîlîğı) established under the governor and, thus, the central government, to police the capital more efficiently than its own forces had done in the past.\(^{43}\) Ottoman society thus was far more restricted in the name of public order after the Constitution had been restored than under Abdulhamit.

These restrictions were intended primarily to discourage the terrorists and the more extreme elements of the right and the left. The system of justice, as it related to the vast majority of subjects, continued to improve. The Ministry of Justice was enlarged and reorganized so that it could better supervise the courts and ensure that judges were able and honest.\(^{44}\) A new system of judicial inspectors made certain that the courts were not subjected to interference and that judgments were made in accordance with the law.\(^{45}\) In addition, the provincial courts were completely removed from the authority of the governors, and separate courts were provided in most places for civil, criminal, and commercial cases on both the primary and appeal levels.\(^{46}\)

The new regime took steps to modernize the armed forces, which had been neglected in Abdulhamit’s later days. New guns, cannons, battleships and other equipment were purchased on a large scale, mainly from Germany, Britain, and
the United States. Foreign advisers were brought in to train the Ottomans in their use, and a series of new laws modernized the army. A new Advisory Military Council (Şura ve ʿAskeri) was established at the Seraskerate, and it prepared a large number of regulations to modernize the organization and operations of the army.\footnote{47} The reserves were reorganized and given additional equipment and training.\footnote{48} The army medical and veterinary services were expanded and modernized.\footnote{49} But reforming the army was a difficult task, with the vast morass of military bureaucrats reacting very slowly to the changes that were made, while the political rivalries among the CUP officers and their opponents made it difficult for them to cooperate for the common good.

With financial stringency pressing all the other departments and with the Parliament bogged down in politics when the army or finances were not involved, little else was done until the end of 1911. A few laws were passed to encourage the construction of urban tramways and public roads and the extension of the railroads.\footnote{50} The Istanbul trams were, at long last, electrified,\footnote{51} and public steamship service was provided into the Golden Horn.\footnote{52} The secular school system continued to expand and modernize with the help of the education surtax, but no major changes were made in the basic organization and regulations inherited from the time of Abdulhamid. The only major new schools established were for non-commissioned army officers and infantry riflemen.\footnote{53} Only lip service was paid to developing the economy, and new regulations were prepared to encourage the cultivation of rice,\footnote{54} reorganize the forestry system\footnote{55} and the chambers of commerce\footnote{56} and to transfer the Agriculture Department from the Ministry of Trade to that of Forests, Mines, and Agriculture, thus ending the longstanding conflicts that had arisen because of its position astride the two ministries.\footnote{57} The retirement provisions for bureaucrats were liberalized,\footnote{58} employment of foreign experts restricted to provide more room for trained Ottomans,\footnote{59} and an organization of civil service inspectors established to make sure the bureaucrats were obeying the law and respecting the rights of the subjects.\footnote{60} But that was all, and the limited accomplishments were a far cry from the aspirations of the CUP and most of the people.

**Internal Dissent and the Albanian Revolt, 1910–1912**

The new regime failed to produce miracles, and relations among the races in the empire continued to grow worse. The Armenian Dashnaks launched a new wave of terrorism in eastern Anatolia and intensified their European propaganda campaign accusing the Ottomans of massacre. And the Greek terrorists in Macedonia were equally active. Popular opinion in Istanbul was convinced that terrorists had caused the fire that had destroyed the Çırağan Palace, only recently converted for use of the Parliament, though apparently an electrical short circuit was responsible (January 1910). Parliament lost its archives and papers and had to move to the much less spacious building of the Fine Arts Academy in the Fındıklı section of the capital (now the Atatürk Girls’ Lycée), where it remained until the end of the empire. Continued Greek claims for Cyprus and demands of the Greek representatives in Parliament for substantial quotas of Greek army officers and provincial officials further inflamed the situation.

Another source of trouble was Albania. Since many Albanians had been involved in the Young Turk movement, men such as Ibrahim Temo and Ahmet Niyazi, its nationalists assumed that the triumph of constitutionalism would mean achievement of all the ambitions which they had nourished since the Congress of Berlin.
But Ottomanism, as it was developed in the Young Turk period, meant essentially cooperation in a united empire, not the kind of autonomy that the Albanian nationalists wanted. The Young Turks did not hamper the activities of the Albanian nationalist clubs at first, but they also established in Albania, as elsewhere in the empire, their own party headquarters, which in advocating Ottomanism campaigned against the nationalists. In reaction, the latter renewed demands for autonomy, development of the Albanian language, and appointment of Albanians to key positions in the province. Ismail Kemal Vlora came to Istanbul as parliamentary deputy for Berat and acted as their principal voice in the capital. The participation of Albanian soldiers in the 1909 counterrevolution and Ismail Kemal’s cooperation with the Liberal Union contributed to the misunderstanding. The Young Turks assumed that all the Albanian Muslims supported the central government against the Christians, but the issues were complex. Many Muslims supported the nationalists, putting their Albanian identity above all else, while many Christians, especially the Gheg tribes of the north, opposed them because they feared losing their traditional privileges in an autonomous Albania.

The Albanian revolt, when it finally came in the winter and spring of 1910, was as much a campaign against the new efforts at efficiency and centralization as it was a national movement. The new census and tax regulations struck especially at mountaineers who had long treasured their independence and avoided conscription. The laws against vagabonds and national societies struck Albania in particular because of its traditional armed bands, which had dominated the mountains for centuries. These laws transformed general resentment against government controls into open support of the nationalists. The harshness of Mahmut Şevket’s suppression of the initial revolts won new supporters for the nationalists. Montenegro began to support the rebels, not only shielding and arming Albanian refugees but also pleading their case in Europe, demanding that the sultan give a general amnesty, compensate for all confiscated weapons and property, and that all municipal and district chiefs in the province be Albanians. During the winter of 1911, the trouble mounted, and the nationalists demanded the limitation of Albanian tax revenues to expenditures in Albania. The revolt was begun by the Catholic Albanians, but thousands of Muslims soon joined in the demand for “liberty, justice, and autonomy.” In June 1911 the sultan himself visited Kosova to calm the situation, signing a decree of amnesty and introducing many concessions, including Albanian schools, military service to be performed only in the province, suspension of all conscription and taxes for two years, and the use of officials conversant in Albanian. But while these measures calmed the north, the revolt in the south intensified, with a national Albanian committee formed at Vlora demanding union of the provinces of Işkodra, Kosova, Monastir, and Janina into a single Albanian province governed by its own Parliament and administration and with its own army (May 15, 1911). The government finally gave in to most of the demands (August 1911), but the solution again proved temporary. By this time Ismail Kemal and his associates were convinced that they could secure far more than autonomy as a result of the Ottoman-Italian war in Tripoli and the promises of assistance from the latter as well as from Montenegro. By June 1912 Albania was again in open revolt, with the rebels now demanding a united Albania, fully autonomous, administered by and for Albanians.
The Beginnings of Turkish Nationalism

It was the Albanian revolt, more than any other event, that convinced the Turks that it would be impossible to conciliate different national interests and attain a unified empire. While the conservatives reacted by turning back to Islam, the secularists who supported the Constitution turned instead to Turkish nationalism. The Turkist groups, which had been quiescent since the counterrevolution, became active once again and attracted extensive popular support. In January 1909 the Turkish Society (Türk Derneği) had been formed to coordinate their activities, publishing a journal by the same name to advocate its views, and it had gained little response. But now with the new public interest, its leaders transformed it into the Turkish Homeland Society (Türk Yurdu Cemiyeti) (August 31, 1911) and developed it into a major movement. Under the leadership of Yusuf Akçura and Ahmet Ağaoğlu it began to publish its message in the famous periodical Türk Yurdu (The Turkish Homeland). They initiated a national campaign to simplify the Ottoman Turkish language to reflect the spoken language of the people, and they strove to promote the political and economic interests of Turks all over the world as well as those within the sultan's dominions. The CUP itself, long the principal supporter of Ottomanism, also began to give up hope that the minorities could be kept within the empire and itself turned strongly toward Turkish nationalism.

The Tripolitanian War

The Young Turks' transition to Turkish nationalism had only begun, however, when it was given a final thrust forward by a new wave of foreign attacks on the empire starting with that of the Italians in Tripoli and Bengazi late in 1911. The kingdom of Italy dreamed of an empire that would revive the glory of the old Roman Empire. Most of the African territories contiguous to the Mediterranean had been already taken by Britain and France, and only Tripoli seemed reasonably available. Ottoman rule there was nominal. The garrisons were weak, the government limited and inadequate, and the economic situation poor. The interior, inhabited by bedouins, had recently come under the control of a Muslim pietistic movement led by the Senusis, further undermining the sultan's suzerainty. On the other hand, Tripoli was close to Italy. Italian merchants had been active there for some time, and their complaints about mistreatment as well as the difficult conditions in the country provided a pretext for armed intervention. Nor were the Italian ambitions particularly secret. In 1900 France had agreed to allow it to take Tripoli in compensation for the expected acquisition of Morocco. Two years later Austria had followed suit in return for Italian support of its ambitions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Britain joined the agreement as part of its effort to gain Italian participation in the emerging Triple Entente. In 1909 Russian approval was secured in return for Italian support of its ambition to force the Porte to open the Straits to its warships. Though Germany and Austria feared Italian aggression into the Ottoman Empire might cause a major new crisis, they did not wish to alienate Italy and push it even closer to Britain and France. Thus once the French position in Morocco was secured and the Italian press and public agitated for compensatory action in Tripoli, the Italian government decided to go ahead.

The Italian government for some time had complained about "mistreatment" of its subjects in Tripoli and Bengazi, and the Ottomans had tried to satisfy them
with guarantees and other promises in order to avoid a war. The Italians, however, who had already decided to attack, rejected the Ottoman offers. On September 29, 1911, war was declared. A day later Tripoli was put under naval blockade. Britain declared its neutrality. On October 4 Tripoli was bombarded and an Italian expeditionary force landed at Tobruk. The Ottoman garrison in both provinces numbered only 15,000 men at best. Because of the situation in the Balkans the government in Istanbul decided to send only limited reinforcements, but these were put under the command of two of its brightest young officers, both CUP members, Enver Bey, recently married into the imperial family, who was made commander at Bengazi, and Mustafa Kemal Bey, placed in command at Tripoli and Derne. Even before they arrived, however, the Italians overran the entire coastal area; Kemal and Enver landed their forces and took them into the interior, where they took command of the remaining Ottoman garrison and joined the Senusi tribesmen in preparing to resist the infidel in a Holy War. On November 4 Italy officially proclaimed its annexation of both Tripoli and Bengazi, but its control remained limited to the coast while the Ottomans and Senusis began an effective guerrilla resistance from the interior. In response the Italians began to send arms and ammunition to Montenegro and Albania and encouraged new adventures against the Porte.

The Rise and Fall of the CUP

In Istanbul the immediate political result of the Italian victories was a rapid decline in the fortunes of the Unionists, leading to the resignation of Grand Vezir Ibrahim Hakki Paşa (September 28), who had prided himself on his good relations with the Italians. Several groups split off from the CUP to form the Hızb-i Cedit (New Party), which demanded that the government support the caliphate and sultanate while adhering to the democratic procedures provided in the Constitution. In reaction, a more liberal group, the Hızb-i Terakki (Progress Party), was formed within Unionist ranks. Mahmut Şevket, now minister of war, blamed the entire catastrophe in Tripoli on CUP intervention in the army, and the CUP also suffered from its previous advocacy of friendship with Germany, since Germany was allied with Italy. The CUP tried to regain its popularity by organizing a public boycott of Italian goods and getting the Parliament to abolish the Italian Capitulatory rights and dismiss Italians in Ottoman service. Only partially successful in restoring its prestige, the CUP was forced to accept a coalition government with a number of opposition representatives under the leadership of Sait Paşa as grand vezir (September 30, 1911). Sait asked Britain to help in Tripoli and offered to join the Triple Entente in return, directly contravening the CUP policy, but his overtures were ignored. Russia, fearing that the war would lead the Ottomans to close the Straits, attempted to mediate by demanding that the Porte recognize the Italian conquests and threatening new troubles in Albania and Macedonia in the spring if the war went on; but Sait Paşa rejected the plan, and hence nothing was done.

The victory of the Liberal Union Party, now restored as the Party of Freedom and Accord (Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası) in a parliamentary by-election in Istanbul late in 1911 encouraged it to demand a general investigation of the government's inability to defend Tripoli, while several more CUP members joined the opposition. Since the Parliament thus was getting out of hand, the CUP got Sait Paşa to try to dissolve it by modifying article 35 of the Constitution to restore the
sultan's right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies without the excuse of a dispute between it and the cabinet. The Liberal Union opposed elections at the time, since it realized that the CUP was the only party with a political apparatus, but it was difficult for its deputies to oppose Sait's idea, because they previously had advocated just such a measure to strengthen the sultan's authority. Nevertheless, the modification was defeated by the Chamber of Deputies on January 13, 1912. This, however, triggered the dispute between the Chamber and the cabinet that provided the pretext for the sultan to dissolve Parliament, which he did two days later. A full-scale electoral campaign followed, but the new press, public gathering, and society laws were applied to favor the CUP candidates, and with the additional advantage of its empire-wide organization it had little trouble winning an overwhelming victory, with many of the Liberal Union members of Parliament being defeated. The Italians now tried to pressure the Ottomans to settle the stalemate in Tripoli by occupying the Dodecanese Islands (April 24–May 20) and bombarding the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles, leading the Porte to close the Straits, as Russia had feared would happen. But this act strengthened public support of the CUP as the only political force able to organize national resistance, so that it emerged stronger than ever. When the new Parliament met again in mid-May, more CUP members were appointed to Sait Paşa's cabinet, including Cavit Bey in the key position of minister of finance. In addition, the CUP now was able to push through the constitutional amendments that increased the sultan's power and thus gained the victory they had sought to achieve by dissolving Parliament.

But in gaining the victory the CUP lost the basis of its original political support. Now mostly composed of civilian politicians working to maintain their position, its actions alarmed not only the opposition but also many in the army who had supported it to prevent just the kind of autocratic control that it now wielded and who feared it was using its victory to destroy many of the achievements gained in 1909. As a result, a number of liberal officers formed their own Group of Liberating Officers (Halaskâr Zabitan Grubu) with the objective of ending the CUP's autocracy and eliminating politics from the army. Working with the Liberal Union they threatened some sort of violent action unless the CUP stepped down. Mahmut Şevket resigned as minister of war to support their campaign, and a new coup seemed very likely. Thus despite a strong vote of confidence from the CUP-controlled Chamber of Deputies, Sait Paşa resigned (July 17, 1912) and the government fell. Sultan Mehmet Reşat tried to resolve the situation by criticizing the officers for intervening in politics and then replacing Sait with the elderly hero of the Russo-Turkish War, Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa (1839–1918), for some time president of the Chamber of Notables and a distinguished elder statesmen considered above politics. Ahmet Muhtar tried to establish a cabinet above party, including in his cabinet a number of former grand vezirs, Kâmil Paşa (now president of the High Council of State), Damat Ferit (minister of the interior) and Hüseyin Hilmi (minister of justice), hoping thus to unite the empire's politicians to face the difficult crisis at hand while weakening the CUP by removing the cabinet members associated with it.

The Liberating Officers, however, had achieved only part of their objective. The CUP was out of the government, but it still controlled Parliament. They began to demand its dissolution and the holding of new elections. Ahmet Muhtar responded by submitting the amended article 35 of the Constitution to the Chamber of Notables. He had no difficulty securing its approval, since it was now manned
mainly by former officers sympathizing with the Liberating Officers. This was followed with an amendment to article 43 to provide that if Parliament was dissolved, the new Chamber of Deputies could be called to an extraordinary session for two months and that this in turn could be prolonged if necessary. The sultan then dissolved the Parliament (August 5), and new elections were called, with the general feeling being that this was the end of the CUP. Now it was the CUP that was restricted by the government during the campaign. Its principal newspaper, *Tanin*, was suspended entirely. The CUP at first considered condemning the entire procedure as illegal and refusing to participate in the election, but when Talat convinced his colleagues that this would only lead to its destruction, they decided to participate and the campaign went on.

**Background to the Balkan Wars**

At this point politics was overshadowed by a new threat from the empire’s Balkan neighbors. Austrian annexation of Bosnia stimulated the aggressive desires of the Balkan states to gain compensation and also ended the cooperation between Russia and Austria that had previously kept the peace. Serbia, encouraged by Russia, began to demand new territory and proposed a new Balkan alliance to prevent Austria from making further advances. Though continued rivalries in Macedonia prevented such an alliance right after Bosnia was annexed, the Italian attack on Tripoli convinced the Balkan leaders that their rivalries in Macedonia had to be subordinated to take advantage of the Ottoman preoccupation across the Mediterranean. The first alliance reached was between Serbia and Bulgaria (March 13, 1912) on the basis of autonomy for Macedonia as a means of settling their dispute as to which should control it. In the case of victory over the Ottomans, Serbia would receive the *sancak* of Novipazar and the district of Niš and Bulgaria would get the lands east of the Rhodope Mountains and the Struma. In addition, if Macedonian autonomy proved impractical, then Bulgaria would get Monastir and Ohrid, Serbia would take over northern Macedonia, and the balance, including Kumanovo and Üsküp, would be divided between the two by arbitration of the czar. A Greco-Bulgarian alliance followed (May 29, 1912), the Macedonian problem simply being ignored while the two agreed on joint assistance in case of an Ottoman “attack.” Bulgaria was to remain neutral if the Ottomans and Greeks again fought over Crete. Montenegro completed the ring around the Porte by reaching similar military agreements with Bulgaria (September 27) and Serbia (October 6), the latter actually specifying that hostilities would commence with the Porte no later than October. The Ottomans hardly were in a position to fight all their Balkan neighbors. The attempt to vitalize the army after its neglect late in Abdulhamit’s reign had only begun to produce results. Thousands of cannon and rifles lay in storehouses, and the men were still untrained in their use. Political dissent in the officer corps had destroyed much of the morale and unity that had been encouraged in Abdulhamit’s early years. Furthermore, Mahmut Şevket’s resignation as minister of war had been followed by a general replacement of most of the officers on the General Staff, and the new departmental chiefs had not yet been able to familiarize themselves with the mobilization and war plans that had been prepared. The diversion in Tripoli had not been as serious as the Balkan allies expected, simply because the Italian blockade had prevented the Ottomans from sending more than a few detachments to support the guerrilla war. Even then, however, the Porte had no more than 250,000 men under arms, far fewer than the combined Balkan armies.
Clearing the Decks: Ending the Tripolitanian War and the Albanian Revolt

Ahmet Muhtar and his new cabinet conceived their main job to be that of stalling for time until the powers could intervene to forestall the Balkan attack or until the Ottoman army was fully mobilized. Therefore, the government made an attempt to settle the Albanian Question first. On August 9, 1912, the Albanian rebel leaders in the north presented a new series of reform proposals: the establishment of an autonomous system of administration and justice; military service to be performed in Albania except in time of war; the use of officials knowing the local language and customs, but not necessarily being Albanians themselves; the establishment of new lycées in the main cities and agricultural schools in the larger districts, reorganization and modernization of the religious schools, the use of Albanian in the secular schools, freedom to open private schools and societies, the development of Albanian trade, agriculture and public works, a general amnesty for all those captured during the rebellion, and, finally, the court martial of the Istanbul ministers who had attempted to suppress the Albanian revolt in the first place. The Albanians themselves were divided, some supporting the CUP and others the Liberal Union, with some even wishing to return to Abdulhamit's autocracy. Thus the proposals represented a compromise with which not only they but also the Ottoman government could live. Therefore, with only the final point being ignored, on September 4, 1912, the government accepted the proposals and the Albanian revolt was ended.

Ahmet Muhtar then moved to settle the war with Italy, which had become increasingly embarrassed by its failure to crush the Ottoman resistance in the interior of Tripoli after its initial victories along the coast. Negotiations were difficult at times, with the Italians resisting the Ottoman efforts to limit their control to Tripoli. The Triple Entente powers attempted to get Italy to compromise, but it threatened to retain Rhodes and the Dodecanese and to stir the Albanians and Montenegrans to further aggression unless the Porte accepted its full demands. Finally, on October 15, 1912, an agreement was reached at Ouchy, near Lausanne, following the same formula that had established Austrian rule over Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Ottoman army would evacuate all its remaining units from both Tripoli and Cyrenaica. In return Italy would leave the Dodecanese, acknowledge the sultan's religious position in the provinces, allow his name to be read in the Friday prayers, accept the religious teachers and judges whom he appointed, preserve the religious foundations, and accept an Ottoman agent to represent all the Muslims now placed under Italian control. The boycotts imposed against Italian goods and individuals were ended, and the Italian Capitulations and postal rights in the empire were restored, but Italy promised to help the Porte gain European agreement to their total abolition. Italy also assumed the burden of its new province's share of the Ottoman public debt. Italy in fact did not evacuate the Dodecanese Islands, on the pretext of protecting them from the Balkan War, which broke out soon afterward, but at least the Porte was freed to face the onslaught of its neighbors without further diversion.

The First Balkan War

Montenegro started the war by moving into northern Albania as well as the sanjak of Novipazar on October 8, 1912. Soon after, its allies sent identical ultimatums to the Porte demanding the autonomy of its remaining European provinces, redraw-
ing the boundaries on ethnic lines, with Christian governors, provincial elective administrative councils, free education, native militias and gendarmes, new reforms under Christian supervision, and the immediate demobilization of the entire Ottoman army. Clearly, Ottoman agreement was not expected, and war declarations from all sides followed during the next few days. Greece went on to announce its formal annexation of Crete. 80

The war was disastrous for the Ottomans, particularly since the Greek fleet was able not only to take a number of the Aegean Islands but also to prevent reinforcements from being sent from Anatolia through the Aegean to the beleaguered garrisons in Rumelia. The Bulgars wanted to move immediately into Macedonia, but fear of an Ottoman offensive from Istanbul compelled them to send most of their forces toward the Ottoman capital, allowing the Greeks and Serbs to conquer and divide Macedonia before they could get there. The Bulgars moved rapidly into eastern Thrace, routing the main Ottoman defense forces at Kirklareli (October 22–24) and putting Edirne under siege. With the CUP officers and their political enemies fighting over strategy as well as politics, the Ottoman army retreated in disorder to a new defense line at Lüleburgaz, where the Bulgars routed it again (October 22–November 2) and then advanced to Çatalca, the last defense point before Istanbul. After only a month of war, then, all of Thrace was gone and the Bulgars were besieging Edirne and Istanbul.

To the west the Serbs quickly took much of northern Macedonia, including Kosova (October 23) and then joined the Montenegrans in taking Prittina and Novipazar and routing the remaining Ottoman forces at Komanova (October 23–24). They then occupied much of northern Albania and put Işkodra under siege. In the south the Greeks pushed west and north into Macedonia, taking Preveze (November 3) and, finally, the great prize of Salonica (November 8), getting there just ahead of the Bulgars. Another Greek force took the Epirus and put Janina under siege, taking most of southern Albania as well. In two months, therefore, the Ottomans had lost all their remaining territories in Europe with the sole exception of the four besieged cities. 81

In Istanbul the defeats, the food shortages, and the government's inability to pay the salaries of bureaucrats and teachers led to a series of violent demonstrations, which soon spread to the other major cities of the empire. For the first time in modern memory the young men of Istanbul and of the provinces were fighting and dying together on the battlefields, with hardly a family being spared. Those who had long held properties in the remaining European provinces had lost them, and many were reduced to poverty. Thousands of refugees streamed in from the north. Misery and tragedy stalked the streets, and the government was blamed. The CUP emphasized its role as a coalition of patriotic officers and bureaucrats who sought to restore and modernize the empire. It now advocated a cabinet above party so that all could cooperate for the common cause. But the Liberal Union and the Group of Liberating Officers, though strongly critical of Ahmet Muhtar and his government, were determined not to allow the CUP to share power in any way. 82

When the Muhtar cabinet resigned, then, the opposition got the sultan to replace him with Kâmil Paşa, ostensibly so that he could use his British connections to secure foreign intervention but actually just to keep the CUP out. 83 The new arrangement did little good, however. The Triple Entente was unwilling to push the Balkan states into the hands of Austria by opposing their advance, and the CUP abandoned its patriotic stand for a new exertion of violence to secure control of the government. Kâmil Paşa's first move was to propose that the powers bring
their fleets to Istanbul to save it from the advancing Bulgars (November 6). The CUP, fearing that he was about to capitulate, advocated resistance, leading the grand vezir to send the police to suppress its clubs and newspapers as well as all popular demonstrations. Unionists were arrested and imprisoned, and some fled to Europe. Abdülhamit was brought back to Istanbul just in time to escape the Greek attack on Salonica. And with the CUP at least temporarily dispersed and the Bulgarians still stalled at Catalca, the government was able to obtain the agreement of all the remaining parties for a truce proposal (December 3).

Peace negotiations began in London on December 16, with British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey acting as mediator. The Balkan states demanded full Ottoman cession of all its European possessions and the Aegean Islands. The Ottomans, emboldened by their resistance to the Bulgars at Catalca and by the rapid increase of their men under arms, rejected this proposal and countered with a plan to cede the conquered territories except the provinces of Edirne and Albania, which would become autonomous under an administration to be set up by the powers. The Aegean Islands would not be ceded, but the Porte would accept a decision of the powers on Crete. Macedonia would become an autonomous province under the rule of a member of the Ottoman family. This time, however, the Balkan states demurred and the conference threatened to break up. Grey then got the powers to propose a compromise by which the Ottoman Empire would retain only those parts of eastern Thrace that lay south of a line drawn between Midye on the Black Sea, and Enez, located where the Maritsa flows into the Aegean. Edirne thus would go to Bulgaria, and the powers would make a final decision on the Aegean Islands. At this point the Ottoman army felt that the Bulgarians had been so extended and its own force so built up that if the war went on, eastern Thrace could be regained and Edirne relieved. The cabinet, however, decided that it could not simply reject the powers’ offer outright, since it had wanted foreign intervention previously. So it accepted the proposal, but with the proviso that Edirne remain in the empire, since its population was mostly Muslim and that the area between it and the Dardanelles be formed into a neutral and an independent principality that would constitute a buffer zone to protect the Straits from direct Bulgarian incursion. The CUP, however, began to fear that Kâmil Paşa was going to give away the sacred city of Edirne to get peace. On January 23, 1913, it organized the famous “Raid on the Sublime Porte.” Enver led an army band into the Porte building, burst into a cabinet meeting, and forced Kâmil to resign at gunpoint. That the CUP was acting mainly to save Edirne rather than to secure full power is indicated by its actions during the next few days. Cemal Bey was made commander of the First Army in Istanbul, and he issued a conciliatory proclamation asking for cooperation of all and promising that political groups could continue to meet as long as they did not violate the law. When Enver went to see the sultan, he asked only for a cabinet of all the parties. The able and nonpolitical soldier Mahmut Şevket Paşa became grand vezir, with the assignment of doing what was needed to save eastern Thrace. In the new cabinet only three Unionists were appointed, and the grand vezir himself became minister of war. The CUP’s return to power thus was nonintrusive, with interests of the empire being put first.

The new government took over under difficult conditions. What tax revenues could be secured from Anatolia hardly were enough to compensate for the loss of those from Rumeli. The army had been shattered, and the public was in despair. Kâmil’s dismissal had made the conference delegates in London very suspicious that the Porte might break the truce. Mahmut Şevket’s task was to insist on the
retention of Edirne and eastern Thrace but to keep the London Conference going at least long enough for him to restore the army and appease the public at home. He proposed a compromise to the powers, agreeing to cede only the portions of Edirne on the right bank of the Maritsa, retaining the main part of city on the left bank, where most of the Muslim population as well as the ancient mosques and tombs were located. The powers could decide the fate of the Aegean Islands, but the Porte would have to retain some, since they were necessary for the defense of Anatolia. Finally, he added something new—that in return the powers allow the empire to set its own customs duties, apply the same taxes to foreigners in the empire as to Ottomans, and, eventually, to abolish the rest of capitulatory provisions (January 30, 1913). But the Bulgarians refused the territorial proposals, and the London Conference broke up.

The armistice ended on February 3, and the bombardment of Edirne resumed. The Bulgars now began a campaign of slaughtering thousands of Turkish peasants in Thrace, sending hundreds more toward the capital to disrupt further its ability to support the war. The Bulgars also began a general assault at Çatalca, but they were beaten back again after two weeks of continuous fighting (March 18–30). However, Mahmut Şevket was unable to restore the army because of lack of money. On March 28 Edirne was starved into submission, leading to a reign of terror from which the city has never fully recovered. Already on March 6 Janina had fallen to the Greeks. Işkodra fell on April 22, thus finally ending Ottoman rule in Europe with the exception of Istanbul. Kâmil Paşa tried to use the situation to organize a countercoup that would totally eliminate the CUP and restore the Liberal Union to power. Traveling to Cyprus and Egypt, he seems to have secured British support in return for promises to surrender the key administrative and financial positions in the government to foreign experts. His plans were discovered by the government, however, and on his return to Istanbul he was arrested (May 28, 1913). In the meantime, in the face of all the disasters Mahmut Şevket had to offer a restoration of the truce and full acceptance of the powers’ peace terms (March 31, 1913). The armistice was restored on April 16, negotiations resumed on May 30, and ten days later the Treaty of London was signed, with the Midye–Enez line being established as the new Ottoman boundary and with Thrace and Edirne in enemy hands. The Porte surrendered all rights in Crete and left the settlement of the Aegean Islands and the Albanian boundaries to the powers.

Kâmil Paşa remained under arrest, but the Liberal Union plans for a coup continued and were actually intensified by the Treaty of London. Plans were made to assassinate not only the grand vezir but also the major CUP men to gain revenge for the attack on the Porte and removal of Kâmil. In the end, however, only Mahmut Şevket was gunned down, at Bayezit Square while motoring from the Ministry of War to the Porte. Cemal Paşa immediately put the capital under martial law. Several of the assassins were caught and the ringleaders put under arrest. The CUP took full control after the assassination. Members of the Liberal Union not implicated in the murder were arrested and sent into exile. A court martial convicted and sentenced to death 16 Liberal Union leaders, including Prince Saba-heddin (in absentia) and a number of soldiers involved in the assassination. The CUP appointed one of its members, Mehmet Sait Halim Paşa, an Egyptian prince and a grandson of Muhammad Ali, as grand vezir, and four other committee members were assigned key cabinet positions. Thus began the CUP dictatorship that was to carry the empire to disaster in World War I (June 12, 1913).
The Second Balkan War

The war with the Balkan states was not yet finished, however, because disputes among the allies over division of the spoils soon altered the military balance. Arrangements made among the Balkan states prior to the war were upset by the Albanian Question. As the war went on and the Ottomans were defeated repeatedly, the Albanians began to feel they might achieve full independence instead of the autonomy granted by Mahmut Şevket. On November 28, 1912, a National Assembly of Muslims and Christians met at Avlonya (Valona) and declared Albania's complete independence, with Ismail Kemal Vlora as president. The Albanians quickly got the support of Italy, which hoped to use the new state as a base for its power in the Adriatic, and of Austria, which hoped to use it to keep Serbia from extending its power by securing a direct outlet to the sea. On December 12, 1912, even before the Ottomans returned to the conference table, the ambassadors of the powers meeting in London accepted Albanian independence, pressuring Serbia and Montenegro to withdraw from those of its territories that they had taken from the Ottomans. Once the Treaty of London was signed and the occupiers withdrew, Albania finally achieved its independence, though conflicts between Austria and Italy over who would predominate led to the choice of a weak German prince, William of Wied, and to internal difficulties that left the country bitterly divided in the years preceding World War I.

But with Serbia excluded from Albania, it felt it had the right to demand compensation in the Macedonian territories previously assigned to Bulgaria, particularly areas that it had occupied south of Ohrid and Veles. In this the Serbs were supported by Greece, which, happy to keep the Bulgars as far from Salonica as possible, agreed to cooperate to secure a common frontier in Macedonia west of the Vardar, leaving only the eastern portions of the province to Bulgaria. Russia tried to mediate the dispute, inviting all the parties to meet in St. Petersburg. The Bulgars refused to attend; thus the settlement went against them, setting the stage for a fratricidal conflict that could only help the Ottomans.

The Bulgars were furious. They had done most of the fighting in the First Balkan War, but now their allies were attempting to satisfy their own ambitions at Bulgaria's expense. On the night of June 29–30 the Bulgars, therefore, made a surprise attack on their two main allies in Macedonia, Serbia and Greece. The latter soon were joined by Rumania and Montenegro, however, and the Bulgars, surrounded and outmanned, soon succumbed. In the meantime, the CUP led the Ottoman press and public in advocating restoration of Edirne. The cabinet was divided, with some members fearing that such an advance would only lead to a disastrous new war. In the end, however, Talat and Enver prevailed. On July 21 the Ottoman army was able to reoccupy all of eastern Thrace and move into Edirne without meeting any resistance, since the Bulgarians had withdrawn their army to meet their former allies. In response to the Ottoman push the latter soon made peace, though at Bulgarian expense, in the Treaty of Bucharest (August 10). Greece was able to extend its territory in Macedonia north of Salonica and beyond Kavala in the east, and took all of the Epirus, including the districts of Janina claimed by Albania. Serbia took Old Serbia and most of northern Macedonia, thus doubling its size, though it had to divide Novipazar with Montenegro. Bulgaria got only a small part of eastern Macedonia, but it did at least secure an Aegean coastline of about 80 miles including the port of Alexandroupolis (Dedeğaç), giving it direct access to the open sea.
The boundaries thus established were ratified in a series of separate treaties signed with Bulgaria (September 29, 1913), Serbia (November 14, 1913), and Greece (March 14, 1914), which also regulated the status of Ottoman-owned property and of Muslims resident in the lost territories. All Ottoman subjects were given four years to decide if they wished to remain under Christian rule or to emigrate; if they did leave, they were to be allowed to sell their property and transfer their assets to Istanbul. Those remaining were to have the same civil and political rights as their Christian neighbors. Their new governments would give them freedom to practice their religion and maintain their own culture, with secular schools teaching Turkish as well as the state language. Religious affairs would be controlled by chief muftis chosen by the local ulema, who would supervise and control Muslim schools and foundations under the general guidance of the şeyhül-islam in Istanbul. Every town or village with a substantial Muslim population could also elect its own Muslim community (millet) council to care for local affairs such as schools and administration of religious endowments and to represent the Muslims with the central government. With the exception of the Bulgarian territories on the Aegean, which went to Greece after World War I, the boundaries thus established in Thrace and Macedonia have held to the present day. The Macedonian Question thus came to an end. Albania was independent, though with not quite all the lands that it had expected. Bulgaria had been enlarged by almost 30 percent, and it had gained an outlet to the sea. Serbia's territory had been increased by 82 percent and its population by over half. Greece and Montenegro had experienced comparable gains. Only the Ottomans had really suffered, losing 83 percent of their land and 69 percent of their population in Europe as well as much of the revenues and food that had come into Istanbul each year. The Balkan allies thus had accomplished a tremendous amount for themselves, but frustrations and rivalries remained, leading to new difficulties as World War I approached.

The CUP in Power

The recapture of Edirne stimulated a mass Ottoman exaltation so intense that the CUP's right to rule unopposed was accepted and confirmed without further discussion or opposition. The main political opposition, the Liberal Union, had in any case been dissolved because of its involvement in the assassination of Mahmut Şevket. The empire was facing terrible problems that required some kind of strong leadership. Public buildings such as mosques and schools were overflowing with the war wounded, and thousands of refugees were flooding into Istanbul from the lost provinces. Many families had lost their properties, homes, and breadwinners and had to adjust to entirely new lives in the lands left to the empire. The economy had to be rebuilt and the system of supplying food to the cities reorganized. The administration had to be adjusted and reduced to meet the needs and capabilities of a much smaller state. The tax system had to be revised once again. The armed forces had to be rebuilt to meet possible future aggressions on the part of the empire's neighbors. Ottoman society had to be restored and its morale raised after the tremendous shocks inflicted on it during the war. Only the CUP had the organization, manpower, and program to accomplish these ends, and so it was to the CUP that the nation instinctively turned, allowing it to assume a kind of autocracy in times of crisis that no individual or group had ever achieved in the empire before.

Power now lay in the hands of the Porte, with both the sultan and the Parliament acceding to its will with little protest. The latter, in any case now filled
almost entirely with CUP protégés, met infrequently; most items of legislation were put into effect by decree (irade) of the sultan as temporary laws (kanun-u muvakkat) or governmental decisions (kararname) until they could be confirmed by the Parliament, but in fact they remained without change as permanent parts of the Ottoman legal system.

Nominally leading the nation during these crucial times was Grand Vezir Sait Halim Paşa (1913–1917), himself a CUP member, but real power in the cabinet fell to the CUP leaders who had emerged before and during the Balkan War crises and whose authority had been established and confirmed by their strong actions at crucial times. No longer children of the Ruling Class or the Tanzimat bureaucracy, the new generation of national leaders had emerged from the lower classes through the army and bureaucracy and was determined to modernize the empire in such a way as to benefit all classes, not just those in power. Secularist and modernist, in many ways far more ruthless than the old generations of reformers, the leaders of the CUP at this time started to lay the foundations for the new era that was to follow. First and foremost among them was the brilliant party leader and strategist Talat Paşa (1874–1921). Following the death of his father, he had been forced to abandon his early army education in order to make a career in the postal bureaucracy. He had joined the Young Turks in his birthplace, Edirne, and then in Salonica, using his official position to circulate their communications in Macedonia and emerging as a leading party strategist. In December 1908 he came to Istanbul as one of the CUP deputies to Parliament from Edirne, and it was he who got the members who survived the counterrevolution to go to Yeşilköy and make their peace with the army. He was actively involved in government after Abdulhamit’s deposition, serving mostly as minister of the interior during the remainder of the Young Turk era.

The second major figure of the CUP triumvirate that increasingly dominated the state after 1913 was Cemal Paşa (1872–1922), who had risen in the army. He had used his position as inspector of railways in Macedonia to help spread the CUP message and organize its cells very much as Talat had done in the post office. After the revolution he had become a member of the CUP executive committee under Talat’s chairmanship and had led several army units that came to Istanbul in the Operation Army, subsequently rising because of his role in suppressing the counterrevolution as military governor of Istanbul in 1909 and 1910 and again in 1912 after the attack on the Porte and assassination of Mahmut Şevket.

Finally, the most vibrant personality among the CUP leaders was Enver Paşa (1881–1922), a military career officer who, as we have seen, had fought valiantly against the terrorists in Macedonia and the Italians in Tripolitania. He went as Ottoman military attaché to Berlin in 1909, and again in 1910–1911, establishing close contacts with senior German military officials and developing an admiration for German militarism that was to dominate and influence the remainder of his life. His recent marriage to Emine Sultan, daughter of Prince Süleyman Efendi, and subsequent service in Tripoli, seems to have caused a rivalry with his fellow officer Mustafa Kemal, which was to keep the latter out of the CUP leadership. Enver rose to first rank among the CUP leaders, however, only when he led the famous Raid on the Porte (January 23, 1913) and commanded the Ottoman troops that retook Edirne during the Second Balkan War, actions that gained him the position of minister of war during the crucial year that preceded World War I.

The members of the CUP triumvirate had different personalities. Talat, by far the most brilliant and calculating, was the master politician, “a man of swift and
Cemal's role in suppressing the opposition stamped him as a skillful professional soldier, absolutely ruthless and without pity when dealing with enemies. Enver, finally, was the soldiers' soldier, the people's hero, quick, energetic, courageous, loyal to his colleagues and friends, honestly patriotic and devoted to the nation, a good soldier and an extremely able administrator. Together their talents brought them to almost absolute power within the councils of state, particularly after the empire was once again engulfed in war.

The program of the CUP was clearly set out in its congress declarations made almost annually until 1913. Government was to be made more efficient by the "extension of responsibility" of individual bureaucrats, giving them the authority to act without having to secure authorization for every move from superiors, and by the "separation of duties" among the different bureaus, departments, ministries, and individual officials of the central government and between it and the equivalent provincial bodies. The nation was to be given economic independence, the Capitulations abolished, and foreigners made subject to the same laws as Ottomans so that the government could develop financial and economic policies related to the empire's good and not that of the foreign powers. The Parliament was to be given more power, and both the deputies and notables were to receive higher salaries. Deputies who were members of the administration or the police would have to resign before entering the Parliament to ensure their independence in policy making. Greatly increased low-interest loans were to be made available to cultivators to help the advance of agriculture, and they were to be allowed to form their own cooperatives and other organizations to protect themselves in marketing their goods. Artisans were to be allowed to protect themselves by developing their guilds into craft unions. The tithe was to be reduced once again to no more than one-tenth, with the surtaxes ended and education and public works financed from other sources. The tax farm system was to be abolished once and for all and the profits tax extended into a full-fledged income tax so that all would share in the burden of government according to their means. The animal taxes were to be reduced and imposed only when the cultivators could pay in cash rather than being forced to surrender their animals in payment. Efforts also were to be made to improve animal husbandry, to develop industry and trade, and to facilitate the formation of corporations. Above all, the government would have to be reorganized and systematized. All corruption, favoritism, and protection were to be ended. The communes (nahiye) would be allowed to develop their police, education, and public works according to local needs. Strong efforts were to be made to develop public health and to wipe out the diseases that had so troubled the population. Municipalities were to be given sufficient money to meet local needs without calling on the central government for help. Private, religious, and foreign schools were to be supervised by the government and elementary education made free and compulsory, with Turkish used in all schools in order to promote the unity of Ottoman society. More teachers were to be trained, and they would go where they were needed in the countryside rather than remaining in the big cities. Students and teachers who excelled in their work were to receive salary supplements and bonuses as further encouragement. The religious schools were to be reformed to meet the needs of the modern world and new arrangements made to support the religious and cultural institutions previously maintained by foundations. Foreign experts would be brought to the empire as needed to help develop the higher technical academies and schools.
Ziya Gökalp and the Foundations of Turkish Nationalism

With the definitive loss of the major non-Muslim territories in the empire and with the continued ambitions of the Balkan states and czarist Russia, Ottoman public opinion joined the CUP in abandoning Ottomanism in favor of Turkism. Particularly influential in developing the ideological basis of Turkish nationalism, both in and out of the CUP, was the great Ottoman sociologist and philosopher Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924), whose work contributed to the intellectual development of the empire in its latter days and of the Turkish Republic that followed.

Born in Diyarbekir in the first year of Abdulhamit's reign, Gökalp grew up in a mixed Kurdish-Turkish area, speaking both languages but very early emphasizing his Turkish background and connections and acquiring an abiding interest in the subjects of race and national culture. In his youth Ziya received both religious and secular education and became acquainted with the philosophies of a number of intellectuals exiled from Istanbul by the sultan, including one of the founders of the CUP at the Istanbul Army Medical School, Abdullah Cevdet, who roused his interest in the French sociologists. Soon after going to Istanbul to further his education (1896), Ziya became involved in Young Turk political activities and was imprisoned and sent back to his home within a year, thus ending his higher education before it really had begun. By this time, Ziya's father, a minor bureaucrat, had died, but the latter's pension and the modest wealth of his wife enabled him to devote his full time to studying philosophy, psychology, and sociology, abstaining for some time, however, from publication so as not to attract the attention of the sultan's police. After Abdulhamit had been deposed, Gökalp began to lecture at the local CUP branch, editing several local newspapers, publishing his own works, and building a reputation as a forceful thinker.

Gökalp's rise to the national stage came suddenly, in the fall of 1909, when he represented Diyarbekir at the first CUP congress in Salonica. His writings and speeches apparently impressed the leaders, since he was elected a member of the party's executive council, a position he retained until it was dissolved in 1918.

Gökalp stayed in Salonica and started teaching at the CUP-sponsored lycée, becoming the first teacher of sociology in the empire. He also served as the director of the party's youth department. Within a short time he was the most influential of the CUP party philosophers, writing widely and giving lectures to disseminate the ideas he had formulated during the long years of study. He carefully avoided an active political life, preferring philosophical and scholarly activities over holding government positions. He settled in Istanbul only after the CUP party headquarters was transferred there during the first Balkan War. At this time he shared the CUP's early enthusiasm for Ottomanism, making the transition to Turkish nationalism only in disappointment at the failure of the minorities to cooperate. Ziya became the first professor of sociology at the University of Istanbul, joined the Turkish Hearth (Türk Ocağı) organization, and helped Yusuf Akçura publish its Türk Yurdu (The Turkish Homeland). He urged the CUP to sponsor major reforms in education and stimulated and in certain instances formulated its strongly secularist policies during the war. Many of his disciples at this time, including the historian Fuat Köprülü, the novelist Halide Edip, the poet Yahya Kemal, the writer Ömer Seyfeddin and the journalists Ahmet Emin Yalman and Faîlîh Rûfîk Atay, went on to distinguished and influential careers during the Republic, though Gökalp himself spent his last years at his home in Diyarbekir and in Ankara, supporting the Turkish national revival by producing his own Küçük Mecmua.
His death on October 25, 1924, deprived the young Republic of the continued stimulation of a dedicated ideologist.

Reforms draw their strength either from the ability of the authorities to impose them, as was the case during the periods of the Tanzimat and of Abdulhamit, or from the receptivity of society. Ziya Gökalp's ideas created an intellectual movement that provided the inspiration needed for a change in popular mentality from empire to nation, from religious to secular, from East to West. The rapid succession of reforms that followed, from 1913 through the first decade of the Republic, was reinforced, and in many ways made possible, by the ideological basis and support Gökalp's writings provided. Thus changes that had been accepted (and resented) previously as inevitable adjustments needed for survival were transformed into goals that were considered desirable by the mass of the people. The Ottoman Empire, by his time, was in a position where it could not be preserved. But instead of bemoaning the loss, his ideas provided the means to build a new nation with firm roots in the past and trust in the future. This optimism and constructive approach was the light (Turkish ziya) that led to the building of a new society.

Gökalp began writing at a time when Islamism and Ottomanism were the predominating trends of thought. There had been signs of an awakening Turkism, but the latter lacked a real body of philosophy to give it life and force. Gökalp believed in nationalism based on a foundation of social science, one that drew its strength from the traditions, customs, art, folklore, language, and social consciousness of the people that formed the nation. He launched his program on two fronts: (1) the positivist-sociological approach that brought out his scholarship and gave his ideas as part of a systematic, learned, closely reasoned argument; and (2) the publicist aspect of his work, often written as didactic poetry, to facilitate the transmission of ideas through memorization and repetition. He wrote children's stories inspired by old legends, in the process creating a new pride in the Turkish past and awareness of historical ties with the Turks of Central Asia. This ideological imperialism offered an escapist consolation at a time when the actual boundaries of the Ottoman Empire were contracting.

Gökalp maintained that nations developed through three stages. First there were tribal communities, in which language and race had precedence. Then there were the religious communities, based on religious unity. And, finally, there was the nation, in which the basic concepts of culture and civilization had to exist. Culture belongs to the nation, he argued, whereas civilization is international. A nation may change from one civilization to another, but it cannot change cultures without losing its identity. A nation must preserve its culture, therefore, and use it as an inspiration for further artistic and creative developments. In dealing with nationalism, Gökalp drew his examples from Turkish history, sociology, and folklore. He expressed his belief in a nationalist education but rejected racism and blind attachment to the past. The past, traditions, and the Islamic background could provide the Turks with a stable base for participation in contemporary Western civilization. “Turkification, Islamicization, and Contemporarization” were thus compatible, with all joining together to strengthen both state and society.

Gökalp aimed at eliminating the dualisms that led to philosophical and practical inconsistencies and hindered progress. He favored the adoption of Western models and technique without abandoning elements of national culture and identity. His concept of culture (hars) was based on folk tradition and feeling, and he viewed it as the core of national strength. Aesthetics, arts and crafts, literature, music,
ethics drew their inspiration from the people (halk). Accordingly, the complex
Ottoman language, with its Arabic and Persian elements, had to be replaced by the
simple Turkish language and grammar of the people, although Arabic and Persian
vocabulary already absorbed into the language might be kept as enriching elements.
Some of Gokalp’s students and successors were to extend these ideas into a doctrine
demanding complete purification of the language through the elimination of all non-
Turkish words. In poetry he felt that the old aruz meter, based on a system of
short and long syllables, was not easy to adopt to the smooth flow of the Turkish
language and that it should therefore be replaced by the syllabic meter, based on
counting syllables. A collection of his poetry, Kizil Elma (Red Apple), published in
1914–1915, contained only one poem using the old meter, and in spite of the fact
that many of his brilliant contemporaries, like Yahya Kemal, Mehmet Akif, and
Ahmet Hasim, continued to use the old aruz with mastery, he started a trend
toward the syllabic meter that has continued to the present day.

Gokalp criticized the Tanzimat for having failed to develop the cultural base of
the nation. It had borrowed automatically from Europe without attempting to dis-
tinguish what really was needed and what could be taken from the Turkish national
tradition. It had imitated the external manifestations of Europe civilization with-
out penetrating to its philosophical and scientific foundations. It had introduced
secular schools and courts without eliminating or reforming the traditional institu-
tions developed by Islam, thus leaving a dangerous dualism that undermined whatever
successes it might have achieved. Instead of unifying the nation, it had widened
the gap between the rulers and the common people.

Gokalp’s approach to the religion of Islam was an attempt to keep what was es-
sential and discard those elements that prevented the progress of Turkish society.
In developing a rational approach to religion, he thus started a movement that,
although modified by the much more secularist approach of the Republic, has
gradually reimposed itself on Turkish life in the modern world. To him, Islam was
most important as a source of ethics and it was fully capable of being modified to
meet the needs of the time. To rescue religion as well as the nation they had to be
separated, making possible the retention of Islam’s fundamental values and princi-
ples side by side with a modern and Turkish national culture. Legislation had to be
rescued from the limitations of the religious law, and religion left to the ulema. The
seyhulislam himself had to be as independent from the control of the state as the
legislature would be from him. The religious endowments also had to be eliminated,
since they diverted much of the wealth of the nation and allowed funds to be mis-
managed in the hands of incompetent trustees. The religious schools and courts had
to be abolished to end the longstanding dualism between secular and religious ele-
ments that existed in Ottoman society. The religious law had to be supplanted by
secular law. The position of women had to be restored to the high place it had
enjoyed in ancient Turkish society. However much Islam had developed its prac-
tices toward women to save them from discrimination, its modern manifestation had
held them down, prevented them from taking their rightful place in the Turkish
nation. Women should be given the same education as men; they had to be allowed
to earn their living in the same way as men; they could no longer be subjected to
the degradation that was inherent in polygamy, which was allowed by traditional
Islam. The family had to be developed as a basic unit in society, and toward this
end family names had to be adopted as was done in Europe. Islam would remain,
therefore, but only as a national religion, supplementing the national culture. It
could be used to retain the connections with the Muslim brothers in the Arab world, Central Asia, and the Far East, but the interests of the Turkish nation had to be uppermost. Islam had to be Turkified. Arab traditions had to be replaced by Turkish traditions, rituals and prayers had to be carried out in the Turkish language and in the Turkish way, and the Koran had to be taught in Turkish, so that the people would understand their religion and appreciate God far more than they could when reciting phrases in a foreign tongue.101

The Islamicists and Pan-Islam

Though the CUP emphasized Turkish nationalism, the strong Islamicist feelings nurtured during Abdulhamit's reign were not forgotten. The fact that the Turks now shared the empire primarily with Arab Muslim brothers even strengthened the feelings of many that for survival they should emphasize Islam rather than Ottomanism or Turkism. This group, however, lacked effective leadership. The major Islamicist group, the Society for Islamic Unity, had come to a sudden end following the failure of the counterrevolution in the spring of 1909. Its basic message had been that Islam had to be maintained as the religion of the state; no matter how the regime was established and whether it was autocratic or constitutional, its primary duty was to enforce the Muslim religious law; and because the Young Turks were not following the Şeriat, they were secularists and atheists and had to be overthrown. Though the party ceased to exist, its philosophy was kept alive by Sait Nursi (1867–1960), who led a group of religious reactionaries called "Followers of Light" (Nurcu) and favored the reestablishment of religious autocracy until the day of his death, well into the republican period.102

Another influential Islamicist group was the Society of Islamic Learning (Cemiyet-i İlimiye-i İslamiye), which, starting in 1908, published its ideas in its monthly periodical, Beyan ul-Hak (Presentation of the Truth). It was led by Mustafa Sabri, who achieved his greatest notoriety during the Allied occupation of Istanbul following World War I (1918–1923), when he led a number of ulema who cooperated with the British in abolishing the secular measures introduced by the Young Turks. Sabri led those who felt that Islam could in fact itself become the principal vehicle for the empire's modernization; Muslims had to unite to reform their religion on its own terms as well as to repel the attacks by non-Muslims.103

The most intellectual Islamicist group was that led by the poet Mehmet Akif (1870–1936) and a group of conservative intellectuals who published their ideas in the monthly Sirat-i Miistakhin (The Straight Path), later called Sebil ur-Resad (Fountain of Orthodoxy). Claiming that Abdulhamit's autocracy had violated the simple faith of the Prophet and the Orthodox Caliphs as much as had the secular Young Turks, Akif and his followers emphasized the perfect conformity of the Constitution with the democracy of Islam, with the Parliament representing the earliest Muslim practices of consultation among believers. But they differed with the reformers over those policies that attempted to introduce Western institutions and to give equality to non-Muslims. Those policies that emphasized union with the Turks of the world at the expense of universal Muslim ties also were condemned. Western civilization had corrupted the Islamic ethic, and Muslims would have to return to their old values and unity if they were to be rescued from imperialism. Islam could take only the science and technology of the West, rejecting the elements of government that would weaken the Islamic community. There was a tremendous gap between the so-called educated people and the mass of the people. The former
attempted to imitate the West, but the latter knew that this was in fact the cause of their fall. Intellectuals could not yet see that nations had to follow different roads to progress according to their own backgrounds and experience and that the road of the Islamic world was not that of the West.\textsuperscript{104}

The Modernizers

In the precarious situation of the empire, however, and under the joint influence of the CUP and the intellectual message provided by Ziya Gökalp, it was those who advocated modernism who dominated Ottoman life during the later Young Turk years. Basing their ideas on the need for unity with both the Turks and the Muslims outside the empire, they felt that the empire simply had to modernize if it was to survive and that the West was the only model from which this modernization could be taken. Leading the secular modernizers was the poet Tevfik Fikret, who attacked the idea of Islamic domination of state and society rather than the religion of Islam as much. But since, for the orthodox, Islam covered all aspects of life and since the traditional Islamic state was based on religion, this still brought down on him the attacks of the conservatives. Another persistent advocate of modernization was one of the early CUP founders, Dr. Abdullah Cevdet (1869–1932), who had first published his ideas in the \textit{Iqtihat} (Struggle) in Geneva. He criticized all those who would return to the past and showed impatience with those who fell short of his expectations. Under Abdulhamit he found fault with the people for allowing such an autocracy; he attacked the Young Turks when they failed to live up to their democratic ideals. To him the only civilization of the modern world was that of Europe. The trouble with the Tanzimat, the Young Turks, and Abdulhamit was that they had not gone far enough, they had left too much of the old for the new to work efficiently. What should have been done, what had to be done, was to destroy the old and replace it with European civilization, thus making the Ottoman Empire part of the West. He accepted the Tanzimat idea that reform had to be imposed from on top and said that people had to be driven to modernize themselves. Thus along with Ziya Gökalp he provided much of the impetus for Mustafa Kemal’s reforms during the early years of the Republic.\textsuperscript{105}

Modernization Under the Young Turks, 1913–1918

Under the stimulus of their own party program as well as the intellectual and mass demand for rapid modernization to save the empire, once in full power in 1913 the CUP began a frantic push toward secularization, which continued, with little pause, right through World War I until its leaders were forced to flee due to the empire’s defeat and occupation. The reforms of the later CUP period often are overlooked by those who see only the autocracy and the war itself. As during the period of Abdulhamit, the autocracy harmed only those who actively opposed the regime, but to most intellectuals as well as to the mass of Muslims now forming the bulk of the empire’s population, it was absolutely essential if they and the empire were to survive.

In direct fulfillment of the CUP party program of 1913, modernization of the apparatus of government came first. For the first time since the early years of the Tanzimat, the ministries were reorganized and modernized. Divisions of authority and responsibility were more clearly defined. Civil servants were encouraged to take the initiative, and the bureaucratic structure was rationalized to better serve the
needs of a much smaller empire than that which the Men of the Tanzimat had ruled. A new Financial Reform Commission (*İslahat-ı Maliye Komisyonu*), established in 1912, drastically reformed the tax system, with the tax farms on the tithes definitively abolished and the rates raised sufficiently to balance the budget in the face of rising costs. The road-labor tax was increased and its application extended to Istanbul and the other large cities that had been exempt, thus spreading the burden and leaving the rural populace with less to pay than in the past. Income taxes were introduced to provide the municipalities with needed funds. The financial activities of all civil servants were placed under the supervision of a newly established Financial Inspection Commission.

A new Provincial Administration Law (March 15, 1913) strengthened the governors and extended bureaucratic reforms similar to those introduced in Istanbul. Reforms in the financial and judicial systems in the provinces assigned increased responsibility to those in positions of authority. The police also were reorganized and placed entirely under civilian authority, with more personnel and equipment to enable them to enforce the laws limiting the activities of the terrorist groups. An entirely new gendarme organization was established, on the model of that created by the foreign advisers in Macedonia, and its control was transferred from the Ministry of War back to that of Interior, again strengthening the civilian authorities in the provinces.

Istanbul’s municipality was reorganized and modernized, with a City Council (*Şehir Emaneti Encümeni*) provided to help the mayor; councils of law, health, accounting, and police were introduced to provide the necessary technical advice and direction to municipal operations. With the municipality now securing sufficient funds, especially from the new income taxes, it was able to carry out a vast program of public works, paving streets and sidewalks, installing electric lights and a new sewage and drainage system, and reorganizing the police and fire departments. The major city communication services, the telephone, trams, the tunnel between Beyoğlu and Galata, and the electric, water, and gas services also were modernized and extended so that by the commencement of World War I, Istanbul had caught up to the major European cities. The municipality also worked to solve the city’s population problem. The refugees who had crowded in since 1908 and the new refugees coming after the Balkan Wars were resettled outside Istanbul as rapidly as possible. But new problems were to appear in consequence of the population dislocations of World War I.

In addition, a series of even more drastic reform proposals made by Ziya Gökalp to further Ottoman secularization were brought to culmination during the darkest days of the war. On April 26, 1913, a new regulation established close state control over the ulema and the religious courts, requiring them to accept the authority of the secular appeals court (*Mahkeme-i Temyiz*) in many areas. State standards of education and training were imposed on the kadis, and a new state-operated madrasa was opened in Istanbul to train ulema wishing to serve as judges in religious courts. State examinations administered by the *seyhulislam* were imposed to test their training and competence. All subordinate employees of the religious courts were placed under the control of the Ministry of Justice, and new regulations limited the authority of the religious courts in favor of the secular ones.

This was only the beginning. In 1915 Gökalp proposed the complete secularization of the religious courts, schools, and religious foundations and the limitation of the *seyhulislam* to purely religious functions. This program was carried out by a series of measures enacted during the next two years. In late April 1916 the *seyhulislam*
was removed from the cabinet and his office changed from a ministry to a department. On March 25, 1915, all Şeriat courts as well as those organized by the Ministry of Religious Foundations to care for properties belonging to foundations and orphans were transferred to the authority of the Ministry of Justice, with decisions of the religious courts being subject to review by the secular Appeals Court. Kadis now were appointed, supervised, transferred, and dismissed by the Ministry of Justice in accordance with the same regulations and standards applied to the secular courts.\footnote{122} All other members of the ulema were placed under direct government control and put on a salary and pension scale comparable to that of other civil servants.\footnote{123} Religious foundation property was put under the control of the Ministry of Finance.\footnote{124} Religious schools were put under the control of the Ministry of Education,\footnote{125} which sent its own directors to modernize their staffs and curricula. A new Department of Foundations was established under the Ministry of Finance to manage the financial affairs of foundation properties and the religious schools and mosques supported by them, with surplus revenue going directly to the Imperial Treasury for general use. The şeyhulislam thus retained only religious consultative functions, and even these were placed under a new department, called the Dar ul-Hikmet ul-Islamiye (School of Islamic Wisdom), associated with his office.\footnote{126} A Council of Şeyhs (Meclis-i Meqayih), organized to control all the dervish monasteries and lodges, made certain that their activities conformed fully with the law.\footnote{127} The rapid secularization of schools and courts promised an end to the dualisms that Gokalp and his disciples had criticized. Nor was this all. As the war came to a climax, on November 7, 1917, the Code of Family Law was promulgated. Though it included the basic regulations of the Şeriat as well as of Jewish and Christian law regarding matters of divorce, marriage, and other family relationships for subjects of those religions, the state's assumption of the legal power to enforce these regulations furthered the secularization movement considerably. The marriage contract became a secular contract and, despite the mention of the religious codes in the law, it was subject basically to secular regulations.\footnote{128}

Gökalp led the way in emancipating women during the CUP period, advocating legal reforms to give them a position equal with that of men in marriage and inheritance, educational reforms to give them a chance to secure the same kind of secular education as men, and social and economic reforms to allow them full and equal participation in society and economic life as well as in the professions.\footnote{129} Elementary and middle education for girls was greatly expanded by the Ministry of Education, and women were admitted to the higher schools. The first lycée especially for women was opened in 1911. Trade schools for women were established to teach them not only to cook and sew but also to give them training so that they could earn a living as secretaries, nurses, and the like. City women began to work in public, not only in textile and tobacco factories, replacing men taken into the army, but also in businesses and stores. They began to discard the veil in public and appear in European-style clothing long before such measures were decreed by the Republic. Associations to protect the rights of women were established in the major cities. Liberated women emerged to lead the fight for justice, led by one of Gökalp's most distinguished followers, the novelist Halide Edip (Adivar). A 1916 law finally allowed women to obtain divorces if their husbands were adulterers, wished to take additional wives without the first wife's consent, or violated the marriage contract, thus undermining the traditions based on Şeriat provisions.\footnote{130}

Women still were far from having full equality, however. They could not go to public places of assembly such as theaters and restaurants in the company of men,
even their own husbands, but had to keep to areas especially set aside for them. In the higher schools and the university they could not attend joint classes with men but had to go to special classes or hear lectures in curtained-off sections of the classrooms. They could not smoke publicly or greet men of their acquaintance on the streets. Popular customs limiting the relationship of girls and boys and providing for arranged marriages remained in force. And women in the villages remained bound by their husbands' will according to the traditions of centuries. Yet the advances made for urban women still were tremendous, enabling the full emancipation of women decreed soon afterward by the Republic to take place quickly and completely and with little significant opposition.\textsuperscript{131}

The empire was modernized in many other ways during the CUP period. Electricity and the telephone became common, at first in official and business buildings and later in the homes of the wealthy. Sanitation facilities and general cleanliness were greatly improved. Airplanes were introduced in 1912, and the Ottoman army had its own air force in World War I.\textsuperscript{132} The dual system of Muslim and European calendars, based on the lunar and solar year respectively, which had been introduced during the time of Selim III and extended during the Tanzimat now was replaced by the latter, with the lunar-year calendar remaining in use only for strictly religious activities.\textsuperscript{133} The Islamic systems of telling time and measuring, however, remained in force together with their European counterparts until their elimination by the Republic in 1926.\textsuperscript{134}

After the Balkan War debacles the need to modernize the armed forces was recognized fully. A German military mission came to help the government. General Liman von Sanders initially was appointed commander of the First Army in Istanbul (November 1913), with the right also to direct the activities of all the other German officers in Ottoman service. But because of the fears of the other powers, led by France and England, that this would give Germany control of the Ottoman army, a compromise was reached by which he was instead appointed only inspector general of the First Army, and his colleagues also were made subordinate to their Ottoman colleagues. Though the Germans continued to play an important role in Ottoman military affairs before and during World War I, their appearance of arrogance soon became very grating to most of the Ottoman officers. The Entente's accusations that Germany actually controlled the Ottoman army were quite unfounded, since command remained in Ottoman hands under the jealous watch of Enver and his associates. With German help, however, the Ottoman army was rapidly modernized and reorganized. Its annual budget was almost doubled. Large quantities of new equipment were purchased in Europe, and the Imperial Arsenal and other military factories were modernized. All the senior officers who had led the army during the Balkan Wars were retired or transferred to nonmilitary duties, and the remaining junior officers were promoted, giving them an opportunity to display their knowledge and energy in command. Enver encouraged initiative among his officers and men, himself inspiring a spirit of confidence and vigor that had been sorely lacking since the time of Abdulaziz.\textsuperscript{135}

Soon afterward, Cemal Paşa was assigned to modernize the navy in the same way. Von Sanders' appointment was balanced by the appointment of a British naval mission led by Rear Admiral Sir Arthur H. Limpus, which helped Cemal to reorganize the ministry completely. The previous tendency of departmental chiefs to avoid responsibility by deferring to the Naval Council was ended by abolishing the latter. The Admiralty then was reorganized into autonomous technical departments whose directors were made responsible for developing and carrying out
reform plans, while the grand admiral was limited to matters of planning, training, and war command. The Imperial Shipyards at Samsun, Izmir, Beirut, and Basra also were set to work competing with one another to see which could build the most and best ships in the shortest time. As in the army most of the older officers were retired and command passed to the young and enthusiastic recent graduates of the naval academy. The British also were urged to speed up construction of two new battleships ordered some time earlier. To provide the last payments a popular subscription campaign was opened, with collection boxes set up in schools and hospitals and outside mosques, coffeehouses, and railway stations. Even school-children made contributions to the campaign, and the ships were named after the first and then-reigning sultans (Sultan Osman and Resadiye). Preparations were also made for lavish patriotic ceremonies when the ships were scheduled to be delivered, in August 1914, to cap off the forced draft program of rearmament that was intended to assure that the empire would never again be dishonored.\textsuperscript{136}

The Young Turks, anxious not to allow any single power to dominate the empire, followed a careful policy of balancing the political, economic, and military influence of Britain, France, and Germany. If Germany seemingly was favored, as that country's European rivals often complained, it was because it was so far behind at the start. To be sure, a number of German firms were allowed to invest in the Ottoman railroads, particularly the new Baghdad Railroad, but despite a steady increase in German economic involvement in the Ottoman Empire, it still was well behind Britain and France in overall investment as well as in imports and exports. France still dominated the Ottoman Public Debt Commission, and joined with Britain in controlling the Ottoman Bank, which had a legal monopoly on the issuance of bank notes and regularly financed the cash flow deficits of the treasury. To further balance German and British predominance in the armed forces, French officers were employed to modernize the gendarmerie and to introduce new organization and methods into the Ministry of Finance during the last two years before the war.\textsuperscript{137}

In response to the urgings of the Turkish nationalists and in reaction to the tragedy of the Balkan Wars, official and popular opinion moved strongly toward Turkish nationalism. On March 22, 1912, the Turkish Homeland Society (Türk Yurdu Cemiyeti) was supplanted by the Turkish Hearth (Türk Ocagi), incorporating many of the former leaders but also witnessing the emergence of many new ones, such as Halide Edip (Adivar), Ahmet Agaoğlu, Fuat Köprülü, and others, who were to lead the struggle for Turkish national rights in the years ahead. Organizing now on the pattern of the CUP itself, the Turkish Hearth established units in every city, school, and major public organization. The Turkish Hearth was mainly a nonpolitical organization. Its duty was to combat the ideas of Islamism and Ottomanism and to convince the Turkish people of the empire that they could survive only if they accepted the ideals of Turkish nationalism as developed mainly by Gökalp. Participation of Turks in the areas of the economy and government that previously had been monopolized by non-Turks was encouraged. Contacts were made with Turks outside the empire, and for the first time there was an attempt to counteract the propaganda of the minority organizations in Europe. The Hearth's chapters around the empire became adult education societies, educating cultivators and townspeople alike in the Turkish language and history and striving to develop an awareness of the Turkish cultural heritage. Pressure was applied on the government to increase the use of Turkish in official business and to squeeze out the many Arabs who had been introduced into the
bureaucracy by Abdulhamit. The use of Turkish as the primary language of business in the foreign and minority commercial establishments and schools was encouraged. With the religious schools and courts coming under governmental control, Turkish rather than Arabic predominated.

As it was developed during the CUP period and came to be applied under the Republic, Turkish nationalism was mainly a constructive rather than a destructive force, seeking to convince its adherents to build their society and nation by their own efforts, aiming only to eliminate those elements of discrimination that kept them from doing so, and inviting all those ethnic groups that were not Turkish to accept the new nationality and to join in the struggle to build a new nation in place of the declining empire. This was not to be, however. As the Turks were beginning to seek their own national identity, the bases of Islamic unity in the empire were torn apart, and the Arab national movement developed to the extent that it facilitated the disintegration of the empire soon after the war began.

The Ottoman Empire Enters the War

Ottoman involvement in World War I, and on the side of the Central Powers, certainly was not inevitable. Despite the newly emerging patriotic fervor, most members of the cabinet and the CUP and many Turkish people realized that the empire was hardly in a state to support any major military effort so soon after the series of wars that had decimated its population and finances as well as its armed forces. Although Germany had been building up the army, it did not really expect the Porte to be able to make a significant military contribution even if it did decide to join the Central Powers. Modernization had only begun. Besides, most members of the CUP and the mass of the public still felt closer to Britain and France than to Germany. German autocracy and militarism appealed only to Enver and those officers who had received some training in Germany, but they hardly dominated Ottoman politics at the time, and whatever influence they had seemed to be countered fully by that of Cemal and the navy, which favored the Triple Entente, or even better, neutrality.

Behind the scenes, however, Enver was skillfully paving the way for an alliance with Germany. His argument was simple. If war came, Russia would most certainly attempt to extend its gains at Ottoman expense, particularly in the east, where it continued to foment Armenian terrorism and agitation. With Russia on the Entente side it would be difficult to secure protection from England and France. On the other hand, Germany had no territorial ambitions in the Middle East; its own strategic interests required limitation of further Russian expansion. While its Austrian ally long had coveted Ottoman territory, its acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina had increased its minority problems to such an extent that it hardly would be anxious to add further Slavic territories to its domains. Cemal actually made some approaches to the Entente early in 1914 to counter Enver’s efforts, but Britain and France brusquely rejected the offer. Germany, on the other hand, alone among the major powers, seemed willing to join the Ottomans in open alliance. Since there remained so much popular opposition to an attachment with Germany, however, the negotiations were conducted secretly with only the grand vezir and foreign minister, Sait Halim, and Enver initially involved. The actual alliance treaty was signed only on August 2, 1914, after the war had already begun in Europe. It provided for Ottoman intervention in support of the Central Powers only if Germany’s assistance to Austria in the Serbian crisis (Austria had declared war
on Serbia on July 28) led it to war with Russia, an eventuality that did in fact take place only four days later, on August 6. The Ottomans agreed to leave the von Sanders mission "with an effective influence on the general direction of the army," and Germany in turn promised to help protect Ottoman territorial integrity against Russia. The treaty was kept secret and was to be disclosed only when the parties chose to invoke it. Cemal and the other cabinet members did not know about the agreement until after it was signed, and while some demurred they finally were persuaded to go along, because it was already a fact and also because it did provide the empire with the protection against Russian ambitions that Britain and France had refused to supply.

The main problem the government leaders now had was to get the empire to fulfill the obligations which they had agreed to in the face of general public opposition as well as the legal requirement that the agreement itself had to be ratified by the Chamber of Deputies as long as it was in session. The latter problem was solved by getting the sultan to send the Chamber home until the end of November as soon as it had authorized the 1914 fiscal year budget as well as various provisions for conscription in case of war. The treaty continued to be kept secret in the hope of securing delivery of the battleships from Britain, with strict press censorship being established to make sure it would not leak out. With the deputies adjourned, the government could promulgate temporary laws with the sultan's assent, subject only to the requirement that they be approved some time in the future by the Parliament, so it now was able to go ahead with a series of laws and regulations preparing the way for full mobilization. Public opinion remained a problem, but here Britain provided the Ottoman government with the help it needed. At the beginning of August the two ships being built in England were ready. Ottoman crews had been sent to pick them up. A "Navy Week" had been scheduled in Istanbul, with lavish ceremonies to welcome the largest and most modern ships of the fleet. On August 3, however, without any advance warning, and apparently without any knowledge of the Ottoman-German treaty that had just been signed, Winston Churchill, first lord of the admiralty, suddenly announced that in view of the emerging European conflict the ships had been commandeered for use by the British navy. Intense popular disappointment and anger swept the Ottoman Empire. Thousands of schoolchildren who had contributed money for construction of the ships swarmed through the streets to protest this example of what appeared to be British perfidy and bigotry. It seemed very likely that if the German alliance had been announced at this moment, it would have been welcomed without demurral. At this point, however, most of the ministers who had not been privy to the original agreement began to hold back. It was uncertain that Germany would in fact win in the west. Germany also was asking the Porte to support it and Austria actively against Russia, but Sait Halim was demanding formal protection against possible Balkan attacks in return, and even Enver was demanding compensation in the form of the Aegean Islands and western Thrace, with Greece and Bulgaria being compensated elsewhere. At this point, however, two other battleships provided Germany and Enver with a convenient means of gaining the desired Ottoman entry. Two cruisers of the German Mediterranean squadron, the Goeben and the Breslau, had bombarded French bases in North Africa (August 3) and then fled into the eastern Mediterranean with the British navy in hot pursuit. Enver arranged for them to pass into Ottoman waters (August 11). When Britain protested that the Ottomans, as neutrals, either had to intern the ships and their crews or had to send them out to fight, the ships were transferred to the Ottoman fleet by a
The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975

fictitious sale, being given the names Yavuz Sultan Selim and Midilli, with the squadron commander, Admiral Souchon, becoming commander of the Ottoman Black Sea fleet while his sailors were given fezzes and Ottoman uniforms and enlisted into the sultan’s navy. Most members of the cabinet continued to oppose entry into the war at least until the desired safeguards had been secured. Enver and Cemal advocated policies that would bring the empire into war on Germany’s side, while Talat mediated between the two groups. Germany by now was anxious for the Ottomans to enter, proposing attacks into the Crimea or around the Black Sea against Odessa and toward the Suez Canal to divert the Russians and the British. Britain and Russia however began to encourage Ottoman neutrality and started negotiations to provide the long-desired guarantees of Ottoman independence and territorial integrity, even offering concessions regarding the Capitulations if only the Porte stayed out. The relative stalemate that emerged on the western front and Russian victories in the east further strengthened the Ottoman advocates of peace and hindered Enver.

Enver and his allies therefore sought out and pushed through more provocations to force the Western allies to declare war on the Ottoman Empire. On September 7 the Capitulations were abolished, inflicting a major blow on the economic interests of the Entente powers in particular. On September 14 Cemal, as minister of the navy, authorized Admiral Souchon to take his ships into the Black Sea and attack any Russian ships or bases he might encounter in the name of the Ottoman government, thus most certainly providing the desired war provocation, but this was countermanded by the cabinet. On October 1 the Ottoman customs duties, traditionally controlled by the powers through the Capitulations, were unilaterally increased by 4 percent. The foreign post offices in the empire, including those of Germany, were closed and taken over. Foreigners in the empire were made subject to Ottoman laws and the Ottoman courts. Enver personally ordered the Dardanelles and the Bosporus closed to foreign ships to prevent the Entente from intervening. On October 11 the German ambassador secretly promised delivery of 2 billion kurus of gold to the Ottoman government if war was declared, and arrival of the gold on October 21 cleared the way for action. Enver and Cemal again gave Souchon authority to attack the Russians in the Black Sea to force a war declaration without consulting the remainder of the cabinet. On October 29 Souchon bombarded the Russian coast and destroyed several Russian ships. Sait Halim and Cavit were furious and got Enver to send a cease-fire order to Souchon as well as apologies to the Entente governments. But it was too late. Enver’s apologies included claims that the incidents had in fact been provoked by the Russian Black Sea fleet. On November 2 Russia replied with a war declaration on the Ottoman Empire. Britain and France followed three days later. Britain proclaimed the annexation of Cyprus and, soon afterward (December 18), the independence of Egypt under British protection. Khedive Abbas Hilmi, who was then visiting the sultan in Istanbul, was replaced with Hüseyin Kâmil Paşa, son of the old khedive, Ismail. Already on November 11 the sultan had replied with the Ottoman war declaration, using his claim to be caliph to add a proclamation of Holy War against the Entente and asking all Muslims, particularly those in the British and Russian possessions, to join in the campaign against the infidel. Interest payments on all the public debt bonds held by investors of the enemy nations were suspended also, thus relieving the Porte of a considerable financial burden, at least until the war was over, and adding one more crack to the crumbling order of European society (December 17, 1914).
War Mobilization and German Military Control

In Istanbul the war declaration was followed by full mobilization. Heavy new war taxes were introduced and non-Muslims again were required to pay conscription exemption taxes. Pensions were provided for the families of bureaucrats called to the army. The Parliament was prorogued so that additional measures could be pushed through without delay. Enver decided to assume command of all Ottoman operations in eastern Anatolia and Cemal took control of Syria, both also retaining their ministerial positions and dominance in Istanbul. Liman von Sanders, who preferred an active role, was made commander of the First Army initially, caring for Istanbul and its environs, subsequently succeeding Cemal as commander in Syria while the latter concentrated on the ministry. Von Sanders' chief assistant, General von Seeckt, became chief of the Ottoman General Staff, von der Goltz succeeded von Sanders as chief of the First Army for a time and then of the Sixth Army in Mesopotamia; von Falkenhayn became adviser and then commander of the Ottoman army in Palestine; and German officers were put in command of the Ministry of War departments of Operations, Intelligence, Railroads, Supply, Munitions, Coal, and Fortresses.153

War Aims and Strategy

The Germans first considered Ottoman assistance mainly against those Balkan states that joined the Entente. But most of those states either remained neutral or joined the Central Powers. Rumania was being courted by both sides but had ambitions that included territories controlled by members of both: Bessarabia, held by Russia, and Transylvania, Bukovina, and the Banat, held by Austria, with each bloc promising it the territory held by the other to get its help, or the lack of same, against the Austrian invasion of Serbia and of Russian Galicia, which opened the war in August 1914. Serbia, under attack from Austria, had no choice but to join the Entente, hoping to be compensated with Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as access to the Adriatic. But the Ottomans could not reach Serbia, since Greece remained neutral, divided between King Constantine's desire to join the Central Powers because of his relationship with the kaiser and that of Prime Minister Venizelos to join the Entente in order to get Istanbul, which also was desired by Russia, a major member of the Entente. The real key to the situation was Bulgaria, which the Entente could only offer Ottoman territory in eastern Thrace and the parts of Macedonia held by Serbia since the Balkan wars. But since the Central Powers offered the Greek-held territories in eastern Macedonia as well as the parts of the Dobruca lost to Rumania in 1913, Bulgaria joined them instead on September 6, 1915. After Greece refused Serbia's request for assistance in accordance with their 1913 alliance, Entente forces invaded Greece (September 21, 1915) to help Venizelos prevail over the king, but they were forced to retire, enabling the Austro-German-Bulgarian alliance to invade and conquer Serbia from all sides (October 1915). The Austrians also took Albania, while a final Entente effort to enter Bulgaria through Greek Macedonia failed, and the Bulgars occupied most of Macedonia as a result.

With Bulgaria cooperating quite successfully with the Central Powers, German strategy therefore dictated that the Ottomans be kept away from their ambitions in the Balkans, where they would most certainly clash with the Bulgars, and instead be used mainly to serve the German interests of diverting the Russians and British
from the main war theaters in Europe. The Ottomans therefore were to advance into Egypt and to invade the Caucasus, with an appeal for a Holy War enhancing their efforts in these campaigns as well as undermining the enemy's ability to mobilize its forces. Germany also attempted to secure the support of the Iranian government against Russia, but Russia responded with an occupation of the northern part of the country (November 1915), forcing the Germans to set up their own puppet government and army at Kerman§ah. This stimulated the British to reply along the Persian Gulf in the south, with Sir Percy Sykes leading the South Persian Rifles, based in Shiraz, which, with some assent from the Tehran government, prevented the Germans from getting help from the Persian Gulf and so forced them to depend entirely on what they could get from the Ottomans and von der Goltz in Iraq.

The Ottoman war aims, as elaborated by Enver and his colleagues, were mostly but not entirely the same as those of the Germans. Enver really hoped to use the war to regain substantial territory in Macedonia and Thrace as well as in eastern Anatolia, Egypt, and Cyprus. As his ambitions developed, however, they also came to include the liberation of the Turkish people of the Caucasus and Central Asia from Russian and Armenian tyranny, the establishment of the influence of the sultan-caliph over all other Muslims in the world, particularly those of India, and the final liberation of the empire from the economic and political domination of all the powers, including the Germans.

The Northeastern Front, 1914–1916

German strategy prevailed at the outset, so that Enver had to concentrate first on his ambitions in the east. Almost as soon as he became minister of war he began to strengthen the Third Army, based at Erzurum, which covered the entire area of northeastern Anatolia from Lake Van to the Black Sea; thus it was ready to attack almost as soon as war was declared. Enver made a last effort to secure the support of the sultan's Armenian subjects, but a meeting at Erzurum with Armenian leaders from Russia as well as the Ottoman Empire was unsuccessful. Russia already had promised the Armenians an autonomous state including not only the areas under Russian rule in the Caucasus but also substantial parts of eastern Anatolia. The Armenian leaders told Enver only that they wanted to remain neutral, but their sympathy for the Russians seemed evident. In fact soon after the meeting "several prominent Ottoman Armenians, including a former member of parliament, slipped away to the Caucasus to collaborate with Russian military officials," making it appear that the Armenians would do everything they could to frustrate Ottoman military action.

Still Enver decided that the Ottoman security forces were strong enough to prevent any Armenian sabotage, and preparations were made for a winter assault. Meanwhile, Czar Nicholas II himself came to the Caucasus to make final plans for cooperation with the Armenians against the Ottomans, with the president of the Armenian National Bureau in Tiflis declaring in response:

From all countries Armenians are hurrying to enter the ranks of the glorious Russian Army, with their blood to serve the victory of Russian arms. . . . Let the Russian flag wave freely over the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. Let, with Your will, great Majesty, the peoples remaining under the Turkish yoke receive freedom. Let the Armenian people of Turkey who have suffered for the
Armenians again flooded into the czarist armies, and the czar returned to St. Petersburg confident that the day finally had come for him to reach Istanbul.

Hostilities were opened by the Russians, who pushed across the border on November 1, 1914, though the Ottomans stopped them and pushed them back a few days later. On December 21 Enver personally led the Third Army in a counter-attack. He aimed to cut the Russian lines of communications from the Caucasus to their main base at Kars and to reoccupy it along with Ardahan and Batum as the first step toward an invasion of the Caucasus. Key to the envelopment operation was the border town of Sarıkamış, which lay astride the main route from Kars to the north. The Ottomans managed to occupy the town on December 26, but the Russians then retook it. A subsequent Russian counteroffensive in January caused the Ottoman army to scatter, with over three-fourths of the men lost as they attempted to find their way back to safety. Ottoman morale and military position in the east were seriously hurt, and the way was prepared for a new Russian push into eastern Anatolia, to be accompanied by an open Armenian revolt against the sultan.

In the initial stages of the Caucasus campaign the Russians had demonstrated the best means of organizing a campaign by evacuating the Armenians from their side of the border to clear the area for battle, with the Armenians going quite willingly. Enver followed this example to prepare the Ottoman side and to resist the expected Russian invasion. Armenian leaders in Russia now declared their open support of the enemy, and there seemed no other alternative. It would be "impossible to determine which of the Armenians would remain loyal and which would follow the appeals of their leaders." As soon as spring came, then, in mid-May 1915 orders were issued to evacuate the entire Armenian population from the provinces of Van, Bitlis, and Erzurum, to get them away from all areas where they might undermine the Ottoman campaigns against Russia or against the British in Egypt, with arrangements made to settle them in towns and camps in the Mosul area of northern Iraq. In addition, Armenians residing in the countryside (but not the cities) of the Cilician districts as well as those of north Syria were to be sent to central Syria for the same reason. Specific instructions were issued for the army to protect the Armenians against nomadic attacks and to provide them with sufficient food and other supplies to meet their needs during the march and after they were settled. Warnings were sent to the Ottoman military commanders to make certain that neither the Kurds nor any other Muslims used the situation to gain vengeance for the long years of Armenian terrorism. The Armenians were to be protected and cared for until they returned to their homes after the war. A supplementary law established a special commission to record the properties of some deportees and to sell them at auction at fair prices, with the revenues being held in trust until their return. Muslims wishing to occupy abandoned buildings could do so only as renters, with the revenues paid to the trust funds, and with the understanding that they would have to leave when the original owners returned. The deportees and their possessions were to be guarded by the army while in transit as well as in Iraq and Syria, and the government would provide for their return once the crisis was over.

During the rest of the war, a substantial proportion of the Armenians in the Empire were killed or fled. Armenians claim that as many as 2 million were massacred, but no counts of the dead were ever taken, and the actual total can only be inferred. These claims are based on the supposition that the prewar Armenian population of the Empire
was 2.5 million. According to the Ottoman census in 1914, however, it was at the most 1.3 million. Half of these people resided in the areas affected by the deportations, but with the city dwellers allowed to remain, it appears that about 400,000 people actually were transported in 1915–16. In addition, some 700,000 Armenians fled to the Caucasus, western Europe, and the United States. As 100,000 remained in Turkey after the war, one can conclude that about 300,000 died if one accepts the Ottoman census reports, or 1.3 million if the Armenian figures are utilized.

The Armenians also feel that the deaths resulted from a planned policy of genocide by the Ottoman government. This accusation was repeated by several European commissions during and after the war. The Ottoman cabinet records, however, do not confirm this, but, rather, manifest numerous efforts to investigate and correct a situation in which some 6 million people – Turks, Greeks, Arabs, Armenians, Jews, and others – were being killed by a combination of revolts, bandit attacks, massacres and counter massacres, and famine and disease, compounded by destructive and brutal foreign invasions in which all the people of the empire, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, had their victims and criminals. Considerable further study is needed to determine the exact degree of blame and responsibility that can be assigned to each of the parties involved.

In April 1915, even before the deportation orders were issued, Dashnaks from Russian Armenia organized a revolt in the city of Van, whose 33,789 Armenians comprised 42.3 percent of the population, closest to an Armenian majority of any city in the empire. While the local Armenian leaders tried to restrain their followers, knowing they would suffer in any prolonged communal conflict with the Muslim majority, they were overwhelmed by the agitators from the north, who promised Russian military assistance if only they showed their loyalty to the czar by helping to drive the Muslims out. The Russian army of the Caucasus also began an offensive toward Van with the help of a large force of Armenian volunteers recruited from among refugees from Anatolia as well as local Caucasian residents. Leaving Erivan on April 28, 1915, only a day after the deportation orders had been issued in Istanbul and long before news of them could have reached the east, they reached Van on May 14 and organized and carried out a general slaughter of the local Muslim population during the next two days while the small Ottoman garrison had to retreat to the southern side of the lake. An Armenian state was organized at Van under Russian protection, and it appeared that with the Muslim natives dead or driven away, it might be able to maintain itself at one of the oldest centers of ancient Armenian civilization. An Armenian legion was organized “to expell the Turks from the entire southern shore of the lake in preparation for a concerted Russian drive into the Bitlis vilayet.” Thousands of Armenians from Muş and other major centers in the east began to flood into the new Armenian state, including many who broke away from the deportation columns as they passed the vicinity on their way to Mosul. By mid-July there were as many as 250,000 Armenians crowded into the Van area, which before the crisis had housed and fed no more than 50,000 people, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. Early in July, however, Ottoman reinforcements pushed the Russo-Armenian army back. It was accompanied by thousands of Armenians who feared punishment for the killings that had made possible the short-lived state. “The panic was indescribable. After the month-long resistance to Cevdet Bey, after the city’s liberation, after the establishment of an Armenian governorship, all was blighted. Fleeing behind the retreating Russian forces, nearly two hundred thousand refugees, losing most of their possessions in repeated Kurdish ambushes, swarmed into Transcaucasia,” with as many as 40,000 Armenians perishing during the flight.
number of refugees cited encompassed essentially all those Armenians of the eastern provinces who had not been subjected to the deportations. Those who died thus did so mainly while accompanying the retreating Russian army into the Caucasus, not as the result of direct Ottoman efforts to kill them.  

The Dardanelles Campaign

Ottoman fortunes varied widely during the war, sometimes exceeding the fondest hopes of Enver and his associates, at other times approaching the kind of catastrophes experienced during the Balkan Wars. In general, however, the army showed evidence of the modernization program carried out by the Young Turks and their German advisers just before the war, achieving far more success than its enemies and friends had expected until it was undermined by the general collapse of the Central Powers near the end of the war. Certainly one of the most spectacular and successful Ottoman operations came at Gallipoli, where an Allied effort to force the Dardanelles was beaten back with heavy losses almost at the start of the war.

The first impetus for the campaign came from Russia, which to facilitate its campaign into eastern Anatolia asked the British to mount some kind of operation to divert the Ottomans. After considerable debate the British decided in favor of an operation proposed by Churchill, a naval expedition “to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula (the western shore of the Dardanelles), with Constantinople as its objective.” Capture of the Straits would force the Ottomans from the war, frustrate German efforts to expand their influence in the east, facilitate planned British campaigns in Mesopotamia, safeguard the British position in Egypt, and open the way for supplies to be sent to Russia through the Black Sea.

The first British squadron moved to the attack on February 19, 1915, expecting to force the Straits with ease and pass on to Istanbul. But the British were not aware that the Ottoman First Army, now led by von Sanders, had mined the waterway and mounted strong batteries on the surrounding hills; hence a month went by with their objectives unfulfilled and three battleships lost. As a result, the operation was changed to include landings by British troops from Egypt starting on April 25. In the meantime, however, von Sanders himself came to Gallipoli and strengthened the Ottoman defenses even more. Command over the Ottoman troops was given to the brilliant Mustafa Kemal, who now began to gain the popular reputation that was to serve him so well after the war. Against strong Ottoman opposition a force composed mainly of Australian and New Zealand contingents managed to establish a bridgehead north of Kabatepe on the western side of the peninsula. Landings at other points on the eastern side were only partly successful, and at very heavy cost, however, while the Ottomans remained in their fortifications and beat the British assaults back again and again. The French were able to land at Kumkale, on the Anatolian side of the Straits, but this had little strategic significance and they finally were recalled to help at Gallipoli.

Basically, however, there was a stalemate as summer approached. The only hope for the British commanders was additional reinforcements, the kind of major involvement that Britain really could not afford. Churchill now was relieved as first lord, though he remained on the War Cabinet. The British still felt they were too deeply involved to pull out; thus in an effort to sever the Ottomans’ north-south communications down the peninsula from Istanbul, another landing was made farther north of Kabatepe at Anafarta Limanı (Sulva Bay) on the night of
August 6–7, while another force mounted the heights of the Kilid-i Bahr fort, which overlooked the Straits from the east. But again they were kept to the beaches by fierce Ottoman resistance, with heavy casualties, and as the year came to an end the War Cabinet decided to give up the entire operation. The only real British success of the campaign was, in fact, the evacuation, which took place on December 18–19 on the western banks and January 8–9, 1916, at the tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula. The attempt to force the Straits had failed. There were 213,980 casualties on the British side, and the Ottomans had 120,000 dead and wounded. The Ottomans remained in a position to move against the Russians or the British in Egypt. The Bulgars and Germans were encouraged to go ahead with their campaign against Greece. Russia continued to be isolated from British assistance. And the morale of the Central Powers was immensely improved.167

The Iraqi Front

The Ottoman action in Iraq was entirely defensive against British efforts to defend their oil wells and refineries in southern Iran, gain control of new ones recently discovered around Mosul and Kerkuk, in northern Iraq, and counter the Ottoman call for a Muslim Holy War. British operations here were carried out mainly by forces from India. Political affairs were directed by Sir Percy Cox, for many years British resident among the Arabs of the Persian Gulf. Overall Ottoman defenses were directed at first by Süleyman Aşkeri Bey, one of the young men promoted suddenly by Enver, having enthusiasm but no real experience. The British landed at Fao, where the Ṣatt ul-Arab runs into the gulf (November 6, 1914), beat back the resistance of a few Ottoman brigades, and took Basra (November 21) against little resistance, with the only Ottoman success being a raid across the river into Iran against the oil establishments at Abadan. General Sir Charles Townshend then led a British offensive up the river toward Baghdad with the ultimate objective of reaching the Russians in the Caucasus and joining in a common effort to overrun Anatolia and force the Ottomans from the war in the east. The British advance, however, was extremely slow. They made no effort to use Arab auxiliaries, as was done in Arabia and Syria, preferring to wait for supplies landed at Basra and transported up the river. The climate was difficult, and they avoided long marches during the summer months. British operations were hindered by the need to watch for a possible German offensive from Iran. While the British failed to move quickly to use their initial advantage, the Ottoman defense in Iraq was given to von der Goltz Paşa, one of the ablest German generals in the sultan's service, who soon formed the Iraqi army into an effective fighting force with the help of new contingents sent by Enver after the conclusion of the Caucasus campaign.

The British advance was so slow that they took Kut ul-Amara, 400 kilometers north of Basra, only on September 29, 1915. They then moved toward Baghdad, but now the Ottomans were ready. At Selman Pak, von der Goltz smashed the British (November 22), inflicting heavy casualties and putting them under siege at Kut. Townshend appealed for reinforcements, but they had to come all the way from India. In the meantime von der Goltz sent a detachment under Enver's uncle, Halil (Kut) Paşa, who fortified the course of the Tigris to the gulf, making it impossible for a British relief force to reach Kut quickly even if it had arrived on time. Townshend became so desperate that he asked for Russian help from Iran even though this would bring Russian influence into the areas of Iran and Iraq.
that Britain preferred to retain as its own sphere of influence. Von der Goltz died of typhus in Baghdad (April 6, 1916), but Halil Paşa pushed the siege at Kut to a successful conclusion, forcing the British to surrender their entire force (April 29, 1916) and causing them to suffer another major defeat soon after Gallipoli was evacuated.

Halil now wished to fortify the Tigris against a possible British return from Basra. But as Ottoman interests again were subordinated to those of the Germans, only a single brigade was left at Baghdad while Halil had to lead the main Ottoman force into Iran to help German ambitions there. The British were able to return, therefore, now under the command of Sir Frederick Maude, who took the offensive in December 1916. Unaware of how weak the Ottoman defenses were along the river, he made his way gradually up the Tigris in a series of outflanking maneuvers, forcing the Ottomans left behind to withdraw rather than to be cut off from the rear. The river was crossed and Kut recaptured on February 22, 1917. Halil then returned from Iran, but he was unable to reach Baghdad before its commander, Kâzım Karabekir, later to find fame in the War for Independence, had to evacuate it to avoid encirclement, enabling the British to take it without resistance (March 11, 1917). Maude moved rapidly north in order to join a Russian force advancing through northern Iran and the Caucasus to make a united effort against Mosul. But he had to stop because of the summer heat, and by the time he resumed his march the Russian army had dissolved because of the advent of the Russian Revolution. In September, however, he took al-Ramadi, on the Euphrates, thus assuring British control of central Iraq. Maude himself died of cholera, but his successor, Sir William Marshall, took the rest of Iraq except for Mosul. It too was occupied following Ottoman withdrawal because of the armistice of Mondros thus precipitating a struggle at the peace conferences to see who would control its rich oil deposits once the war was over.

The Egyptian Campaigns

The British in India and Egypt and the Russians in Central Asia were successful in suppressing the sultan's call for a Pan-Islamic movement. One might say, however, that to the extent that the powers had to maintain large garrisons at home to keep their Muslim subjects from revolting, the call had more success than has generally been admitted. Perhaps its greatest direct success came in Libya, where the Senusis responded by resuming their revolt against the Italians early in 1915, using Ottoman officers and German money to force the Italians to leave most of the desert areas and to concentrate in the coastal areas that they had taken in the early years of the Tripolitanian War. They also began to attack the British in Egypt's western deserts, and, though they were beaten in open battles, they carried on a destructive guerrilla warfare from a base at the Siwa Oasis until it was taken by the British late in 1916.

The Ottomans were encouraged to move into Egypt not only by the deposed Khedive Abbas Hilmi, who assured the sultan that his subjects would rise in revolt, but also by the British, who occupied the port of Akaba, at the northern tip of the Red Sea, thus posing a serious threat to the Ottoman positions in Syria as well as the Arabian Peninsula. In direct response Cemal Paşa was made governor of Syria with the job of organizing and leading an expeditionary force to drive the British from Egypt. After he arrived in Damascus, he started to introduce major reforms in the hope of securing Arab assistance, but emerging Arab na-
nationalism led to local resistance. Cemal was therefore forced to take stern measures to prevent an open revolt from frustrating his plans for Egypt. Thus even as new roads and schools were built, leading nationalist agitators were imprisoned and executed and general suppression followed. His move against Egypt was no more successful than his effort to conciliate the Arabs. He marched a force of some 80,000 men across the wastes of the Sinai Desert in January 1915, but the British had successfully suppressed Arab movements in Egypt through a combination of force and promises for some kind of Arab independence in the future. So Cemal was not greeted with the expected Egyptian uprising, and strong British resistance forced him back from the Suez Canal without any success. Thereafter, the Ottoman threats to the canal and to Egypt were limited to a series of raids, mainly under the command of a Bavarian colonel, Friedrich Kress von Kressenstein. He was helped by a young German major, Franz von Papen, whose subsequent rise to power in Germany led him to a role in the Nazi triumph, after which he was sent back as German ambassador to the Turkish Republic during World War II.

Secret Wartime Promises

As the war went on, the Entente's need to secure allies against the Central Powers led it to make arrangements by which enemy territory, mainly that of the Ottomans, was promised in return for various forms of wartime assistance. This was entirely suitable to the Russians, who wanted to use the war to satisfy their ambitions at the Straits and in eastern Anatolia, but it was quite a change for its allies, who previously had supported Ottoman integrity to maintain the balance of power in Europe. The result was a series of agreements dividing the Ottoman Empire, some of which, particularly those involving the Arab nationalists and the Zionists, were contradictory. The promises were successful in securing effective wartime support, but they gave rise to new conflicts and bitterness in the postwar world.

There were three major agreements concerning the Middle East made during the war. The first, often called the Istanbul Agreement because it purported to settle the question of who should control the Ottoman capital, was concluded by an exchange of notes among Russia, England, and France on March 18, 1915. The principal object of the agreement was to allow Russia to take Istanbul and both Straits, with sufficient land on both sides and islands at their mouths to assure full control of all navigation as well as defenses against outside threats. Russia also was promised eastern Thrace to the Enos–Midye line, which was to be the boundary of Bulgaria, and the Anatolian hinterland of the Bosporus and the Sakarya River to the Gulf of Izmit. Istanbul, however, was to remain as a free port for all the Entente members, with Russia agreeing to allow free commercial navigation through the Straits as well as the British and French spheres of influence in Anatolian Turkey. The Muslim Holy Places in Mecca and Medina and the rest of Arabia and the Arab world would be detached from the Ottoman Empire and placed under independent Arab rule. The division of Iran between Russia and Britain, as agreed on originally in 1907, would be continued. The neutral zone formerly maintained as a buffer between them would go to the latter, with the exception of Isfahan and the eastern sections near Afghanistan, to be taken over by Russia.

The Treaty of London (April 26, 1915) concluded by the Entente powers with Italy allowed the latter to secure full sovereignty over the Dodecanese Islands,
which it never had really evacuated. In addition all Ottoman rights in Libya were transferred to it along with a part of the Mediterranean coast of Anatolia, mainly the province of Adalya, in case Turkey in Asia was partitioned after the war.

Probably the best-known and most significant of the wartime secret agreements regarding the Middle East was that reached between Britain and France on May 16, 1916, as the result of a long series of negotiations carried on by Sir Mark Sykes and Georges Picot (and thus usually called the Sykes-Picot Agreement) to adjust their claims to the Asiatic portions of the Ottoman Empire. Britain also was negotiating with the Zionists and with Sherif Hussein of Mecca to secure their support against the Ottomans, promising the former a Zionist homeland in Palestine and the latter recognition of Arab national aspirations in return, and France wanted to make certain that its ambitions for rule in the Levant were not sacrificed in the process. By the terms of the agreement Britain was to secure southern Iraq, from Baghdad to the Persian Gulf, along with the ports of Haifa and Acre in Palestine. France in turn would get the coastal province of Syria, the province of Adana, and all of Cilicia. Palestine would be internationalized, while the remaining Arab territories between the British and French areas would be formed into an Arab state or confederation of Arab states. This area would also, however, be divided into spheres of influence, with France controlling the rest of Syria and northern Iraq, including Mosul, while Britain got the area stretching between Palestine and Iran. Russian acquiescence was secured with promises of compensation in much of eastern Anatolia, including Erzurum, Trabzon, Van, and Bitlis and a large part of northern Kurdistan, from Muş and Siirt to the Iranian border. The treaty was kept secret because the provisions concerning the Arabs and Palestine contradicted the promises then being made to the Arab leaders. Italian agreement was later secured at St. Jean de Maurienne (April 17, 1917), where Italy's area around Adana was defined to include most of southwestern Anatolia, including the provinces of Izmir and Konya and the districts of Menteşe, Adalya, and İçel, along with a sphere of influence in western Anatolia to the Bosporus. This also had to be kept secret since Venizelos of Greece was being wooed at the same time with promises of Izmir and parts of southwestern Anatolia. The only part of the Sykes-Picot Agreement that was subsequently altered was that concerning Mosul, which in December 1918, after the British occupied it, was surrendered to England by France in return for a share in the Iraqi oil fields once they were developed.

The promises made by the British to the Arab leaders involved those of Arabia rather than Syria, since the latter had been suppressed by Cemal Paşa. There were two main Arab leaders in the peninsula, Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, who had reestablished Saudi-Wahhabi power in the Nejd in the early years of the century, and Sherif Hussein, who ruled the Holy Cities as an autonomous vassal of the sultan. The British agreement with Ibn Saud (December 26, 1915) was patterned on similar arrangements previously made with other Arab chiefs along the Persian Gulf. He was recognized as ruler of the Nejd and its environs; Britain would pay him a subsidy and defend him against outside attacks. In return he promised only to be friendly with Britain, to refrain from attacking other British-supported chiefs, and to keep other foreign powers out of his lands. It was thus a passive arrangement, not requiring him to attack the Ottomans, but, by keeping him from attacking Sherif Hussein, it did encourage the latter to more open action. The British agreement with the latter was concluded in negotiations with Sir Henry McMahon in Cairo early in 1916. By its terms Britain promised to support full
independence for almost the entire Arab world, from the 37th parallel to the Persian Gulf in the east, south to the Arabian Peninsula and the Red Sea, and west to the Mediterranean, but excluding coastal Syria west of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, Lebanon, and possibly Palestine, though the exact definition was left vague in regard to the latter. Britain would help the new Arab governments establish themselves in return for the right to be their principal foreign adviser and for a special position in the provinces of Baghdad and Basra. It would guarantee the Holy Places against attack and provide Sherif Huseyin with a subsidy and military assistance to help him organize what, in fact, became the Arab Revolt. Of course, these promises already had been violated by the Sykes-Picot Agreement and by similar wartime promises made to the Zionist leaders of England and America, incorporated into the Balfour Declaration, accepted by the British cabinet, and communicated to the Zionists on November 2, 1917, in which the British government stated that it would “view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people” and “use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.”

Beginnings of the Arab Revolt

In the meantime, with McMahon's promises in hand Sherif Huseyin proclaimed the Arab Revolt on June 5, 1916, soon following with a declaration of himself as “King of the Arab Countries,” though Allied objections, particularly on the part of France, subsequently caused him to modify this to no more than “King of the Hicaz.” The Ottoman army in Arabia was stationed in the Yemen, at the Holy Cities, and along the new Hicaz Railroad, which connected Medina with Damascus, and it assumed a mainly defensive role. Huseyin organized the bedouins under his control into a guerrilla army entrusted to the command of his son, Emir Faysal, with the advice of several British officers, including T. E. Lawrence, whose later claims to have inspired the movement seem somewhat exaggerated. The immediate effect of the revolt was to cut the Hicaz Railroad and overrun the Ottoman garrisons at Mecca and Cidda. All the other towns in the Hicaz soon were also under rebel control with the exception of Medina, which remained under siege, and the Yemen was entirely cut off. Another Arab force commanded by Emir Faysal was organized to move north to assist a British push from Egypt into Syria. But with the barren wastes of the Sinai Desert as well as a strong Ottoman army in Syria, now commanded by von Sanders and Mustafa Kemal, the British took their time. Though the Arab Revolt concentrated in the Arabian Peninsula disrupted the Ottoman position there, it had yet to make the significant overall contribution the British expected.

The Russian Occupation of Eastern Anatolia

Despite the victory at Kut ul-Amara, the Ottomans were unable to react more actively to the Arab Revolt or the expected British push from Egypt because they were diverted by a Russian campaign into eastern Anatolia. One force moved southward around Lake Van and toward Mus while another, in the north, advanced directly from Kars toward Erzurum, which it besieged and took (Feb-
ruary 16, 1916). The worst massacre of the war followed as over a million Muslim peasants and tribesmen were forced to flee, with thousands being cut down as they tried to follow the retreating Ottoman army toward Erzincan. Enver sent Ahmet Izzet Paşa, former minister of war, to organize a counteroffensive force near Erzincan with the help of men who had just arrived from their victory at Gallipoli. But his effort to retake Erzurum was frustrated by supply shortages, since many Turkish peasants in the area had been slaughtered or had fled, while most of the Armenians had been deported to Syria or had gone behind the Russian lines to avoid entrapment in the battle. The Russians went on to overwhelm Trabzon (April 18, 1916) and Erzincan (late July), cutting the Sivas–Erzurum road before they were slowed down by the arrival of winter. The Ottomans were more successful in the south, blocking the Russian push around Lake Van but at heavy cost, and the Russians were able to prepare for a general offensive toward Harput and Sivas as well as along the Black Sea coast as soon as spring came. Armenians throughout the world also were organizing and sending volunteer battalions to join the effort to cleanse eastern Anatolia of Turks so that an independent Armenian state could be established. But the Russians, while happy to use Armenian support, were no more anxious than were the Ottomans to see the lands of eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus formed into an independent state. Therefore, in the negotiations for the Russian annex to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, mention was made only about Russian acquisition of the northeast and that of France in Cilicia, with no mention at all about any obligation to give the Armenians autonomy or independence. Though eastern Anatolia was for a time under Russian occupation, the 1917 revolution in Russia freed the Ottomans to face new dangers confronting them in Iraq, Arabia, and Syria.

The Yıldırım Army

With the Russian offensive halted and the Arab Revolt still in the Hicaz, Iraq seemed to be the most pressing danger for the Porte during the winter of 1917. Enver at first tried to get the Germans to live up to their promises to send men and arms as well as money if Ottoman lands should be occupied or in danger, as was the case here. But when he received no definite reply, he decided to do what he could to organize a special strike force on his own, first to regain all Iraq and then to move against the British and Arabs in the west, giving it the name Thunderbolt (Yıldırım) to signify the intent of its structure and operations. Appointed to command the army were General von Falkenhayn and 65 German officers, who came with about 6000 selected German soldiers intended to weld it into a force with unlimited power and range. With Russia now convulsed in revolt, it was felt safe to reinforce the new army with selected regiments from eastern Anatolia as well as five divisions that had been fighting with the Germans in the west. By early 1917, the Yıldırım Army, now also known as the Seventh Army, had 14 divisions ready to go, and it was given several of the best Ottoman officers available, including Mustafa Kemal, who thus once again was in a key situation to demonstrate his abilities.

Resumption of the Syrian Campaign, 1917

The Yıldırım Army never got to Iraq, however. After a year of preparation the British expeditionary force in Egypt had finally begun its Syrian campaign, under
the command of Sir Archibald Murray (December 1916). The Ottoman defenses were weakened by conflicts of jurisdiction between the Yıldırım Army, sent to defend Gaza, and the regular Fourth Army of Syria, which remained under Cemal Paşa. The British were initially beaten back at Gaza with heavy losses (March 1917), leading to Murray's replacement by Sir Edmund Allenby. But the advance then proceeded methodically, with the invaders going slowly enough to build a railroad to keep them supplied while Faysal's Arab army moved through the interior east of the Jordan, taking Akaba (July 6) and harassing the Ottomans with raids and other forms of sabotage.

Once the summer heat had passed, the British offensive resumed in October against Ottoman defenses stretching across much of Palestine from Gaza on the Mediterranean to Bir us-Sebi, at the edge of the desert. After a major week-long battle (October 26–November 1) the latter fell to a combined British-Arab assault, and Acre followed after a three-day siege. The Allies moved ahead on a wide front against Ottoman resistance, taking Ramla and Jaffa in mid-November and moving ahead along the coast while Jerusalem held out against several massive assaults before finally surrendering on December 9. The Yıldırım Army was forced to move its headquarters back from Jerusalem to Nasiriye, and then after the latter's fall (December 27) into Syria, causing Cemal to leave his command and return to Istanbul. Syria's defense and administration were left entirely in von Falkenhayn's hands, while Mustafa Kemal, never very anxious to accept German orders, resigned his post and returned to Istanbul to see if he could get the government to make better arrangements for the following year's campaign.

Political Changes in Istanbul

Meanwhile, in the capital, Grand Vezir Sait Halim resented the manner in which his colleagues had pushed the empire into war, and, after several unsuccessful efforts to counteract the power gained by Enver, he resigned (February 3, 1917). Talat's appointment in his place brought the CUP triumvirate into power in name as well as fact. The new grand vezir remained also as minister of the interior to add to his political control of the situation. The Russian invasion of eastern Anatolia, compounded by drought and the conscription of cultivators, affected agricultural productivity and led to severe food shortages in Istanbul and other major cities. The typhus epidemic that had begun among the warring armies in eastern Anatolia soon also began to decimate the civilian population. Large tax increases, government repression of opposition, and the news of German losses on the western front also caused severe morale problems that the government no longer could counter by patriotic appeals. The entry of the United States into the war also had a severe effect (though the Ottoman Empire never declared war on it), which was not really counteracted when Emperor Wilhelm II made a state visit to Istanbul in September 1917 followed by a return visit to Germany of Crown Prince Yusuf Izzeddin Efendi. Despite the censorship and police control, more and more people began to question openly why the Porte had become involved in such a long-drawn-out and disastrous war, and no clear answer could be given. Only the Russian Revolution seemed to give cause for hope.

The Bolshevik Revolution and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

The revolution of 1917 did, indeed, offer hope for all the Central Powers. Soon after the Bolsheviks had taken control, they published the secret agreements to
partition the Ottoman Empire (November–December 1917), greatly embarrassing the Allies. Lloyd George attempted to nullify the effect by stating that Britain really did not wish to "deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace . . . homelands of the Turkish Race," while Woodrow Wilson stated in the twelfth of his Fourteen Points that "The Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty," but there were few in the empire who believed them in the light of the Russian disclosures. Only the Bolsheviks clearly renounced Russia’s rights under the agreements, declaring (December 5, 1917) that "the treaty for the partition of Turkey which was to deprive it of Armenia is null and void," though adding that "after cessation of military operations the Armenians will be guaranteed the right of free determination of their political destiny." |

Peace negotiations with the Central Powers went on at Brest-Litovsk after December 1917 despite the efforts of the Entente powers and some Soviet elements to keep Russia in the war to frustrate further German ambitions. The Ottoman representatives tried to regain the east Anatolian provinces in the process, with opposition coming more from Germany than Russia. Only Enver's strong protests at the last minute secured inclusion of a provision that in addition to the immediate evacuation of the provinces of eastern Anatolia and their return to Turkey, the districts of Ardahan, Kars, and Batum also would be cleared of Russian troops. Russia agreed also to abandon Iran and the Caucasus as well as Poland, Lithuania, the Ukraine, Finland, and the Baltic provinces and to demobilize the Armenian bands found in Russia as well as the occupied Turkish provinces. Enver got German agreement allowing him a free hand in the Caucasus and northwestern Iran, thus securing an opportunity to fulfill his Pan-Turkic ambitions in these areas.

**Competition in the Transcaucasus**

It was one thing for the Ottomans to reclaim their eastern provinces by treaty—it was another to actually occupy them. Enver hoped to replace the lost Arab provinces with a Turkish empire that would extend through the Caucasus into the Crimea and Central Asia. But the native national groups in the Caucasus, the Georgians, Azerbaijani Turks, and Armenians, had formed their own independent Transcaucasian Republic at Tiflis, with its own government and army (December 1917). And the British and Germans had their own ambitions to control the oil of Baku as well as the manganese and other ores of Georgia.

Following the revolution a truce was signed between the Republic and the Ottoman Empire at Erzincan (December 18, 1917), but the Armenian national units began a general massacre of the remaining Turkish cultivators in the southern Caucasus and eastern Anatolia, leaving over 600,000 refugees out of a former population of 2,295,705 Turks in the provinces of Erzurum, Erzincan, Trabzon, Van, and Bitlis before the war. With the truce clearly violated, Enver responded with a general offensive. The Third Army forces around Diyarbekir and Muş commanded by Ali Ihsan Saip and those at Erzincan led by Kâzım Karabekir soon emerged as the early leaders of the Turkish War for Independence. On February 14 Kâzım took Erzincan, forcing the thousands of Armenian refugees who had gathered there to follow their army back into the Caucasus. Kâzım now became commander in charge of further operations to free the Muslims of the Caucasus just as the news came of Brest-Litovsk, and he went on to occupy Kars, Ardahan, and Batum as the Russians retired. When the Armenians at Erzurum
refused to surrender, he took it by storm (March 12), thus breaking the Armenian
hold in the north and forcing those concentrated at Van in the south to retreat
without further resistance.

Peace negotiations with the Transcaucasian Republic began at Trabzon. Enver
offered to surrender all ambitions in the Caucasus in return for recognition of the
Ottoman reacquisition of the east Anatolian provinces at Brest-Litovsk. The Ar-
menians pressured the Republic to refuse, however, so that hostilities resumed
and the Ottoman troops overran new lands to the east as the Russians retired.
Thousands of Armenians who had retired behind the battle lines expecting a victory
which would enable them to settle in new homes in eastern Anatolia now were
forced to flee into Armenia proper. Erivan became so crowded that “anarchy,
famine and epidemic” were the result. A new peace conference opened at
Batum (May 11), with the Ottomans extending their demands beyond the Brest-
Litovsk provisions to include a number of districts around Tiflis as well as Alex-
andropol and Echmiadzin, through which a railroad could be built to connect Kars
and Julfa with Baku, key to Central Asia. In addition, Enver insisted that Otto-
man merchants gain free right of passage through the Caucasus and that the
Transcaucasian Republic reduce its armed forces to prevent future Armenian
threats to Anatolia. The Armenian and Georgian members of the Republic’s
delegation began to stall, however, and so the Ottoman army moved ahead once
again into areas of Russian Armenia that had not been under the sultan’s control
since the seventeenth century. Hundreds of pleas for help against persecution on
the part of their Turkish inhabitants provided Enver with more than enough pre-
text. But the Germans, of course, also were interested in taking over the area.
So in response to Armenian appeals channeled through German missionaries, they
pressured Enver to keep his forces in eastern Anatolia against the possibility of
British advances in Iraq and Syria. They even tried to get the Ottomans out of
Batum, which as the terminus of the oil pipeline from Baku could become a center
for the shipment of raw materials from Central Asia to the factories of Germany.

In the end, with German encouragement, the Georgians broke up the Trans-
caucasian Republic, forming their own independent state under German guar-
antees (May 26, 1918), with the Armenians and Turkish Azerbaijani's following
suit soon afterward. Germany also agreed with Russia (August 27, 1918) to keep
the Ottomans away from Georgia and Baku in return for Russian promises to send
some of the latter’s oil to fuel the kaiser’s warships. It was at this point, however,
that a British force came from Iran under the command of Major General L. C.
Dunsterville (called “Dunsterforce”) to keep the Caucasus out of German and
Ottoman hands, reaching Baku in mid-August. Here the Russian Social Revolu-
tionaries and Armenian Dashnaks had combined to drive the Bolsheviks out and
establish their own regime, so the situation was quite fluid. Talat in the meantime
succumbed to German pressure and signed an agreement (September 23) promis-
ing Ottoman withdrawal from the Caucasus and pressure to get the nascent Azer-
baijani Republic to favor German economic and political interests. With Dunsterv-
ille in Baku, however, the Germans had to abandon their opposition to an Otto-
man advance. Enver sent a new push through the Caucasus that took Derbend
(September 10), cutting Baku off from the north. Dunsterville was forced to sail
away, much to the unhappiness of the local Russians and Armenians, who were
forced to flee to Erivan as the Ottomans occupied the city and made it into the
new capital of the Azerbaijani Republic. In protest the Bolsheviks repudiated the
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Ottomans, but this was of little consequence,
since by now they had no force to back up their claims.
Collapse of the Ottoman Empire, 1918

Enver's victories in the Caucasus were, however, gained at the expense of the other fronts. Even as his forces were advancing to the Caspian, the British were moving into the heartland of the empire from the south. Mehmet V Reşat died on June 28, 1918, and was replaced quietly by Abdulmecit's eldest son, Mehmet VI Vahideddin, who became even more of a puppet of the CUP than his brother had been. The capital was filled with starving refugees. There were massive food shortages and the inevitable typhus, and a new Allied blockade of the Dardanelles further increased these problems.

Almost as if on signal, the Allies began mopping up on all fronts. In Iraq the British occupation of the north continued, now in conjunction with their forces from Iran. Kerkuk fell on May 6 and the remaining Ottoman defenders were routed 40 kilometers to the north at Altun Köprü. A second force went up the Tigris, routed a series of Ottoman ambush efforts, and finally occupied Mosul soon after the armistice. In Syria the Ottoman resistance was stronger, with the army commanded by von Sanders, joined again by Mustafa Kemal, at least holding together as Allenby pushed it farther northward. The fall of Nablus and breaking of the Şeria River line (September 20, 1918) broke the organized Ottoman defenses, with Haifa and Acre both succumbing to the invaders on September 23. The Arab nationalists in Damascus openly revolted against its Ottoman garrison; thus it was evacuated (October 1), Aleppo and Homs fell without resistance a few days later. The French fleet soon occupied Beirut (October 6), and Tripoli and Alexandretta followed (October 14) as the Ottomans began to retire quickly into Anatolia toward Adana to make a new stand on home territory.

The Armistice of Mondros

There was, however, to be no further resistance. As Talat returned from Berlin, he saw the beginning of the end of the Bulgarian army, which led to its acceptance of the Allied surrender terms on October 2. With the direct Ottoman connection with Germany thus severed, the fate of the Ottoman empire was sealed. Within the Allied camp the British gained the right to send their forces from Salonica through Thrace to Istanbul, with their Allies gaining only token representation. This gave Britain control of Istanbul and the Straits on land and sea, enabling them to impose the final armistice terms on the Ottomans without consulting the other Allies to assure their control of the Ottoman capital as soon as the armistice was put into effect.

Talat initially joined the German efforts to make armistice overtures through President Wilson (October 5), relying on his Fourteen Points to save the empire from the kind of retribution advocated by the other Entente countries. Armistice overtures also went through other channels and were finally referred to the commander of the British Mediterranean squadron that had been blockading the Dardanelles, Admiral Calthorpe, who went to Mondros on October 11 to make final arrangements. Talat and the CUP cabinet already had resigned on October 8, but no one could be found to assume responsibility for a week until Ahmet Izzet Paşa, former commander in the east, finally accepted the grand vezirate. For the purpose of concluding peace he formed a new cabinet (October 14), which included several CUP members (in particular Cavt Paşa as minister of finance), though the triumvirate stood aside and soon afterward fled. The British delayed the final meeting at Mondros for two weeks to enable their forces to occupy Mosul
The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975

and Aleppo and make sure that they, rather than the French, would dominate Istanbul and the Straits. The Ottoman delegation, now headed by the new minister of war, Hüseyin Rauf Orbay, was finally brought to Mondros only on October 27, and four days later the armistice agreement was concluded.

The Armistice of Mondros, signed ten days before the fighting stopped on the western front, provided for a total and unconditional surrender, a considerably harsher arrangement than that imposed on the Christian members of the Central Powers. The Straits were to be opened at once, their forts surrendered to Allied crews, and passage facilitated for Allied warships sailing into the Black Sea for action against the Bolsheviks in southern Russia. All mines were to be removed or their locations communicated to the Allied commanders. Allied prisoners, and all Armenians held in Ottoman prisons, no matter what their crimes, were to be freed immediately. Ottoman forces were to be demobilized and surrendered except where their presence was temporarily needed to keep order. Ottoman warships were to surrender, and all ports were to be opened to Allied ships. The Allies were to be allowed to take over important forts, railroads, telephone and telegraph facilities, harbors, quays, and the tunnels leading through the Taurus in Cilicia. Ottoman forces still operating in the east were to surrender to the nearest Allied troops. The Ottomans were to supply the occupation forces, without charge, with coal, food, and whatever other supplies they needed. German and Austrian military and civilian officials in the empire were to be turned over to the Allies and communications with the Central Powers cut. The Allies were put in charge of all food supplies for the empire's civilian population. Finally, "in case of disorder in the six Armenian provinces, the Allies reserve for themselves the right to occupy any part of them," with Sis, Haçin, Zeytin, and Ayintap to come under immediate occupation.¹⁷²

The armistice terms went into effect on October 31, 1918. Ottoman troops began laying down their arms, and the Allies prepared to occupy Istanbul and the other major cities. The Ottoman Empire thus was placed in the hands of the Entente Allies, led by Britain, who at long last were in position to do with it as they wished. The six eastern provinces already were being called Armenia. The Greeks came to Istanbul in the guise of victors in consequence of Venizelos' last-minute entry on the Allied side, and they were not very far behind in pressing their case. Vengeance was, indeed, for the victors.

The Allied Occupation

Ottoman compliance with the truce provisions went very quickly. Liman von Sanders turned his Syrian command over to Mustafa Kemal and returned to Istanbul. After the Yıldırım Army reached Adana and surrendered to the Allies, the latter also went back to the capital (November 13). Allenby's forces immediately spread out to occupy their share, and the French landed to take up the areas allotted to them in Cilicia, including Mersin, Tarsus, Adana, and all the Taurus tunnels.¹⁷³ The British took those parts of Mosul originally assigned to the French in the Sykes-Picot Agreement and surrendered later in return for oil concessions.¹⁷⁴ In the east it soon became apparent that the Allies were preparing to give the Armenians not only the six provinces specified at Mondros but also the three districts of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, which had even smaller Armenian populations and had been returned to the empire by Russia only recently.¹⁷⁵ The British intentions seemed all too clear when, during February, Armenian officials assumed most civilian positions in the occupied eastern provinces.
In north-central Anatolia, efforts unfolded to establish a Greek state in the ancient Pontus region, encompassing the districts of Samsun, Amasya, and Sivas. A secret Greek society looking for such a state had been established in Merzifon in 1904, and it had developed into a widespread movement, giving the Greek government a golden opportunity to press its claims. On March 9, 1919, British forces landed at Samsun and went on to occupy Merzifon, leading Greek bands to revolt openly and to slaughter their Muslim neighbors in the hope of founding the new state. Order was partly restored, but with great difficulty, by the Ottoman police helped with some reluctance by the British.178

In the southwest the Allied occupation was a joint affair because of the conflicting claims for territory by the Italians by virtue of the wartime agreements, and the Greeks, who now sought to change the settlement to fulfill their old dream of restoring the Byzantine Empire. The Allied fleet that occupied Izmir (November 7) was commanded by a British officer, but it included ships and men sent by France as well as the disputing parties. The command of individual districts as well as the blockade still enforced against Anatolia was alternated among the different nationalities. Elsewhere in the southwest the Italians occupied Marmaris, Antalya, and Burdur to take the positions promised them in the treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne (January–April 1919) and tried also to establish a claim on Konya, though this was prevented by a British detachment that had earlier occupied the town.177

Finally, the greatest prize of all was Istanbul and the Straits, which after the withdrawal of the Russian claims had been without formal claimants until the British assured their own control preceding and following the armistice agreement. On November 13 a large Allied fleet sailed through the Straits and landed at Istanbul. The city was formally placed under Allied occupation, with military control mainly in the hands of British troops. Overall political and administrative control was given to Admiral Calthorpe as Allied high commissioner, governing with the help of a three-man High Commission, with British, Italian, and French members. The shores of the Bosporus were originally occupied solely by the British, but on November 15 the European side was turned over to French forces.178 Allied authority in the Ottoman government was assured by appointing commissioners to supervise the ministries to make sure that the civilian authorities would do whatever the high commissioner wanted.179

The Allied forces entered the Ottoman Empire with an unshakeable belief in the truth of their own propaganda, that the Turks had slaughtered millions of Christians for no reason whatsoever, forfeiting their right to rule even themselves and demonstrating once again the essential superiority of Western civilization over that of Islam. Admiral Calthorpe himself stated that “it has been our consistent attitude to show no kind of favour whatsoever to any Turk . . .” and “All interchange of hospitality and comity has been rigorously forbidden. . . .”180 That the minorities intended to use the Allied occupation for their own benefit was demonstrated time and again as the occupying troops marched into the major cities and were welcomed by throngs of Greeks and Armenians waving Allied flags and kissing and hugging their deliverers. The feeling was reciprocated by the Allies in hundreds of incidents. Turks and other Muslims were replaced by Christians in most of the local governments as well as in the railroads and other public utilities. Muslims were discriminated against in public places. When the state schools were reopened, only Christians were allowed to attend, while Muslim children had to remain in the streets. Perhaps most cruel of all, Christian missionaries were put in charge of the major orphanages and they often used their positions to identify as
Christian thousands of Turkish youths who had lost their families during the war, applying the general rule that the children were Armenian or Greek unless they could prove the contrary, a difficult task indeed in a land where records had been destroyed and entire families scattered.\textsuperscript{181} In many of the occupation areas, especially in eastern Thrace, southwestern Anatolia, Cilicia, and the eastern provinces, the entire machinery of local governments, and in particular the local police forces, were turned over to the minorities in preparation for the final partition of the country. The latter in turn massacred large numbers of recently discharged Ottoman soldiers as well as thousands of civilians without any visible effort by the Allied forces to interfere. Only the Italians in the south made some efforts to control the minorities and protect the Muslim population.\textsuperscript{182}

**The Peace Conferences**

As the Paris Peace Conference began to meet in January 1919, various plans were put forward to partition what was left of the Ottoman Empire, with only conflicts of interest among the victors rather than consideration of the national rights of the defeated delaying a settlement. The main differences between the British and French delegates came not so much over the Turkish area but, rather, over the Arab lands, with the former, now urged on by T. E. Lawrence, desiring to satisfy the Arab national claims mostly at the expense of the Syrian areas originally assigned to France, and the latter insisting on its share so as to retain its traditional position in the Levant. Emir Faysal came to the peace conference as the principal Arab representative, insisting on full recognition of Arab national rights and fulfillment of the wartime promises to the Arabs. When he visited England and France before coming to the conference, he learned of French resistance and, to get British support, signed an agreement with the Zionists (January 3, 1919) by which he welcomed Jewish immigration to Palestine and the establishment of the Jewish national home envisioned in the Balfour Declaration, but only in an Arab state made fully independent. Zionist representatives came to Paris to gain international recognition of the Balfour Declaration by including it in the peace treaties and also to prevent the establishment of an Arab state in Palestine, preferring instead British control, under which they felt they could develop the kind of home they had envisaged.

Greece had entered the war only at the last minute, and in return for Allied promises, which had been limited due to Italian interests in southeastern Anatolia and those of Britain in Istanbul. Now, however, the brilliant Greek Prime Minister Venizelos came to Paris with a claim to occupy Izmir and much of southeastern Anatolia because of a long historical link between the eastern and western shores of the Aegean and the possibility of their joint economic development as well. Britain supported the Greek claim because of the strong anti-Muslim sentiment at home, fully shared by Prime Minister David Lloyd George, and also a desire to have a friendly state in control of the Aegean to counter any possible future Russian move. The Armenians demanded full independence for their own state, which would stretch from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean as a reward for their "long centuries of suffering" as well as their contributions to the Allies, mainly in the service of the Russians.\textsuperscript{188} Despite the exaggerations of these claims, the Armenians were able to gain British support, again in the hope of maintaining a friendly vassal state in eastern Anatolia to fulfill its longstanding hope of establishing a permanent rampart against Russian expansion to the Mediterranean from
that direction. Early support received from France in this matter, however, soon turned to hostility when the claims were extended to include the French-occupied areas of Cilicia. The Arab delegations also had the same lands in mind for their independent state. The Kurds, Georgians, and Azerbaijanis disputed other parts of the Armenian claims along with the Turks, who had substantial majorities of the population in the entire area. Iran demanded the Caucasus regions lost to Russia during the nineteenth century, including Armenia and much of the Kurdish area in the southeast. The Republic of Azerbaijan sought the southern districts of Tiflis and Erivan as well as Baku and even Batum and Kars. While the debates went on, the Armenian delegations strove to get Allied support for a plan to forbid the return of any Turks or Kurds to eastern Anatolia and to replace them with Armenian refugees so as to create an Armenian majority. While continuing to express sympathy publicly, Britain and its Allies in fact largely dropped their interest in satisfying these extensive ambitions.

At this point the position of the United States became crucial. It had not been involved in the wartime treaties and was not bound by them, as President Wilson made very clear in his Fourteen Points. His insistence on self-determination conflicted with all the claims being made at the peace conference, with the exception only of those of the Arabs and the Turks. The Armenians in the United States therefore mounted a large-scale campaign to force the President to abandon his principles and support their cause at the conference. Lloyd George began to develop the idea of replacing whatever obligation Britain had to help the Armenians by getting the United States to assume a mandate over the disputed provinces or all of Anatolia, officially proposing it in mid-May just as the Council of Ten decided on a mandate system for the Arab provinces of the empire. In response, Wilson sent two investigative commissions to the Middle East, one to Syria under the leadership of Henry C. King, president of Oberlin College, and Charles Crane, founder of a leading plumbing and toilet manufacturing company, and the other to Anatolia under Major General James G. Harbord. The King-Crane Commission toured Syria and Palestine in July and August 1919, concluding that almost all the Arab inhabitants wanted an independent and united Arab state, including the Lebanon, but that if full independence could not be achieved, they preferred a mandate controlled by the United States or Great Britain, with very strong opposition to France except from a few pro-French groups in the Lebanon. All expressed strong opposition to the establishment of a Jewish home of any kind in their midst. The delegations from Iraq demanded only independence, expressing no mandatory preference. The commission therefore recommended an American mandate over Syria, or otherwise that of Britain, which also would establish mandatory rule over Iraq while both would be constitutional Arab kingdoms. It opposed establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, recommending instead that it become part of a united Syrian state, with the Holy Places being internationalized. The Harbord Commission toured Anatolia in the same summer. Its report, issued in October 1919, found that most of the existing population was, indeed, Turkish and recommended that in view of the minority claims a single mandate be established over the entire area, including the Caucasus, to provide political and economic unity and facilitate whatever settlement might be agreed on. Wilson, however, was in no position to get the United States into the League of Nations, let alone to assume such a burden, and thus this plan was dropped.

Most of the final treaties dealing with former Ottoman territory were signed in 1919 and early in 1920. The Treaty of Saint-Germain (July 16, 1920) provided...
for a breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the surrender of its remaining Slavic areas to the new Confederation of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, soon to grow into the kingdom of Yugoslavia. Bulgaria was broken up by the Treaty of Neuilly (November 27). Its western districts went to Yugoslavia while those in the Rhodope Mountains and its stretch of Aegean coastline were transferred to Greece. Bulgaria was partly compensated with Ottoman territory north of Edirne, and it was allowed to maintain a merchant fleet in the Black Sea with free access to the Mediterranean through the Straits. By the Treaty of Trianon (June 4, 1920) Hungary had to cede Transylvania and most of the Banat to Rumania. The Arab portions of the Ottoman Empire were dealt with by a conference held at San Remo, where agreements were reached on assignment of the mandates, with only partial consideration of local Arab desires. Syria went as promised to France, while Britain got its territories in Palestine and Iraq. The mandates were to be only temporary and were to provide the natives with training that would enable them ultimately to achieve full independence. The Balfour Declaration was incorporated into Britain's mandate for Palestine, thus satisfying the Zionist aspirations. France's share in the Mosul oil operations was confirmed, and it was given the right to construct a pipeline across Iraq and Syria to Alexandretta so that it could ship its oil to Europe. Thus was laid the basis for the violence and disturbances that plagued the Arab world until it achieved full independence after World War II. The final treaty with the Ottoman Empire was, however, delayed due to the disputes among the Allies and the seemingly irreconcilable differences among the minority groups. It finally was to be signed only in August 1920 at Sèvres, but in the meantime events in Anatolia deprived it of any practical value.

The Turkish Reaction

The events of the Allied occupation and of the settlement developed in Paris evoked a wide range of reactions within Ottoman government and society. Many Ottomans felt that the only solution was to cooperate with the Allies, especially the British, as the only hope for some kind of compromise to save something for the Turks. This group included Sultan Vahideddin and the Istanbul government, which was led principally by Grand Vezir Tevfik Paşa (November 11, 1918–March 3, 1919, October 21, 1920–November 4, 1922), the sultan's son-in-law Damat Ferit Paşa (March 4, 1919–October 1, 1919, April 5–October 17, 1920), Ali Rıza Paşa (October 2, 1919–March 3, 1920), and Salih Hulusi Paşa (March 8–April 2, 1920), who cooperated fully with the occupation authorities, imprisoning all those cited for crimes, justly or unjustly, by the high commissioners and their subordinates. Talat, Cemal, and Enver fled on a German freighter (November 2), the CUP was disbanded, and its property confiscated. In its place the Liberal Union Party (Hürrriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası) was revived under Damat Ferit's leadership, and its politicians were happy to gain revenge against the CUP at long last. Declaring that it had been the CUP that had been defeated, not the Turkish nation, it concluded that it was the only party with a wide enough base to rebuild the nation and to govern. But soon its prewar divisions between conservatives and moderates surfaced once again. When the former managed to gain control, the latter, including most of the nationalists, began to look toward the new national movement which, as we shall see, was just beginning to build in Anatolia.186

In the meantime, the surviving members of the CUP joined several new political groups. Its parliamentary members formed the Regeneration Party (Teceddüt
Firkası), which espoused a secularist and national policy. This group included several men who later were to rise as leading nationalist figures, the journalist Yunus Nadi, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, later foreign minister, and the historian Şemsettin Günlütay, prime minister in 1949–1950. Though it disavowed any direct connection with the CUP, it attempted to take over many of the latter’s local branches as it expanded into Anatolia, in the process putting its leaders in a position to pursue the nationalist cause as soon as their movement in Istanbul was suppressed.187

Another CUP offshoot was the Ottoman Freedom-Loving People’s Party (Osmanlı Hürriyetperver Avam Firkası), which developed its own liberal social and economic policies while emphasizing both popular sovereignty and continuation of the sultanate, more or less the kind of constitutional sultanate that had been attempted before the war. It tried to unite all the Ottoman political groups in the face of the foreign occupation, but the demand of many that all active CUP members be purged from its ranks and lack of cooperation among the different elements led to its collapse.188

Another attempt to secure political unification came from the National Congress (Milli Kongre), organized by a group led by Abdurrahman Şeref Bey, last court historian, and Dr. Esat, an Istanbul optometrist who had been chairman of the National Education Society (Milli Talim ve Terbiye Cemiyeti), which had tried to spread the ideals of Turkish nationalism to the masses during the later Young Turk period. Not a party as such, the National Congress held a series of meetings of delegates from all the major political groups in the capital, trying to reconcile their views, act as a spokesman for the defeated Turks, and mobilize popular opposition to the impending peace settlement. Though the movement failed, it did perform an important function by focusing Turkish public opinion on the immediate problem of enemy occupation and built support for the nationalist movement that eventually rose in Anatolia.189

In the face of the CUP revival and the proliferation of political groups opposing the peace settlement and Allied occupation, the sultan finally dissolved the Parliament (December 21, 1918) to deprive them of a forum and enable the government to rule by decree without the need of popular consultation.190

It should be recalled that while the CUP had become enmeshed in the military and nationalist aspirations of Enver and his associates, it had risen as a liberal party and had pushed through a number of basic economic and social reforms during the war. These now were systematically disbanded, as the government’s alliance with the occupiers became a cover for reaction. Taxes bearing most heavily on the poor were doubled, trebled, and then doubled again to provide the government with needed funds while the rich remained largely untouched. Strict censorship was imposed to curb reactions to government policies as well as those of the occupiers.191 The army and navy patriotic organizations were dissolved and their assets transferred to the Ministry of War.192 The new Family Law was abolished,193 and the ulema restored to power. Control of the religious schools and courts was transferred back to the şeyhülislam.194 The Istanbul University was reorganized to curb student “troublemakers.”195 The religious courts were given their original functions and procedures and the secular courts curbed.196 The Societies Law was strengthened to control all those who opposed the regime.197 The Financial Reform Commission was abolished,198 and the Allied desire to punish Young Turks for the so-called crimes of the former regime was satisfied with the arrest not only of people like former Grand Vezir Sait Halim but also the cream of Ottoman intellectual life, men such as Ziya Gökalp, Fuat Köprülü,
and Hüseyin Cahit, who were declared to be implicated in the “massacres” and sent off to detention in Malta early in 1920.

The government was supported by a number of political groups united mainly by their opposition to the CUP and desire to do the best they could under the occupation, of which the most important were the Ottoman Peace and Welfare Party (Sulh ve Selâmet-i Osmaniye Fırkası), established in 1919 by the former Amasya deputy İbrahim Hakkı Paşa and many ulema, and the Friends of England Association (İngiliz Muhibler Cemiyeti). There were others who felt that cooperation with the Allies was a necessary evil only and that the Ottomans had to rely on enforcement of the Wilsonian principles to survive. Loyal to the old CUP social and economic programs, they formed several groups, including the General Welfare Committee (Selamet-i Amme Heyeti), the Wilsonian Principles Society, which included a number of liberal Ottoman writers among whom was Halide Edip, who through some previous work at Robert College was closer to the British than most of her colleagues and who therefore escaped deportation; also Refik Halit (Koray), Celal Nuri, Hüseyin Avni, Yunus Nadi, and Ahmet Emin Yalman; and the National Unity Party (Vahdet-i Milliye Heyeti), founded and led by the old Young Turk leader Ahmet Rıza. Members of these groups approached the Allied officers, explained the Turkish case, and generally tried to secure the same rights of self-determination that were being granted to the non-Turkish peoples of the former empire. But faced with the hostility of the government to their liberal political ideas and of the occupiers to their Muslim heritage, they soon had to join the more radical groups demanding action to save the Turks from their oppressors.

Notes to Chapter 4

1 Edib, Memoirs, p. 258.
2 Edib, Memoirs, p. 260.
3 Dütür², I, 9-14.
5 Sabah, August 16, 1908; Ahmad, pp. 21-23; Kâmil Paşa, pp. 241-253.
6 Dütür², I, 1-105.
7 Tunaya, pp. 171-181, 206-210, 239-254.
9 Danişmend, IV, 368-369; Ahmad, pp. 24-28; Tunaya, p. 165 n. 4; Bayur, Kâmil Paşa, p. 296.
10 TV, December 18, 1908; tr. Ahmad, p. 29.
11 Dütür², I, 105-108.
12 Bayar, I, 167-171; Farhi, pp. 275-316; Celal Nuri, İttihat-i İslam, Istanbul, 1918.
13 Tunaya, pp. 254-261.
15 Tunaya, pp. 261-275; Bayar, I, 167-171.
16 Tunaya, pp. 271-72; Farhi, p. 283.
17 Bayar, I, 291-293, 297-298.
18 Farhi, pp. 286-288.
19 Bayar, I, 141-166, 184-214.
20 Bayar, I, 267-288, 297-299.
21 TV, April 28, 1909; Dütür², I, 166-167.
22 The events of the counterrevolution are found in Sina Akşin, 31 Mart Olayları, İstanbul, 1972; Ahmet Refik, İnkılab-ı Azim, İstanbul, 1324/1908-1909; Ali Cevat-Faik Reşit Unat, İkinci Meşrûtiyetin İlâmi ve Otuzbir Mart Hâdisesi, Ankara, 1960; Tarık
The Young Turk Period, 1908–1918

23 Tunaya, pp. 206–212.
27 Bayar, II, 449–454; Tunaya, pp. 315–344.
29 Ahmed, p. 69n.
31 Düüsür², vols. I, II, III.
32 Düüsür², I, 357–363.
33 Düüsür², I, 383–385.
34 Düüsür², I, 624–629.
35 Düüsür², I, 749–751.
36 Düüsür², I, 752.
37 Düüsür², II, 300–311.
38 Düüsür², I, 169–174; Bayar, I, 306; Lewis, p. 213.
39 Düüsür², I, 327–329.
40 Düüsür², I, 604–608.
41 Düüsür², I, 395.
42 Düüsür², I, 404–406.
43 Düüsür², III, 410–416.
44 Düüsür², III, 467–479.
45 Düüsür², II, 33–37.
46 Düüsür², I, 665–666.
47 Düüsür², I, 658–663.
48 Düüsür², II, 189–190.
49 Düüsür², II, 89, III, 643.
50 Düüsür², I, 240, 637.
51 Düüsür², III, 30.
52 Düüsür², II, 22.
53 Düüsür², I, 790, II, 77, III, 395.
54 Düüsür², I, 268.
55 Düüsür², I, 281.
56 Düüsür², I, 322.
57 Düüsür², III, 73.
58 Düüsür², I, 634, 666.
59 Düüsür², I, 742.
60 Düüsür², II, 171.
61 Bayur, Türk İnkılabı Tarihi, II/4, pp. 400–404.
64 Bayar, II, 488–496, 654–659.
66 Tunaya, pp. 186–188.
67 Tunaya, p. 187; Lewis, p. 216.
68 Bayar, II, 508–515.
69 Bayar, II, 457–474.
70 Bayar, II, 474–482.
71 Ahmad, p. 106; Bayar, II, 482–483; Lewis, pp. 217–218.
72 Tunaya, pp. 345–358.
75 Bayar, II, 558–569.
76 Düştür², VII, 4–7; TV 119, 23 Şaban 1330.
77 Stavrianos, pp. 532–533; Miller, pp. 500–501; Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi, VI, 3485–3487.
78 Skendi, pp. 434–438; Bayar, III, 781–784.
79 Düştür², VII, 8–14; Bayar, II, 648–653.
80 Bayar, III, 796–802.
81 Bayar, III, 846–879; Miller, pp. 501–504; Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi, VI, 3492–3497.
83 Bayar, III, 986–993.
84 Bayar, III, 914–932; Ahmad, pp. 114–115.
85 January 17, 1913; Bayar, III, 954–970.
86 Ahmad, pp. 116–119.
87 Ali Fuat Türkü geldi, Görüp İşittiklerim, pp. 87–88; Bayar, IV, 1069–1103.
88 Bayar, IV, 1107–1112.
89 Bayar, IV, 1115–1117.
90 Bayar, IV, 1200–1202; Ahmad, pp. 123–124.
91 Ahmad, pp. 126–129.
92 Ahmad, pp. 130–131; Bayar, IV, 1202–1222; Stavrianos, p. 537.
93 Bayar, IV, 1238–1250; Ahmad, pp. 129–130; Türkü geldi, pp. 103–105; Cemal Paşa, Hâtrat, pp. 47–53.
94 Bayar, IV, 1250–1251.
95 Bayar, IV, 1312; Düştür², VII, 15–74.
99 Lewis, p. 222.
100 Bayar, II, 421–439; Tunaya, pp. 206–218.
102 Tunaya, pp. 261–275.
104 Berkes, pp. 341–343.
106 Düştür², V, 370, 514, 830, 843; VI, 73, 130, 167, 173, 220, 238, 513, 601, 820, 858, 1036, 1342, 1369, 1409.
107 Düştür², V, 665; VI, 578, 961.
108 Düştür², VI, 304.
109 Düştür², VI, 660.
110 Düştür², VI, 1369.
111 Düştür², V, 186–217.
112 Düştür², V, 217, 232, 660.
113 Düştür², V, 309, 385.
114 Düştür², V, 244; Lewis, p. 224.
115 Düştür², VI, 50–58.
117 Düştür², V, 352.
118 Düştür², VI, 146.
119 Düştür², VI, 207, 1027.
120 Düştür², VI, 207.
121 Düstur², VI, 1335.
122 Düstur², IX, 270-271.
123 Düstur², IX, 272-274.
124 Düstur², IX, 692-694.
125 Düstur², IX, 745-753.
126 Düstur², X, 505-508.
127 Düstur², X, 554-557.
128 Düstur², IX, 762-781; X, 52-57.
129 Berkes, pp. 390-391.
130 Düstur², VIII, 853-857.
131 Berkes, pp. 385-388; Lewis, pp. 224-225.
132 Düstur², IX, 99-104.
133 Düstur², IX, 185-186.
134 Berkes, pp. 421-426.
135 Liman von Sanders, Five Years in Turkey, Annapolis, Md., 1927; Carl Muhllmann, Deutschland und die Turkei, 1913-19, Berlin, 1929; Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918, Princeton, N.J., 1968.
136 Cemal Paşa, Hātrat, pp. 94-106.
139 Cemal Paşa, Hātrat, pp. 124-129; Bayur, III/1, pp. 194-274.
140 August 2, 1914; Düstur², VI, 1412.
141 Düstur², VI, 1022, 1023, 1025, 1026, 1030, 1036 and passim.
143 Trumpener, pp. 23-25.
144 Trumpener, pp. 29-31.
145 Trumpener, pp. 33-40.
146 Düstur², VI, 554.
147 Trumpener, p. 39.
148 Düstur², VI, 558.
149 Trumpener, pp. 46-47.
150 Trumpener, pp. 49-51.
151 Trumpener, pp. 55-57.
152 Düstur², VII, 125-127; Bayur, III/1, pp. 317-348.
153 Muhllmann, p. 326; Trumpener, p. 373.
155 Horizon, Tiflis, November 30, 1914, quoted by Hovannisian, Road to Independence, p. 45; FO 2485, 2484/46942, 22083.
157 Hovannisian, Road to Independence, pp. 47-48; FO 2146/70404, 2130/31341.
159 May 27, 1915; FO 371/9158, 4376/P.I.O. 206.
160 The Ottoman population figures are documented on pp. 239-245; the best account of the Armenian movements and claims can be found in Richard Hovannisian, “The Ebb and Flow of the Armenian Minority in the Arab Middle East,” Middle East Journal, 28 (1974), 20, and Republic of Armenia, I, 126; figures on the immigration from the Ottoman Empire to the United States are given in U.S. Department of Justice, 1975 Annual Report, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Washington, D.C., 1975, pp. 63-64.
The best general account of the deportations and the general situation among the Armenians in Anatolia is Bayur, II/3, pp. 18-100, III/3, pp. 35-59, reproducing many secret documents from the Ottoman cabinet meetings held during the war. Close examination of the same documents has revealed no major omissions or exaggerations on the part of Bayur and no evidence to support the charges of official complicity. See also BVA, Bab-i Ali Evrak Odası, dossiers no. 176908, 189354, 196578, 203987, and 148765, and FO 2130/11985, FO 2488/108070. The most reliable presentation of the Armenian case is in Hovannisian, *Road to Independence*, pp. 48-55. See also FO 371/4241/170751.

The most reliable presentation of the Armenian case is in Hovannisian, *Road to Independence*, p. 56; FO 2488, nos. 127223 and 58350.

BVA, Meclis-i Viikela mazbataları, debates of August 15-17, 1915; Bab-i Ali Evrak Odası, no. 175, 321, "Van Ihtilali ve Katl-i Am," 1 Zilkade 1333/10 September 1915.

Dustur*, XI, 1421-1423.

A full exposition of the American involvement is found in Harry N. Howard, *Turkey, the Straits, and U.S. Policy*, Baltimore and London, 1974, pp. 51-129.

Weiker, p. 43.

Düstür², XI, 72; Bayar, V, 1435-1458, 1544-1545.

Düstür², XI, 117-119.

Düstür², XI, 124, 183.

Düstür², XI, 299-300.

Düstür², XI, 351-352; XII, 69-70.
196 Düüstur², XII, 128–132.
197 Düüstur², XII, 280.
198 Düüstur², XII, 435.
200 Bayar, V, 1440–1443; VI, 1865–1890.
The Turks were the only one of the Central Powers able to overturn immediately the vindictive settlements imposed by the Allies following World War I. Because Turkish resistance ultimately was led to success by Mustafa Kemal, it long has been assumed that he created it as well. He did, indeed, do more than anyone else to create the Turkish Republic on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, but he accomplished this by bringing together elements of resistance that had already emerged. He coordinated their efforts, expressed their goals, personified their ambitions, and led them to victory.

The National Resistance Forces

Resistance appeared from the first days of the occupation while Mustafa Kemal still was in Cilicia. It came initially from within the Istanbul government itself, where many of the officials organized the secret Outpost Society (Karakol Cemiyeti) shortly after the armistice and used their positions to thwart the Allied demands as well as to send arms and ammunition to Anatolia. Small boats were loaded in the capital in the cover of darkness and sent out into the Aegean and the Black Sea to deliver their valuable cargoes.  

There is considerable evidence that Talat Paşa himself stimulated the first resistance movements in Thrace before fleeing the country and that resistance in Istanbul was organized within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When Mustafa Kemal, Kazım Karabekir, and other leading officers returned to Istanbul to protest the demobilization orders, they were warmly received by the sultan and others and appointed to important positions in the areas remaining under direct Ottoman authority, where they could lead opposition almost under the noses of the Allies. As the movement spread through the countryside, many Istanbul officials also did all they could to conceal it from the occupying authorities until it was too late.

Sympathetic members of the central government could have done nothing, however, without the active participation of the mass of the Turkish people. The old Middle Eastern tradition of self-help, of society organizing to govern and defend itself in the absence of effective government, again came to the fore. Organized resistance came first in the areas most seriously threatened by foreign or minority occupation, where Societies for the Defense of the Rights of Turks sprang up to defend local interests. At first they attempted to persuade the occupying authorities that their areas were in fact Turkish and that the imposition of foreign rule would violate their human rights. When such claims were ignored, they assumed local authority and organized their own resistance forces, which have come to be
known in Turkish history as the National Forces (Kuvayi Milliye). Ranging from roving guerrilla bands to regular volunteer militias attached to local political committees, the National Forces were highly heterogeneous, including not only soldiers but also civil servants, landowners, businessmen, artisans, religious leaders, peasants, nomads, bandits, members of the CUP as well as the other old political parties, women, and children—all united in reaction to the occupation and determined to be free.  

Strongly supporting the resistance movement in these early days was the Turkish Communist Party, organized first among Ottoman prisoners in Russian hands, some of whom came to the All-Russian Congress of International Prisoners of War held by the Bolsheviks in Moscow in April 1919, and later formed their own Congress of Turkish Radical Socialists in the same city on July 25 despite the protests of the Ottoman ambassador there at the time. Leader of the Turkish Communists was Mustafa Suphi, a Turkish intellectual who had fled to czarist Russia from the Young Turk police shortly before the war. Their activity in Turkey after the war was predicated principally in reaction to the Allied use of Istanbul and the Straits to send ships, men, and arms into southern Russia to support those opposing the Bolsheviks, though this was supplemented, of course, by a desire to use the chaos in Turkey to establish a Communist regime there. Late in 1919 the Bolsheviks established the Central Bureau of the Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East under the authority of the Communist International, with Mustafa Suphi publishing propaganda material in Turkish in a daily newspaper called Yeni Dünya (New World), printed for a time in the Crimea after it was evacuated by the French and then in Baku after May 1920. The Russians later claimed that thousands of Ottoman Communists joined the national struggle, but this does not seem to accord with the evidence, which indicates that, at best, there was in Anatolia a “small group of underground workers, former Turkish prisoners in Russia, which was not particularly large, but which worked very intensively.” By the end of 1920, Suphi’s Communist Party had only 200 members in Turkey, mainly in Istanbul, the coal-mining port of Zonguldak (on the Black Sea), Trabzon, and the Caucasus. The Bolsheviks, however, gave general propaganda support to the Turkish resistance movement in the hope that it would relieve them of at least some of the Allied pressure in the south.

Beginnings of the War for Independence

The resistance movement began to develop into a full War for Independence when one of Mustafa Kemal’s closest associates in the army, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, was sent to command the Twentieth Army corps in Ankara in March 1919 and began to send out agents to coordinate the national defense forces in the vicinity. On April 13 Kâzım Karabekir, hero of the previous conquests in the Caucasus, left Istanbul by boat to assume command of the Fifteenth Army corps at Erzurum, in charge also of the provinces of Van and Trabzon, with the full intention of inspiring resistance among the soldiers and populace of the area under his command. Soon after his arrival he announced that he would work to free Anatolia from enemy rule and also regain Kars, Ardahan, Batum, and the Turkish portions of the Caucasus. He took over a force that still had some 18,000 men, his first job being to secure the war matériel that the British were preparing to ship back to Istanbul. When he heard that the British had turned Kars over to the new Armenian Republic and that it was preparing a new force to invade Anatolia, he joined
the Society for the Defense of the Rights of the Eastern Provinces and vowed a struggle to the end to keep Anatolia Turkish.  

The next move came on May 5, 1919, when Mustafa Kemal, the greatest Ottoman military hero to emerge from the war, was appointed inspector general of the Ninth Army, encompassing much of eastern and north-central Anatolia from its center at Samsun, on the Black Sea. His instructions were to restore order and security, gather the arms and ammunition laid down by the Ottoman forces, and prevent organized resistance against the government, exactly what the Allies had been pressing the Istanbul government to do. To undertake this, however, he was given command not only over the army but also over all the civil servants in the area. With such extensive authority it appears fairly clear that he was intended to do much more than just gather arms. It has been suggested that the appointment simply was an accident; that the Allies and the government were anxious to get him out of Istanbul because of his vociferous opposition to the armistice and that this assignment was chosen because it was vacant at the time. Others suggest that his opponents arranged the assignment on the assumption that he would fail and his reputation would be ruined. In fact, however, it seems clear that he was sent because his superiors in the Ministry of War, and possibly the grand vezir and sultan, fully expected him to organize resistance. Whatever the reason, he was urged to leave Istanbul at once before the Allies knew either of his appointment or his instructions, and he did so.

The Greek Invasion

Mustafa Kemal’s assignment to Anatolia was followed almost immediately by the event that, more than any other, stimulated the Turkish War for Independence: the Greek invasion of Anatolia. With the United States and Italy opposing the British and French efforts at the peace conference to secure territory for Greece around Izmir, Venizelos sent an expeditionary force to take what he wanted, obtaining advance approval from Lloyd George and Clemenceau and also, at the last minute, from Wilson, who hoped that Italy’s imperial ambitions would thus be frustrated and that “self-determination” would result. Legal justification for the landings was found in article 7 of the Mondros Armistice, which allowed the Allies “to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies.” The National Resistance provided the pretext, and Venizelos needed little persuasion to use it. On May 14, 1919, an armada of British, American, and French warships brought an entire Greek division into the harbor of Izmir. The next day they landed amid a wild reception from the local Greek population, with church bells ringing, priests kissing the soldiers, and men and women falling to their knees before their “liberators.” The landing was followed by a general slaughter of the Turkish population. Greek mobs roamed the streets, looting and killing, with those Turks who escaped being arrested by the Allied authorities. In Paris the powers went on to agree on a Greek mandate for Izmir and its vicinity, and the Italian zone was pushed to the south. The Istanbul government protested, but to no avail. The Greek army began moving into Anatolia, ravaging and raping as it went, with the local Greek population taking the opportunity to join in the massacre. By the end of July the Greeks had overcome the local Turkish defense forces and gained control of the greater and lesser Menderes valleys, a far more extensive advance than the Allies originally had intended. At this point the offensive was halted, partly at the insistence of the Allies but
also because of the need to consolidate the unexpected conquests before a new offensive was launched.14

First Phase of the War for Independence, May 1919–March 1920

The War for Turkish Independence went through several distinct phases. The first began with Kemal's arrival at Samsun on May 19, 1919, and went on for about a year. During this period, his primary concern was to use his position as inspector general as well as his own prestige to secure general acceptance of his leadership. Soon after his arrival he was told stories of terrible Greek atrocities, not only in the southwest but also around Trabzon, where advocates of a Pontus Greek state had anticipated the arrival of the Greek army by instituting massacres of their own to remove the Turkish population.15 Kemal, however, still was only an inspector. The national groups in the area had their own commanders, and they certainly did not recognize his authority. If anyone, it was to Kâzım Karabekir in Erzurum or to Ali Fuat Cebesoy in Ankara that they looked for leadership. But with the self-assurance that had made him such a great commander at Gallipoli and in Syria and such a difficult subordinate for both the Young Turks and the Germans, he soon began to act as if he was, indeed, the leader who would bring the Turks out of their darkest hour. By the end of May he was already writing to the local resistance forces and governors to suggest ways they might resist the Greeks,16 and criticizing the grand vezir for not doing more toward this end.17 He warned the British officers in Samsun that the Turks would never tolerate foreign occupation and sent a confidential letter to the corps commanders under his own authority emphasizing the need to raise a popular guerrilla force until a regular army could be organized for defense. Soon he left Samsun, where he had been under close British supervision, and moved into the interior where he was less likely to be arrested. Though it does not seem that Kemal concerted directly with Karabekir while they were in Istanbul, he now got the latter's agreement on joint action as well as the good news that he had not yet surrendered his own forces' weapons to the British.18 Thus encouraged, Kemal traveled through the east spreading his message among commanders, governors, mayors, and local resistance forces, with the Greek advance to the Menderes strengthening both his resolve and the response.19 When the British finally learned what he was doing, they got the Istanbul government to dismiss him and order all officials in Anatolia to refrain from accepting his direction (June 23); but to save the grand vezir further embarrassment Mustafa Kemal simply resigned his commission, thus making him officially a full-fledged rebel though in fact close cooperation with some Istanbul officials continued.

The Amasya Protocol

Mustafa Kemal had already been building a new base of support to replace the authority derived from his official position. On June 19, 1919, he met in Amasya with some of the men who were to join him in leading the national movement: Rauf Orbay, former minister of the navy and Ottoman delegate to Mondros; Ali Fuat Cebesoy, commander at Ankara; and Refet Bele, who commanded several corps near Samsun. On June 21 the three signed the Amasya Protocol, soon afterward accepted also by Kâzım Karabekir, which became more or less the first
call for a national movement against the occupation. The message was a simple one:

1. The unity of the Fatherland and national independence are in danger.
2. The Istanbul government is unable to carry out its responsibilities.
3. It is only through the nation's effort and determination that national independence will be won.
4. It is necessary to establish a national committee, free from all external influences and control, that will review the national situation and make known to the world the people's desire for justice.
5. It has been decided to hold immediately a National Congress in Sivas, the most secure place in Anatolia.
6. Three representatives from each province should be sent immediately to the Sivas Congress.
7. To be prepared for every eventuality, this subject should be kept a national secret.  

Kemal also wrote a number of leading figures in Istanbul inviting them to join the national struggle, adding that "From now on Istanbul no longer rules Anatolia but will have to follow it," thus providing the rallying cry for the events that were to follow.

While Kemal thus moved to secure national support, he also acted to get what help he could from outside. Just before the Amasya meeting, while in Havza, he met a Bolshevik delegation headed by Colonel Semen Budenny, who offered arms and ammunition in the hope of stemming Armenian expansionism in the Caucasus as well as to close Allied access to southern Russia through the Black Sea. Budenny also urged Kemal to accept Communist ideology for the new Turkey, but the latter said that such questions had to be postponed until Turkish independence was achieved. Thus were laid the bases for the assistance that was to be of utmost importance once the national movement was organized.

**The Erzurum Congress, July 23–August 7, 1919**

Even before the Sivas Congress was called, the Society for the Defense of the Rights of Eastern Anatolia had arranged a regional meeting to be held in July in Erzurum in response to the threat of further Armenian aggression in the east. Kemal attended it as well, using it to secure support from Kâzım Karabekir and other local nationalist leaders. The Istanbul government ordered Kâzım to arrest Kemal. But Kâzım refused, thus declaring his own revolt as well as his acceptance of Kemal's leadership. The declaration drawn up at the Erzurum Congress, though the protection of the eastern provinces was its original concern, in fact became the basis for the national pact that followed. Its ten-point resolution set forth the principles for which the war for independence was to be fought and won:

1. The province of Trabzon, the district of Samsun, and the provinces of Erzurum, Sivas, Diyarbekir, Elazı̇g, Van, and Bitlis, sometimes called the "six provinces," are an integral whole which cannot be separated from each other or from Ottoman territory for any reason.

2. To preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and our national independence and to protect the sultanate and the caliphate, it is essential that the national forces be put in charge and the national will be recognized as sovereign.

3. As all occupation and interference will be considered undertaken in be-
half of establishing Greek and Armenian states, the principle of united defense and resistance is resolved. The bestowing of new privileges to Christians in a manner to alter political control and social balance will not be allowed.

4. In case the central government, under foreign pressure, is forced to abandon any part of the territory, we are taking measures and making decisions to defend our national rights as well as the sultanate and the caliphate.

5. We reaffirm the legal rights, as indicated in the laws of the Ottoman state, of non-Muslims with whom we share our Fatherland. The protection of their property, life, and honor being among the basic tenets of our religious practices, national traditions, and legal principles, this policy is confirmed by the consensus of our Congress.

6. We are calling for a decision based on right and justice, one that respects our historic, cultural, and religious rights, and that rejects totally the theory of dividing lands and separating peoples who are within the boundaries established by the armistice signed by the Allies on October 30, 1918 and in eastern Anatolia, as well as in other regions, inhabited by a majority of Muslims and dominated by Muslims culturally and economically.

7. Our people honor and respect humanitarian and progressive developments and are appreciative of our own scientific, industrial, and economic conditions and needs. Therefore, on condition that the internal and external independence of our people and our state, and the territorial integrity of our country shall be conserved intact, we will accept with pleasure the scientific, industrial, and economic assistance of every state which will not nurture imperialistic tendencies towards our country and which will respect the principles of nationality as indicated under Article 6. We await, for the sake of preserving humanity and peace, the urgent signature of a peace based on these equitable and humanitarian conditions, which we consider to be our great national objective.

8. In this historical age when nations determine their own destinies, it is essential that our central government submit itself to the national will. As made clear by past events and their results, government decisions not based on the national will have no validity for the people and are not respected by foreign nations. In consequence, before the nation is forced into taking matters into its own hands to look for a remedy to its anguish, our central government should proceed without delay to convoke the national assembly and submit to it all the decisions to be taken relating to the fate of the nation and the country.

9. “The Society to Defend the Rights of Eastern Anatolia” (Şarkı Anadolu Müdafaai-i Hukuk Cemiyeti) is the union of societies born out of the sufferings and calamities experienced by our land. This assembly is totally free of party interests. All Muslim compatriots are the natural members of this assembly.

10. A Representative Committee (Heyet-i Temsiliye) chosen by the Congress will work in its name to establish national unity on all levels from the village to the province.

Thus Kemal and his colleagues at this point still were declaring that they were working to preserve the Ottoman nation; that all subjects, Muslim and non-Muslim, would have equal rights; that since the government in Istanbul was controlled by the occupiers, the national movement in Anatolia was assuming the burden of protecting the nation's rights; but that all of this still was done in support of the sultan-caliph, to rescue him and to protect in particular the eastern provinces.
Soon afterward a local congress was held at Alaşehir (August 16–25, 1919) so that the local defense organizations also could declare their support for the national movement: "The aim of the congress composed of brothers uniting against the danger to the nation is to unify the national movement and completely drive away the enemy." This set the pattern for other local congresses that followed and manifested general support for the movement, which now was clearly led by Mustafa Kemal.

The Sivas Congress, September 4–11, 1919

Just as the Harbord Commission arrived in Istanbul (see pp. 331–332), Mustafa Kemal opened the National Congress at Sivas. Delegates came not only from the east but from all over the nation, including far-off Thrace. The resolutions adopted at Erzurum now were transformed into a national appeal, and the name of the organization changed to the Society to Defend the Rights and Interests of the Provinces of Anatolia and Rumeli. The resolutions adopted in Erzurum were reaffirmed with minor additions, such as a clause added to article 3 stating that the formation of an independent Greece on the Aydin, Manisa, and Balikesir fronts was unacceptable. In content and spirit the Sivas Congress basically reinforced the stance taken at the Erzurum Congress.

After the Sivas Congress the nationalists entered a strange in-between period, not yet severing ties with Istanbul but pulling their political and military forces together into a movement that inevitably presaged such a split. On September 22–23 an American investigating committee led by General Harbord came to Sivas and met with Kemal, receiving full assurance that Anatolia was, indeed, Turkish and that no mandate would be allowed or accepted. Additional Defense of the Rights of Turks committees were set up to center the movement's activities, particularly in Konya, Bursa, and other places in the west. In the face of the increasing national resistance, Damat Ferit resigned as grand vezir and was replaced by Ali Riza Paşa (October 2, 1919), but the latter seems to have cooperated with Kemal and his associates even more than the previous leaders. In October 1919 he sent his minister of the navy, Salih Paşa, to negotiate with Kemal to secure some kind of agreement on national objectives, with the Istanbul government promising cooperation with the nationalists in return. Negotiations took place in Amasya on October 20–22, 1919, resulting in the Second Amasya Protocol. The government was asked to accept essentially all the resolutions of the Erzurum and Sivas congresses and to recognize the legality of the Society for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumeli, promising also that the forthcoming session of the Chamber of Deputies would not be held in Istanbul so that it would be free of foreign domination. Provinces inhabited by Turks would not be ceded to enemies. No mandate would be accepted, and the integrity and independence of the Turkish fatherland would be safeguarded. Non-Muslims would be given no privileges that might undermine the national sovereignty and social balance. Only delegates approved of by the Nationalist Representative Committee would be sent to any peace conference with the Entente powers. But Salih Paşa ultimately was unable to get the cabinet in Istanbul to ratify the agreement. Ali Riza later announced that elections would, indeed, be held for a new Chamber of Deputies, but that it would meet in Istanbul the following January, a clear violation of the Amasya Protocol.

Elections followed. But since most of Anatolia and Thrace were in fact under the control of the nationalists, it was inevitable that their members would be and
The Turkish War for Independence, 1918-1923

were elected, with Mustafa Kemal himself being chosen deputy from Erzurum. The Istanbul government thus, in a certain sense, was absorbing the national movement into the Parliament right under the noses of the Allies. It even went so far as to declare that Kemal had not really been dismissed from the army but only had resigned, restoring all his decorations as well as his rank (December 29).

As the elections went forward, the nationalists were immensely encouraged by the Harbord Commission report, which reached them in late November 1919. While recommending an American mandate, it went on to propose that all revenues be controlled by Turks and that foreign control over Turkey's financial machinery cease, including that of the Public Debt Commission. All countries formed out of former Ottoman possessions would have to take their reasonable share of the paper currency, foreign obligations, and reparation obligations of the empire. There would have to be a complete abrogation of all existing commercial agreements, especially the hated Capitulations. All foreign governments and troops should vacate the country. It was, indeed, a partial victory for the nationalists, with only the recommendation on the establishment of a mandate left to be overcome.27

The Last Ottoman Parliament

Kemal really did not expect the Allies either to accept the Harbord report or to respect his parliamentary immunity if he went to Istanbul. Hence he stayed in Anatolia, moving the Representative Committee's capital from Erzurum to Ankara so that he could meet with as many deputies as possible as they traveled to Istanbul to attend the Parliament and to keep in touch with them while they met. He also started a newspaper, the Hakimiyet-i Milliye (National Sovereignty), to speak for the movement both in Turkey and the outside world (January 10, 1920).

The last Ottoman Chamber of Deputies met in Istanbul starting on January 12, 1920. After the sultan's speech was presented, a welcoming telegram from Mustafa Kemal was read in the name of the Representative Committee, thus manifesting its claim to be the rightful government of Turkey. The British began to sense that something had been put over on them and that, in fact, the Istanbul government was not doing what it could to suppress the nationalists; so they secured the dismissal of both the minister of war and the chief of the general staff. The latter post went to Fevzi Çakmak (1876-1950), an able and relatively conservative officer who was known as one of the army's ablest field leaders and who soon was himself to become one of the principal military leaders of the national movement. On January 28 the deputies met secretly. Proposals were made to elect Mustafa Kemal president of the Chamber, but this was deferred in the certain knowledge that the British would prorogue the Chamber before it could do what had been planned all along, namely, accept the declaration of the Sivas Congress. This was done on February 17 as the National Pact (Misak-i Milli), thus putting the Parliament itself on record as expressing the will of the Turkish people to regain full national integrity and independence:

The members of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies recognize and affirm that the independence of the State and future of the Nation can be assured only by complete respect for the following principles, which represent the maximum of sacrifice which must be undertaken to achieve a just and lasting peace, and that the continued existence of a stable Ottoman sultanate and society is impossible outside these principles:
1. The destiny of the portions of Ottoman territory under foreign occupation and peopled by an Arab majority at the time of the signing of the armistice on October 30, 1918 should be determined by a plebiscite of all inhabitants. All such territories inhabited by an Ottoman Muslim majority, united in religion, in race, and in aspirations, are imbued with feelings of mutual respect, concern, and devotion, and form an indivisible whole.

2. We accept a new plebiscite in the case of the three sancaks [Kars, Ardahan, and Batum] which had by general vote decided to join the mother country when they were first freed [from Russian occupation].

3. The juridical status of western Thrace, which has been made dependent on the peace treaty to be signed with Turkey, must also be determined in accordance with a free vote of the inhabitants.

4. The city of Istanbul, which is the seat of the Islamic caliphate and of the Ottoman sultanate and government, as well as the Sea of Marmara must be protected from every danger. So long as this principle is observed, whatever decision arrived at jointly by us and other states concerning the use for trade and communication of the Straits of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean shall be honored.

5. The rights of minorities as agreed on in the treaties concluded between the Allied powers and their enemies and certain of their associates shall be confirmed and assured by us on condition that Muslim minorities in neighbouring countries will benefit from the same rights.

6. Like every country, in order to secure a more effective and well-ordered administration that will enable us to develop our political, judicial, and financial affairs, we also need complete independence and sovereignty as a fundamental condition of our life and continued existence. Therefore we oppose restrictions that are harmful to our political, judicial, and financial development. The conditions of the settlement of our [foreign] debts shall be determined likewise, in a manner not contrary to these principles.28

The British authorities were, of course, enraged. The elections and Parliament had been presented to them as means to manifest national support for the Istanbul government, but instead the popularly elected Parliament had supported the man whom they considered to be the principal villain of the time, Mustafa Kemal.

The reply was quick in coming. Ali Riza officially condemned the national resistance and began sending funds to Anatolia to encourage the organization of bands to oppose it.29 Soon afterward a major revolt led by the Circassian bandit Ahmet Anzavur (see pp. 353-354) and supported by the British with arms and money rose to capture the area north of Balikesir.30 The Allies pressured Ali Riza to arrest the leading nationalist sympathizers in Istanbul and to condemn Kemal and his associates, and when he refused they forced him to resign (March 3, 1920), with the far more malleable Salih Hulusi Paşa replacing him. The full weight of the government now was turned against the nationalists for the first time. On March 15, 1920, 150 leading civil servants and army officers in Istanbul were arrested and turned over to the Allies for internment in Malta. Included among them were most of the members of the Karakol organization, which now was broken up.31 The next day Istanbul was put under martial law, and Allied troops replaced the Ottoman police in control of the city. Police entered the Parliament and arrested some of its leading members, after which it was dissolved on March 18.32 The Salih Paşa cabinet was replaced with one headed once again by Damat Ferit Paşa (April 5), who was now determined to carry out the Allied
The Turkish War for Independence, 1918–1923

The Turkish War for Independence, 1918–1923

Second Phase of the War for Independence, March 1920–March 1922

The strong measures taken against the nationalists by the Istanbul government inaugurated a distinct new phase in the Turkish War for Independence. For the first time the nationalists claimed the sole right to rule the Turkish people. Mustafa Kemal declared the Representative Committee in Ankara the only lawful government of Turkey and ordered all civilian and military officials to obey it rather than the Istanbul government, since the latter was now fully under Allied control. To make sure that everyone knew he was still fighting in the name of the sultan to rescue him from the Allies, Kemal appealed to the entire Islamic world asking for help against the infidel (March 17). Plans were made to organize a new government and Parliament in Ankara, and the sultan was asked to accept its authority. A flood of supporters moved from Istanbul to Ankara just ahead of the Allied dragnets. Included among them were Halide Edip, her husband, Adnan Advar, Ismet Inönü, Kemal’s most important friend in the Ministry of War, and the last president of the Chamber of Deputies, Celaleddin Arif. The latter’s desertion of the capital was of great significance. As legally elected president of the last representative Ottoman Parliament, his claim that it had been dissolved illegally, in violation of the Constitution, enabled Kemal to assume full governmental powers for the Ankara regime. On March 19, 1920, he announced that the Turkish nation was establishing its own Parliament in Ankara under the name Grand National Assembly (Büyük Millet Meclisi). Some 100 members of the Istanbul Parliament able to escape the Allied roundup joined 190 deputies elected around the country by the national resistance groups. On April 23, 1920, the new Assembly gathered for the first time, making Mustafa Kemal its first president and Ismet Inönü, now deputy from Edirne, chief of the General Staff. The new regime’s determination to revolt against the Istanbul government and not the sultan was quickly made evident. It was resolved that:

1. The founding of a government is absolutely necessary.

2. It is not permissible to recognize a provisional chief of state nor to establish a regency.

3. It is fundamental to recognize that the real authority in the country is the national will as represented by the Assembly. There is no power superior to the Grand National Assembly.

4. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey embraces both the executive and legislative functions. A Council of State, chosen from the membership of the assembly and responsible to it, conducts the affairs of state. The President of the Assembly is ex-officio President of the Council. The Sultan-Caliph, as soon as he is free from the coercion to which he submits, shall take his place within the constitutional system in the manner to be determined by the Assembly.

The Assembly thus was the real government, with the Council of State carrying on the daily affairs of government. The time for deciding the fate of the sultanate was postponed to a more propitious occasion, presumably after full inde-
The Grand National Assembly as the Ankara Government: The Constitution of 1921

A new system was incorporated into the first constitution of the Turkish nation, passed by the Assembly on January 20, 1921, as the Law of Fundamental Organization (Teskîlât-ı Esasiye Kanunu). Both executive and legislative authority were "manifested and concentrated in the Grand National Assembly, which is the sole and rightful representative of the nation." The state of Turkey was to be run by the Assembly itself through the government of the Grand National Assembly. As a legislative body it would promulgate or abrogate all laws, conclude treaties, proclaim war, and the like. As an executive, it would administer "the departments into which its government is divided through the ministers it elects" and "give direction to the ministers, if necessary changing them." The president of the Assembly, Mustafa Kemal, was ex-officio president of the Council of Ministers, but he and the ministers were subject to Assembly direction on all matters. The 1876 Constitution's division of the state into provinces (vilayet), districts (kaza), and counties (nahiye) was retained. The provinces were made quite powerful and autonomous, with their administrative councils having the right to "organize and administer, in accordance with laws promulgated by the Grand National Assembly, matters relating to religious foundations, religious schools, public schools, health, economics, agriculture, public works, and social aid," while "external and internal political affairs, matters concerning the religious law, justice and the military, international economic relations, general government taxation, and matters concerning more than one province" remained to the Grand National Assembly. The administrators of the districts were to be appointed by the Grand National Assembly but were under the orders of the governors. The counties were defined as "corporative entities with autonomy in local life," and were to be ruled by administrative councils elected by their inhabitants, acting mainly in local judicial, economic and financial affairs. The provinces also were grouped "according to their economic and social relationships" into general inspectorships (umumi müfettişlik), whose holders were "charged with the maintenance of public security in general and with controlling the operations of all the departments in the general inspection zones, and with regulating harmoniously the mutual affairs of the provinces," thus in fact controlling the governors and provincial councils under the authority of the Grand National Assembly. All the nationalist forces were incorporated into a united army with a central command. The ministers were to be appointed by and responsible to the Assembly. Elections for the national and provincial assemblies were to be held every two years, for two-year terms, with the sessions being extensible for one additional year in emergencies. The Constitution of 1876, as amended in 1909, remained in force in all areas not covered by the new regulation.39

Soon afterward the National Pact was accepted as the Assembly's basic aim. It declared null and void all treaties, contracts, or other obligations signed by the Istanbul government after March 16, 1920, reserving thus for itself the sole right to make agreements and laws in the name of the Turkish people. The Assembly also assumed the right to confirm the appointment of diplomats and other representatives sent abroad, not because this was specifically provided in the Constitution, but since the shortages of trained diplomatic personnel in Ankara made it
necessary for such persons to be chosen from among the deputies. One of the first laws passed by the new body was the National Treason Law, which essentially condemned to death anyone who betrayed the nation. Among the first to be affected were Damat Ferit and his associates. Thus was the Ankara government firmly established and institutionalized, and its authority was accepted by most of the country.

The reasons for concentrating so much power in the Assembly varied from member to member. Kemal insisted on the Assembly's supremacy to remove the need for an executive position whose occupant would be like a substitute for the sultan: "The first goal of our struggle is to show our enemies, who intend to separate the sultanate from the caliphate, that the national will shall not allow this... Accordingly there can be no question of designating a head of government, even a provisional one, or a regent-sultan in Anatolia. Therefore we are compelled to form a government without a head of government." On the other hand Kemal's opponents in the Assembly also favored its supremacy, but to limit or obstruct his power and to enable them eventually to supplant him as leader of the national movement. Whatever the reasons, the relative freedom in which the Assembly members were elected provided a representation of different interests never before seen in Ottoman legislative bodies as well as an opportunity for those interests to express and assert themselves. Its members were current and former government officials, both civilian and military (40 percent), professionals (20 percent), local landowners and wealthy businessmen (20 percent), and Muslim religious leaders (17 percent). The members also represented a wide spectrum of political and social beliefs:

There was the conflict of laicism with religious feeling, radicalism with reactionarism, republicanism with monarchism, Turkism with Ottomanism. There was the ideal of racial interest and unity versus that of the religious community of Islam... each of which could survive in its own environment without contacting or harming the others, now come together in the Assembly, to be set against one another daily, with now one now the other emerging victorious.

During most of the War for Independence, these differences crystallized around two interrelated issues involving the future of the Turkish nation—how it should be organized and what its relationship should be with the Russian Bolsheviks, who were offering more help in return for a move toward the left. The two major ideas around which opinions coalesced were called the “Eastern ideal” and “Western ideal.” For supporters of the former, the East signified opposition to the Western imperialism that had engulfed the empire and all other Islamic countries, with Bolshevik Russia being the model because it had fought Western imperialism and replaced the czarist regime with a new revolutionary order. The Eastern ideal implied the replacement of the sultan-caliph with a new republican regime based on popular sovereignty and rule. The supporters of the Western ideal, on the other hand, retained a strong attachment to the Young Turk idea of a constitutional regime based on essentially Western foundations. Beyond this, however, and partly in reaction to the Easternists, they supported the old Ottoman order based on the sultanate-caliphate, as limited and controlled by a constitution. They opposed any radical political, social, or economic reforms as well as close relations with the Soviets. Radical proposals from the Easternists, therefore, such as elections on a corporative basis or women’s suffrage, were opposed on the grounds that they were no more than Bolshevism. The attitudes of the two groups for or
against the Bolsheviks should not be overemphasized, however. Most of the Easternists were Turkish patriots and reformers in the Young Turk tradition, not just Communist sympathizers as claimed by their opponents. The Constitution of 1921 was mainly their work and reflected the ideals of Rousseau and the French Revolution more than it did the Soviet system. On the other hand what the Westernists wanted ignored the West’s own reaction to the old regime and its growing commitment to the ideals of popular sovereignty. Instead, they emphasized its monarchical traditions and older social and economic systems. The Westernists were concerned with preserving the political and structural aspects of Islam, while the Easternists were attempting to prove that their ideas were compatible with its basic social tenets. The Islamic clergy was on both sides, sometimes holding the balance between them. The ideals of the Turkish Republic in the end were produced by a dynamic interaction between them, not by the triumph of one over the other. Kemal used the war to achieve almost dictatorial powers, and in formulating the programs for the new Turkey came to adopt the radical programs of the Easternists without their Bolshevik overtones, and the constitutional liberalism of the Westernists without the sultanate. The synthesis was achieved in a populist program introduced on September 13, 1920.

The Civil War

With the Istanbul government still operating and also claiming jurisdiction over the entire country, the stage was set for a full civil war. The situation was quite similar to that in Anatolia in the early fifteenth century after Bayezid I’s defeat by Tamerlane at the Battle of Ankara. In both cases rule over the Turks was contested by governments ruling in Anatolia and Europe, the empire was threatened by foreign invasion, and the land was infested by local rebellions and robber bands. And in both cases it was the heartland of Turkish life and traditions, Anatolia, that produced the victor.

In response to the declarations of the Grand National Assembly, the Istanbul government appointed its own extraordinary Anatolian general inspector (Anadolu fevkalâde müfettiş-i umumi) and a new Security Army (Kuvayi Intizamiye) to enforce its rights and battle the nationalists, with help from the British, with the latter forming in essence what came to be called the Caliphal Army starting in 1920. Other bands rose to seek wealth and power for themselves in alliance with one or another of the governments, sometimes at the instigation of the Greeks, the British, or even the Communists, sometimes representing the large landowners and old derebeys who were seeking to regain their power. Most became little more than bandit forces, manned by a motley assortment of dispossessed peasants, Tatars from the Crimea and Central Asia, and Turkish and Kurdish nomads, always ready for a good fight against whoever was in power. These armies became so powerful that on April 29, 1920, the Grand National Assembly passed a law that prohibited “crimes against the nation” and set up Independence Courts (İstiklâl Mahkemeleri) to try and execute on the spot. These courts became a major instrument of the Ankara government to suppress opposition long after independence itself was achieved.

Most famous of the private armies operating in Anatolia during the civil war was the Green Army (Yeşil Ordu), which posed a major threat to all sides. Originally it was organized during the winter of 1920 “to evict from Asia the penetration and occupation of European imperialism.” Its members were former
Unionists, known to and respected by Mustafa Kemal, including their secretary general, Hakki Behiç Bey, and Yunus Nadi, an influential Istanbul journalist, whose journal *Yeni Gün* (New Day) had just been closed by the British and who in 1924 was to found the leading newspaper of republican Turkey, *Cumhuriyet* (The Republic). Its original objective was to counter the reactionary propaganda spread in Anatolia by agents of the Istanbul government and the Allies by popularizing the national movement and mobilizing the Turkish peasants in support of the national forces. As such it was supported and even encouraged by Kemal. In fact, however, many of its members had a more radical purpose: They wished to combine Unionism, Pan-Islam, and socialism “to establish a socialist union in the world of Islam by modifying the Russian Revolution.” As such it soon attracted a number of groups opposing the Ankara government, including not only supporters of the Istanbul government but also anti-Kemalist Unionists and Communists connected with the Third International. This led Mustafa Kemal to get Hakki Behiç to disband the organization late in 1921, though its various anti-Kemalist elements continued to act on their own during the next two years.

Two other independent armies, both led by Circassians and gaining most of their supporters from the Tatar and Circassian refugees driven into Anatolia by the Russians, were also active. A left-inclined guerrilla movement led by Çerkes Ethem was at first quite successful against the Greeks near Izmir in 1919, and for some time it supported the national movement against the reactionary, right-oriented Caliphal Army and the anti-Ankara movements that the latter stimulated in the eastern Marmara region in 1920. Ultimately, however, Çerkes Ethem became increasingly rapacious toward the civilian population, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. He allied with the Green Army, occasionally supported various Communist manifestos being circulated, and showed no interest in submitting to the central control that was essential for the success of the new nationalist army being built by Ankara. Finally, Kemal sent a major force, which destroyed Çerkes Ethem’s army in January 1921, forcing him to flee into the hands of the Greeks and, eventually, to exile in Italy.

A more conservative movement was the force led by another Circassian, Ahmet Anzavur, who with money and arms from the Istanbul government and the British led two major revolts against the nationalists in the areas of Baksiris and Gönen in October–December 1919 and again from February to June 1920. For a time leading the Caliphal Army as well, Anzavur’s bands began to ravage the countryside, leading Mustafa Kemal to oppose him. He was finally beaten and sent on the run by Çerkes Ethem in April 1920, when the latter still was helping the Ankara government. Anzavur raised a new army, but he was defeated and killed and his army dispersed by the nationalists on May 15, 1920.

The strongest local rebellions were in the areas of Bolu, Yozgat, and Duzce, the latter led by the Çapanoğlu derebey family, which tried to restore its old power until its army was hunted down and dispersed by the nationalists and its leading members hanged in Amasya in August 1920. Such movements, however, continued to be troublesome in Anatolia well into the republican period, as it took time to reduce the old family forces that were revived by the civil war.

Then there were the Communists, who Mustafa Kemal opposed but felt unable to disperse because he needed help from the Russians. Mustafa Suphi remained in Russia sending propaganda literature into Anatolia. In response to his pleas, Kemal tolerated a number of Communist activities during 1920 including a new joint Communist-Unionist organization in Ankara called the People’s Communist
The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975

Party (Türk Halk İştirakiyûn Fırkası), which had some connection with the Green Army. This organization enabled the Communists to emerge to public view in Turkey for the first time. In addition, on October 18, 1920, Kemal allowed the formation of a separate Turkish Communist Party (Türk Komünist Fırkası), but it was operated mainly by some of his close associates in the Assembly. Far less active or radical than the first-named group, it was a government tool to divide and confuse the Communists and their supporters. Soon the former was active enough to cause its suppression. The last straw came when it issued a joint declaration with the Green Army and Çerkes Ethem that they had “approved the Bolshevik party program passed by the Third International . . . and joined to unite all the social revolutionary movements in the country,” and adopted the name Turkish People’s Collectivist Bolshevik Party. Communist agents became active around Ankara and Eskişehir and cooperated with Unionist groups in Erzurum and Trabzon, which were centers of Enver’s supporters throughout the War for Independence. This stimulated Kemal to criticize the Communists for working outside the organ of the people, the Grand National Assembly. After Çerkes Ethem was crushed and the Green Army broken up, he suppressed the Communists and brought their leaders to trial, though the final judgments were suspended until after the Treaty with Moscow was signed in March 1921, and the sentences were relatively light compared to some. The only violent action against the Turkish Communists came when Mustafa Suphi and a few friends entered Anatolia via Kars on December 28, 1920. Though they met with Ali Fuat Cebesoy and Kazım Karabekir at Kars early in January 1921, they were arrested soon after. As they were being sent by boat to Erzurum for trial, they were assassinated by a group of pro-Enver supporters from Trabzon, apparently because of their fear that Suphi might bring discredit to Enver’s efforts.

What, indeed, had happened to Enver and his supporters? Enver, Cemal, Talat, and a few friends had fled from Istanbul the night of November 2, 1918, on a German freighter going to Odessa. From there they had gone on to Berlin, where they lived under assumed names, since the Entente victors were demanding their extradition for the “crimes” of their regime. Soon they were invited by Karl Radek to continue their work in Moscow, with full Bolshevik support for the “Turkish national struggle.” Talat remained in Germany, where he was killed by an Armenian assassin on March 15, 1921. Cemal and Enver went to Moscow, and later to Central Asia, where they undertook a series of political activities with the ultimate intention of using the Bolsheviks to regain power in Turkey once the nationalists were defeated. With Bolshevik encouragement Enver proclaimed the organization of the Union of Islamic Revolutionary Societies (İslam İhtilâl Cemiyetleri İttihadı) and an affiliated Party of People’s Councils (Halk Şuuralar Fırkası), the former as the international Muslim revolutionary organization, the latter as its Turkish branch. On September 1–9, 1920, he attended the Congress of the Peoples of the East at Baku, meeting a Kemalist delegate who was present. But while Kemal generally encouraged Enver’s work in the hope of using him to get Bolshevik aid, he never actually committed himself to anything. Enver had a small group of supporters in Anatolia, mainly at Trabzon, and about 40 secret Unionists in the Grand National Assembly were working to install Enver in place of Kemal at the right time. Enver moved from Moscow to Batum in the summer of 1921 just as the Greek offensive began, so that he could enter Anatolia quickly if Kemal was defeated. But following Kemal’s victory over the Greeks at the Sakarya (September 1921), Enver abandoned his plans for Turkey and went into
Central Asia in the hope of leading its Muslims against both the British and the Russians. It was while leading a band in pursuance of this aim that he was killed in a battle with Russian forces near Çeken. Cemal Paşa in the meantime had also worked to facilitate Kemal's contacts with the Bolsheviks, and then he spent time training the Afghan army. While passing Tiflis on his way to Moscow he was killed by two Armenian assassins (July 21, 1922).

The Role of the Sultan

In the midst of all these conflicts and difficulties, the question arises whether the sultan was willing or able to provide effective leadership. As related by Sir Horace Rumbold, British ambassador in Istanbul, the ruler's interpretation of the activities and backgrounds of the nationalists indicated a disdain for the movement:

A handful of brigands had established complete ascendancy. They were few in number, but they had got a stranglehold on the people as a whole, profiting by their submissiveness, their timidity or their penury. Their strength lay in the backing of 16,000 military officers who were concerned for their own interests. . . . The Ankara leaders were men without any real stake in the country, with which they had no connection of blood or anything else. Moustafa Kemal was a Macedonian revolutionary of unknown origin. His blood might be anything, Bulgarian, Greek or Serbian for instance. He looked rather like a Serbian! Bekir Sami was a Circassian. They were all the same, Albanians, Circassians, anything but Turks. There was not a real Turk among them. He and his government were nevertheless powerless before them. The hold was such that there was no means of access to the real Turks, even by way of propaganda. The real Turks were loyal to the core, but they were intimidated or they were hoodwinked by fantastic misrepresentations like the story of his own captivity. These brigands were the men who sought his submission. They looked for external support and had found it in the Bolsheviks. The Angora leaders were still playing with them. They might discover and regret too late that they had brought on Turkey the fate of Azerbaijan. Muslim Turks would have no truck with Bolshevism, for it was incompatible with their religion, but if it were imposed on them by force, then what? Such was the leadership that the last sultan was giving his people in their hour of distress. Though it might be said that the remarks were intended to soothe Allied irritation at the nationalist movement, they contained no redeeming spark of sympathy for those who were trying to save the country.

Ankara's Preparations for War

In the meantime, Kemal was trying to organize his army for the ordeal to follow. The national forces were called back to Ankara to be trained, disciplined, and armed, and a new officers' school was established. An ambassador was sent to Moscow, and Russian arms and ammunition began to flow across the Black Sea in increasing amounts. After the Karakol association in Istanbul was broken up by the Allied suppression, a new and wider-based group was founded among the remaining civil servants and officers and called the National Defense Organization (Müdafaa-i Milliye Teşkilâtı). Its members again began sending arms and equipment to the nationalists while the telegraphers and postal officials used their positions to confuse the enemy regarding the strength of the nationalist movement.
The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975

The Treaty of Sevres, August 10, 1920

The final break between Ankara and Istanbul came when the latter officially accepted the Treaty of Sevres, which incorporated the will of the Allies as to how the Turks should be treated. It was, indeed, a vindictive document. The Arab provinces were detached from the empire, as decided already at San Remo. Greece, in addition to western Thrace (which it had just acquired from Bulgaria), received eastern Thrace, including Edirne, right up to the Çatalca line, only 40 kilometers from the Ottoman capital. The city of Izmir and its environs were put under Greek administration for a period of five years, after which what was left of the population would be allowed to request permanent incorporation into the Greek state if it wished. The Aegean Islands were given to Greece outright, while the Dodecanese, including Rhodes, went to Italy. Armenia was recognized as an independent state, with its boundaries to be determined by arbitration of President Wilson. The territory called Kurdistan, east of the Euphrates, was to gain autonomy with the right to opt for independence within a year if the Kurds wished. There would be international control of the Straits with demilitarization of the adjacent lands, but Istanbul would remain under nominal Ottoman control.

What of the Ottoman state that was left? Additional provisions made it certain that Turkish sovereignty would be very limited. The Ottoman army could have no more than 50,000 men, and they would be subject to the advice of foreign officers. Its armaments as well as the navy would be restricted. The Capitulations were restored and a new Allied commission was established to supervise and regulate not only the public debt but also the Ottoman state budget, taxes, customs duties, currency, and public loans, leaving the government with little control over its own policies. Finally, the Ottomans were required to make extensive concessions to the remaining non-Muslim minorities. The Turkish state that survived, thus, would be under the financial and military control of the powers, whose subjects would continue to exploit it. To the Turks, it projected a bleak future. The Istanbul government’s acceptance of the treaty was, however, a new weapon in the hands of the Turkish nationalists. The Grand National Assembly immediately declared all those who signed it, including the grand vezir, to be traitors.

The Turko-Armenian War

In addition to facing the various bandit forces, the Ankara regime also had to fight wars in all parts of Anatolia. In the southeast were the French, sometimes in alliance with Armenian bands, pushing out from Cilicia and stimulating a guerrilla war. It was mainly a slow war of attrition, devastating the countryside, but with no substantial advances or retreats on either side. Much more important was the war carried on with the newly established Armenian Republic in the Caucasus. If the latter had been content with the boundaries gained in 1919, most likely there would have been no war and Armenia would probably have been able to put up a far better resistance than it did to the subsequent Bolshevik conquest. But the Armenians were determined to conquer eastern Anatolia, leaving the Turkish nationalists with little choice but to move against them despite the more pressing Greek danger. Armenian raids on Turkish border villages began in May 1920. Soon after, Karabekir was made commander of the eastern front (June 15, 1920). He organized an army to repel them and urged the Grand National Assembly to authorize an advance. Despite the sufferings of Turkish peasants, the Assembly
hesitated because of the Greek threat and limited its action to diplomatic protests. In the end, the postponement proved propitious, for as we shall see the new Greek offensive began on June 22, 1920, and if part of the Turkish forces had been busy in the east they might never have been able to hold back the Greeks at the crucial time.

It was only after the Greek danger was contained in the fall of the same year that Karabekir finally was authorized to advance against the Armenians, but only to Kars (October 7). Right from the start, however, he was determined to go considerably further. On October 30 Kars was taken. Karabekir then pushed beyond the old 1877 territory, forcing the Erivan government to ask for an armistice and agree to a peace treaty, signed at Alexandropol (Leninakan/Gümrü) on the night of December 2-3. The treaty never in fact was ratified, since the Armenian Republic soon after was taken over by the Bolsheviks, and it was superseded by the Turkish-Russian Treaty of Moscow of March 1921. But it was significant in establishing the boundaries of eastern Turkey, incorporated without change into the subsequent agreements that remain unaltered to the present day. The Armenians repudiated all claims on Turkish territory, agreed to reduce their armed forces, and promised to allow Turkish use of the railroads passing through their lands to the north. The Turks were allowed to occupy Alexandropol, thus giving them a good strategic position for the subsequent negotiations with the Russians. The arms left by the defeated Armenian forces were sent to the west to be used in the resistance then being mounted against the Greeks. It should be noted that the Turkish offensive against the Armenian Republic was not, as has been alleged, accomplished in coordination with the Red Army. The Bolsheviks conquered Azerbaijan while the Armenians were fighting the Turks. It was only after the peace agreement was reached that they moved into Erivan and Sovietized its government, thus laying the basis for the Turko-Soviet Friendship Treaty that followed.

The First Greek Offensive to the First Battle of İnönü, June 1920–January 1921

At the center of the Turkish War for Independence was, above all else, the Greek invasion. It was the Greeks who were trying to conquer Anatolia, and it was the Greeks who had to be beaten if the other invaders were to be pushed out. The initial Greek occupation, as defined by the British as the Milne Line, encompassed Izmir and the surrounding area, starting from Ayvalık on the Aegean to the north, extending inland to Akmaz, south to Aydın, and then west to the Aegean near Selçuk, incorporating the valleys of the Bakır, the Gediz and the greater and lesser Menderes. While the Greeks spent the winter of 1919–1920 consolidating their position and killing or driving out as many Turkish cultivators as possible, the Kemalists had withdrawn most of their forces to Ankara for training. The small force remaining was commanded by Mehmet Efe, and most of the active resistance was undertaken by bands such as that of Çerkes Ethem.

In addition to arranging the mandate system, the San Remo Conference (April 19–26, 1920) also authorized Greek occupation of the entire province of Aydın as well as eastern Thrace and thus stimulated the resumption of the Greek offensive in southeastern Anatolia in late June 1920. Ali Fuat Cebesoy became commander of all the nationalist forces facing the Greeks, but with limited numbers of men and weapons there was little he could do. The initial Greek drive went on
until mid-July, with Alaşehir, Balıkesir, Bandırma, and the old capital of Bursa falling in rapid succession while the British moved in to take Gemlik and Izmir (July 6). The Greek offensive into eastern Thrace was completed in a week (July 20-27), and only Allied pressure kept them from taking Istanbul. In August the Greek advance in Anatolia captured Gallipoli (August 4), and Uşak (August 29) and cut the Aydın-Izmir-Eğridir railroad, the main transportation line in the southwest (August 26). It was at this point that Karabekir undertook the offensive against the Armenians under the assumption that the Allies would keep the Greeks from going beyond the territories granted them at San Remo.

But the Greeks wanted more. A third offensive began in late October. The Grand National Assembly panicked and began to think of moving to Sivas. Ali Fuat was removed as commander of the western front and sent as ambassador to Moscow, and the front was divided into two. Chief of the General Staff İsmet (who later was to take the surname of İnönü) was put in charge of the western part, while Albay Refet Bele was appointed to defend the south. İsmet now worked to consolidate all the forces that had worked independently against the Greeks. Even as İsmet's forces were hunting down those of Çerkes Ethem, the Greeks resumed their offensive along a front stretching from Eskişehir through Bursa to Uşak (January 6, 1921). This time, however, İsmet's forces made their first stand, at the İnönü River just north of Kütahya. After a pitched battle, the First Battle of the İnönü, the Greeks began to retreat toward Bursa (January 10), marking the first major Turkish victory in the war. Though some efforts were made to mount a pursuit, the Turks were unable to follow up the victory not only because of exhaustion and lack of supplies but also because of the need to suppress Çerkes Ethem as well as the Green Army.

The London Conference

The Entente for the first time began to see the need to make some kind of arrangement with the Turkish nationalists; thus a conference was called at London (February 21–March 12, 1921) to salvage the Sèvres Treaty by getting the nationalists to agree with the Istanbul government, which also was invited to send representatives. But nothing was accomplished, since the Ankara representative, Bekir Sami, insisted that the delegate from Istanbul leave before the negotiations even started and refused the Allied demand to make Sèvres the basis for the discussions. The only positive result of the conference came from contacts made by the Turks with the French foreign minister, Franklin-Bouillon, which ultimately led France to be the first of the Allies to break the solid front and recognize the Ankara government.

The Turkish-Soviet Treaty

It was at this time also that the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship finally was signed in Moscow (March 16, 1921). This enabled the Ankara government to begin the process of breaking out of the diplomatic isolation imposed on it by the Entente powers as well as by the circumstances of its birth. It now was being recognized by a major power as the sole representative of Turkey. The Turkish national claims, moreover, defined as “the territory which the National Pact declares to be Turkey,” were recognized, including the eastern boundaries set by the Alexandropol Treaty, with only three exceptions: Batum was left to the Soviet
Republic of Georgia, though Turkey was to have free use of it; Nahcivan, with a largely Turkish population, was to become an autonomous Soviet Republic under the protection of Azerbaijan; and while Turkish sovereignty over the Straits was recognized, their final status was to be determined subsequently by agreement among the Black Sea littoral states, of which three out of six were parts of the Soviet Union: Russia, the Ukraine, and Georgia. The parties agreed not to recognize any international agreement not accepted by the other, with the Soviet Union specifically promising not to accept the Treaty of Sèvres. Both states agreed to regard as null all treaties concluded between the Ottoman Empire and czarist Russia, including the Capitulations. New treaties would be concluded to regulate all relations between the two. Both parties promised to refrain from supporting "seditious groups and activities on the other's territory," thus giving Kemal the legal justification he wanted to suppress the Turkish Communists.75

**From the Second Greek Offensive to the Battle of the Sakarya, March–July 1921**

Following the First Battle of the Inönü, the Greeks fell back to their previous positions between Bursa and Uşak. After waiting to see the outcome of the London Conference, they began a new offensive (March 23, 1921). Adapazan and Afyon Karahisar fell in rapid succession. Again İsmet Bey marshaled his forces along the Inönü. This time the Greeks pressed their attack, so that the Second Battle of the Inönü went on from March 27 to April 1. Even after they were pushed back from the river, the Greeks continued to press until finally on the night of April 6–7 they fell back, thus providing the second major Turkish victory. Again the Turks failed to follow it up because of lack of adequate manpower and supplies.76

The summer of 1921 was in many ways the most crucial period of the entire Turkish War for Independence. In Greece Venizelos had fallen in the elections of November 1920, and policy was now being made by King Constantine and the Royalists, who held even more romantic and reactionary views. In preparation for a new offensive the king and his government went to İzmir (June 13, 1921), embarking significantly not at the port but at the spot where the Crusaders had set foot centuries before. Up to this point Soviet military aid to Turkey had been limited, and the Turkish nationalists were critically short of money as well as arms. Half the Assembly's budget was devoted to defense, and when money was not available the salaries of soldiers and civil servants had to be suspended for months on end.77 But now as a result of the new agreement the Soviets began to send major shipments of arms and money.78 Still, however, the Turkish forces remained inferior to those of the Greeks in both numbers and equipment.79

Kemal also had political difficulties at home. Though all the members of the Grand National Assembly had affirmed their allegiance to the Society for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, as time went on they formed different parliamentary groups, because of political differences that had existed in the national movement all along. The groups on the right were composed of religious and economic conservatives as well as Unionist supporters of Enver and included members of the ulema and a few civil servants and businessmen. The majority, moderately leftist and including both Easternists and Westernists, clustered around Kemal, while there was a small radical group of Communists on the extreme left.80 Most of the conservatives also opposed any move to end the sultanate and considered the Ankara government as a temporary group that would go out of exis-
tence once victory was won, while Kemal and his followers considered the war not only as a period of military campaigns but also as a situation to be used to prepare the way for a new state as envisioned in the 1921 Constitution. In response to the opposition, Kemal formed his own political association in the Assembly (May 1921), the Group for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumeli (Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaası-i Hukuk Grubu). Policy now was made in it under his leadership before it was presented to the full Assembly for its approval.81 In reaction, the different opposing groups coalesced into the Society for the Protection of Sacred Institutions (Muhafaza-i Mukaddesat Cemiyeti), declaring their allegiance to the sultan and the Constitution of 1876 and their insistence that the theocratic basis of the Ottoman state would have to be continued under the leadership of the sultan-caliph.82 Kemal had a clear majority in the Assembly, and his position was further strengthened when he made an agreement with Italy by which it abandoned its positions in the south and allowed the nationalists to take over (May 1921). He also was helped soon afterward when nationalist detachments re-took Izmit from the Greeks, though only after the latter had burned the city and massacred many of its inhabitants (June 28, 1921).83

The Battle of the Sakarya

After six months of preparation the remanned and rearmed Greek army began a new offensive on July 13, 1921, advancing between Kütahya and Eskişehir and hitting especially hard at the Turkish left flank to cut its communications with Ankara if possible. Threatened with envelopment Ismet ordered a retreat, leaving Afyon Karahisar, Kütahya, and Eskişehir to the enemy while basing his entire defense plans on the last natural boundary before Ankara, the Sakarya River (July 23–25, 1921). The Assembly panicked. Karabekir, just returned from his victory over the Armenians and long resentful at Kemal's prominence in the nationalist movement, now led the opposition. He claimed that the Greeks could no longer be stopped and demanded that Kemal's powers be reduced so that a new policy could be developed. Kemal's opponents advocated that Kemal be made commander in chief of the armed forces with full powers so that he could bear the blame when the army suffered what seemed to be an inevitable defeat. Kemal agreed (August 4, 1921) on condition only that he be authorized to exercise all the powers normally given the Assembly for the next three months. Both proposals were approved, and he took full charge of the preparations to meet the Greek assault.84 Despite the Soviet help, supplies were short as the Turkish army prepared to meet the Greeks. Every household was required to provide a pair of underclothing, socks, and sandals. All men's clothing in stores was turned over to the army, with payment to be made later. Forty percent of all food and gasoline supplies were requisitioned. Owners of transport vehicles had to provide free transportation for the army. Twenty percent of all farm animals and carts were to be given up. And owners of rifles, guns, and ammunition had to surrender them to the army, a major sacrifice for the hardy men of Anatolia.85 All the reserves were sent to the Sakarya. With Kemal as commander in chief, Feyzi Çakmak became chief of the General Staff in Ankara and Ismet Bey commanded the troops on the battle lines. The Greek advance toward the Sakarya began on August 13, with Ankara their objective. Halide Edip volunteered for military service and was made a sergeant on the western front, a major step forward for Turkish women.86 The battle began...
when the Greeks approached the Sakarya and continued for over three weeks. The thunder of cannon was plainly heard in Ankara. Most of the politicians and the people who had gathered there to fight for the Turkish nation were poised to leave if the Greeks broke through—not to surrender, but to retreat further into Anatolia in order to continue the fight. The crucial moment came when the Greek army tried to take Haymana, 40 kilometers south of Ankara. For 11 days (August 21–September 2) they pushed against the town, leveling its buildings, but the Turks held out. It was now a sustained war of attrition, and it seemed that the Greeks would prevail. But they also had their problems. The advance through Anatolia had lengthened their lines of supply and communication. Their ravaging of the countryside and slaughter of Turkish peasants had left little food. They were running out of ammunition. It seemed only a question of time, then, before one side or the other would break. The break came suddenly on September 8. A small Turkish counterattack on the enemy’s left flank was so successful that Kemal decided that this was the Greeks’ weak point, and he exploited it. By September 13 the Greeks were in flight. The battle had been won. The Turkish nation had been saved.\textsuperscript{87} Mustafa Kemal returned in triumph to Ankara, where a grateful assembly awarded him the rank of marshal of the army (miisir) as well as the title gazi, “fighter for the faith against the infidel.”\textsuperscript{88}

Again the Turks were unable to follow up the victory, and they continued to refrain for another year. In the meantime, the Turkish army was reorganized and rearmed. The outside world began to accept the inevitability of a Turkish victory and to make the necessary adjustments. The first foreign diplomat to arrive was Franklin-Bouillon, who signed the treaty that came to bear his name (October 20, 1921) by which France agreed to withdraw from Cilicia, and it did so soon afterward. French recognition of the Ankara government allowed the nationalists to demobilize the army in the south and transfer its soldiers and weapons to the west in preparation for the final advance against the Greeks. France also agreed to accept the National Pact instead of the Treaty of Sèvres, moving the boundary between Turkey and its Syrian mandate to its present line except for Hatay (Alexandretta), whose fate was determined later, the city joining the Turkish Republic as a result of a plebiscite held in 1938. The first revision of the Sèvres provisions gave the Turks a precedent they used in all subsequent negotiations with the other powers. France in turn was able to move its forces back into Syria to face the uprisings of the Arab nationalists who also were protesting the peace settlement.\textsuperscript{89} Britain protested the unilateral French move, but itself agreed on an exchange of prisoners with the Ankara government and released the detainees on Malta. On March 22 the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and Italy offered a truce to the governments of Istanbul, Ankara and Greece, but Kemal stated that he would agree only after all foreign armies were evacuated from Turkey. The Greeks still were in Anatolia, however, and it appeared that the Turkish army still was not ready to drive them out.

Politics in Ankara

Delay in driving the Greeks out again stimulated opposition to Kemal in Ankara. Important army leaders such as Kâzım Karabekir, Rauf Orbây, and Refet Bele resigned and gained election to the Assembly as deputies, and they were highly critical of Kemal’s military policies. The parliamentary opposition was reorganized into the Second Defense of Rights Group, which included Unionists, Westernists,
supporters of the caliphate, and others who opposed Kemal for personal reasons. Its declared aim was to prevent autocracy, establish the rule of law in place of Kemal's personal rule, and to establish rule by the Assembly as a whole rather than by any group. It advocated an end to the special Independence Courts set up to try those who had committed crimes against the nation; repeal of laws giving coercive powers to the government; liberalization of the election laws; and rules to forbid the president of the Assembly and the ministers from belonging to any political group. The new group did not have a majority, only 118 members out of 437 in all. But with many of Kemal's supporters out of Ankara on official missions, at times it was able to secure majorities on the floor of the Assembly and to stymie or criticize the policies of the Council of Ministers. On July 8, 1922, it used one such occasion to pass a law ending Kemal's right to nominate ministers for the Assembly's approval, returning to the original system by which members elected ministers from among themselves by secret ballot. In addition, the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers was separated from that of president of the Assembly, with Kemal retaining only the latter post while finally supporting the election of his old comrade Rauf Orbay to the former (July 12, 1922). Kemal's powers, though limited for the first time, were still considerable, and he assured the Assembly that the army would indeed drive the Greeks out as soon as it was ready. In the end Kemal was able to retain most of his power despite the changes, because his rivals supported the opposition only behind the scenes, fearing that to do so publicly might endanger the national movement against the Greeks.

New Peace Proposals

Considering the extent of Turkish successes it is remarkable to see what the Allies still hoped to impose as a peace settlement. Meeting in London early in March, the Entente foreign ministers again proposed an armistice that would include establishing an Armenian state in eastern Anatolia, removing Turkish troops from the Straits area, Turkish abandonment to the Greeks of Izmir and eastern Thrace, including Edirne, raising the Sèvres limits on the Turkish army to 85,000 men, eliminating the European financial controls over the Turkish government provided at Sèvres but retaining the Capitulations and Public Debt Commission, and so forth. These proposals were so widely at variance with the National Pact that it was easy for all groups in the Assembly to agree on their rejection as well as on a renewal of Kemal's demand for complete evacuation before negotiations began.

The Great Offensive

All through the summer of 1922 the Turkish military preparations continued while criticism of Kemal's military leadership increased in Ankara. Finally, on August 26 the Turkish army began to move forward in what has come to be known to the Turks as the Great Offensive (Büyük Taarruz). A force stretching 100 kilometers from Iznik to Afyon Karahisar advanced against the enemy. The major Greek defense positions were overrun on August 26, and Izmit also fell the same day. On August 30, the Greek army was defeated at Dumlupinar, with half of its soldiers captured or slain and its equipment entirely lost. As thousands of Greek soldiers fled toward Izmir, on September 1 Mustafa Kemal issued his most famous order to the Turkish army: "Armies, your first goal is the Mediterranean - Forward!" Prayers for the success of the nationalist efforts were said at the Fatih and Aya
Sofya mosques in Istanbul. On September 2 Eskişehir was captured, and the Greek government asked Britain to arrange a truce that would preserve its rule in Izmir at least. Kemal would have none of this. Balıkesir was taken on September 6, and Aydın and Manisa the next day, the latter burned by the Greeks before their departure. The government in Athens resigned. Two days later the Turkish cavalry raced into Izmir to the cheers of thousands. Bursa was taken on September 10. The next day Kemal’s forces headed for the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles, where the Allied garrisons were reinforced by British, French, and Italian soldiers from Istanbul. Gemlik and Mudanya fell on September 11, with an entire Greek division surrendering. Thousands of Greek soldiers and peasants flooded into Izmir from all over Anatolia and were loaded on Allied transport ships for shipment back to Greece. Civil government in Izmir was now back in Turkish hands, and desperate efforts were made to keep order and prevent looting. On September 13 a fire broke out in the Armenian quarter of the city. It spread rapidly through gasoline-soaked buildings while the Turkish army’s efforts to extinguish it were stymied by the discovery that all the city’s fire hoses had been cut and the fire cisterns emptied. In a single day as many as 25,000 buildings were burned and half the great city destroyed. Perhaps the last atrocity of the war was the suggestion, quickly taken up by the Western press, that the victorious Turkish army was responsible for burning the conquered second city of the old empire. Actual culpability has never been proved.

In the meantime, the advance continued. On September 14, 1922, Bergama and Kuşadası fell into Turkish hands and the French government proposed the return of eastern Thrace. The Istanbul government sent a telegram of congratulations to Kemal, praising what it called “one of the greatest victories in Ottoman history.” On September 18 he was able to announce that the Greek army in Anatolia was completely destroyed. The same day the Allied commanders asked the Turkish forces to move back from the Straits and to observe their neutrality as well as that of Istanbul. The British army prepared for war, sending out a call to London for reinforcements. At home, however, the General Staff reported that the time of year would be “most unpropitious for field operations, and the hardships to which the troops will be subjected will be much more trying to the British than the Turks, who are more or less inured to them.” The British cabinet decided to resist the Turks if necessary at the Dardanelles and to ask for French and Italian help to enable the Greeks to remain in eastern Thrace. On September 19, however, the former abandoned their positions at the Straits, leaving the British alone to face the Turks if they wished to do so. On September 24 Kemal’s troops moved into the Straits zones and refused British requests to leave; conflict seemed near. The British cabinet was divided on the matter. In the end the situation was resolved by the British General Harrington, now Allied commander in Istanbul, who kept his own men from firing on the Turks, warned the cabinet against any rash adventure, and convinced Kemal that he could get what he wanted at a peace conference if he abstained from forcing a conflict. On September 27 at his persuasion the Greek fleet left Istanbul. The same day King Constantine was overthrown and a new regime established in Athens. The British cabinet decided to force the Greeks to withdraw behind the Maritsa in Thrace, and the withdrawal began. This convinced Kemal to accept a truce with the British and the opening of armistice talks (September 29), and so the crisis was averted. The achievement of the National Pact was almost a reality. Only a major intervention would enable the Greeks to triumph, and this was something that Britain no longer was willing.
to undertake. The Turkish War for Independence had achieved its goals. Anatolia was clear of the enemy. Eastern Thrace was being evacuated. On October 2 Kemal returned to a wild reception in Ankara. The war was over. The Turks had won.

The Armistice of Mudanya

The conference to arrange the armistice began on October 3, 1922, at the Marmara sea resort town of Mudanya. Unlike Mondros, now it was the Turkish representative, İsmet İnönü, commander of the victorious western armies, who took the chair, while it was the British and the Greeks who were the vanquished. The British still expected Kemal to make concessions, however, and were startled when he continued to demand fulfillment of the National Pact—so the conference dragged on far beyond the original expectations. While the British troops in Istanbul prepared for a Kemalist attack, the Turkish troops bypassed the city and began mopping up in Thrace. The only concession that İsmet made to the British was an agreement that his troops would not advance any farther toward the Dardanelles. In the end it was the British who had to yield. The Armistice of Mudanya was signed on October 11. By its terms the Greek army would move west of the Maritsa, turning over its positions in Thrace to the Allies, who would in turn surrender them to the Turks. The Allies would occupy the right bank of the Maritsa, and Allied forces would stay in Thrace for a month to assure law and order. In return Kemal’s army would recognize continued British occupation of the Straits zones until the final treaty was signed. This arrangement included also Istanbul, which thus would have to wait a little while longer for liberation.101

Refet Bele now was sent as special representative of the Grand National Assembly to arrange the recovery of Thrace. On October 19 he arrived in Istanbul, the first nationalist representative to reach the old capital since the victory, and he was greeted by a massive reception. The British did not allow the hundred Turkish gendarmes who came with him to land until the next day, however, so that it was only then that the victory parade took place from the Sirkeci boat station up the Divan Yolu to the Aya Sofya mosque, where prayers were offered in gratitude for the Turkish success. The ancient city now witnessed a scene of mass emotion such as never had taken place before in its long history, while the gendarmes marched along.102

End of the Ottoman Empire

Events now came thick and fast as all sides prepared for the peace conference, which the Allies proposed to be held at Lausanne. In England the Conservatives, never too happy with Lloyd George, forced his replacement with Bonar Law, though Lord Curzon, long a friend of the Greeks, remained as foreign minister. In Istanbul the change in regimes was even more dramatic and unusual. The Allies had signed the Mudanya Armistice with the victorious Ankara government, but there still was an Ottoman government in Istanbul, led by the sultan, with Tevfik Paşa as grand vezir—a government, indeed, that had condemned Kemal and the other nationalist leaders to death. Kemal had postponed confronting the problem of what to do with the sultanate until independence was achieved. It still was a problem, since many of Kemal’s strongest supporters retained a strong reverence for the sultan. What, then, was to be done?
The problem was, in a way, solved by the British, who sent invitations for the Lausanne Conference to both the Istanbul and the Ankara governments (October 27, 1922). Right after the latter accepted, Tevfik Paşa said he would be happy to join in representing Turkey at the peace conference. Was the Istanbul government going to resume its power now that the war was over? This was not likely. Aside from all other considerations, such a move would have cost hundreds of nationalist politicians and administrators the positions and power that they had earned during the years of suffering in Ankara. Kemal, therefore, judged that he had sufficient support to push through what he could not have done during the dark days in Ankara. In a cabinet meeting on October 31 he declared that the only solution was to abolish the sultanate and, thus, the Istanbul regime. No one disagreed. On November 1, 1922, the Grand National Assembly enacted new legislation separating the sultanate and the caliphate and abolishing the former. The caliph was left as no more than the leading Muslim religious dignitary, to be chosen by the National Assembly at its convenience. By this act the Istanbul government lost its legal foundation. The entire Ottoman Ruling Class, given its position by the sultan, was thus dispossessed of its rank and functions. Refet Bele informed the Allies that Istanbul thereafter would be under the administration of the Grand National Assembly. On November 4 the Tevfik Paşa cabinet resigned, and the official Ottoman newspaper, *Takvim-i Vekayi*, published its last issue. The next day Refet ordered the Istanbul ministries to stop their activities. The Istanbul government simply ceased to exist. The Grand National Assembly promulgated laws providing severance pay or pensions for bureaucrats still serving in Istanbul. Many, of course, already had or would soon join the Ankara government, which desperately needed manpower. Others retired in order to remain in Istanbul.

The last scene in the drama of Ottoman history approached. Sultan Vahideddin fled the city aboard a British destroyer along with his son, his chamberlain, and a few servants and eunuchs, claiming that his life was in danger (November 16), going first to Malta and then to permanent exile in San Remo. The next day the Assembly deposed Vahideddin as caliph. After Kemal declared “the Turkish people possess all sovereignty without any condition. It does not accept the Caliph's participation in rule in any meaning, any form, any way, by any means,” the choice went to Abdulmecit II (1868–1944), son of Abdulaziz. The new caliph issued a declaration to the Muslims of the world asking them to accept his leadership. The same day the traditional ceremony of homage was performed in the Topkapi Palace. It seemed possible at least that the new arrangement might work, with the caliph's continued existence mollifying those who might otherwise have opposed the Ankara government.

**The Conference and Treaty of Lausanne**

In the meantime the Lausanne Conference began on November 21, 1922. The Ankara government was represented by Ismet Inönü, who had a very difficult task. He was representing the nation that had overturned the Sèvres peace settlement, but the Allies still tried to treat him as representative of a defeated nation. Ismet had been chosen because of his firmness at Mudanya, but just to make sure that he made no concessions Minister of Health Riza Nur was set beside him. He was hardly needed, however. Whenever offensive proposals were made by the Allies, Ismet, long hard of hearing, simply pretended not to hear. Ismet maintained the
basic position of the Ankara government, that it had to be treated as an independent and sovereign state, equal with all others at the conference. In discussing matters regarding control of Turkish finances and justice, protection for the minorities, the Capitulations, the Straits, and the like, he absolutely refused to budge on any proposal that in any way would compromise Turkish sovereignty. Lord Curzon, the British delegate, “often assumed the role of a weary schoolmaster admonishing a stupid pupil. Ismet refused to learn. When the American observer brought the two men together to discuss the judicial capitulations in Turkey, Curzon shouted and beat the wall with his cane. Ismet held out for complete sovereignty and said that the adjustment of such matters took time.” One of the British representatives, reported that “Ismet Pasha, who was well-attended by a phalanx of forbidding-looking Turks seemed impervious to all argument on the subject, and his obtuseness and obstinacy put the patience of the Allied delegates to a severe test.” Ismet used his deafness to gain time and think out his replies, exasperating some of the other delegates but gaining his points. He used the rivalries of the Allies and their fear of the Bolsheviks to Turkish advantage. As the conference went on, Kemal further strengthened the Turkish position by occupying the last towns in eastern Thrace. He improved his political position at home by organizing his own political party, the People’s Party (Halk Fırkast) on December 6. He also sent a huge volume to Lausanne chronicling the Greek atrocities in Thrace and Anatolia. An economic congress was held at Izmir to stress the need for Turkish economic and financial independence. After long months of stalemate the Lausanne Conference recessed (February 4, 1923). When Ismet returned to Ankara, he was severely criticized for the few concessions he had made. The Grand National Assembly then drew up its own peace proposals (March 8, 1923), which Ismet brought back to Lausanne, stimulating new arguments when the conference reconvened on April 23. Three more months of haggling followed, with Ismet making only the most essential concessions while wearing down the opposition, whose press and public became more and more anxious for peace.

Finally, on July 24, 1923, the articles of the Treaty of Lausanne were signed. The territorial integrity of the Turkish nation, as specified by the National Pact, was confirmed with the sole exception of Mosul. Turkey retained eastern Thrace to the Maritsa River along with the railroad town of Karaağaç, on the western bank, added in return for Turkish withdrawal of all reparation claims from Greece. Greece got the Aegean Islands themselves because of their Greek populations, but excluded were the surrounding waters and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos because of their strategic importance at the entrance to the Dardanelles. The boundary with Syria followed the provisions of the Franklin-Bouillon agreement, thus excluding both Hatay (Alexandretta) and Antioch for the moment. Despite the largely Kurdish and Turkish nature of its inhabitants, Britain retained control of the Mosul area in its capacity as mandatory for Iraq because of the oil deposits of the area. Though its final disposition was left to the direct negotiation of the parties, in the end the League of Nations awarded it permanently to Iraq. Armenia and Kurdistan were not mentioned, and the regions in question were given to Turkey in accordance with the principle of self-determination. In return Turkey renounced “all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is recognized by the said Treaty,” thus establishing an anti-irredentist policy that has remained a basic element of the Turkish Republic’s foreign policy ever since.
Though the treaty provided for Turkey to gain full sovereignty within its own boundaries, its terms were vague and implementation took time. For instance, it was stated that “each of the High Contracting Parties hereby accepts, insofar as it is concerned, the complete abolition of the Capitulations in Turkey in every respect.” Yet Turkey also was forced to accept the continued application of all concessionary contracts entered into force before October 20, 1914, and it was only in 1929 that it was able to gain full control over its own customs policies. Other privileges and concessions previously granted to foreigners were eliminated later only as a result of the firm policy of the Turkish government. Insofar as the public debt was concerned, the treaty only determined its size and allocated its obligations among Turkey and the other successor states of the Ottoman Empire. Important questions such as the status of the Public Debt Commission and the monetary value of the debt were so hotly disputed during the conference that they were finally left out of the treaty. The Public Debt Commission had not actually been abolished during the war, but all the enemy representatives and staff had left and the debt payments had been suspended except to the bondholders in the Central Power states. When the Allies took over in Istanbul, they resuscitated the commission with their own representatives, while those of the Central Powers went home, thus reversing the situation. In the end, after long negotiation, the debt of the former empire as a whole was evaluated at 129.4 million Turkish liras (100 kuruş equal 1 lira) and the annual payments at 8.66 million liras, with the Turkish Republic’s share being 84.6 and 5.8 million liras respectively. However, the Turkish Republic refused to accept Abdulhamit’s Decree of Muharrem, which allocated revenues to the Public Debt Commission to make these payments, and no provisions were inserted at Lausanne for its restoration. In fact, it never was restored. Turkey continued to protest the amount of its obligation as set by the treaty, and no further payments were made until 1929. In the end, through the mediation of the League of Nations, a settlement was reached whereby the Turkish debt was reduced to 8 million gold liras (80 million paper liras) and the annual payments to 700,000 gold liras (7 million paper liras), starting in 1933. These payments continued until the last bonds were liquidated in 1944.118

The noneconomic provisions of Lausanne were more definite and final. The foreign and mixed courts were abolished and foreign subjects forced to accept the jurisdiction of Turkish courts. Foreign observers were allowed to watch over the latter, but they could only report and complain if necessary. All foreign postal systems in Turkey were ended. The Turks were allowed to build their military forces without any limitation of size or armament. They were, however, required to leave a demilitarized zone along the Greek border in Thrace to prevent any incidents. The problem of reparation claims was solved when Greece recognized “her obligation to pay for the damage caused in Anatolia by the acts of the Greek army or administration which were contrary to the laws of war,” and Turkey renounced its claims “in consideration of the financial situation of Greece resulting from the prolongation of the war and its consequences.” The Turks and the Allies mutually renounced reparation claims against each other for all wartime damage. All foreign rights to supervise Turkish handling of its minorities were ended. Turkey simply declared that it would protect the life and liberty of all inhabitants, regardless of birth, nationality, language. Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech would be allowed to use their own language in public and private intercourse and even before the courts. Finally, non-Muslim Turks would be allowed to establish and operate whatever charitable, religious, social, and educational institutions they wished.
These provisions were accepted by the Turkish government, and have been observed in full to the present day.

All properties of Allied nationals confiscated during the war were restored, with a mixed arbitration tribunal set up to settle disputes on the subject. The only real limitation placed on Turkish sovereignty outside the financial field came in regard to the Straits, which were internationalized under the control of a mixed commission whose chairman always was to be Turkish. The lands on both sides of the Straits were demilitarized, but Turkey was allowed to send its troops through the neutral zones as needed as well as to station as many as 12,000 men in Istanbul. Turkey finally regained full control over the Straits by the Agreement of Montreux in 1936.

Finally, a separate agreement between Greece and Turkey arranged for a compulsory exchange of population, involving about 1.3 million Greeks and a half-million Turks in all. It included all Greeks living in Anatolia and Thrace with the exception of those who had lived in Istanbul before 1918, and all Turks in Greece except those in western Thrace. The exchange had in fact begun during the latter days of the War for Independence when thousands of Greeks were transported from Izmir to Greece. It left both sides far more homogeneous than before.

The Treaty of Lausanne thus certified and legalized the victory won by the Turkish War for Independence. The National boundaries were secured almost completely. There were no more foreign rights and privileges in the new Turkey. Some deputies in Ankara criticized the abandonment of Mosul and Hatay, but the Assembly approved the accord on August 23 by a vote of 227 to 14.114

The achievement at Lausanne gave Kemal the prestige and authority needed to finish the job of creating a new state. But first the Allied troops had to leave. The final evacuation of the British troops in Istanbul was scheduled for October 2, 1923. The square in front of the Dolmabahçe Palace was prepared for the final ceremony. Guards of honor representing the different Allied armies marched by. As the British soldiers saluted the Turkish flag, the Turkish crowd broke through the lines of the guards and swarmed into the midst of the ceremony in a happy boisterous spirit of celebration. When the British Coldstream Guards marched to their boats, the Turks began to clap and whistle in tune with the cadence. The Coldstream band played "Mustafa Kemal Is Our Commander," and the Turks applauded. The soldiers embarked onto their launches and sailed into the middle of the Bosporus while the British band played "Auld Lang Syne." The first—and last—foreign occupation of Muslim Istanbul had come to an end.115 On October 6 a full division of the Turkish national army marched into Istanbul amid the cheers of thousands of Turks.116 The same day, Damat Ferit Paşa, who had fled to Yugoslavia, died of natural causes in Niš. On October 13 the Grand National Assembly passed a new law making Ankara the official capital of the Turkish state.117 On October 29 it accepted a new constitution that declared the state to be a republic with sovereignty coming from the people. Kemal was elected first president and Ismet İnönü first prime minister of the Turkish Republic.118

There was only one step left, elimination of the caliphate. Abdulmeit had held the office in a reasonably inoffensive way. But as the thrill of Lausanne wore out, he became the center for the opponents of the new regime, who began to intrigue to restore the sultanate and the sultan. When the caliph wrote Kemal asking for increased privileges, the president reacted: "Let the caliph and the whole world know that the caliph and the caliphate which have been preserved have no real meaning and no real existence. We cannot expose the Turkish Republic to any sort
of danger to its independence by its continued existence. The position of Caliphate in the end has for us no more importance than a historic memory." On February 29 Abdulmecit attended his last Friday Selamk, the last such ceremony ever attended officially by a member of the Ottoman dynasty. Four days later, on March 3, 1924, the Grand National Assembly abolished the caliphate, thus ending the Ottoman dynasty and empire. The next day Abdulmecit left Istanbul. The Ottoman Empire was finally extinguished, almost 640 years from the time that Osman had founded the dynasty. A new era in Turkish history had begun.

Notes to Chapter 5

3 Bayar, V, 1572-1582.
4 Midilli Ahmet, Türk İstiklâl Harbinin Başında Milli Mücadele, Ankara, 1928; Bayar, VII, 2368-2383.
7 Karabekir, pp. 2-9, 16-17.
8 Karabekir, pp. 19-23.
11 Biyikhoğlu, Atatürk Anadolu'da, pp. 47-48; HTVD no. 1; Tar. Ves., II/12, p. 402.
14 Türk İstiklâl Harbi, II/2, pp. 120-124; Bayar, VI, 1768-1818, 1903-2046, VII, 2253-2263, VIII, 2474-2567.
15 Bayar, V, 1457-1465, VIII, 2581-2589, 2752-2755.
16 HTVD no. 4, June 1953, doc. 64-65, 69, 71, 77; no. 5, Sept. 1955, no. 92.
18 Karabekir, pp. 35-36, 43; F. Kandemir, Milli Mücadele başlangıcında Mustafa Kemal arkaçaşları ve karşısında hakarsanakiler, Istanbul, 1964, pp. 35-36.
19 Speech, pp. 28-30.
20 Kili, Kemalism; Speech, pp. 30-34; Nutuk, I, 30-34.
21 Bayar, VIII, 2595-2602; Nutuk, I, 35, III, 916-917.
22 Bayar, VII, 2632-2656, 2760-2763.
23 Gologlu, Erzurum Kongresi, pp. 201-203; Bayar, VIII, 2670-2681, 2764-2778.
25 Gologlu, Sivas Kongresi, pp. 232-234; an English tr. can be found in E. G. Mears, Modern Turkey, New York, 1924, pp. 624-627; Tar. Ves. 1/1, June 1941.
26 Kili, Kemalism, pp. 15-16; Nutuk, I, 243; Türk İstiklâl Harbi, II/2, p. 62; Selek, I, 310.
The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975

28 Meclis-i Mebusan, Zabıt Ceridesi, 4 devre 11 inikad, 17 Şubat 1336/17 February 1920, p. 114; Goloğlu, "Üçüncü Meşruyet," 1920, pp. 80-1; an English tr. in Mears, pp. 629-631; New York Times, October 1, 1922; see also Bıyıkçıoğlu, Trakya'da Millî Mücadele, I, 195; Türk İstiklal Harbı, II/2, pp. 95, 100, II/6, kp. IV, 15; Ahmed Emin (Yalman), Turkey in the World War, New Haven, 1930, pp. 276-277; Kili, Kemalism, pp. 224-225.

29 Documents on British Foreign Policy, First Series, XVII, 59-60.
30 Nutuk, II, 443; Türk İstiklal Harbı, II/2, 41, VI, 27.
31 Türk İstiklal Harbı, II/6 kp. IV, p. 16; Türk geldi, Görüp Işıtkilerim, p. 259.
32 Türk İstiklal Harbı, II/2, pp. 97, 101, II/6, kp. IV, 16; Söylemezoğlu, p. 197; Kansu, I, 553; Mears, p. 631.
34 Nutuk, I, 417-419; Kansu, p. 556; Türk İstiklal Harbı, II/2, p. 101; Yalman, Yakın Tarihte, II, 54.
35 Atatürk TTB, IV, 258.
36 Documents on British Foreign Policy, First Series, XVII, 49-50, February 7, 1921.
37 HTVD, no. 13, September 1555, doc. 337; Nutuk, I, 421; Türk İstiklal Harbı, II/2, p. 158; Nurettin Peker, İstiklâl Savaşıının Vesika ve Restimleri, 1955, pp. 159-160.
38 TBMM, Zabıt Ceridesi, 70-79; Webster, p. 86.
40 TBMM, Zabıt Ceridesi, 1/1, p. 145; Türk İstiklal Harbı, II/2, p. 340.
41 Atatürk Soylev, I, 58-59.
45 TBMM, Zabıt Ceridesi, V, 368-369, XIV, 22.
46 Atatürk Soylev, I, 209.
48 HTVD, no. 11 (March 1955), doc. 271; Türk İstiklal Harbı, II/2, 83; VI, 76; Bıyıkçıoğlu, Atatürk Anadolu, 1, 58, 85; Goloğlu, "Üçüncü Meşruyet," p. 143.
50 Speech, pp. 401-402; Edib, Turkish Ordeal, pp. 172-174; Kılıç Ali, İstiklâl Mahkemesi, pp. 1-52.
51 Yunus Nadi, Çerkes Ethem Kuvvetlerinin İhanei, İstanbul, 1955, p. 11.
52 Speech, p. 404; Cebesoy, Hâtrakarlık, p. 466.
55 Halis Asarkaya, Ulusal Savaşı Topat, Ankara, 1936, p. 121.
58 Yakin Tarihte, I, 297.
59 Karabekir, pp. 929-930; Speech, pp. 412-414.
The Turkish War for Independence, 1918–1923

63 Documents on British Foreign Policy, First Series, XVII, pp. 89–90.
65 TBMM, Zabıt Ceridesi, I Devre III, 299; Türk Istiklal Harbi, II/6, kp. IV, 17.
68 Karabekir, p. 840.
69 Karabekir, pp. 950–952.
70 Türk Istiklal Harbi, II/2, pp. 120–124 and map no. 6.
71 Bayar, VII, 2075–2105, 2137–2179.
72 Nutuk, II, 544; Yunus Nadi, Çerkes Edhem, p. 97.
73 Türk Istiklal Harbi, II/2, pp. 194–343.
74 Türk Istiklal Harbi, II/3, p. 260; Şimşir, p. 15; Selek, II, 203.
75 Webster, p. 93; Nutuk, II, 460; Karabekir, pp. 884; Türk İstiklal Harbi, II, 225, 255.
76 Türk İstiklal Harbi, II/3, pp. 249–585.
78 Karabekir, pp. 882, 1165; Cebesoy, Moskova Hatıraları, p. 82.
80 Kili, Kemalism, p. 27; Webster, p. 97.
82 Selek, I, 592; Kili, Kemalism, p. 29.
84 TBMM, Zabıt Ceridesi, XII, 19–21; Nutuk, II, 612, Speech, pp. 515–517; Türk İstiklal Harbi, II/6, kp. 1., p. 194, IV, 229.
85 Nutuk, II, 616; Atatürk TTB, IV, 394–400.
86 Atatürk Soylev, 135.
87 Özalp, I, 213; TV, II/8, 92; Nutuk, II, 618, Selek, I, 287.
88 TBMM, Zabıt Ceridesi, I/12, 264; Nutuk, II, 620; Türk İstiklal Harbi, II/2, 584; Tar. Ves., II/8, 96; Düstür³, II, 143.
89 Düstür³, II, 98–107; Hurewitz, Diplomacy¹, II, 98–100; Nutuk, II, 624; Selek, I, 667; Türk İstiklal Harbi, II/6, kp. I, p. 10, IV, 249, 252.
92 Weiker, p. 46.
93 Türk İstiklal Harbi, II/6, ktb. 1, p. 325, II/6, ktb. 4, p. 37; Şimşir, p. 377.
94 Türk İstiklal Harbi, II/6, kp. 2, p. 277, Atatürk TTB, IV, 450.
95 Şimşir, p. 479.
96 Türk İstiklal Harbi, II/6, kp. 3, p. 156; Edib, Türkün Atesle İmtihanı, p. 292.
98 Türk İstiklal Harbi, II/6, kp. 3, p. 226.
100 Walder, p. 281.
101 Nutuk, II, 679; Türk İstiklal Harbi, II/6, kp. 4, pp. 36, 83; Byukkoğlu, Trakya'da Milli Mııcadele, I, 450–454; Reşat Ekrem (Koçu), Osmanlı Muahedeleri, pp. 312–317.
102 Fethi Tevetoğlu, Atatürkle Samsuna Çıkanlar, pp. 77–81.
103 Nutuk, II, 683, 689, 691; TBMM, Zabıt Ceridesi, I/24, pp. 314–315; Türk İstiklal Harbi, II/6, kp. 4, pp. 111–112; Düstür³, III, 152.
The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975

104 Türk Istiklâl Harbi, II/6, kp. 4, pp. 112-113; Tevetoğlu, Atatürkle Samsun Çıktanlar, p. 86.

105 Büyüköğlu, Atatürk Anadolu, pp. 49-59; Walder, pp. 333-334; Nutuk, II, 692; TBMM, Zabıt Ceridesi, I/24, p. 562; Türk Istiklâl Harbi, II/6, kp. 4, p. 112.

106 Nutuk, II, 699-700.

107 TBMM, Zabıt Ceridesi, I/24, pp. 564-565; Türk Istiklâl Harbi, II/6, kp. 4, p. 113.


110 Nutuk, II, 718.

111 Türk Istiklâl Harbi, II/6, kp. 4, p. 213; Sabis, V, 362; Goloğlu, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, Ankara, 1971, p. 139.


113 Hershiag¹, pp. 27-30; İ. Hakki Yeniay, Yeni Osmanlı Borçları Tarihi, Istanbul, 1964, pp. 113-358.


116 Yalman, Yakın Tarihte, III, 86-87.

117 TBMM, Zabıt Ceridesi, II/2, pp. 665, 670; Nutuk, II, 796.

118 TBMM, Zabıt Ceridesi, II/3, pp. 99, 103.

119 Nutuk, II, 846-848.

120 TBMM, Zabıt Ceridesi, II/7, pp. 7, 24, 27, 69; Nutuk, II, 849.
The Turks had won their independence, but a decade of war and revolution, massacre and countermassacre, banditry, blockade, and foreign occupation had decimated the population and shattered the economy of the lands that composed the new Turkey.

The Turkish Society and Economy in 1923

The disruption was massive. Most non-Muslims were gone, with the Greek community reduced from 1.8 million to 120,000 the Armenians from 1.3 million to 100,000. No less than 2.5 million Turks had died during the war, leaving a population of 13,269,606 in Anatolia and eastern Thrace. Foreign trade had fallen drastically, exports from 2.5 to 0.8 billion kurus, imports from 4.5 to 1.4 billion kurus between 1911 and 1923. State revenues declined from 2.87 to 1.8 billion kurus, with the only consolation being that the dismantlement of the vast bureaucracy of Istanbul had left expenditures at 1.72 billion kurus, providing a surplus for the first time in many years. The retail price index had skyrocketed from 100 in 1914 to 1279 in 1923, and prices were to continue rising during the remainder of the 1920s.

The years of sustained war effort followed by disastrous economic prospects might have led the nationalists of the young Republic to espouse an aggressive militaristic policy like that of the Young Turk leaders of the previous decade. Or they might have resorted to a highly nationalistic, revanchist, dictatorial regime, as in Nazi Germany, by harping on the misfortunes that had beset the nation. Instead, the Turkish Republic adopted a constructive policy based on a positive self-image and optimistic assessment of its future as a nation. Crucial to the success of this attitude were the psychological impact of having won the War for Independence and the quality and nature of the leadership provided in the formative years of the new nation-state. It was Mustafa Kemal, later to be given the surname Atatürk (“Father of the Turks”) by a grateful nation, who used his reputation as victor on the battlefield to secure the respect of the people and inspire and guide them in the years of peace and reconstruction that followed.

The Age of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 1923–1938

Equipped with hindsight provided by history, the circumstances of Atatürk’s life and career, from his humble origins to his education and war service, seem to have had a specific purpose and direction: achievement of the rebirth of the Turkish nation out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. Born in Salonica in 1881, his father
was a bureaucrat on the lowest levels of the Ottoman civil service, thus making him a member of the Ruling Class, but without the kind of loyalty and respect for tradition that other nationalists higher in the social order retained throughout their lives. Mustafa Kemal had a feeling for the needs and thoughts of the common man almost unique among his colleagues. During his school years, in the military preparatory school in Salonica where he first showed the brilliance that earned him the pseudonym Kemal (meaning excellent, mature) from his teacher, in the Istanbul military academy which he entered in 1899, and in his subsequent military career in Damascus and Istanbul, he demonstrated a number of personal qualities that made him a difficult colleague and subordinate but later on an effective national leader. He was very difficult to get along with: When he knew his friends or superiors were wrong, he told them so; when he was proved right, he made sure that they knew. He was extremely impatient with stupidity as well as with those who refused to accept his brilliance. He was highly authoritarian with his subordinates, but he refused to respect the authority of his superiors. In both the Young Turk movement and the army, therefore, he did not receive the positions and ranks that his talent and experience entitled him to, probably saving his political career from an untimely end by removing him from the Young Turk coterie that had brought the nation to disaster. After the Young Turks came to power, they sent him first to Libya (1911–1912), then as military attaché to Bulgaria and Berlin. During World War I, they assigned him first to Gallipoli (1915), then to the Caucasus (1916), and finally to Syria (1917), mainly to relieve themselves of his constant criticism when in Istanbul. Though Kemal admired German military efficiency, he resented what he considered to be the arrogance of the German advisers, and in reaction gained a similar reputation among the Germans and Austrians who served with him. But wherever he was sent, his basic military knowledge and unusual ability to understand, inspire, and lead his men achieved victory in the face of adversity and so brought him the military reputation that was to propel him to the top in the period of chaos that followed the war. During the War for Independence, the same qualities enabled him to lead the Turks to victory. When the local leaders and generals refused to accept his authority, he appealed directly to the people and got them to force their leaders to join him. His authoritarian nature, his belief that only he was right, his inability to accept opposition, his ability to appeal to the common people—all those qualities that had made him a bad colleague and a good soldier now achieved the union of forces necessary for Turkish victory. He also demonstrated a quality not evidenced before, an ability to put first things first, to subordinate long-term principles to the solution of short-range problems, to analyze and use political forces, and to postpone radical changes until the way was prepared for them. Thus it was that during the War for Independence he declared that he was fighting to restore the sultan, thus gaining for the national movement the support of all those who revered the sultanate. Even after the Grand National Assembly had been established in the name of the people, he still maintained that this was being done because the sultan was in the hands of the Allies and that he could therefore not take the lead in saving the Turkish nation. The mass following he gained after driving the Greeks into the sea enabled him to proceed to abolish the sultanate. And it was only after he assured the final triumph of the National Pact at Lausanne that he eliminated the caliphate and created the Turkish Republic. These same qualities of patience and sense of timing were to serve him well during the years of the Republic.

What did Mustafa Kemal envisage for the Turkish nation? His basic ideas and
policies, developed in hundreds of speeches, programs, and laws from the early days of the War for Independence to his death in 1938, have come to be known as Kemalism. Developed originally out of the struggles and debates among the Easternists and Westernists during the early days of the Grand National Assembly and partly included in the new Constitution enacted in 1924 to replace that promulgated during the war, they later were made part of the political programs of the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), which he created as his principal instrument to secure them. In February 1937 they were brought together in six ideologies written into article 2 of the Constitution: Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Revolutionism, Secularism, and Statism. These became the bases for most of the programs developed by Kemal and his successors from 1923 to the present day. The first four principles reflected the ideological basis of the new political structuring, and the last two expressed the policies that were to provide a philosophical framework for reforms.

Republicanism (Cumhuriyetçilik)

Republicanism involved not only replacement of the sultanate by the Republic but also elimination of the whole Ottoman social system through which a small Ruling Class governed and the mass of subjects existed to support it. Kemal's moves to abolish the sultanate and caliphate culminated the process by which the old Ottoman idea of reform had evolved from restoration of old institutions to their destruction and replacement by new ones. The Men of the Tanzimat and Abdulhamit II had applied this new concept mainly to the empire's physical apparatus but had not really extended it to its social bases. Now the sultanate, the caliphate, and the Ruling Class gave way to a republic, manifesting and organizing the sovereignty of the people and their right to rule themselves for their own benefit. The new slogan was "Sovereignty Belongs to the Nation" (Hakimiyet Milletindir). The Republic was to be by and for the people. The people learned that their interests were identical with those of the Republic and that its continued existence and prosperity were essential for theirs.

Nationalism (Milliyetçilik)

Nationalism, and particularly Turkish nationalism (Türkçülük), was the essential rallying cry for the War for Independence and the Republic. The territorial losses and the refusal of the minorities to renounce their national aspirations in favor of a multinational Ottoman state turned Ottomanism to Turkish nationalism. The flight of the minorities during the wars left the Turkish Muslims with 97.3 percent of the total population in 1927, thus making the Republic ethnically and culturally homogeneous and leaving it in a position to fulfill the aims and goals of Turkish nationalism.

The doctrines of nationalism were expounded by the state through the press, the schools and various branches of government, through the Republican People's Party, and through the Turkish Hearth organization inherited from the Young Turks. The main obstacle that had to be overcome was the feeling of scorn heaped on "the Turk" by Ottomans and foreigners alike over the centuries. In reaction, the Kemalist tenets asserted that the Turks were the direct descendants of the world's greatest conquering race, that they had played a leading role in the origins and development of world civilization, and that it was the Turks who had contributed
most to what had been great in the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish Historical Society (*Türk Tarih Kurumu*) was founded in 1925 to show the Turks what they had done in history. Nationalist theories of language and history were expounded, such as the Sun-Language theory, which maintained that Turkish was the first language on earth and that all other languages developed from it; that the Turks were the first people and that all human achievement had essentially Turkish origins; that there was an unbroken thread of Turkish history in Anatolia from the beginning of mankind, not merely from the eleventh century; and that they first appeared in history as Sumerians and Hittites.

A very important element of Turkish nationalism was the increased Turkification of the language under the leadership of the Turkish Language Society (*Türk Dil Kurumu*) founded in 1926. Arabic and Persian were eliminated from the school curriculums. Words of foreign origin were replaced by those of purely Turkish origin, as used by the people, found in old texts, or simply invented according to the rules of Turkish morphology. The Latin script was introduced in place of the Arabic script as the vehicle of the new Turkish. Linguistic nationalism was followed both to make it easier for people to learn to read and also to cut young Turks off from their Ottoman heritage and to replace the conservative mentality of the past with a modern and liberal one. Kemal wanted thus to create a generation of Turks that would not only be proud of its race but would also regard reform and change according to the needs of the time as natural, rather than always looking back to the way things had been done in the "good old days" as had so many Ottoman reformers in the past.

The theories of Turkish nationalism expounded in the 1920s and 1930s were extreme, but they were not created as part of a search for truth as such. Rather, they were weapons to achieve the Republic's aims, and as soon as they had accomplished their purpose, they were mostly abandoned. Turkish nationalism replaced regionalism and unified the Turkish people around common goals. It prevented the class struggles and ideological divisiveness that might have resulted in a period of rapid change. It created a feeling of national solidarity in place of the discredited ideologies of Ottomanism and Pan-Islam. Turkish nationalism encouraged the Turks to build their own land, without fostering aggressive irredentist aspirations. Turkish nationalism was not imperialistic; it did not seek to achieve greatness by regaining lands once ruled by the Ottomans, even in the case of areas still inhabited by considerable Turkish minorities. The Pan-Turkish emphasis of the Young Turks also was ignored and suppressed. The emphasis now was on building a modern state for the Turks within the boundaries of the Republic created by the Treaty of Lausanne. The Republic's only aim regarding the lost territories was to make sure that the Turks living in them were treated fairly and justly.

Thus it was that on June 5, 1926, Turkey signed a treaty with Great Britain surrendering all rights to Mosul in return for 10 percent of the oil produced in the area and British agreement to refrain from further agitation on behalf of the Kurds or Armenians, thus restoring the old friendship between the two and leading to British participation in the Turkish economy. Turkish nationalism was not hostile to its neighbors, even those that it had fought recently. The main objective now was cooperation for mutual benefit. On December 30, 1930, Greece and Turkey concluded a treaty of friendship settling the boundary and population exchange problems, agreeing to naval equality in the eastern Mediterranean, and reaffirming the status quo, partly in fear of Bulgarian desires to regain access to the Aegean through western Thrace. Trade and friendship treaties signed in 1930 with Britain,
Hungary, Germany, Bulgaria, and others also marked Turkey’s reentry into the concert of nations, culminating with its entry into the League of Nations on July 18, 1932. In the face of Italian aggression in Ethiopia and the fear of similar moves in the Middle East, Turkey supported the League of Nations as well as its Balkan neighbors and moved closer to Britain and France. On February 9, 1934, Turkey joined the Balkan Entente Treaty signed in Athens, with Greece, Yugoslavia, and Rumania guaranteeing each other’s territorial integrity and independence and establishing machinery to settle disputes among the signatories. The Balkan non-signatory was Bulgaria, which continued to nourish ambitions in Macedonia, western Thrace, and the Dobruca despite improving relations with Turkey. Only two major problems prevented a full rapprochement with the world, the Straits, and the province of Alexandretta. On April 11, 1936, Turkey asked the signatories of the Lausanne Treaty for permission to fortify the Straits and resume full sovereignty. The result was the Agreement of Montreux (July 20, 1936), by which the Turkish proposals were accepted by all the Lausanne signatories excepting Italy, which finally acquiesced in a separate agreement (May 2, 1938).

The matter of Alexandretta (Hatay) was harder to solve, since its population was equally divided between Turks and Arabs and another nation, Syria (under French mandate), was involved. The Franklin-Bouillon agreement (1921) had established an autonomous regime there under the French. This satisfied the Turks until September 1936 when France promised Syria its full independence, including Alexandretta. Atatürk responded with a demand that the latter be given its own independence (October 9, 1936). He also formed the Hatay Independence Society (Hatay Erginlik Cemiyeti) in Istanbul to centralize the activities of its residents living outside the province and wishing to make their protests known. Turkey then brought the matter to the League of Nations, resulting in an agreement for a special arrangement that would give Alexandretta independence, demilitarize it, and guarantee the rights of its Turkish inhabitants. Turkey was so satisfied by this that it joined the Sa'adabad Pact with Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan, which provided the signatories with the same kind of territorial guarantees and mutual assistance that the Balkan Pact had done in the west (July 8, 1937). But when the new Alexandretta regime went into effect and elections were held (November 29, 1937), France responded to Syrian pressure with a decision to give the Turks only a minority representation in the provincial government and Parliament. This so angered Turkey that it denounced its 1926 friendship treaty with Syria and protested to the League (December 15, 1937). Finally, an agreement was reached with France (July 3, 1938) by which the province was made into a joint Franco-Turkish protectorate, with troops from both sides to guarantee order pending a general election to determine its fate. After a summer of campaigning, the elections (July 21) provided a Turkish majority of 22 to 18 in the National Assembly. The new state, now called Hatay, began using Turkish flags, and petitioned Ankara for union. This was impossible as long as the French remained there, but France finally agreed to annexation in return for Turkish entry into a nonaggression pact (July 23, 1939), followed by a similar agreement with Britain. In return for Turkey’s support in the conflict then unfolding with Nazi Germany, then, France and Britain acquiesced in the establishment of Turkish rule in a province that according to its population make-up probably could have justly gone to either of its neighbors.

If there was a harmful aspect to the nationalism of the Turkish Republic, it involved a self-imposed isolation of individuals from the world and an overly self-
centered view of Turkey. Though Western institutions, practices, and ideas were accepted, instruction in foreign languages and non-Turkish history was reduced in the schools, partly in reaction to overemphasis of foreign languages and history before World War I, partly also so that the official language and history theories would remain unquestioned. While the foreign and minority schools were allowed to continue operating, they could not expand, and their social science instruction in particular was subject to the guidelines of the Ministry of Education. Turkish newspapers concentrated almost entirely on internal affairs. This created a whole generation of educated people who knew little of the world, could not read Western publications, and viewed the world largely in terms of its relationship to Turkey. We shall see later how this isolation and self-centeredness broke down during and after World War II.

**Populism (Halkçılık)**

Closely connected with Turkish nationalism was the Kemalist doctrine of Populism, a corollary to Republicanism, that government was of the people, not the Ruling Class. This idea had various manifestations. One was that all citizens of the Republic were equal regardless of class, rank, religion, or occupation. So it was that the 1924 Constitution specified that “The People of Turkey, regardless of religion and race, are Turks as regards citizenship” (article 88). “All Turks are equal before the law and are expected to conscientiously abide by it. Every kind of group, class, family, and individual special privilege is abolished and prohibited” (article 69). Every Turk, regardless of origin, was given the same right to practice “the philosophical creed, religion, or doctrine to which he may adhere” (article 75). Citizens therefore could no longer be given different rights and positions according to their millets. While Lausanne essentially confirmed the autonomy of the latter, the promise of equality under the Republic was sufficient to convince the Jews to renounce their separate legal status and rights (October 8, 1925), the Armenians following three weeks later and the Greeks, after much more debate, on January 7, 1926. The millets continued to provide religious and social leadership for their coreligionists and separate schools, hospitals, and other social institutions for those wishing to use them, with the government insisting only that all millet children receive their elementary education in the state schools or according to curriculums established by the Ministry of Education, in order to provide the common bonds needed for them to participate fully in Turkish life (March 23, 1931). A further step toward equality came in 1928 when the articles of the 1924 Constitution specifying Islam as the state religion, including reference to Allah in the official oath and requiring the National Assembly to enforce the Şeriat, were replaced by articles separating religion and state and declaring the Turkish Republic a secular state. Since then members of the non-Muslim religions have had full legal equality in the Turkish Republic.

The second basic premise of Populism involved government by and for the people. Institutions had to be developed to enable the Republic's citizens to share in the process of rule. This was formally accomplished through the Grand National Assembly. Since its foundation, the Assembly had been given both legislative and executive powers, the latter carried out through the president of the Republic, elected by it, and the former through the Council of Ministers, chosen by and responsible to the president. Judicial functions were carried out in the name of the Assembly, in accordance with the law, by courts that were independent of it. At
The vote was given only to every male Turk aged 18 or over, but in 1934 women also were given the right to vote and serve as deputies. Representatives were elected for four-year terms by the people, but through an indirect voting system until 1946, when direct elections were substituted. The deputies' immunities were guaranteed by provisions that only the Grand National Assembly could surrender one of its members to the authorities for trial and that if he was found guilty, execution of the sentence had to wait until the expiration of his term. The Assembly was to convene annually on November 1 without being convoked by any other authority; only it had the right to decide on its dissolution and the holding of new elections. Legislation could be initiated either by its members or by the cabinet collectively. It could not recess for more than six months during the year, but if it was in recess, the president of the Republic or president of the Council of Ministers could recall it in case of emergency. The Assembly also had to reconvene if requested by one-fifth of its members. Debates were to be public, with reports fully published, but the Assembly could also meet in secret session and decide on the propriety of publishing such discussions. The president's term was set at four years, but he could be reelected by the Assembly and, of course, Kemal continued in that position through the remainder of his life. The president's powers seemed limited, at least on paper. Though he was a member of the Assembly, he could not participate in debates or vote. He could veto a law within ten days of its passage, but the deputies could pass it over his veto by majority vote. All decrees promulgated by the president also were signed by the prime minister and the relevant minister, while the latter two alone were responsible for their enforcement. The president did have power, however, and this came mainly from his right to designate the prime minister from among the members of the Assembly, with the other ministers being chosen by the latter but approved by the president before being presented collectively for the approval of the Assembly. Once approved and in office, however, they were responsible to the Assembly rather than to the president for the government's policies and programs.

The powers of the Assembly were enforced by the constitutional provisions regarding the budget. The government had to present it annually to the Assembly for its approval at the opening of each session, and it also had to present a statement of fiscal accounting to the Assembly no later than the beginning of the second year following the fiscal year. Budgets were approved only for one year; the government could not spend money beyond the budgetary provisions without additional Assembly approval; and the latter also could establish its own Accounting Office "to control the revenues and expenditures of State on behalf of the Grand National Assembly" (articles 95–101).

One of the few Tanzimat relics left in the republican period was the Council of State (Şuras Devlet, later called Danştay), whose members were elected by the Assembly "from among those who have held important posts, who possess great experience, who are specialists or who are otherwise qualified." Its duties involved deciding administrative controversies, advising on the contents and propriety of legislative proposals and government contracts and concessions, sanctioning cabinet regulations, providing for execution of the laws passed by the Assembly, acting as a court of appeal in matters of administrative justice, and deciding on conflicts among organs of government (articles 51–52). In many ways, thus, the Council of State evolved into a Supreme Court, and in its participation in both the legislative and executive processes it gained a far more active role than similar bodies in other countries.
The Constitution provided that “judges are independent in the conduct of trials and in the rendering of their judgments. They shall be protected from any sort of intervention and are subject only to the law. Neither the Grand National Assembly of Turkey nor the Cabinet may modify, alter, delay or influence the execution of their judgments” (article 54). Every person could use all legal means needed to defend his rights before the courts. And a High Court (Divan-ı Ali) of 21 members, of whom 11 were chosen from among members of the Court of Appeals (Temyis Mahkemesi) and 10 from the Council of State, was established to try members of the cabinet, the Council of State, and the Court of Appeals “in all questions pertaining to the performance of their duties” (article 61).

The old districts and communes were retained, but the old large vilayets established by the Tanzimat were now broken into 62 new provinces. Their governors were nominally given much more autonomy than their nineteenth-century Ottoman predecessors, but this meant little in practice, since the Constitution also established general inspectorship (mufettislık) districts, each including from 10 to 14 provinces, which dealt with all military and health matters as well as most questions of education and finance. In addition, each province had military, financial, and educational officials appointed by and responsible to the Ankara ministries, leaving the governors to do no more than coordinate their activities and represent the prime minister’s office in the process of administration.

There was no prohibition of a multitude of parties in the Constitution. But Kemalism came to dictate that the people’s interests could best be served by focusing its energies into the party that Kemal had evolved out of the Committee to Defend the Rights of Anatolia and Rumeli, called first simply the People’s Party (Halk Fırkası) and after the establishment of the Republic, the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) (hereafter abbreviated as the RPP). There were several opposition groups during the War for Independence, as we have seen. Only the Second Group (İkinci Gurup) was important, however, since it included a number of Kemal’s close associates. But since it basically represented the Westernists in the Assembly and included some who opposed the basic tenets of Kemalism, especially Secularism, Kemal made very certain that in the elections held in August 1923 for delegates to the second Grand National Assembly its members were defeated, thus leaving full control to his own party. It was mainly subsequent challenges to secularism and modernism that led Kemal to exclude rival parties in later years. Soon after the caliphate was abolished, a number of leading military figures of the revolution, including Kâzım Karabekir, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Refet Bele, and Rauf Orbay, attacked the government’s secularist and modernist policies. Kemal reacted by demanding that they give up either their military positions or their assembly seats. They resigned from the former and also from the RPP (October 26–November 9, 1924), joining many members of the Second Group to form the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası), which included also many respected civilian nationalists like Adnan Adivar and his wife, Halide Edip. The new party carried on the spirit of the Westernists and the Second Group. It opposed abolition of the caliphate and the secularizing policies of the government. But it was reformist in its own way. It encouraged free enterprise and foreign capital investment more than the government’s current economic policies and declared its full support for Republicanism, Democracy, and Liberalism. Imitating the RPP, it began to build its own national organization to secure a mass following. Criticizing Kemal’s merging of the government and the RPP, it demanded that he be above party. Kemal at first tried to reconcile the existence of the new group with the people’s need for practice in the exercise of democracy, going as far as to replace
Prime Minister Ismet Inönü, a particular object of their criticism, with Ali Fethi Okyar to meet some of their criticism. Kemal apparently allowed the party to grow because he felt that by this time opposition to the Republic was so weak that it could no longer gain mass support. But the new party's existence unleashed such a torrent of willing supporters from all sides of the political spectrum that the president and his associates soon were forced to recognize their error. It was the party's very success that doomed it, since it stimulated the rise of a number of violent opposition groups whose existence finally convinced the government to suppress all of them. 

Early in 1925 a serious revolt began in southeastern Anatolia led by the Kurds. It was stimulated by the Russian Communists, who no longer could use the Armenians as weapons of disruption, and by the Turkish conservatives to express their own opposition to the government's religious and secularist policies. Ravaging widely in the area of Diyarbekir under the leadership of Şeyh Sait, the rebels burned and looted Elazığ and a number of smaller towns. As the movement attracted sympathy among conservative groups in Istanbul and elsewhere, Kemal acted decisively to curb it before it became a rallying point for a general reaction against the Republic. On March 3 Ismet replaced Ali Fethi as prime minister. He got the Assembly to issue the Restoration-of-Order Law (March 4, 1925), by which the government was given virtual dictatorial powers for a period of two years, with Independence Tribunals (İstiklâl Mahkemesi) again being established in Ankara and the eastern provinces to convict, imprison, and/or execute rebels according to the gravity of their crimes. The rebels soon were disbanded. Şeyh Sait and his chief assistants were captured (April 15), convicted by the Eastern Independence Tribunal (May 25), and executed (June 29), thus putting the cap for the moment on both the Kurdish and the conservative reactions.

The experience, however, convinced Kemal that continued existence of opposition parties would only focus and deepen these and other sources of discontent. On June 3, 1925, therefore, the Council of Ministers decreed that the Progressive Republican Party be dissolved after its founders had been pressured to do so and refused. On August 12 the Istanbul newspaper Vatan was closed and its founder and editor, Ahmet Emin Yalman, arrested, both orders eventually, however, being rescinded. The same day the Ankara Independence Tribunal convicted the well-known Communist poet Nazım Hikmet and several of his colleagues of spreading Communist propaganda. This indicated that there were limits on the extent Kemal would allow the Russians to take advantage of their Turkish friendship. Since these measures came just before the government's introduction of new clothing regulations and decrees closing the dervish lodges (tekkes) (see pp. 385–386), their object was clear; a minority of conservative agitators would not be allowed to use the new democracy to stir popular opposition to secularism. In the process the kind of political opposition represented by the Progressive Republican Party also had to be sacrificed.

The Restoration-of-Order Law and the Independence Tribunals were abolished soon afterward (March 2 and 7, 1927), but renewed Kurdish uprisings in the summers of 1927 and 1928, supported by coalitions of Communist and reactionary groups around the country, made the government reluctant to sanction any new political opposition despite European criticisms in this regard. The Restoration-of-Order law was revived late in 1927, and it was only after the last Kurdish movement had been suppressed on March 4, 1929 that Kemal felt secure enough to tell the Assembly that he did not feel it had to be renewed.

Kemal now felt he had achieved the basic aim of his initial reforms, general
acceptance of the Republic and of Secularism, so that the time had come for a new opposition party to give the Assembly, the government, the people, and even the RPP the kind of stimulus needed for them to work more efficiently and rapidly for the common good. As depression and economic crisis were stirring the kind of internal criticism that might have gained revolutionary content unless given some means of expression, Kemal sought to create a limited opposition, channeling the discontent into a harmless movement that he could control. To lead the opposition Kemal chose his former prime minister, Ali Fethi Okyar, who since his dismissal in 1925 had been ambassador to Paris. Emerging from a long meeting with Kemal, Ali Fethi announced the formation of the Free Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkast), with a program that differed from that of the government mainly on questions of financial and economic policy while accepting its other basic principles. Ali Fethi soon began to build a national organization, touring the country to enlist mass support, advocating an end to state monopolies and the encouragement of free enterprise and foreign investment, lower taxes, closer ties with Turkey's Balkan neighbors and the League of Nations, and a freer political climate. Kemal wavered between allowing the party enough parliamentary strength to exercise significant opposition and limiting its role in fear of weakening the government. In the end, only 15 RPP deputies went over, including the journalist Ahmet Ağaoğlu, who became its principal spokesman, Nuri Conker, its first secretary general, Mehmet Emin Yurdakul, the "Poet of the Revolution," and, surprising to many, Kemal's sister Makbule, his "gift" to the movement.

In the end the Free Republicans, like their predecessors, were doomed by their success in stimulating the opposition not only of those republican supporters who wanted to criticize the rigors and mistakes of the RPP regime but also of the reactionaries and Communists, who sought to use the movement despite Ali Fethi's rigorous efforts to avoid their embrace. As he traveled around western Anatolia, his public gatherings were accompanied by numerous incidents, as radical mobs used the occasion to attack RPP buildings. The extent of popular support for the new party again began to alarm the government. In addition, ministers and other political leaders who bore the brunt of the new party's quite justified criticisms of inefficiency, dishonesty, or failure began to resent its existence and used their access to the president to convince him it should be ended. When conservatives in other parts of the country began to form their own illegal parties, Kemal began to feel that the situation was getting out of hand. The final blow came in the Assembly debate of November 15, 1930, when Ali Fethi complained of large-scale irregularities that he felt had cost his party many seats in the recent elections. Most RPP members replied by attributing the Free Republican Party's failure to its own inadequacies, in the usual political manner, but one went so far as to accuse Ali Fethi himself of treason during the War for Independence. Ali Fethi replied with attacks on the RPP, and the debate degenerated, leading Kemal, who was an interested observer, to conclude that Turkey was not yet ready for a responsible opposition and to order the party to disband as rapidly as possible (November 17, 1930). The president's will was carried out immediately by the party leaders, and it was officially dissolved by cabinet decree (December 21, 1930), thus ending Kemal's second effort to establish an opposition. A number of Free Republican Party deputies, however, continued to cooperate in the Assembly on an unofficial basis for some time afterward.

It was, then, through the instrument of a single party, the RPP, that the Kemalist programs were formulated and carried through, with Kemal controlling the Assembly, and thus the government, through the party. It was declared to be a
"republican, populist, nationalist political organization," with Kemal as its permanent chairman. Membership was limited to the elite of Turkish society, who were admitted through a complicated system of introductions and examinations and were required to accept strict party discipline, regularly attend party meetings, and work as the party directed. Party branches were organized throughout the country to include representatives of all the major political, economic, and social groups that supported the Republic's aims. The party, therefore, became the means of reconciling and mediating what differences existed in approach and method so that its decisions, as carried out in the Assembly, did represent the merging views of the nation, at least those in the nation who approved the ideals of Kemalism.

In order to remedy the deficiencies exposed by the Free Republican Party episode, the RPP also became the government's principal agent for mass political education and indoctrination in the ideals of the Republic. This kind of adult-education program had begun with the Turkish Hearth movement, which had played an important role in initially organizing Turkish national feeling against the peace settlement and the Allied occupation. But its energies had been absorbed by the nationalist movement and it did not recover its early vigor during the early years of the Republic. In 1932, therefore, it was abolished and its branches were absorbed into a new organization set up by the RPP, the People's Houses (Halk Evleri), established in the cities and larger towns, and, later, the People's Rooms (Halk Odaları), opened in the small towns and villages. The main objective of the new organization was to educate people in the Kemalist ideals and to create ideological unity between the educated elite running the party and the Assembly, and the masses. Thus the opponents of the Republic would be deprived of possible mass support for their subversive ideas. The People's Houses and the People's Rooms functioned on several levels. They became adult-education centers as well as schools for political education for Turks of all ages. They became community centers, with programs of sports, movies, and cultural activities. They developed their own educational courses, research, and publication in areas needed to support the Kemalist doctrines, especially in Turkish history, language, and folklore. Their fine-arts sections presented performances and encouraged mass participation in the presentation of modern music and art. Their sports sections emphasized team sports to develop a feeling of cooperation for the common effort. Their social divisions cared for those in need. The adult-education sections offered courses on reading, handicrafts, fine arts, health and hygiene, and the like. Village affairs sections were established in some areas to improve the physical and social condition of the villagers and to encourage a feeling of unity between them and the city dwellers by arranging visits. The principal organ of the movement was Ulkü (Ideal), published by the Ankara People's House starting in 1932 under the editorship of RPP General Secretary Recep Peker for four years and then of the distinguished historian Fuat Köprüülü until 1941. Many local People's Houses published their own journals and books, which included useful material on local history, folklore, and society. There also was the Halk Bilgisi Haberleri (News of Folk Culture), edited after 1927 by the folklorist Pertev Naili Boratov, who made it into a major instrument of research into social and religious groups, nomadic tribes, agricultural methods, and other matters of interest to the villages. At its peak in 1940 the People's House movement had some 130,000 members, and it had a major impact on developing public opinion in town and country.

The dictatorship of president and party, made possible by the principle of Populism and its claim that all interests in the state are embodied in the party and
represented by its president, has been criticized as having denied the Turkish people their right to govern themselves. Such criticism would be more just if Kemal's totalitarianism had been used to misrule the people, regain lost territories, or persecute minorities. But in fact the policies of the government were directed toward modernizing the nation and improving its people's lives. The forms of democracy were provided so that people and politicians could gain experience in their use. While the opposition parties were suppressed during most of the era of Atatürk he encouraged public discussion of the major issues, himself answering his critics in speeches to the Assembly, in the press, and while traveling around the country to speak with the people. That the system did in fact work as intended is demonstrated by the success of Turkish democracy in the years following his death, when the institutions that he left produced a nation that is modern, vibrant, and democratic.

Revolutionism (Inkilâçılık)

Another Kemalist doctrine reflecting the philosophical basis of change was Revolutionism. It involved a readiness, even zeal, to transform the traditional Ottoman society into a modern one by radical, forced measures aimed at achieving success within the span of a single generation. This method was dictated by the need to protect the nation against its enemies and also to justify the radical measures taken to establish the Republic. Revolutionism basically involved the use of whatever was needed to make sure that the revolution begun in 1919 would achieve its aims. So it was that the RPP declared in 1935 that it did not consider itself and the conduct of the state to be limited to gradual, evolutionary steps of development. It committed itself to defending the principles that had been developed as part of revolutionism.

The modernism that was to be achieved through the institutions developed out of Republicanism and Populism—for the objectives of Nationalism, and through the techniques of Revolutionism—was supplemented by two more Kemalist doctrines, which directed and defined the outlook and policies of the state: Secularism and Statism.

Secularism (Layiklik)

Secularism involved not just separation of the state from the institutions of Islam but also liberation of the individual mind from the restraints imposed by the traditional Islamic concepts and practices, and modernization of all aspects of state and society that had been molded by Islamic traditions and ways. Liberation of the state had to come first. Abolition of the caliphate was followed by a series of reforms to end the union of state and religion that had characterized the Ottoman Empire, thus in turn ending the ability of the religious class to limit and control the state. The position and office of şeyhülislam and the Ministry of Religious Foundations were abolished and replaced by small departments for Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Müdürlüğü) and Religious Foundations (Evkaf Müdürlüğü), placed directly under the prime minister's office. The foundation properties were retained and administered separately. But their revenues went to the treasury, which used most of them for general state purposes while allotting only as much as was needed to finance the maintenance of the mosques and other religious buildings and to pay the salaries of a bare minimum of religious officials. Most members of the ulema were pensioned off (March 3, 1924). The entire system of religious schools also was eliminated, with the mekteps and medreses being incorporated into...
a unified system of national education under the direction of the Ministry of Education.\textsuperscript{31}

The periodic revolts and disturbances of Muslim conservatives often were direct responses to these and other measures that eliminated the remaining bases of their former power. On April 8, 1924, a National Law Court Organization Regulation (\textit{Mahkeme Teşkilatı Kanunu}) abolished the Şeriat courts, retired their judges, and transferred their jurisdiction to the secular courts.\textsuperscript{32} Soon after, the \textit{Mecelle} and the Şeriat were replaced by new secular codes of civil law (\textit{Türk Medeni Kanunu}, October 4, 1926),\textsuperscript{33} criminal law (\textit{Türk Ceza Kanunu}, July 1, 1926),\textsuperscript{34} and commercial law (\textit{Türk Ticaret Kanunu}), based respectively on the corresponding Swiss, Italian, and German codes. On November 30, 1925, the Assembly closed the dervish lodges (tekke) and cells (saviye) as well as all religious tombs (türbe), abolished religious titles and their use, and prohibited the wearing of clerical garb in public except under special circumstances such as funerals.\textsuperscript{35} The 1928 changes in the Constitution ending the stipulations that Islam was the state religion and that the government had to support the Şeriat, thus were only confirmations of what had already been done to undermine the religious institutions and leaders, though the latter's influence over the masses, particularly in the countryside, continued for some time.

Other changes were directed more toward undermining the religious classes indirectly by encouraging a spirit of modernism in the minds and hearts of everyone in the republic. Polygamy was abolished and divorce by court action introduced, with women being given extensive grounds to divorce their husbands. The wearing of turbans and fezzes in public was prohibited, and the hat was made the official headgear, thus ending the traditional distinctions in rank, class, and religion (November 25, 1925).\textsuperscript{36} The use of the veil was discouraged, particularly in the cities, but it never actually was made illegal. Civil marriages were made compulsory for all, though those wishing to do so still could have religious marriages as well (September 1, 1926). Muslim women now begun to expose themselves in beauty contests, and in 1929 the first Turkish beauty queen was chosen.\textsuperscript{37} Women were allowed to vote and be elected, first in the municipalities (April 3, 1930, then the village councils of elders (October 26, 1933), and finally in national elections for the Grand National Assembly (December 1934).\textsuperscript{38} Women were admitted to the public schools, the civil service, and the professions on an increasingly equal basis with men.

A series of further shocks assaulted the conservatives and emboldened the modernists. In 1925 the international time and calendar systems replaced the traditional Islamic ones, which already had been reduced to limited usage by the end of the nineteenth century (December 26, 1925).\textsuperscript{39} Six years later the metric system definitively replaced the old measures of weight and capacity (March 26, 1931).\textsuperscript{40} Buildings and houses had to be numbered and all streets named, in the European fashion, supplementing but never quite replacing the Middle Eastern system of locating houses in relation to the major squares and places in their vicinities (April 10, 1927).\textsuperscript{41} Spirits and alcohol were made legal for Muslims, and their production and sale were continued in a government monopoly so that the treasury would receive all the profits (March 22, 1926).\textsuperscript{42} Statues and paintings of Kemal began to appear in public places in October 1926, flouting the old Muslim tradition against the representation of living things. Government decrees required that tugras and religious phrases be removed from the exteriors of public buildings, and their use on private buildings was discouraged as well (May 5, 1927).\textsuperscript{48}
An indirect but most effective step toward breaking old religious traditions came in the area of language and its use. On November 1, 1928, the Grand National Assembly required all Turks to learn and use Latin letters in place of the traditional Arabic ones by the beginning of the new year, either by passing an examination or by attending a system of special national schools (millet mektepleri) established to teach their use. By the middle of 1929 all publications were being printed in the new script, while the use of Arabic and Persian even for religious books was strictly prohibited. Instruction in these languages was also, of course, ended in the schools (September 1929). Turkish translations of the Koran, anathema to orthodox Muslims, were written with government encouragement and recited publicly on January 22, 1932, creating a sensation among many. A public Friday service was recited in Turkish for the first time at the Suleymaniye mosque only a few days later, and just a year after Turkish was required in both calls to prayer and in prayer in the mosques around the country. The use of Turkish in place of the foreign geographic names commonly in use—thus Istanbul in place of Constantinople and Edirne instead of Adrianople—also was urged on all foreign companies and embassies, with an encouraging response. Citizens were required to adopt family names (June 21, 1934), with the Assembly subsequently giving Kemal the name Atatürk and forbidding that name to anyone else, while he in turn suggested names to many of his associates, including that of İnönü, site of the famous battles, to his old friend the prime minister, who now became İsmet İnönü. The use of official titles like Paşa, Bey, and Efendi was prohibited, and all positions and ranks connected with these titles were abolished. The final steps came with the adoption of Western clothing and with making Sunday, instead of the Muslim Friday holiday, the official day of rest.

An important element of secularism was the development of a modern system of education throughout the Republic. Here direction was left to the Ministry of Education, helped by an Education Council (Maarif Şurası), which included ministry officials and representatives of the various levels of education, both teachers and administrators, who met periodically to develop policy on matters of curriculum and school regulations. At first the nation was divided into 12 education districts, each controlled by a superintendent of education (maarif emini) appointed by and responsible to the ministry rather than the provincial officials. But subsequently control over education was decentralized, with the districts abolished and each province given its own Education Director (maarif müdürü), appointed by the governor and responsible not only for carrying out the ministry's directives but also for modifying them to meet local problems and needs.

Public education now was completely divorced from religion, and religious lessons were forbidden, leaving them to the family or, where they existed, to hocas maintained privately, mainly in the smaller villages. Elementary education was made compulsory and free for all children, regardless of religion, to assure a common training. The basic structure of elementary, intermediate, and lycée education inherited from the nineteenth century was retained, and changes in curriculum and length of terms of study were introduced to strengthen the lower levels and make them more than just preparatory stages for secondary education. As time went on, foreign experts, including John Dewey, were brought to Turkey to recommend further changes. Large-scale programs training new teachers and building new schools soon made the ideal of compulsory elementary education a reality all over the nation. The old problems of securing sufficient teachers for the more distant rural areas continued, however, to limit the extension of the higher levels as
rapidly as they were needed. Though emphasis was on technical and career training, the schools continued to provide a kind of literary and classical education not suited to the needs of many, especially in the rural areas. The teachers also, while usually well trained, soon became parts of an educational bureaucracy that tended to discourage innovation and interest, a problem certainly not unique to Turkey. As the result of the government efforts, however, the number of schools in the country doubled between 1923 and 1940, from 5,062 to 11,040; the number of teachers increased by 133 percent, from 12,458 to 28,298; and the number of students increased by slightly less than 300 percent, from 352,668 to 1,050,159. Literacy improved slowly but steadily. In 1927 only 10.6 percent of the population (17.4 percent of the men and 4.7 percent of the women) could read. By 1940 this had improved to only 22.4 percent (33.9 percent of the men and 11.2 percent of the women), with Istanbul much above the national average, though still no more than half the population there could read. Disparities in literacy between urban and rural dwellers and between men and women continued to be marked, with only a very few village children going beyond the elementary levels due to family opposition and the lack of economic incentives.

At the higher levels also the educational plant begun by the Tanzimat was retained but modernized, often with the help of foreign experts and teachers. The Ottoman University (Dar ılf-ı-Fınun) was reorganized as the University of Istanbul in 1933. In the process, however, the Ministry of Education gained much more control than before, and many members of the old staff were replaced by German refugees, improving the quality of education but setting a precedent for further government intervention in later years. In January 1936 the Faculty of Language and History-Geography (Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi) was opened as the nucleus of the new University of Ankara. The old Civil Service School (Mekteb-i Müktüye) of Istanbul, only recently reorganized into the School of Political Sciences (Siyasal Bilgiler Okulu), was moved to Ankara. The numbers of vocational, technical, and teacher-training schools were increased, technical academies enlarged, and the War Academy (Harbiye) transferred to Ankara. Between 1923 and 1940 the number of higher faculties and technical schools increased from 9 to 20, teachers from 328 to 1,013, and students from 2,914 to 12,147, a sizable though not substantial improvement.

Though the secularism of the Republic was aimed at lessening the influence of the clergy and creating an environment in which the individual could follow his religious beliefs without having to embrace predetermined dogma and conform to strict rules, it did not intend to abandon Islam as some of its opponents have claimed. The secularist program never opposed religion as such. There were no atheistic institutes on the Soviet model. The state was not anticlerical as long as the ulema made no overt attempt to interfere with the reforms. Worship at mosques was not forbidden. Religious leaders never were prevented from performing their religious functions. But the education centered in the secular schools and People's Houses did attack the obscurantism of the Muslim clergy and mysticism of the dervishes. Young people questioned the value of traditional rites and were indifferent to the teachings of the clergy. Attendance at mosque services in Kemal's time was limited largely to the older generation except in the villages, where the influence of the ulema remained strong. On the whole, however, by World War II the secularist policies of the Republic had achieved their main goals. The leaders of religion had little influence on the masses in the cities, and their hold in the villages decreased as communications were improved and the villagers benefited from educa-
tion and economic development and an increased movement of population to the cities. People now accepted the ideas that civil affairs could be carried out better by government officials than by the clergy and that the doctrines of traditional Islam as propounded by the ulema were not always sufficient to cope with the demands of modern life. But as in the case of other programs of the Republic, this victory was achieved at a price. An entire generation of Muslim Turks was deprived of any education in the values of their religion except that provided sporadically by parents and a few hocas. Nationalism commanded the spiritual commitment once reserved to religion but was unable to provide the spiritual solace and philosophical comprehensiveness provided by Islam. The reconciliation of nationalism and spiritual needs was to come about gradually, as the tension created by rapid secularization diminished and a balance emerged.

Statism (Etatism) and the Economic Development of the Turkish Republic

The Republic's economic policies in Atatürk's time followed a confusing and only partly successful mixture of private enterprise and governmental supervision and participation in a program which came to be known as Statism.

In the area of agriculture, which remained by far the largest segment of the Turkish economy, the Republic took over the policies of the Young Turk period, adding assistance and some incentives to encourage the cultivator. In 1924 the Conscription Law required the army to train conscripts from the villages in the use of machines and new cultivation techniques in the course of their military service. In the area of agriculture, which remained by far the largest segment of the Turkish economy, the Republic took over the policies of the Young Turk period, adding assistance and some incentives to encourage the cultivator. In 1924 the Conscription Law required the army to train conscripts from the villages in the use of machines and new cultivation techniques in the course of their military service. The Village Law encouraged local initiative and the use of modern methods and provided means to instruct cultivators on how to improve their standards of living and develop useful home industries (March 18, 1924). The Ministry of Agriculture was reorganized to function effectively and provide agricultural training and advice about new crops, methods, and machines (March 3, 1924). The Agricultural Bank (Ziraat Bankası) was transformed into a major instrument of agricultural development. It was required to accept the advice of Local Needs Commissions (Mahalli İhtiyat Komisyonları) so that its loans would be given to small as well as large landowners (February 24, 1924). Its capital was increased, dividends to shareholders suspended, and credit facilities raised to 100 percent of capital. In addition to granting loans it also was ordered to use its funds to buy agricultural produce to maintain prices, sell equipment to peasants at minimum cost, buy and improve land to increase the cultivable areas, and to invest and participate in private companies dealing with agriculture in some way. As a result, its loans to peasants increased spectacularly, from only 4.8 million kuruş in 1923 to 25.9 million kuruş in 1929, still not equal to demand but much better than before. To meet the demands for credit, a new Agricultural Credit Cooperative (Ziraat Kredi Kooperatifleri) system was established in June 1929 under the control of the Agricultural Bank. Some 572 cooperatives around the nation rescued many more peasants from the moneylenders, though in the end this program also suffered from lack of sufficient capital.

Other approaches also were tried to help the cultivators. The tithe (öşür), long a symbol of the peasant's exploitation, finally was replaced with a new tax on produce set at only 6 kuruş per thousand, including the old shares set aside for education and public works. This in turn was replaced by a tax on agricultural income, which subjected the cultivators to even less taxation (March 1926). But the new system left almost the entire support of the government to the city dwellers through
increasingly heavy excise, income, and customs taxes, which made the development
of urban trade and industry just that much more difficult. By such means, however,
the Republic assured the support, or at least the acquiescence, of most peasants for
its secularist reforms in succeeding years.

Important reforms also were introduced in landownership. As a first step, the
extensive landholdings of religious foundations were subjected to direct state con-
trol, and the lot of peasants on them was improved at least to the level of the other
cultivators. The Civil Law Code of 1926 unified the old Ottoman landholding
categories set up in 1858 and ended on paper the last traces of feudal ownership,
though many landlords in fact continued to maintain their hold on large estates
and to exercise control over the peasants, particularly in the southwest and north-
west. Various laws were passed in the 1920s to distribute state-owned lands or those
recently restored to cultivation to peasants, particularly to those who had been
dispossessed and their homes and fields burned by the Greeks and Armenians before
and during the War for Independence as well as refugees from the Balkans and
Central Asia. But no where near the amount of land needed was available or dis-
tributed in this way, and landless peasants remained a serious problem to modern
times.

To train peasants in the use of new equipment and in new methods of cultivation
the Ministry of Agriculture drew on the experts and provincial agricultural stations
inherited from the Young Turks and began a program that was extended by the
Rural Instruction Reform Law of 1927. Agricultural and veterinary institutions
were established at Ankara and around the country. The Agricultural Societies
(Ziraat Odaları) established during the Tanzimat had been reorganized and ex-
panded just before World War I, and their activities in demonstrating new equip-
ment and distributing seed were now encouraged by ministry grants and exemp-
tions from customs duties for imported equipment. The ministry also secured the
passage of laws that encouraged the cultivation of new crops such as hazelnuts,
lemons, tea, vegetables, and potatoes, also providing irrigation systems and helping
eradicate malaria and other diseases that affected the cultivators' ability to work.
Experimental stations were established around the country, and the ministry de-
veloped its own agencies in the regions and districts to improve seeds and help the
cultivators to obtain and use them. Agricultural experts were sent to Europe and
America to learn the new methods. New forest conservation techniques were
introduced to rescue what had survived the severe exploitation of the nineteenth
century. And the rural road network was expanded from almost 14,000 kilometers
of paved road and 14,450 kilometers of dirt roads in 1923 to 18,378 kilometers and
23,112 kilometers respectively in 1941, helping the cultivators to get their crops to
market and secure the supplies that they needed. As a result, agricultural produc-
tion increased by 58 percent overall between 1923 and 1932, with grains up by
100 percent, tobacco by 57 percent, and cotton by 67 percent over their wartime
 lows. From 1934 to 1941 the land devoted to grain increased from 6.55 to 8.2 mil-
ion hectares; vegetables from 408,694 to 428,755 hectares; cotton from 248,961 to
327,785 hectares; and potatoes from 55,075 to 72,899 hectares, with production
improving accordingly.

Industrial development in the first decade of the Republic was even slower than
that of agriculture. For one thing, Turkish industry started from a much less de-
veloped level. The Young Turks had encouraged industrial expansion by tax con-
cessions and customs exemptions for imported machinery, but what little developed
as a result had been destroyed during the wars that followed. In addition, after
long years of exploitation by foreign capitalists and the minorities, Turkish entrepreneurs were cowed and uncertain, inexperienced, and without accumulated capital. Kemal and those around him first concentrated on buying up what foreign enterprises remained, particularly in the public utilities and the exploitation of natural resources. The government also worked to mobilize what capital and enterprise the Turks had. In August 1924 the İş Bankası (Business Bank) was established by directive of the president as a publicly controlled but privately owned and financed savings bank to provide capital for Turks wishing to develop factories and businesses.68 It invested in a number of small enterprises, but its main efforts in the 1920s and 1930s were devoted to the development of coal mines at Zonguldak, on the Black Sea, a necessary preliminary for heavy industry in the country.70 Imported machinery intended for export industries and agriculture was exempted from customs duties.71 On April 19, 1925, the Assembly established the Turkish Industrial and Mining Bank (Türk Sanayi ve Maadin Bankası) to provide government capital to develop state industries.72 Industry also was encouraged by regulations giving a new legal status to the Chambers of Trade and Commerce (Ticaret ve Sanayi Odaları) started under Abdulhamit. They were made agents of the government to develop the crafts and trades, providing funds to train apprentices and upgrade artisans, settling disputes among workers in different guilds, setting standards of quality and conditions of employment, and providing facilities for savings, insurance, pensions, and social security, formerly provided by the craft guilds themselves.73

The most important industrial law of the 1920s was the Law for the Encouragement of Industry (Tesvik-i Sanayi Kanunu), promulgated on May 28, 1927.74 Factories and mines were granted free land as well as exemptions from property, land, and profit taxes, and even from telephone and telegraph charges, to help set them on their way under private control. Government departments were required to purchase native products even when the price was higher and quality lower than that of foreign competition, and the government was authorized to provide each factory with subsidies equal to as much as 10 percent of its output. In return, employment had to be limited mainly to Turkish citizens, with foreign workers admitted only under certain severe restrictions. Those who built new factories under this law were allowed monopolies in their fields for 25 years, without any government intervention aside from that required to enforce the law itself.75

Though there was some improvement in industry in the 1920s, the government was dissatisfied with the rate of growth achieved through private enterprise. Starting in 1930, therefore, it turned to statism, or increased state supervision, control, and direction of industrial production. The then current international economic crisis as well as criticisms of the Free Republican Party seemed to necessitate firm measures that would enable the Turkish economy to survive. Statism, as expressed in the RPP program of 1931, was direct and to the point. It stated that when the nation's interests called for it, particularly in industry, the instrumentality of the state would be used to bring prosperity. Nevertheless, the state would continue to allow private enterprise: "The determination of which specific areas the state will enter is dependent on the needs of the situation. If it is determined that such intervention is needed, and there are private enterprises operating in the area, the taking-over of the latter will be governed by a special law in each case. . . ."78

The first step in the Statist program came in 1929 as soon as the Lausanne Treaty was no longer in force, when a series of protective customs duties was set up to protect nascent Turkish industry.77 On June 11, 1930, the Central Bank of the
The Turkish Republic was set up (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Merkez Bankası) with the sole right to issue and control currency, a function that had previously been handled by the private Ottoman Bank in conjunction with the state treasury. This gave the government full control of national monetary policy for the first time. The new bank was authorized to "contribute to the economic development of the country" by regulating the money supply and interest rates and adopting other fiscal devices to assure the stability of Turkish currency, then beginning to get caught up in the international monetary and economic crisis.

Statist economic policy in Turkey was developed mainly in two Five-Year Plans adapted from the Soviet model in the 1930s. The plans emphasized industrial over agricultural development and involved the use of government capital, enterprise, and control in developing the new industries. Because of the country's low standard of living, the government did not follow the Soviet model of allocating all its resources to develop both capital and producer goods. Instead, it emphasized industries that would provide consumer goods and only to a lesser extent machinery for heavy industry. It aimed to reduce imports to establish a favorable trade balance and to meet local demand by developing native industries. Industrialization would also create an internal market for the country's raw materials, for which demands and prices had fallen because of the international crisis.

The first Five-Year Plan involved the development of chemical, earthenware, iron, paper, sulfur, sponge, cotton textile, worsted, and hemp industries in particular. The already established sugar industry was included later because of its importance to the economy. There was an attempt to locate industrial plants near areas that produced needed raw materials in order to facilitate transportation, diversify regional economies, and provide alternative employment for farmers. The textile industry was particularly emphasized, since, as we have seen, the adverse Ottoman trade balances had come from the need to import almost all textiles. Large state banks were developed as the main agencies for fulfilling the plan under the general supervision of the government. The Turkish Industrial and Mining Bank was divided into the State Industry Office (Devlet Sanayi Ofisi), charged with establishing and supervising the operations of state factories, and the Industrial Credit Bank (Sanayi Kredi Bankası), which provided capital to private industrial enterprises. Later they were brought back together as the Sümerrbank (Sumerian Bank), which took the lead in both light and heavy industrial development (June 3, 1933), operating state factories, planning and establishing new factories and industries according to the plan, with state capital, and participating in other enterprises in cooperation with private capital, thus also acting as a regular credit bank for businessmen. As time went on, it invested in all areas of industry, taking over large shares of the production of cotton and wool goods, coke, cement, and leather and securing a virtual monopoly of the synthetics, of paper, iron, phosphate, steel, and lubricating-oil industries. It also opened vocational schools in connection with its major industries, providing scholarships to promising students for advanced study in Turkey and abroad. In more recent times the Sümerrbank also has developed its own chain of department stores to sell the products of its factories, becoming one of the leading mercantile operations in the country and serving also to keep commercial prices down by competing with private industries and merchants.

Other state banks also performed significant roles in developing Turkey's economy during and after the Atatürk years. The Eribank (Hittite Bank) was established in June 1935 to develop the Republic's natural wealth. It invested in
enterprises in mineral and petroleum exploration and exploitation, electric-power facilities, coal mining and distribution, and the selling of these products in and out of the country. The Denizcilik Bankası (Maritime Bank) was established on December 27, 1938, to operate the nationalized fleet of the Republic, including long-distance and commuter passenger and freight services, port facilities, and the like. The Ziraat Bankası (Agricultural Bank) continued to invest widely, not only in enterprises that processed and distributed agricultural products and equipment but also in diverse activities such as insurance, cotton weaving, electric, textile, jute, and lumber industries and in private banks and savings associations in the provinces. The Emldak Kredi Bankası (Real Estate Credit Bank), formed with state capital in 1927 but with 45 percent of its stock held privately, functioned to provide credit for both private and public construction, and later also participated in various commercial and industrial enterprises. The Iller Bankası (Bank of the Provinces), formed in 1933 with capital from payments of 5 percent of the tax revenues of the provincial, municipal, and village governments, financed projects implementing the developmental plans of these administrations. Later also the Department of Religious Foundations formed its own Vakıflar Bankası (Foundations Bank), using income from foundations and private accounts to invest in a wide range of enterprises in and out of the country.

In addition, though not organized as banks, two other major state companies were established: (1) the Land Products Office (Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi), to maintain agricultural price levels by buying and selling certain crops (June 24, 1938), and (2) the Monopolies Company (İnhisarlar) to control the French-owned Régie tobacco company and later also to administer state monopolies established over alcoholic beverages and spirits, matches, tea, and salt and, for a time, also oil and gasoline. Among the private banks the most important was and is the İş Bankası (Business Bank), founded in 1924 at the initiative of Kemal to encourage savings and economic development. It played a major role in developing Turkish railways, lumber, coal, sugar, textile, glass, sugar, cement, electric, and insurance enterprises, cooperating with the Sümerbank in several developments. It also supplied credit to Turkish merchants interested in participating in foreign trade, establishing several export companies and branches abroad. The Türk Ticaret Bankası (Turkish Commercial Bank), established in 1924 with private capital, invested mainly in department stores, insurance, electric, and cotton thread and textile industries. These and other public and private banks have remained the major forces in Turkish economic development to the present day, though private capital on one side and direct state planning on the other have assumed important roles in recent times.

Foreign investors were reluctant to enter the Turkish loan market for some time because of the long stalemate over the final payment of the old public debt. But the Turkish government did solicit and secure some foreign loans starting, in June 1930, with an American loan, followed by one from the Soviet government in 1934 to carry out the first Five-Year Plan, and loans from Britain, France, and Germany later to help pay for the nationalized railway and utility companies. These loans were not of major significance in the total picture of Turkish finances, but they did enable the government to eliminate foreign control of the major public works and services by the end of the 1930s.

The second Five-Year Plan, accepted by the cabinet on September 18, 1936, aimed much more than the first at developing capital industries, and emphasized mining, electricity, ports, and heavy factory machinery. Whereas Russia contributed
most advice and financial help to the first plan, Britain also participated in developing the second. Heavy industry was to be based on local raw materials, with a complex of coal and steel mills in the Black Sea coastal area around Zonguldak and Karabük, electric plants to power them, and railways to carry the product where it was needed. Eastern Turkey was to be industrialized by the construction of yarn, cement, sugar, and meat-processing factories and by building a new port at Trabzon. Factories also were to be built to make agricultural equipment, jute, aluminum, and textiles, again to lessen Turkish dependence on foreign imports in these areas. The tremendous housing shortage left from the war years was to be relieved by new housing developments, and efforts were to be made to increase agricultural exports. The plan had only begun to be implemented, however, when it was disrupted by the outbreak of World War II.

Statism and the Five-Year Plans did not outlaw private enterprise, but the manner in which they were carried out certainly discouraged investment in the areas taken over by the government. Although the state enterprises made major contributions toward industrial development, they were not too efficient. In time, this led the government to encourage competition from private enterprise in order to stimulate increased efficiency in the state enterprises and secure the participation of private capital when needed. The first step came on June 17, 1938, when the Law on the Organization, Management, and Supervision of Economic Associations divided the enterprises of each state bank and other state bodies into separate establishments (müesseseler), which provided supervision, and these in turn into institutions (teşekkülter), organized as corporate institutions, with financial and administrative autonomy and limited liability in relation to capital. The latter were now subjected to private law and expected to make profits, but their stock and overall supervision remained in the hands of the banks. At times also provisions were made for their transformation into joint-stock companies, with the entry of private capital and even management as circumstances warranted. Under the new law the Sümêrbank, for example, created the Yarn and Fabric Association, the Leather and Shoe Industry Association, the Turkish Steel and Iron Factories Association, and the Cement Industries Association.

Business activity was regulated by the Commercial Code of May 29, 1926. Anyone with the legal ability to make contracts could engage in trade, including women (with the permission of their husbands), and foreign nationals, but excluding all government employees and judges. Firms had to register with the Commercial Court of their area and affiliate with the local chamber of commerce and/or industry, which was directed by an executive appointed by the Ministry of Commerce and which enforced state policies regarding businesses, including price and quality controls as well as settling all disputes among members, with no right of appeal.

One conspicuous deficiency in the Statist program was its failure to modernize the Turkish tax system, which remained essentially as it had been in the late nineteenth century, with the sole exception of the replacement of the tithe with a land tax. Even though the latter partly compensated the treasury for the lost revenues, and animal taxes also were increased, it was the city dwellers who now paid most of the cost of government, exactly the opposite of the Ottoman system, whereby the taxes on produce were the major source of government revenue. Even among the taxes imposed in the cities the old profits and excise taxes provided the bulk of the revenue, while a regular income tax was imposed only after World War II.

Turkey’s industrial development in the 1930s created a growing working class
that required the introduction and enforcement of various labor and social regulations. The Republic's programs in this respect reflected the idea of populism that society was composed of functional groups, with the government's main task being that of merging the interests of all, thus achieving social unity and order and avoiding class distinctions and conflicts. Labor, thus, had to achieve its aims through state action. But the state was very slow in acting because of the overriding need to encourage industrial development. Meanwhile, the workers suffered the consequences and could do little to change their poor conditions of labor and compensation. The first major labor law came in January 1924 when all employers were required to allow their workers a holiday of at least one day a week, Friday, but subsequent proposals to limit the duration of weekly labor to 60 hours were defeated by the Assembly on numerous occasions. Legislation favoring labor actually came first from the Ministry of Health, established in 1915. It secured passage of the Public Health Law in 1930, providing for health councils on the provincial and municipal levels to care for general health and set standards of sanitation for both public and private institutions. The working hours of pregnant women and minor children were somewhat restricted and industrial health and safety standards established but not actually enforced. Craftsmen and small merchants also were allowed to organize their own craft guilds (esnaf odası), but these were left under the control of the chambers of commerce, which were mainly concerned with the interests of the employers, while workers were not allowed to form unions “based on class lines.” In the Penal Code they were denied the right to strike, though employers also were prohibited from locking out employees in the case of disputes.

Foreign workers were subject to the same regulations and were also affected by a 1932 law that limited to Turkish citizens the right to engage in certain professions, such as medicine, dentistry, veterinary medicine, and law, with special permission being required to hire foreign experts in these fields. Turks also were given a monopoly in trades and occupations such as hairdressing, photography, printing, making clothing and shoes, peddling, selling goods produced by the state monopoly, working in public transportation; this also applied to musicians, laborers in building, iron, and wood factories, guards, doorkeepers, janitors, waiters and servants in public establishments, and nightclub singers and dancers. While these restrictions may seem harsh, they should be interpreted in the light of the situation in the Ottoman Empire, where many subjects took foreign citizenship to escape Ottoman laws and many enterprises owned or operated by foreigners or members of the minorities actively discriminated against Muslims and Turks. Foreigners, however, were still allowed to own, transfer, bequeath, or sell personal property and real estate as long as Turkish citizens were allowed the same rights in the foreigners' home countries, and they were allowed to work in certain specialized occupations where there were not yet enough Turks, such as aircraft mechanics and pilots.

The first comprehensive Turkish labor code was enacted only in 1936. Its coverage was very limited, extending only to establishments employing ten workers or more (only 15 percent of the total at that time) and excluding all agricultural and government workers. Stressing the need for balance between capital and labor, it prohibited strikes and lockouts, authorized "worker delegates" to represent dissatisfied workers, and in the event of disputes required all sides to negotiate and, if necessary, to accept arbitration. Much of the law attempted to establish a kind of worker welfare that would make strikes unnecessary. The basic
workweek was set at 48 hours for the first time, normally 8 hours daily for six days, with the official weekend holiday from Saturday afternoon to Monday morning. Overtime labor was allowed for no more than 3 hours daily and 90 hours annually, and then only with the worker’s consent, with supplementary pay of from 25 to 50 percent. Those leaving their jobs were entitled to receive from their employers a certificate indicating the extent, nature, and quality of their work. Pregnant women were to be excused from work before and after confinement and with half-pay as long as they had already worked for the same employer for at least six months. Since enforcement of the labor code was sporadic and workers were not given the right to organize and strike, their overall condition remained poor.

The results of Atatürk’s economic policies were less than the government claimed but certainly far better than his critics maintained. Coal production increased by only slightly less than 100 percent in a decade, from 1.59 million tons in 1930 to 3.019 million tons in 1940. During the same period, chrome production increased by almost 600 percent, from 28,000 to 170,000 tons; iron production at Karabük from nothing to 130,000 tons in 1940; and overall mineral production from a base index of 100 in 1930 to 157 in 1935, and 232 in 1940. The textile industry developed sufficiently for it to meet about 80 percent of the country’s textile needs, reducing fabric imports from a value of about 51.1 million Turkish liras in 1929 to 11.9 million liras in 1939. Between 1924 and 1929 production of cotton products increased from 70 to 3,773 tons, wool from 400 to 763 tons, and silk from 2 to 31 tons. Sugar production, which started only in 1926, rose from 5,162 to 95,192 tons between 1927 and 1930. The number of kilometers of railroads almost doubled between 1927 and 1940, from 4,637 to 7,381, while roads also increased from 22,053 to 41,582 kilometers. The net national income increased from a base index of 100 in 1927 to 125.8 thirteen years later, while foreign trade went from an overall deficit in the 1920s to a clear surplus during most of the 1930s.

Atatürk’s Final Years and Death

As time went on and his presidency was confirmed for life, Atatürk became increasingly autocratic, treating even minor instances of opposition as rebellion and sending into exile some of his oldest associates, including Rauf Orbay, Halide Edip, and Adnan Adivar, for criticizing some of his policies. Thus it was that after over 20 years of collaboration with Atatürk, Ismet Inönü himself was forced to resign as prime minister (October 25, 1937) in favor of his long-time minister of finance, Celal Bayar, ostensibly because of minor disagreements with the president, though there are some suggestions that the incident was arranged so that whatever reaction there might be against Atatürk following his death, İnönü would not be deprived of the succession.

Atatürk followed a heavy schedule of work, traveling regularly around the country by train to spread the ideals of the Republic among the masses through a
personal image that only he could supply. Isolation and heavy work, however, drove him to an increasingly dissolute private life, which finally caught up with him in 1938. On March 11 the public first was made aware of the fact that the president was ill, as it turned out with cirrhosis of the liver. On March 24 the Turkish government purchased the yacht Savarona in England for his personal use, and thereafter he spent most of his time resting on it, even holding cabinet meetings next to his bed. On September 5 Atatürk was transferred to the Dolmabahçe Palace as his condition became worse. He wrote his final will and left his entire fortune to the nation. On October 17 he fell into a deep coma from which he emerged only with difficulty two days later. The seriousness of his illness became apparent to the public for the first time. A literal “death watch” now began, with medical bulletins being issued twice a day. On October 29, the 15th anniversary of the Republic, the students of the Kuleli Army Lyceée sailed past the palace on the Bosporus, serenading the president with the strains of the national anthem. Two days later Celal Bayar read the president’s speech to the new session of the Grand National Assembly, the first time Kemal was unable to do so himself. On November 8, 1938, he fell into his final coma, and two days later he succumbed to his illness at the relatively young age of 57. His death precipitated a wave of mass sorrow unequaled in Turkish history, with mourning crowds silently observing the funeral train as it brought the president back to Ankara and as he was interred at the Ethnographic Museum (November 30, 1938). The body remained there until it was transferred to the Anıt Kabir (The Mausoleum-Monument), the permanent tomb especially built for him, on November 10, 1953. The “Father of the Turkish nation” had found his final resting place.

The İnönü Years, 1938–1950

There was no dispute at all about Atatürk’s successor. He was the man who had done more than anyone else to help him save and modernize the nation, his loyal lieutenant İsmet İnönü, who was unanimously elected president of the Republic by the Grand National Assembly on November 11, 1938, and life president of the RPP two weeks later. İnönü’s years as president were dominated by two major crises, World War II, which broke out less than a year after he assumed power, and the increasing demand for liberal reforms that followed the war.

Turkish Neutrality During World War II

İnönü and most of his associates and countrymen remembered all too well how the Ottoman Empire had been dragged to its destruction and the Turkish nation threatened with extinction by involvement in World War I. Nevertheless, circumstances had dictated Turkey’s involvement in a number of international alliances. In the face of the Italian threat, relations with Britain had been improved in the mid-1930s, culminating with the visit of King Edward VIII to Istanbul while cruising the Mediterranean in his yacht (September 4–5, 1936) and by İnönü’s visit to London to attend the coronation of George VI (May 9–10, 1937). New credit agreements followed (May 27), providing in particular for British participation in the industrial development of the second Five-Year Plan and leading to a treaty of mutual guarantee between the two (May 12, 1939), which soon was followed by the Franco-Turkish Agreement (June 23, 1939), which accompanied the Hatay settlement. The Turks entered these agreements mainly because of fear of Ger-
many and Italy and also on the assumption that there would be no difficulty with the Soviet Union because of its strong opposition to nazism and fascism. But with the Nazi-Soviet alliance (August 23, 1939) and joint invasion of Poland, it seemed very possible that they might go on to overrun Turkey as well. Turkey attempted to secure a Russian guarantee for its territorial integrity so that its previous agreements with Britain and France could be transformed into open alliances. But Germany, facing encirclement from the south as the result of British-French agreements with Rumania and Greece (April 1939), worked to prevent this and also to secure Turkish friendship or at least neutrality so that Britain could not send help to Rumania through Turkish territory. Russia supported the German policy, and continued to threaten Turkey to keep the Allies out of the Balkans. It demanded Turkish agreement to close the Straits to foreign warships and to garrison them with Russian troops through a mutual-assistance pact (October 2, 1939). The Turks could not accept this proposal, if for no other reason than it would violate their obligations under the Montreux Convention and might well lead to war with the Allies.

On October 19, 1939, Turkey entered a mutual-assistance agreement with Britain and France. But it was arranged to prevent Turkish participation in a war unless the Republic's interests were directly involved, such as aggression by a European power in a war in the Mediterranean, in which case the Allies would help Turkey. Turkey's obligations to help Greece and Rumania by the terms of the pre-war Balkan Pact would thus also be honored. Turkey was allowed to exclude any action against the Soviet Union regardless of other obligations. France and Britain promised to give loans to help Turkey rearm and settle its commercial debt. The Russians were highly critical of the agreement despite the fact that they were excluded, but their own subsequent involvement in Poland and then with Germany prevented them from expressing their hostility by an open attack.

As World War II went on, its shifts and starts prevented Turkey from joining the Allies. It also avoided any entanglement with Germany, thus staying neutral. As Italy invaded and conquered Greece (October 1940) and Albania, and Germany in turn conquered Yugoslavia, Greece, Rumania, and Bulgaria, taking Crete and moving into North Africa in early 1941, Turkey was increasingly isolated from its nominal allies and exposed to the German threat without much hope of assistance except from Russia, whose position still was not very clear. Germany now was represented in Ankara by Franz von Papen, who had come to the Ottoman Empire during World War I as an assistant to von Falkenhayn. As long as the Allies seemed to be winning, his main effort was directed to keep Turkey from joining them. But once Germany began to win in Europe, he attempted to tighten relations with Turkey in various ways. His first victory came early in 1941 when he got the Turks to close the Straits to the ships of all nations, preventing the Allies from helping Russia, which was by then at war against Germany. He then attempted to get permission for German troops to pass through Turkey to attack the British and French in Iraq, Syria, and Iran, promising in return territories in Thrace and a guarantee of Turkish security. Turkey, however, realized that agreement to such terms would mean essentially a declaration of war on the Allies; thus it ultimately agreed only to a treaty of nonaggression with Germany (June 18, 1941), which specifically excluded commitments previously made by the parties. Germany, following its invasion of Russia (June 22, 1940), increased its demands on Turkey to include the supply of raw materials, particularly manganese and chrome, but the Turks were able to avoid a commitment on the grounds that they
already had agreed to send these metals to Britain. In the end, Turkey was able to sell these metals to both sides at very high prices while avoiding a break with either. A trade agreement with Germany (October 9, 1941) provided some chrome in exchange for war equipment, but little more. In 1942 von Papen pressed the Turks once again for transit rights to the east, disclosing new Russian claims to the Straits made to Germany while they were allies, and also encouraging the surviving Pan-Turkans in Turkey to undermine the Soviet Union by stirring its Turkish minorities to revolt. Turkey avoided a final commitment on the pretext that such actions, if openly supported by its government, might cause the Russians to massacre their entire Turkish population, particularly since Armenians had become very strong in the Communist party. As a result, all Germany was able to get was new trade agreements, but Turkey was able to avoid any commitments that might cause an open break with the Western Allies. The Allies, in the meantime, encouraged Turkish neutrality, since they no longer were in any position to help Turkey in case it entered the war openly on their behalf.\textsuperscript{103}

While Turkey thus managed to maintain itself in uneasy neutrality, its internal economic situation deteriorated rapidly as a result of the war. Because of the imminent threats of invasion, first by Russia and then by Germany, İnönü had to mobilize the Turkish army, putting over 1 million men under arms and doubling the military's share of the budget. The mobilization was a tremendous burden on an economy that had not been very strong to begin with. Withdrawal of thousands of men from the work force reduced agricultural and industrial production markedly, while the war actions and blockades in the Mediterranean halted the flow of most imports and exports, causing serious shortages of most goods and spare parts and depriving Turkey of many of its foreign markets. The armed forces provided a new source of competition on the market, taking goods needed by civilians. There were severe shortages of goods and a wild inflation, with the overall price index in Istanbul increasing from 101.4 in 1939 to 232.5 in 1942 and 354.4 in 1945, while the food price index increased from 100 in 1938 to 1113 in 1944 before falling to 568.8 in 1945 due to the reopening of the Mediterranean in the late years of the war.\textsuperscript{104} The total national product fell during the war from 7690.3 to 5941.6 million Turkish liras, while per capita income dropped from 431.53 to 316.22 liras during the same years, a reduction of almost one quarter.\textsuperscript{105}

The government tried various solutions to its financial problems. The National Defense Law of 1940 enabled it to require compulsory labor from citizens in the mines and factories, causing discontent but at least enabling it to meet the needs of the army.\textsuperscript{106} Production, foreign trade, and government revenues fell while military expenditures increased. Increasingly, the war budgets of the government were in deficit.\textsuperscript{107} Attempts to meet the crisis by printing money and by internal borrowing only fueled the inflation. A 10 percent tax on agricultural production imposed in 1942 helped somewhat but was not enough in itself. Efforts to ration goods were unsuccessful, since both retailers and buyers were able to circumvent the controls and create a flourishing black market. Shopkeepers and wholesalers reaped extremely high profits at the expense of an exasperated public, and in particular the civil servants, whose salaries had to be reduced so that the government could make ends meet.

All these difficulties and frustrations culminated in the Capital Levy (\textit{Varlık Vergisi}) passed by the Assembly on November 11, 1942. It was designed to tax the previously untaxed commercial wealth in the Republic and to curb the inflationary spiral. The method was quite similar to tax measures introduced elsewhere
in Europe at the time—a single tax on the capital of all property owners, businessmen, farmers, corporations, and others liable to pay the annual profits tax. Because of the difficulty of securing honest estimates from the capital holders themselves, the assessments were made by special local committees of government financial experts and local property owners appointed by and responsible to the municipalities. Their decisions could not be appealed, and defaulters were subject to interest penalties and, if prolonged, to property confiscation, arrest, and deportation to work camps. Most Muslim Turks considered the tax a patriotic obligation and paid. Many non-Muslim citizens and foreigners resident in Turkey, however, never considered the country their home and did all they could to conceal their wealth and avoid the tax. This in turn stimulated the assessment committees to increase the estimates of non-Muslims' capital wealth over what was apparent, on the assumption of concealment. While many non-Muslims in fact paid their just tax at the same rate as Muslims, others whose concealed wealth was not in fact sufficient or who did not wish to produce it under any circumstances were forced to sell all or part of their businesses or properties to pay the tax. In the end, since the minorities continued to form the bulk of the commercial community in Istanbul, they paid most of the tax, about 53 percent of the total collections of 315 million Turkish liras, with Muslims paying 36.5 percent and foreign subjects 10.5 percent. The latter, who assumed falsely that Muslims were paying nothing, or a reduced rate, accused the government of prejudice, an argument that the outside world readily accepted. The long-range result of the tax was to encourage non-Muslims to transfer their investment and commercial activities to other countries as soon as they were able to do so after the war, leaving Muslims in charge of most commercial activity in the years that followed.

The only positive economic result of the war came in the latter two years (1943–1945) when Turkey, as it came closer to the Western Allies, began to receive lend-lease help to increase production and exports, and accumulated a sufficient amount of foreign credit to finance much of its postwar economic recovery. In December 1942 the British began to pressure Turkey to enter the war on the Allied side, but Churchill agreed that Turkey would have to be fully armed first. Allied weapons and air advisers began to come to Turkey in 1943, but İnönü still held back because of quite justified fears that Germany still could bomb Istanbul without fear of Allied retaliation. The Allies appreciated Turkey's hesitations, but at the Moscow and Teheran conferences (October–November 1943) they decided to pressure the Turks to enter the war as soon as possible. İnönü continued to put them off until the spring of 1944, when the rapidly developing German collapse led him to break the economic and political ties that von Papen had built and, finally, to declare war on Germany on February 23, 1945, just in time to become a charter member of the United Nations.

The Postwar Crisis

The end of the war in Europe did not mean the end of the war for Turkey. After World War II the Republic had to defend itself against commissars who were very interested in achieving the imperialistic plans of the czars. Even before the declaration of war on Germany, Turkey had opened the Straits for Allied supplies to Russia (January 12, 1945), but the Russians were far less willing to forget the previous closure than were Turkey's friends. On March 21 the Russians abrogated the treaty of friendship and nonaggression signed with Turkey in 1925.
At the same time, just as they were extending their rule over the states of Eastern Europe, they demanded the restoration of Kars and Ardahan in the east and of parts of Thrace to Bulgaria, now under Communist control. The Soviets also demanded revision of the Montreux Convention to assure them of access to the Straits in war as well as peace and also to allow them to establish military bases along both the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. In 1946 the Soviet government continued to pressure the Turks for an agreement and also emulated its actions after World War I by publishing selected documents to demonstrate Turkish sympathy for the Nazis. The Turkish government refused the Russian demands, and when Communist groups in the country began to agitate for concessions, they were suppressed. Russian pressure mounted. The Russians also began to support Communist guerrillas in Greece, and in the face of their previous tactics in the Balkans and Iran, it appeared very likely that some kind of attack on Turkey might follow.

Turkey Joins the West

It was at this juncture, on March 12, 1947, that President Harry S Truman proposed to Congress a program to provide both Turkey and Greece with military and economic assistance to help protect them from the Russians, part of the Truman Doctrine developed to resist further Soviet imperialism as an essential element of American security. Congress's decision to grant the requested assistance was the start of a growing American involvement in Turkish security and economic development, which was to become a basic element in the policies of both countries during the next three decades. American military experts came to Ankara for discussions that led to the Turkish-American agreement on military aid and cooperation, ratified in Ankara on September 1, 1947. Beginning in 1948 Turkey began to receive military equipment and help in building up its transportation systems, which soon transformed its army into a major military force. The Marshall Plan, announced on June 5, 1947, and Turkey's subsequent admission into the Organization for European Economic Cooperation further strengthened its economic ties with the United States (April 16, 1948), leading to a direct economic agreement between the two nations (July 8, 1948), which became a second pillar of their relations. Turkey's military contribution to the U.N. effort in Korea, starting in June 1950, and its subsequent entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (February 18, 1952), after overcoming initial British and French objections to extension of their strategic commitments, made it an integral part of the joint efforts of the Western nations to defend themselves from Russian expansion and confirmed Turkey as a full member of the Western alliance. This ended the isolation that had begun during World War II. Economic and military cooperation with the West has remained the basis of Turkey's foreign policy and an essential pillar of Western defenses ever since.

The New Liberalism

Turkey's entry into the Western world following the war was paralleled by new and more liberal political, economic, and social attitudes and policies in the country. The war had so developed and manifested the different classes and groups among the Turkish population that it was no longer possible to satisfy them all within the confines of a single party or under the kind of authoritarian rule Atatürk had maintained. The old Statist policies and the need to maintain
tight controls during the war had greatly increased the number of civil servants and made them into a significant political force. In addition, by the end of the war overall literacy had increased to 30 percent, and twice that amount in the cities. By now Turkey had a significant intellectual class, based mainly in the universities, which was able to influence public opinion and government policy. A new middle class of industrialists and businessmen also emerged out of the economic development of the 1930s, with common interests focused by the government’s wartime financial policies, which had, indeed, affected Muslims in proportion to their wealth as much as non-Muslims. The rural landowners continued to form their own middle class, partly allied with that in the cities in the hope of removing government controls that limited their ability to gain profits from their properties. The number of factory workers had increased from 25,000 in 1923 to almost 300,000 in 1946, and at least twice that number were employed in agriculture and small industry. All these groups emerged from the war with a clear idea of their distinct existence and interests and a determination to improve their lot through political action.109

The resulting pressures affected the government as well as the RPP. Their response was a series of liberal measures intended to show that the existing regime could continue to focus and meet the needs of all interests as it had since the Republic was established. To appease the urban workers the prohibitions against trade unions were lifted and their existence and legal position codified in the 1947 Trade Union Law,110 which allowed worker and employer unions but did not repeal the old provisions prohibiting both strikes and lockouts. That the workers were, indeed, interested in joint industrial action is shown by the rise of several hundred such organizations within a very short time. As many as 75,000 workers were involved in unions by the end of 1949, still only a small proportion of the total but a fairly substantial beginning.111 In addition a Ministry of Labor (Çalışma Bakanlığı) was now established to look after their interests.112 It secured passage of a number of welfare laws providing for accident insurance, maternity benefits, labor exchanges, and even the eight-hour day and paid holidays.113 Perhaps even more revolutionary was the personal income tax system (June 3, 1949), which replaced the old profits tax at long last,114 with a proportional tax of from 15 to 45 percent levied on wages, salaries, and income from trade and commerce, real estate, and from private investments. Exemptions, however, were granted to all income from agriculture, domestic labor, royalties from books and music, and the like, thus throwing the burden on the urban population even more than before. Soon afterward, the Corporation Tax Law (June 7, 1949) imposed a 35 percent tax on the net profits of corporations, lowering it to 10 percent for cooperative societies and capital associations.115 Petroleum companies were charged a tax of 50 percent of their profits, while customs, inheritance, and excise taxes were increased to redistribute the burden among the various groups of Turkish society.116 Finally, the Land Distribution Law (June 11, 1945) provided for the distribution to landless peasants of state and foundation lands as well as privately owned estates above 200 dönüms in extent. Peasants were also provided with machinery and sufficient seed to cultivate the land. These measures weakened the rural middle class and large landowners, who were allowed to receive compensation only after going through long and complicated procedures.117

Liberalization also was felt in many other areas. Government controls over the sale and pricing of goods sold by private shopkeepers were relaxed. Products of state industries could be sold in privately owned shops. The Press Law was amended
so that newspapers no longer had to post bond for good behavior and the government could no longer close them by its own decision instead of going through judicial channels. The Societies Law was amended to allow the establishment of associations "on a class basis," with the courts and not the government being allowed to suppress them if they violated the law. Workers, professionals, and, significantly, newspeople, thus could form their own professional or craft organizations instead of being forced to remain in the government-controlled chambers and syndicates that had dominated them in the past. The universities were given autonomy in internal administration and in educational and disciplinary matters. They were allowed to elect their own rectors, govern through elected university senates, and form their own disciplinary committees to judge faculty and students for violating university regulations. But their finances remained under government control. In 1948 when the government wanted to discharge four Ankara University sociology professors for their Marxist views, it had to do so by indirect means, abolishing the budgetary provisions for their salaries and courses, since the established university councils refused to comply. This of course established a precedent for attacks on university freedom in later years, but at the moment it was the exception and was conceded in order to protect the Turkish universities from the kind of Communist penetration that had helped end the independence of Turkey’s neighbors in the Balkans.

The Rise of Political Opposition: The Democratic Party

All these measures helped Turkey’s workers and intellectuals, but they increased expectations beyond the government’s readiness to satisfy them. Urban workers were happy with their new unions and benefits but wanted greatly increased wages and the right to strike, while their employers opposed the concessions that had been made already. In the countryside landlord opposition limited the actual distribution of land as authorized by law. The intellectuals, particularly those in the universities, demanded far more political and cultural freedom than they had, while the civil servants opposed any measures that threatened to limit their traditional privileged position. The result was an increase of political activity, at first in the RPP and then outside. Also the concurrent rise of a popular and independent press made it possible for the different discontented groups to express their views and to gain wide support throughout the country.

Opposition to the RPP’s autocratic rule had risen even within the party soon after Atatürk’s death, but it had been subordinated to the more pressing national needs during the war. Once peace was achieved, however, the party was split between the conservatives wishing to retain its privileged position as the instrument of modernization and a more liberal group, which felt that further democratization and liberalization were essential if Turkey was to take its place among the other advanced nations. Despite all the liberal measures that followed, there were others who wanted to go even further. Led by four distinguished party members—Celal Bayar, former prime minister and minister of finance, Fuat Köprülü, the distinguished historian, and two deputies, Adnan Menderes and Refik Koraltan—they left the RPP altogether late in 1945, building support through the efforts of the newspaper Vatan, edited by Ahmet Emin Yalman; on January 7, 1946, they formed the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti) to advocate their ideas. The Democrats set out to build their own national organization, but they hardly were
The Turkish Republic, 1923–1975

able to match that of the RPP, which had an organic connection with the government and reached the people directly through its control of the People's Houses. Some RPP members wanted to suppress the new party from the start, but İnönü strongly defended its right to organize and in fact pushed through amendments to the election laws to assure secrecy of the ballot. The Democrats feared that this would not be sufficient, since the government still controlled the election apparatus and ballot counting but decided to participate in the 1946 elections anyway because of the tremendous groundswell of support that rose in response to their call.

The National Election of 1946

Turkey now experienced its first real election campaign, and there was a great deal of popular enthusiasm and participation. The Democrats quickly attracted the support of all the discontented groups in the country, though many of these were unable to agree with each other. Complaining particularly about the continued inflation and the innumerable cases of bureaucratic tyranny and blundering that had taken place during the long years of RPP rule, the Democrats lacked time to develop a systematic program of their own beyond simply promising to do better. They were helped by the support of Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, one of the last living heroes of the War for Independence, who joined because of anger over the government's decision to retire him in 1944 after 23 years of service, to give the army younger and more energetic command.

Despite the excitement, in the elections themselves (July 21, 1946) the RPP won a landslide victory, gaining 395 seats in the Grand National Assembly compared with only 64 for the Democrats and 6 for independent candidates. The Democrats did gain a majority of the seats from Istanbul, 18 out of 27, but the RPP reaped the result of years of propaganda in the countryside as well as the longstanding tax concessions given to the rural population. There also were accusations of government fraud, probably with some justification. The RPP was more than just a political organization; for many of its members, it was a religion. It was their lives, it was the nation—and many of them used their positions to alter the election results despite İnönü's orders to the contrary. In addition, the elections took place before the Democrats really had a chance to build a national following and make their candidates known, and it is very likely that they would have lost by a considerable majority even if the elections had been conducted with complete honesty.122

The Democrats' Struggle to Survive

The Democrats now settled down to build their program and organization to compete more successfully in the next elections, scheduled for 1950. It was a difficult four years, with the very existence of the opposition being under constant threat of suppression by the more radical groups in the RPP. The new prime minister, Recep Peker (1946–1947), led those who strongly disliked the opposition's existence, also introducing many of the liberal measures mentioned previously to steal the latter's thunder and prove that it was not needed. In addition, to stabilize the economy and bring lower prices the wartime import restrictions were mostly lifted and much of the hard currency amassed during the war by sales of chrome and manganese was used to import capital and civilian goods. The Turkish lira also was devalued to a rate of 2.80 to the dollar to fulfill the arrangements of the
Bretton Woods international conference, which stabilized and regularized the world's currency exchanges in the postwar world. This resulted in a general price rise that, on top of what had happened during the war, greatly distressed the public. Once again the merchants were making fortunes, and most of the imports were luxury goods, which the nation could ill afford in view of the need to develop its economy. This gave the Democrat members in the Assembly, led by Menderes, an opportunity to develop their reputations with attacks on the government. Without a tradition of responsible opposition, debates were not always constructive. The Democrats sometimes attacked to seek political advantage regardless of the actual issues. Peker replied with repressive measures, extending martial law, suppressing the Socialists and Communists, and coming close to suppressing the Democrats as well, but he was held back by İnönü, who used the new connection with the United States to support the liberal regime regardless of the consequences to his party. He finally gained enough support in the party to force Peker's resignation (September 1, 1947), substituting the more liberal and tolerant regime of Hasan Saka (1947-1949), who worked to establish a true democratic system with equal treatment for all parties in return for respect of the basic institutions and ideals of the government.

The RPP now also was liberalized. More and more, the People's Houses were emphasized as cultural centers for general public use rather than party centers. While İnönü remained RPP party chairman, actual direction was turned over to the vice chairman to begin the process of separating party and government. The RPP council, formerly restricted to the close associates of the president and prime minister, now was elected by and from among all members, and it in turn elected the secretary general as well as the Central Executive Committee. Delegates to the RPP conventions now were chosen by the local organizations instead of the central secretariat. Divisions between the conservatives and liberals in the party continued, but as public opinion became more important, the popular representatives' influence grew. For the first time the RPP began to act as if it had to win popular approval to retain its ruling position rather than being the autocratic agent of an autocratic president. Once the threat of government action was removed, the disparate elements in the Democratic Party also began to fight, leading to a series of resignations and dismissals. The majority, led by the party founders, applied party discipline to remove their opponents and then worked to build a strong party organization throughout the country. Those ousted formed their own Nation Party (Millet Partisi), led by Osman Bölükbaşı and including Fevzi Çakmak, which attracted the more conservative and religious elements of both major parties by declaring its support for an end to state capitalism, reduced taxes, emphasis on individual initiative and work and an uplift of moral standards through a nationalistic and religious program of education and emphasis on the home and family.

The existence of the Nation Party and liberalization of the RPP finally forced the Democratic Party to define its program. It pressed the government to turn the election machinery over to the judiciary, demanded increased political and economic freedom, and called for the use of American assistance to help raise living standards rather than build up the armed forces. In reaction to this the RPP installed the new Şemsettin Günlaltay government in 1949, which promised not only free elections but also many of the same things advocated by the opposition, including optional classes on religion in elementary schools, encouragement of private enterprise, tax reforms, and economic projects to help the masses.
The Elections of 1950

New election laws curbed the government's ability to suppress the opposition, enabling all parties to campaign on the issues. The RPP promised to modify the rigors of Statism, stimulate private enterprise, increase agricultural credit, encourage foreign capital, provide tax reforms, and limit inflation. It also offered to create a Senate to curb the majority in the Assembly and to eliminate the six principles of Kemalism from the Constitution, though they were to remain part of the party's own objectives. Now a competing political party, the RPP offered what the masses wanted: more schools, credit, farm equipment, seed and water in the countryside, houses, roads, telephones, and electricity in the towns. The Democrats continued to concentrate on criticizing the RPP. In addition, they demanded an end to the government monopolies, encouragement of private enterprise, and balancing the budget and reducing taxes to solve the nation's economic problems. They also promised to end the monopoly of power granted the Assembly and to make the executive and judiciary equal with it on the American model to establish a more equitable democracy. The Nation Party continued to stress a more conservative and religious approach though its campaign for free enterprise had been largely taken over by the Democrats.127

The campaign of 1950 was far more orderly and secure than in 1946. There was no interference with the opposition, enabling the Democrats in particular to organize in the villages for the first time and receive support from all those who had built up grievances during the long years of RPP rule. Peasants wanted more land, landowners hoped for fewer restrictions, workers advocated more welfare laws and higher wages, employers wanted more freedom from government control, intellectuals demanded full freedom—all saw what they wanted to see in the Democratic platform.

The results of the elections (May 14, 1950) astonished even the Democrats. With 90 percent of the voters going to the polls, Democratic candidates received 53.3 percent of the vote, the RPP only 39.9 percent, the Nation Party 3 percent, and various independents 3.8 percent (see Table 6.1). Because of the district system then in use, the majority party received all the seats in each; out of a total of 487 Grand National Assembly seats, the Democrats won 86.2 percent to only 12.9 percent for the RPP, and the Nation Party gained only 1 seat.128 The Democratic victory has been attributed to many factors, including American influence, better organization, and even a bad harvest in 1949, but the real reason seems to have been simply the accumulated frustrations and hostilities of 25 years of RPP rule. Perhaps the people of Turkey simply decided that it was time for a change. Whatever the cause, it was a political revolution. The party that had won the nation's independence and guided its destinies without opposition for a quarter-century had been voted out of office, and it turned over its power without protest. As a matter of fact, a few of its die-hard members still hoped to retain office, perhaps through army intervention, but İnönü used his great prestige to make certain that this did not happen. He insisted on accepting the will of the people and thus establishing the basis for the kind of democratic regime that he and Atatürk had long hoped for.

The Democratic Years, 1950–1960

On May 29, 1950, the new Assembly elected Celal Bayar as president, Adnan Menderes, deputy from Istanbul, as prime minister, and Fuat Köprülü as foreign
Table 6.1 Turkish Assembly election results, 1950–1973: the major parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justice Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>3,176,561</td>
<td>3,161,696</td>
<td>3,753,136</td>
<td>3,724,752</td>
<td>2,675,785</td>
<td>2,487,006</td>
<td>3,570,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of vote</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembly seats</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican People's Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>3,527,435</td>
<td>4,921,235</td>
<td>4,229,712</td>
<td>3,197,897</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of vote</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembly seats</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>149</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>4,241,393</td>
<td>5,151,550</td>
<td>4,372,621</td>
<td>1,275,502</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of vote</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembly seats</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliance Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>597,818</td>
<td>564,343</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of vote</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembly seats</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Salvation Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>1,265,771</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of vote</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembly seats</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Turkey Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>1,301,934</td>
<td>346,514</td>
<td>197,929</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of vote</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembly seats</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Workers' Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>276,101</td>
<td>243,631</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of vote</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembly seats</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>582,704</td>
<td>292,961</td>
<td>62,377</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of vote</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembly seats</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasant’s Party/Republican</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered voters</td>
<td>8,905,743</td>
<td>10,262,063</td>
<td>12,078,623</td>
<td>12,924,395</td>
<td>3,679,753</td>
<td>14,788,552</td>
<td>16,798,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number voting</td>
<td>7,953,655</td>
<td>9,095,617</td>
<td>9,259,949</td>
<td>10,522,716</td>
<td>9,489,078</td>
<td>9,316,635</td>
<td>11,223,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent voting</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>66.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The three leaders represented respectively the old guard civil servants, the new middle class, and the intellectuals. There was a sufficient majority in the Assembly to achieve all the Democrats' promises, and, with strong American economic and military support, the new government seemed to have a promising future. Real power and leadership went to Prime Minister Menderes instead of the president, thus presaging a regime in which the government would, indeed, be responsible to the people through their representatives. The achievement of real democracy was not quite that simple, however. Three major problems rose to bedevil the government, create tremendous hostility between it and the RPP, now in opposition, and eventually lead it into the same kind of autocracy that it had so strongly criticized in the past. The first problem was economic. The Democrats promised rapid economic growth accompanied and mainly achieved by a relaxation of the stringent controls of the statist policies of the past and by encouragement of private enterprise. At first they were quite successful. Once barriers were removed, investment from public and private sources soared, and the economy grew rapidly. Bank credits, for example, increased from 1.275 billion Turkish liras in 1950 to 7.787 billion Turkish liras in 1957 and 9.522 billion Turkish liras in 1960, with investment flowing into all sectors of the economy. Production also rose fantastically. In agriculture, land under cultivation, which had remained at about 14.5 billion hectares between 1940 and 1950, rose to 23.264 billion hectares by 1960. The number of tractors in use increased from 1,756 in 1949 to 42,136 in 1960! Total agricultural output almost doubled, from an index of 70 in 1950 to 130 in 1960-1961. Industrial production rose from an index of 100 in 1948 to 256 in 1960, with the manufacturing portion up to 279, the food industry to 311, and electrical power to 390! Coal output doubled. The number of factories, homes, and other buildings increased tremendously, particularly in the smaller towns and cities. All-weather roads extended from 9,093 kilometers in 1948 to 23,826 kilometers in 1961, commercial vehicles in use from 14,100 to 68,400, private cars from 8,000 to 45,800. Even the rate of population growth doubled, from an average of 23 per 1,000 between 1945 and 1950 to 57 per 1,000 in the years to 1955 and 50 per 1,000 the next five years. From a total population of 13.64 million in 1927 and 20.947 million in 1950, thus, it shot up to 24.065 million in 1955 and 27.755 in 1960, reflecting an increased birth rate and massive improvements in health and medical facilities. The number of schools increased from 18,282 to 25,922 and students from 1.785 million to 2.932 million during the decade. Literacy increased from 33.5 to 43.7 percent. The gross national product at market prices increased from 496 Turkish liras to 1,836 Turkish liras during the decade, and the net national product, figured at constant money value, which had just doubled between 1927 and 1950, increased by 50 percent in the Democratic decade, from 434 to 601 Turkish liras. Per capita income increased from 96 Turkish liras (in 1938) to 428 (in 1950) and 1,598 Turkish liras (in 1960) if figured at current prices, and from 432 to 434 to 601 Turkish liras respectively, figured at constant prices. Villages, towns, and the great city of Istanbul experienced physical changes as roads were widened, new arteries penetrated isolated regions, and buildings mushroomed.

The statistics are impressive, and the mass of Turks certainly benefited. But the tremendous economic expansion was achieved at a price that eventually undermined the regime and seriously threatened democracy itself. The government budget, which had been more or less balanced in the later 1940s, now fell into chronic debt, averaging 296.5 million Turkish liras of arrears annually, almost 20
The public debt more than tripled, from 2,565 to 9,342 million Turkish liras between 1950 and 1960. The money supply increased by 408 percent, from 1,594 to 9,256 billion Turkish liras, while national income grew in constant prices by only 200 percent, from 8,815 to 16,312 Turkish liras. While per capita income at constant prices thus rose, this affected only certain elements of the population, while most were exposed to the ravages of a massive inflation. The general index of wholesale prices increased from 46 to 126 and the cost of living in Istanbul from 54 to 133 during the decade. And the balance of foreign trade, which had been in surplus continuously between 1930 and 1946, and which already had turned to deficit during the last four RPP years as the government tried to satisfy consumer demands, now fell into increasing deficit, with exports increasing, to be sure, from a value of $263.4 million to $320.7 million, but imports increasing far more, from $278.4 million to $468.2 million. It should be pointed out, however, that most of these imports were machinery and fuels needed to continue the nation's economic development and that following the Democrats' fall from power in 1960 the deficit became even more severe, increasing from 498 million to 2,903 million Turkish liras in 1963. In sum, the Democrats achieved a remarkable growth rate, as much as 5 percent a year, but it was accomplished in such a hectic way that it undermined the total economy before the nation was able to really reap the results. The long-term prospects were in fact bright, and if the government could have controlled the side effects until the results could show, it might have remained in power for a much longer time. But two other major areas where disputes rose as well as reaction to its economic policies clouded its undeniable achievements.

The second major area of difficulty was that of religion, where the government was accused of trying to reverse the Kemalist secular policies. Actually, it was the RPP that in 1949, as part of its liberalization efforts, had allowed religious instruction to be provided to those students in the public schools whose parents requested it. But the Democratic Party's following included many conservatives who were kept out of the hands of the Nation Party by promises of increased religious instruction, and these promises had to be honored. The Menderes regime soon extended religious instruction to all schools and required all Muslim children to receive it unless their parents specifically requested exemption. The RPP had restored the old Faculty of Divinity, originally at the University of Istanbul but then transferred to Ankara, to train religious leaders. The Democrats greatly expanded its budget, providing more teachers and fellowships. They also established the imam-hatip schools in 1951 to train lesser religious functionaries, ended the use of the Turkish call to prayer and translation of the Koran, using Arabic again, and encouraged public celebrations of the major holidays. Much of this in fact reflected a general popular feeling that the RPP had gone too far in undermining the national faith without providing a true substitute. Much of it, however, also reflected the desire of the religious leaders to regain some of the influence that the reforms of Atatürk had taken from them. Religious books and pamphlets again appeared, with certain bookshops specializing in their sale and becoming centers of religion-oriented activities. Religious leaders began to appear in public and once again preach opposition to Secularism. There was renewed interest in the dervish orders. The government began to invest large amounts of money in repairing old mosques and building new ones.

It is doubtful that these measures really had any significant effect. A whole new generation had grown up without paying much attention to the hocas, and how-
ever much the latter sought to regain influence, they succeeded only among the ever-lessening group of religious conservatives who had been there all along. At best the "religious revival" gave Turkish youth an idea of their faith, providing them historical perspective as well as spiritual guidance in a period of rapid changes. But government support of religion soon became a political issue for the opposition, provided it with an emotional appeal, and brought accusations of abandonment of the secularist principle.

The third major problem, and the one that in the end destroyed the Democratic regime and threatened to disrupt the entire progression of Turkey toward democracy, involved political freedom. Neither the Democrats nor the Republicans really understood how to oppose responsibly or to accept opposition fairly. The result was often harsh RPP criticism of the government's economic and religious policies, to which the Democrats became excessively sensitive and responded by suppressing the opposition. Much of the initial problem came from the universities, many of whose leaders sought to use the autonomy given them in 1946 to make them into bases for political action. The University Law of 1946 had organized the universities according to the German system, with a small number of institutes and professorial chairs and many assistants forced to serve the latter at low pay for many years until vacancies arose. Since there were no retirement laws and pensions were poor in comparison with salaries, few left their chairs until they died, even further limiting opportunities for promotion and causing severe struggles for the vacancies when they did become available. With unhappy and poorly paid junior faculty members forming factions in consequence, it is not surprising that many of them turned to politics, hoping to achieve their ambitions by association with one or another of the parties and sometimes rising quite high in politics as a result of their undoubted abilities to express themselves. One of the results of the situation was a tendency to bring politics into the classroom. Faculty members went beyond their right to participate in politics as citizens and used their university positions to inflict their views on their students, particularly in the faculties of law and political science, which became hotbeds of opposition politics. Since it was the Democrats who were in power, and since most faculty members favored Statist approaches to economic problems, most of them joined the RPP and led the growing chorus of criticism of the party in power.\textsuperscript{144}

The Democrats certainly had a sufficient majority in the Assembly to overcome all opposition. But when the criticism started in mid-1953, the next national elections were only a year away. The government leaders, many themselves university people, knew how much the articulateness of the intellectuals and their access to mass media might sway public opinion. Thus the repression effort began, against not only the universities but also the press, the RPP, and the other opposition parties. On July 12, 1953, the Nation Party was banned on the grounds that it was trying to use religion to subvert the Republic. Charges were brought against the leaders of several branches that they were harboring reactionary elements hostile to the reforms of Atatürk.\textsuperscript{145} On July 21 the Assembly amended the University Law to restrict further the universities' control of their own budgets and, thereby, of their educational and personnel policies.\textsuperscript{146} On December 14 a new law directed that "all moveable and immovable properties, moneys, titles and claims and other valuables held in the possession of the Republican People's Party . . . shall be invested in the Treasury . . . provided only, however, that such of the moveables existing in buildings used exclusively as party premises . . . shall be left to the Republican People's Party."\textsuperscript{147} Ostensibly this was done to compensate the nation
for “past misappropriation of public funds” by the RPP, but since it allegedly owed far more than the value of its assets, everything was confiscated, and the party newspaper, *Ulus*, was forced to suspend publication. The People’s Houses also were confiscated and closed, and despite a government effort to replace them with a revived Turkish Hearths Society (*Türk Ocakları*), the entire organization disappeared, but was later revived and was active as late as 1975. On February 2, 1954, the Peasant’s Party (*Köylü Partisi*), later to develop into the Republican Peasant’s Nationalist Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*), was founded as successor to the Nation Party. Its program demanded constitutional guarantees for religious and civil rights and the creation of a constitutional court to pass on the legality of laws passed by the Assembly. It soon began to cooperate with the RPP, leading the government to respond with laws prohibiting such cooperation and imposing prison sentences and fines on newspapermen whose writing “could be harmful to the political or financial prestige of the state” or was “an invasion of private life,” even when the allegedly injured parties failed to complain.148

The new laws were not extensively applied before the election campaigns of 1954. But as it turned out, the Democrats had underestimated their strength. The worsening situation had not really harmed the popularity they had gained among the many people who had benefited from the new regime. Therefore, the Democratic Party won the 1954 national elections (May 2, 1954) with increased majorities of the popular vote (56.6 percent, as against 34.8 for the RPP and 4.8 for the Peasant’s Party) and also of the Assembly seats (505 of the 541 seats) (see Table 6.1). As soon as the new Assembly was organized, however, the opposition became more vitriolic than ever and the government responded in kind. All government officials and employees, including university professors and judges, were made subject to retirement as soon as they completed 25 years of government service or became 60 years of age, compared with the previous regulations, which had provided for retirement after 30 years of service or at the age of 65 and enabled university people at least to remain beyond these limits (June 21, 1954).149

The same government employees also now could be dismissed or retired by the authorities who employed them, without statement of reason or appeal, and on pensions ranging from one-half to one-fourth of their salaries according to length of service (July 4, 1954).150 In addition, university teachers were ordered to limit their activities “to scientific, educational writing” and to avoid using their positions for “active partisan politics.” Menderes defended the restrictions on the grounds that they were remedies “against the terrible disease of bureaucracy aggravated by inefficient employees who remain in the ranks of the civil service.”151

Within a short time the laws were being applied, particularly to the universities and the courts. On July 13, 1954, 4 judges and 17 professors at the University of Ankara were retired. Before the year was finished three newspapermen had been jailed and four others dismissed for similar reasons.152 In 1955 the RPP general secretary, Kasim Gülek, was jailed for insulting the government in a political speech. When difficulties arose over Cyprus (see pp. 430–431), five newspapers were suspended, including the RPP organ *Ulus* once again, for violating censorship regulations. In September 1955 a leading economics professor at the University of Istanbul, Osman Okyar, was suspended for writing an article that questioned the value and duration of American assistance. During the remaining years of the Democratic decade, this situation intensified. The universities became active centers of RPP political activity and propaganda, and the government replied with suspensions, restrictions, and imprisonments. In October 1955 a number of Demo-
catic Party members were dismissed for refusal to accept party discipline, and others resigned in disagreement with the party leaders. On December 11 many of them joined to form the new Freedom Party (Hürriyet Partisi), which declared that it would not adhere to "outmoded doctrines" such as liberalism or Statism but would, rather, support a rational program of economic planning combined with a democratic regime and constitutionally secured legislative process, essentially what has happened in Turkey since 1960. Soon after, the government used the increased multiplicity of opposition parties for its own advantage by passing a new Election Law that not only prohibited party coalitions, thus preventing a united front against it, but also gave the party winning a plurality of votes in each district all of its deputies even when it did not secure a majority.

Through all the political turmoil, while the Democratic Party and the intellectual community grew further apart, the government's economic achievements continued to gain it the support of the mass of the people. This was especially true in the countryside, which had most of the votes, where the government moved to satisfy the cultivators with new roads, irrigation, electricity, buildings, schools, and hospitals in the smaller towns and villages while the big cities struggled vainly to keep up with their rapidly rising populations. The amount of government land distributed to cultivators increased enormously during the Menderes years, from 389,212 decares given to 8,359 families in 1949 to an average of 2 million decares distributed to 45,000 families yearly until 1956, and then about 1.3 million decares yearly until 1960. Farmers also benefited from some 50,000 tractors distributed annually, a tremendous expansion of credit cooperatives, and a vast rural electrification program. Most city workers, shopkeepers, small factory owners, providers of services, and other residents of the growing towns also were enjoying much higher standards of living than before, and they appreciated it. In sum, then, while the intellectuals and civil servants with relatively fixed incomes were antagonized by the inflation and the shortages, the masses "never had it so good" and the government prospered. In the October 1957 national elections, then, the Democratic Party again emerged victorious, though with only a plurality of the votes, 47.2 percent to 40.6 for the RPP, 7 percent for the Republican Nation Party, and 3.8 for the Freedom Party; the Democrats got a higher percentage of the seats than their popular vote warranted because of the district representation rule, 70 percent (424 seats), while the RPP increased to 29 percent (178 seats) and the Nation Party to six (see Table 6.1). The Freedom Party failed to win a single seat and soon merged with the RPP.

The election results only contributed to further political tumult. The RPP, thirsty for victory and with an increased representation in the Assembly, stepped up the violence and frequency of its attacks on Menderes and his associates, and the government retaliated by continued acts of repression. Violence mounted in and out of the Assembly, with all sides acting primarily for political advantage and with very little responsibility. In May 1959 the old warrior Ismet İnönü was attacked by a pro-Democratic mob while traveling in the countryside and again on his return to Istanbul. More incidents followed, with the government forbidding the press from publishing news of them. The economic situation also worsened. The government's insistence on continued industrialization and rapid capital improvement added to the inflation and brought the nation to the brink of international bankruptcy.

Finally, in 1960 in return for loans from an international consortium, the government was forced to accept an economic-stabilization program to reduce infla-
tion and restore monetary order. With the help of the International Monetary Fund a new program was worked out. It involved severe restrictions on deficit financing and credit expansion, devaluation of the Turkish lira, consolidation of the public debt, an end to price controls, and a more rational program of internal investment. The inflation was reduced, the budget and foreign trade again were in surplus, and the crisis seemed to be over. But neither the government nor the opposition was satisfied. The Democrats' basic philosophy remained strongly expansionist, and they soon attempted to evade the program that had been forced on them, particularly since the reduced capital expenditures were causing discontent among their supporters both in the countryside and the towns. The RPP also was unhappy with a situation that threatened to deprive it of the victory for which it had aimed for so long, and it sought out new ways of opposing the government. The press, the universities, and the RPP criticized the government both for its previous economic blunders and for the results of the new stabilization policies. In February 1960 they accused a number of high officials of corruption and profiteering. The army and police were used to block the activities of İnönü and his colleagues, but this only increased the vehemence of the opposition. On April 18 two Democratic deputies introduced a bill in the Assembly to investigate the RPP and the press. İnönü replied with a violent condemnation of both the proposal and the government, and the debate soon degenerated into the worst kind of personal accusations. After the RPP members finally walked out, the Democrats who remained used their temporary majority to prohibit all political activity and to appoint an Investigation Committee composed of the most partisan Democratic representatives (April 18, 1960).

**The Revolution of May 27, 1960**

The RPP walkout and the creation of the Investigation Committee touched off violent demonstrations in the cities, but the government was able to keep order both because it controlled the police and the army and retained majority support outside Istanbul and Ankara. In the end, however, the government's determination to press ahead against the opposition led to open revolt. On April 27 the Investigation Committee was given the right to imprison any citizens, close any newspapers, or suspend any law that interfered with its work. In response, the politically active students and faculty of Istanbul University demonstrated openly against the government (April 28), followed by those in Ankara a day later. While the majority of the university community probably sympathized with the demonstrators, they remained out of the fray, hoping only to complete their studies and avoid bloodshed. As usual, however, the radicals had their way. Police and soldiers moved in and bloody clashes followed, with many injured and a few students killed. Thus was set off the sequence of events that was to topple the government, though news of these clashes was kept out of the press by government order. The government immediately closed the universities (April 29), thus making all suffer for the actions of the militant few and causing many to join the demonstrators. Since the Investigation Committee continued its work, stories soon spread of secret arrests and inquisitions, further increasing the tension. Most newspapers by now were suspended, and foreign periodicals reporting on the situation were refused entry into the country.

When the Revolution of 1960 finally came, it was a product not so much of street action, however, as of many of the same social forces that had achieved the
Young Turk Revolution a half-century earlier, stimulated and led by the modernized bureaucracy and the army. It was organized and planned by students and faculty at the War College and the Faculty of Political Science, both of which had been moved to Ankara but remained principal channels through which the nation's modernizing elite was recruited and trained. Considering themselves the defenders of the reforms against the new middle classes brought to power through the instrument of the Democratic party, they moved to take over. Leadership of the rebels was assumed at least as early as May 3, 1960, by General Cemal Gürgel, commander of the army, who first wrote to the prime minister demanding reforms and then went on leave to assume more active direction of the plotting. On May 27, as the agitation in the streets reached a new peak, a group of officers led by Gürgel, commanding the key military units in Istanbul and Ankara and using the students of the war academies, arrested Menderes, Bayar, and most other members of the cabinet along with many Democratic deputies. The remaining elements of the armed forces immediately declared their support. Martial law was imposed and the coup accepted throughout the country with very little opposition, even by those who continued to support the Menderes regime.

Thus ended the Democratic Party era that had begun so optimistically just a decade before. The government, which gained power because the autocratic RPP allowed free elections and accepted their result, now had lost its ability to govern. Its efforts to suppress the opposition had led the army to intervene in Turkish politics for the first time since the Young Turk period. In the end, the attempt to combine rapid economic development with political liberalization had created too many problems. The intellectuals had arrogated for themselves the role of voice of a nation whose citizens were mostly happy with the government's policies despite the difficulties involved. The government in turn had forgotten the circumstances by which it assumed power and had become needlessly sensitive to criticism, which, if only left alone, might never have stimulated the kind of opposition that finally toppled it. The evolution of Turkish democracy had received a staggering blow. The question now was whether the army would assume power, as armies had done under similar circumstances in other modernizing countries, or whether somehow the orderly progression of Turkish democracy would resume.

The National Unity Committee, 1960–1961

That the actual revolution was carried out by the military without the direct participation of the intellectuals in the universities is indicated by what happened during the next few days. General Gürgel and 38 officers representing all branches of the armed forces organized themselves into the National Unity Committee (Milli Birlik Komitesi, hereafter referred to as NUC), to operate the country, assuming legal powers under a provisional law (June 12, 1960) that it promulgated soon afterward, though executive power remained in the hands of the civilian Council of Ministers, which it appointed and controlled.

The NUC declared that the revolution "was not against any individual or any group. . . . Every citizen regardless of his identity and party affiliation shall be treated in accordance with the law and principles of justice." The civilian intellectuals called in to write the new constitution soon attempted to use it to achieve their longstanding hopes for social reforms through an autocracy. The NUC replied, however, that it had no intention of ruling beyond the time needed to try and punish those responsible for betraying Turkish democracy and to draw up a new
constitution better able to protect the nation from abuses in the future. That there were several NUC officers who agreed with the intellectuals and opposed the committee’s decision to limit its term and relinquish power as soon as possible was indicated soon afterward when 14 member officers were ousted and sent out of the country, mostly as military attachés to Turkish embassies around the world (November 13, 1960).

The NUC remained in power for little more than a year. It concentrated mainly on its basic objectives of trying the Democratic leaders and writing a new constitution, but it also inaugurated major policy changes in the areas of economics and finance in order to set the subsequent regime on a new course. First it acted to stem the inflation that had undermined national unity in previous years. Most of the large construction and city rebuilding projects were stopped. The banks were closed, personal accounts of leading politicians and businessmen frozen, and loans suspended. Partial banking activity resumed only after the interest rate on borrowing was raised to 12 percent to reduce the expansion of credit. The purchase of government bonds was made compulsory to wage earners to soak up demand. Price controls were introduced, causing food prices in particular to drop, to the despair of the farmers and pleasure of the townspeople. The chambers of commerce and industry as well as the artisan guilds were forced to elect new administrative boards to remove those who had cooperated with the Democrats. Land taxes were increased tenfold, building taxes two to six times, and the income tax was doubled, while all those subject to the latter were required to declare their total assets, causing many to fear a new capital tax. As time went on, some of these measures were modified to facilitate the restoration of normal business activity, but much of their impact remained.

The NUC also carried out its own brand of social reforms, though hardly the kind envisaged by the intellectuals. The salaries of military officers and men were greatly increased. Special army stores were opened, selling scarce goods at subsidized low prices, and other fringe benefits were added, making the total military pay at least 60 percent higher than that of their civilian counterparts in the bureaucracy. Democratic Party supporters and sympathizers were purged from the army and the government, though the former at least were given high pensions. And 147 members of the university faculties were dismissed on the accusation that they had been spending most of their time in outside occupations (as doctors, engineers, and so on); but the list included many who had been meeting their obligations but whose names had been reported by political, personal, and academic rivals. A new University Law was introduced, not only to restore and strengthen university autonomy, but also to introduce internal reforms that the faculties had been unwilling to accept themselves. The younger faculty members were given more of a voice in university affairs, providing them with more opportunities for promotion through merit, at least partly through provisions for the normal retirement of the professors. Also, faculty members were required to be present at the universities during the working hours from Monday through Friday, a radical innovation indeed. Other laws also were introduced during the NUC year to wrap up the destruction of the Democratic Party regime and hasten achievement of social progress. A State Planning Organization was established and Turkish Cultural Societies were formed to take the place of the People's Houses. Both institutions were later written into the Constitution. The High Court of Justice was reorganized so that it could try the accused Democrats. The military went ahead with energy and enthusiasm, but many of the measures were so drastic that the
the economy almost came to a halt and not only businessmen but also workers and peasants began to show increasing unrest and a desire for restoration of a civilian regime that would provide for representation and protect their interests.

The Democratic Party itself was abolished and its property confiscated on September 29, 1960. Soon afterward, 592 of its leading members were brought to trial at Yassıada, in the Sea of Marmara opposite Istanbul (October 14, 1960–September 15, 1961), by the High Court now composed of civilian and military judges. The charges included cases of corruption by individual members of the governments, accusations of incitement of riots against the Greeks in Istanbul during the Cyprus crisis in 1955 (see pp. 429–430), using the state radio for partisan purposes, inciting the attacks against the RPP leaders, illegally entering university grounds, illegal expropriation of private property, imposing the rule of one class on another, and subversion of the Constitution by violating its guarantees. In the end, 15 of the defendants were sentenced to death, with Adnan Menderes, Foreign Minister Fatih Rüştü Zorlu, and Finance Minister Hasan Polatkan being hanged (September 16, 1961), while Celal Bayar and the other 11 had their sentences commuted to life imprisonment by the NUC. Also 31 other defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment, including 4 former cabinet ministers, 8 members of the Investigation Committee, the former governor of Istanbul, and a number of Democratic deputies. Four hundred other Democrats were given lesser sentences, and 123 were entirely acquitted, including Fuat Köprüülü, who had soured on the regime and resigned somewhat before its final collapse.\textsuperscript{164}

The Constitution of 1961

The new Constitution was drawn up by a Constituent Assembly that included 272 members and acted as the Parliament during the NUC period. Among its members were 10 appointed by the president and 18 by the NUC. All members of the cabinet were included along with 75 elected from the provinces, 49 by the RPP, 25 by the Republican Peasant’s National Party (the only other party to survive from the previous regime), and the rest from various professional, craft, and business groups.\textsuperscript{165} Most had been associated previously with the RPP, since the Democrats were excluded. Despite this, there were sharp differences between liberals and social-reform-minded autocratic groups, the former representing the property class, the latter emerging more from the intellectual elites who wanted to restore some kind of autocratic regime to achieve their aims. In the end, the Constitution that emerged represented a compromise between the two groups, emphasizing not only human and property rights and freedoms as part of a liberal, constitutional regime but also more radical economic and social programs. On July 9, 1961, the new Constitution, in force to the present day, was ratified by a popular vote of 61 percent (6,348,191) in favor; 39 percent (3,934,370) were opposed, and 19 percent (2,412,840) abstained, the latter more as an expression of discontent with the continued NUC rule than with the Constitution itself.

The new government organization based on the 1961 Constitution is widely different from that established during the War for Independence and incorporated into the 1924 Constitution. It involves a system of division of powers and checks and balances to prevent autocracy. The Grand National Assembly is composed of two bodies instead of one, and its duties are specifically legislative as well as including the ratification of treaties and the power to authorize the use of the armed forces (articles 63–66). The lower house, or National Assembly, is composed of 450 depu-
ties elected for four-year terms by direct general ballot (article 67). The number of deputies for each province is relative to the size of its population, and each party receives the same proportion of the provincial seats as its popular vote in that province. The upper house, or Senate of the Republic, is composed of 150 members elected for six-year terms at two-year intervals, with 15 additional members appointed by the president of the Republic "from among people distinguished for their services in various fields, at least ten of whom cannot belong to any party" (articles 70, 72). The chairman and members of the NUC also were made ex-officio members of the Senate as long as they remained outside the parties. The elective Senate seats are distributed by province, from one to six according to population, with the party receiving a majority of votes in each province receiving all its seats except in Istanbul and Ankara. Elections are under control of the courts, with a Supreme Election Board and local election boards established to carry out the election process independent of government control (article 75).

The Grand National Assembly is required to convene on November 1 each year without any convocation and to remain in session at least seven months (article 83). The chairmen and vice chairmen of the two houses are elected by their own members and are forbidden from participating in party activities or debates while serving in these positions (article 84). The two houses develop their own rules of organization, with the stipulation, however, that all parties must be represented on committees in proportion to their total representation in each house (articles 84, 85). Both houses can debate and make parliamentary investigations, but only the lower house can interpellate ministers (article 89). Laws can be initiated either by members of both houses or by the Council of Ministers (article 91), but the lower house has final authority in legislation. It debates bills first and submits those it approves to the Senate. If the latter approves of a submitted bill, it becomes a law. If the Senate approves with amendments, the result becomes law if the Assembly concurs. If the Senate rejects the National Assembly's proposal, however, the latter can pass it anyway by an absolute majority if the rejection was by that much and by two-thirds vote if the Senate rejection was by two-thirds or more (article 92). The president of the Republic also can veto legislation, but the Grand National Assembly can override it simply by reenacting the law, after which the president is required to promulgate it (article 93). Budgetary procedures are somewhat different. The cabinet budget goes first to a joint committee of the two houses and then is debated and approved by the Senate before it goes on to the National Assembly (article 94).

The president of the Republic is elected for a seven-year term by and from among the members of the Grand National Assembly aged at least 40 and with a higher education, by a two-thirds majority on a secret ballot or by a simple majority if no one is elected on the first two ballots. Once elected, the president must disassociate from his party; his Assembly membership is ended, and he is not eligible for reelection (article 95). He can preside over the Council of Ministers when necessary, act as head of state, issue decrees, which must be signed by the prime minister, and he can be impeached for high treason only by a two-thirds vote of both branches of the Grand National Assembly (articles 98, 99). The president appoints the prime minister from among members of the Assembly. The other ministers are nominated by the latter and appointed by the former, either from among Assembly members or "those qualified for election as deputies," that is, suitable persons from outside (article 105). If the Council of Ministers is defeated three times by a vote of no confidence by the National Assembly (articles 89, 104), elections can be called by the president (article 108). A Provisional Council of Ministers composed of party
members in proportion to their Assembly membership then acts as the government until the new Assembly is elected, except for the posts of ministers of justice, interior, and communications, which are turned over to nonparty administrators during the interregnum (article 109). The Council of Ministers is now the real executive body, with the prime minister’s duties being to promote the cooperation of the ministries and supervise implementation of the government policies. With his longer term of office, ineligibility for reelection, political neutrality, and ability to preside over the Council of Ministers, the president is intended to be a person above party, a mediator among political forces, far different from the position assumed by both Atatürk and İnönü.

Also included is the old Council of State, the only Ottoman institution to survive all the twists and turmoils of republican Turkey. Its prestige was seriously threatened during the later Democratic years when the government prevented it from acting effectively against illegal acts or unwarranted dismissals of public officials, but the new Constitution has attempted to restore its ability to curb the government by ensuring its independence from both the legislature and government. Article 114 declares that no act of administration can be excluded from the control of the courts, including the Council of State, thus ending the practice of nullifying such authority by government decree. Article 140 assures its independence by having its members elected by an independent committee composed of members of the Constitutional Court, named both by the Council of Ministers and the General Council of the Council of State. The Council of State acts mainly as an administrative court of first instance in cases not referred first to other courts, and of final appeal in all cases. It is supposed to hear and settle administrative disputes, advise the government on draft laws, treaties, and contracts, and also hear appeals from the decisions of the tax courts.

Strong efforts also were made to assure the autonomy of the courts: “... judges shall be independent in the discharge of their duties”; and “no organ, office, agency or individual may give orders or instructions to courts or judges in connection with the discharge of their judicial duty...” (article 132). The appointment, promotion, transfer, disciplining, and retirement of judges are now made by a Supreme Council of Judges chosen by the judges themselves. Military courts can try civilians only for military offenses prescribed by special laws (article 138), even in periods of martial law. The basic court structure remains the same as before, with a Court of Cassation acting as the final appeals court. The most important change was the provision of a Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of laws and to try the president, prime minister, other ministers, and the chief judicial and executive officers for offenses connected with their duties (articles 145–147).

The basic rights and duties of Turkish citizens are clearly defined in the first sections of the Constitution. As in the 1924 Constitution all citizens of the Republic are defined as Turks regardless of religion (article 54). Every person has the right of personal freedom (article 14), privacy (article 15), immunity of domicile (article 16), freedom of communication (article 17), freedom to travel and reside where he or she likes (article 18), freedom of religious faith and worship and freedom from abuse of one’s religion by others (article 19). The press is assured of freedom from censorship (article 22), and it can be “restricted by law only to safeguard national security or public morality, prevent attacks on the dignity, honor and rights of individuals, prevent instigations to commit crimes and assure proper implementation of judicial functions” (article 22). Publications cannot be subjected to requirements of prior permission or deposit of a guarantee fund (arti-
cles 23, 24), and “all persons are free to congregate or march in demonstrations without prior permission so long as they are unarmed and have no intent to assault,” with this right being restricted “only for the purposes of maintaining public order or morality” (article 29). Individuals can be arrested by the police “if there is a strong case for indictment,” but they must be informed of the charges at once and cannot be held for more than 24 hours without court sanction (article 30).

All citizens are entitled to vote and be elected in free, open, and secret elections on the basis of equality, direct suffrage, and public counting (articles 54, 55). Political parties can be formed without prior permission, and whether in power or opposition are declared to be “indispensable entities of democratic political life” (article 56). They are, however, expected to “conform to the principles of a democratic and secular republic, based on human rights and liberties, and to the fundamental principle of the State's territorial and national integrity,” or they can be dissolved (article 57). They are accountable for their income and expenditures and for their internal affairs and activities to the Constitutional Court (article 57). All Turkish citizens are entitled to attend public schools and to enter public service or the army regardless of religion or sex (articles 58, 59, 60).

Perhaps the most interesting part of the Constitution of 1961 is its inclusion of many of the social and economic rights desired by the more radical members of the Constituent Assembly. The family is declared to be “the fundamental unit of Turkish Society” (article 35), and the state is required to do whatever is necessary to protect it as well as “the mother and the child.” Everyone can own and inherit property (article 36), but the exercise of property rights cannot conflict with public welfare, and the state can legislate to achieve efficient utilization of land and to provide land for those cultivators lacking it by measures such as defining and limiting the size of landholdings and helping farmers acquire agricultural implements (article 37). The state is authorized to expropriate any private immovable property in return for just compensation (articles 38, 39). Private enterprise is free, but it can be restricted in the public interest, nationalized for compensation when necessary (articles 39–40), and regulated to assure its functioning “in an atmosphere of security and stability consistent with the requirements of the national economy and the objectives of the society” (article 40). The state is bound to regulate economic and social life “in a manner consistent with justice and the principle of full employment, with the objective of assuring for everyone a standard of living befitting human dignity” (article 41). Every person has not only the right but the duty to “be engaged in some occupation, trade, or business.” The state must “protect workers and promote employment by adopting social, economic, and financial measures” to give them “a decent human existence so that stable employment” may be secured and unemployment avoided. Workers’ rights are specified. No one “can be employed at a job that does not suit his age, capacity, and sex,” and special permission is needed to employ children, young people, and women (article 43). Every worker “has the right to rest,” but the exact requirements for paid annual vacations and payment for work on holidays and weekends when required are left to special legislation (article 44). The state can pass laws to assure workers a decent and livable wage (article 45). Both employers and employees can establish their own unions and federations without prior permission and can resign from such associations freely, with the state acting only to assure that their operation “shall not conflict with democratic principles” (article 46). Workers can bargain collectively and strike (article 47) but only in accordance with legal regulations, and the state is required to provide or help provide social security, insurance, and welfare...
organizations (article 48). The state must ensure that everyone is provided with health and educational facilities, with primary education being free and compulsory for both males and females and scholarships provided to help able students to achieve the "highest level of learning consistent with their abilities" (article 50). The state also must promote agricultural and urban cooperatives (article 51) and "take the necessary measures to provide the people with adequate nourishment, to assure an increase in agricultural production ... enhance the value of agricultural products and the toil of those engaged in agriculture" (article 52).

The State Planning Organization is entitled to develop plans for economic, social, and cultural development (article 129), though its structure and the implementation of its plans were left to special regulation by law. All natural wealth and resources are under state control, and private exploitation can be carried out only with state permission and supervision (article 130).

The provincial, district, and local governmental bodies are retained as before with the exception that "provincial administration is based on the principle of self-government" and regional self-government organizations also are allowed to carry out "specific public services" (article 115). Civil servants are entitled to protection by law in disciplinary cases (article 118), and they cannot join political parties (article 119) or discriminate among citizens because of their political views. Universities can be established and operated only by the state and are declared to be "public corporate bodies enjoying academic and administrative autonomy" (article 120), with self-government through "organs consisting of qualified members of the teaching staff." Teachers and assistants can be removed from their positions only by the universities and through university procedures. They are free to engage in research and publication, are exempted from the restrictions forbidding civil servants from joining political parties, but are forbidden from assuming executive positions except in case of "the central organizations of political parties" (article 120), thus enabling them to function as political leaders and in other capacities. Radio and television broadcasting is placed under "autonomous public corporate bodies," with the obligation to broadcast "along the principles of impartiality" (article 121). Finally, civil servants receiving illegal orders from superiors are ordered to execute them only after protesting their illegality and receiving written orders to proceed, except where such orders and their fulfillment themselves constitute crimes, in which case both the superior and the civil servant are criminally liable (article 125). All articles of the Constitution can be amended by a two-thirds vote of each chamber of the Grand National Assembly except article 1, which declares the Turkish state to be a republic (article 155)."166

The Constitution of 1961 thus provides significant changes from its predecessors, but since much of its implementation is subject to the directives of the individual ministries and body of legal precedent built up over the entire republican period, in many cases the effect of the changes has been slight, particularly since some civil servants preserve old mentalities and traditions of action that do not always conform with the spirit or laws of the new Republic.

The Politics of the Second Republic Since 1961

The division of Turkish society along class lines, manifested and accentuated by the Democratic Party's rise and decade of power, was further encouraged by the events that caused its collapse and the establishment of the Second Republic. In more than a decade since the Constitution of 1961 was introduced, moreover, these
divisions have become more vivid than ever. The bureaucracies of the government and army, which dominated the state during the Atatürk period, remain wedded to policies mainly reflecting and supporting their own well-being, but with their monopoly of power gone they have had to ally with one or another of the new political interests and groups to achieve their ends. The intellectuals, whose hopes that the 1961 Constitution would achieve all their liberal economic and social ambitions have dimmed, have tended to move away from the existing constitutional structure and toward the more radical Socialist movement that would accomplish their objectives by revolutionary change. The new middle class, interested mainly in preserving and extending its prosperity both in the towns and countryside, has come to associate with groups wishing to limit social reforms and promote free enterprise. The religious nationalists and conservatives have splintered into their own radical groups with limited, but potentially dangerous, influence among the masses. The armed forces, divided internally among liberals and conservatives, have sought generally to keep the civilian regimes progressive, with their extreme elements also splitting away to join the more liberal and conservative groups in society as a whole (see Table 6.2).

Under the 1961 structure of government, however, all these interest groups still have had to work through political parties. With the Democratic Party seemingly put out of existence, the RPP initially emerged as the most important remaining political force, apparently assured of resuming the power lost in 1950. It never was able to accomplish this promise in the decade of the 1960s, however, because many in the country associated it with the 1960 coup and the trials that followed, while the new mercantile classes and peasants who prospered so much under the Democrats feared that an RPP triumph would restore the old Statism that had seemingly suppressed them in the past. Still including both conservative and liberal elements, the RPP program in 1961 expressed general proposals that could satisfy everyone. Private as well as public enterprise was to be encouraged, a more equitable system of taxation developed, land given to the peasants, and social security and social services provided for all workers. Foreign capital was to be attracted, but under strong government supervision, and the alliance with the West would be preserved.

Table 6.2. The Senate results, 1961–1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justice Party</td>
<td>3,560,675</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1,385,655</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1,688,316</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1,656,802</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican People's Party</td>
<td>3,734,285</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1,125,783</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>877,066</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>899,444</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliance Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Turkey Party</td>
<td>1,401,637</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>96,427</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>70,043</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>284,234</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Workers' Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Peasant's Party</td>
<td>1,350,892</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>83,400</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>57,367</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>66,232</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered voters</td>
<td>12,926,837</td>
<td>4,668,865</td>
<td>5,466,284</td>
<td>4,420,255</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number voting</td>
<td>10,519,659</td>
<td>2,808,592</td>
<td>3,072,393</td>
<td>3,595,976</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent cast</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The RPP thus emerged as a progressive but basically middle-class liberal party, somewhat more socialistic than before but still moderate.

Such an approach was hardly acceptable to the many groups that had coalesced in and around the Democratic Party and that now sought out a new vehicle to express their interests and political ambitions. Several parties emerged to secure the Democratic vote. The New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi) was founded in February 1961, at least partly by members of the Freedom Party group that had split from the Democrats in 1957. Accepting private enterprise and rapid industrialization as basic necessities for economic development, it advocated government action to achieve this end, but with more of a balance between the nation's financial capacities and efficiency of production than had been the case in the past. Religious education would be encouraged to give Turkish youth an idea of their heritage, but secularism was accepted as a basic principle and freedom for all religions encouraged. Foreign capital would be accepted but controlled. Land would be divided among the peasants, but only as long as the proliferation of small holdings did not hurt production. State planning would be used not to control all aspects of the economy but merely to coordinate and harmonize its different elements.

The Republican Peasant's National Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi) emerged as somewhat more conservative than the New Turkey Party but took on its more definitive position on the right only after June 1962, when its founder and leader, Osman Bölükbaşı left to form the new Nation Party, and March 1965, when it was joined and partly taken over by a nationalist group led by one of the members of the NUC, Alparslan Türkeş. The new RPNP, now basically a secular and nationalist group, emphasizes also social and religious aims more or less in the pattern of the National Socialist movements of prewar Germany and Italy. It accepts the democratic regime established in 1961 but does not really emphasize it, advocating instead strong state action to achieve its aims. Workers are to be given social security and even allowed to participate in industrial management, to organize, and to strike. On the other hand, party and government are to reconcile class differences. Private enterprise is encouraged, but capitalistic exploitation and excessive profits are to be discouraged. Planning is needed so that society can be organized and controlled for its own good. People should be educated and directed through their entire lives. Land should be distributed but large units retained to encourage production, while private property is to be recognized and encouraged. Turkish nationalism and Islam are to be emphasized as basic pillars of the society of the Republic.

In the meantime, the Nation Party restored in 1962 by Osman Bölükbaşı also emphasizes private enterprise and economic planning, but unlike the RPNP it strongly defends political democracy and rejects the extremes of political and social organization advocated both by the right and the left. Religion is emphasized and all forms of socialism and communism rejected because of their basically godless approaches. Turkish nationalism should influence foreign policy. Turkey's actions should reflect less what its Western allies want and more what its own interests are in relation to the Arab countries and Cyprus. It also should avoid any kind of cooperation with the Soviet Union. Religion and morality should be emphasized to guide Turkish society.

In the end, however, most of the old Democratic vote has been captured by the more moderate conservatism espoused by the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi), founded in February 1961 by one of the military officers retired by the NUC, Ragıp Gümüşpala, and led after his sudden death in 1964 by a career engineer, Süleyman
Demirel. With the NUC still in control during the 1961 elections, the Justice Party had to develop an independent program, and could not openly pose as the direct heir of the Democratic Party. It did so though in fact, however, and took over much of the latter's electoral apparatus around the country. Its basic position is only slightly right of center, with its conservative position stemming not so much from the more authoritarian approaches of the other groups on the right but, rather, from old-fashioned liberalism, very much like that of the Democrats. Advocacy of the maximum amount of freedom for the individual whether he be a worker, a peasant, a merchant, or a factory owner. Private enterprise is to be encouraged, though state enterprise can be accepted when necessary. The party's concern for rural support is expressed through its declarations against any kind of rural income or animal taxes and its support of reductions of taxes on small merchants and traders. Land reform is emphasized, but landowners would be allowed to retain at least small estates, and small plots would be discouraged so as not to lessen productivity. Workers would be allowed to strike, and the government would give them social security, socialized health care, and the like. Education would be reformed to end elitism among the intellectuals; villages and towns would be given more autonomy to control their destinies according to their own needs. Planning would be a voluntary effort to coordinate the different elements of the economy, with worker representatives helping develop goals. Foreign capital would be encouraged, and with little control as long as the overall national objectives are achieved. Unemployment would be remedied by money payments and also by finding work for those able and willing to do so. Universities would be reformed so that they could better meet the students' needs and interests, and academic advice would be heeded by the government as much as possible. The party itself has been divided into liberal and conservative wings, but Demirel has favored the former, while the latter have tended to go off into the more conservative groups, particularly at times when the party actually has achieved power.

During the 1960s, the strongest left-wing group was the Turkish Workers' Party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi), formed in 1961 by a number of Istanbul union leaders and a year later made into a full-fledged Socialist party after leadership was assumed by Mehmet Ali Aybar, a noted Ankara Socialist. Calling all the other parties reactionary, the Workers' Party followed the Marxist line of criticizing American "imperialism" and claiming that Turkish interests were sacrificed in return for American help. While he went on to advocate an independent foreign policy, Aybar also maintained that it would be in Atatürk's tradition for Turkey to cooperate with its more immediate neighbors, particularly the Soviet Union. Including both workers and intellectuals in its candidate lists, the Workers' Party emphasized restoration of state control over heavy industry and all the basic units of production, with private enterprise being allowed to continue though slowly disappearing as a result of its uselessness in a Socialist state. The banks, insurance companies, foreign trade, and the use of foreign capital would be nationalized along with the exploitation of mineral resources. Landholdings would be restricted to 500 dönüms (about 125 acres) per person; large landholdings would be expropriated, and locally elected peasant groups would execute the land laws. While all the parties accept social reforms for the workers, the Workers' Party alone demanded a 5-day, 40-hour week, with prohibitions against employer lockouts of workers. The People's Houses would be reorganized and developed to provide for adult education and control, and youth would be organized and educated so that it would recognize and preserve the ideals of the Socialist state. In a strongly property-oriented state, how-
ever, the Workers' Party was not able to expound more radical ideas while in opposition; thus it stated that property rights would be preserved as long as the owners did not use them for exploitation. The democratic regime would be retained, with minority rights respected. Democracy would be extended to include not only voting but also popular participation in the affairs of local and provincial government as well as the factories and businesses, but with strong party guidance to suppress whoever would use this freedom to preserve the "exploitation" of the past. 167

Turkish politics since 1961 have very much reflected the new democracy created by the Constitution. The different social classes and political groups, which were united under the RPP by Atatürk and İnönü and which began to split apart during the Democratic decade, have now risen to reflect their individual interests. Since the major parties in turn have tried to gain the support of different groups by widening their appeal as much as possible, very much in the American manner, they have come to emulate the old RPP much more than they might care to admit. The major parties have become almost evenly balanced, securing the majorities needed to govern by coalition arrangements with the small parties. The old NUC, largely retired into the background, has chosen to exercise a moderate influence from behind the scenes, acting mainly through the presidents of the Republic, all of whom have been former military officers, to push the squabbling parties to overcome their differences in order to enact the reforms envisaged in the Constitution while retaining the essentially civilian democracy that is the basis of its program. 168

The national elections held on October 15, 1961, were carried out in complete freedom and without government or army interference despite the continued rule of the NUC. Though the latter gave the RPP its moral support and the other parties had only just been organized, the RPP gained only 36.7 percent of the popular vote and 38 percent of the Assembly seats. The Justice Party gained 34.8 percent of the vote and 35 percent of the seats, while the balance of power was left to the New Turkey Party, which received 13 percent of the vote and 14.5 percent of the seats, and the Republican Peasant's National Party, with 14.0 percent of the vote and 12 percent of the seats (see Table 6.1). In the Senate, on the other hand, since the old electoral system prevailed, with the majority or plurality party in each district receiving all the seats, the Justice Party, with about the same vote as in the Assembly elections, received 47 percent of the seats, while the RPP received only 24 percent, the New Turkey Party 14 percent, and the Republican Peasant's National Party 13.6 percent. Under the circumstances a coalition government seemed necessary, and the NUC thought of annulling the elections because of the fear that no one could govern effectively. It finally agreed to accept the situation and retire from the scene, however, when the RPP and the Justice Party agreed to a coalition with the trusted elder statesman Ismet İnönü as prime minister, while the NUC leader, Cemal Gürsel, was unanimously elected president to watch over the situation.

During the four years of İnönü's prime ministry (1961–1964), much of the deadlock that the NUC had feared in fact ensued, and İnönü was forced to rule through three successive coalitions. The first was not destined to last too long, since it brought together political leaders who differed in personality and ambition as well as policy. In the end the Justice Party's insistence on more liberal economic policies and the pardon of the imprisoned Democratic Party leaders conflicted with the more Statist views of the RPP as well as with the military's insistence that nothing be done that might be interpreted as criticizing or undoing the results of the revolu-
tion. It was at this time that many intellectuals turned to the Workers' Party in frustration over the Parliament's inability to act, while several rightist groups banded together under the leadership of Colonel Türkeş and his associates. Democracy, however, continued to prevail. In June 1962 the first coalition broke up, and İnönü formed his second coalition among the RPP and the small parties, remaining with the Peasant Party after the New Turkey Party, startled by the loss of half of its votes in the municipal elections of November 17, 1963, withdrew in a vain effort to regain its following. A third coalition, formed in January 1964, continued to govern for another year, but by then the Justice Party was making such gains in popular esteem that it seemed certain to prevail in the next elections. Without an overall majority İnönü was unable to take decisive action to snap the nation out of the economic stagnation that had set in with the revolution, or to enact any of the major reforms. The most important problem that faced the regime was the privileged position of the rural sector, which paid only a small portion of the taxes while benefiting from the huge subsidies provided in the past by the Democrats to gain its support. This not only burdened the treasury but also deprived the peasants of the incentive needed to improve their efficiency. In the end, İnönü was unable to secure more than a very small new agricultural income tax (1964), while other reform efforts, such as that to distribute land, were defeated. İnönü at least did secure the release of 283 imprisoned Democrats in October 1962 and the remainder in 1964, returning the 147 dismissed university teachers to their jobs and the dispossessed large landowners to their lands to restore political normalcy and end the tremendous divisions in society that these acts had caused. In these efforts he again displayed political acumen and courage, securing the support of the army and of his own party for measures that were quite unpopular to many of their members and supporters.

Meanwhile, Süleyman Demirel had assumed leadership of the Justice Party and was rebuilding it in a new image, moving it away from the old Democratic ties and ideology. Since he was an engineer, he projected the image of the new kind of technocrat able and willing to steer the nation according to the needs of the time rather than in fulfillment of outmoded political philosophies. This image was strengthened by his moves to give control of the party machinery to professional and technical experts in place of the more conservative politicians who came over from the Democrats. He also was able to develop a sufficiently modernist policy to satisfy the demands of the army as well as his own professional supporters for reform while he retained enough of a rural and religious approach so as not to alienate his peasant followers, who still provided most of the votes. With party affiliations in the Assembly increasingly fluid, he finally forced the third İnönü coalition to resign by a no-confidence vote on the budget in February 1965, so that, in accordance with the constitution, an all-party government ruled until the new elections were held.

During the election campaign, the Justice Party presented an image of a vigorous, dynamic group with a positive policy to move the nation ahead. The RPP, on the other hand, still led by the aging İnönü, though now with the help of an energetic young secretary general named Kasım Gülek, gave the appearance of merely holding together a number of disparate groups to keep power, mainly to keep the Justice Party out. Many of its most vigorous intellectual supporters by now had gone to the Workers' Party, while those who remained fought strongly with the party leaders over the future direction of both party and country. The December 1964 Electoral Law established the principle of the "national remainder" in dis-
tributing parliamentary seats, setting aside a certain number of seats to be distributed to the parties according to their overall proportion of the vote in addition to those elected locally. The purpose of the law was to help the smaller parties, but many saw in it a government effort to deny the Justice Party the triumph that its popularity seemed to presage, further adding to its support. In the elections held on October 10, 1965, the Justice Party did, indeed, gain a victory, with 52.9 percent of the popular vote providing it with a bare majority of Assembly seats, 53 percent, while the RPP gained 28.7 percent of the votes and 29.7 percent of the seats and Bölükbaşi’s new Nation Party received 6.3 and 6.8 percent respectively. The Senate elections held the same year gave the Justice Party 59.4 percent of the vote and 35 out of the 52 seats up for the election, while the RPP won only 13 seats and 29 percent of the vote (see Table 6.1).169

With an overall parliamentary majority, between 1965 and 1970 the Demirel government was able to push ahead to fulfill its programs in a way that İnönü, now in opposition, never had been able to do with coalition regimes. Its policy was determined by its desire to promote economic development and social justice, not only in reaction to the Constitution and the insistence of the army, but also to the increasingly strident demands of the more radical left-wing groups, composed mainly of trade unionists and militant students, who began to manifest their opposition by street demonstrations and even more violent activities. Economic policy followed the mixed approach dictated in the Constitution. The Demirel government used both private and state control to stimulate growth and prosperity through plans provided by the State Planning Organization. The leftist organizations, which now came to include most university teachers and students and many professionals, became more and more adamant in criticizing the government for not going much faster despite the fact that most people were satisfied by policies that increased their prosperity without the hectic excesses of the Menderes years. Relations of the government with the army were better than anticipated, mainly as a result of Demirel’s decision to get his party to elect another general, Cevdet Sunay, as President after Gürsel’s death in 1966. Demirel also continued the effort to modernize the army, improving the conditions of its officers and men and avoiding direct interference in its affairs, while Sunay in turn kept the officers from mixing too much in politics. The main problem that continued to cause friction between government and army involved the question of amnesty for the Democratic politicians, including Celal Bayar, who had been released from jail by İnönü but still were deprived of political rights because of their prior convictions. A law to this effect was pushed through the Assembly, but it was defeated in the Senate in 1969 just before the new elections. Following the elections, however, the amnesty was passed without significant reaction from the army. Bayar retired to write his memoirs, while the other Democrats found that the Justice Party and the smaller groups by now had evolved new leadership structures that they could not really influence by their mere presence.

Government relations with the RPP became increasingly bitter, however. The clashes came initially over RPP criticism of the government tendency to favor its religious supporters by following the Democratic policy of building mosques, allowing religious lessons in the schools, and even encouraging the use of loudspeakers in the cities to amplify the call to prayer. By this time, however, secularism was such an accepted policy of the Republic that people lost interest in the subject; hence this issue could not be exploited. On the other hand, the RPP came under the leadership of a dynamic new secretary general, Bülent Ecevit, who developed a
much more leftist program than before, transforming the party into a democratic socialist group to absorb many of the intellectuals and others who had been going off to the more extreme parties. The government, however, continued to carry the day for some time because of the success of its economic programs. There were the old problems of deficit spending and a deficit trade balance once again, but despite this the 5 percent growth rate achieved under the Democrats actually was increased to 6.6 percent during the new Five-Year Plan (1962–1967), although the population was increasing at a rate of from 2.5 to 3 percent annually. Industrial production was rising by as much as 9 percent annually. Private enterprise contributed significantly, and though the agricultural sector of the economy did not quite achieve some of its goals, its growth and general prosperity still were significant. Between 1962, the first year that the new government’s policies really had an impact, and 1970, while population increased from 28.9 to 35.2 million, per capita income stated in constant terms increased 35.3 percent (from 2,546 to 3,445 Turkish liras), while in the current prices understood by the people the increase was 109 percent (from 1,905 to 3,982 Turkish liras). Overall agricultural production, stated in Turkish liras in absolute terms, rose from 25.143 billion to 32.65 billion, or 29.82 percent; industrial production from 13.01 billion to 28.25 billion, or 117 percent; construction from 4.58 billion to 8.3 billion, or 81 percent; trade from 6.275 billion to 12.048 billion, or 92 percent; government services from 7.35 billion to 12.257 billion, or 66.7 percent; income from Turkish workers and sales abroad from a deficit of 275 million to a surplus to 1.47 billion, or 634 percent; and the total national product from 73.65 billion to 121.376 billion, or 64.8 percent. During the same decade the number of schools increased from 25,922 to 41,667, or 60.7 percent, and the number of students from 2.984 to 6.492 million, or 117 percent. Industrial workers were happy both because of their increased incomes and buying power and also because of the development of trade unionism and permission to strike (1963), which was freely used in subsequent years. Agricultural cultivators were receiving more income than ever, particularly with their limited tax burden and continued government subsidies. Even the nonpolitical elements in the universities were pleased by the autonomy and liberalization provided by the NUC reforms, and also by the tremendous expansion of the bureaucracy to meet the increasing duties of government, which provided good jobs for graduates.

The only drawback, as in many aspects of the Democratic regime, was financial. There now was plenty of investment capital, coming not only from the United States but also from a consortium forced by the European Economic Community, the World Bank, and even the Soviet Union. The migration of close to a million Turkish workers to fill the needs of the booming industries of West Germany and other nations of Western Europe also provided Turkey with an additional significant source of foreign income as well as an opportunity to train its workers in more modern methods and disciplines of work. But with a tremendously increasing internal demand and rapid investment, the result was a new inflation, with the overall consumer price index in Istanbul increasing from 100 in 1958 to 148 in 1970, and in Ankara from 100 to 155. As the vast majority of the population enjoyed the new prosperity, the inflation had little effect on the government’s political position except to provide new fuel for the ideologically oriented opposition of the extreme leftists and rightists and the politically oriented position of the RPP. The latter sometimes cooperated with the extremists for the sake of opposition, attempting to block the government’s programs simply to secure power for
itself. But the more conservative elements in the party criticized the leaders for this, while its leftists continued to oppose the party as an inadequate vehicle for securing their aims. The Justice Party, on the other hand, reacted to the RPP tactics by condemning ideologically formulated social ideas, but in the process alienated many of its own intellectuals and technical experts and came to rely more and more on its rural and urban proletarian supporters. The end result was a restoration of the RPP as the party of the intellectual and technical elite while leaving the Justice Party to an ever-more uneasy balance between the modernist elements led by Demirel and the more conservative religious and rural groups seeking his ouster. In addition, there was a proliferation of new minor parties, particularly on the right, including the Reliance Party (Güven Partisi). In the national elections of October 12, 1969, both major parties lost votes. The Justice Party declined from 52.9 to 46.5 percent of the total vote, though it increased its Assembly seats to 56.8 percent, and the RPP retained 27 percent of the vote and got 3.7 percent of the seats. The old small parties largely faded, while the Reliance Party gained 6.6 percent of the vote and a small number of seats (see Table 6.1). In a sense, therefore, Turkey was evolving a two-party system, with the lesser parties largely falling aside.173

The polarization of Turkish politics evidenced in the 1969 elections led Bülent Ecevit to carry out a major reorganization of the RPP during 1970, driving out most of the older elements, including İsmet İnönü (who subsequently was made a lifetime senator, acting as an elder-statesman above politics until his death in 1974 after a half-century of service to his nation), and recasting the party in a more liberal and progressive image. The Justice Party, still led by Demirel, continued to direct the country’s economic development, but since its conservative elements had gained somewhat increased power, it was reluctant to push through any further social or economic reforms. In the meantime, the left-wing radicals took more and more to the streets, demanding fundamental changes in the structure of Turkish society and also using the American military presence and Turkish attachment to NATO as a focus for their attacks, pushing the government and both major parties toward an increasingly independent kind of foreign policy. With the radicals now using the tactics developed so long before by the minority terrorists, the RPP seized on the government’s inability to suppress them as another issue of criticism. In reaction to the emerging left the main conservative parties, the Reliance, Nation, and New Turkey parties, formed a coalition (October 17, 1970), only to see their more religious elements form the conservative National Salvation Party (Milli Selâmet Partisi), while some of the old Democrats left the existing parties to organize the new Democratic Party.174 The government’s inability to control the violence of the extreme left eroded its support despite the continued development and prosperity. Inflation added to the furor. Members gradually left its group in the National Assembly so that by January 1971 it had lost its absolute majority. And with the RPP’s continued refusal to cooperate in any kind of coalition, it also lost its ability to govern effectively insofar as major decisions and policies were concerned. As a result, the military finally forced the Demirel government to resign (March 12, 1971), leaving the nation to be governed by a series of nonparty coalitions, led by Nihat Erim (March 26–May 21, 1971), Ferit Melen (May 22, 1972–April 10, 1973), and Naim Talu (April 15–October 1973), until the next elections were held.

Under pressure from the army, at first both major parties cooperated with the new regime, but as Ecevit continued his effort to reconstitute the RPP as a left-of-
center progressive force, he finally got it to withdraw its members on the grounds that the government was in fact a right-wing coalition (November 4, 1972). With the Justice Party still divided between its own conservatives and liberals and the nonparty governments seemingly unable to handle the terrorists or to develop major new reform programs, the public gradually swung back to the RPP as well as toward the more radical parties, making it more difficult than ever for any single party to secure a majority let alone organize a harmonious government and follow a rational policy. In the national elections held on October 14, 1973, the RPP secured only 33.3 percent of the vote, the Justice Party 29.8, the Democratic Party 11.9, the National Salvation Party 11.8, and the Reliance Party 5.3 percent. The RPP ended up with 185 seats in the Assembly and the Justice Party with 149, forcing both to seek the coalition support of the minority parties to form a government (see Table 6.1). Though the RPP had the largest vote, since all the other smaller parties were more radical it avoided a coalition at first. The most likely coalition seemed to be one between the Justice and Nation parties, whose policies were similar, but they were unable to get together for some time because of the personal politics and rivalries that have bedeviled recent Turkish political life. Under military pressure, therefore, it was left for the RPP to join forces with the National Salvation Party, an uneasy union that lasted for only six months (February–September 1974) and broke up over the widely diverging views of its members on both domestic and foreign policy. After a long period of nonparty government, Demirel was able to form a new coalition with the minority conservative parties (March 31, 1975). Since the new government held only a plurality in the Assembly and the RPP continued to amass popular support, it seemed possible that the latter might regain power in the next elections unless the Justice Party itself moved leftward to match the changing popular mood.

Foreign Policy, 1950–1975

Perhaps one of the brightest aspects of the new Turkey has been the general agreement of all the major parties on the basic lines of foreign policy. The Soviet efforts to take over significant portions of the country in 1946 led the nation into a strong postwar alliance with the West that has remained basically unaltered. The RPP took steps to join NATO soon after the Marshall Plan had been introduced, and, although its efforts were frustrated for a time by NATO politics, when the opportunity arose to demonstrate Turkish support for the United Nations' effort in Korea, the Democrats accepted the invitation to help so willingly that Turkey's subsequent entrance into NATO (18 February 1952) was assured. This was supplemented by moves to strengthen the nation's ties with both Europe and the Balkans. It soon joined the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (the Common Market), with an associate status taking cognizance of its relatively undeveloped economy, but with hopes of gaining full membership by 1995. The regional alliances of the 1930s also were revived by defense agreements with Greece and Yugoslavia and a mutual defense agreement with Pakistan (1954). The latter soon developed into the Baghdad Pact, later called the Central Treaty Organization, which included also Great Britain and Iran and, for a time, Iraq. The United States was not formally included in the latter but provided strong support and encouragement, supplemented by a bilateral defense agreement with Turkey signed in March 1959. The Arab countries attempted to secure closer relations with Turkey on the basis of religious unity, but all the postwar Turkish governments, regardless of their
policy toward religion within the country, continued to base their response on overall national and secular considerations. Turkey, therefore, remained friendly with the Arabs except at times with Syria because of its claims on Hatay. There have been continued good diplomatic and economic relations between Turkey and Israel, suspended only briefly during the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. Since 1964 also the Muslim members of CENTO, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, have joined in the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) Organization, which has carried forth a number of joint economic and cultural projects with the hope of political cooperation as well. Turkish relations with Iraq, on the other hand, were made more difficult by the latter’s orientation toward Russia as well as its long preoccupation with the Kurdish revolt in the north, brought to an end only in 1975. While the Iraqis at times accused Turkey of encouraging the Kurds, Turkey was not at all anxious to stimulate a similar movement within its own borders and therefore refrained from any overt action, with Iran providing the Kurds with most of their support. Although Armenian and Greek exiles and their supporters tried to instill anti-Muslim sentiments and national aspirations into the political life of the countries where they settled—particularly in the United States, France, and Britain—Turkey effectively countered their claims by pointing out that what massacres had occurred in the past were the result of minority terrorism and not of government policy and that in any case the Republic could no more be held responsible for the actions of the sultans than could the commissars of the Soviet Union for the repressive policies of the czars. Turkey’s key strategic position in NATO also led its partners to place realistic national interests above the pleadings of the minorities.

The most difficult question of foreign policy to trouble Turkey after 1950 was that of Cyprus, caused not by any Turkish desire to annex the island, but rather by the tendency of the island’s ruling Greek majority to exclude the Turkish minority from significant participation in its political and economic life and by the efforts of a militant Greek minority to achieve enosis (union) with Greece. Agitation toward this end began while the British controlled the island. Greek attacks on the Turkish minority periodically caused strained relations between Greece and Turkey starting in 1955. In February 1959 the problem was solved temporarily by an agreement among Turkey, Greece, and Britain, concluded in Zurich and London, by which Cyprus became an independent republic (August 16, 1960), with protection for the Turkish minority under the guarantee of the three signatories, which were allowed to station small garrisons on the island for that purpose. Turkey’s position toward Cyprus after 1959 was to secure full implementation of that settlement. But most of the key governmental positions on the island were controlled by Greeks, who also managed to dominate trade and the economy and left only the worst lands and positions to the Turks. In addition, renewed demand for union with Greece led to a civil war during 1964. Agitated by stories and pictures of massacres in the press, Turkish public opinion strongly supported the idea of military intervention to protect the Turks on the island, particularly in view of the longstanding Greek persecution of the Turkish minority in western Thrace, and in August Turkish airplanes attacked coastal fortifications. But Turkey’s NATO allies, led by the United States, applied severe pressure to prevent a clash between it and fellow member Greece, causing the government to call off its invasion force at the last minute and leave the settlement to the United Nations. Greek subjects living in Turkey were, however, expelled because of their strong support for enosis, and impetus was given to the anti-American agitation of the Turkish radicals, who took
advantage of the popular belief that the United States should have supported Turkey under the terms of their bilateral agreements.

Relations between Turkey and the United States deteriorated subsequently. Radical agitation forced the government to restrict American bases, prevent the U.S. Mediterranean fleet from retaining its home base at Izmir and visiting Istanbul, and gradually phase out other American military operations in the country. Peace finally returned to Cyprus in 1965, but there was no final agreement, and the Turkish minority remained as oppressed as it had been before. The Cyprus Greek government, led by Archbishop President Makarios, did manage to suppress the more radical enosis elements led by General Grivas, but its tendency to join the third world nations in world affairs and to use its position to enhance the position and status of the Greek Orthodox church on the island seriously disturbed the Turks, who were in any case increasingly unhappy at rule by a religious figure. During the summer of 1967, new attacks on the Turkish minority led Demirel to attempt an agreement to safeguard their interests, but American pressure again prevented the kind of Turkish intervention that might have secured a solution, leaving a stalemate that allowed conditions to deteriorate further. The United States got Greece to withdraw its regular troops, but it substituted Greek officers sent as “volunteers” to command the National Guard of Cyprus. In addition, with the Greek military dictatorship in control in Athens, General Grivas returned to Cyprus to organize support for a new move toward enosis. The continued stalemate increased internal pressure on the Turkish government to lessen its American connections and improve those with the Soviet Union, leading to economic and cultural agreements with the latter in 1970. Turkey, however, continued to recognize the possibility of Soviet military attack. Along with a strong connection with NATO, then, it has maintained its substantial military forces in readiness and continued to accept American military assistance and advice.

A new chapter in the Cyprus quarrel came in the summer of 1974 when the National Guard, under the leadership of its Greek army officers, carried out a coup that forced Makarios to flee and installed a regime led by the radical Greek nationalist Nikos Sampson, who declared his intention of bringing the island into union with Greece. The United Nations and United States attempted to resolve the situation peacefully once again, but their apparent intention of accepting the coup and, possibly, enosis, as a fait accompli and large-scale Greek massacres of the Turkish minority finally led Turkey to intervene with an expeditionary force that overwhelmed the National Guard and took control of the northern part of the island. Greece's blatant effort to intervene in Cyprus and, even more important, its failure led the junta in control of Greece to install a civilian government led by Constantine Karamanlis. It was hoped that the restoration of civilian rule and the semblance of democracy would satisfy its Greek critics and also enable the government to use the old Western religious prejudices against Turkey so that foreign pressure would force the Turkish army out of the island and restore the previous situation. Turkey, however, used its presence to enforce a division of the island's population, taking over the north for a new Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and declaring its willingness to withdraw as soon as the new arrangement was recognized, possibly in conjunction with a Cypriote Federal Republic. Turkey's position remained one of supporting continued Cypriote independence under international guarantee, but with full autonomy for the Turkish areas so that the minority would no longer be exposed to the kind of political and economic subjection that had existed previously under the Makarios regime, and would have security of life and property.
The only other major question that arose in the mid-1970s to trouble Turkey’s relations with its Western friends concerned its substantial crop of opium poppies, which, as processed illegally in western Europe and the United States, came to form a part of the supply of illicit drugs circulated through the world. In 1971 Turkey agreed to phase out the crop entirely so as to reduce the international supply. But this policy was the subject of intense internal criticism that came to a climax in the 1973 elections. The U.S. government gave Turkey funds to compensate the peasants affected, but very little actually reached them. In addition, Turkish resentment against the American failure to help in Cyprus contributed to a reaction against dictation in what seemed to be a purely internal matter. Many Turks could not understand why they were forced to bear the brunt of solving the American drug problem while the United States did nothing to curb the health-endangering tobacco crop in its own country and allowed American drug companies to manufacture and export far more drugs than could be used in legitimate medical activities. Since there was, in any case, no drug problem in Turkey, a majority of the population favored restoration of the poppy crop, and thus all parties in the 1973 elections joined in condemning the old agreement. One of the first acts of the Ecevit coalition government was to distribute seed and prepare the way for a resumption of poppy production, though under strict government controls to prevent illicit drug traffic. Subsequent investigation by the International Narcotics Control Board and the U.N. Secretariat completed on July 13, 1976, indicated that these controls were fully effective and that there had “not been any diversion or leakage to the illicit market.”

The issues of Cyprus and poppies in themselves were not serious or fundamental enough to strain Turkey’s relations with the West. But they were escalated especially by foreign and minority political activity, particularly in the United States, where in the absence of a substantial number of Turkish–American constituents, the Congress easily succumbed to the political pressure applied not only by its Greek–American constituents but also by the smaller Armenian–American minority, which sought to gain American support for the fulfillment of its national aspirations. A consequence of this kind of pressure was that all United States military assistance to Turkey was suspended early in 1975. Ostensibly this was done to force Turkish evacuation of Cyprus and to restore Greek rule there. But without corresponding American pressure to force compromises in the Greek position (American military assistance to Greece was continued), Greece was encouraged to make new demands. In particular it brought forth a longstanding dream to gain control of the Aegean by claiming that the continental shelves of the islands that it controlled along the western and southern shores of Turkey, by virtue of the Treaty of Lausanne, placed that sea entirely within the national boundaries of Greece, and sent out exploratory ships that seemed to offer the possibility of the discovery of substantial oil deposits in what had previously been considered international or Turkish waters. Inevitably, the Turkish government stiffened its resolve to maintain its position in Cyprus as well as its insistence on full possession of the territorial waters off its Aegean coasts; and while not ceasing to fulfill its NATO commitments, it suspended American control of its substantial air bases and observation posts in the country, entered into closer economic and political relations with the Soviet Union, and began to explore the possibility of joining some kind of grouping with the Islamic countries of the world. This raised the specter of a major change in Turkey’s foreign policy, including, perhaps, withdrawal from NATO and alignment with the third world block of noncommitted nations in international affairs.
Within Turkey itself the crisis seemed to strengthen the political extremes. The conservatives and reactionaries, now seemingly represented by the National Salvation Party, emphasized Islam in both internal and foreign relations. The more radical left-wing groups sought to use the situation to secure a significant turn toward socialism internally as well as closer relations with the Soviet bloc. Though foreign politics thus threatened to force major changes in Turkey's foreign and domestic policies, as the last quarter of the twentieth century began and Turkey celebrated the one-hundredth anniversary of its first Constitution, with its basically homogeneous population and commitment to modernism and democracy, it could still look forward to a continuation of the changes begun with the establishment of the Republic just a half-century before.

Notes to Chapter 6

1 Ba§vekalet Istatistik Umum Müdurlüğü, Istatistik Ylùlû, hereafter abbreviated as IY, V (1931-1932), 35-99; République Turque, Office Central de Statistique, Population de la Turquie par vilayets et cazas par villes et villages d'après le recensement du 28 Octobre 1927, Angora, 1928.
2 The figures for 1911 are from Ihsaiyat-ı Maliye, III; those for 1923 and 1926 are from IY, V, 237-272, 337.
3 IY, V, 302-333.
4 Düüstur®, XV, 124.
5 TBMM, Zabxt Ceridesi, IV/9, pp. 537, 543.
6 Düüstur®, XX, 119.
7 Cumhuriyet, July 22, 1936; Düüstur®, XVII, 665; RG, 3374.
8 Cumhuriyet, December 28, 1936.
9 Düüstur®, XX, 893; RG 4255; Cumhuriyet, May 29, 30, 1937.
10 Düüstur®, XIX, 151; RG 3819.
11 Cumhuriyet, July 4, 1938.
13 TBMM, Zabxt Ceridesi, III/3, 104, 112, 125.
14 Selek, I, 601; Kili, Kemalism, 118.
15 Yalman, Yakm Tarihte, III, 152; Fethi Tevetoğlu, Atatürkle Samsuna Çskanlar, pp. 99-100; Golo§lu, Devrimler ve Tepkiler, p. 81; Cebesoy, Sıyasi Hâtralar, II, 111; Weiker, pp. 47-50; Tunaya, pp. 606-672.
17 Cemal, pp. 112-114; Cemal, Şeyh Sait Isyans, pp. 112-114; Yalman, Yakm Tarihte, III, 166; Cebesoy, Sıyasi Hâtralar, II, 171-172.
18 Cebesoy, Sıyasi Hâtralar, II, 161; Yalman, Yakm Tarihte, III, 162; Tevetoğlu, Atatürkle, pp. 104-105.
19 Yalman, Yakm Tarihte, III, 171.
20 Tevetoğlu, Türkiyede Sosyalist, pp. 392-394.
21 Weiker, pp. 70-71.
22 Weiker, pp. 76-80; Ahmet A¤ao§lu, Serbest Furka Hâtralar, Ankara, 1969; Golo§lu, Devrimler ve Tepkiler, pp. 279-280.
23 Weiker, pp. 107-127.
24 Tunaya, pp. 622-635; Golo§lu, Devrimler ve Tepkiler, pp. 297-280.
25 TBMM, Zabxt Ceridesi, 11/22, pp. 16-73.
26 Weiker, pp. 128-140; Kili, Kemalism, pp. 120-122; Golo§lu, Devrimler ve Tepkiler, p. 298.
27 Tunaya, p. 597; Weiker, p. 171.
The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975


29 Webster, pp. 307–309; Kili, Kemalizm, p. 79.

30 TBMM, Zabıt Ceredesi, II/7, p. 24.

31 TBMM, Zabıt Ceredesi, II/7, p. 27; Nutuk, II, 849.

32 TBMM, Zabıt Ceredesi, II/8, p. 49.

33 TBMM, Zabıt Ceredesi, II/22, p. 334.

34 TBMM, Zabıt Ceredesi, II/23, p. 4.

35 TBMM, Zabıt Ceredesi, II/19, pp. 311–312.

36 TBMM, Zabıt Ceredesi, II/19, p. 247.

37 Cumhuriyet, September 3, 1929.

38 TBMM, Zabıt Ceredesi, IV/25; Hakimiyet-i Milliyete, October 24, 1933.

39 TBMM, Zabıt Ceredesi, II/19, pp. 115, 133.

40 TBMM, Zabıt Ceredesi, III/26, p. 106.

41 TBMM, Zabıt Ceredesi, II/31, pp. 54–55.

42 TBMM, Zabıt Ceredesi, II/23, p. 356.

43 TBMM, Zabıt Ceredesi, II/32, p. 336.

44 TBMM, Zabıt Ceredesi, III/5, p. 12.

45 Cumhuriyet, February 7, 1932.

46 Cumhuriyet, February 8, 1933.

47 TBMM, Zabıt Ceredesi, IV/23, p. 259.

48 TBMM, Zabıt Ceredesi, IV/25, pp. 50–52.

49 TBMM, Zabıt Ceredesi, V/3, pp. 115, 304.


52 Düüstur³, V, 292.

53 Düüstur³, V, 336.

54 Düüstur³, V, 324.

55 Düüstur³, V, 302.

56 Hershlag¹, pp. 56–57.

57 TBMM, Zabıt Ceredesi, III/12, p. 131; Düüstur³, X, 691; RG 1208; Hershlag¹, p. 146.

58 Düüstur³, VI, 57; RG 84; February 17, 1925.

59 Düüstur³, V, 336 (1924), VI, 191 (1925).


61 Düüstur³, V, 292; Hershlag¹, p. 54.

62 Düüstur³, IV, 541–544.

63 Düüstur³, III, law no. 1457.

64 Düüstur³, VII, 116, XI, 540, XXIII, 116.

65 IY, XIII (1941–1942), 359.

66 Hershlag¹, p. 57.


70 Robinson, Republic, p. 105.
71 Düstur³, IV, 86.
72 Düstur³, VI, 212.
73 Düstur³, VI, 274–276; Hershlag¹, pp. 61–62; April 22, 1925.
74 Düstur³, VIII, 655; Hershlag¹, pp. 62–64.
76 Weiker, pp. 250–251.
77 Düstur³, VI, 9, VII, 1440, 1466, VIII, 654, 953, X, 724, XI, 9, 79, 185, 455, 684, 694,
    XII, 197.
78 Düstur³, XI, 671; RG 1533.
79 Herslag¹, pp. 111–112.
81 Düstur³, XIV, 433, June 3, 1933; Herslag¹, pp. 118–119.
82 Herslag¹, p. 120.
83 Düstur³, XVI, 704; RG 3035, TBMM, V/4, p. 274; Herslag¹, pp. 119–121.
84 Düstur³, XIX, 116; RG 3796; TBMM, V/21, p. 129.
85 Düstur³, XIX, 661; RG 3958; TBMM, V/26, p. 318.
86 Herslag¹, p. 68; Düstur³, VI, 442, VIII, 993, XI, 449, XIV, 4654; RG 645, 1509,
    and 2425.
87 Herslag¹, pp. 121–124; Robinson, Republic, p. 107.
88 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İktisat Vekaleti, Sanayi Tetkik Heyeti, İkinci Beş Yılın Sanayi
89 RG 3950; Herslag¹, p. 178.
90 Düstur³, VII, 1217; RG 406.
91 Düstur³, VIII, 666.
92 Düstur³, XI, 143–178; RG 1489; TBMM, Zabıt Ceridesi, III/18, pp. 121, 123; April
    24, 1930.
93 Düstur³, VII, 519; RG 320.
94 R. Robinson, Investment in Turkey, Washington, 1956, pp. 44–45; Düstur³, XIII,
    519–520.
95 Düstur³, XVII, 448; RG 3330; TBMM, Zabıt Ceridesi, V/12, p. 114; June 8, 1936.
96 Webster, pp. 255–257.
98 IY, XIII, 220; Herslag¹, p. 133.
99 Weiker, p. 27.
100 IY, 1941–1942, p. 205; IY, 1959, p. 296; Herslag¹, p. 135.
102 IY, XIII, 259–280; Webster, p. 117; Herslag¹, pp. 109–117.
103 Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, Series D, vols. V–X, Washing-
104 IY, XVII (1949), pp. 220, 228.
106 Düstur³, XXI, 443; RG 2892.
107 IY, XVII, 249; Herslag¹, p. 201.
108 The only Turkish discussion of the tax, Faik Ökte, Varlık Vergisi Faciası, İstanbul,
    1951, is highly critical of the government. See also E. C. Clark, “The Turkish Varlık
    Vergisi Reconsidered,” Middle Eastern Studies, 7 (1972), 205–206; L. V. Thomas and
109 This process is described best by Kemal Karpat. Turkey's Politics, pp. 98–133.
110 Düstur³, XXVIII, 929; RG 6542.
111 Herslag¹, p. 294; Karpat, Turkey's Politics, p. 110.
112 Düstur³, XXVI, 1228, XXVII, 860; RG 6042, 6219.
113 Düstur³, XX, 218, XXII, 3, 200, XXVI, 1262, XXXII, 5837; RG 4658, 7885, 4165,
    4736, 6051.
114 Düstur³, XXX, 1125; RG 7228.
115 RG 7229.
The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975

117 Düstür, XXVI, 1169; RG 6032.
118 Düstür, XXVII, 1322; RG 6336.
119 Düstür, XXVII, 1253; RG 6329.
120 Düstür, XXVII, 1320.
121 Included among the four were Pertev Naili Boratav and Niyazi Berkes, both distinguished scholars; see Walter Weiker, Revolution, p. 50; Karpat, Turkey's Politics, pp. 372–373.
122 Karpat, Turkey's Politics, pp. 160–164.
123 Karpat, Turkey's Politics, pp. 172–173.
124 Karpat, Turkey's Politics, pp. 188–203.
125 Tunaya, pp. 712–715; Karpat, Turkey's Politics, pp. 219–220.
126 Karpat, Turkey's Politics, pp. 220–228.
128 IY, 1971, p. 143; the figures in Karpat, Turkey's Politics, p. 241, are slightly different.
133 Hershlag, Challenge, p. 361.
134 Hershlag, Challenge, p. 366.
140 Hershlag, Challenge, p. 338.
141 Hershlag, Challenge, p. 285.
144 Weiker, Revolution, p. 50.
145 Cumhuriyet, July 13, 1953.
146 Düstür, XXXIV, 1963; RG 8469.
147 Düstür, XXV, 78.
148 Düstür, XXV, 144–145; RG 8660.
149 Düstür, XXV, 1939; RG 8738.
150 Düstür, XXXV, 1955–1956; RG 8649.
152 Weiker, p. 10; Robinson, Developments, pp. 16–19.
153 Robinson, Developments, III, 15.
154 Weiker, Revolution, p. 11.
155 Robinson, Developments, IV, 224; Hershlag, Challenge, p. 359.
156 IY, 1971, p. 143.
161 Weiker, Revolution, pp. 53-55.
162 Weiker, Revolution, pp. 52-55.
164 Weiker, Revolution, pp. 25-44.
166 RG 10859, July 20, 1961; official translation, prepared by S. Balkan, Kemal H. Karpat, and Ahmet Uysal, was published in Ankara in 1961 and is reprinted in S. Kili, Turkish Constitutional Developments, pp. 172–204. See also Walter Weiker, Revolution, pp. 72-81; C. H. Dodd, Politics and Government in Turkey, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969, pp. 107-127; and Rona Aybay, Karşılaştırmalı 1961 Anayasası Metin Kitabı, Istanbul, 1963, which compares the relevant articles with those of the 1876, 1909, and 1924 constitutions.
169 Landau, pp. 247-264.
170 IY, 1971, p. 41.
171 IY, 1971, p. 113.
## The Ottoman Grand Vezirs and Prime Ministers, 1839–1922

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Dates of Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Koca Husrev Mehmet Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>July 2, 1839–June 8, 1840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mehmet Emin Rauf Paşa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>June 8, 1840–December 4, 1841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Topal Izzet Mehmet Paşa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>December 4, 1841–August 30, 1842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Mehmet Emin Rauf Paşa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>August 30, 1842–September 28, 1846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Koca Mustafa Reşit Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>September 28, 1846–April 28, 1848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. İbrahim Sarım Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>April 29, 1848–August 12, 1848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Koca Mustafa Reşit Paşa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>August 12, 1848–January 26, 1852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Mehmet Emin Rauf Paşa</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>January 26, 1852–March 5, 1852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Koca Mustafa Reşit Paşa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>March 5, 1852–August 5, 1852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Mehmet Emin Ali Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>August 6, 1852–October 3, 1852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Damat Mehmet Ali Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>October 3, 1852–May 13, 1853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Mustafa Nâzîli Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>May 14, 1853–July 8, 1853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Mustafa Nâzîli Paşa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>July 10, 1853–May 29, 1854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Kibrâslî Mehmet Emin Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>May 29, 1854–November 23, 1854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Koca Mustafa Reşit Paşa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>November 23, 1854–May 2, 1855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Mehmet Emin Ali Paşa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>May 2, 1855–November 1, 1856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Koca Mustafa Reşit Paşa</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>November 1, 1856–August 6, 1857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Mustafa Nâzîli Paşa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>August 6, 1857–October 22, 1857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Mehmet Emin Ali Paşa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>January 11, 1858–October 18, 1859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Kibrâslî Mehmet Emin Paşa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>October 18, 1859–December 23, 1859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Mehmet Rüştü Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>December 24, 1859–May 27, 1860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Kibrâslî Mehmet Emin Paşa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>May 28, 1860–August 6, 1861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Mehmet Emin Ali Paşa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>August 6, 1861–November 22, 1861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Mehmet Fuat Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>November 22, 1861–January 2, 1863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Yusuf Kâmil Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>January 5, 1863–June 1, 1863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Mehmet Fuat Paşa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>June 1, 1863–June 5, 1866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Mehmet Rüştü Paşa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>June 5, 1866–February 11, 1867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Mehmet Emin Ali Paşa</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>February 11, 1867–September 7, 1871</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Dates of Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mahmut Nedim Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>September 8, 1871–July 31, 1872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midhat Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>July 31, 1872–October 19, 1872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Rüştü Paşa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>October 19, 1872–February 15, 1873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmet Esat Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>February 15, 1873–April 15, 1873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Rüştü Paşa, Şirvanizade</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>April 15, 1873–February 13, 1874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hüseyin Avni Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>February 15, 1874–April 25, 1875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmet Esat Paşa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>April 26, 1875–August 26, 1875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahmut Nedim Paşa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>August 26, 1875–May 11, 1876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Rüştü Paşa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>May 12, 1876–December 19, 1876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midhat Paşa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>December 19, 1876–February 5, 1877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İbrahim Ethem Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>February 5, 1877–January 11, 1878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmet Hamdi Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>January 11, 1878–February 4, 1878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmet Vefik Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>February 4, 1878–April 18, 1878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Sâdik Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>April 18, 1878–May 28, 1878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Rüştü Paşa</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>May 28, 1878–June 4, 1878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Esat Safvet Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>June 4, 1878–December 4, 1878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayreddin Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>December 4, 1878–July 29, 1879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmet Arifi Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>July 29, 1879–October 18, 1879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Sait Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>October 18, 1879–June 9, 1880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Kadri Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>June 9, 1880–September 12, 1880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Sait Paşa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>September 12, 1880–May 2, 1882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdurrahman Nureddin Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>May 2, 1882–July 11, 1882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Sait Paşa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>July 12, 1882–November 30, 1882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmet Vefik Paşa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>November 30, 1882–December 3, 1882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Sait Paşa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>December 3, 1882–September 25, 1885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Kâmil Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>September 25, 1885–September 4, 1891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmet Cevat Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>September 4, 1891–June 8, 1895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Sait Paşa</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>June 8, 1895–October 1, 1895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Kâmil Paşa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>October 2, 1895–November 7, 1895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halil Rifat Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>November 7, 1895–November 9, 1901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Sait Paşa</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>November 18, 1901–January 14, 1903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Ferit Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>January 14, 1903–July 22, 1908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Sait Paşa</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>July 22, 1908–August 4, 1908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Kâmil Paşa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>August 5, 1908–February 14, 1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>February 14, 1909–April 13, 1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmet Tefik Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>April 14, 1909–May 5, 1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>May 5, 1909–December 28, 1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İbrahim Hakki Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>January 12, 1910–September 29, 1911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Sait Paşa</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>September 30, 1911–December 30, 1911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Sait Paşa</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>December 31, 1911–July 16, 1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmet Muhtar Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>July 22, 1912–October 29, 1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Kâmil Paşa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>October 29, 1912–January 23, 1913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahmut Şevket Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>January 23, 1913–June 11, 1913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sait Halim Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>June 12, 1913–February 3, 1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Talat Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>February 4, 1917–October 8, 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmet Izzet Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>October 14, 1918–November 8, 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmet Tefik Paşa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>November 11, 1918–January 12, 1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmet Tefik Paşa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>January 13, 1919–March 3, 1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damat Ferit Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>March 4, 1919–May 16, 1919</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Dates of Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>79. Damat Ferit Paşa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>May 19, 1919–July 20, 1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80. Damat Ferit Paşa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>July 21, 1919–October 1, 1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82. Sâlih Hulusi Paşa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>March 8, 1920–April 2, 1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83. Damat Ferit Paşa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>April 5, 1920–July 30, 1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84. Damat Ferit Paşa</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>July 31, 1920–October 17, 1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85. Ahmet Tevfik Paşa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>October 21, 1920–November 4, 1922</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Presidents of the Turkish Republic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates of Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk</td>
<td>October 29, 1923–November 10, 1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Ismet İnönü</td>
<td>November 11, 1938–May 14, 1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Fahri Korutürk</td>
<td>April 6, 1973–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Prime Ministers of the Grand National Assembly and the Turkish Republic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates of Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk</td>
<td>May 3, 1920–January 24, 1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Fevzi Çakmak</td>
<td>January 24, 1921–July 9, 1922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Rauf Orbay</td>
<td>July 12, 1922–August 13, 1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Fethi Okyar</td>
<td>August 14, 1923–October 27, 1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. İsmet İnönü</td>
<td>November 30, 1923–November 21, 1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Fethi Okyar</td>
<td>November 21, 1924–March 2, 1925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. İsmet İnönü</td>
<td>March 4, 1925–October 25, 1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Şükrü Saracoğlu</td>
<td>July 8, 1942–August 5, 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. İsmet İnönü</td>
<td>November 20, 1961–February 21, 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Ferit Melen</td>
<td>April 17, 1972–April 29, 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Naim Talu</td>
<td>May 15, 1972–April 7, 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Süleyman Demirel</td>
<td>November 17, 1974–March 31, 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferit Melen (acting P.M.)</td>
<td>March 31, 1975–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. General Histories


II. Bibliographies


III. Reference Works

Bibliography
tive and technical terms is M. Z. Pakahn, Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü (Dictionary of Ottoman Historical Terms and Expressions), 3 vols., Istanbul, 1946-1956. See also M. Sertoğlu, Resimli Osmanlı Tarihi Ansiklopedisi (Illustrated Ottoman History Encyclopedia), Istanbul, 1952.

IV. Official Laws and Documents

All the Ottoman laws and documents cited in this study are in the Prime Minister's Archives (Başvekâlet Arşivi abbreviated as BVA, also called Başbakanlık Arşivi) in Istanbul. See M. Sertoğlu, Muhteva Baksından Başvekâlet Arşivi (Contents of the Prime Minister's Archives), Ankara, 1955, and S. J. Shaw, "Archival Sources for Ottoman History: The Archives of Turkey," JAOS, 80 (1962), 1-12, "The Yıldız Palace Archives of Abdüllahmid II," Archivium Ottomanicum, 3 (1971), 211-237, "Turkish Source Materials for Egyptian History," Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt, ed. P. Holt, London and New York, 1968, pp. 28-48, and "Ottoman Archival Materials for the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries: The Archives of Istanbul," IJMES, 6 (1975), 94-114. Many of the laws themselves were published in the official Ottoman newspaper, Takvim-i Vekayi (Chronicle of Events, abbreviated as TV), which appeared in three series between 1831 and 1923. After 1921 all laws and regulations issued by the Ankara government have been published in the Resmi Gazete (Official Newspaper), abbreviated as RG. In addition, those currently in force were gathered in the Dütur¹ (Code of Laws), of which the first volume was published originally in 1863 and then reprinted, with additions, in 1865 and 1872. Volumes II, III, and IV were published respectively in 1873, 1876, and 1879. Four supplements (Zeyil) were issued between 1879 and 1884, adding new laws and changes in old ones, and a volume entitled Mütümüm (Completion), containing laws added between 1872 and 1907, appeared in 1919. This series was concluded with an additional four volumes entitled Dütur: Birinci Tertib (Code of Laws: First Series), covering the years from 1883 through 1908, published in modern letters in Ankara between 1937 and 1943. The laws and regulations of the Young Turk period were published in 11 volumes in the Dütur: Tertib-i Sani (Code of Laws: Second Series), Ankara, 1911-1928, abbreviated as Dütur², containing laws published in Istanbul through October 30, 1922. The laws issued by the Grand National Assembly in Ankara from April 23, 1920, to October 31, 1970, were published in 41 volumes as Dütur: Tertib-i Salı (Code of Laws: Third Series), abbreviated as Dütur³, in Ankara from 1921 to 1971. There is a full index to this series to vol. 38 (1957), Üçüncü Tertip Dütürün 1-38 inci ciltlerinde mürdüçer Kanun, Tefsir, Nizamname, Talimatname ve Kararlarla ait Umumi Tahillih Fihristi (General Analytic Index to the Laws, Commentaries, Regulations, Instructions, and Decisions published in volumes 1-38 of the Third Series of the Code of Laws), Ankara, 1958. Those issued by the National Unity Committee from May 27, 1960, to November 1, 1961, were published as the Dütur: Dördüncü Tertib (Code of Laws: Fourth Series), abbreviated as Dütur⁴, in 3 vols., Ankara, 1961; and those issued under the 1961 Constitution are being published as Dütur: Beşinci Tertib (Code of Laws: Fifth Series), abbreviated as Dütur⁵, November 1961 to date. Volumes 39-41 of the third Dütur, all those of the fourth, and volumes 1-9 of the fifth were indexed in Üçüncü Tertip Dütürün 39-41 inci, Dördüncü Tertip Dütürün 1 inci, Beşinci Tertip Dütürün 1-9 uncu ciltlerinde mürdüçer mevzuata ait Genel Tahillih Fihristi (General Analytic Index to the subjects published in volumes 39-41 of the Third Series Code of Laws, the first volume of the Fourth Series Code of Laws (consisting of three parts), and volumes 1-9 of the Fifth Series Code of Laws, Ankara, 1972.

Laws, regulations and other administrative decrees issued since 1908 also have been published in the Debates (Zabıtnıme) of the Ottoman Parliament and the Debate Registers (Zabıt Ceridesi) of the Grand National Assembly; also in the Decisions (Kararname) of the Grand National Assembly, the Senate (since 1961), and the Council of Ministers, and in the administrative regulations published by the individual ministries and departments.

Many laws and regulations, and other important information, were printed in the yearbooks (*Salname*) published both for the empire as a whole (*Salname-i Devlet-i Aliye-i Osmaniye*) annually starting in 1263/1846-7, and less regularly for individual provinces, ministries, and other government institutions. For a complete list of all yearbooks published see H. R. Ertuğ, “Osmanlı Devrinde Salnameler” (*Yearbooks in the Ottoman Period*), *Hayat Tarih Mecmuasi*, IX (7), no. 103 (1973), 15-22, IX (8), no. 104 (1973), 10-16. Provincial yearbooks (*Yıl Bilgisi*), containing similar information, have been published occasionally for most provinces during the republican period.

**V. The Reign of Mahmut II, 1808-1839**


On Ali Paşa of Janina and the origins of the Greek Revolution as well as the war with
Bibliography


VI. The Tanzimat Reform Era, 1839-1876


Bibliography


Bibliography


Municipal reforms are described in Osman Ergin, Mecelle-i Umur-u Belediye (Journal of Municipal Affairs), 5 vols., Istanbul, 1914–1922; B. Lewis, “Baladiyya; (1) Turkey,” EI, 1, 972–975; C. Orhonlu, “Mesleki bir teşekkür olarak kaldırılması ve Osmanlı Şehir yollarını hakkında bazı düşünceler” (Some thoughts on the paving profession as a professional organization, and on Ottoman city streets), Güney-Doğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi, 1, 93–138; and “Osmanlı Türkleri devrinde İstanbulda kayıcık ve kayık işletmeciliği” (Small boats and their operation in Istanbul in the age of Ottoman Turks), Tarih Dergisi, 16 (1966), 109–134; Ş. Turan, “Osmanlı teşkilatında hassa mimarlar” (The Imperial Architects in Ottoman Organization), Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi, I (1963), 157–202.


Bibliography


Ottoman rule in Crete is described in Cemal Tukin, "Girit" (Crete), *IA*, IV, 791-804; *Salname-i Vilayet-i Girit* (Yearbook of the Province of Crete), Hanya, 1310/1892-1893; Hüseyin Kâmi Hanyevi, *Girit Tarihi* (History of Crete), Istanbul, 1288/1871. The revolt in Crete and resulting Ottoman-Greek War are analyzed in Süleyman Tevfik and


Paşa and the Prisoners of Taif), Ankara, 1950, Midhat ve Rüştü Paşaların tevkiferine dair vesikalor (Documents concerning the imprisonment of Midhat Paşa and Rüştü Paşa), Ankara, 1946; and “Sultan Abdülaziz vak'asına dair vak'anuvis Lütfi Efendinin bir risalesi” (A memoir by court historian Lütfi Efendi on the deposition of Sultan Abdulaziz), Belleten, 7 (1943), 349-373.

VII. The Reign of Abdulhamit II, 1876-1909


Information can also be secured from biographies of the leading figures of the reign: İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnal, *Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrâsamlar* (The Last Grand Vezirs in the Ottoman Period), 14 parts in 6 vols., Istanbul, 1940–1953; M. Z. Pakahn, *Son Sadrâsamlar ve Başvekiller* (The Last Grand Vezirs and Prime Ministers), 5 vols.,
Bibliography


The Constantinople Conference (called the Naval Arsenal Conference/Tersane Konferans by the Turks) is discussed in Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, pp. 89–120; Y. T. Kurat, Henry Layard’un İstanbul Elçiliği (The Istanbul Embassy of Henry Layard), Ankara, 1968; and T. H. Uzunçarşılı, “Tersane Konferansının mukarrerâtı hakkında Şura mazbatası” (The report of the Council of State on the Naval Arsenal Conference), Tarih Dergisi, 6 (1954), 123–140. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 is


VIII. The Young Turk Period, 1908-1918


IX. World War I, 1914–1918


See also F. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, 1914–1921, New York, 1951; F. Gusee, Die Kaukasusfront im Weltkrieg, Leipzig, 1940. On the Armenian Question as


The wartime secret agreements dividing the Ottoman Empire are described in H. N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey, Norman, Okla., 1931 and Turkey, the Straits and U.S.

X. The Postwar Occupation of Turkey and the Turkish War for Independence, 1919-1923


The Turkish War for Independence that followed has been the subject of numerous studies. Excellent chronologies and bibliographies of the period are provided by G. Jaschke, Die Türkei seit dem Weltkriege: Geschichtskalender, 1918-1928, Berlin, 1929 (published also in Welt des Islams, 10, 1927-1929), revised and partly published (to 1923) in Turkish translation as Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı Kronolojisi: Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya kadar 30 Ekim 1918-11 Ekim 1922 (Chronology of the Turkish Struggle for Liberation, from Mondros to Modanya, October 30, 1918-October 11, 1922), Ankara, 1970, and Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı Kronolojisi, Mudanya Mütharekesinden 1923 sonuna kadar (Chronology of the Turkish Struggle for Liberation, from the Truce of Mudanya to the end of 1923), Ankara, 1974. Also see Utkan Kocatürk, Atatürk ve Türk Devrimi Kronolojisi, 1918-1938 (Chronology of Atatürk and the Turkish Revolution), Ankara, 1973; and Muzaffer Gökman, Atatürk ve Devrimleri Tarihi Bibliyografyası. Bibliography of the History of Atatürk and His Reforms, Istanbul, 1968.

1920 (The Third Constitution, 1920), Ankara, 1970; (IV) Cunhuriyetçe Doğru, 1921-1922
(Toward the Republic, 1921-1922) Ankara, 1971; (V) Türkiye Cunhuriyeti, 1923 (The
Turkish Republic, 1923), Ankara, 1971; Mustafa Kemal, Nutuk, Gazi Mustafa Kemal
tarafından (The Speech, by Gazi Mustafa Kemal), 2 vols., Ankara, 1927; many reprints,
of which Nutuk, 3 vols., Ankara, 1960-1961, was used in this study. Its official English
translation was A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, President of the Turkish
Republic, October 1927, Leipzig, 1929; see also T. Gökbilgin, Millî Mücadele Başlarken
(Starting the National Struggle), 2 vols., Ankara, 1959-1965; Sabahattin Selek, Millî
Mücadele. Anadolu İhtilâlsı (The National Struggle. Revolt in Anatolia), 2 vols., Ankara,

Among the hundreds of memoirs and other histories of the war are Celal Bayar, Ben
de Yâzdim: Millî Mücadeleye Giriş (I Also Have Written: Entering the National
Struggle), 8 vols., Istanbul, 1965-1972; Kemal Arıburnu, Millî Mücadelede İstanbul
Mitinerleri (Meetings in Istanbul During the National Struggle), Ankara, 1955; Fatih
Rıfti Atay, Atatürk'ün Bana Anlatıkları (What Atatürk Explained to Me), Istanbul,
1955, and Atatürk'ün Hatıraları, 1914-1919 (Atatürk’s Memoirs), Ankara, 1965; Ş. Turan,
Balkesir ve Alaşehir Kongreleri ve Hacım Muhittin Çarkılı’nın Kutsayısı Millîye Hatıraları,
1919-1920 (The Congresses of Balikesir and Alaşehir and Hacım Muhittin Çarkılı’s
Memoirs of the National Forces, 1919-1920), Ankara, 1967; Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Millî
Mücadele Hatıraları (Memoirs of the National Struggle), I, Istanbul, 1953, Moskova
Hatıraları (Memoirs of Moscow), Istanbul, 1955, and General Ali Fuat Cebesoy’un siyasi
hatıraları (General Ali Fuat Cebesoy’s political memoirs), 2 vols., Istanbul, 1957-1960;
Mazhar Müfit Kansu, Erzurumdan 80 cbmme kadar Atatürk’le beraber (With Atatürk
from Erzurum until his death), 2 vols., Ankara, 1966-1968; Sami Sabit Karaman, İstiklal
Mücadelesi ve Enver Paşa (Enver Paşa and the National Struggle), İzmir, 1949; Kâzım
Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz (Our War for Independence), Istanbul, 1960, and İstiklal
Harbinde Enver Paşa (Enver Paşa in the War for Independence), Istanbul, 1967; Süley-
man Kılıç, Mareşal Fevzi Çakmak, Istanbul, 1953; Alfred Rawlinson, Adventures in the
Near East, London, 1923; Ali Ihsan Sabis, Harb Hâtralarım. İstiklal Harbi (My War
Memories. The War for Independence), Istanbul, 1951; Fethi Tevetoğlu, Türkiye’de
Sozialist ve Komünist Faaliyetler (Socialist and Communist Activities in Turkey), An-
kara, 1967; İhan E. Darendelioğlu, Türkiye’de Komünist Hareketleri, 1910-1973 (The
Mondros ve Mudanya Mütarekelerinin Tarihi (History of the Mondros and Mudanya Truces),
Ankara, 1948; Yunus Nadi, Mustafa Kemal Samsunda (Mustafa Kemal in Samsun), Is-
tabul, 1955, Ankara’ının İlk günleri (The First days of Ankara), Istanbul, 1955, and
Çerkes Ethem kuvvetlerinin ihaneti (Betrayal by the forces of Çerkes Ethem), Istanbul,
1955; Anadolu’da Yunan zulüm ve vaahseti (Greek misdeeds and atrocities in Anatolia),
3 vols., Ankara, 1922; Atrocités Grecques. Documents et rapports officiels, Constantinople,
1922; Cemal Bardakçığı, Anadolu isyanları (Anatolian revolts), Istanbul, 1940; A. Çer-
rahoğlu, Türkiye’de sosyozializm, 1848-1925 (Socialism in Turkey), Istanbul, 1968; Ömer
Samı Coşar, Millî Mücadelede Basın (The Press during the National Struggle), Istanbul,
1964; A. Gökoğlu, İnkalıbmsada posta ve telgrafçular (Postal and telegraph men during
our revolution), Istanbul, 1938; Zühdi Güven, Anzavur isyanı (The Anzavur revolt),
İstanbul, 1948, and İstiklal Savası hatıralarından acı bir sahфа (A bitter page of the War
for Independence memories), Ankara, 1965; Mithat İşin, İstiklal harbi deniz cephesi (The
naval front of the War for Independence), Istanbul, 1946; Sami Sabit Karaman, Trabzon
ve Kars Hâtraları, 1921-2. İstiklal Mücadelesi ve Enver Paşa (Memoirs of Trabzon
and Kars, 1921-2. The War for Independence and Enver Paşa), İzmir, 1949; Yakup
Kadri Karamanoglu, Vatan yolunda: Millî Mücadele hâtraları (On the Fatherland
Road. Memories of the National Struggle), Istanbul, 1958; Cemal Kutay, Çerkes Ethem
hâdisesi (The Çerkes Ethem Affair), Istanbul, 1955; Çerkes Ethem, Hâtrat (Memoires),
(The Black Book of the Turks. Greek atrocities in Anatolia), Istanbul, 1966; Nurettin
Peker, 1918-1923 İstiklal Savası’nın vesika ve resimleri (Documents and pictures of the


XI. The Turkish Republic, 1923-1975


Bibliography


Up-to-date statistical Information can be derived from the publications of the State Institute of Statistics/Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, Ankara, including its *Türkiye İstatistik Yılığı* (Statistical Yearbook of Turkey), abbreviated in this work as IY, published most recently for 1963, 1964–1965, 1968, and 1971, its *Aylık İstatistik Bülteni* (Monthly Bulletin of Statistics), and a wide range of specialized monographs. The *Annual Report of the Central Bank of Turkey* and the *Review of Economic Conditions* of the Türkiye İş Bankası (Turkish Business Bank), both published in English as well as Turkish, are extremely useful. Laws and governmental decrees are published daily in the *T. C. Resmi Gazete*, by the prime minister's office.
Index

This Index has been formulated to serve also as a glossary. Parentheses are used to indicate alternate names, exact translations, and dates; definitions and explanations follow colons. Muslim names are alphabetized by first name except for individuals who lived in the Turkish Republic and became well-known under the family names they adopted after 1934.

Abadan, 318
Abalıoğlu, Yunus Nadi (1880–1945): CUP newspaperman, delegate to first Grand National Assembly, founder of Republican newspaper Cumhuriyet, 333, 334, 353, 461
Abbas Hilmi I (1813–1854): Ottoman governor of Egypt (ruled 1848–1854), 63, 83, 144
Abbas Hilmi II (1874–1944): Khedive of Egypt until deposition by British at start of World War I (ruled 1892–1914), 312, 319
Abdulaziz (1830–1876): Ottoman sultan (ruled 1861–1876), 49, 55, 64, 66, 68, 82, 83, 86, 148, 153, 155, 156, 158, 182, 212, 213, 216, 228, 245, 308, 445; deposition of, 163, 452–453; death of, 164
Abdulhak Hamit (Tarhan) (1853–1937): Young Ottoman and Republican author, member of Parliament, 254
Abdulhamit I (1725–1789): Ottoman sultan (ruled 1774–1789), 55
Abdullah Cevdet (1869–1932): medical doctor, one of founders of CUP, author and translator of western literature, 256, 257, 276, 279, 301, 305
Abdullah Efendi, Dürrizade (1867–1923): şeyhülislam (5 April–30 July 1920), 349
Abdullah Paşa, Deli (d. 1823): grand vezir (1822–1823), 9
Abdullah Ramiz Efendi/Paşa, Kırımlı (1765–1811): grand admiral and poet, 3, 5
Abdulmeçit I (1823–1861): Ottoman sultan (ruled 1839–1861), 22, 55, 60, 75, 82, 121, 122, 129, 153, 213
Abdulmeçit II (1868–1944): last Ottoman caliph (ruled 1922–1923), 365, 369
Abdulwahhab Efendi, Yasincizade, Seyyit (1758–1833): Ottoman şeyhülislam (1821–1822, 1828–1833), 22
Abdurrahman Nüreddin Paşa (1833–1912): grand vezir (1882), governor of Kastamonu (1882–1890) and Edirne (1890–1895), and minister of justice and sects (1895–1908), 439
Abdurrahman Paşa, Kadi (d. 1810): governor of Karaman province (1802–1810), supporter of military reforms under Selim III and Mahmud II, involved in assassination of Mustafa IV, 2, 3, 5
Abdurrahman Şerif Efendi (1835–1925): last official Ottoman historian (takvimi) (1908–1925), director of Imperial Civil Service School (1878–1894) and of Galata Saray Lycée (1894–1908), minister of education (1911–1912) and president of chamber of notables in Young Turk period, Istanbul representative to first Grand National Assembly, 333
Abyssinia, Egyptian conquests in, 146
accounting and auditing, 73, 74, 108, 154, 177, 217, 224, 251, 270 (65), 285, 306, 379
Acemi oğlan (foreign youths), abolished in 1826, 21, 29
Acre (Akka), 33, 70, 134, 321, 324, 327
Adalet Partisi, see Justice Party
Adalya, 320, 321
Adana, 23, 34, 56, 154, 201, 227, 230, 233, 281, 321, 327, 328
Adapazan, 359
Adivar, Abdullah Adnan (1881-1955) : medical doctor, director of Imperial School of Medicine, Istanbul deputy to last Ottoman Parliament, minister of health for government of Grand National Assembly, exiled from Turkey with wife Halide Edip (1926-1939), historian of science and technology, 349, 380, 395
Adivar, Halide Edip (1884-1964) : leading Turkish advocate of women's rights, journalist, author, married to Adnan Adivar in 1917, professor of English Literature at Istanbul University (1939-1964), 301, 307, 309, 334, 349, 360, 380, 395
Adliye Nezareti, see Justice, Ministry of
administration, administrative organization, 36-41, 71-76, 79, 175-176, 216-218, 243, 245, 300, 379, 380, 416, 446
Adriatic Sea, 13, 196, 211, 277, 297, 313
adult education, 111, 309, 383, 404, 423
advisers and experts, foreign, 7, 11, 12, 29, 43, 45, 48, 122, 141, 145, 193, 197, 211, 245, 287, 300, 308, 309, 311, 313, 323, 374
Aegean (Ege) Sea and islands, 7, 13, 18, 31, 119, 121, 173, 174, 188, 196, 206, 208, 209, 294, 295, 296, 311, 332, 366, 376, 432; Greek claims to, 330, 332, 356, 432
al-Afgani, Cemaleddin (1839-1897) : pan-Islamic philosopher, leader, 157
Afghanistan, 16, 320, 377
Afonyakarhisar, Afony Karahisar, 121, 123, 359, 360, 362
agricultural chambers (ziraat odası), 231, 389
Agricultural Credit Cooperatives (Zirai Kredi Kooperatifleri), 388
Agricultural director (ziraat müdürü), 230
Agriculture, Council/Ministry of: Council established 1838, in Ministry of Trade (1839-1846), Ministry of Agriculture (1846-1862), in Ministry of Trade and Agriculture (1862-1891), Ministry of Forests, Mines and Agriculture (1891-1911), Ministry of Trade and Agriculture (1911-1920), Ministry of Economics and Agriculture (1920-1924), Ministry of Agriculture (1924-1928), united in Ministry of Economics (1928-1932) until definitively established as Ministry of Agriculture (Ziraat Nezareti, later Tarım Bakanlığı) after 1932, 74, 231, 256, 388
ağa : officer, commander, chief, eunuch, provincial estate owner, elder brother, 7, 8, 19, 21, 25, 37, 115, 160
Ağa Hüseyin Paşa (1776-1849) : involved in abolition of Janissary corps (1826), later serasker of new army, governor of Edirne and Vidin, 19, 22, 23, 24, 31, 33
ağa kapanı: headquarters of Janissary ağa in Suleymaniye section of Istanbul, tower used to watch over city, after destruction of Janissary corps (1826) became headquarters of serasker, then of şeyhülislam, 23
Agâh Efendi, Çapanzade (1832-1885) : Young Ottoman writer, publisher of newspaper Tercûman-ı Ahval; introduced postage stamps as Minister of Posts (1861), 130
Ağaöğlu (Agayev), Ahmet (1869-1939) : Azerbaijani Turkish nationalist writer, CUP member, publisher of Tercûman-ı Hakikat and professor of Turkish civilization at the Dar ul-Funun in Young Turk period, member of Grand National Assembly, editor of Hakimiyet-i Milliye, and professor at Ankara Faculty of Law in Republican period, leading philosopher of Turkish nationalism, 261, 289, 309, 382
ağnam resmi, adet-i ağnam: sheep tax, animal tax, 96, 97, 99, 225, 227, 246
Ahali Fükas, see People's Party
Ahiska, 31
Ahmet Ağa, Laz, 13
Ahmet Arifi Paşa (1830-1895) : minister of education (1875), grand vezir (1879), 439
Ahmet Celâeddin Paşa : chief of Abdulhamit II's secret police, 214, 257, 258
Ahmet Cevat Paşa (1850-1900): career military officer, grand vezir (1891-1895), governor of Crete, writer on Ottoman military history, 439, 443
Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, see Cevdet Paşa
Ahmet Esat Paşa (1828-1875) : professional military officer, protégé of Fuat Paşa, minister of navy and war, grand vezir (1873, 1875), 438, 439
Ahmet Fevzi Paşa : grand admiral (1836-1840), 45, 56
Ahmet Hamdi Paşa (1826-1885): minister of religious foundations (1868-1871), finance and interior, grand vezir (1878), governor of Aydın (1878-1885), 439
Ahmet Haşim Efendi (1885-1933): Servet-i Fünun poet, 303
Ahmet İhsan (Tokgoz) (1868-1942): publisher of Servet-i Fünun magazine (from 1891), 254, 255
Ahmet İzzet Paşa (1864-1937): professional military officer, second scribe of Abdülhamit II (1893), chief of general staff in Young Turk period, commander of Caucasus front in World War I, grand vezir (1918) following flight of CUP leaders, minister of war in early years of Republic, 214, 323, 327, 439
Ahmet Midhat Efendi (1844-1912): popular novelist and newspaperman under Abdülhamit II, 252-253, 263
Ahmet Midhat Paşa: see Midhat Paşa
Ahmet Muhtar Paşa, see Muhtar Paşa
Ahmet Niyazi, Resneli (1873-1912): leader of military revolt in Macedonia which sparked Young Turk Revolution (1908), 266, 287, 457
Ahmet Rasim Efendi (1864-1932): Ottoman journalist and writer, representative from Istanbul to Grand National Assembly (1927-1932), 252
Ahmet Riza (1859-1930): Young Turk leader in Europe during reign of Abdülhamit II, CUP member and representative to Parliament in Young Turk period, Darül-Fünun instructor under Republic (1918-1933), 256, 257, 265, 279, 280, 284
Ahmet Vefik Paşa (1823-1891): Tanzimat writer and administrator, minister of education (1872, 1878), president of Chamber of Deputies (1878), grand vezir (1878, 1882), author of a major dictionary of the Turkish language, 182, 187, 188, 219, 263, 439, 454
Ahundzade, Mirza Fathi Ali (1812-1878): Azerbaycani Turkish writer, 261
Ahlal-i Memurun Sicili Komisyonu, see Civil Servants, Commission to Register the Affairs of airplanes, 308
Akaba, 319, 324
Akçura (Akçuraoğlu), Yusuf (1876-1933): Kazan Turk, Turkish nationalist writer, CUP politician, editor of Türk Yurdu (1911) and Türk Ocağı (1912), professor of history at Darülfünun, 262, 289, 301
Aki Efendi/Paşa, Mehmet (1878-1845): professional scribe, reis ul-kültab (1832-1835), first foreign minister (1836-1837), minister of the interior (1837), early sponsor of Mustafa Resit Paşa, 22, 30, 36, 58, 67
Akkerman, Treaty of (1826), 29, 30
Akmaż, 357
Aksaray (a district of Istanbul), 111
Aladağ, 186
alamet: insignia affixed to mark quality of gold or silver, 102
alay (regiment, band, troop, parade), 24, 43, 85
alay emini (regimental commander), 39
Albania (Arnavutluk), Albanian language, nationalism, 2, 10, 18, 32, 65, 83, 195, 199-200, 203, 208, 245, 253-254, 256, 258, 265, 287-288, 290, 293-298, 313, 455, 457
Albanian League, 199
alcoholic beverages, 103, 104, 224, 237, 385, 392
Aleko Paşa: governor of East Rumelia, 198
Alemdar Mustafa Paşa, see Bayraktar Mustafa Paşa
Aleppo (Halep), 15, 34, 50, 65, 70, 90, 123, 203, 230, 236, 279, 322, 327, 328
Alexander I: czar of Russia (ruled 1801-1825), 13, 17, 29
Alexander II: czar of Russia (ruled 1855-1881), 139, 186, 197
Alexander III: czar of Russia (ruled 1881-1894), 197, 199, 202
Alexander of Battenberg: prince of Bulgaria (ruled 1879-1886), 197, 198, 199
Alexandretta (Iskenderun), 33, 83, 183, 239, 327, 332; see also Hatay
Alexandria (Iskenderiyen), 56, 57, 120, 193, 194
Alexandropol (Leninakan, Gümüş), 326; agreement of (1920), 357, 358
Alexandroupolis, see Dedeağac
Alexinatz, 147; battle of (1876), 166, 172, 173
algebra, 64, 108, 251
Algiers, Algeria (Cezair-i Garf), French occupation and annexation of (1830), 31, 32, 59, 192, 242, 259, 455
Ali Fuat Bey, Alipaşazade (1840-1885): elder son of Ali Paşa, member of the
Index

Ali Fuat Bey, Alipaşaçade (cont.)

Şūray Dāvlet, chief scribe of Abdulhamit II (1876–1881), minister of education (1881–1882), 214

Ali Ihsan Saip: general on the Caucasian front in World War I, 325

Ali Paşa, İsparta, Seyyit, 58


Ali Paşa, Silahtar: grand vezir (1823), 7, 9


Ali Suavi (1838–1878): rüşdiye teacher during Tanzimat, Young Ottoman writer, editor of newspaper Muhbir, favored by Abdulhamit II due to criticism of Midhat Paşa, made director of Galata Saray Lycée (1876–1877), died in attempt to restore Murat V to throne (1877), 131, 157, 189, 257


Anapa, 31, 116


Anatolian Army (Anadolu Ordusu), 85, 86

Anatolian Extraordinary Inspector General (Anadolu fevkîlde müfettiş-i umumi), 352

Anatolian nationalism, Anatolianism, 263

Anatolian Railroad (Anadolu Demiryolu), 121, 211, 227

Andrássy, Count Jules/Julius (1823–1890): Hungarian statesman, foreign minister of Austro-Hungarian empire (1871–1879), 158; Andrásy note (1876), 159, 160

animals, husbandry of, 233, 300; taxes on, 96–97, 99, 225, 227, 246, 393, 423

Ankara (Angora), 44, 121, 227, 234, 341, 343, 347, 349, 354, 360, 361, 368, 381, 387, 396, 413–414; becomes capital of Turkey, 368, 427

Ankara University (Ankara Üniversitesi): established 6 July 1948, 387

Antalya, 329

Antioch (Antakya), 33, 366

Antiquities, Museum of (Mecma-ı Asar-ı Atika): established in St. Irene's Church in 1847, changed to Mûze-i Hümayun/Imperial Museum in 1868 and transferred to Çinili Küşk in 1874, 111

Antiquities Regulation (Asar-ı Atika Nizamnamesi, 1874), 111

Anzavur, Ahmet (d. 1921): Circassian bandit and guerilla leader in Anatolia during Turkish War for Independence (1919–1921), 348, 353, 461

appeals courts, 215, 218, 247–248, 380, 418

Arabia, Arabian Peninsula, 10, 11, 16, 40, 57, 72, 85, 98, 99, 273, 319, 321–322, 450; World War I in, 321–322; Army of (Arabistan Ordusu), 85, 86

Arabic language, 48, 108, 144, 251, 253, 259, 260, 303

Arabic script, use of abolished for Turkish, 386

Arabs (cont.)
War I, 318-322; revolt of in World War I, 322, 324, 459; division of in peace settlement, 321, 331, 332
Arap kapi, 111
Aras river, 16
Aras, Tevfik Rüştü (1883-1972): member of first Grand National Assembly, foreign minister of Turkish Republic, general secretary of RPP, 333
arazi ve müsakkafat vergisi (land and dwelling tax), 98
archaeology, archaeological excavations, 111, 251
archives, 73, 76, 217, 287, 442
Ardahan, 183, 184, 189, 191, 315, 325, 328, 341, 348, 400
Arif, Celâleddin: last president of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies, 349
arithmetic, 47, 64, 107, 108
armaments factories, 236
arzi ve aşamalar vergisi: see tithes
Armenian Republic, war with Turkish nationalists, 325-326, 341-342, 344, 356-357, 362, 366
Armenian troops: see Mersin, 328
Arsenal (Tophane-i Amire), 7, 44, 63, 70, 75, 81, 123, 130, 228, 308
art, 383
Arta, 31, 196
artillery, artillery corps, 6, 11, 20, 25, 27, 41, 43, 44, 75, 85, 122, 216
artisans, artisan schools, 5, 10, 20, 28, 96, 278, 300, 341, 390, 394
arts and crafts, 113
ars: poetic meter, 303
Asâkir-i Mansure, see Mansure army
Asâkir-i Muntazama (The Ordered Troops): name applied to Mansure army after 1837, 42
Asâkir-i Nizâmiye-i Şahane (The Ordered Troops of the Sultan): name applied to the new army after 1841, 85-86
ágr (sing. áğır): see tithes
Ağır ve Ağınam Emaneti (Department of Tithes and Sheep Taxes), 99
Askeri Tekâüt Sandığî Nezareti: see Military Retirement Fund, Ministry of assassinations, 1, 164, 283, 298
Assistance Surtax (lane Vergisi): surtax on tithe to benefit agriculture, public works, 231, 249
association, freedom of, 285, 333, 402, 419
Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938): pre-World War I career, 69, 264, 265, 281, 290, 299, 373-374; as commander during World War I, 317, 322-324, 327, 328, 368, 374; as leader of Turkish War for Independence, 340-369; as president of Turkish Republic (1923-1938), 373-396, 440, 461, 463; death of, 395-396; awarding of name, 386
Atay, Falih Rifki (1894-1971): Republican journalist and essayist, 301, 461
Athens (Atina), 18, 30, 151, 207
Auspicious Event (Vakayt Hayriye): destruction of Janissaries (1826), 20-21, 25, 52
Austria, Austria-Hungary, 13, 17, 33, 56, 57, 63, 70, 110, 116, 121, 135, 136, 139, 140, 141, 146, 148, 158, 159, 165-166, 184, 198, 199, 209, 210, 211, 239, 250, 276, 277, 289, 292, 297; involvement in Rumania, 141-142; involvement in Serbia, 147-149; trade with Ottoman Empire, 122, 227, 238-239; penetration of Southeastern Europe, 196, 209; diplomacy during Crimean War, 138-141; diplomacy during Russo-Ottoman war (1877-1878), 173, 180, 181, 183, 184, 186-188, 189; role in Balkan Wars, 292-298; postal service of in Ottoman Empire, 229-230; involvement in Public Debt Commission, 223; alliance with Ottomans in World War I, 310-332; broken up by peace treaties following war, 331-332
Avlonya (Valona), 297
Aya Sofya mosque, quarter of Istanbul, 5, 75, 83, 157, 182, 205, 278, 280, 282, 364
ayar damgas: stamp of purity on precious metals, 102
Aybar, Mehmet Ali (1910- ) : Turkish socialist, journalist, chairman of the...
Aybar, Mehmet Ali (cont.)
Turkish Workers Party (1962–1969),
423–424
Aydin, 15, 44, 121, 123, 211, 235, 236, 346, 357, 358, 363
Aynatap, 328
Ayvalik, 357
Azadlı gunpowder factory, 7
Azerbaijan, Azerbaijani Turks, 261, 325, 326, 331
Azerbaijanian SSR, 359
Azhar University (Cairo), 12
Bab-t Alt (Babtali), Bab-t Alt Evrak Odası, see Sublime Porte
Bab-t Asafi, see Sublime Porte
Bab-t Defter, Bab-t Defterdar, see Finance, Ministry of
Bab-t Serasker: office of the serasker, Seraskerate, see serasker
Bab-t Valayt Fetva Heyeti (Committee to Interpret and Execute the Holy Law), 216
Baghdad (Bağdat), 8, 16, 68, 85, 86, 107, 227, 239, 252, 318–319, 321, 322
Baghdad Pact: mutual security organization of Turkey, Iran, Irak, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom (24 February 1955), 429
Baghdad Railroad, 121, 227, 309
Bahremin Ağa, 174
Bahriye Mektebi, see Naval School
Bahriye Nezareti (Ministry of the Navy), bahriye nazir, see Navy, Ministry of
bahşş (legal fee, tip, bribe), 39
Bakir river, 357
Bakırköy, 41
Baku, 228
Balat Limani Treaty (1838): Anglo-Ottoman trade agreement, 50, 59
Baltazzi, 97
Banat of Temesvar, see Temesvar
Bandırma, 358
bandits, 160, 341, 352
banishment, 175, 180, 216, 252, 281, 398
banks, bankiers, 68, 97, 115, 118, 161, 172, 200, 204–205, 210, 211, 231–232, 238, 389–393, 415, 423
Banya Luka, 150
Bar, Confederation of, 186
barley, 232, 237
barracks, 3, 4, 6, 44, 216, 281
Baruthane-i Amire, see Gunpowder Works, Imperial
Basiret: Tanzimat newspaper (published 1870–1877), 129, 157
Basra, 309, 318, 319, 322
baş kâtib-i şehriyari: chief secretary to the sultan, 38
baş vekil, başbakan, see prime minister
baş boşuk: tribal irregulars, volunteers for military service, 86, 161, 162
Başir II al-Şihabi (1767–1851): ruler of Lebanon (1788–1840), 15, 33, 57, 133, 134, 142
Başir III al-Şihabi: ruler of Lebanon (ruled 1840–?), 134
Başvekalet Arşivi (Prime Minister’s Archives): principal Ottoman archives, 442
battleships, 226, 286, 309, 311, 312
Batum, 189–191, 202, 315, 325, 326, 328, 331, 341, 348, 354, 358–359
Baydar, Celâl (1884–?): first minister of economics, founder and first director of İŞ Bankası, initiator of Etatist policies as minister of economics, prime minister (1937–1939), 395–396, 440; one of founders of Democratic Party, 402–403; third president of the Turkish Republic (1950–1960), 405; trial, conviction, and pardon, 414, 416, 426, 440, 457, 461
Bayezit (eastern Anatolia), 32
Bayezit square (İstanbul), 16, 23, 111, 296
Bayraktar (Alemdar) Mustafa Paşa (1775–1808): notable of Ruşçuk, first grand vezir of Mahmut II (1808), 1–5, 8, 9, 443
Bebek: village on European side of Bosphorus, 64
bedel-i askeri: military service tax for non-Muslims, imposed (1856-1909) in place of head tax, 100; see also conscription exemption taxes

bedel-i nabdi-i askeri: military service tax for Muslims (1856-1909), 100

bedel-i sahsi-i askeri: personal substitute for conscription obligation, 246

bedouins, 70

Behiç, Hakkı (d. 1943): member of Representative Committee and minister for government of Grand National Assembly (1920), leader of the Green Army (q.v.) during War for Independence, 353

Behram Ağa, Hafız: chief black eunuch of Abdülhamit II, 214

Beirut, 33, 57, 122, 133, 142-144, 239, 309, 327

Bekir Sami (d. 1932): professional military officer, foreign minister of Representative Committee during War for Independence, 355, 358

Bektasî dervish order, abolition (1826), 21; revival, 280

Bele, Refet (1881-1963): military commander during War for Independence, first nationalist to enter Istanbul after victory (19 October 1922), member of early Grand National Assemblies, minister of interior and national defense, 343-344, 358, 361, 364, 365, 380

belediye reisi (municipal chief, mayor), 95; see also municipal local government

Belen, 33

Belgrade, 13, 15, 70, 120, 121, 172, 173, 180, 259

Bengazi (Benghazi), 200, 245, 289, 290

Berkat (Albania), 288

berat (diploma, patent): document conferring a rank, position, salary, or privilege, 73

Bergama, 363

Berkes, Niyazi: Turkish sociologist, 436(121)


Bessarabia, 13, 14, 139, 160, 165, 173, 181, 186, 188, 190, 191, 196, 313

Beşiktaş: town on European side of Bosporus, 20, 24, 93

Beşiktaş sarayı (The Beşiktaş palace), see Dolmabahçe palace

beş (beğ, beg): title of district chief, lower military rank, abolition of, 386

Beyan ul-Hak (Presentation of the Truth): Islamicist journal, published by the Society of Islamic Learning, (182 issues, 1908-1912), 304

Beyath, see Yahya Kemal

Beykoz, 123

Beylerbeyi: Anatolian village on Bosporus, 82

Beylerbey Sarayi: Imperial pleasure palace built by Mahmut II, enlarged and modernized in 1865, 282

Beylikçisi: chancellor, chief of department, 217

Beyoğlu (Pera): modern district of Istanbul, settled mainly by minorities and Europeans, located north of Golden Horn above Galata, 91, 92, 108, 129, 172, 204, 306; protocol of Beyoğlu (1861), 143

Bibescu, George: prince of Wallachia (1842-1848), 136

bîdâyet mahkemesi: primary court, 218, 248

Bika’a: fertile plain between mount Lebanon and the anti Lebanon, 144

bilad-i erbaa mollas payesi (rank of molla of the four towns): judicial rank, 39

Bilecik, 123

binbaş (chief of one thousand, major), 23, 39, 85

biology, 251

birth rate, births, 240, 241

bishops, 124, 126, 127

Bismarck, Prince Otto von (1815-1898): first chancellor of united Germany (1871-1890), 146, 152, 173, 188, 189, 196

Bitlis, 16, 201, 246, 315, 321, 325, 344

Bitola, 208

black market, 398

Black Sea (Kara Deniz), 14, 27, 31, 34, 58, 115, 116, 119-120, 138, 139, 140, 146, 152, 156, 173, 183, 184, 191, 196, 228, 295, 312, 323, 332, 359

blankets, 237

Bolshevik Revolution, Bolsheviks, relationship with Ottoman Empire, assistance to Turkish nationalists, 323-326, 328, 341, 344, 354, 355, 359; conquest of Armenian Republic, 357; see also Soviet Union

Bolu, 353

Bonaparte, Napoleon (1769-1821): first consul of France (1799-1804), emperor (1804-1814, 1815), 13, 14, 16

bonds, bondholders, bonded debt, borrowing, 74, 93, 97, 98, 105, 145, 155, 156, 166, 193, 194, 221-224, 226, 276, 415

books, book publishing, 128, 215-216, 251
Index

Boratov, Pertev Naili (1907–) : Turkish folklorist, 383, 436
borax, 234

Bosco: 19th-century Ottoman theatrical producer, 129

Bosnia (Bosna), Bosnia-Herzegovina, 10, 14, 32, 35, 65, 90, 116, 123, 148, 149–150, 154, 158–160, 162, 165, 166, 173, 198, 203, 204, 213, 239, 260, 293, 313, 451; in period of Russo-Ottoman War (1877–1878), 173, 179, 181, 184–192, 195, 196, 216; occupation (1878) and annexation (1908) of by Austria-Hungary, 230, 276, 277, 289, 292, 308, 457

Bosporus (Bogazicj), Bosporus forts, 7, 20–24, 33, 34, 44, 49, 64, 82, 85, 91, 93, 119–121, 172, 195, 228, 312, 320, 321, 329, 363, 400

Bostancio Cağı, Bostancıyan (Gardeners’ corps): Imperial Guards, 46

boyars: Rumanian notables, 135, 136

boycotts, 290, 293

Bükürdelen, 172

bülük (squad, division, troop, regiment), 3, 24, 85

Böyükbaşı, Osman (1911–): founder and chairman of the Nation Party (1948–1952), and Republican Peasant’s Nation Party (1954), 404, 422, 426

Breslau: German cruiser, 311–312

Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (1918), 325–326

Bretton-Woods International Conference (United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference) (1944), 404

bribes, bribery, 6, 10, 39, 59, 245, 247

bricks, brick manufacturers, 236, 237

bridges, 74, 87, 90, 101, 161, 217

brigands, bandits, 160, 200

Brindisi, 229

Bucharest, 63, 120, 255; treaty of (1812), 14, 29, (1913), 297

Budapest, 135, 181; convention of (1877), 181, 183

Budenny, Col. Semen (Semyon) (1883–1974): Soviet military hero, 344


Buhara, 157

building, construction regulations, 46, 47, 91–94, 124–125, 391, 408, 415, 427

Buildings Commission (Meclis-i Ebniya), 91

Bukovina: province NE of Moldavia, 313

Bulgardağ, 234


Bulgarian Exarchate (1870), 161, 208

Burdur, 329


Burhaneddin Efendi, Mehmet (1885–1949): fourth son of Abdulhamit II, 280


business, businessmen, see merchants

butter, 237

büyük meclis: large provincial representative council, 84

Büyük Millet Meclisi, see Grand National Assembly

Büyük Taarruz (The Great Offensive, 1922), 362–364

Büyükdere: village on European side of Bosporus, 34

Byzantium, Byzantine Empire (330–1453), 201, 206, 208

cadastral surveys (tapu, tahrir-i emlak), 11, 40, 87, 88, 90, 92, 93, 95, 96, 98, 114, 152, 217

Cadastres, Ministry of (Tahrir-i Emek Nesaari), 98

Cahun, Léon (1841–1900): French Turkologist, 261

Cairo, 10, 33, 59, 194

calendar systems, regulations, 308, 386

calico, 237

caliph, caliphate, 158, 175, 192, 260, 277, 290, 293, 312, 314, 344, 348, 349, 360, 362, 368–369, 374, 380; separation of from sultanate, 365; abolition of (3 March 1924), 369, 374–375, 380, 384

Caliphal Army (Hülfet Ordusu, Kuveyt), 84

Tedibiye, Halife Kolordsusu, Kuveyt
Caliphal Army (cont.)
Inzibatiye, Kuvayi Intizamiye, Sadakat Ordusu: established by Istanbul government to fight Turkish nationalists and Greeks, led by Süleyman Şefik Paşa and Ahmet Anzavur (18 April 1920), 352-353
Calosso, 25, 28
Calthorpe, Admiral Arthur: commander of British Mediterranean squadron, first Allied High Commissioner for Istanbul during occupation, 327, 329
Candia, 207
Canning, George (1770-1827): British foreign secretary (1807-1809, 1822-1827) and prime minister (1827), 30
Canning, Stratford, see Stratford de Redcliffe
cannon, cannons, 7, 43, 85, 86, 245, 286, 292; see also artillery
Cannon Corps (Topçu Ocağı), 6, 11, 20, 25, 27, 41, 43, 44, 75, 85, 122, 216
Cannon-Wagon Corps (Arabaci Ocağı), 6, 25, 41
Capital Levy (Varlık Vergisi), 398-399, 435 n108
Capitulations, 13, 32, 50, 101, 103, 104, 119, 122, 131, 134, 146, 158, 229, 236, 246, 275, 277, 290, 293, 296, 300, 312, 347, 356, 359, 362, 366; abolished (1923), 367
Capodistrias, John, 17, 31
caravansarays, 21
Carol I (1839-1914): king of United Principalities, Rumania (1866-1914), 165
carpet weaving, 123
Caspian Sea, 115, 256, 326, 327
Cassation Court (Temyiz Mahkemesi), 75, 80, 215, 218, 248, 306, 380, 418
Catholicos of Armenian Gregorian church, 125, 288
Catholicos, Catholic millet, 125, 137, 180, 199-202, 205, 208, 239, 242, 244, 250, 288
cattle, 160
Caucasus, Caucasian Turks, 11, 14, 16, 29, 30, 32, 116, 138, 202, 256, 314-319, 325-326, 331, 341, 344, 374
Cavallof, 45
cavalry, 6, 15, 24-27, 43, 45, 75, 147, 216, 246
Cavit Paşa, Mehmet (1875-1926): CUP minister of finance and public works, hanged (26 August 1926) for involvement in conspiracy against Atatürk, 274, 283, 291, 312, 327
Cebeciyan Ocağı, see Armorers Corps
cebeli: military substitute, 26, 43
Ceb-i Hümayun, see Privy Purse
Celal Nuri, see Ileri, Celal Nuri
Celaleddin Mehmet Ağa, 7
Celal revolts: Anatolian rebels against devşirme rule in Istanbul in 16th and 17th centuries, 114, 160
cement, 392, 393
cemetaries, 125
Cemiyet-i İlimiye-i İslamiye (Society of Islamic Learning), 304
Cemiyet-i İlimiye-i Osmaniye (Society of Ottoman Knowledge), 110
Cemiyet-i Tedrisiye-i İslamiye (Society for Islamic Studies), 111
Cemiyet-i Umumi: General City Assembly, 93
Cenap Şehabettin (1870-1934): leading poet of Servet-i Fünun period, professional army doctor, 254
census, 40, 41, 46-47, 59, 72, 74, 87, 88, 96-98, 200, 216, 239, 240, 288
Central Asia, 157, 158, 259-263, 314, 325, 326
Central Bank of the Turkish Republic (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Merkez Bankası), 390-391
Central Bureau of the Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East, 341
Central Powers: World War I coalition of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, 310-328, 367
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO): mutual security organization of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and United Kingdom, organized 1959 in place of Baghdad Pact (q.v.), 429, 430
Ceride-i Askeriye (The Army Newspaper, published 1863-1922), 129-131, 252
Index

Ceride-i Havadis (Newspaper of Events, 1212 issues, published 1840–1864), 128–129

Cerrahhane-i Amire, see Surgery, Imperial School of


Ceza Kanunnamesi, see penal codes

Ceza-i Bahr-i Sefid Eyaleti (Province of the Mediterranean Islands), see Rhodes

Ceza-i Garp (The Islands of the West), see Algiers


Chamber of Notables (Meclis-i Ayan): upper house of Parliament, 175, 176, 182, 184, 218, 219, 278, 281, 282, 283, 291

Chamberlain, Joseph (1836–1914): British politician, secretary of state for the colonies (1895–1903), advocate of protective tariffs, economic imperialism, 194

Chamberlains (kurena) of Imperial Palace, 83, 214

chambers of commerce and industry, 219, 231, 236, 287, 390, 393, 394, 415

chambers of commerce and industry, 219, 231, 236, 287, 390, 393, 394, 415

chemistry, chemical industry, lessons, 108, 110, 230, 251, 391

Chernayev: Russian general commanding Serbian army, 165, 166

children, youth activities, 97, 244, 301, 394

chrome, 234, 395, 398, 403

churches, 115, 124–125, 137, 144, 201

Churchill, William: editor and founder of Ceride-i Havadis, 129


Cidda (Jidda), 34, 322

cigarettes, cigars, 105

Cilicia, Cilician gates: valley and plain between Taurus and anti-Taurus mountains, leading from Anatolian plain into Syria, 33, 34, 50, 56, 85, 116, 315, 321, 328, 330, 331, 361

Circassia, Circassians (Çerkes), 32, 115–117, 161, 179, 256

citrus fruit, 237

city organization, cities, see municipal and local government

Civil Codes, of 1869 (Mecelle), 66, 68, 119, 280, 385; of 1926 (Medeni Kanun), 385, 389

Civil Engineering School (Hendese-i Mülkiye Mektebi; established 1844): becomes Mühendis Mektebi (Engineering School) in 1908 and Istanbul Teknik Üniversitesi (Istanbul Technical University) in 1944, 109

Civil Servants, Commission to Register the Affairs of (Ahval-i Memurin Sicili Komisyonu), 215, 218

Civil Service, see bureaucracy

Civil Service Commission (Memurin-i Mülkiye Komisyonu), 215, 243

Civil Service School (Mekteb-i Mülkiye): founded 12 February 1859, changed to School of Political Science (Siyasal Bilgiler Okulu), 10 June 1935, and later to Faculty of Political Science (Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi), 90, 109–110, 113, 182, 215, 220, 243, 249, 255–256, 387; see also Political Science, Faculty of

civil war, 352–355

cizye, see head tax

clay, 234

Clot Bey, 11

cloth factories, 123, 236, 237

clothing, clothing manufacture, regulation, 44, 47, 122, 158, 236, 239, 307, 381, 385; modernization of clothing law (1934), 386

coal, coal mines, 93, 123, 234, 237, 313, 390, 392–393, 395, 408

coffee, coffee houses, 92, 237, 278

cognac, 237

coins, coinage, 175

collective bargaining, 419

commerce, see trade and commerce

Committee of Seven, 274–275

Commodity Customs Administration (Emtia Gümüşük İdaresi), created (1840) to replace tax farms on customs duties taxes (q.v.), replaced by Excise Taxes, Department of in 1861, 103

communications, 74, 75, 89, 106, 119–122, 178, 236, 241, 306, 418, 420, 449; see also railroads, road construction, steamships, telegraph, telephones

communists, communist activity in Turkey, 341, 344, 352–354, 359, 381, 382, 400, 404, 423, 426, 433, 461

concerts, 49
concessions to foreign companies, 102, 120–121, 193, 211
confiscations, 4, 21, 39, 59, 177, 286, 399
Congress of Berlin, see Berlin, Congress and Treaty of
Congress of Ottoman Liberals (Paris): first (1902), 258; second (1907), 265
Congress of the Peoples of the East (Baku), 354
Congress of Turkish Radical Socialists, 341
Conker, Nuri, 382
conscription exemption taxes, 100, 152, 225, 246, 275, 313
Constantinople, see Istanbul
constitutional commissions, of 1876, 174; of 1961, 416
constitutionalism, 71, 130–133, 157, 164–165, 211, 256, 289, 351–352
construction, see building
consular courts, 246–248; abolition of, 367
consumption taxes, 105
copper, copper mines, 123, 234, 237
cord, 237
Corinth, Gulf of, 18
corn, 237
corporations, corporation taxes, 300, 393, 401
corruption, 27, 31, 70, 155, 264, 413, 416
Cossacks, 24, 25, 86, 116, 246
cost of living indices, 409; see also prices
cotton, cotton goods, gins, 11, 123, 144, 145, 233, 234, 236, 237, 389, 391, 392, 395
Council of Judicial Regulations (Divan-i Ahkam-i Adliye), see Judicial Regulations, Council of
Council of State (Surayi Devlet, Danştay): created in 1867 to assume Tanzimat legislative duties, continued by Turkish Republic (law of November 23, 1925) as supreme administrative, judicial court, 79–81, 90, 94, 132, 154, 164, 174, 176, 178, 180, 184, 213, 217–218, 231, 247, 248, 275, 276, 278, 291, 379, 380, 418
Council of the Tanzimat (Meclis-i Tanzimat): supreme reform legislative body of Tanzimat from 1854 to 1861, 63, 65, 78–79, 92, 93
 counterrevolution of 1909, 279–282, 285, 299, 334 n22
courts, 37, 46, 61, 74–76, 90, 118–119, 177–178, 210, 246–249, 286, 333, 367, 378; see also justice
Cox, Sir Percy (1864–1937): British diplomat, chief political officer of Indian Expeditionary Force in Iraq during World War I, British minister to Iran (1918–1920), High Commissioner to Iraq (1920–1923), 318
craft guilds, 10, 12, 46–47, 80, 84, 91, 92, 94, 106, 122, 236, 300, 390, 393; see also trade unions
credit, credit cooperatives, 391, 412, 415
Crete, Cretan Revolt, Crisis, 18, 29, 31, 32, 34, 59, 64, 67, 70, 75, 83, 85, 90, 137, 145, 148, 151–152, 166, 181, 188, 190, 191, 196, 203, 204, 208, 209, 292, 295, 296, 397, 451–452
Crimea, Crimean Hanate, Tatars, 4, 17, 115–118, 120, 161, 259, 246, 261–263, 312, 325, 341
Crimean War (1853–1856), 61, 63, 67, 70, 73, 78, 84, 88, 91, 92, 97, 98, 105, 107, 109, 110, 119–122, 132, 133, 134, 136, 142, 146, 148, 150, 157, 192, 228, 241, 451; diplomacy and battles of, 138–141
criminal law, 39–40, 89, 119, 385
Croatia, 149, 165
Cromer, Lord (Evelyn Baring) (1841–1917): British High Commissioner in Egypt (1883–1907), 195
cultivation, cultivation methods, taxes, 68, 84, 99, 116, 230; see also agriculture
culture, cultural development, institutions, 111, 128-133, 450
Cumhuriyet (The Republic): first major newspaper of the Turkish Republic, founded by Yunus Nadi Abahoglu (May 7, 1924), 353; see also Yunus Nadi Abahoglu
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, see Republican People's Party
Cumhuriyet Senatosu, see Senate of the Republic
Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi, see Republican Peasant's National Party
Cumhuriyetiçilik, see Republicanism
CUP, see Union and Progress, Society/Committee of
currency, currency controls, values, regulations, 391, 395, 403-404, 409, 413
Curzon, Lord (George Nathaniel Curzon, 1859-1925): British viceroy of India (1898-1905) and foreign secretary (1919-1924), 364, 366
customs duties (gümüş resmi), 95, 103, 134, 136, 179, 193, 197, 223, 232, 238, 312, 356, 367, 389, 390, 401
Cuza, Alexander Ion (1820-1873): first prince of united Romanian Principalities (ruled 1859-1866), 142
Cyprus (Kibris), Cyprus Problem, 57, 157, 287, 296; British occupation of, 190, 193, 224, 260; Greek efforts to annex, 411, 416, 430-431; Turkish occupation of, 431
Cyrenaica: Ottoman province, ceded to Italy (1912), 293
Cyril and Methodius Committee: Bulgarian nationalist organization (1884), 209
Çağatay Turkish, 262
Çakmak, Fevzi (1876-1950): professional military officer, fought in Dardanelles, Caucasus, and Syrian campaigns in World War I, chief of General Staff and Minister of War in Istanbul (1919-1920), minister of defense and head of council of ministers for Ankara government (1921-1922), led troops at battles of İnönü and Sakarya, first chief of general staff of Turkish Republic (1923-1944), 347, 360, 403, 404, 440, 461
Çalışma Bakanlığı (Ministry of Labor): established January 29, 1946, 401
Çanakkale: town on eastern shore of Dardanelles, 123
Çapanoğlu: Anatolian landowning and derebey notable family, 2, 3, 15, 353
Çatalca defense line, 188, 245, 294, 295, 296, 356
çavuş (sergeant, city policeman, messenger), 85, 94
çavuşbaşı (chief of çavuşes): officer in charge of delivering and enforcing imperial orders, judicial pronouncements, and of arranging official ceremonies, replaced by minister of Judicial Pleas (devâi nasrû) in 1836, 36
Çerkes Ethem: Anatolian guerilla leader during War for Independence, tried and executed (May 9, 1921) by Ankara Independence Court, 353, 354, 357, 358, 461, 462
Çerkes Hasan (d. 1876): protégé of Abdulaziz, raised and educated in palace, professional military officer, aide to Prince Yusuf Izzeddin, killed minister of war Hüseyin Avni Paşa and minister of foreign affairs Raşit Paşa in attack on house of the former (Çerkes Hasan incident), hanged the next day (1876), 164, 452
Çernavoda, 121
Çrağan palace: built (1863-1867) by sultan Abdulaziz on Bosporus in northern section of Beşiktaş, superseded by Yıldız palace, used by Parliament (1909-1910), destroyed by fire (January 20, 1910), 82, 83, 164, 167, 189, 287
Çinili Kösk, 111
Dağarsık (The Pouch): literary journal, 252
Dağlıstan, 256
dahili gümüş: domestic customs service, 103; see also customs duties
Dahiliye (Interior), see Interior, Ministry of the
daire: city district, governmental department, 93
Dalmatia, 158
Damascus (Şam), 33, 34, 57, 85, 86, 90, 122, 123, 134, 143, 230, 264, 319, 322, 327, 374
damat: title given to sultan's son-in-law, man married into Ottoman family, 69
damga resmi (stamp tax), 102-103, 232
damgals varaka-sahîha: stamped legal document, 102
dams, 68
Danilo I: prince-bishop (vladika) of Montenegro (ruled 1851-1860), 150
Dantstay: name applied to Council of State in place of Şurayi Devlet (law of November 23, 1925), see Council of State
Danube International Commission, 140, 142
Danube Province (Tuna Vilayeti), 67, 86, 90, 99, 101, 110, 121, 154, 161, 179, 231, 252
Dar-ş Şurayi Askeri: deliberative council of the army (1838-1839), 38
Dar-ş Şurayt Bab-ş Ali: deliberative council of the Sublime Porte (1838-1839), 38, 76
Dar ul-Fünun-u Osmani (Darülfiinun-u Osmani), see Ottoman Imperial University
Dar ul-Hikmet ul-Islamiye (School of Islamic Wisdom), 307
Dar ul-İhälé (place of the Caliphate), see Istanbul
Dar ul-Muallimat (House of Female Teachers): teacher training school for women (established 1869, opened April 26, 1870), 109, 113
Dar ul-Muallimin (House of Male Teachers): teacher training school for men (established March 16, 1846), 107, 108, 109, 113
Dar ul-Şafaka (Darüssafaka): Imperial Orphanage (established 1868, opened June 25, 1873), 111, 113
dar ussaade aşası (darüşsaade aşası): chief black eunuch of the sultan, 214
Dardanelles (Çanakkale Boğazı), 13, 30, 41, 83, 136, 137, 183, 188, 291, 295, 312, 327, 363, 366; Peace of the Dardanelles (1809), 13; Dardanelles Campaign (1915), 317-318
Darphane, see Mint
Dashnak organization, Dashnaks: Armenian Revolutionary Federation (founded 1890), 203-205, 265, 278, 287, 316, 326
dates, 237
Davut Paşa, Davutpaşa (district outside Istanbul), 19, 23
David, A. L., 261, 263
Davut Paşa: governor of Lebanon (1861-1868), 143
Davut Paşa: Mamluk leader of Baghdad (1813-1828), 15
deaf mutes, 113
deavi nazırı (minister of judicial pleas), Deavi Nezareti (Ministry of Judicial Pleas): created from office of çavuşbaş in 1836, changed to Ministry of Justice (Adliye Nezareti) in 1870, 36-37
decentralization movement, 258, 265-266, 276
decimal system, 238
Dedeağac (Alexandroupolis): port of western Thrace, 121, 183, 188, 297
Defense of Rights (Müdafaa-i Hukuk) committees, societies: created to defend Turks from foreign occupation after World War I, 340, 341, 344-346, 359, 380
Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia Committee (Müdafaa-i Hukuk-u Anadolu ve Rumeli Cemiyeti), 345, 346, 359, 360
defterdar: treasurer, keeper of the registers, controller of finances, minister of finances, replaced by minister of finance (maliye nazırı) in 1838, 42, 73; see also Finance, Ministry of
Defterhane: storehouse of Ottoman cadastral and other property records, replaced by Defter-i Hakani Emaneti in 1871, see Property Records, Department/Ministry of
defter-i hakani: register of property ownership, records, register of government receipts, 81
Defter-i Hakani Emaneti/Nezareti: created from Defterhane (q.v.) in 1871, see Property Records, Department/Ministry of
de Hirsch, Baron: Belgian banker, financier, builder of Oriental Railroad, 121
de Lesseps, Ferdinand: French banker, builder of Suez Canal, 144, 145
Deligannes, Theodore: conservative Greek politician, 206
Deniz Kuvvetleri Bakani (Ministry of Naval Forces), see Navy, Ministry of the
Denizcilik Bankası (Maritime Bank): established December 27, 1938, 120, 392
dentistry, 394
department stores, 391, 392
Index

deportations, 315-316, 338 n161, 399; see also refugees
Der Saadet, Dar üs-saade (Abode of Felicity): Istanbul
Der Saadet Bidayet Mahkemesi: Court of First Instance for Istanbul, 76
Der Saadet Ordusu: the Army of Istanbul, 85
Derbend, 326
derebeys: Anatolian notables, eliminated by Mahmut II, 352, 353
Deren, 290
ders vekili: lesson assistant of the grand mufti, 74
dervish orders, monasteries, lodges, dervishes, 8, 21, 262, 278, 307, 381, 387, 409; suppression of (1923), 385
Derviş Paşa, 194
Derviş Vahdeti, Hafiz (1870-1909): publisher of newspaper Volkan, stimulator of counterrevolution of 1909, 280
Deutsche Bank, 227
Devlet Planlama Teşkilâtı, see State Planning Organization
Devlet Sanayi Ofisi (State Industry Office), 391
dictionaries, 254, 263
Dikimhane-i Amire (Imperial Sewing Workshop), 44
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi (Faculty of Language and History-Geography): Faculty of Letters, University of Ankara (established by law of June 14, 1935; opened January 9, 1936), 387
Dinar, 121
Disraeli, Benjamin (1804-1881): British prime minister (1868, 1874-1880), 160, 162, 173, 179, 183, 184, 187, 188, 189, 190
disturbances, riots, 4-5, 8, 20-21, 134, 189, 203, 204, 281-282, 294, 412, 413, 416, 426, 428
Divan-i Ahkâm-i Adliye, see Judicial Regulations, Council of
Divan-i Ali: High Court of Appeal, 178, 380, 415-416
Divan-i Harb-i Orfî: Military Martial Law Court, 349
Divan-i Hümayun, see Imperial Council
Divan-i Hümayun hacesâns: chief clerks of the Imperial Council, 39
Divan-i Hümayun Kalemi: Scribal Department of the Imperial Council, 73
Divan-i Muhasebat (Accounting Council): 73, 177, 217, 224, 285
Divanyolu: street and quarter of Istanbul, 5
Divinity, Faculty of (İlahiyat Fakültesi): established in Ankara June 4, 1949, 409
divorce, divorce regulations, 246, 307, 385
Diyanet İşleri Müdürlüğü/Bakanlığı (Department/Ministry of Religious Affairs): established in place of şeyhulislamate on March 3, 1924, 384
Diyarbakir, 16, 123, 201, 236, 301, 325, 344, 381
Dniester (Turla) river, 13
Do bunker, the, 24, 31, 32, 86, 116, 138, 161, 183, 188, 189, 191, 196
Dockyard, Imperial Dockyard (Tersane-i Amire): absorbed by the Ministry of the Navy in 1830, 27, 75, 178, 216
dockyard superintendent (tersane emini): abolished in 1830, 27, 42
Document of Agreement (Sened-i İttifak), 2-3
Document of Obedience (Sened-i İtaat), 5
Dodecanese islands (Oniki Ada/the Twelve Islands), 291, 293, 320-321, 356
Doğu Bayezit, 184, 189, 191
Dolmabahçe palace: constructed by Abdulmecid in Beşiktaş (1853) in place of older palace located on filled-in land beside sea, 49, 163, 164, 172, 182, 396
Donizetti, Giuseppe: founder of palace band, composer of first Ottoman national anthem, musical advisor to Abdulmecid (1828-1856), 23-24, 28, 49
donme: adult convert to Islam, member of Jewish community, centered in Salonica, converted to Islam in 17th century, 265
Drina river, valley, 147, 188
drugs, 237
Druze, 133-134, 142
Dulcigno, 200
Dumlupinar, Battle of (1922), 362
Dunsterville, L. C.: commander of Dunsterforce, British military expeditionary force operating in Iran and the Caucasus during World War I, 326
Duru, Kazim Nami: one of founders of CUP, 256, 257, 457
Duru, Jean Victor (1811-1894): French minister of education (1863-1869), inspired Ottoman Education Act of 1869, 108
Düstur: Code of Public Laws, 119, 442
düyun-u umumiye, see public debt
Düzce, 353
earthenware, 237, 391
East Rumelia (Rumeli): Bulgaria south of Balkan mountains, created as autonomous province under Ottoman rule by Treaty of Berlin (1878) with capital at Filibe, annexed by Bulgaria (1885), 190, 191, 196–199, 206, 220, 224
Eastern Ideal, Easternists, 351–352, 359
Ebniye-i Hassa Müdurlüğü (Department of Imperial Buildings), ebniye-i hassa müdürü (director of imperial buildings): created in 1831 in place of mimarbasi (q.v.) to supervise construction and repair of all government buildings and of all buildings in Istanbul, 47
Ebüzüya Tevfik (1848–1913): member of Council of State, director of School of Industries (Sanayi Mektebi) under Abdulhamit II, editor of literary journal Mecmuası-i Ebüzüya, 253
Echmiadzin, 125, 326
Edip (Edib), Halide, see Adivar, Halide
Education Benefits Share (Maarif Hisse-i İanesi, Maarif Hisseesi): surtax on tithe imposed for benefit of education (February 8, 1883), 232, 249–250, 285, 287
Education Council, Council on Public Instruction (Meclis-i Maarif-i Umumi, Meclis-i Maarif, Maarif Şurası): first established July 21, 1846, 65, 111, 125
efendi: title given to literary, religious people, members of ilmiye (Learned) and kalemîye (Scribal) institutions of Ottoman Ruling Class, abolition of, 386
elahi (the people): popular term applied to 19th-century provincial notables, 60, 114
Elazığ, 344, 380
Elbistan, 15
elders, councils of, 47, 90, 107, 152, 385

Index
Index

electoral laws, 90, 181, 185, 186, 276, 277, 282, 350, 379, 403, 405, 412, 416-417, 419, 425-426

electricity, electric power, 230, 306, 308, 392, 393, 408, 412

Ele§kirt river valley, 191

Elfi Bey, Mehmet: Egyptian Mamluk leader in early 19th century, 10

Elliot, Sir Henry, 179

Emine Sultan (1898- ) : daughter of Prince Süleyman Efendi (son of Abdul- 
mecit I), niece of Abdulhamit II, wife of Enver Paşa (1911-1922), 299

Eminonii: section of Istanbul, 230

Emlak Kredi Bankasi (Real Estate Credit Bank, founded June 14, 1945), 392

Emniyet-i Umumi Mudiirliigu (Department of Public Security), 286

employment restrictions, 390, 394

Emtia Gumriik Idaresi, see Commodity Customs Administration

Encumen-i Adliye (Supreme Judicial Council), 75

Encumen-i Dani§ (Academy of Knowledge) : operated 1851-1862, 65, 109, 110, 263

Enderun-u Hümâyun: inner section of Sultan's palace, Imperial Palace Service, see sultan, palace of endowments, see religious foundations

engineering, engineering schools, 11, 23, 27, 29, 41, 48, 64, 75, 107-110, 249, 251

Enos (Enez), Enos-Midye line, 295, 296, 320

Enver Paşa (1881-1922): one of founders of CUP, member of CUP triumvirate ruling Ottoman Empire after 1913, minister of war during World War I, 266-267, 276, 278, 281, 290, 295, 297, 299, 300, 308, 310-311, 312-314, 323-326, 332, 457, 461

Epirus, 148, 151, 181, 184, 190, 196, 206, 294, 297

equality, 50, 59, 125, 127-128, 132, 157, 164, 177, 275, 276, 282, 378, 418, 419


Erêgli, 234

Erenköy, 254

Erfurt, Agreement of (1808), 13

Ergani, 234

Erim, Nihat (1912- ) : lawyer, director of newspaper Ulus (1950- ), prime minister of Turkey (1971-1972), 428

Erivan: capital of Republic of Armenia, 16, 32, 316, 326, 331

Erkân-ı Harbiye, see General Staff

Ersoy, Mehmet Akif (1870-1936): poet, Islamist leader, 303, 304

Erzincan, 201, 323, 325


Esat, Dr. (İşık), 333

Esat Efendi, Mehmet (1785-1847): chronicler of destruction of Janissaries (1826), official chronicler (vakânîvis), editor of Takvim-i Vekayi, first minister of education (1846-1847), 443

esham (bonds), esham-s cedid (new bonds), issued 1865, see bonds

Eskişehir, 234, 354, 358, 360, 363

esnak odası, see guilds

Eşkîcîyan corps, 19-20, 22

esraf: name applied to 19th-century provincial notables, 114

Et Meydani: public square in Istanbul, 20

Etatism (Statism): program of state financing and control of key elements of Turkish economy, developed in 1930's under leadership of Celal Bayar, 390-395, 401, 405, 408, 412, 421

Ethnike Hetairia (Ethnic Band): Greek national society established in 1894 to expand Greek territory, foment revolts, annexation of Crete, Macedonia, 206, 209

Etî Bank (The Hittite Bank): established October 23, 1935, 391-392

cunuchs, 214

Euphrates (Firat) river, 105, 319

European Economic Cooperation (EEC) Organization (the Common Market, founded 1957), entry of Turkey (December 1, 1964), 400, 427, 429

evkaf (sing. vakaf, Arabic waqf), see religious foundations

Evîlad-î Fatihân: Anatolian Turkish tribes settled in parts of Rumeli, with special salaries, tax exemptions; newly organized by Mahmut II (1828), abolished by Tanzimat (1845), 26

excise taxes (rusum-u sitte/the six taxes, on document stamps, spirits, fishing, salt, tobacco and silk): administered by Rûsûmat Nesaretî/Ministry of Excise Taxes, turned over to Public Debt Commission
Index 483

**excise taxes (cont.)**
(q.v.) in 1882, 28, 40, 46, 91, 92, 95–96, 102, 103, 193, 223, 389, 393, 401

Excise Taxes, Department/Ministry of (Rüşsāmat Emaneti/Nezareti/Mudur-lüğü): created in 1861 to administer excise taxes and customs duties, 81, 103, 217, 225, 235

executive departments of government, 71–76, 175–176, 350, 378

export tax (raftiye resmi), 103

exports, 103, 122–123, 232–234, 236–239, 300, 373, 392, 409; see also trade and commerce

External Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, 209

eyalet (province): name replaced by vilayet starting in 1864, 89

factories, 11, 25, 44–45, 122–123, 236, 308, 390–393; see also industry

fahri yürüşen-ı ekrem: sultan's guards of honor, 83

Falkeisen, 123

family laws, 307, 333, 419

family names, 303, 386

famine, 156, 165

Fao, 318

Fath Ali Şah (1771–1834): şah of Iran (ruled 1797–1834), 16

Fatherland and Liberty Society (Vatan ve Hürriyet Cemiyeti): founded by Ottoman officers in Damascus (1907), 264, 265

Faysal, Emir (1885–1933): son of Şerif Hüseyin, leader of Arab Revolt in World War I, king of Iraq (1921–1933), 322, 324, 330

Fehim Paşa (1873–1909): raised in palace of Abdulhamit II from early age, professional military officer, member of sultan's guard of honor, chief of secret police, assassinated in Yenişehir, 214

felt, 237

Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg (1861–1948): prince (ruled 1887–1908) and first king (ruled 1908–1918) of Bulgaria, 199

ferik: divisional general; title used in Ottoman and Turkish armies (1830–1934), 39

Ferit Paşa, Damat Mehmet (1853–1923): husband of sultan Abdulmecit I's daughter Mediba Sultan, professional diplomat, member of Chamber of Notables (1908), fought nationalists as grand vezir (1919, 1920), 283, 291, 332, 346, 348–349, 351, 368, 439, 440

ferman: imperial edict, largely replaced in 19th century by irade (q.v.), 38, 125

fetva: decision of a mufti on a legal matter, juridical decision, 282

fetva emini: scribe in charge of writing out official opinions of the grand mufti, 74, 166

Fevahane-i Ceilâ: Supreme Religious Court, 74

feudal organization, Corps, 26–27, 31, 43, 95, 96–97, 100, 101, 114, 147, 149, 150, 224, 389

Fevaid-i Osmaniye: 19th-century Ottoman steampship company, 119–120

fez, fezzes: used in Ottoman Empire and Turkey, 1832–1925, 237, 385

figs, 237, 238

Filibe (Philippopolis, Plovdiv): capital of East Rumelia, 131, 167, 198


Finance, Council on (Meclis-i Maliye), 73


Financial Inspection Commission, 306

financial organizations, 37, 41–42, 73–74, 177, 197–198, 211, 217, 347, 379, 384, 391, 446


fine arts, 113, 287, 383

Finkenstein, Treaty of (1807), 16

firefighting, fires, 28, 46, 75, 92

Firozvik, 267

fish, 103, 237

five year plans, of 1933, 391; of 1936, 392–393; of 1963, 427

flour, flour milling, 123, 237

food, food supplies, shortages, 46, 92, 93, 324, 327, 328, 408, 420

forced labor (corvée), 50, 95, 101, 121, 144, 145, 158, 227, 232, 398

Foreign Affairs, Ministry of (Hariçiyet Nesearetı): created out of office of reis ul-küttap (q.v.) in 1836, 22, 36, 37, 39, 71, 72–73, 76, 155, 214, 216, 222, 340, 350

foreign languages, foreign language training, 38–39, 47, 49, 106, 109, 251, 253, 378

foreign relations: of Ottoman Empire, see Eastern Question and entries for individual countries; of Turkish Republic, 366, 376–377, 422, 429–433, 465–466


forestry regulations, department, 95, 105, 235–236, 389

Forests, Mines and Agriculture, Ministry of (Orman ve Maadin ve Ziraat Nezareti), 217, 230, 232, 275, 287

Forests, Ministry of (Orman Nezareti), 235

fortifications, forts, 7, 11, 45, 75, 95, 216, 313, 328

foundations, see religious foundations

Fourteen Points declaration (January 8, 1918), 325, 327, 331, 342


Franklin-Bouillon, Henri (1872–1937): French diplomat, negotiator of Franklin-Bouillon treaty with Turkish nationalists (1921), 358, 361, 366, 377

Francois Tiyatroso (the French Theater), 129


Fraşeri, Şemsettin Sami, see Şemsettin Sami


Freedom and Accord Party (Hürriyet ve İtilâf Firkası), 283, 290, 332; see also Liberal Union Party

Freedom Party (Hürriyet Partisi): founded by dissidents from Democratic Party (20 December 1955–24 November 1958), 412, 422

French language, 48, 49, 61, 63, 108

French Revolution, influence on Ottoman Empire, 17, 22, 61, 66

Friday prayer ceremony, 83, 212, 293

Friday weekend holiday, 394; changed to Sunday, 395

Friends of England Society (İngiliz Muhibler Cemiyeti), 334

fruit crops, 234, 237


Galata: section of Istanbul on left bank of Golden Horn, 3, 8, 23, 65, 74, 91, 92, 94, 97, 172, 230, 306; banks, bankers of, 223, 224

Galatasaray, Galata Saray: Imperial Lycee (Mekteb-i Sultani, opened September 1, 1869), 48, 108–109, 110, 113, 158, 255

Galicia, 139, 313

Galip Dede dervish lodge, 8

Galip Efendi/Paşa, Mehmet Sait (1763–1829): Crimean newspaperman, Turkish nationalist writer, publisher of newspaper Tercuman, 261

Gani Ağa: chief black eunuch of Abdulhamit II, 214

Ganim, Halil: publisher of Young Turk newspapers, 255, 256

gas, gas lamps, supplies, 92, 105, 241, 306

gasoline, 392

Gaspersali, Gasprinski, Ismail Bey (1851–1914): Crimean newspaperman, Turkish nationalist writer, publisher of newspaper Tercümân, 261

gauze, 237

Gavril Paşa (Gavriel Krestovic): governor of East Rumelia, 198

Gaza, 33, 324
Great Offensive, the (Buğünkü Taarruz), 362-364

Greece, 2, 11, 14, 17-19, 39, 109, 148-149, 151-152, 161, 165-166, 181, 182, 184, 190, 195, 196, 211, 224, 229, 240, 242, 243, 244, 249, 273, 277, 278, 287, 292, 294, 297, 298, 311, 346; trade of with Ottomans, 122; ambitions of for Ottoman and Turkish territory, 313, 321, 328, 330, 432; war of with Ottoman Empire (1897), 206-207; involvement in Macedonian Question, 207-211, 277, 287; involvement of in World War I, 292-298; involvement of in World War II, 313, 321; invasion of Turkey following World War I, 329, 342-343, 353, 357-361, 362-364; claims at Paris Peace Conference, 328, 330, 332, 356; in Lausanne settlement, 366-369; relations with Turkish Republic, 377, 397, 429; effort to annex Cyprus, 430-432

Greek language, 109


Greek Revolution (1821-1832), 7-10, 16, 17-19, 22, 29-31, 32, 39, 58, 160, 200, 206, 443-444

Greek sailors, 25, 27

Green Army (Yeşil Ordu), 352-354, 358

Gregorian Orthodox church, millet, see Armenian millet


Grivas, General George (1898-1974): Greek Cypriot terrorist, leader of EOKA national movement for union with Greece, 431

gross national product (Turkey), 408, 427

Group for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia (Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaası-i Hukuk Grubu), 360, 380

guerrilla warfare, guerrilla bands, 341, 352-354, 356, 358

guilds (esnaf odası), 10, 12, 46-47, 80, 84, 91-94, 106, 122, 236, 300, 390

gulam: child male slave, 28

gunpowder, gunpowder factories, 7, 44, 105
Gunpowder Works, Imperial (Baruthane-i Amiri), 44

guns, rifles, 44, 286


Gülhane, Imperial Rescript of (1839), 57, 59-61, 118

Güllü Agop (Hagop Vartovyan, Güllüyan, 1840-1902): theatrical producer at Gedikpaşa, 129

Gümüş, 234


Günaltay, Şemseddin (1883-1961): Turkish historian, prime minister (1949-1950), 333, 404, 440

Gürpinar Hüseyin Rahmi (1864-1943): government scribe until 1908, novelist and playwright, member of 5th and 6th grand national assemblies, 252


Güven Partisi, see Reliance Party

gypsies, 239

Habsburg Empire, see Austria

hare (pl. hasegan): head of scribal department, chief clerk, 38, 39

Haçıköy, 234

Haçın, 201, 328

had: boundary of individual Ottoman status and behavior, 77

Hademe-i Rikâb-i Hümayun (Servants of the Imperial Stirrup): sultan's personal bodyguard, 41

hafiyeye (secret police), 214; see also police, secret

Haifa, 33, 321, 327

Hakimiyeti Milliye (National Sovereignty): major newspaper of Turkish nationalist movement during War for Independence (1920-1934; 4793 issues; continued by Ulus), 347

Halaskar Zdbitan Grubu (Liberating Officers Group): founded Istanbul, (1912), 291, 292, 294

Haleppa, treaty of (1878), 206

Halet Efendi, Mehmet Sait (1761-1823): Ottoman ambassador to Paris (1802-1806), leader of conservatives in early years of Mehmet II, 8, 9, 15, 18, 22, 445
Halil Ethem (Eldem), 219
Halil Hamit Paşa: reforming grand vezir (1782-1785), 55
Halil (Kut) Paşa: commander of Turkish victory over British at Kut ul-Amara (1916), 318, 319
Halil Rifat Paşa (1830-1903): provincial governor, minister of the interior (1893-1895), grand vezir (1895-1901), 70, 439
Halil Rifat Paşa, Damat (d. 1856): slave and protegé of Husrev Paşa, ambassador to Russia, grand admiral (1830-1832, 1843-1845, 1847-1848), chairman of Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances, 1842-1845, 1849-1850, serasker, 1836-1838, 1839-1840), 36, 69; see also Husrev Paşa

Halk Bilgisi Haberleri (News of Folk Culture): journal, 383

Halk Èveleri, see People’s Houses

Halk Firkası, see Republican People’s Party

Halk Odaları, see People’s Rooms

Halk Şuralar Firkası (Party of People’s Councils), 354

Halklı Agricultural School (Halklı Ziraat Mektebi), 113, 230

Halkçılık, see Populism

Hama, 207

Hamidiye: tribal gendarmerie organized by Abdülhamit II, 203, 204, 246

Handkerchiefs, 237

Hanya, 207

Harar, 146

Harbiye, see War Academy

Harbiye Nesareti, see War, Ministry of Harbord, James G.: commander of Harbord Commission, sent to Anatolia by President Wilson to determine local feelings about postwar settlement, author of Harbord Commission report (16 October 1919), 331, 346, 347

Harc, harç: fees charged to recipient of official orders, 102

Hareket Ordusu, see Operations Army

haremeyn mollası payesi: judicial rank of molla of the Holy Cities, 39

Harici gömrük (foreign customs department), 103

Hariciye Evrak Odası (Archives of Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 73

Hariciye Nesareti (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), hariciye nazırı (minister of foreign affairs), see Foreign Affairs, Ministry of harık tulumbaları (fire stations), 46

Harir Dar ut-Ta‘alim (Silkraising Institute), 233

Harput, 203, 323

Harrington, General Tim: British commander during occupation of Istanbul following World War I, 363

Hasan Paşa, Gazi (d. 1790): reforming grand admiral (1774-1789) and grand vezir (1789-1790), 55

Hassa, Hassa Ordusu, see Imperial Guard

Hatay: declared independence September 2, 1938, annexed to Turkey July 23, 1939, 361, 366, 368, 377, 396-397, 430

Hats, 237, 385

hâtti hümâyûn, hâtti sérif, see imperial rescript

Haydarpaşa, 93, 121, 227

Hayduts: Bulgarian bandits, 160

Hayreddin Paşa, Tunuslu (1822-1890): grand vezir (1878-1879), 193, 220, 439

Hayrullah Efendi, Hafiz Hasan (1834-1898): chief imam of Abdulaziz, accompanied sultan to Egypt and Europe, şeyhülislam (1874, 1876-1877), 163

Hazelnuts, 237, 389

Hazine, Hazine-i Amire, see Treasury

Hazine-i Evrak (Treasury of Documents): original Ottoman archives, established 1846, reopened in 1882; see archives

Hazine-i Hasa (Sultan’s Treasury), see Privy Purse

Head tax (çizye): paid by non-Muslim heads of households in return for protection, exemption from military service; replaced by bedel-i askeri in 1856, 84, 95, 96, 97, 100, 104, 128; see also bedel-i askeri

Headgear, headgear regulations, 44, 122, 237, 385

Health, health measures, organizations, 11, 72, 94, 144, 150, 300, 306, 350, 380, 389, 394, 408, 420, 423

Health, Ministry of (Sihhiye Nesareti), 217, 276, 394

Hendese-i Mülikiye Mektebi, see Civil Engineering School

Herzegovina (Hersko), 65, 116, 148-150, 154, 158; see also Bosnia

Heybeli Ada: island in sea of Marmara, one of Prince islands, 48, 111

Heydehane: Projectiles School, 250

Heyet-i Muşavere-i Malîye (Committee on Financial Consultation), 224

Heyet-i Müttefika-i Osmaniye (Ottoman Committee on Alliance): decentralization group formed in 1910; included some
Heyet-i Muttefika-i Osmaniye (cont.)
CUP members, Dashnaks, Greeks, Albanians, Bulgarian, Kurdish and Circassian clubs; published newspaper Osmanlı, 283

Heyet-i Temsiliye, see Representative Committee

Hicaz (Hejaz), 15, 200, 214, 217, 239, 245, 322

Hicaz Railroad: 1302 km. line between Damascus and Medina, built 1901–1908, destroyed by Arab Revolt in World War I, 217, 225, 227, 322

High Court of Appeal (Divan-ı Ali), 178, 380, 415, 416

Hikmet, Nazım (Kan) (1902–1963): Turkish communist poet, 381

Hilal-% Ahmar Cemiyeti (Red Crescent Society), 225

Hirsova, 138


History courses, 47, 48, 107, 108, 128, 251, 253, 383

Hiidavendigar (Bursa), 256; see also Bursa

Hünkâr Iskelesi, Treaty of (1833), 33, 34–35, 56, 135, 147

Hürriyet (Freedom): Young Ottoman newspaper (100 issues, published 1868–1870), edited by Namık Kemal and Ziya Bey, 129

Hürriyet Partısı, see Freedom Party

Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası, see Freedom and Accord Party and Liberal Union Party

Hüseyin Ağa (Ağa Paşa): commander of the Janissary Corps (1823), 7

Hüseyin Ağa, Karaosmanoğlu: Anatolian notable, 15


Hüseyin Avni Paşa (1820–1876): professional soldier, serasker (1869–1871, 1873–1874, 1876), grand vezir (1874–1875), involved in deposition of Abdulaziz (1876), assassinated by Çerkes Hasan, 86, 152, 153, 155, 159, 163, 164, 438; see also Çerkes Hasan

Hüseyin Cahit, see Yalçın

Hüseyin Hâki Efendi/Paşa (d. 1887): founder of Şirket-i Hayriye steamship company, great-great grandfather of Ezel Kural Shaw, 120

Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa (1855–1922): provincial administrator, attempted settlement of Macedonian problems, minister of the interior (1908, 1909), grand vezir at the time of the 1909 counterrevolution, minister of justice (1912), ambassador to Austria-Hungary during World War I, 209, 279–280, 283, 291, 439

Hüseyin Hüsnü Paşa (1852–1918): commander of Operations Army (1918), 281
Imperial Museum (Müze-i Hümayun) : created in 1868 in St. Irene’s church, moved to Çinili Köşk (19 August 1880), 111
imperial rescript (Hatt-i Hümayun, Hatt-ı Şerif) : decree written or signed by sultan, 38, 60; of 1839 (Güllhane decree), 57, 59–61, 63, 69, 77, 118; of 1856 (İlahat Ferman/Reform Decree), 87, 100, 106, 124, 125, 127, 129, 140, 143
Imperial Treasury (Hazine-i Amire), see Treasury
import taxes, 103
imports, 122–123, 237, 239, 373, 391, 393, 395, 403, 409; see also trade and commerce
Imroz (Imbros) island, 123, 366
Inceköy, 123
income, per capita, 398, 408, 409, 427; national, 395, 409
income tax (patent vergisi, gelir vergisi), 92, 224, 225, 306, 388, 389, 401, 415, 423, 425
Independence Tribunals (İstiklal Mankemeleri) : established by National Treason Law (September 12, 1920), 352, 361, 381
India, 13, 16, 142, 158, 259, 314, 318
indigo, 11, 144
inditgo, 11, 144
industrial banks, 390, 391
industrial schools, 111
industry, industrial development, production, 37, 59, 72, 98, 111, 114, 122–123, 135, 155, 217, 234, 236, 239, 242, 300, 389–393, 398, 400, 408, 427
infantry, 43, 45, 75, 85, 216, 220
inflation, 189, 373, 398, 403–405, 409, 412–413, 415, 427, 428
inheritance, inheritance laws, 114–115, 246, 307, 401, 419
Inhisarlar: Turkish Monopolies Company, established in place of private Régie (February 26, 1925), to administer tobacco, spirits, and other monopolies, 392
İntizam-ı Şehir Heyeti (City Ordering Commission), 92
Iranian Islands, 13
Ipsilanti, Alexander (1725–1807) : Phanariote notable, hospodar of Wallachia (1774–1784, 1796–1797) and Moldavia (1786–1788, 1807), 17
İptitâmiye: elementary schools, 107
irade (“will” of the sultan) : Imperial order, decree, replacing ferman (1832–1908), 38, 60, 72, 82, 299
İraş-ı Cedid (The New Revenue) : treasury established by Selim III to finance his Nizam-ı Cedid army, 20
Iran (Persia) : Ottoman relations with, 16, 30, 32; in World War I and peace conferences, 314, 318, 319, 320, 325, 331; relations of with Turkish Republic, 377, 429
Iraq (Mesopotamia) : as Ottoman province, 8, 15, 16, 36, 68, 85; in World War I, 313–315, 318–319, 323, 327, 331, 332, 366; relations of with Turkish Republic, 429, 430, 450, 459
İnönü river, first battle of (1921), 358; second battle of (1921), 359
inspectors, 380
insurance, insurance companies, 238, 390, 392, 401, 419, 423
Interior, Ministry of: created from office of lieutenant of grand vezir (sadaret kethidi-i Miilkiye) in 1836 with name Nezaret-i Umur-u Müilikiye (Ministry of Civil Affairs), changed to Nezaret-i Umur-u Dahiliye (Ministry of Interior Affairs) in 1836 and Nezaret-i Dahiliye (Ministry of the Interior) in 1837 and to İçişleri Bakanlığı (Ministry of the Interior) in 1945, 22, 36, 40, 71–72, 95, 155, 167 n8, 215, 216, 222, 224, 243, 253, 306, 418
International Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), 209, 210, 266
International Finance Committee, 211
International Monetary Fund, 413
interpellation of ministers, 77, 78, 79, 80, 176, 284, 285, 417
İntihar (“suicide”) : murder, 418
İntihar Politics, see Revolutionism
Inner Service of Imperial Palace, see sultan, palaces of, and Mabeyin-i Hümayun
İnönü, İsmet (1884–1973) : chief lieutenant of Atatürk during War for Independence, 349, 358, 360–361; nationalist representative at Mudanya armistice (1922), 364; at Conference of Lausanne (1922–1923), 365–368; prime minister (1923–1924), 381, (1925–1937), 381, 395; president of...
Index

iron, iron manufacture, mines, 123, 234, 391, 395

Iron Gates of the Danube, 191

irrigation, 11, 68, 87, 90, 145, 389, 412

Ishak Efendi, Hoca (1774-1835): mathematician, teacher in Army Engineering School (1816-1831), director of school (1831-1834), 48

Ishak Süktü (1868-1902): medical doctor, one of founders of CUP, first publisher of newspaper Osmanlı, 256, 257

İslahat Fermanı (reform decree of 1856), see imperial rescript

İslahat Komisyonu (Reform Commission), 81, 154

İslahat-i Esasiye-i Osmaniye Fırkası (Ottoman Radical Reform Party), 283


İslahhane (artisan school, orphanage), 110

Islam, 131-132, 303; in Turkish Republic, 384-388, 422

İslam İhtilal Cemiyetleri Ittihadi (Union of Islamic Revolutionary Societies), 354

İslamic Unity Society (Ittihat-ı Muhammadiye/Fırkası), the Islamic Party (Fırka-ı Muhammediyi): founded 5 April 1909 at offices of newspaper Volkan by religious conservative group led by Hafız Derviş; fomented counter-revolution of 1909, 280


İsmail: Danubian port, 13, 138

İsmail Galip (1848-1895): son of Ibrahim Efendi, authority on history of Turkish and Ottoman coins, 219; see also Ibrahim Efendi

İsmail Hakki Paşa (1876-1913): founder of Freedom and Accord Party, deputy to Ottoman Parliament, 283

İsmail Kemal (Vlorà): Albanian Muslim nationalist leader, 185, 258, 281, 283, 288, 297, 453

İsmail Paşa (1830-1895): khedive of Egypt (1863-1879), 64, 145, 146, 157, 193

İsra, relations with Turkey, 430

İstanbul (Constantinople), 10, 13, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23-25, 28, 33-35, 40, 44, 45, 47, 56, 64, 66, 67, 71-75, 79, 81, 84, 85, 88, 90, 94, 100, 105, 108, 119, 188, 236, 239, 241-243, 255, 257, 265, 294, 306, 356, 363, 374, 413-414, 427, 431; Allied occupation after World War I, 304, 327, 329-330, 348, 368, 460; communications and public transportation of, 119-120; city post, 229-230; fires in, 28, 46-47, 75; city life of, 294-295, 306, 324; population of, 200-201, 241-243, 244, 306; provincial organization of, 94, 243, 286; port, 228; disorders in, 4-5, 8, 20-21, 204, 281-282, 294, 413, 416; health problems, 28; refugee problems, 306; city finances, 224-225, 306; Greek ambitions for, 196; Russian ambitions for, 320; see also municipal organization, markets, police, streets, theater, schools, transportation

İstanbul Agreement (1915), 320

İstanbul Army (İstanbul Ordusu, Der Saadet Ordusu), 85

İstanbul Bankası (The Istanbul Bank), 97

İstanbul Chamber of Commerce, 219, 231

İstanbul Conference, on Lebanon (1861), 143; on the international crisis (1876, also called the Tersane Konferansı/Dockyard Conference and Constantinople Conference), 173-174, 178-181, 183, 188, 212, 454-455; on Bulgaria (1885), 198

İstanbul müderrislik payesi: judicial rank equivalent to that of müderris of the Fatih mosque of Istanbul, 39

İstanbul Üniversitesi (İstanbul University): replaced (1933) the Ottoman Imperial University (Darülfunun), 301, 333, 387, 409, 413

İstiklal Mahkemeleri, see Independence Tribunals

istinaf: appeals court, 75, 218, 248

İz Banması (The Business Bank): founded August 26, 1924 by its first General Director, Celal Bayar, 390, 392

İskodra (Shkodra, Scutari of Albania), 85, 90, 195, 199, 288, 294

İştirak (Participation): socialist newspaper, edited by Hüseyin Hilmi (1909-1912), 283

Italy, diplomatic relations with Ottoman Empire, 110, 142, 146, 160, 229, 250, 253, 292, 297; trade with Ottoman Empire, 122, 238-239; activities in Tunisia, 192-193; Tripolitanian War with Ottomans (1911), 282, 284-285, 288, 289-290, 291, 293; and public debt, 223; in World War I, 319, 320-321; occupation of Anatolia, 329; relations with Turkish Republic, 361, 397-398

İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti/Fırkası, see Union and Progress, Society/Committee of
Ittihad-i Muhammadi Cemiyeti, see Islamic Unity Society

Ittihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti (Ottoman Unity Society): original name of Committee of Union and Progress, see Union and Progress Society


Izmit (Nicomedia), 7, 20, 40, 44, 75, 83, 87, 121, 227, 230, 320, 360, 362

Iznik (Nicaea), 326

Izzet Mehmet Paşa, Topal (1793-1885): grand admiral (1827-1828), grand vezir (1841-1842), 27, 438

Jaffa (Yafa), 33, 264, 324

Janina (Yanya), 2, 18, 98, 123, 195, 199, 207, 240, 253, 288, 294, 296, 297

Janissary Aga: commander of the corps, 21

Janissary corps, Janissaries, 1-9, 13-15, 18-21, 28, 41, 42, 46, 62, 69, 74, 114; destruction of (June 17, 1826), 19-21, 22, 29, 58, 65, 443

Jassy (Yaş): capital of Moldavia, 13, 17

Jerusalem (Kudus), 33, 70, 137, 264, 324

Jesuit missionaries, 125

La Jeune Turquie: early Young Turk newspaper, 255

Jews, Jewish millet, 59, 127-128, 180, 181, 188, 208, 239-244, 249, 264, 273, 278, 307, 378, 450

Journal de la Chambre de Commerce de Constantinople, 231

Judicial Ordinances, Supreme Council of (Meclis-i Valâ, Meclis-i Valâya Akhâm-ı Adliye): created as primary Tanzimat legislative council in 1838/1839; in 1867 divided into Council of Judicial Regulations and Council of State, 38, 55, 61, 62, 65, 67, 69, 76-78, 79, 80; see also Judicial Regulations, Council of, and Council of State

Judicial Pleas, Ministry of (Deavi Nezareti), see Justice, Ministry of

Judicial Regulations, Council of (Divan-ı Akhâm-ı Adliye): created in 1867 to assume judicial duties of Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances, 61, 67, 79-81, 154

Julfa, 326

jurisprudence, 251

jurnal: memorandum, report by a spy (jurnalct), undercover agent, 214


Kabatepe, 317

Kacar dynasty of Iran (ruled 1794-1925), 16

kadi, kadh: Muslim judge, 84, 85, 87, 89, 101, 118, 277, 306, 307

Kadri Paşa, Cenanizade Mehmet (1832-1883): career administrator, member of Council of State, twice mayor (gehiremini) of Istanbul, minister of Interior (1878) and public works (1879), grand vezir (1880), governor of Edirne (1881-1883), 439

Kâğthane: sweet waters of the Golden Horn, 2, 19, 82, 172

kâhya (kethida): lieutenant, executive secretary, helper to a chief of an office, 47

kaime: paper money, bond: first issued in 1841 at 8% interest, reissued in 1847, see paper money

Kala-i Sultaniye (Dardanelles), Peace of (1809), 13

Kalemiye, see Scribal Institution

kalyonlar katibi (scribe of the navy), 27

Kâmil Bey: minister of police (1884-1890), 215


Kanlıca: Bosporus village, 93

Kanun-ı Esasi, see constitutions
kanun-u muvakkat (temporary law), 299, 311
kap kethïïds: representative of province in Ministry of Interior, 72
kapkulu: slaves of the Porte, 3, 9, 24-26
kapudan-i derya, kapudan pasa, see grand admiral
Kapudan-i Ticaret Mektebi, see Merchant Marine Academy
Kara George (Karageorgovic, George Petrovic) (1762-1817): Serbian national leader, ruler of Serbia (ruled 1808-1813), 13, 14, 148
Karaağaç, 366
Karabekir, Kâzım (1882-1948): career army officer, fought terrorists in Macedonia (1907), member of Operation Army (1909), fought in Albania and Balkan wars, at Dardanelles and in Iraq as aide to von der Goltz in World War I, commanded eastern front in War for Independence, political opponent of Atatürk (1924-1926), reentered RPP after Atatürk's death (1938) and became deputy to Grand National Assembly, 319, 325, 340-344, 354, 356-358, 360-361, 380, 461
Karabük, 393, 395
Karageorgević, Alexander: prince of Serbia (ruled 1842-1858), 148
Karakol Cemiyeti, see Outpost Society
Karaman, 2, 123
Karaosmanoğlu: Anatolian notable family; ruled Aydin, Saruhan, 2, 3, 15
kârname: governmental administrative decision with force of law, 299
Karatodori (Karatheodori) Paşa, Alexander (1833-1906): Abdulhamit II's advisor on foreign policy, Ottoman plenipotentiary at Congress of Berlin (1878), member of Council of State, chief translator of mabeyin-i hümâyûn (1880-1906), 190, 206, 214
kârîye: village, 89
Karlowitz, Treaty of (1699), 17
Kars, 32, 86, 138, 139, 183, 184, 186, 189-191, 315, 322, 325, 328, 331, 341, 348, 354, 357, 400
Kartal, 123
Kasaba, 121
Kasımpaşa, 48, 75
Kastamonu, 123, 124, 235, 236
kâtib-i sani: assistant scribe, 213
Kavala, 297
kavas: messenger, doorkeeper, watchman, policeman, 46
kaymakam (substitute): lieutenant, subgovernor, district chief, 24, 39, 84, 86-88, 109, 149-152
Kayseri, 201
kaza: judicial and/or administrative district, subdivision of a sancak, 84-86, 89, 90, 100, 119, 121, 152, 350
Kazan, 261
kazasker (kadi asker): military judge, chief judge of Anatolia or Rumelia, 74
Kâzım Nami, see Duru
Keldani, 239
Kemal, Mustafa, see Atatürk
Kemalism, 375, 405
Kerkuk, 318, 327
Kermanshah, 314
kethïïda (lieutenant, steward, deputy): government representative in a city district, 81
kethïïda-r rikûb-i hümâyûn: steward of the sultan's court, 8
khedive (Hidiv): title applied to Ottoman governor of Egypt after 1867, 71, 111, 131, 145, 160, 214
Kilid-i Bahr fort, 318
King-Crane Commission: report of (August 28, 1919), 331
Kisselev, Count Paul (1788-1872): Russian general, chief administrator of Russian-occupied principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia (1829-1834), 135-136
Kırklareli, 294
knez (Serb: notable), 14, 15, 147
kocabaşı: millet administrative leader, 46, 120
Komanovo, 292, 294
komiser: city police commissioner, 215
Konya, 41, 44, 121, 123, 230, 321, 329, 346; Battle of (1832), 33
Koraltan, Refik (1891-): one of founders of Democratic Party, member of Grand National Assembly since foundation, career police administrator, chief of Independence Tribunal No. 5 and member of Istanbul Independence Tribunal, 402
Koran, Koranic studies, 251, 304; translation of into Turkish, 386, 409
Koray, Refik Halit, 334
Korean War, 429
Korutürk, Fahri (1903-): career soldier, president of Turkey (1973-), 440
Kosova (Kossovo), 195, 208, 209, 388, 294
Kossuth, Louis (1802-1894): Hungarian nationalist leader, 135
Kozan, 65
Köprülü, Mehmet Fuat (1890-1966): leading Ottoman and Turkish historian, teacher at Imperial Ottoman University and Istanbul University, 1913-1943, founded Institute of Turcology (Türkiyat Enstitüsü) in 1924, president of Turkish Historical Society (1927), member of Grand National Assembly (1943-1957), one of founders of Democratic Party, foreign minister (1950-1954), acquitted at Yassiada trials (1961), 301, 309, 333, 383, 402-403, 405, 416
Köstence, 121, 138
Köylü Partisi, see Peasant’s Party
Krupp, 86, 245
Kuban, 116
Kuleli army barracks, school, 67, 396
Kumkale, 317
Kurdistan, Kurds, 16, 150, 186, 201, 246, 256, 317, 321, 331, 352, 356, 366, 376; revolts of, 381, 430
kurena (chamberlains): principal household officers of sultan’s palace, 83
kuruş (piaster) Kurşun, 121, 138
Kuşadası, 363
Kut ul-Amara, Battle of (1915), 318-319, 322
Kutuzoff, Prince Mikhail (1745-1813): Russian general, 13
Kuvayi İntizamiye (Security Army), see Caliphal Army
Kuvayi Milliye, see National Forces
Küçük Çekmece, 230
Küçük Kaynarca, Treaty of (1774), 65, 138
küçük meclis: small provincial council, 85
Küçük Mecmua (The Small Journal): published by Ziya Gökalp while living in Diyarbekir after establishment of Turkish Republic, 302; see also Gökalp, Ziya Kütahta, 8, 33, 34, 59, 360
labor, lead, lead mines, 123, 234
leather, leather manufacture, 236, 237
League of Nations, 366, 382; joined by Turkey (1932), 377
leather, leather manufacture, 236, 237
Lebanon, 15, 33, 57, 63, 123, 133-134, 142-144, 181, 239, 322, 450
Legislatures, legislative organization, see law
lemons, lemon cultivation, 389
lend-lease agreements, 399
Leonti, 237
Leon, 97
Levantines, 145
Levent Çiftlik, Levent: training grounds of new Ottoman armies, 3, 23
Libya (Tripoli and Cyrenaica), 239, 262, 319, 320, 374
Liman von Sanders, Otto (1855-1929): German advisor to Ottoman army (1913-1918), commanded Ottoman armies in Gallipoli (1915) and Syria and Palestine (1918), 308, 311, 313, 317, 322, 327, 328, 457

Limni (Limnos) island, 83, 211

Limpus, Arthur H.: British admiral in Ottoman service before World War I, 308-309

linen, 237

lira (Türk Lirası, T.L.): equals 100 kurşun

literacy, 128, 144, 250, 387, 401

literature, 128-133, 450

Little Wallachia, 14

liva (banner): administrative district, equivalent of sancak, 87, 89, 90

Lloyd George, David (1863-1945): British prime minister (1916-1922), 325, 330, 331, 342, 364

loans, lending, 68, 96-98, 145, 155, 185, 192, 221-224, 226, 232, 300, 356, 388, 391, 392

logic, 108, 251

London, 22, 31, 56, 62, 63, 70, 137, 255; treaty of (1827), 30; treaty of (1840), 57; conference (1871), 152; conference and treaty of (1913), 295-297; treaty of (1915), 320-321; conference of (1921), 358; conference of (1922), 362; conference of (1960), 430

lumber, 103, 237, 392

Lüleburgaz, 294

Lütfi Efendi, Ahmet (1815-1907): official Ottoman chronicler, kazasker of Rumelia, member of Council of State, 445

Lütfullah, 258

lycées, 108

Maadin Nesareti, see Mines, Ministry of

maarif emini: superintendent of education, 386

Maarif Hisse-i Ianesi, see Education Benefits Share

maarif müdürü: provincial director of education, 111, 386

Maarif Nezareti, Maarif-i Umumi Neza- reti, see Education, Ministry of

Maarif Şurası (Council on Education), 386

mâbeyin (in between): in the Imperial palace, the area between the private apartments of the sultan and his family, or Harem, and the outer areas (birun) where state business is conducted, 83

Mâbeyin-i Hümayun: palace department organized in 1866 to administer the palace service, 69, 83, 213

mâbeyîn müşiri: chief of Mâbeyin-i Hümayun, 83, 174, 213

mâbeyînci: servant of the mâbeyin, 284


Maçka: section of Istanbul, 48, 172

Mahalli İtlyaç Komisyonları (Local Needs Commissions): created to advise government on development of Ottoman agriculture, 388

Mahdi, the (Muhammad Ahmad ibn as-Sayyid Abdullah) (1844-1885): leader of Islamic revival in the Sudan, 195

Mahmut Celaleddin Paşa, Damat (d. 1884): husband of Abdülhamit II’s sister Cemile Sultan, 213

Mahmut Celaleddin Paşa, Damat (1853-1903): husband of Abdülhamit II’s sister Seniht Sultan, father of prince Sabaheddin, member of Council of State, minister of justice (1877), fled to Europe with sons (1899) and founded own Young Turk movement, 174, 180, 257-258

Mahmut Nedim Paşa (1817-1883): professional scribe, governor of Tripoli, minister of justice (1867) and navy (1867), grand vezir (1871-1872, 1875-1876), minister of the interior (1879), 66, 81, 153-156, 159, 162, 180, 185, 218, 221, 438, 439


Mahmut Şevket Paşa, see Şevket Paşa

mahreç mollahs payesi: lowest rank of judge in İlimiye, 39

Makarios III (Mikhail Khristodolou Mouskos) (1913-): archbishop and primate of the Greek Orthodox church of Cyprus, president of Greek Republic of Cyprus (1959-), 431

Makbule Hanim (1885-1956): sister of Atatürk, 382

Malatya, 123

Malcolm, Sir John, 16

Maliye Haznesi, see Treasury

Maliye Mümüşâr (Financial Undersecretary), 74

Maliye Nezareti, see Finance, Ministry of

Maloumian, K., Armenian Dashnak leader, 265

Malta, 348, 360, 365

Mamluks, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16

Index 495
mandates, 331, 332, 347, 357
manga: military mess hall, 85
manganese, 123, 234, 325, 397, 403
Manisa, 346, 363
Mansure army, Muallem Asahir-i
Mansure-i Muhammadiye (The Trained Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad) : new army established by Mahmut II in 1825, 22-24, 26-31, 35, 41, 42, 45, 46, 49, 50, 95
Mansure Hazinesi: treasury organized (1826) as Mukata'at Hazinesi to finance the Mansure army, united with other treasuries into Ministry of Finance (1838/1839), 37, 42, 43, 73
Maraş, 154
maritime communications and trade, 75, 91, 105, 118-120, 161, 228-229, 287, 392
Maritsa (Meriç) river, 295, 296, 363, 364, 366
markets, market regulations, taxes, 28, 46-47, 91-93, 95-96
Marmara, Sea and islands, 60, 93, 119, 120, 187, 228, 254, 348, 363
Marmaris, 329
Maronite Christians, 133, 134, 142-144, 255
marriage, marriage regulations, 246, 307, 385
Marseilles, 229
Marshall, Sir William, 319
Marshall Plan, 400, 429
martial law, 281-282, 283, 284, 348, 404, 414, 418
masarifat nazir: superintendent of military expenditures, 42
masdariye resmi: source tax on local consumption, 103
masons, masonic lodges, 265
Massawa : Red Sea port, 145-146
Massis: Armenian journal published in eastern Anatolia, 126
Matbaa-i Amire, Dar ul-Tibaat-il Amire (Imperial Printing Press) : established outside the walls of the Topkapi Palace behind Aya Sofya mosque in 1863; now used by Ministry of Education Press, 219, 252
matches, 237, 392
mathematics, mathematics lessons, 47, 48, 106-110, 128, 230, 251
Maude, Sir Frederick (1864-1917), commander of a division in the Dardanelles campaign (1915-1916), 319
Mavrocordates, Alexander (1791-1865) : Phanariote Greek in Ottoman service, leader of Greek Revolution (1821-1827), first president of Greek Republic (1822), minister of finance (1832) and prime minister (1833, 1844, 1854-1855) of Kingdom of Greece, 18
mayor, 46-47, 84, 90-95, 243, 306
mazbata: report, protocol, memorial, legislative draft, 38, 60, 82
McMahons, Sir Henry, 321, 322
measures, 238, 308, 385
Mecca, 100, 322, see also Holy Cities
Mecelle, Mecelle-i Ahkâm-i Adliye: Ottoman code of civil laws, drawn up by commission chaired by Cevdet Paşa, issued 1869-1878; replaced by Civil Code of Turkish Republic (1926), 66, 68, 119, 280, 385
Mechveret (Mesveret, Consultation) : CUP newspaper, ed. Ahmet Riza (30 issues in Turkish, 1895-1898, 202 issues in French, 1895-1908), 256, 280
meclis, see councils, administrative
Meclis-i Ayan, see Chamber of Notables
Meclis-i Ebniye (Buildings Commission), 91
Meclis-i Emanet (Prefecture of Istanbul) : council created under şehiremini while he was mayor of Istanbul, 93-94
Meclis-i Hass, Meclis-i Hass-i Vükelâ, Meclis-i Vükelâ, see Council of Ministers
Meclis-i Hass-i Umumi: supreme ratification council, 77
Meclis-i Maliye (Council on Finance), 73
Meclis-i Mebusan, see Chamber of Deputies
Meclis-i Meşayih (Council of Seyhs) : established to control dervish monasteries and lodges (1915), 307
Meclis-i Muhasebe-i Maliye (Council on Financial Accounting), 74
Meclis-i Nafia, Meclis-i Umur-u Nafia (Council on Public Works), 106
Meclis-i Tanzimat, see Council of the Tanzimat
Meclis-i Ticaret, see trade/commerce courts
Meclis-i Umumi (General Council), 80
Meclis-i Umumi-i Milli (National Public Assembly), 281, 282
Meclis-i Umumi-i Vilayet (Provincial General Assembly), 89-90, 95
Mekteb-i Maarif-i Edebiye (School of Literary Knowledge), 48
Mekteb-i Mülykiye, see Civil Service School
Mekteb-i Mülykiye-i Baytar, see Veterinary Medicine, School of
Mekteb-i Mülykiye-i Tbbiye-i Şahane, see Medicine, Imperial School of
Mekteb-i Sanayi (School of Arts and Crafts), 113
Mekteb-i Sanayi-i Nefise (School of Fine Arts), 113
Mekteb-i Sultani (Imperial Lycee) : official name of Galatasaray Lycee, see
Galatasaray
Mekteb-i Şahane-i Tbbiye, see Medicine, Imperial School of
mektep: Muslim primary school, 47, 74, 106, 107, 384
mektubi-i sadr-% AH: chief scribe of the Grand Vezir, head of scribal department of the Sublime Porte, 217
Melen, Ferit (1906–): financial expert, non-party prime minister (1972–1973), 428, 440
Memleket Sandı: agricultural credit banks, established to provide low-interest loans to cultivators, 115, 231
memur: 19th and 20th century bureaucrat, 40, 71, 105, 113, 133; see also bureaucracy
Memurun-i Mülykiye Komisyonyu, see Civil Service Commission
Menafi lane Hissesi: surtax imposed on tithe to finance agricultural loans and educational construction, 231
Menafi Sandı (Public Benefits Bank), 101
Menderes (Meander) river, 121, 342, 353, 357
Menteşe, 321
menzil: station, stopping point, 40
merchant marine, 11, 111; see also maritime communications
Merchant Marine Academy (Kapudan-i Ticaret Mektebi), 249
Merzifon, 329
Meşihat, office of şeyhülislam (q.v.)
metric measurement system, 155, 385
metruk: abandoned, deserted, communal, public land, 114
Metternich, Klemens, Prince von (1773–1859): Austrian minister of foreign affairs (1809–1848), 30
metvat: idle, barren, waste land, 114
Mevlevi dervish order, 8
Mezahib-i Gayr-% Muslim Dairesi (Department of non-Muslim Religious Affairs): absorbed into Ministry of Justice and Sects in 1878, 73
middle class, 105–106, 113–115, 118, 123, 128, 182, 401, 408, 414, 421
Midilli: name given to German cruiser Breslau transferred to Ottoman service at start of World War I, 312
Midilli island, 123, 211
Midye, 295, 296, 320
Mihran Efendi, 254
Military Assistance Share, 253
Military Equipment Ministry (Techizat-t Askeriye Nezareti), 217, 253
Military Inspection Commission (Teftis-i Umum-u Askeriye Komisyonu-u Alisi), 245, 254
Military Retirement Fund, Ministry of (Askeri Tekailt Sandigi Nezareti), 217
military service taxes, see bedel-i askeri, bedel-i nakdi-i askeri
military supplies, 26, 31, 41–42, 44, 75, 86, 276, 313
militia, 43, 179, 186, 191, 197, 294, 341; see also reserves
millet: nation, 262, 263, 284

Millet Mektepleri, see Nation Schools
Millet Partisi, see Nation Party
Milli Birlik Komitesi, see National Unity Committee
Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, see Education, Ministry of
Milli Kongre (National Congress), 333
Milli Selamet Partisi, see National Salvation Party
Milli Talim ve Terbiye Cemiyeti (National Education Society): founded Istanbul (1916), 333
milliyet (nationality), 262
Milletgilik, see nationalism
Milne line, 357
mimarbaşi, mimar başı (chief architect): charged with supervising construction and repair of all government buildings, also civilian buildings in Istanbul; in 1831 latter function given to şehir emini, while official buildings cared for by Ebniye-i Hassa Müdurlüğü, 47, 91; see also Ebniye-i Hassa Müdurlüğü

Minakyan, Mardiros (1837–1920), 129
Mines, Ministry of (Maadin Nezareti), 102, 234
minister (vekil, nasır, vezir), 37, 81, 275, 284, 417–418
ministerial responsibility, 78, 80, 174–175, 197, 220, 275, 284, 378, 408
ministries (nezaret, bakanhık, vekalet), establishment and organization of, 3, 36–37, 71–76, 80, 175–176, 216–218, 275, 276, 284, 305, 378, 417–418; see also individual ministries
Mint (Darphane-i Amire), 75, 102, 217
miralay (colonel), 24, 39, 85
miri: state property, 114
mir-i liva (major general): newer title for sancak bey; modern equivalent is tuğgeneral, 39
mir-i miran (brigadier general): newer title (1843) for beylerbey, 39
Misak-t Milli, see National Pact
mixed courts (meclis-i ticaret), see trade/commerce courts
Mizan (The Scale): Young Turk newspaper published by Mizancı Mehmet Murat (286 issues, 1887–1909), 256, 257
model farms, 230, 232
Moderate Liberal Party (Mutedil Liberaller), 283
Moldavia (Boğdan), 14, 17, 30, 136, 140, 142; see also Rumania
monasteries, 104
Monastir, 85–86, 121, 188, 195, 199, 207–210, 230, 266, 267, 279, 288, 292
Mondros (Mudros), Armistice of (30 October 1918), 327–328, 342–343
Moniteur Ottoman: official Ottoman French-language newspaper, 35
monopolies, 50, 60, 104–105, 120–121, 144, 235, 380, 385, 390, 392
Montreux Straits agreement (20 July 1936), 368, 377, 392, 400
Morava river, 208
Morea, 17–19, 22, 29–31, 58
Morocco, occupation of by France, 289
mortars, see Humbaractyan
Moscow, 150, 357–359; conference of (1943), 399
mosques, 19, 21, 23, 37, 104, 216, 259, 296, 298, 384, 387, 409, 426
Mostar, 150
Mosul, 236, 315–319, 321, 327–328, 332, 366, 368, 376
Muallim Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammadiye, see Mansure army
Muallim Bostaniyan-i Hassa, see Imperial Guard
Muallim Naci (1850–1893): Tanzimat poet and writer, refugee from Varna, son-in-law of Ahmet Midhat Efendi, 252
Mudanya, 121–123; armistice of (1922), 364
multi: juriscustom, interpreter of Şeriat, 74, 277, 298
Muhafaza-i Mukaddesat Cemiyeti (Society for the Protection of the Sacred Objects): founded in Erzurum (1922), 360
Mubarak, Decree of (1881) : unified Ottoman debts into Public Debt, 223, 225, see also public debt
Muharrir (the Writer) : newspaper published by Ebuzziya Tevfik (8 issues, 1876-1878), 253
Muhasebat-i Umumiye Dairesi (Department of Public Accounting), 154
Muhasebe Kalemi (Accounting Office), 73
muhasstl-t emval (collector of funds) : salaried tax collectors hired (1839-1842) to replace tax farmers in collecting state revenues, 34, 40, 84-86, 96-97, 103
Muhbir (the Reporter) : Young Ottoman newspaper edited by AH Suavi (72 issues, 1866-1868), 129
muhtar (head man, chosen one, mayor) :
title applied after 1834 to government representatives in quarters of cities and towns; later applied to mayors as municipalities organized, 47, 84, 90-91, 94, 243
Muhhtar Paşa, Gazi Ahmet (1839-1918) :
hero of Ottoman-Russian war of 1877-1878, high commissioner to Egypt (1895-1906), grand vezir (1912), 159, 166, 184, 186, 194, 245, 257, 276, 279, 291, 293-294, 439
Mukataa (mukata'at, pi. mukata'at) : unit of administration and tax collection, 95-99, 114, 224
Mukata'at Hasinesi, see Treasury of the Army
Mudafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri, see Defense of Rights committees
Mudafaa-i Milliye Teskilah (National Defense Organization) : founded Istanbul (1920) replacing Outpost Society to fight foreign occupation, 355-356; see also Outpost Society
müdür: administrator, chief of an office, 84, 86, 88, 94, 243, 245
müfettis: inspector, 380
Mühendis Mektebi, see Civil Engineering School
Mühendishane-i Bahri-i Hümayun, see Naval Engineering School

Muslims, Muslim millet, population, 47, 53
Muhendis Mektebi, see Civil Engineering School
Mühendishane-i Bahri-i Hümayun, see Naval Engineering School
Mühendishane-i Berri-i Hümayun, see Army Engineering School
Mühimme Odası: records department of Imperial Council, 217
mühürdar: keeper of the sultan’s seal, 58, 253
mülaazım (lieutenant), 15
müllk: private property, freehold, 114
Mulkiye Mektebi, see Civil Service School
müller: tax farmers
mürettebat: appropriations, service taxes, 84
mürrur terekesi (travel permit), 40
mürruriye resmi (transit tax), 103, 105
Miirzteg Reform Program (1903), 210
müzakerat zabit verakast: discussion, minute, 82
Miize-i Hümayun, see Imperial Museum
Nablus, 327
Nadi, Yunus, see Abahoglu
Nafia Nezareti, see Public Works, Ministry of
Nahcivan, 32, 116, 356
nahiye: administrative sub-district, township with population of 5,000 to 10,000 people, 84, 89, 243, 300, 350
nails, 237
Namik Kemal (1840-1888): Young Ottoman writer and journalist, 129, 131, 154, 157, 165, 212, 251-254, 259, 262, 276, 454
Namik Paşa (1804-1892): studied military science in Paris for Mahmut II, career officer, director of the Imperial Guards, three times serasker and twice minister of the navy, 48
Napier, Admiral Sir Charles (1786-1860): second in command of British expedition to Syria (1840-1844), 57
Napoleon, Louis (Napoleon III) (1808-1873): emperor of France (1852-1870), 83, 137, 141, 146, 151-152
Nation Schools (Millet Mektepleri): maintained (1929-1936) to train Turks in Latin alphabet, 386
National Assembly (Millet Meclisi): lower house of Grand National Assembly by constitution of 1916, 416-417
National Congress (Milli Kongre), 333
National Defense Organization (Müdafaa-i Milliye Teşkilâtı), 355-356
National Education Society (Milli Talim ve Terbiye Cemiyeti), 333
National Forces (Kuvays Milliye): Turkish nationalist forces in World War I, 340-341
National Treaty Law (Hiyanet-i Vataniye Kanunu): enacted April 29, 1920, 351
National Unity Committee (NÜC, Millî Birlik Komitesi): committee of military officers which carried out revolution of May 27, 1960 under leadership of General Cemal Gürsel, ruled until November 20, 1961, 414-427, 434
nationalism (milliyetçilik), 132, 375-378, 388
nationalist movements, 132, 277; Albanian, 199-200, 265; Armenian, 202-205; Arab, 310, 319, 321-322, 361; Bulgarian, 160-162, 198-199, 207-211; Greek, 206-211; Serbian, 208-209; Turkish, see Turkish Nationalism; Rumanian, 135, 141-142, 209; Egyptian, 193-194; Sudanese, 195; Macedonian, 209; Ottoman, 157; see also entries for individual countries
Naum, Mihail, 129
naval campaigns, battles, 30, 56, 183, 294, 311-312, 328
Naval Engineering School (Mühendishane-i Bahri-i Hümayun): founded 1773 in Golden Horn, moved to Heybeli Ada (1831), 27, 29, 48, 109
Naval School (Bahriye Mektebi), 111, 113
Navarino, Battle of (1827), 28, 30
Navy, Ministry of the (Bahriye Nezareti), bahriye nazır (minister of the navy): created in place of kapudan-ı derya in 1867, named changed to Bahriye Bakanluğu (1924) and Deniz Kuvvetleri Bakan-
Navy, Ministry of the (cont.)

Ministry of Sea Forces (1947) (Ministry of Sea Forces) (1947), 75, 178, 216, 225, 228, 275, 308-309

Nazım Paşa, Hüseyin (1854-1927): Abdulhamit II's minister of police (1890-1897), subsequently provincial governor, 215

Nazım Bey: minister of education (1918), 266

Nazım Paşa, Hüseyin (1854-1927): Abdulhamit II's minister of police (1890-1897), subsequently provincial governor, 215

Nazım Paşa, Hüseyin (1854-1927): Abdulhamit II's minister of police (1890-1897), subsequently provincial governor, 215

nazır (superintendent, minister), 23, 37, 41, 42

Need, 15, 245, 321

nepotism, 27

Nerses: Armenian Patriarch, 188, 202

Nesselrode, Karl Robert (1780-1862): Russian foreign minister (1822-1856), 137

Neuilly, Treaty of (1920), 332

New Party (Hızb-i Cedit), 290


newspapers, newspapermen, 35, 128-129, 131, 215, 251-254, 276, 401, 413

nezaret (ministry), see entries for individual ministries

Nezib, Battle of (1839), 50, 56

Nice (France), 64

Nicholas I (1796-1855): czar of Russia (ruled 1825-1855), 29, 30, 33, 56, 134-137

Nicholas II (1886-1918): czar of Russia (ruled 1894-1917), 199, 205, 210, 222, 314

Nicopolis (Niğbolu), 13, 183

Nightingale, Florence (1820-1910): British nurse, 139

Niş, 14, 44, 67, 88, 90, 123, 147, 160-161, 173, 188, 190, 252, 292

Nişan Efendi: chief of Abdulhamit II's palace press department, 214

nişancı: inscriber of the Imperial monogram, 8

Nişantaşı: section of Istanbul, 220

nizam: regular force, 246

Nizam-i Cedit (New Order): reformed army established by Selim III, 1-3, 11, 20, 23, 28

Nizamîye army: modern European-style army of Egypt, 11; of Ottoman Empire, 80, 85-86, 100; see also military organization

Nizamiye courts: secular Ottoman courts, 80, 89, 118-119, 217-219, 246-248

Nogay tatars, 116

nomads, 26-27, 86, 114, 116, 203-204, 246, 341, 352


North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Turkish entry into (1952), 400, 428, 429, 431, 432

notables and their suppression, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 12, 14, 15, 44, 84-87, 99, 114-115, 117, 179, 231

novels, 128, 214, 252-253, 255-256

Novipazar, Yeni Pazar, sancak of, 154, 165, 181, 188-189, 196, 277, 292-293, 294, 297

Nubar Paşa (Nubarian) (1825-1899): prime minister of Egypt (1878, 1884-1888, 1894-1895), Armenian nationalist, 193

Nur, Rıza (1879-1943): medical doctor, CUP founder, later political opponent as member of Liberal Union, member of Grand National Assembly, minister of health (1920), foreign affairs (1921), second plenipotentiary at Lausanne, Turkish historian, 283, 453

nurcu (follower of the light): conservative Muslim religious organization, founded by Saidi Nursi (1945), 304

Nursi, Saidi (1867-1960): conservative Muslim religious and political leader, 304

nuts, 234, 237

Obrenović (Obrenovich) dynasty of Serbian rulers: Michael (1823-1868), prince (1839-1842, 1860-1868), 148; Milan, prince (1839), 148; Milan II (1854-1901), prince (1868-1882), king (1882-1889), 149, 165-166, 172-173, 180, 186; Miloš (Milosh) (1780-1860), prince (1815-1839, 1858-1860), 14-15, 32, 147

Odessa, 139, 312, 354

Ohrd, 208, 266, 292, 297

oil, oil supplies, concessions, extraction, 318, 319, 321, 325-326, 328, 332, 366, 376, 391-392, 401, 432

Okyar, Ali Fethi (cont.)
sador to Great Britain (1930), minister of justice, 381–382, 411, 440
Okyar, Osman: Turkish economist, 411
olives, olive oil, 123, 234, 237, 238
önbaş: corporal, 85
opera, 49, 128, 129
Operations Army (Hareket Ordusu), 281, 282, 299
opium, 237, 238, 432–433
Organic statutes, of Rumania, 135–136; of Lebanon, 141, 143; of Crete, 151–152, 206
Orlov, A. F.: Russian diplomat at Hünkâr Iskelesi, 34
orman, see forest entries
orphans, orphanages, 94, 110, 111, 113, 161, 216, 329–330
Orta oyunu (play in the middle): 19th century popular comedy theatrical form, 129
Orthodox church, see Greek Orthodox church
Osman Hamdi (1842–1910): son of İbrahim Ethem, director of foreign publications for Abdulhamit II (1876–1878), Director of Sixth Municipal District of Istanbul (1878–1881), director of Imperial Museum of Antiquities (1881–1910), leading Ottoman archaeologist, author of Antiquities Regulation, founder of Fine Arts School, 219; see also İbrahim Ethem, Imperial Museum of Antiquities
Osman Paşa, Topal: governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1861–1869), 150, 183, 186, 189
Osmanlı (The Ottoman): CUP newspaper (142 issues, 1897–1904), 257
Osmanlı Bankası (The Ottoman Bank): founded 1856, 97, 118, 204–205, 211–211, 223, 309, 391
Ottoman Committee of Alliance, see Heyet-i Müttefika-i Osmaniye
Ottoman Democrat Party (Osmanlı Demokrat Fırkası): founded Istanbul (1909), 279, 283
Ottoman Freedom-Loving People's Party (Osmanlı Hürrüyelover Asam Fırkası): founded Istanbul (1918), 333
Ottoman Imperial University ( Dar ül-Fünun-u Osmanî ): first established in 1846, again in 1869, 1870–1871, 1874–1881; definitive opening 1900, replaced by Istanbul University (1933), 109–110, 250–251, 387; see also university regulations and Istanbul University
Ottoman Liberty Society (Osmanlı Hürrüyet Cemiyeti), 265
Ottoman Peace and Welfare Society (Sulh ve Selâmet-i Osmanîye Fırkası), 334
Ottoman Socialist Party (Osmanlı Sosyalist Fırkası): founded Istanbul (1910), 283
Ouchy, Treaty of (1912), 293
Outpost Society (Karakol Cemiyeti): founded Istanbul (1919), to fight foreign occupation of Turkey, after suppression replaced by Müdafa-a-i Millîye, 230, 348, 355; see also Müdafa-a-i Millîye
oxen, 237
Ömer Seyfettin (1884–1920): short story writer and poet, 301
örfi: customary, customary taxes, 40, 102
Pakistan, relations with Turkey, 429
Palmerston, Lord (Henry John Temple) (1784–1865): British secretary of war (1809–1829), foreign minister (1830–1834, 1835–1841, 1846–1851), and prime min-
Index

Palmerston, Lord (cont.)

ister (1855-1858, 1859-1865), 33, 34, 50, 56, 58, 59, 139-147

pan-Islam, see Islamism

pan-Slavism, pan-Slavs, 146, 148-150, 156, 158-159, 172-173, 184, 188, 196

pan-Turkism, pan-Turks, see Turkish nationalism

paper, paper manufacture, 123, 236, 237, 391

paper money (kaime, kaime-i mutebere, evrak-i sahiha), 96-98, 105, 166, 391


Party of People's Councils (Halk Şurası Fırkası), 354

passports, 40, 47

paşa: Ottoman title of rank for holders of political and military positions above sancak bey; abolished by Republic (1934), 386

Paşabahçe, 123

patent vergisi, see income tax

patriarch, 124-127, 161

patriotic organizations, 333

Pazarlık, 162

peasants, see cultivators

Peasant's Party (Köylü Partisi), 407, 411


penal codes (Ceza Kanunnamesi), 39, 118, 385

pensions, 28, 155, 224, 313, 390

People's Communist Party (Halk İşbirlikçiyi Fırkası), 354


People's Party, Ahali Fırkası: founded Is-
population statistics, of Ottoman Empire, 100, 112-113, 116-117, 239-243, 244, 268 n31, 270 n96, 337 n160; of Istanbul, 53, 241-244; of Macedon, 208; Armenians, 200-201, 205, 316, 337 n160; Populism (Halctık), 378-384; porcelain factories, 236; port facilities, quays, 93, 228, 238, 239, 328, 392, 393; Porte, see Sublime Porte; Portugal, 33; post office, postal system, Ottoman, 40, 74, 119-120, 146, 161, 200, 228-230, 285, 293, 449; foreign in Ottoman Empire, 131, 202-203, 229-230, 252, 256-257, 262, 277, 312, 367; potatoes, 389; Poti, 116; President of the Turkish Republic, 378-379, 417-418, 440 (list); press, press law, press control, 35, 72, 145, 157, 174, 185-186, 214-216, 219, 251-252, 275-276, 283-286, 381, 402, 411, 413, 418; Preveze, 294; prices, price controls, regulations, 91, 92, 94, 373, 388, 392-393, 398, 401, 404, 409, 415, 427; prime minister (baş vekil, başbakan): title used 1838-1839, 1878, 1879-1882 and in Turkish Republic, 37, 167, 175, 246, 379, 384, 418, 440 (list); see also grand vezir; Principalities (Moldavia and Wallachia), 13, 14, 17, 29, 31-33, 126, 135-142, 161-162, 182, 451; see also Moldavia, Wallachia, and Rumania; prisons, 216; Priştina, 294; private enterprise, 118-123, 236, 258, 380, 390-393, 404-405, 408, 419, 421-423, 427; Privy Council (Yaveran-i Ekrem), 83, 214, 220; Privy Purse (Ceb-i Hümayum, Hazine-i Hassa), 82-83, 225, 228, 259, 284; Prizren, 90, 199; professors, 410-411, 426; profits tax (temettuat vergisi): created by Tanzimat (1839), replaced by income tax (1926, 1946), 96, 98, 224, 225, 393, 401; Progress Party (Hizb-i Terakki), 290; Progressive Republican Party (Terakki-Perver Cumhuriyet Partisi): founded by Bele, Cebesoy, Orbay and Karabekir in opposition to secularization (1924-1925), 380-381; property holding, ownership, 60, 61, 95, 114-115, 119, 124, 368, 394, 419, 423-424; Property Records, Ministry/Department of (Defter-i Hakani Nezareti/Emnneti): created out of Defterhane (1871), 81, 217; property taxes, 98, 217, 225; Protestants, Protestant millet, 126, 200-202, 205, 239, 241-242, 244, 250; provinces (eyalet, replaced by vilayet in law of 1864), administrative organization of, 40-44, 72, 83-91, 119, 150, 154, 156, 178-179, 185-186, 216, 243, 258, 275, 292, 306, 346, 380, 420; educational organization of, 107, 111, 155, 380, 386; financial organization of, 40, 73, 86, 88, 224, 231, 306, 392; governors, 2, 23, 40, 46, 72, 80, 83-89, 94, 185, 245, 247, 380; military organization of, 23, 40, 43, 46, 75, 85-86, 88, 161, 179, 186, 191, 197, 216, 294, 341; reforms of, 67, 87-90, 119, 149-152, 154, 161, 211, 219, 243; investigations and inspections of, 67, 70, 219; municipal code for, 94-95; see also councils, education, municipal and local government, reserves; Provincial General Assembly (Meclis-i Umumi-i Vilayet), 89-90, 95; provincial regulations, 1858, 88; of 1864, 89; of 1876, 181; of 1877, 185; Prussia, relations with Ottomans, 56, 59, 86, 134, 139, 146; advisers in Ottoman service, 43, 45, 50, 216, 245; involvement in Crimean War, 138-141; Pruth river, 17, 32, 138; psychology, 301; Public Benefits Bank (Menafi Sandığı), 101; public debt (diýun-u umumiye), Public Debt Commission (Diiyun-u Umumiye Komisyonu), 104-105, 146, 191, 217, 219-220, 223-227, 233, 235, 256, 293, 309, 312, 346, 356, 409, 413; public gatherings, regulation of, 286; public lectures, 109-111; Public Security, Department of (Emnnet-i Umumi Müdurlüğü), 286; see also police; public transportation, 91, 93, 241, 287; see also railroads, steamships, tramways; public works, 37, 74, 87, 90, 193, 210, 243, 285, 306, 350; Public Works, Council on (Meclis-i Naфа, Meclis-i Umur-u Naфа): established in Istanbul (July 7, 1838), 106; Public Works, Ministry of (Naфа Nezareti), 74, 102, 104, 120-121, 217, 221, 230-231, 235
quarantine, 11, 253
rabbis, 124, 127-128
Radical Reform Party (Islahat-i Esasiye-i Osmaniye Firkası), 283
radio, 420
Radloff, Vassily (1837-1919) : Russian Turcologist, 261
raftiye resmi (export tax), 103
Raglan, Lord (1788-1855) : British commander in Crimean War, 139
raid on the Porte, 285, 299
railroads, railroad construction, 74, 105, 120-121, 145, 150, 155, 173, 193, 200, 211, 214, 217, 220, 226-228, 232, 235-236, 281, 287, 309, 313, 322, 328, 357, 392, 393, 395, 449
Ramla (Palestine), 324
ranks and titles, 38-39, 77, 365; abolition of (1934), 385-386
Raşit Paşa, Mehmet (1824-1876) : professional Tanzimat administrator, provincial governor, minister of public works (1873), foreign affairs (1873-1874, 1875-1876), assassinated by Çerkes Hasan, 164; see also Çerkes Hasan
rationing, 398
Red Crescent Society (Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti) : established in Istanbul (1877), 225
redif, see reserves
Redif Paşa, Mehmet (d. 1905) : professional soldier, serasker under Abdulhamit II, 174, 185
Reform Commission (İslahat Komisyonu), 81, 154
Reform Decree (1856), see imperial script
Refugees Assistance Share (Muhacirin lane Hissesi), 232
Refugees Commission (Muhacirin Komisyuyu-u Ali), 115
Regeneration Party (Teceddüü Firkası) : founded Istanbul (1918), 332
Régie (Tütün Rejisi) : Ottoman tobacco monopoly, created 1883, sequestered February 26, 1925 and replaced by the Turkish Monopolies Company (Inhisarlar), 233, 392
Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) : economic grouping of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, 430
Reichstadt agreement (1876), 181
reis (captain, chairman), 9, 27
reis ul-kittap (chief of scribal corporation, scribal chief of Sublime Porte, chief executive assistant to grand vezir, position abolished in 1836 and replaced by ministries of interior and foreign affairs, 8, 22, 36, 58, 72
Reliance Party (Güven Partisi) : founded Istanbul (February 13, 1961) by Turhan Feyzioglu and RPP dissidents, taken over by Alparslan Türkçeş and conservatives (1967), 428-429
Religious Affairs, Department of (Diyanet İşleri Müdurlüğü) : established (March 3, 1924) to replace şeyhülislam, 384
religious equality, freedom, 115, 124-125, 159, 177, 180, 367, 378, 418
religious organization, Muslim, 8, 74, 276, 305-307, 384-387, 409-410, 426-427, 464-465; see also Muslims, İlimie, and Ulema
Representative Committee (Heyet-i Temsilîye) : executive committee of the Grand National Assembly, Ankara government (1919-1922), 345-349
representative institutions, representation, 80, 84-87, 89, 91, 93-94, 124-128, 131-132, 134, 145, 150, 152, 174-175, 178, 197, 202, 206, 243, 275, 277, 282-283, 350-351, 378-379
Republican People's Party (RPP) : founded as the People's Party (Halk Firkası) December 6, 1923, changed to Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet
Republican People's Party (cont.)
Republicanism (Cumhuriyetçilik), 375
reserves (redif), 43-44, 85-86, 100, 179, 191, 197, 245, 246, 287, 294, 341
resm-i damga (stamp tax, embossing tax), 102
Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette, abbreviated RG) : established as Ceride-i Resmiye (1920-1927), then Resmi Ceride (1927-1930), Resmi Gazete (1930- ), 442
Restoration of Order Law (Tahrir-i Siikun Kanunu) : issued March 4, 1925, 381
Resadiye: Ottoman warship, 309, 311
Re§it Mehmet Pa§a, (d. 1836) : slave of Husrev Pa§a, grand vezir (1829-1833), 33, 36
Re§it Pa§a, Mustafa, see Mustafa Re§it Pa§a
retirement laws, 72, 75, 287, 411
Reval Agreement (1908), 211
Revolutionism (Inktlapcihk), 384
revolutions, of 1848, 116, 134-136; Young Turk (1908), 266-267; of May 27, 1960, 413-414
Rhodes (Rodos) island, 83, 252-253, 256, 293
Rhodope mountains, 160-161, 292, 294; see also East Rumelia
Rumbold, Sir Horace: British ambassador to Istanbul (1920), 355
Rumeli, Rumelia: European portion of the Ottoman Empire; also province encompassing Bulgaria, parts of Macedonia and Greece, 26, 37, 44, 58, 66, 72, 74, 83, 87, 99, 116, 117, 121, 173 294; see also East Rumelia
Rumeli Feneri: Bosporus village 93, 101, 120
Rumeli Provinces Reform Commission, 209
Rusçuk, 4, 7, 13-14, 31, 41, 70, 121, 183, 187
Russia, Ottoman diplomatic and military relations with. 2, 6-7, 10, 12-17, 22, 24, 27, 29-35, 41, 44, 49-51, 56-58, 63-64, 70, 86, 115-116, 134-141, 152, 156-159, 162, 165-166, 172-174, 178-191, 196-200, 203, 210, 212, 219, 239, 242, 246, 250, 262, 277, 289, 292; involvement of in Istanbul, 70-71, 156, 250; advisors of in Ottoman service, 45; involvement of in Crimean War, 138-141; involvement of in Balkans, 147-151, 165-166, 172, 196-199, 206-207; involvement of in Armenian revolt, 200-205, 314-317, 322-323; occupation of Principalities, 141-142; trade of with Ottomans, 122, 238-239; postal service in Ottoman territory, 229-230; involvement of in Balkan Wars, 292-298; ambitions of for Ottoman territory, 320; involvement of in World War I, 310-332; ambitions of for Ottoman territory, 320-321; see also Bolsheviks, Soviet Union
Rüstem Pa§a: governor of Lebanon (1872-1883), 143
Rüsumat Emaneti, riisumat emini, see Excise Taxes, Department/Ministry of
Rüştü (adolescence) schools: begun for men in 1838, for women in 1858, 47, 107-108, 113, 130-131, 215, 249-250
rütbə: bureaucratic rank, 39
rüüss: certificate of ability or position, 111
Sa‘adabad Pact: including Turkey, Iran, Irak and Afghanistan (July 8, 1937), 377
Sabah (Morning) : Istanbul newspaper (12,147 issues, 1876-1922), 253-254
Sahabeddin, Prince (1877-1948) : son of prince Damat Mahmut Celaeddin Paşa and Abdulhamit II's sister Seniha Sultan, founder of Young Turk decentralist movement, 258-262, 265-266, 276, 296; see also Mahmut Celaeddin Paşa, Damat
sadaret kethiidas (lieutenant of the grand vezir): principal executive officer of grand vezir in 18th century, replaced by minister of the interior (1836), 36, 71
sadaret misicaps (undersecretary of the grand vezir): acted as minister of the interior while that office was attached to the grand vezirate, 71
Sadaret-i Uzma (Grand Vezirate), sadr-t azam, sadrazam (grand vezir), see grand vezir
Sadullah Paşa, Rami (1838–1890): chief scribe of Murat V, ambassador to Berlin (1876–1878) and Congress of Berlin, poet and translator, 190
Saffet Efendi/Paşa, Mehmet Esat (1814–1883): long-time scribe to Abdulaziz and member of the Council of the Tanzimat, minister of education (1868–1871, 1874–1875, 1875–1876), foreign minister (1873, 1875, 1876–1877, 1879, 1882), minister of trade (1863–1865, 1867), and grand vezir (1878), 172, 178, 439
sailors, 4, 25, 27
Saint Germaine, Treaty of (1920), 331–332
Saint Irene Church, 111
Saint Jean de Maurienne, Treaty of (1917), 321, 329
Saint Petersburg, 45, 62–63, 136, 157, 172, 188, 297
Saint Slava, Serbian nationalist society of, 209
Sait, Şeyh, Kurt Sait (1865–1925): Naksibendi mystic leader, Kurdish rebel leader, 381
Sait Mehmet Paşa, 36
Sait Paşa (1822–1863): fourth son of Muhammad Ali, governor of Egypt (1854–1863), 144, 193
Sait Paşa, İngiliz, Mehmet (1830–1895): well-known mathematician, studied seven years at University of Edinburgh, naval officer and provincial governor, early advisor of Abdulhamit II, 174, 189
Saka, Hasan Hüsnü (1886–1960): Professor at Civil Service School, Law Faculty of University of Ankara; representative to Istanbul parliament, Grand National Assembly; aide to İnönü at Lausanne Conference, foreign minister (1944–1946), prime minister (1947–1949), 404, 440
Sakarya river, 320; Battle of (1921), 354, 360–361
salaries, salary system, 3, 6, 23, 38–39, 99, 156, 222, 245, 247, 266, 276, 285, 307
Salih Paşa, Salih Hülsü Kezrak (1864–1939): professional military officer, aide to von der Goltz, minister of navy and public works in Young Turk period, Istanbul government’s representative to Amasya conference with Atatü rk (1919), grand vezir (1920), minister of the navy (1920–1922), then joined nationalists, 332, 346, 348, 440
salt, salt extraction, marketing, regulation, taxes, 104–105, 223, 235, 237, 392
Samarkand, 157, 263
Samos, 32, 83, 198
Sampson, Nikos: Greek newspaperman, Enosis leader in Cyprus, 431
Samsun, 121, 309, 329, 341, 343–344
San Remo, Conference of (1920), 332, 356–357, 365
San Stefano (Yesilköy), 281; Conference and Treaty of (1876), 187–190, 196, 199, 202, 208
Sanayi Kredi Bankası (Industrial Credit Bank), 391
Sanayi Mektebi, Mekteb-i Sanayi (Industrial School), 110–111
sancak (banner): provincial administrative district, composed of kazas, administered by sancak bey historically, by mutassarif in Tanzimat; abolished by Republic, leaving kazas directly under provincial authority, 24, 84, 86, 89, 98, 101, 119, 121, 150, 243
sanitation, 72, 92, 150, 242, 308, 394
Saraçoğlu, Şikrû (1887–1953): specialist in finance, business administration; İzmir representative to Grand National Assembly, minister of education (1924–1925),
finance (1927–1930) ; arranged population exchanges with Greece, established bases of Central Bank of Turkey, made final arrangements of Public Debt, foreign minister (1938–1942), prime minister (1942–1946), 440
Sarajevo (Bosna Saray), 107, 149, 259 sarfıyat resmi (consumption tax), 105
Sankamî, 315
Saruhan, 15
Sasun, Armenian revolt at, 203-204
Saudi dynasty, Saudis, 15, 321-322
Sawakin (Sevakin), 145-146
Saydam, Refik (1881-1942) : medical doctor, minister of health for Republic, minister of the interior and RPP general secretary following Atatürk’s death (1938–1939), prime minister (1939–1942), 440
schools, school building, 19, 38, 40, 46-48, 90, 106–113, 125, 136, 144, 160–161, 249, 408, 412, 427; see also education
science courses, books, 47, 106, 110, 128
Scribal Institution (Kalemiye), scribes, 8-9, 22, 38-39, 58, 61, 65, 72-74, 83-84, 86, 88, 130, 217, 245, 249
Sebil ur-Resad (Fountain of Orthodoxy) : conservative islamist journal, 304
Second Group (Ikinci Grup), Second Defense of Rights Group (Ikinci Müdafa靛-i Hukuk Grubu) : party founded in Grand National Assembly (1922) to oppose Atatürk, 361, 380
security and order, 60, 72, 87, 89, 91, 118, 345, 350
Security Army (Kuvâincl İnizamiye), 352
Sefer Efendi : Abdulhamit II’s chief of palace press department, 214
Seğban-i Cedit (New Şebans) : new army established by Bayraktar Mustafa Paşa (1808), 3–6
Selâmet-i Amme Heyeti (General Welfare Committee) : founded Istanbul (1918), 279, 334
Selim Giray : Crimean Tatar prince, 4
Selim Melhame Efendi : minister of Forests, Mines and Agriculture (1892–1908), 230
Selim Paşa, Benderli (1771–1831) : governor of Silistria (1818–1824), grand vezir (1824–1828), 9, 30, 58
Selim III (1761–1808) : Ottoman sultan (ruled 1789–1807), 1, 3, 6, 8, 10–11, 20, 23, 25, 27, 36, 50, 55, 68, 106, 158, 308
Selimiye barracks (Üskûdar), 139, 142
Selman Pak, Battle of (1915), 318
Senate, see Chamber of Notables
Senate of the Republic (Cumhuriyet Senatosu) : upper house of Grand National Assembly, created by 1961 Constitution, 417
Sened-i İtaat, see Document of Obedience
Sened-i Ittifak, see Document of Agreement
Senusî (al-Sanusi, Sanusiyah) movement : Muslim pietistic movement among Libyan nomads, founded by Muhammad ibn Ali al-Sanusi (1787–1859) in 1837, 289, 290, 319
ser yâverân-ı ekrem : chairman of sultan’s Privy Council, 213
ser yâverân-ı harp : chief of sultan’s personal guard, 214
serasker (chief soldier, commander in chief), Seraskerate (serasker kâpsi, bab-ı serasker) : established at headquarters of Janissary Ağa (1826) to center command of new Mânsûre army; replaced by Ministry and minister of War in 1880–1882 and after 1908; new buildings constructed (1865–1870) after fire, now location of Faculty of Medicine, University of Istanbul, 23–24, 27, 36, 38–39, 41–44, 46, 48, 59, 69–70, 74–75, 81, 85–86, 107, 129, 155, 163, 215–216, 245, 287; see also War, Ministry of
Serbest Cumhuriyet Fûrkası, see Free Party
Serez (Siroz), 208, 267
Servet-i Fünun (Wealth of Sciences) : Ottoman literary journal (2464 issues, 1891–1944) and literary movement (also called the New Literature/Edebiyat-ı Cedit), 254–255
sesame seeds, 237
Sevastopol, 138–139
Sève (Süleyman Paşa) : French officer in service of Muhammad Ali, 28
Sevkiyat-i Askeriye Komisyonu (Military Consignments Commission), 253
Sevres, Treaty of (signed August 10, 1920), 356, 358–359, 361
sewage, sewage system, 92, 306
seyfiye: military class, 38
seymen: policeman, 46
Seymour, Admiral: British naval officer, 194
shoes, 133
short story, 128
Sis, 125, 201, 328
Stambulov, Stefan Nikolov (1854–1895): Bulgarian nationalist, president of Bulgarian national assembly (1884), prime minister (1887–1894), 198–199
state enterprises, 104–105, 114, 391–393, 421
State Planning Organization: established September 30, 1960, 415, 420, 426
Statism, see Etatism
steamships, steamship lines, 75, 91, 105, 119–120, 161, 228–229, 287
steel, 393
stock exchanges, 238
Soviet Union, help to Turkish War for Independence, 344, 355, 359; diplomatic relations with Turkey, 358, 423, 431, 432; agitation in Turkey, 381; economic relations with Turkey, 391–392, 427, 431–432; relations in World War II, 396–399; postwar claims for Turkish territory, 399–400
spirits, spirits tax (azciriye resmi), 103–104, 224, 237, 385, 392
sponges, 237, 391
sports, 383
Stamboul, Stefan Nikolov (1854–1895): Bulgarian nationalist, president of Bulgarian national assembly (1884), prime minister (1887–1894), 198–199
stamp tax (damga resmi), 102–103, 232
stamps, 229
state enterprises, 104–105, 114, 391–393, 421
State Planning Organization: established September 30, 1960, 415, 420, 426
Statism, see Etatism
steamships, steamship lines, 75, 91, 105, 119–120, 161, 228–229, 287
steel, 393
stock exchanges, 238
Stratford de Redcliffe, Stratford Canning, 1st Viscount (1786–1880) : charge d'affaires to the Porte (1810–1812), ambassador to the Porte (1825–1829, 1831, 1841–1846, 1848–1851, 1853–1858), 33, 63, 137, 138

street lighting, 92

street paving, construction, cleaning, regulations, 46, 91, 93, 94, 121, 241, 306

strikes, strike regulation, 394–395, 401–402, 423, 427

Struma river, 292

Sturza, Michael : prince of Moldavia, 135–136

Subject Class (rayas, reaya), 12, 105, 178, 258, 264; see also Muslims, non-Muslims

Sublime Porte (Bab-i Ali, Bab-i Asafı, Paşakapası) : offices of grand vezir, separated from Topkapı Palace in 1654, located beneath palace in 1740; buildings fully or partly burned and rebuilt in 1754, 1788, 1808, 1838, 1878, and 1911. Grounds now occupied by the offices of the Province (Vilayet) of Istanbul, the Prime Minister's Archives (Başbakanlık), and the Ministry of Finance; term used by Europeans to signify Ottoman government, 28, 36–38, 48, 58–61, 63, 68–83, 87, 90, 120, 124, 135, 137–138, 151–153, 156, 159, 161, 163, 165, 172, 173, 179, 181, 182, 187, 189, 191, 204, 210–212, 214, 217, 277, 284, 286, 291–292, 295, 296, 298; archives of (Bab-i Ali Evrak Odası), 76, 217; raid on (Bab-i Ali bâkımı), 295, 299

Sudan, 11, 146

Suez Canal, 144–146, 160, 312, 320

sugar, sugar industry, 11, 144, 145, 239, 391–393, 395

Sûlûh ve Selâmet-i Osmaniye Fırkası (Ottoman Peace and Welfare Party) : founded Istanbul (1919), 334


Sultan Amet mosque, quarter of Istanbul, 5, 47, 157, 280

Sultan Osman : warship, 309, 311

Sultani : lycée, 108–109

Sun Language Theory (Günes Dil Teorisi), 376

Sunay, Cevdet (1900– ) : military officer, president of Turkey (1966–1973), 426, 440

Sunni (orthodox) Muslims, 133; see also Muslims

Supreme Court, 379, 418

Surgery, Imperial School of (Cerrahhane-i Amire), 48

Süleyman Ağa : commander of Seğban-ı Cedit army, 3

Süleyman Ağa/Paşa the Great : Mamluk ruler of Baghdad (1780–1810), 8, 15

Süleyman Askeri Bey (d. 1914) : Ottoman commander of Iraq at start of World War I, 318

Süleyman Efendi, Buharah : leader of Çağatay Turkic center in Istanbul, 262

Süleyman Nazif (1870–1927) : Young Ottoman and Servet-i Fünun poet, 254

Süleyman Paşa, Hüsnü (d. 1892) : military officer and educator, commander at §ipka Pass (1876), director of War Academy, involved in deposition of Abdulaziz (1876), banished to Baghdad (1878–1892), 163, 183, 186

Süleymaniye mosque, 23, 37, 47, 74, 386

Sümerbank (Sumerian Bank), 391–393

Süreyya Efendi/Paşa : professional scribe, chief scribe of Abdulhamit II (1881–1894), 214

Switzerland, 123, 203

Sykes, Sir Mark (1879–1919), 321

Sykes, Percy, commander of South Persian Rifles, 314

Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), 321–323, 328


Şahin, Taniyus : Lebanese peasant rebel leader, 142

Şamil, Şeyh Ali (1795–1871) : leader of Dağistan Turkish rebels against Czar (1834–1859), 138

Şatt ul-Arab, 318

Şebinkarahisar, 154

Şefik Paşa : minister of police (1897–1908), 215
Index

Şehir Emaneti Encümeni: City Council of Istanbul, 306


Şehir Meclisi (City Council), 92

Şehrizer, 16

Şekip Paşa, Mehmet (d. 1855) : ambassador to London (1840–1844), foreign minister (1844–1845), solved problems in Lebanon, ambassador to Vienna (1848–1850), 134

Şemssettin Sami (Fraşeri) (1850–1904) : Tanzimat writer, 253–254, 263

Şemsi Paşa (d. 1908) : aide to Abdulhamit II, 266

Şeriat: Muslim religious law, Şeriat courts, 87, 89, 96, 101, 104, 110, 118–119, 164, 175, 178, 279–280, 284, 306, 378, 385; see also justice

Şerif Paşa, Boşerif (1865–1944) : professional soldier, ambassador to Sweden (1898–1909), founder of Ottoman Radical Reform Party, condemned to death for complicity in murder of Şevket Paşa, so remained abroad, 283


Şeyhülislam: chief of İlimiye institution, chief jurisconsult (grand muttı), transformed into ministry (Bab-i Fetva, Bab-i Meşihat) starting in 1836, 8–9, 19, 21–22, 24, 36–39, 42, 65, 69, 74–75, 81, 89, 119, 163, 248, 275, 284, 298, 303, 306–307, 333; abolished (March 3, 1924) and replaced by Ministry of Religious Affairs, 384

Şinasi, Ibrahim (1824–1874) : Young Ottoman writer, published newspapers Terciman-i Ahval, Tasvir-i Efkâr (1862), 130–131

Şişka Pass, Battle of (1877), 183–184, 186 şıra resmi (grape juice tax), 104

Şirket-i Hayriye: Ottoman steamship company for Bosporus, founded 1850, nationalized by Republic (1944), now part of Denizcilik Bankası, 91, 120, 229

Şümla (Şumna), 31, 41, 44, 58, 86, 138, 183

Şurays Askeri: Military Advisory Council, 287

Şurays Devlet, see Council of State

Tabriz: capital of Iranian Azerbaijan, 16 tabur (battalion), 24, 85

Tahir Paşa: governor of Tunis, 63 tahrir-i emlak, see cadastral surveys tahsilat müdürü: tax collection administrator, 224

Tahsin Paşa: chief scribe of Abdulhamit II (1894–1909), 214

Taksim: water reservoir from which supplies are distributed; section of Istanbul where principal reservoir was located, 281

Takvim-i Vekayi (Calendar of Events) : official Ottoman government newspaper (4891 issues, 1831–1923), 35, 48, 128, 252, 365, 442


Talimhane: military training center, 29


Tanin: principal newspaper of the CUP (3030 issues, 1908–1925), 280, 292

Tanzimat (ordering, re-ordering), Tanzimat-i Hayriye (Beneficent Reordering) (1839–1876), 20, 26, 33, 38, 44, 48, 50, 55–171, 184, 273, 445–450


Tapu Nizamnamesi (Cadastral Regulation), 114

Tapu Senedi (cadastral receipt) : shows individual rights of possession, 114

Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni (Ottoman Historical Society: established November 27, 1909), see Turkish History Society

Tarsus, 328

Tasvir-i Efkâr (Description of Ideas) : Tanzimat newspaper (643 issues, 1861–1870), 129, 131

Taşkent (Tashkent), 157

Taurus mountains, tunnels, 328
tax farm (iltizam), tax farmers (multezims), 40, 41, 60, 67, 74, 84, 95–98, 99, 101–103, 135, 147, 154–161, 166
Index

Tilsit, Agreement of (1807), 12, 13, 16

Tilmar: form of military compensation, popularly referred to as fief; tilmahr (tilmar holder), 4, 6, 42-43, 95, 100; see also feudal organization

timber, 237

time law (26 December 1925), 308, 385

tirnovo, 70, 90, 183, 207

tithes (ağşır, sing. ağşır), 84, 95, 96, 99, 114, 152, 154, 179, 224-225, 227, 233; surtaxes on (hisse), 101, 210, 227, 231-232, 235, 246, 249, 285, 287, 300; abolition of tithe (February 17, 1925), 388, 393

Tithes and Sheep Taxes, Department of (Aşar ve Ağnam Emaneti), 99

Tiyatro-i Osmani (The Ottoman Theater), 129

Tophane, see Medicine, Imperial School of

Tophane, see Arsenal

Topkapı Palace (Topkapı Sarayı): constructed by Mehmet II (1465-1478), 20, 24, 49, 60, 75, 82-83, 111, 163, 167, 183, 215, 219, 222, 365

Townshend, Sir Charles (1861-1924): British general in Iraq during World War I, 318

Trablusgarp (Tripoli of Libya): provincial newspaper (1253 issues, 1872-1908), 253

Trabzon (Trebizond), 15, 31, 90, 154, 172, 201-204, 239, 321, 323, 325-326, 341, 343-344, 354, 393

town: police station, jail, guardhouse, 46

Tophane, see Cannon Corps

Topkapi Palace (Topkapı Sarayı): constructed by Mehmet II (1465-1478), 20, 24, 49, 60, 75, 82-83, 111, 163, 167, 183, 215, 219, 222, 365

Trabzon (Trebizond), 15, 31, 90, 154, 172, 201-204, 239, 321, 323, 325-326, 341, 343-344, 354, 393

tractors, 408, 412


Trade/Commerce, Ministry of (Ticaret Nezareti), 37, 74, 106, 115, 287, 393, 397

trade/commerce courts, mixed courts (ticaret mahkemesi), 76, 118-119, 150, 216, 246-248, 300, 367, 393

Trade and Public Works, Ministry of (Ticaret ve Nafta Nezareti), 74

trade laws (Ticaret Kanunu), law codes, 89, 118, 385, 393

trade schools (ticaret mektebi), 111, 113, 238

trade societies (Ticaret Odası), 219, 231, 236, 287, 390, 393, 394, 415

trade unions, 394, 401-402, 415, 419, 427

tramways, street cars, 94, 241, 287, 306

Transcaspian Republic, Federation, 325-326

transit taxes (müruriye resmi), 105

Translation Office (Terciime Odası) of Foreign Ministry: opened April 23, 1821, 61, 73, 131

transportation, 23, 26, 91, 119-121, 241, 306

Transylvania (Erdel), 313, 332

treasure, 31, 57, 105, 144-146, 147, 173, 190, 194, 197, 223-224, 277

Tricoups, Charilaos: Greek liberal leader, 206

Triple Alliance (1881), 196, 211

Triple Entente: alliance of Great Britain, France and Russia before and during World War I, formed from Franco-Russian alliance (1893), Anglo-French Entente Cordiale (1904), and Anglo-Russian agreement (1907), 277, 289, 290, 293-294; opposes Ottomans and Central Powers in World War I, 310-332

Tripoli of Lebanon (Trablus), 9, 33, 327; of Libya (Trablusgarp), 85, 90, 153, 200, 245, 253, 289-290, 292-293


Tulvat Tiyatro: improvised folk theater, 129

Tulumbaci Ocagi, firefighters corps, 46

Tuna Ordusu (Army of the Danube), 86

Tuna Vilayeti, see Danube Province

Tunis, Tunisia: conquered definitively by Ottomans in 1574, by France in 1881, 44, 63, 181, 192-193, 200, 220, 259, 455

turbans, 49, 385

Turcologists, 260-261, 263

Turk, definition and use of term, 262
Index


Timor river, 147

Turk ibn Abdullah, 15

Timur, 13

Timor river, 147

Timurid Empire, 147

Timurid period, 147

Timurid family, 147

Timurids, 147

Türk İtilafı (Union and Progress Society) (Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti), 209, 457; origins of, 255–256; political activities of, before 1908, 256–259, 263–267; political activities of, after 1908, 265–267, 270–287, 298–304, 327, 332–334, 341; party programs of, 256, 258, 334

Turkomen nomads, Turkomans, 101, 246, 352

tüfenkçi (riflemen), 27

Tüfenkhan (Rifle Factory), 44

Türk Sanayi ve Maden Bankası (Turkish Industry and Mining Bank), 390

Türkiye Ticaret Bankası (Turkish Commercial Bank), 392

Türkiye Yurdu (The Turkish Homeland), Türkiye Cemiyeti (Turkish Homeland Society), 289, 301

Türkiye Halk İftirakiyün Fırkası (Democratic People's Revolutionary Party), 354

Türkiye Komünist Partisi (Turkish Communist Party) (Türkiye Komiinist Partisi): founded Ankara (1920), 354


Türkoman nomads, Turkomans, 101, 246, 352

tüfenkçi (riflemen), 27

Türkiye (Turkey): newspaper, 279

typhus, 324, 327

Ukraine, 24, 325, 358


Ulus (Nation): RPP newspaper, continuation of Hakimiyet-i Milliye (q.v.) (1934 to date), 411

Umur-u Cihadiye Nezareti (Ministry of Holy War Affairs), 3

Umur-u Hariciye Nezareti, see Foreign Affairs, Ministry of

Umur-u Mülliyeti Nezareti, see Interior, Ministry of


Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, see Soviets and Soviet Union

Unionists (Ittihatçılar): members of CUP political party after 1908, 276, 279, 290–292, 296, 353–354, 359, 361

United Nations (UN), 429, 431; joined by Turkey (June 26, 1945), 399
United States of America, missionaries in Ottoman Empire, 250; trade of with Ottomans, 122, 232, 287; involvement of in World War I, 324; at Paris Peace Conference, 331, 342; relations of with Turkish Republic, 287, 399, 400, 423, 428–433, 465–466; military bases in Turkey, 400, 432; relations regarding poppies and Cyprus, 430–433; investment of in Turkey, 427; political pressures regarding Turkey, 432

University, Imperial Ottoman (Dar ul-Fünun-u Osmani, Darülfunun-u Osmani), see Ottoman Imperial University


Urabi Paşa, Ahmet (1839–1911) : Egyptian army officer, nationalist leader of revolt against foreign influence (1881–1882), 193–194

urban life, 49, 185, 215, 241–245; see also municipal and local government, municipalities

Urfa, 236

Urşak, 236, 358–359

Uşak Avlulgil, Halit Ziya (1865–1945) : novelist, politician, 254, 457

Uzbek Turkish, 262

Ülkü (Ideal) : journal of the People’s House movement, 383

Ürgüplü, Suat Hayri (1903–1965) : prime minister of Turkey (1965), 440

Üşküdar (Scutari), 3, 23, 44, 85, 93, 139, 262, 281

Üşküp (Skopje), 199–200, 208, 267, 292

vagabonds and suspects, law on, 285

vakırusis (relator of events) : official Ottoman chronicler, 65

Vakayi-i Misriyye (Events of Egypt) : official Egyptian government newspaper, 35

vakif, pl. evkaf, see religious foundations

Vakıflar Bankası (Foundations Bank) : established January 15, 1954, 392

Vakıflar Genel Mûdürülgüsü, see Religious Foundations, Department of

Vakit (Time) : newspaper, 252

vali : see provinces, governor of

Vambery, Arminius (1832–1913) : Hungarian Turcologist, friend of Abdulhamit II, 261

Van, lake and province of, 184, 201–203, 246, 314, 316, 321–323, 325, 341

vanilla, 237

Vardar river, 208, 297

Vârş Vergyisi, see Capital Levy

Vasa Paşa : governor of Lebanon (1883–1892), 143

vassals, vassal troops, 24, 144–145

vatan (homeland, fatherland), 132, 263, 284, 302

Vatan : newspaper founded by Ahmet Emin Yalman (835 issues, 1923–1925), 264, 381

Vatan ve Hürriyet Cemiyeti (Fatherland and Liberty Society), 264, 265

vegetable crops, 234, 389

veil, 307, 385

vekil (minister), 37

vekilüharcı : commissary officer, 44

Veles, 297

Venice, 125–126


vergi nüfus teskeresi : population tax receipt, census receipt, identity card, 88

veterinary medicine, 113, 216, 230, 287, 394

Veterinary Medicine, School of (Mekteb-i Mülkiye-i Baytar), 113, 249

vezir : highest military and administrative rank in Ottoman Empire beneath sultan, 36–37, 65, 214

vezir-i âzam, see grand vezir

Victoria (1819–1901) : Queen of England (1837–1901), 187

Vidin, 7, 14, 21, 31, 32, 90, 123, 160, 183

Vienna, 61, 120, 135, 210, 229; Note (1853), 138

Vilâyet-i Selâse (The Three Provinces) : of Macedonia, 209

viliayet (province), vilâyet reforms, 88–90, 152; see also provinces

villages, village improvements, 383, 388, 392, 423

vineyards, 232–233

Vlachs, 208–210, 250

Vladika : prince-bishop of Montenegro, 150

Vladimirescu, Tudor : Rumanian rebel leader, 17

Vlora, 288

Volga river, 262

Vulkan (Volcano) : newspaper (published 1908–1909), 280

Volo, Gulf of, 31, 207

von Falkenhayn, Erich Georg (1861–1922) : chief of German General Staff early in World War I, dismissed for von Hindenburg (1916), commanded Ottoman forces
von Falkenhayn, Erich Georg (cont.) in Palestine (1917), but replaced by Liman von Sanders (early 1918), 313, 323–324
von Kressenstein, Friedrich Kress: German officer in Ottoman service in World War I, 320
von Moltke, Helmuth von (1800–1891): Prussian and German military leader, in Ottoman service under Mahmut II, 45, 50, 245
von Sanders, see Liman von Sanders
von Seekt, General: Chief of Ottoman General Staff in World War I, 313
Wallachia (Eflak), 14, 17, 135–136, 140, 142, 160–161; see also Principalities
War Academy (Harbiye, Mekteb-i Ulum-u Harbiye, Mekteb-i Fünün-u Harbiye): established first in Istanbul (1834), 48, 109, 163, 180, 249, 255, 264, 387, 414
War Supplies, Department of (Mühimmat-i Harbiye Müdürlikleri), 41
water, water supplies, 5, 46, 91–92, 94, 306 weights, 46, 92, 94, 385
Western Ideal, Westernists, 351–352, 359, 361, 380
wheat, 237
widows, 97
Wilhelm II (1858–1941): Emperor of Germany (ruled 1888–1918), 324
William of Wied, 297
Wilson, Woodrow (1856–1924): president of the United States of America (1913–1921), 325, 327, 331, 342, 356
wine, wine taxes, 104, 232; see also spirits
wood, wood supplies, 93
wool, 236, 237, 395
workers, agricultural, 401, 419, 427, see also cultivators; industrial, 394, 401–402, 405, 419, 422–423, 427; Turkish in Europe, 427
World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), 427
World War II (1939–1945), Turkish neutrality in, 396–399
Yahya Kemal (Beyathi) (1884–1958): Ottoman poet, professor at Imperial University (1915–1923); advisor at Lausanne Conference (1923), representative to Grand National Assembly, 301, 303
Yakup Bey, 157
Yalçın, Hüseyin Cahit (1875–1957): Servet-i Fünun author and Republican newspaperman and novelist, Unionist politician, 254, 280, 334
Yalım, Ahmet Emin (1881–1972): Turkish journalist, founder of newspaper Vatan, 301, 334, 381, 462
yamak: auxiliary soldier, 21
Yassıada trial (Yassıada Yüksek Adalet Divanı/Yassıada High Justice Court) (October 14, 1960–September 15, 1961), 416
Yaver-i Harp: military aides de camp, personal guards of sultan, 214
yaşer-i ekrem: aide de camp to sultan, 83, 214
Yavuz Sultan Selim: Ottoman battle ship, 312
yearbooks (salname), 443
Yedi Kule (Yedikule): fort of the “seven towers” built into the land walls of Istanbul along sea of Marmara, used as prison until modern times, 23
Yemen, 85–86, 200, 209, 216, 239, 322
Yeni Dünya (New World): Turkish Communist newspaper (published Eskişehir, 1920), 341
Index

Yeni Gün (New Day) : Turkish nationalist newspaper, 353

Yeni Osmanlılar Cemiyeti, see Young Ottoman Society

Yeni Saray (New Palace), see Topkapı Palace

Yeni Türkiye Partisi, see New Turkey Party

Yeniköy : Bosporus village, 93

Yeşil Ordu, see Green Army

Yeşilköy (San Stefano), 44, 299

Yıldırım (Lightening) army, 323, 328

Yıldız Palace, 49, 82, 153, 163, 213, 280

Young Ottoman Society (Yeni Osmanlılar Cemiyeti, founded Istanbul, 1865), Young Ottomans, 71, 80, 130–133, 153, 157, 164, 180, 189, 202, 253, 255, 259, 263

Young Turk Revolution, 266–267, 273–274

Young Turks, 81, 99, 104, 214, 215, 219, 220, 253, 255–259, 261–267, 273, 339, 374, 456 ; see also Union and Progress, Society/Committee of

Yozgat, 353

Yörük tribes, 26, 101

Yugoslavia, 332, 397 ; relations of with Turkey, 377, 429

Yunus Nadi, see Abalıoğlu

Yurdakul, Mehmet Emin (1869–1944) : Ottoman and Turkish poet, administrator and provincial governor, representative to Grand National Assembly, 382


Yusuf Kâmil Paşa (1808–1876) : served Muhammad Ali in Egypt to 1848, married his daughter Zeynep Hanım; imprisoned by Abbas Paşa (1849) and returned to Istanbul, served as minister of trade (1852–1853, 1854), and grand vezir (1863)

Yusuf Ziya Paşa (d. 1819) : grand vezir (1798–1805), 13

yübaşi (head of one hundred), captain, 85

Zabtiye, see police

Zarif, Hagop : financial advisor of Abdulhamit II, 172, 214, 222

Zecriye resmi, see spirits tax

Zeytin, 328

Zionism, Zionists, 321–322, 330–332

Ziraat, see agriculture

Ziraat Bankası (Agricultural Bank) (founded 1888), 101, 226–227, 231–233, 244, 388, 392

Ziya Paşa, Abdulhamit (1825–1880) : Tanzimat author, 131, 165, 251

Zonguldak : Black Sea port, 123, 341, 390, 393

Zorlu, Fatin Rüştü (1910–1961) : foreign minister of Turkey, executed at Yassiada (September 16, 1961), 416

Zurich, Agreement on Cyprus (February 11, 1959), 430